/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/200821.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Friday, August 21, 2020, Vol. 21, No. 168
Headlines
A R G E N T I N A
ARGENTINA: Has Not Yet Requested New Financing Program
BUENOS AIRES: S&P Lowers Rating on $750MM Bond to D
B R A Z I L
GOL LINHAS: Fitch Cuts Issuer Default Ratings to CCC-
OI SA: Amends Restructuring Plan, Aiming Higher Offers
UNIGEL PARTICIPACOES: Fitch Affirms B+ LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
USINA CORURIPE: Moody's Rates BRL85.8MM Sr. Unsec. Debt Caa2
C H I L E
LATAM AIRLINES: Lays Off 12,600 Employees Since March
C O L O M B I A
AVIANCA AIRLINES: Seeking US$1.2BB Financing During Bankruptcy
FRONTERA ENERGY: Fitch Hikes LT IDRs to B, Outlook Stable
E L S A L V A D O R
SALVADORENO DPR: Fitch Affirms Series 2015 Loans Rating at 'BB'
P U E R T O R I C O
INTERNATIONAL FOOD: Suit vs. Suppliers Moved to Illinois Court
V E N E Z U E L A
PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Lost 3 Oil Supertankers to Chinese Partner
- - - - -
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A R G E N T I N A
=================
ARGENTINA: Has Not Yet Requested New Financing Program
------------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg News reports that President Alberto Fernandez said he
will not allow the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to impose
austerity measures on Argentina during talks over a new financing
program.
The government, which sealed an initial US$65-billion debt
agreement with private foreign creditors, is looking to open formal
negotiations with the Fund after September 4 over repayments for
Argentina's US$44-billion credit line, according to official
sources, Bloomberg News relates.
However, IMF Spokesperson Gerry Rice said that Argentina had not
yet requested a financing program, according to Bloomberg News.
"I would reiterate the Argentine authorities have not requested
Fund financing, at this stage. They have not requested an IMF
program, at this stage," he said, Bloomberg News notes. "I can say
that it does not have to be necessarily tied to an Article IV
consultation," he added. "If and when such a request were to occur,
the financing associated with a new IMF supported programme would
be to help Argentina meet its balance of payments needs, including
those related to its official sector obligations."
Argentina took a loan of US$57 billion from the IMF in 2018--the
Fund's largest ever--under former president Mauricio Macri, though
President Fernandez said he did not want to receive the remaining
disbursements upon taking office, Bloomberg News relays.
The government is seeking to seal a deal before the end of March
2021, officials have briefed, with the first repayments currently
due to begin in late December, Bloomberg News notes.
'No conditions'
Given the coronavirus pandemic and Argentina's economic turmoil,
the country is not in a position to accept any conditions from the
IMF, Fernandez said in a radio interview.
"I am not in a position to accept any conditionality. I am not in a
condition because Argentina is not in condition to," said the
Peronist leader, Bloomberg News notes.
"I ask them to trust us because we cannot accept conditions that
require us to make adjustments [austerity measures], though we know
that we must fulfil our obligations," he added.
The Peronist leader nevertheless praised the support the IMF had
given Argentina during its negotiations with bondholders, Bloomberg
News says.
"If the Fund said, as it was, that the debt is not sustainable, it
is because they said that Argentina has nowhere to get the
resources from. That is the same as saying that Argentina has
nowhere to adjust," the president stressed.
"We are at a time where everything is under discussion. The Fund's
dogma has already fallen to pieces," he insisted.
Speaking, Economy Minister Martin Guzman predicted that talks with
the IMF will be "long" and "complex."
"We do not see an agreement arriving quickly due to the number of
issues that must be negotiated," Guzman said in a radio interview.
He vowed that officials would go through "every detail on the basis
of prudence," he added.
About Argentina
Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of
South America. It's capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel
Fernandez is the current president of Argentina after winning the
October 2019 general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the
position.
Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America. The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal
year 2019 according to the World Bank. Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America on
April 14, 2020, Fitch Ratings upgraded Argentina's Long-Term
Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating to 'CC' from 'RD' and
Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR to 'C' from 'RD'.
The TCR-LA reported on April 13, 2020, that S&P Global Ratings
also lowered its long- and short-term foreign currency sovereign
credit ratings on Argentina to 'SD/SD' from 'CCC-/C'. S&P also
affirmed the local currency sovereign credit ratings at 'SD/SD'.
There is no outlook on 'SD' ratings.
On April 9, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Investors Service
downgraded the Government of Argentina's foreign-currency and
local-currency long-term issuer and senior unsecured ratings to Ca
from Caa2.
BUENOS AIRES: S&P Lowers Rating on $750MM Bond to D
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its issue-level rating on the province
of Buenos Aires' $750 million 6.5% bond due 2023 to 'D' from 'CC'.
Rationale
The New York-law, dollar-denominated bond had a $24.4 million
interest payment due Aug. 15, 2020, and an applicable payment date
of August 18. The bond is one of the 11 bonds included in the
restructuring proposal that the province presented April 24, 2020.
The province hasn't made its foreign currency foreign law debt
service payments after it presented the restructuring offer.
The province's following bonds are rated 'D' according to S&P's
rating definitions:
-- 6.5% notes due 2023;
-- 10.875% notes due 2021;
-- 7.875% notes due 2027;
-- 9.95% notes due 2021;
-- 9.625% dollar-denominated bonds due 2028;
-- 4% dollar-denominated medium-term notes due 2020;
-- 4% euro-denominated medium-term notes due 2020;
-- 4% dollar-denominated long-term par bond due 2035; and
-- 4% euro-denominated long-term par bond due 2035.
These bonds will remain at 'D' pending conclusion of the debt
renegotiations that are currently underway.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.
The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.
The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.
Ratings List
Downgraded
To From
Buenos Aires (Province of)
Senior Unsecured
US$750mil 6.50% due 2023 D CC
Ratings Affirmed
Buenos Aires (Province of)
Issuer Credit Rating SD/--/NR
Buenos Aires (Province of)
Senior Unsecured CC
Senior Unsecured D
===========
B R A Z I L
===========
GOL LINHAS: Fitch Cuts Issuer Default Ratings to CCC-
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded GOL Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A.'s
Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings to
'CCC-' from 'B-' and its Long-Term National Scale rating to
'CCC(bra)' from 'BB(bra)'. Fitch has also downgraded GOL Finance's
unsecured bonds to 'CCC-/RR4' from 'B-'/'RR4'.
