/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/200918.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Friday, September 18, 2020, Vol. 21, No. 188

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

BUENOS AIRES: Moody's Affirms Ca Issuer Rating, Outlook Negative
TELECOM ARGENTINA: Moody's Affirms Caa3 CFR, Outlook Negative


B A H A M A S

SANDALS: To Reopen Royal Bahamian Resort in January 2021


B R A Z I L

BANCO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO: Fitch Gives 'BB-/B' IDRs, Outlook Neg.
CEMIG: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3/A1.br, Outlook Positive
EMBRAER SA: Egan-Jones Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to B
ENTREVIAS CONCESSIONARIA: Fitch Affirms BB- on BRL1BB Debentures


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

[*] DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Okays 1,195 Passenger & Cargo Flights


P A N A M A

BANCO LA HIPOTECARIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Neg


P U E R T O   R I C O

DAVE & BUSTER'S: At Risk of Going Bankrupt
IL MULINO: Seven Branches File for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

CARIBBEAN AIRLINES: To Expand Partnership With Virgin Atlantic
HOME CONSTRUCTION: Liquidators Start Process to Sell 2 Malls
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Debt Tops $120 Billion at July 2020

                           - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================

BUENOS AIRES: Moody's Affirms Ca Issuer Rating, Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Ca Issuer rating assigned to
the Province of Buenos Aires. The outlook remains negative. The
baseline credit assessment is affirmed at ca, the same as the
issuer rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation of the Province of Buenos Aires Ca issuer rating
reflects Moody's expectation of losses to bondholders in the 35-65%
range in light of the province's ongoing debt restructuring
proposal. The rating acknowledges the province's positioning and
strategic importance, counterbalanced by immediate credit
challenges related to debt affordability. Alike all Regional and
Local Governments in Argentina, Buenos Aires is exposed to
substantial systemic risks such as a deep economic contraction,
exchange rate volatility and high inflation, among others. In
addition, the province faces meaningful idiosyncratic challenges
such as a liquidity position incommensurate with growing spending
pressures and burdensome foreign currency debt service payments.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Given the strong macroeconomic and financial linkages between the
Government of Argentina's and Sub-sovereigns, a downgrade in
Argentina's bond ratings and/or further systemic deterioration
could exert downward pressure on the ratings. Alternatively,
increased idiosyncratic risks could translate into a downgrade.
Moody's would also downgrade the ratings in the event a debt
restructuring results in losses inconsistent with the current
ratings.

Moody's does not expect upward pressures in the rated Argentinean
sub-sovereigns in the near to medium term. Nevertheless, Moody's
would consider stabilizing the outlooks if financing conditions
stabilize and the anticipated losses to private creditors from debt
restructuring are less than currently forecast.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2018.


TELECOM ARGENTINA: Moody's Affirms Caa3 CFR, Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed Telecom Argentina S.A.'s Caa3
corporate family rating (CFR) and maintained its negative outlook.
At the same time, Moody's has affirmed YPF Sociedad Anonima's (YPF)
Caa3 issuer rating and maintained its negative outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Telecom Argentina's Caa3 ratings are supported by the company's (1)
market position as the largest integrated telecom operator in
Argentina, (2) its solid market share of around 37% in cable TV,
54% in broadband, 50% in fixed telephony and 33% in mobile
services; and (3) Solid financial metrics for its rating category.
The company has low leverage, driven by its strong cash flow from
operations. The ratings are mainly constrained by (1) tight
regulatory oversight of Argentina's telecom industry, which poses
operating risks, (2) concentration of operations in Argentina
(Government of Argentina, Ca negative), (3) foreign-currency
financing risk, because the company generates most of its revenue
in Argentine pesos, and (4) expected negative free cash flow (FCF)
generation through 2021.

YPF's Caa3 ratings reflect the company's (1) large oil and gas
production and its reserve size; (2) good cash generation and
credit metrics for its rating category; (3) status as the largest
industrial corporate and energy company in the domestic market; and
(4) links with the Government of Argentina, its controlling
shareholder, which combine YPF's underlying caa3 Baseline Credit
Assessment (BCA), which expresses a company's intrinsic credit
risk, and its view of moderate support from and high dependence on
the Argentine government. The ratings are mainly constrained by
YPF's (1) concentration of operations in Argentina, (2) a
moderate-to-high foreign-currency risk given that most of the
company's debt is denominated in foreign currency, (3) its
portfolio of majority mature producing fields, and (4) its rigid
labor cost structure.

The negative outlook of both Telecom and YPF mirror the negative
outlook on Argentina's sovereign rating. Fitch believes that a
weaker sovereign has the potential to create a rating drag on
companies operating within its borders, and, therefore, it is
appropriate to limit the extent to which the company can be rated
higher than the sovereign, in line with its cross-sector rating
methodology Assessing the Impact of Sovereign Credit Quality on
Other Ratings published in June 2019.

COMPANY PROFILE

Headquartered in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Telecom Argentina S.A. is
one of the three major telecommunications service providers in
Argentina. The company offers mobile, broadband, fixed and pay-TV
services to the residential, corporate and government sectors, and
is one of the largest private-sector companies in the country. For
the last twelve months ended in June 2020 Telecom's revenue and
adjusted EBITDA were ARS232,910 million and ARS89,324 million,
respectively.

Headquartered in Buenos Aires, Argentina, YPF is an integrated
energy company with operations concentrated in the exploration,
development and production of crude oil, natural gas and liquefied
petroleum gas, and downstream operations engaged in refining,
chemicals production, retail marketing, transportation and
distribution of oil and petroleum products. The company is 51%
owned by the Argentine Estate and had revenues of USD 11.8 billion
in the last twelve months as of June 2020 and total assets of USD
23.8 billion as of June 30, 2020.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

An upgrade of Telecom would depend on an upgrade of the Government
of Argentina's rating, currently at Ca with a negative outlook.
However, for an upgrade to be considered, the company would have to
maintain its leading market position while expanding its internal
cash flow generation and sustaining its prudent financial policies
and healthy credit metrics, such as (1) adjusted debt/EBITDA below
3x; and (2) adjusted retained cash flow/debt above 20%. The ratings
could be downgraded (1) if the government of Argentina's Ca rating
is downgraded; (2) if its operating margin or market position
weakens; (3) an excessive increase in leverage or a deterioration
in liquidity could also trigger a rating downgrade. Quantitatively,
adjusted debt/EBITDA above 4.5x or retained cash flow/debt below
10% could place the rating under negative pressure.

YPF's ratings could be upgraded (1) if there is an upgrade of the
government of Argentina's Ca rating and YPF maintains its strong
credit metrics for its rating category (2) if the company manages
to grow total production while maintaining strong margins and
relatively low leverage; (3) if there is a more clear view of the
government's energy policies for the next several years and how
they could affect YPF. The ratings could be downgraded (1) if YPF
is unable to sustain current credit metrics; (2) if the company
loses access to credit markets or lacks access to foreign currency
to meet its debt service obligations; (3) if the government of
Argentina's Ca rating is downgraded.

The principal methodologies used in rating YPF Sociedad Anonima
were Integrated Oil and Gas Methodology published in September
2019, and Government-Related Issuers Methodology published in
February 2020. The principal methodology used in rating Telecom
Argentina S.A. was Telecommunications Service Providers published
in January 2017.




=============
B A H A M A S
=============

SANDALS: To Reopen Royal Bahamian Resort in January 2021
--------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Sandals has scheduled the reopening of its
Royal Bahamian resort on New Providence for the end of January
2021, making it the last of the Caribbean chain's resorts to open.

Sandals' Emerald Bay property on Exuma is scheduled to reopen on
November 1, according to RJR News.

Sandals said its reopening decisions are being guided by demand,
the country's border openings and its travel restrictions, the
report notes.

The Tourism Minister revealed in a national address that the
country plans to reopen the tourism sector on October 15 with
restrictions, the report adds.




===========
B R A Z I L
===========

BANCO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO: Fitch Gives 'BB-/B' IDRs, Outlook Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the following ratings to Banco de
Desenvolvimento do Espirito Santo S.A. (Bandes):

  -- Foreign and Local Currency Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) 'BB-'; Outlook Negative;

  -- Foreign and Local Currency Short-Term IDR 'B';

  -- National Long-Term Rating 'AA(bra)'; Outlook Stable;

  -- National Short-Term Rating 'F1+(bra)';

  -- Support Rating '3'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATING

The IDRs and National Ratings for Bandes are driven by expected
support from its controlling shareholder, the government of the
state of Espirito Santo. Fitch believes Bandes is strategically
important for the state, as it is the government's development arm,
playing an important role in boosting the local economy's growth
through lending to small and medium enterprises, as well as
providing resources for municipalities within the state. Fitch does
not assign a Viability Rating to the institution, given the bank's
role as a development agency, for which Fitch cannot form an
entirely stand-alone credit view.

Fitch views group regulation as a significant factor for Bandes'
rating. Since the regulator is very active and imposes some
limitations on the actions of the development banks in Brazil,
another very important factor is that there would be no impediment
on the regulator's part for potential support by the state.

Fitch also considers the following in its assessment: the size of
the institution relative to the financial capacity of Espirito
Santo; the very low potential for selling the institution; the high
reputational risk to the state; the high level of operational
integration between the state and Bandes; and that the development
bank is a state-owned institution.

Bandes' Support Rating of '3' reflects moderate probability of
support, if needed. Fitch does not assign a Viability Rating to the
institution due to its characteristics as a development agency.
Fitch recognizes that it would be relatively easy for the state to
provide support in case of need considering the financial
flexibility of the State of Espirito Santo. The state is rated 'A'
in terms of payment capacity (CAPAG) by the Brazilian Treasury.
This strong financial flexibility highlights the state's ability to
support the institution. The Negative Outlook reflects the
sovereign's Outlook.

Bandes' main objective is to expand and promote government programs
to help develop the regional economy through financing lines to
small and medium-sized enterprises and municipalities, especially
for investments focused on technology. This objective is in line
with the state government's development plan, which is reviewed
annually.

Bandes' financial profile has no direct rating implications, but it
has been comparatively weak in recent years and is currently going
through a transformation. The previous strategy to support the
primary economic sector has changed along with the new government,
which now seeks to support the secondary economic sector
(industries and services) through loans to SMEs. This has led to
the reclassification of most of the bank's agricultural loans which
resulted in a deteriorated financial profile in 2019. Loans
classified in the D-H categories increased to 35% from 18% in 2018,
while bottom line losses reached BRL 209MM due to higher provision
expenses. Despite these losses, the bank continues to be adequately
capitalized and maintains sufficient liquidity.

Preliminary figures show that the restructuring done in 2019 paved
the way for improvement, with asset quality and profitability on an
upward trend in the first half of 2020, despite the effects of the
coronavirus pandemic on the local economy.

As a development bank, Bandes has limitations regarding its funding
sources. The credit portfolio has been financed mainly by equity or
on-lendings from official entities, such as BNDES (National
Economic and Social Development Bank). However, the institution
aims to increase and diversify its funding, mainly with credit from
international development banks.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

IDRs

Potential upgrades to Bandes's IDRs are limited, given the Negative
Outlook.

National Long-Term Ratings

National Long-Term Rating upgrades depend on an improvement in
local relativities, which is limited due to the challenging
economic environment.

SUPPORT RATINGS

An upgrade of the SR would depend on an improvement in the State of
Espirito Santo's ability or propensity to provide support.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

IDRs

  -- Further changes in Brazil's ratings or Outlooks;

  -- Any changes to the State of Espirito Santo's ability or
propensity to support Bandes may result in a rating review.

NATIONAL LONG-TERM RATINGS

Downgrades depend on the evolution of its local relativities within
the challenging economic environment.

SUPPORT RATING

Bandes's SR would be downgraded to '4' from '3' if Espirito Santo's
ability or propensity to provide support decreases.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.


CEMIG: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3/A1.br, Outlook Positive
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina upgraded the corporate family ratings of
Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais - CEMIG to Ba3/A1.br from
B1/Baa1.br respectively in global and national scale. The baseline
credit assessment (BCA) was also upgraded to ba3 from b1. The
outlook is positive.

Concomitantly, Moody's has upgraded the global scale issuer and
senior unsecured ratings of Cemig Distribuicao S.A. (CEMIG D) to
Ba3 from B1 and the national scale issuer and senior unsecured
ratings to A1.br from Baa1.br. The outlook is positive. Moody's has
also upgraded the global scale issuer, senior unsecured, and senior
secured ratings of Cemig Geracao e Transmissao S.A. (CEMIG GT) to
Ba3 from B1, and the national scale issuer, senior unsecured, and
senior secured ratings to A1.br from Baa1.br. The outlook is
positive.