The downgrade reflects continued weakness in air-travel demand in
Brazil, high uncertainty related to the timing of an effective
recovery, and GOL's limited financial flexibility to raise new
money. The company is in the process of renegotiating its leasing
obligations and financial banking loans, and its USD300 million
term loan, which is guaranteed by Delta Air Lines ('BB+/Negative
Outlook) that is due at the end of August. Fitch has concerns that
the combination of an extremely weak business environment and the
negotiation with bank creditors and limited access to additional
financing could lead to some sort of restructuring of its capital
market debt.
GOL has improved its readily available cash, per Fitch's criteria,
to BRL1.5 billion when including the recent advance ticket sale
transaction (BRL1.2 billion) with its mileage subsidiaries Smiles
S.A. In a scenario of limited access to credit lines, Fitch would
expect the company to preserve liquidity as seen in others cases
within the region and in the global airline industry. The delay in
the BNDES support and the complex structure of the transaction are
also negative headwinds incorporated into GOL's current rating
review.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Coronavirus Assumptions: Fitch's current base case assumes a slow
recovery that will only reach 2019 levels of traffic by YE 2021,
with a full rebound to 2019 levels only occurring by 2022 or 2023.
Fitch's base case scenario envisions a 55%-60% drop in revenue
passenger kilometers for 2020 from 2019 and that 2021 levels will
remain 25% below 2019 and that FX weakness will pressure margins.
Industry dynamics are expected to change with leisure passengers
being a higher proportion of the mix, which could limit yields
recovery. Since April, when GOL's RPK drop 93%, demand has been
slightly recovering. GOL's RPK showed a decline of 77% during July
versus the previous year.
Progress on Refinancing Plan: GOL is in the process of refinancing
its leasing, banking debt and local debentures. The company had
BRL8.1 billion of leasing obligations, BRL1.7 billion of term loan
BRL6.4 billion cross-border senior notes, BRL2.4 billion of banking
loans and BRL582 million in local debentures as of June 30, 2020.
Short-term maturities total BRL6.1 billion and pro forma readily
available cash was BRL1.5 billion, per Fitch's criteria. Fitch
believes that GOL will be able to complete the refinancing with
lessors, which would improve its cash flow and offset some of the
drop in demand. Back in March and April, GOL reached an agreement
with the Boeing Company related to deferrals of future aircraft
deliveries seeking to better adjust its fleet planning to the new
demand levels. During 2Q20, GOL received BRL137 million in PDP
return from the agreement with Boeing related to the 737-8 Max.
Good Market Position: GOL has a leading business position in the
Brazilian airline domestic market, which is viewed as sustainable
over the medium term, with a market share of around 38% as measured
byRPK in 2019. As this is the company's key market, GOL's operating
results are highly correlated to the Brazilian economy. Due to this
limited geographic diversification, the company's FX exposure is
high. GOL generates approximately 85% of its revenues in Brazilian
reals, while around 60% of its total costs and 87% of its total
debt are denominated in U.S. dollars.
DERIVATION SUMMARY
GOL~sratings reflect Fitch's concerns on the sustainability of both
credit profiles in a scenario of high uncertainties of air
passenger demand, limited access to credit and debt markets and
concerns of a more debt-structuring process.
GOL has a weaker position relative to global peers given its
limited geographic diversification and relatively high leverage;
nonetheless its important regional market position in the Brazilian
market, high operating margins and a track record of strong
liquidity ratios have been key rating drivers. These positive
factors are tempered by the company's ongoing business growth and
operational volatility related to its key market, Brazil. FX risk
exposure is viewed as a negative credit factor for GOL considering
its limited geographic diversification. However, the company has
implemented a currency hedge position which partially limits its
exposure to currency fluctuation.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS
Key assumptions in Fitch's rating case include a steep drop in
demand through 2020, with full recovery only occurring by
2022-2023. During 2020, Fitch's base case includes revenues down
roughly 60%-70% in the third quarter, and down around 50% for the
fourth quarter. Its base case reflects traffic only slowly
recovering toward 2019 levels by YE 2021, with a full rebound to
2019 levels only occurring by 2022 or 2023.
KEY RECOVERY RATING ASSUMPTIONS
The recovery analysis assumes that GOL would be considered a going
concern in bankruptcy and that the company would be reorganized
rather than liquidated. Fitch has assumed a 10% administrative
claim.
Going-Concern Approach: GOL's going concern EBITDA is based on an
average of 2014-2018 EBITDA that reflects a scenario of intense
volatility in the airline industry in Latin America and Brazil,
plus a discount of 20%. The going-concern EBITDA estimate reflects
Fitch's view of a sustainable, post-reorganization EBITDA level,
upon which Fitch's bases the valuation of the company. The
EV/EBITDA multiple applied is 5.5x, reflecting GOL's strong market
position in the Brazil.
Fitch applies a waterfall analysis to the post-default enterprise
value (EV) based on the relative claims of the debt in the capital
structure. The agency's debt waterfall assumptions take into
account the company's total debt at June 30, 2020. These
assumptions result in a recovery rate for the unsecured bonds
within the 'RR4' range, which per Fitch's criteria leads to
equalization of the rating to the IDR.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Developments that may, individually or collectively, lead to
positive rating action/upgrade Completion of all debt refinancing,
associated with ability to raise new money via BNDES or capital
market, without a distressed debt exchange (DDE) process
Developments that may, individually or collectively, lead to
negative rating action/downgrade Deterioration in GOL's liquidity
profile or difficulties to progress on refinancing strategy. Terms
and conditions of a potential bond refinancing could likely be
considered a DDE under Fitch's criteria.:
BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO
International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.
LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE
The current challenging scenario in terms operating cash flow
generation will require GOL to fund its medium term negative FCF
generation with new debt. GOL's ability to access credit/debt
market during the second semester of 2020 will be a key to avoiding
a default. GOL held pro forma readily available cash of BRL1.5
billion as of June 30, 2020, per Fitch's criteria. This includes
BRL1.2 billion of advance sale transaction with Smiles completed
early in July 2020. GOL's short-term debt was BRL6.1 billion,
including the BRL2.2 billion of leasing obligations. GOL does not
have a committed standby credit facility.
REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING
The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.
OI SA: Amends Restructuring Plan, Aiming Higher Offers
------------------------------------------------------
Carolina Mandl at Reuters reports that Brazilian telecom firm Oi SA
proposed amendments to its restructuring plan, urging creditors to
extend new loans and to get higher bids for assets put on the
block.
Creditors will vote on the proposed changes on Sept. 8, as Oi plans
to exit bankruptcy protection by May 2022, roughly six years after
starting the process, according to Reuters.
"After lots of talks, we concluded that the plan needed some more
flexibility than initially foreseen," Chief Executive Rodrigo de
Abreu said in an interview, the report notes.
Oi set the floor on bids for its fiber unit at 20 billion reais
($3.7 billion) in enterprise value, the report says. It is selling
a 51% controlling stake in the fiber unit, known as InfraCo, and
plans to auction it in the first quarter and conclude the sale by
September 2021, the report discloses.
For the mobile assets, Oi decided to include long-term
contracts--for 3, 5 or 10 years--with its fiber unit in the total
price offered by bidders, the report relays. Abreu said these
contracts tend to increase InfraCo's value.
Oi is in exclusive talks with TIM Participacoes SA , Telefonica
Brasil and America Movil's Claro which delivered a joint 16.5
billion reais bid for the mobile assets, the report discloses. If
they reach an agreement, the telecom providers will have the right
to match any other higher bid for bankrupt Oi's cellular operations
that other parties could make later, the report says.
Oi also decided to sell its TV operation for 20 million reais, in a
move to eliminate more significant satellite costs, the report
notes. Still, the acquirer will share some revenues with Oi, as it
will continue to offer TV services to its clients, the report
discloses.
Oi is also offering creditors to pay more on their current debt if
they extend new loans or letters of guarantees to the company, the
report says. The proposed haircut may fall to up to 40% from 60%
if creditors provide Oi with fresh money, for instance, the report
adds.
About Oi SA
Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, and operating almost exclusively
within Brazil, the Oi Group provides services like fixed-line data
transmission and network usage for phones, internet, and cable,
Wi-Fi hot-spots in public areas, and mobile phone and data
services, and employs approximately 142,000 direct and indirect
employees.
On June 20, 2016, pursuant to Brazilian Law No. 11.101/05 (the
'Brazilian Bankruptcy Law'), Oi S.A. and certain of its
subsidiaries filed for recuperao judicial (judicial
reorganization) in Brazil.
On June 21, 2016, OI SA and its affiliates Telemar Norte Leste
S.A. and Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A. commenced Chapter 15
proceedings (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 16-11791). Ojas N.
Shah, as foreign representative, signed the petitions.
Coop and PTIF are also subject to proceedings in the Netherlands.
The Chapter 15 cases are assigned to Judge Sean H. Lane.
In the Chapter 15 cases, the Debtors are represented by John K.
Cunningham, Esq., and Mark P. Franke, Esq., at White & Case LLP,
in New York; and Jason N. Zakia, Esq., Richard S. Kebrdle, Esq.,
and Laura L. Femino, Esq., at White & Case LLP, in Miami, Florida.
On July 22, 2016, the New York Court recognized the Brazilian
Proceedings as foreign main proceedings with respect to the
Chapter 15 Debtors, and granted certain additional related relief.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 28, 2020, Fitch Ratings has downgraded Oi S.A's ratings,
including the Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating to
'CCC+' from 'B-', the LT Local Currency IDR to 'CCC+' from 'B-',
the National LT Rating to 'B(bra)'/Stable' from 'BB-(bra')/Stable,
and the 2025 notes to 'CCC+'/'RR4' from 'B-'/'RR4'. The Rating
Outlook on the international ratings has been removed.
UNIGEL PARTICIPACOES: Fitch Affirms B+ LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Unigel Participacoes S.A.'s Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings at 'B+' and
National Scale Long-Term Rating at 'A-(bra)'. In addition, Fitch
has affirmed the 'B+'/'RR4' rating of Unigel Luxembourg's unsecured
and secured senior notes, which are guaranteed by Unigel. The
Rating Outlook is Stable.
Unigel's operating flexibility, established market position in
Brazil, and diversified portfolio of customers and key end markets
are positive rating considerations. The company's ratings are
constrained by its small business-scale relative to larger and more
diversified global petrochemical peers and its position as a
price-taker. Unigel's ratings further reflect the cyclical nature
of the industry, which is partially offset by a degree of vertical
integration within both its acrylics and styrenics businesses, and
through long-term contracts with price formulas based upon raw
materials for a material portion of the company's sales.
Fitch's base case forecast projects that Unigel's net debt/EBITDA
ratio will decline from 4.5x in 2020 to 3.3x in 2021, considering
around BRL200-BRL250-million of capex per year. Unigel's successful
implementation of the new fertilizer segment could improve its
business profile, increase its scale and exposure to different
sectors (agribusiness). Once running, this segment could help
Unigel's to reduce its leverage by 2022, which could benefit its
ratings.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Coronavirus Impact: Unigel's operations were impacted during 2Q20
due to plants shutdowns as a result of a rapid drop in demand by
its clients. Positively, Fitch estimates the company was able to
maintain neutral free cash flow generation despite the loss of
EBITDA (estimated in BRL34 million). As of July, operations were
back on track. For 2020, Fitch estimates recurring EBITDA of around
BRL396 million, 5% lower than 2019.
Potential Business Diversification: Unigel is in the process of
expanding the fertilizer segment, after having leased two plants
from Petrobras in the states of Bahia and Sergipe, with total
production capacity of urea of 3.1kt per day. The contract is for a
10 year-period with a 10-year renewable period for an estimated
lease cost of BRL177 million. The company is still discussing
contract terms of the main raw material (gas) and expects to start
operations during 2021. Fitch estimates capex for this project to
be around USD25 million.
Intermediate Player in Cyclical Industry: The cyclical nature of
the commodity chemicals sector means Unigel is subject to feedstock
and end-product price volatility, driven by prevailing market
conditions and demand/supply drivers. Unigel is a chemicals
producer with a small business scale operating in the midstream of
the petrochemical industry value chain, placing the company in a
weak position against much larger single-product suppliers and
large manufacturing groups. Unigel's long-term contract sales with
price formula based upon raw-materials prices are mitigating
factors that help to offset major deteriorations in its product
spreads.
Operational Flexibility: Unigel's credit profile benefits from a
diversified product range under the acrylics and styrenics segments
and end-markets. Varying degrees of integration are present along
the production value chain for its key products, providing greater
flexibility in sales, fewer constraints from raw material supply,
and bolstering its operating margins. The company's small business
scale also provides some ability to switch product lines relatively
swiftly to take advantage of favorable price movements. Over the
last four years, Unigel's EBITDA margin averaged 12.5%, which is
comparable with small- to medium-size petrochemical peers. As of
the LTM ended on March 31, 2020, Unigel's EBITDA split was 55%-45%
styrenics and acrylics, respectively, and the company reported a
10.4% EBITDA margin.