CEMIG is a government related issuer (GRI). The State of Minas
Gerais (B2 stable) is the shareholder with majority control, with
50.97% ownership of common shares and 17.04% of overall shares.
CEMIG's Ba3/A1.br ratings consider the following four input factors
within Moody's GRI rating methodology: (i) a low-level probability
of extraordinary support from the state should CEMIG face financial
distress, (ii) Moody's estimates of a very high level of dependence
between the company and the state, (iii) Moody's rating of the
state of Minas Gerais, and most importantly, (iv) CEMIG's intrinsic
credit profile as captured in the baseline credit assessment of
ba3.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions reflect the track record of substantial
improvements in financial policy and risk management over the past
three years. The most notable improvement is in the company's
liquidity position. As of June 2020, the company reported a
consolidated cash position of BRL3.5 billion, and short-term debt
maturities of BRL3.0 billion. The cash position was aided by funds
related to the successful award of a legal claim related to tax
disputes. Furthermore, in July 2020 the company received
approximately BRL1.2 billion from a total amount of BRL1.4 billion
that it is entitled to receive as per the syndicated regulated
support package entitled 'Covid-Account'. Liquidity available is
sufficient to cover all debt maturities for the next 18 months.
Furthermore, during the pandemic, the company reduced capital
expenditures, reduced and delayed dividend distributions, and
lengthened debt terms.

The ratings further consider maintenance of a low leverage profile,
with an expectation of debt/EBITDA below 4.0x and CFO pre-WC/debt
between 17%-22%. Factored in the ratings are the off-balance sheet
contingent obligations related to financial debt at non-controlled
subsidiaries, which cause a 20% deterioration in credit metrics if
added in full to the debt balance, the potential expiration of key
hydro concessions in 2025, and the turnover in key management
positions. Also embedded in the ratings is the view that the
company's credit quality is less linked to that of its controlling
shareholder, the State of Minas Gerais (B2 stable).

The rating actions on Cemig Distribuicao S.A.'s and Cemig Geracao e
Transmissao S.A.'s ratings mirrors that of CEMIG. All debts are
guaranteed by the holding; there is cross default across the
corporate family; and cash flow management is centralized,
including with the use of intracompany lending.

CEMIG's credit profile reflects its large scale and leading
position as one of the largest integrated power utilities in
Brazil, holding an installed generation capacity of 6.1 GW, 97% of
which is hydro, 9,830 kilometers of transmission lines, and
distributing electricity to 8.6 million consumers located in the
State of Minas Gerais. The company's credit profile is benefiting
from the increased representation of the more predictable regulated
electricity distribution business, closer to 50% of total EBITDA
from 30% between 2014-2017, as power generation concessions
expired, and the company continued investing in its distribution
network.

The wider service area and more diverse profile of its customer
base has contributed positively in lowering the impact of the
economic consequences imposed by the spread of the coronavirus,
with electricity distribution declining 6% in the second quarter of
2020 relative to same period 2019, while the overall Brazilian
system declined 10%. In fact, electricity consumption across the
country has demonstrated to be much more resilient than most
sectors, and to have reacted quickly, with consumption reaching
same levels of 2019 as of the first week of July.

Power generation increased 5.4% in the second quarter, function of
improved hydrology conditions, but revenue declined approximately
15% with lower demand from industrial customers. The balance was
sold in the spot market with prices averaging 75% of that in 2019.
Within the power generation sector, Fitch continues to view the
large size of the company's energy trading business as a source of
potential risk despite showing a proven track record. Its energy
purchases between 2020 and 2023 are on average 140% of its
generation levels and exposes the company to price risks in the
long term, with more than one gigawatt of excess energy supply as
of 2024. These risks are magnified by the expiration of the Sa
Carvalho, Emborcacao, and Nova Ponte hydro power plants in late
2024 and mid-2025. These power plants represent approximately 50%
of CEMIG GT's physical guarantee.

Underpinning continued growth of its distribution business is the
investment in its network. Annual investments between BRL1.4--1.7
billion will continue to support its regulated asset base and
contribute to improvement in operating parameters. Another
BRL220-280 million will be spent annually in its transmission
business, also supporting revenue growth. Annual spending of less
than BRL100 million is allocated for maintenance of the generation
infrastructure.

CEMIG's leverage has presented stable metrics when adjusted for
non-recurring effects. CFO pre-WC/debt has oscillated between
17%-20% since 2016, and Fitch expects that to remain the same over
the next three years. If Fitch adjusts the debt balance to
incorporate the fact the protections embedded in its foreign
currency debt hedging mechanism, that range improves slightly to
18%-22%. The credit view is not constrained by leverage even when
adjusted to incorporate the BRL4.6 billion of off-balance sheet
guaranteed debt incurred by certain non-controlled subsidiaries.

RATINGS OUTLOOK

The positive outlook reflects its expectation that CFO-pre-WC to
Debt will be above 18% on a sustainable basis and that the company
will maintain a prudent financial policy, holding a cash balance in
excess of 12-month debt maturities.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

CEMIG's ratings can be upgraded upon continued progress in its
liability management strategy, including management of foreign
exchange risks and strategies to address large year-specific debt
maturities, while maintaining strong credit metrics such that
CFO-pre-WC/debt remains above 18% on a sustainable basis.

A rating downgrade could happen if Fitch believes that the
company's liquidity risks are not being prudently managed or if
there is a sustainable increase in leverage such that the company's
consolidated CFO pre-WC/debt remains below 15% on a sustainable
basis.

RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in rating Cemig Distribuicao S.A.
was Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities published in June 2017.
The principal methodology used in rating Cemig Geracao e
Transmissao S.A. was Unregulated Utilities and Unregulated Power
Companies published in May 2017. The principal methodologies used
in rating Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais - CEMIG were
Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities published in June 2017, and
Government-Related Issuers Methodology published in February 2020.

COMPANY PROFILE

Headquartered in Belo Horizonte in the State of Minas Gerais, CEMIG
is a leading Brazilian integrated utility operating in the sectors
of electricity distribution, generation and transmission, with 6.1
gigawatts (MW) in installed capacity and around 9,830 km of
transmission lines across the country. Cemig is controlled by the
State of Minas Gerais, which owns 50.97% of the company's voting
capital. For the 12 months ended June 2020, Cemig had net revenue
of BRL23.0 billion and EBITDA of BRL5.0 billion, respectively
(according to Moody's standard adjustments).


EMBRAER SA: Egan-Jones Lowers Senior Unsecured Ratings to B
-----------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on September 9, 2020, downgraded the
foreign currency and local currency senior unsecured ratings on
debt issued by Embraer SA to B from B+. EJR also downgraded the
rating on commercial paper issued by the Company to B from A3.

Headquartered in Sao Jose dos Campos, State of Sao Paulo, Brazil,
Embraer SA manufactures and markets commercial, corporate, and
defense aircraft.


ENTREVIAS CONCESSIONARIA: Fitch Affirms BB- on BRL1BB Debentures
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Entrevias Concessionaria de Rodovias
S.A.'s BRL1.0 billion second debentures issuance due in 2030 at
'BB-'/'AA-(bra)' and has removed them from Rating Watch Negative.
In addition, Fitch has assigned a Negative Rating Outlook.