Competition from Imports: Unigel benefits from solid market-share
positions in Brazil and Mexico; these two countries are where the
company's industrial sites are distributed; six in Brazil and two
in Mexico. Mexico and other overseas businesses represented 11% of
consolidated revenues during 2019. Unigel is the single producer of
acrylics in Brazil and exhibits a good business position in the
styrenics segment. Most competitors have a larger scale of
business, but the company's main competitive threats are from lower
priced imports, as it operates in a niche sector of the market. The
company has benefited from local imports tariffs (10%-14%), and any
change to this framework could pose a risk. The company's global
capacity share ranges from 1%-2% for its main products and between
37% and 40% in Brazil.
Improving CFFO: For 2020 and 2021, Fitch expects Unigel to generate
CFFO of about BRL270 million, which positively compares to around
BRL219 million in 2019 and BRL38 million in 2018. The company's
capex plan for the fertilizer segment is expect to be around USD25
million. Despite the higher capex, Unigel is expected to continue
generating positive free cash flow during the next three years.
Dividends are expected to be in line with covenants, around 25%
payouts from 2021 on.
Leverage to Peak in 2020: Fitch forecasts Unigel's net debt/EBITDA
to move toward 4.5x by YE 2020, and to decline to 3.3x in 2021,
considering the start of the fertilizer business by mid-2021. The
increase in leverage during 2020 reflects the lower EBITDA
generation due to the pandemic and FX impacts on total amount of
debt in BRL. More clarity on the gas contract terms will be key to
determining the profitability of the project and the amount of
EBITDA this segment is expected to generate.
ESG Considerations:
Unigel has an ESG relevance score of '4' for Governance Structure
due to ownership concentration and key person risk.
DERIVATION SUMMARY
Despite Unigel's good market share in Latin America, the company is
a price-taker and is small relative to the global chemical
industry, with historical EBITDA generation of approximately USD111
million. Product diversification and some business integration help
to reduce profit margin volatility, although cash generation is
still affected by commodity price movements and any change in the
supply/demand dynamics of its end-products.
Compared with other Latin America petrochemical peers, Unigel is
smaller and has a weaker financial profile when compared with Cydsa
S.A. (BB+/Stable), Braskem S.A. (BB+/Stable) and Orbia Advance
Corporation, S.A.B. de C.V. (BBB/Negative). Unigel is well
positioned in terms of leverage ratios when compared with other
Latin American peers in the 'B' category.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS
Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer
-- Low double-digit decline in volumes during 2020 (mostly
styrenics);
-- Average EBITDA margins around 13%-14%, from 2020-2021;
-- Capex of around BRL200-250 million, including USD25 million
for fertilizer business;
-- Dividend payouts at 25% of net profits.
Recovery Ratings Assumptions
The recovery analysis assumes that Unigel would be considered a
going concern in bankruptcy and that the company would be
reorganized rather than liquidated. Fitch has assumed a 10%
administrative claim.
Going-Concern Approach
The going-concern EBITDA is 25% below 2019 EBITDA to reflect
volatility in the petrochemical industry's volume and prices. The
enterprise valuation/EBITDA multiple applied is 5x, reflecting
Unigel's strong market share in its operating regions and a
mid-cycle multiple.
Fitch applies a waterfall analysis to the post-default enterprise
value based on the relative claims of the debt in the capital
structure. The agency's debt waterfall assumptions take into
account the company's total debt at March 31, 2020. These
assumptions result in a recovery rate for the secured and unsecured
bonds within the 'RR3' range, but due to the soft cap of Brazil at
'RR4', Unigel's senior unsecured and secured nots are rated at
'B+'/'RR4'.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:
-- The company's ability to improve its EBITDA generation,
maintaining stable margins above 14% on a sustainable basis;
-- Net Debt/EBITDA around 2.5x on a sustainable basis;
-- Track record of robust liquidity and financial flexibility
could favits the ratings.
Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:
-- Operating EBITDA margin consistently below 10% on a sustained
basis;
-- Maintenance of poor liquidity, leading to recurring
refinancing risks;
-- Net Debt/EBITDA moving above 4.0x on sustainable basis;
-- Change in imports tariffs in Brazil that could allow increased
competition.
BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO
International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.
LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE
Adequate Liquidity: Unigel has an adequate liquidity position
relative its short-term debt. As of Mar. 31 2020, Unigel reported
total financial debt of BRL2.3 billion, of which BRL133 million was
short-term debt, and had readily available cash position of about
BRL410 million. Short-term debt coverage, as measured by
cash/short-term debt, was 3.1x in the same period, which positively
compares to an average of only 0.1x during 2015-2017. Fitch expects
Unigel to maintain a solid cash position versus short term debt to
avoid exposure to refinancing risks. Around 98% of Unigel's debt is
unsecured, following the bond issuance during 2019 when Unigel paid
most of its secured debt.
SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS
EBITDA is adjusted by non-recurring items.
REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING
The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.
ESG CONSIDERATIONS
Unigel Participacoes S.A has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for
Governance Structure due to ownership concentration and key person
risk.
Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3' - ESG issues are credit
neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either
due to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by
the entity.
USINA CORURIPE: Moody's Rates BRL85.8MM Sr. Unsec. Debt Caa2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. assigned a B3.br national scale
corporate family rating to Usina Coruripe Acucar e Alcool. At the
same time, Moody's also assigned Caa2/Caa2.br ratings to the first
issuance of debentures maturing in 2021; Caa2/Caa2.br to the first
series of the third issuance of debentures maturing in 2025, and
Caa3/Caa3.br to the second series of the third issuance of
debentures maturing in 2025, all issued by Coruripe. The outlook is
stable.
Ratings assigned:
Issuer: Usina Coruripe Acucar e Alcool
Corporate Family Rating -- National Scale: B3.br
- BRL85.8 million senior unsecured first issuance of debentures
maturing in 2021: Caa2/Caa2.br
- BRL457.7 million senior secured first series of the third
issuance of debentures maturing in 2025: Caa2/Caa2.br
- BRL230.7 million senior secured second series of the third
issuance of debentures maturing in 2025: Caa3/Caa3.br
Outlook is stable.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The rated debentures underly issuances of agricultural receivables.
The first issuance of debentures, BRL85.8 million, underlies the
first issuance of CRAs by Eco Securitizadora de Direitos
Creditorios do Agronegocio S.A. The third issuance of debentures,
BRL688.4 million in two series, underlies the seventh issuance of
CRA by Eco Securitizadora in two series, the first series (senior)
and the second series (subordinated). The third issuance of
debentures is secured by certain sales and purchase agreements and
the first lien on IAA (Federal Institute of Sugar & Ethanol)
claims, in which Coruripe asks for compensation from the Brazilian
Federal Government on losses caused by price controls imposed by
the authorities of the now extinct IAA.
Coruripe has 2 claims which together are booked at a value of over
BRL3 billion. These claims are currently under judicial dispute and
therefore there is no existing writ-of-payment obligation relating
to them. Despite this credit enhancement, Moody's considers these
obligations as senior unsecured given the absence of a real estate
asset pledge. Under the current capital structure, Moody's
considers these debentures to be subordinated to BRL1.7 billion in
secure bank debt which currently comprise around 52% of Coruripe's
total debt. Furthermore, Moody's considers the second series of the
third issuance of debentures as subordinated to the first series of
the same debentures in the hierarchy to receive any proceeds
triggered by a default event and is therefore rated one notch
below.
Coruripe's ratings continue to consider a weak liquidity profile
and high refinancing risk despite the recently announced debt
extension. In March 2020, end of the 2019-20 harvest year, Coruripe
had BRL605 million in cash, compared to BRL316 million in the end
of the prior harvest.
Proforma for the debt extensions Coruripe will have around BRL843
million in maturities for the 2020-21 harvest, of which an
estimated BRL455 million relating to working capital and export
finance lines. Before the announced debt extension the amortization
schedule included BRL1.3 billion in the 2020-21 harvest.
The creditors that are part of the extension agreement already had
the collateral of the Iturama plant, and other assets, and will
receive an additional land collateral with an estimated value of
BRL400 million and the second lien on IAA (Institute of Sugar and
Ethanol) booked at more than BRL3.0 billion. Instead of three
amortizations of BRL571 million in 2021, 2022, and 2023, Coruripe
will amortize BRL171 million in the present harvest, BRL256 million
yearly and a payment of BRL513 million in 2025. Also, the new
agreement will have a financial covenant of Net Debt/EBITDA equal
to or lower than 3.0x (2.91x as of March 2020) which will reduce to
2.8x in March 2021 and 0.2x per harvest.
The prior agreement had a covenant of Net Debt/(EBITDA -- Capex)
which proved to be incompatible with the company´s high capex
expenditures, increasing dollar denominated debt, lower crushing
levels and EBITDA. Coruripe had breached such covenant in March
2019 and March 2020, for which waivers were negotiated.
Coruripe's ratings also incorporate its scale as one of the 10
largest sugar-ethanol groups in Brazil with a crushing capacity of
15.0 million tons of sugarcane per harvest and a very high capacity
utilization, over 97%. The ratings also reflect its cluster
organization with ample access to sugarcane and logistic
infrastructure and its geographic diversification that provides
some protection against weather and other localized event risks,
while allowing for a more stable production throughout the year,
because of different harvest periods.
Historic high capacity utilization and low land lease costs are
among the elements that contribute for Usina Coruripe´s
competitive production costs. Coruripe's has a more flexible cost
structure to reduce cost volatility since the price paid to
sugarcane providers is linked to the company's selling prices
through local price index instead of a general price index -- such
as Consecana.
Coruripe's operating performance improved in 2019/2020 and Moody's
estimates results will remain on track during 2020 despite the
volatility caused by the coronavirus outbreak. In the 2019/2020
harvest, ended March 2020, revenues reached BRL2.3 billion, 16.1%
higher compared to the prior harvest and EBITDA reached BRL1.02
billion, 33% higher. Crushing reached 14,631 thousand tons, a
record for the company, sugar and ethanol prices were higher and
working capital improved. Since 2018 the company increased
investments to improve the quality of its sugarcane and industrial
efficiency, actions that helped sustain the observed operating
results.
Coruripe increased investments to BRL803 million in 2019, from
BRL518 million in 2018 and an average of BRL469 million in the two
harvests before that. In 2020-21 Moody's expects a crushing of
14,760 thousand tons and EBITDA of BRL1.2 billion, 4.5% higher than
in 2019/2020. Despite the COVID-19 outbreak and lower ethanol
prices, Coruripe's results will be supported by higher crushing
volumes, higher sugar prices in BRL and hedges already in place for
sugar at an average price of BRL1,453/ton (0.13 USD/lb.). Moody's
believes the production mix will shift to 59% sugar, instead of the
mix observed in 2019-20 of 54% sugar/46% ethanol.
The stable outlook on Coruripe's ratings incorporates its view that
the company will present a more adequate debt amortization schedule
in the coming harvests and that operating results and cash flow
generation will remain solid. Moody's also expects Coruripe to
maintain its liability management strategy in order to adequate its
debt amortization schedule to its investment needs.
FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS
An upgrade would require a considerable improvement in liquidity
with cash consistently covering short-term debt during the harvest
even in a low-price environment. Quantitatively EBITA/Interest
Expense would need to be sustained above 1.0x, while Debt/EBITDA
maintained below 5.5x and CFO/Net Debt above 10%.
A downgrade could happen if Usina Coruripe's liquidity continues to
deteriorate or if it is not able to refinance upcoming maturities.
Founded in 1925 and headquartered in Coruripe, State of Alagoas,
Usina Coruripe is a sugar and ethanol producer and electricity
cogenerator with five crushing units, one in the State of Alagoas
and other four in the State of Minas Gerais. In the 2019-20
harvest, the company generated BRL 2.3 billion in revenues. The
company currently has the largest plant in the Northeast region of
Brazil with 3,000-ton capacity.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Protein and
Agriculture published in May 2019.
=========
C H I L E
=========
LATAM AIRLINES: Lays Off 12,600 Employees Since March
-----------------------------------------------------
Fabian Cambero and Marcelo Rochabrun at Reuters report LATAM
Airlines Group S.A. said it had laid off 12,600 employees since
March--or almost 30% of its pre-coronavirus workforce--due to the
pandemic that has upended the global travel industry.
The carrier went from employing almost 43,000 people across Latin
America and the United States to 29,957, the company said,
according to Reuters.
LATAM reported a net loss of $890 million for the second quarter,
slammed by the pandemic that drove the company into a Chapter 11
bankruptcy filing in May, the report notes.
"COVID-19 has had a very significant impact, which is reflected in
the company's numbers," LATAM CFO Ramiro Alfonsin told journalists,
the report relays.
While employees already had their salaries cut by half in late
March when the pandemic led to widespread travel restrictions in
the region, it said its remaining employees are now facing cuts of
20% through September, the report notes.
LATAM and its rivals are struggling to preserve cash while
operating just a small fraction of their usual flights, the report
discloses. The airline has said it will need to be a smaller
carrier for years to come, and it is unclear whether there will be
more job cuts in the future, the report relays. Cutting down its
workforce has helped preserve some liquidity, the report notes.
The carrier posted a 75% drop in revenue between April and June due
to widespread travel restrictions around Latin America, the report
discloses.