RATING RATIONALE

The removal of the Negative Watch reflects better traffic
performance than Fitch's coronavirus-related impact scenarios.
Second quarter traffic reduction was 15.3% in comparison with the
same period of 2019, while Fitch's scenario included a fall of
50%.

The Negative Outlook reflects the grantor's ongoing delay in
signing the amendment to rebalance the prohibition to charge lifted
axles of heavy vehicles, following the Brazilian truckers strike in
May 2018. If the rebalancing is not settled in a way that preserves
the cash balance within the concessionaire until 2024, Entrevias'
liquidity will be lower than expected in Fitch cases, which would
mean the projected LLCR would no longer be in line with the current
ratings.

The ratings reflect the operational profile of the concessionaire,
with heavy vehicles representing 56% of the paying axles in 2019.
The North Section of the toll road, which crosses Ribeirao Preto
(SP), has a proven traffic base, and represented 71% of total
traffic in 2019. This stretch presents relatively moderate
volatility. The South Section, a more recent stretch, is crucial
for the region's agricultural production flow. The concession
agreement provides for annual tariff increases that track
inflation. The senior debt structure is also indexed to inflation
and includes a six months reserve account. Until 2024, the
obligation to perform a large amount of investments causes debt
service coverage ratios (DSCRs) to be below one. Nonetheless, the
existent restrictions on cash distribution up to 2024 provide
adequate liquidity leading to a LLCR of 1.2x, which is in line with
the assigned rating, according to applicable criteria.

Fitch's rating case reflects a scenario that includes a 7.4%
decline in traffic in 2020, a recovery to 95% of 2019's level in
2021 and a growth trend following Brazilian GDP onwards. Currently,
Entrevias has a comfortable cash position to withstand the severe
traffic declines. Fitch also ran an additional downside scenario,
considering a decline in the volume of traffic of 9.6% in 2020 and
the same assumptions of the rating case from 2021 onward. Under
this scenario, the minimum LLCR is also 1.2x, and Entrevias still
has liquidity to meet debt service in the short term but will need
to postpone capex obligations in 2024 to serve the debt.

The outbreak of coronavirus and related government containment
measures worldwide create an uncertain global environment for the
transportation sector. While Entrevias' performance data through
most recently available issuer data may not have indicated
impairment, material changes in revenue and cost profile are
occurring across the transportation sector and will continue to
evolve as economic activity and government restrictions respond to
the ongoing situation. Fitch's ratings are forward-looking in
nature, and Fitch will monitor developments in the sector as a
result of the virus outbreak as it relates to severity and
duration, and incorporate revised base and rating case qualitative
and quantitative inputs based on expectations for future
performance and assessment of key risks.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Volume Strongly Linked to Economy [Volume Risk - Midrange]

Entrevias' concession is divided in two sections: North and South.
The North Section, which crosses Ribeirao Preto, has a long traffic
track record of operations. The right to collect tolls was granted
to Entrevias in May 2018, after the maturity of the prior
concession. The South Section, which crosses Marilia, connects the
states of Sao Paulo and Parana, and is crucial for agricultural
production flow. This stretch started collecting tolls for the
first time in October 2018. The Brazilian logistics network narrows
competition between toll roads; therefore, the price elasticity is
moderate. Fitch expects Entrevias' volume to perform in line with
the overall economic outlook given the high percentage of heavy
vehicles in both sections.

Tariffs Adjusted by Inflation [Price Risk - Midrange]

The concession agreement sets forth inflation pass-through
annually. Tariffs on the North Section, which have been levied
since 1998, have been readjusted accordingly without greatly
affecting volumes. The regulatory framework is well-defined and
provides for enforceable contracts. Political measures that
impacted tariff readjustments have been offset by other mechanisms
to preserve the financial/economic balance of the contract.
However, it is still pending the signing of the amendment to
rebalance the concession agreement regarding the prohibition to
collect tolls from lifted axles of heavy vehicles, even though the
grantor has already recognized the imbalance.

Extensive Capex Plan in the Next Years [Infrastructure
Development/Renewal - Midrange]

Entrevias is expected to undertake a heavy capex plan in order to
comply with the concession agreement, and to accommodate
medium-term traffic forecasts in the South Section of the road, in
the region of Marilia. Although the company has an adequate
infrastructure and renewal plan, it does not have an Engineering,
Procurement and Construction (EPC) agreement with a major
construction company. However, the construction works are standard,
making it easier to replace the contractor if necessary. The
concession framework provides for adequate recovery of expenditure
via the mechanisms defined in the concession contract to preserve
its financial/economic balance.

Retained Cash Partially Mitigates Low Coverage Ratios [Debt
Structure - Midrange]

The debentures are senior and indexed to inflation, which is also
used to readjust tariffs, providing a natural hedge to the debt.
The structure benefits from a six-month debt service reserve
account (DSRA), has strong additional indebtedness limitations, and
the amortization profile is back-loaded. The low DSCRs until 2024
are partially mitigated by the cash distribution restriction until
2024.

Financial Summary

Entrevias' average DSCR is below 1.0x during the debenture tenor.
However, the deficit in cash generation is mitigated by the
existence of significant retained cash balances in the
concessionaire up to 2024 (period of higher investments) and by a
minimum LLCR of 1.2x. Entrevias' leverage, measured by net
debt/EBITDA, peaks 3.2x considering only the senior debt and 7.0x,
when including the deeply subordinated debt, both in Fitch's rating
case in 2020.

PEER GROUP

The closest peer in the region is the Panamanian project ENA Norte
Trust's (ENA Norte) notes in Panama (BB/RWN). ENA Norte has a lower
minimum rating case LLCR (1.0x), resulting in a standalone credit
profile (SCP) of 'b+'. ENA Norte notes' higher final rating follows
Fitch's Government-Related Entity criteria (GRE), which factors the
likelihood of government support by assessing the strength of the
linkage between the issuer and the Panamanian government. A
bottom-up approach of up to three notches from the SCP and capped
at Panama's sovereign rating minus three notches was applied,
resulting in ENA Norte's 'BB'

Additionally, Entrevias is comparable with Autopistas del Nordeste
(Cayman) Ltd's (AdN) in Dominican Republic, whose notes are rated
'BB-'/ Negative Outlook. AdN has higher coverage ratio than
Entrevias, with average DSCR of 1.3x, while Entrevias present
minimum LLCR of 1.2x in Fitch's Rating Case. Both issuances have
the same rating because AdN's notes are supported by the minimum
revenue guarantee paid by the Dominican Republic's government
(Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB-' /
Negative Outlook), which largely mitigates the project's volume and
price risks, as toll revenues remain persistently insufficient to
cover operational costs and debt service.