LATAM's Chapter 11 filing has allowed it to raise more than $1.3
billion in cash from investors, although it still needs the
approval from a bankruptcy judge before it can access the money,
the report relays.
Alfonsin said the airline had operated during the quarter at 6% of
its normal capacity and that demand in Brazil, its largest market,
was showing some signs of recovery, the report notes.
He added LATAM ended the quarter with a total cash position of $1.4
billion, the report adds.
About LATAM Airlines Group
LATAM Airlines Group S.A. is a pan-Latin American airline holding
company involved in the transportation of passengers and cargo and
operates as one unified business enterprise. It is the largest
passenger airline in South America. Before the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic, LATAM offered passenger transport services to
145 different destinations in 26 countries, including domestic
flights in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru,
and international services within Latin America as well as to
Europe, the United States, the Caribbean, Oceania, Asia and
Africa.
LATAM Airlines Group and its 28 affiliates sought Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 20-11254) on May 25,
2020. Affiliates in Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and the United
States are part of the Chapter 11 filing.
The Debtors disclosed $21,087,806,000 in total assets and
$17,958,629,000 in total liabilities as of Dec. 31, 2019.
The Hon. James L. Garrity, Jr., is the case judge.
The Debtors tapped Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP as general
bankruptcy counsel; FTI Consulting as restructuring advisor; Togut,
Segal & Segal LLP and Claro & Cia in Chile as special counsel;
PricewaterhouseCoopers Consultores Auditores SpA as independent
auditors; and Larrain Vial Servicios Profesionales Limitada as
Latin America investment banker. Prime Clerk LLC is the claims
agent.
The U.S. Trustee for Region 2 appointed a committee of unsecured
creditors on June 5, 2020. The committee is represented in
Debtors' bankruptcy cases by Dechert LLP. The committee has also
tapped Morales & Besa LTDA to provide advice on matters related to
the Chilean and cross-border insolvency law.
===============
C O L O M B I A
===============
AVIANCA AIRLINES: Seeking US$1.2BB Financing During Bankruptcy
--------------------------------------------------------------
Finance Colombia News reports that Colombian airline Avianca,
currently in Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization proceedings in US
Federal Court has announced that it has been working with its
advisors, led by investment bank Seabury Securities LLC to put in
place a DIP (Debtor In Possession) financing structure.
Debtor in Possession financing under US law allows a firm in
Chapter 11 bankruptcy to borrow money under strict conditions that
subordinate existing debt and claims, with the goal of allowing the
firm to emerge from bankruptcy as an operating business, and
existing creditors to receive more than they otherwise would should
the firm be liquidated, according to Finance Colombia News.
Avianca's proposed DIP financing structure consists of a Tranche A
senior loan and a Tranche B subordinated loan, under which the
airline seeks to obtain a total of approximately $1.2 billion USD
of new funds ($900 million USD of Tranche A and $316 million of
Tranche B) excluding any rollups of existing debt and purchase
consideration, the report notes. Total DIP facilities inclusive of
rollup consideration will be $2.0 billion, consisting of a $1.3
billion Tranche A and a $700 million Tranche B, the report
discloses. Both tranches will be secured ratably by a lien on all
available collateral, with the Tranche B subordinated in right of
repayment to the Tranche A, the report relays.
Avianca says that it has now reached key agreements, subject to
definitive documentation, the requisite consents and approvals from
the relevant entities, U.S. Bankruptcy Court approval and other
customary conditions, with various parties that are providing
substantial funding towards such DIP loans, the report notes.
These agreements will allow the airline to offer prospective
lenders a significantly enhanced collateral pool of assets to
secure all of the DIP loans, the report says.
Goldman Sachs Lending Partners LLC and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
have been engaged by Avianca subject to U.S. Bankruptcy Court
approval, to serve as co-lead arrangers and joint physical
bookrunners of the Tranche A DIP Loans, the report discloses. The
providers of this financing may include certain of Avianca's
existing lenders, other prospective third-party lenders, and
possibly the government of Colombia. Additional information about
the potential financing will be posted on Avianca's website, the
report says.
Key DIP Agreements to Date
The three key agreements that have been reached, as integral
elements of the securing the $1.2 billion of new DIP financing, are
as follows:
1. Avianca's Tranche B DIP financing will include funding from its
existing stakeholder lenders as well as new investors consisting of
$316 million of new money financing and a rollup of approximately
$384 million of secured convertible debt issued in December 2019
and January 2020. The property that currently secures the existing
Stakeholder Facility--Avianca's 70% equity interest in LifeMiles,
as well as certain Colombian Peso-denominated credit card
receivables--will now be available to secure the DIP financing.
2. Avianca also has reached an agreement in principle with an ad
hoc group of holders of Avianca's 2023 senior secured notes; this
agreement will be memorialized in a restructuring support agreement
(RSA) between Avianca and holders of a majority of the notes.
Pursuant to the RSA, all holders of the notes will have an
opportunity to provide up to $250 million of new money commitments
to the Tranche A DIP, with certain holders of notes agreeing to
backstop $200 million. The RSA provides that holders of notes who
become a party to the RSA will have the opportunity to roll up a
portion of their notes into the Tranche A DIP, with the aggregate
amount of rollup equal to $220 million of the Tranche A DIP. The
RSA also provides for the collateral presently pledged to secure
the notes, including Avianca's trademarks, certain freighter
aircraft and Avianca's residual equity interest in certain pools of
aircraft, to be pledged on a senior secured priming basis as
additional collateral to secure the DIP loans.
3. In addition, Avianca has reached an agreement in principle with
AI Loyalty (Cayman) Limited, holder of a 30% ownership stake in
Avianca's loyalty company, LifeMiles Ltd., to acquire 19.9% of
LifeMiles equity, currently held by AI Loyalty for a combination of
cash and Tranche A DIP loans and also to receive a call option to
acquire AI Loyalty's remaining equity stake in LifeMiles for cash.
As a result of this agreement, Avianca will own 89.9% of LifeMiles
upon the closing of the transaction, with a path toward ultimately
buying back 100% of LifeMiles. These incremental stakes in
LifeMiles will also be available as collateral to secure the DIP
facility.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America on
Nov. 7, 2019, S&P Global Ratings lowered its issue-level rating on
Colombian airline operator Avianca's 8.375% senior unsecured notes
due May 2020 to 'CC' from 'CCC' and removed the rating from
CreditWatch negative. At the same time, S&P assigned a 'CCC-'
issue-level rating to Avianca's new 8.375% senior secured notes due
May 2020.