In Brasil, Entrevias' closest peer is ViaRondon Concessionaria de
Rodovia S.A. (ViaRondon, proposed second debentures issuance's
Long-Term rating AA-(bra)/ Negative Outlook). Both assets are
located in Sao Paulo state and present some years of DSCR below
1.0x in Fitch's Rating Case, which is mitigated by retained cash
balance. Both concessionaires present minimum LLCR of 1.2x.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

  -- Ratings will be stabilized if the lifted axles rebalance are
granted in 2021, in a way that assures that the revenue loss is
most compensated by 2024, and traffic decrease in 2020 is not
greater than 5%;

  -- An upgrade is unlikely in the short term.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

  -- Compensation for lifted axles is not settled in 2021 or if it
is, under worse terms than anticipated;

  -- Traffic reduction in 2020 greater than 10% along with the
expectation of a slow and extended recovery.

CREDIT UPDATE

Traffic decreased 7.1% in the first half of 2020, when compared to
the same period of 2019, with a 1.2% increase in the first quarter
and a 15.3% decrease in the second quarter. Heavy vehicles' traffic
was more resilient and increased 7.2% and 2.6% in the first and
second quarters, respectively, while light vehicles decreased by
6.1% in the first quarter and 37.9% in the second.

Entrevias' liquidity remains strong and total cash balance summed
up BRL432 million as of June 2020.

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

The main assumptions of Fitch's Base Case include:

  -- Brazilian Inflation: 1.9% in 2020, 3.3% in 2021, 3.5% in 2022
and 3.3% from 2022 onward;

  -- Brazilian GDP growth: -5.8% in 2020, 3.2% in 2021, 2.5% in
2022 and 1.7% from 2023 onwards;

  -- Brazilian Interest Policy Rate: 2.0% in 2020, 3.0% in 2021,
4.8% in 2022, 6.0% in 2023, 7.0% in 2024 and 8.0% from 2025
onwards;

  -- Decrease in traffic of 5.2% in 2020, followed by a recovery to
100% of 2019's level in 2021 and increase of 1.2x the GDP from 2022
onward;

  -- Increase in toll rates of 2.35% above inflation in 2020, 2021
and 2022 in order to reflect the financial-economic reequilibrium
regarding lifted axles and according to inflation in the period
from 2023 onwards;

  -- Investments of BRL1.93 billion between 2020 and 2026.

The same assumptions were used in the rating scenario, except for
the following:

  -- Decrease in traffic of 7.4% in 2020, followed by a recovery to
95% of 2019's level in 2021 and increase of 1.0x the GDP from 2022
onward;

  -- Investments of BRL2.03 billion between 2020 and 2026.

The same assumptions were used in the downside scenario, except for
the following:

  -- Decrease in traffic of 9.6% in 2020, followed by a recovery to
95% of 2019's level in 2021 and increase of 1.0x the GDP from 2022
onward;

In Fitch's base case, minimum LLCR is 1.4x and maximum leverage
(net debt/EBITDA) is 3.0x in 2020, considering only the senior
debt, and 6.6x in 2020, including the subordinated debt.

In Fitch's rating case, minimum LLCR is 1.2x and maximum leverage
(net debt/EBITDA) is 3.2x in 2020, considering only the senior
debt, and 7.0x in 2020, including the subordinated debt.

In Fitch's downside case, minimum LLCR is 1.2x and maximum leverage
(net debt/EBITDA) is 3.4x in 2020, considering only the senior
debt, and 7.2x in 2020, including the subordinated debt.

DSCRs mentioned on this rating action commentary are calculated
according to Fitch's criteria and, therefore, don't include cash
balance.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of '3'. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

[*] DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Okays 1,195 Passenger & Cargo Flights
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Civil Aviation Board (JAC) president
Jose Marte led the first Ordinary Meeting on issues related to air
transport, renewal of permits and authorizations for commercial and
cargo flights to and from the Dominican Republic.

The JAC authorized a program of 1,195 charter flights, of which 187
correspond to passengers and 1,008 to cargo flights, according to
Dominican Today.

It also activated the Commission for the Review of Air Service
Agreements, as a way to reactivate the economy and contribute to
spur the Dominican tourism sector, the report notes.

Also approved was a special permit for Air Canada to operate 28
cargo flights from August 2 to December 21, 2020 on the
Montreal/Miami/Punta Cana/Montreal route, the report relates.

           About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in April 2019
that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic stands at
BB- with negative outlook (April 2020). Moody's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3 with stable outlook (July
2017). Fitch's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last
reported at BB- with negative outlook (May 8, 2020).




===========
P A N A M A
===========

BANCO LA HIPOTECARIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Neg
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco La Hipotecaria, S.A.'s (BLH)
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+' and Short-Term IDR
at 'B'. BLH's IDR's Negative Outlook is in line with the Outlook of
its parent Grupo ASSA, S.A., revised in February 2020 and affirmed
in March 2020. At the same time, Fitch has affirmed BLH's National
Long-Term Rating at 'AA-' and Short-Term Rating at 'F1+'. The
Rating Outlook on the National Long-Term Rating is Stable.

Fitch has also affirmed the bank's Viability Rating (VR) at 'bb-'
and removed the Rating Watch Negative (RWN). BLH's VR was placed on
RWN in March 2020 to reflect growing uncertainties from the
coronavirus pandemic, which exacerbated near-term asset quality
risks due to deferral programs and the risks associated with a
possible reduction of the bank's funding options. The RWN removal
reflects Fitch's beliefs that negative effects on asset quality
will be lower than initially expected due to lower-than-peers
adherence to deferral programs (20% as of August 2020 compared with
60% of the banking system) and the payroll deductible nature of the
portfolio. It also reflects that lower collection pressures reduce
the probability of immediate liquidity impacts, while the entity
has adequately increased its on-balance-sheet liquid resources and
its access to alternative sources in order to reduce funding and
liquidity stress.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, National Ratings and Senior Debt

BLH's IDRs, National Ratings and senior debt are based on Fitch's
belief that the ultimate parent, Grupo ASSA, would support BLH if
necessary. Grupo ASSA (BBB-/Negative) is a regional financial
conglomerate that mainly operates in the insurance and banking
services, while maintaining some noncontrolling interest in other
industries, with a multi-jurisdictional presence.

BLH's IDRs reflect Grupo Assa's propensity to support its
subsidiary. Fitch views BLH as having a strong relationship with
its parent as it operates in a jurisdiction identified as
strategically important and in complementary market segments.

Fitch's view on Grupo Assa's propensity to support the subsidiary
reflects the significant reputational risk that the default of one
of its subsidiaries could have on its business. However, BLH has
significant independence from its ultimate shareholder, and there
is a relatively low level of integration in terms of management and
the bank's strategic decisions.

VR

The bank's VR considers as a high importance factor due to its
limited franchise in the Panamanian banking sector, with market
shares of total assets, loans and deposits below 1%. Its business
model is weighted towards domestic mortgages, while its portfolio
is less diversified compared to higher rated peers.

Fitch expects profitability to be tested throughout 2020 and into
2021 as mortgage loan yields and net fees decline, and as
provisioning levels for nonperforming loans (NPLs) increase. In
1H20, BLH reported an operating profit/risk-weighted assets ratio
of 0.9%, which is low compared with regional peers and the system's
average. Fitch believes there is little room for profitability
deterioration, as the entity's margins are relatively narrow.

BLH's funding and liquidity also highly influence its VR. The
bank's funding structure is weaker than national peers with a high
loan/deposit ratio of around 200% as of June 2020. A higher
concentration on wholesale funding (38%) has resulted in stressed
covenants, mainly from asset quality growing pressures. Fitch
believes refinancing risk of a more limited access to market
funding (securitization) has been adequately handled during the
crisis, and immediate risks have been partially mitigated by its
growing liquidity levels based on cash, deposits in banks and
investment portfolio offering coverage of 48.2% of total deposits
as of June 2020. BLH's current liquidity level offers a 2x coverage
over the one-year credit facilities maturities, also the increased
access to funding facilities provides a coverage close to 1.2x for
the next 12 months of maturities. Funding and liquidity assessment
are also benefited by expected ordinary support from the parent.

Fitch estimates that asset quality will be pressured in the short
and medium term as credit growth remains slow and borrower
repayment capacity continues to be challenged. Its NPL ratio
remained low, at 1.1% as of June 2020, which is lower than the
banking system's average.

As of 2Q20, BLH's common equity Tier 1 ratio of 12.3% (2019: 12.2%)
is commensurate to its rating category. Fitch expects capital
levels to remain at good levels, even when losses generated by
variations in foreign currency (Colombian peso) have pressured
capitalization. Fitch believes the impact of the coronavirus
pandemic and the sharp drop in oil prices increase
peso-depreciation risks, which will keep adding volatility to the
entity's capitalization.

Debt Ratings

The ratings for the marketable securities are aligned with the
issuer's short-term ratings. The tranches for the unsecured
negotiable notes have the same long-term IDR as the issuer. This is
because they have the same probability of default than the issuer.

The ratings for both the tranches with guarantees from Grupo ASSA,
as well as the negotiable notes guaranteed with mortgage loans, are
a notch above the bank's long-term IDR. Particularly, the
negotiable notes with the mortgage loan guarantees benefit from an
extended warranty.

Support Rating

The bank's Support Rating (SR) reflects Fitch's opinion on Grupo
ASSA's ability and propensity to support BLH if required. According
to Fitch's criteria, BLH's IDR of 'BB+' corresponds to a SR of
'3'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade:

  -- Changes in BLH's IDR and senior issuances would reflect any
changes in its shareholder's risk profile or changes on Fitch's
assessment of its ability or willingness to provide support to its
subsidiary, which Fitch does not expect in the long term.

  -- Ratings could be downgraded in response to a change in Fitch's
perception of a lower propensity of support to the subsidiary due
to the pandemic or due to continued deterioration of the subsidiary
or operating environment.

  -- Negative pressure could be placed on BLH's VR if there were
evidence of outsized deterioration in the bank's financial profile
reflected in a material deterioration of its asset quality and a
significant reduction of its profitability metrics relative to
peers. Increasing liquidity or refinancing pressures from lower
collections, low access to market debt or the inability to
negotiate waivers on covenants if they are breached, which reduces
credit facilities access, could also drive a downgrade.

  -- A downgrade of Grupo ASSA's IDRs would trigger similar rating
action on the bank's SR. Also, a change in Fitch's support
assessment that implies a reduction in Grupo ASSA's propensity to
support the bank;

  -- A downgrade of the bank's National Ratings could be possible
only if Grupo ASSA's IDRs are downgraded;

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade:

  -- BLH's IDR and National Ratings could be affirmed and their
Negative Outlook revised to Stable to reflect an improvement in its
shareholder's risk profile or changes in Fitch's assessment of its
ability or willingness to provide support.

  -- Fitch does not foresee the possibility of a VR upgrade over
the horizon. Any upward actions would require sustained
post-pandemic improvement of the operating environment, with a
relevant positive effect on bank's company profile and financial
fundamentals.

  -- An upward action on the bank's SR would be triggered by an
upgrade of Grupo ASSA's IDRs, which is not foreseeable in the short
term; a change in Fitch's support assessment that implies an
increase in Grupo ASSA's propensity to support the bank could also
trigger an SR upgrade;

  -- An upward potential of the rating is limited in the short
term, given the Negative Outlook on its shareholder's ratings.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

Intangibles, deferred tax assets and other deferred assets were
deducted from the Fitch Core Capital.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS

BLH's ratings are driven by support from its parent, Grupo ASSA.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of '3'. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).




=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

DAVE & BUSTER'S: At Risk of Going Bankrupt
------------------------------------------
Eliza Ronalds-Hannon of Bloomberg News reports that Dave & Buster's
Entertainment Inc. is at risk of becoming bankrupt. The company
started out in 1982 as a buddy business in Dallas, where the
original Dave handled games and entertainment while Buster managed
the kitchen.

Almost 40 years later, founders David Corriveau and James "Buster"
Corley are long gone but their chain endures: it's grown to 137
locations, gone through two different private equity owners and
raised $94 million to pay down debt in a 2014 IPO.

But debt is a problem once again for the good-times guys, and the
company has warned it may need to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy to
restructure its obligations.

Dave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc., (NASDAQ:PLAY), an owner and
operator of entertainment and dining venues, said Sept. 11, 2020,
said that in its second quarter 2020, which ended on August 2,
2020, second quarter comparable store sales decreased 87%, which
was for the entire 115 comparable store sales base, 47 of which
were closed.

The Company's second quarter 2020 financial results were severely
impacted by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic when compared
against the results of the second quarter of 2019. As of March 20,
2020, all of the Company's stores were temporarily closed in
compliance with state-by-state COVID-19 mitigation mandates. The
Company reopened 1 store on April 30, had re-opened 26 stores by
the end of May, 66 stores by the end of June, and ended the second
quarter with 84 re-opened stores in 27 states. As of September 9,
the Company had reopened 89 stores, all operating under reduced
hours and capacity limitations as dictated by each locality, new
seating and game configurations to promote social distancing, a
temporarily condensed food and beverage menu, and extensive
incremental cleaning and sanitation procedures to protect the
health and safety of guests and team members.   

                 About Dave & Buster's Entertainment

Founded in 1982 and headquartered in Dallas, Texas, Dave & Buster's
Entertainment, Inc., is the owner and operator of 136 venues in
North America that combine entertainment and dining and offer
customers the opportunity to "Eat Drink Play and Watch," all in one
location. Dave & Buster's offers a full menu of entrées and
appetizers, a complete selection of alcoholic and non-alcoholic
beverages, and an extensive assortment of entertainment attractions
centered around playing games and watching live sports and other
televised events. Dave & Buster's currently has stores in 40
states, Puerto Rico, and Canada.


IL MULINO: Seven Branches File for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
--------------------------------------------------------
Dennis Lynch of the New York Post reports that Wainscott Il Mulino
outpost and six other restaurants under the brand have filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

The filing does not include New York City locations.  The seven
restaurants are backed by a five-year-old $35 million loan
agreement with Benefit Street Partners, now in default.

Il Mulino owner Jerry Katzoff said the filing was made to prevent
BSP from taking over the properties, which BSP signaled it wanted
to do after the restaurants closed in March amid the coronavirus
pandemic. Katzoff said there was already tension with BSP over the
loan before the pandemic hit.  The March 2020 closure effectively
sealed the deal on the viability of the restaurants.

                        About Il Mulino

Il Mulino owns and operates Italian restaurants throughout the
United States.  

The upscale Il Mulino restaurant chain has filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection for seven of its 16 branches to keep the
operation's principal creditor from seizing control.  According to
FSR, the 16-unit company filed on behalf of seven locations across
Miami, Puerto Rico, Las Vegas, Long Island, and Atlantic City.  The
locations not included in the filing are five
New York City stores -- the flagship in Greenwich Village and four
locations in Manhattan and two in Florida, one in Tennessee, and
another in the Poconos.

K.G. IM, LLC, and its affiliates, including IL Mulino USA, LLC,
sought Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No.
20-11723) on July 29, 2020.  The other debtors are IM LLC III,
IMNYLV, LLC, IM NY, Florida, LLC, IM NY, Puerto Rico, LLC, IMNY AC,
LLC, IM Products, LLC, IM Long Island Restaurant Group, LLC, IM
Long Island, LLC, IM Franchise, LLC, IM 60th Street Holdings, LLC,
IM Broadway, LLC, and IMNY Hamptons, LLC.

The Hon. Martin Glenn presides over the case.  

In the petition signed by Gerald Katzoff, manager, the Debtor was
estimated to have $50 million to $100 in assets and $10 million to
$50 million in liabilities.

Alston & Bird LLP serves as bankruptcy counsel to the Debtors.
Traxi LLC and Davis & Gilbert LLP serve as special counsel.




=====================================
T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================

CARIBBEAN AIRLINES: To Expand Partnership With Virgin Atlantic
--------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Caribbean Airlines Limited will soon be
making a reconnection to London through an expanded partnership
with Virgin Atlantic.

Trinidad's Guardian Media has learnt that in the proposed plan,
Barbados will be the transit point for the flight to London from
the Caribbean, according to RJR News.

The move comes four years after Caribbean Airlines ended its three
weekly flights to London because the route was deemed not
profitable, the report notes.

The London service was launched in 2012 but performed below
expectations, the report discloses.

This time around Caribbean Airlines will bee taking a safer
approach to the route by partnering with Virgin Atlantic instead of
trying to service it alone, the report relays.

                     About Caribbean Airlines

Caribbean Airlines Limited - http://www.caribbean-airlines.com/-
provides passenger airline services in the Caribbean, South
America, and North America.  The company also offers freighter
services for perishables, fish and seafood, live animals, human
remains, and dangerous goods.  In addition, it operates a duty free
store in Trinidad.  Caribbean Airlines Limited was founded in 2006
and is based in Piarco, Trinidad and Tobago.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
November 2, 2015, RJR News said that Michael DiLollo, Chief
Executive Officer of Caribbean Airlines Limited, quit after just
17
months on the job. The 48-year-old Canadian national, citing
personal reasons, resigned with immediate effect.  His resignation
was accepted by the airline's board of directors. Mr. DiLollo was
appointed Caribbean Airlines CEO in May 2014, following the sudden
resignation of Robert Corbie in September 2013.

In early February 2015, Larry Howai, then Finance Minister, told
Parliament that unaudited accounts for 2014 showed the airline made
a loss of US$60 million, inclusive of its Air Jamaica operations,
and the airline planned to break even by 2017. Mr. Howai told the
Parliament that a five-year strategic plan had been completed and
was in the process of being approved for
implementation.

In an interview with the Trinidad & Tobago Guardian in early
November 2015, Mr. DiLollo said CAL did not need a bailout just
yet. Mr. DiLollo said the airline had benefited from extremely
patient shareholders for years and he believed the airline was
strategically positioned to break even in three years.


HOME CONSTRUCTION: Liquidators Start Process to Sell 2 Malls
------------------------------------------------------------
Anthony Wilson at Trinidad Express reports that joint liquidators
of CL Financial, David Holukoff and Hugh Dickson, have started a
process to sell Trincity Mall and Long Circular Mall, two of the
last retail spaces owned by CL Financial subsidiary Home
Construction Ltd, multiple sources told the Express Business.

The joint liquidators have procured a valuation for the properties,
hired a manager for the process and issued a Request for Proposals
to some of the country's top commercial property landowners,
according to Trinidad Express.

Together, the two malls comprise about 650,000 square feet of
retail space and house about 400 stores, inclusive of kiosks, the
report notes.

Before the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic lockdown in March, the
occupancy rate at Long Circular Mall was between 75 and 85 per
cent, while Trincity Mall was between 80 and 90 per cent, the
report relays.

But the occupancy levels at both malls have declined substantially
as a result of the lockdown in April and May and the current health
restrictions aimed at stopping gatherings of more than five people,
the report says.

One Trincity Mall tenant told Express Business that there are a
handful of businesses there that are surviving, including
Tru-Value, Pennywise, and the pharmacies in the mall.

But the traffic of potential shoppers through Trincity Mall has
slowed to a trickle since March, the report discloses.

Another tenant, who insisted on anonymity, outlined three reasons
why the number of people coming to the Trincity Mall has declined,
the report relays.

"The cinemas have been closed down; the restaurants at the two food
courts are now only allowed to sell food on a grab-and-go basis and
Royal Bank has closed its branch at the mall as has Island
Finance," said the tenant.

"We are on borrowed time, unless we can get the mall management to
throw out a survival line for the tenants to hold on to, or until
we can see a change in the economy," said Valentino Singh, the
owner of Trincity Malls Fan Club, a store that sells football
memorabilia for all of the top teams in the world, the report
relays.

The Trincity mall management, one of the tenants said, has so far
refused to budge in responding to the tenants' pleas for a
reduction in the monthly Common Area Management (CAM) charges,
which covers, among other things, the cost of promoting the mall,
security, utilities and the cleaning of the common areas, the
report notes.

Those charges, which are as high as $17.50 per square foot, were
reduced by 50 per cent during the April and May lockdown period,
but when the malls in the country were reopened in June, the
tenants were asked to pay the full CAM charges, the report
discloses.

Speaking hypothetically, one tenant who is considering vacating his
store, asked: "What is the logic of Trincity Mall charging me
$17,500 a month in CAM fees, when since March I would get two
paying customers from Monday through Thursday and a few more on
Fridays and Saturdays," the report notes.

Speaking more broadly, a real estate agent told Express Business
that Covid-19 has resulted in a reduction in the value of retail
shopping centres in the last six months, the report discloses.

The much higher level of uncertainty about the future of the T&T
economy and of the incomes of potential shoppers - as well as the
health restrictions on congregating in groups of more than five in
public spaces - has led to many people holding their hands with
regard to shopping decisions, the report relays.

In coming up with a price for the two malls, the liquidators would
have to use an investment approach to the valuation, said one
property valuation expert, which would involve looking at the
current income flows from Trincity Mall and Long Circular Mall
(including occupancy rates and the common area charges) and forming
judgments about their future income flows, the report notes.

What the liquidators said

In its sixth report to the High Court, dated June 15, 2020, CL
Financial joint liquidators David Holukoff and Hugh Dickson, wrote
that the Covid-19 pandemic has had a material impact on the
subsidiaries of the group, the report notes.

"The pandemic has substantially impacted the financial and
operational position of a number of trading subsidiaries across the
group, including but not limited to: Closure of all non-essential
tenants of Trincity and Long Circular shopping malls in line with
the Government's stay-at-home order for all non-essential workers.

"As two of the largest income-generating assets within the Home
Construction Ltd sub-group, the immediate closure of tenants
significantly impacted the sub-group's ability to recover rent from
its tenants.

"Whilst identified as non-essential for the purpose of the
stay-at-home order, these are key trading businesses within the
group, which materially contribute to profit and cash generation;
their closure has had a significant impact on the cash position of
the group and posed a tangible threat to HCL's overall solvency."

The report relays that the joint liquidators have been busy
disposing HCL's assets in order to release value to repay the CL
Financial group's creditors, which are in the main the State and
state-owned enterprises:

* In March, following receipt of an order from the High Court,
instructions were issued by the liquidators to HCL to sell
3,490,030 shares in Agostini's Ltd.  According to the liquidators'
sixth report: "The pandemic limited market demand for the shares
during the marketing process. A sale of 50 per cent of the shares
was successfully completed in mid-March to release a value of $39
million to HCL;

* In July, HCL advertised the sale of land along the East-West
Corridor.  In the sixth liquidators' report to the High Court, they
commented that they "intend to market and sell . . . about 1,700
acres in line with the sale and marketing strategy sanctioned by
the Court."

* The Minister of Finance, Colm Imbert, announced in a news release
that the Government "pursued the acquisition of CL Marine Ltd and
its subsidiaries with the liquidators, and created the National
Marine and Maintenance Services Company Ltd, a new wholly owned
State enterprise for this purpose. The minister's news release did
not disclose the cost of the acquisition or the procurement process
used by the liquidators.


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Debt Tops $120 Billion at July 2020
------------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that Trinidad and Tobago's (T&T) total net
public sector debt rose to $120.5 billion, or 71.7 per cent of the
country's gross domestic product at the end of July 2020, according
to the Central Bank's published Economic Bulletin for July 2020.

T&T's debt in July 2020 is 16.7 per cent higher that at the end of
September 2019, when it totalled $103.2 billion, or 63.7 per cent
of GDP, according to Trinidad Express.

According to the Central Bank report: "In the mid-year budget
review (June 2020), it was indicated that the fiscal accounts are
anticipated to record a deficit of $14.5 billion in FY2019/20
compared to original estimates of $5.3 billion," the report notes.

"The larger deficit is attributable to a falloff in revenue caused
by a slump in energy prices, coupled with a rise in expenditure for
support measures amid the Covid-19 pandemic," the report relays.

"Some of these measures included salary relief and income supports
grants, rent relief grants, accelerated income tax and VAT refunds,
and additional food cards," the report discloses.

The Economic Bulletin also indicated that the country's external
debt outstanding increased by 16.5 per cent to US$4.58 billion in
July 2020, from US$3.93 billion at the end of September 2019, the
report says.

The Central Bank said most of the external disbursements originated
from three sources:

* The Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF), the Development Bank of
Latin America, which lent T&T US$400 million;

* Export Finance and Insurance Corporation of Australia, which
disbursed US$139.0 million to T&T for the construction and delivery
of the two fast ferries to service the inter-island sea bridge and
for two patrol vessels;

* ExportImport Bank of China, which lent T&T US$31.6 million for
the Phoenix Park Industrial Estate.

The Bank also noted that T&T's external debt increased due to the
issuance of a US$500 million bond on the international capital
market in June 2020 and a US$20 million loan from the World Bank in
July 2020, the report relays.  Half of the proceeds from the US$500
million bond was used to repay a US$250.0 million bond which
matured in July 2020, the report notes.

The foreign loans contributed to boosting T&T's gross official
reserves, the report discloses.

The Central Bank said: "At the end of August 2020, gross official
reserves amounted to US$7,442.4 million (8.8 months of import
cover), which was US$513.4 million higher than the end of 2019.

"Over the reference period, gross official reserves were boosted by
drawdowns from the HSF and proceeds from central government
borrowings," the report says.

"The Central Bank continued to intervene regularly in the foreign
exchange market and sales to the authorised dealers amounted to
US$890 million in the year to August 2020. The increase in gross
official reserves suggests that the external accounts registered an
overall surplus during the first eight months of 2020," the report
relays.

The report states that the central government's fiscal accounts
registered an overall deficit of $10.7 billion for the period
October 1, 2019 to June 30, 2020. The Central Bank said the higher
deficit was primarily on account of lower revenues which outpaced
the decline in expenditure, the report says.

The report discloses that the Economic Bulletin stated: "Central
government total revenue collections declined by 30.2 per cent to
roughly $25 billion over the nine months to June 2020. The
reduction in earnings was reflective of a simultaneous fall-off in
both energy and non-energy receipts.

"Energy revenue fell by 43.1 per cent to $5.9 billion owing to
lower energy commodity prices."

According to the Bank, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil
prices averaged US$43.57 per barrel in the first nine months of the
2020 fiscal year compared with US$57.82 per barrel in the
corresponding period of 2019, the report relays.

Similarly, Henry Hub natural gas prices averaged US$2.01 per
British Thermal Units (mmbtu) in the first nine months of 2020,
compared with US$3.09 per mmbtu in the corresponding period of
2019, the report notes.



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