FRONTERA ENERGY: Fitch Hikes LT IDRs to B, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Frontera Energy Corporation's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings to 'B' from 'B-'
and removed the Rating Watch Negative. The Rating Outlook is
Stable. Fitch also upgraded Frontera's senior unsecured notes to
'B'/'RR4' from 'B-'/'RR4'.
The upgrade and Watch removal reflect Fitch's view that Frontera
has taken crucial actions to cut costs, reduce production to
preserve its reserve profile and maintain a strong liquidity and
leverage profile. Collectively, the actions taken by Frontera have
strengthened its position to absorb shocks in Brent prices, which
were distressed in the second quarter of 2020.
Furthermore, the company has implemented a dynamic hedging policy
to offset its higher operating costs, which are caused by
take-or-pay transportation contracts. Fitch estimates the company's
actions have improved 1P reserve life to 6.5 years from 4.4 years
applying year-end 2019 reserve figures, and gross leverage, defined
as to total debt to EBITDA, is estimated to be 2.3x in 2020 and
average 1.5x thereafter, and net leverage is estimated to be
negative between 2020 and 2023.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Prudent Cost Cutting Initiatives: Fitch believes Frontera Energy's
cost cutting initiative and reduction in production volumes were
positive actions taken to preserve the company's strong credit and
liquidity profiles. In May 2020, the company announced cost cutting
initiatives aimed to maintain profitability while weathering the
volatile pricing environment. The company's cost cutting
initiatives comprised of: SG&A cost reduction of USD30
million-USD35 million, USD100 million in operating costs, USD30
million in transportation and capex cut to USD100 million, from its
original guidance of USD325 million-375 million. Collectively these
measures along with having 100% of its production hedged through
2H20 roughly 42,000boed and a material portion of its production in
1H2021, will stabilize cash flow and preserve its liquidity
profile.
Strong Leverage Profile: Frontera's gross leverage, defined as
total debt to EBITDA, is strong for its rating category. Fitch
estimates gross leverage will be 2.3x in 2020, and net leverage
estimated to be negative over the rated horizon. Total debt to 1P
is expected to remain less than USD3.00boe over the rated horizon,
and EBITDA to interest expense is estimated to be 5.1x in 2020 and
average nearly 9.0x between 2021 and 2023.
Hedging Position Offset High Operating Costs: Fitch believes
Frontera's current hedging contracts offset its fixed
transportation costs, which Fitch estimates will average $11.50
over the rated horizon. Frontera's transportation costs result in
the company having a higher operating cost compared with peers,
which limits its profitability. Frontera's half-cycle operating
cost of USD30.50boe is 66% higher than the average of its Colombia
energy peers (Geopark, Gran Tierra and Ecopetrol), with the main
difference due to transportation costs to transport to the coast,
while its peers sell crude at the well head at a discount.
Improved Reserve Life: Frontera's swift adjustment to decrease
production to an average of 43,000boed in 2H2020, a 40% decrease
from 2019 average of 70,875boed, has materially improved its 1P
reserve life to 6.5 years from 4.4 year in 2019. Fitch does not
expect Frontera will revert to its previously weaker reserve life,
as the pricing environment over the rated horizon for Brent does
not warrant the amount of capex needed to increase production to
previously levels in Colombia of 61,000boed. Furthermore, the
company has suspended production of its Block 192 in Peru, and
Fitch is assuming this block will be closed indefinitely.
DERIVATION SUMMARY
Frontera's credit profile compares well among other small
independent oil and gas companies in the region. The ratings of
GeoPark Limited (B+/Stable), Gran Tierra Energy International
Holdings Ltd. (CCC/RWN) and Compania General de Combustibles S.A.
(CGC; C) are constrained to the 'B' category, given the inherent
operational risks associated with small scale and low
diversification of their oil and gas production profiles.
Frontera's production size compares favorably to other 'B' rated
oil and gas E&P producers, which will constrain its rating to the
'B' category. Over the rated horizon, Fitch expects that Frontera
will average around 45,000boed, which is less than Geopark at
nearly 50,000 boed by 2020-21, but higher than Gran Tierra and CGC,
both expected to be nearly 40,000 boed.
Further, Frontera reported 115 million boe 1P at the end of 2019,
equal to 4.4 years, but increases to 6.5 years after the revised
production to 48.00boed. Fitch expects Frontera will maintain an
average 1P reserve life of seven years thereafter through 2023.
This compares favorably to peers: Geopark's 1P reserve life is
highest amongst peers at 10 years, followed by Gran Tierra with a
pro-forma reserve life of 7.7 years after the company adjusted 2020
production and higher than CGC at 5.0 years.
Frontera has the strong capital structure most comparable to
GeoPark. Fitch expects Frontera's gross leverage will be 2.3x in
2020 but average 1.5x over the rated horizon with a total debt to
1P of nearly $3.00boe in 2020. Geopark's leverage is expected to
increase to 5.3x in 2020 and average 2.5x over the rated horizon
with a total debt to 1P of $4.70 in 2020. Gran Tierra's leverage is
expected to reach 7.8x in 2020 and average 3.5x over the rate
horizon and total debt to 1P is highest amongst peers at $11.51boe
in 2020. CGC's leverage is expected to be 2.2x in 2020 and average
1.5x over the rated horizon and total debt to1P expected to $7.0boe
in 2020.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS
Fitch's Key Assumptions Within the Rating Case for the Issuer:
-- Fitch's price deck for Brent oil prices of $35.50 in 2020,
$45.00 in 2021, $53.00 in 2022 and $55.00 in the long term;
-- Vasconia discount to Brent average of $5bbl over the rated
horizon;
-- Average Production of 43,000boed between 2020-2023;
-- Peruvian production is suspended indefinitely;
-- Production costs averaging USD10/barrel;
-- Transportation costs averaging USD11.50/barrel;
-- SG&A cost averaging USD2.50/barrel;
-- Average annual capex of USD180 million between 2020-2023;
-- No annual dividends in 2021 through 2023 until Brent oil price
averages $60/bbl or high per the company's policy;
-- Annual dividends received from ODL of $25 million per year
through 2023;
-- Stock repurchase of 1.4 million (10% of outstanding) shares in
2020.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:
-- Net production maintained at 45,000 boed or more while
maintaining a 1P reserve life of seven years or greater;
-- Maintain a conservative financial profile with gross leverage
of 2.5x or below and total debt to 1P reserves of $8bbl or below.
Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:
-- Sustainable production size decreased to below 30,000 boed;
-- 1P Reserve life decreased to below seven years on a sustained
basis;
-- A significant deterioration of credit metrics to total
debt/EBITDA of 3.0x or more;
-- A persistently weak oil and gas pricing environment that
impairs the longer-term value of its reserve base;
-- Sustained deterioration in liquidity and operating profile,
particularly in conjunction with more aggressive dividend
distributions than previously anticipated.
BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO
International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.
LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE
Strong Liquidity: Fitch views the company's liquidity position as
strong, supported by cash on hand and a manageable debt
amortization profile. As of June 30, 2020, Frontera reported USD322
million of cash, of which $138 million is restricted. Further,
Frontera has $52 million letters of credit.
REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING
The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.
ESG CONSIDERATIONS
The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).
=====================
E L S A L V A D O R
=====================
SALVADORENO DPR: Fitch Affirms Series 2015 Loans Rating at 'BB'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Salvadoreno DPR Funding Ltd's Series
2015 Loans at 'BB' with a Negative Rating Outlook.
The Negative Rating Outlook on the Loans reflects Banco Davivienda
Salvadoreno, S.A.'s Negative Outlook along with the uncertainty
related to the magnitude and length of the coronavirus pandemic and
containment measures that may further deteriorate transaction
flows.
Salvadoreno DPR Funding, Ltd.
- Series 2015-1; LT BB Affirmed
- Series 2015-2; LT BB Affirmed
- Series 2015-3; LT BB Affirmed
TRANSACTION SUMMARY
The future flow program is backed by existing and future U.S.
dollar-denominated Diversified Payment Rights originated by
Davivienda Sal. The majority of DPRs are processed by designated
depositary banks that have signed acknowledgement agreements
irrevocably obligating the DDBs to send DPRs to an offshore account
controlled by the trustee.
Fitch's ratings address timely payment of interest and principal on
a quarterly basis.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Originator's Credit Quality: The rating of the transaction is tied
to the credit quality of the originator, Davivienda Sal. In May
2020, Fitch affirmed Davivienda Sal's Long-Term Issuer Default
Rating at 'B' and revised the Outlook to Negative from Stable. The
LT IDR of Davivienda Sal reflects the potential support from its
shareholder Banco Davivienda, S.A. (Davivienda; BBB-/Negative).
Going Concern Assessment Score: Fitch assigned Davivienda Sal a
going concern assessment score of 'GC2' based on the bank's
moderate systemic importance and the strong likelihood of parent
support. The agency tempers notching uplift for future flow
transactions originated by sponsors with support-driven ratings;
the DPR ratings are currently three notches above Davivienda Sal's
support-driven LT IDR.
Notching Uplift from IDR: The GCA score of GC2 allows for a maximum
uplift of four notches from the originator's IDR (in accordance
with the Fitch's Future Flow Criteria); however, the uplift is
tempered to three notches given the adverse environmental
conditions which may impact flow stability going forward.
Additionally, the maximum uplift is also tempered given the
originator's credit quality as maximum uplift is only applied to
transactions with originators that are rated in the lower end of
the rating scale and El Salvador's lack of a last resort lender.
Relatively Low Program Size: Davivienda Sal's total outstanding
future flow debt balance as of June 2020 represents 3.3% of the
bank's total funding and 13.7% of non-deposit funding based on
financials as of March 2020. Fitch considers these ratios small
enough to allow the financial future flow ratings up to the maximum
uplift indicated by the GCA score, but is tempered to three notches
in this case for the reasons described.
Coronavirus Impact on Transaction Flows: Total collections observed
through the 1H20 totaled $879.1 million. While these flows show a
slight decrease of approximately 6.2% from $937.2 million over the
same period in the prior year, Fitch expects that global events
such as the expected sharp economic global contractions given the
coronavirus pandemic and different containment measures could
translate into a more substantial decrease in transaction cash
flows which can add pressure to the assigned ratings.
Coverage Levels Commensurate with Assigned Rating: Debt Service
Coverage remains strong amid the current operating environment. The
coronavirus crisis is expected to negatively impact DPR flows.
However, the current environment has not translated into a
substantial decrease in flows through June 2020. Considering
average rolling quarterly cash flows between January 2016 and June
2020, Fitch expects quarterly debt service coverage ratios to be
approximately 43.8x the maximum quarterly debt service for the life
of the program.
Sovereign/Diversion Risk Reduced: The structure mitigates certain
sovereign risks by collecting cash flows offshore until periodic
debt service requirements are met, allowing the transaction to be
rated over the sovereign country ceiling (B). Fitch believes
payment diversion risk is partially mitigated by the AAs signed by
the three correspondent banks processing the vast majority of USD
DPR flows.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
positive rating action/upgrade:
-- Fitch does not anticipate developments with a high likelihood
of triggering an upgrade. However, the main constraint to the
program rating is the originator's rating and bank's operating
environment. If upgraded, Fitch will consider whether the same
uplift could be maintained or if it should be further tempered in
accordance with criteria.
Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
negative rating action/downgrade:
-- The transaction ratings are sensitive to changes in the credit
quality of the originating bank. A deterioration of the credit
quality of the sovereign and/or respective bank by one notch is
likely to pose a constraint to the rating of the transaction from
its current level.
-- The transaction ratings are sensitive to the ability of the
DPR business line to continue operating, as reflected by the GCA
score. Additionally, the transaction rating is sensitive to the
performance of the securitized business line. The quarterly DSCRs
are expected to be greater than 20x and should therefore be able to
withstand a significant decline in cash flows in the absence of
other issues. However, significant further declines in flows could
lead to a negative rating action. Any changes in these variables
will be analyzed in a rating committee to assess the possible
impact on the transaction ratings;
-- No company is immune to the economic and political conditions
of its home country. Political risks and the potential for
sovereign interference may increase as a sovereign's rating is
downgraded. However, the underlying structure and transaction
enhancements mitigate these risks to a level consistent with the
assigned rating.
BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO
International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.
USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.
REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING
The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.
PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS
The future flow ratings are driven by the credit risk of Banco
Davivienda Salvadoreno, S.A. as measured by its Long-Term IDR.
ESG CONSIDERATIONS
The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).
=====================
P U E R T O R I C O
=====================
INTERNATIONAL FOOD: Suit vs. Suppliers Moved to Illinois Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Francisco A. Besosa granted the motion of Defendants
Chicago Premium Steaks, LLC, Best Chicago Meat Company, LLC, and
Brandon Beavers to transfer the case captioned INTERNATIONAL FOOD
SERVICE PURCHASING GROUP, INC. v. CHICAGO PREMIUM STEAKS, LLC,
Civil No. 20-1162 (FAB) (D.P.R.) to the Northern District of
Illinois. The Defendants' motion to dismiss was deemed moot.
Plaintiff International Food Service Purchasing Group, Inc. alleged
that the defendants sold and delivered inedible skirt steaks and
other cuts of meat in violation of multiple purchase agreements.
This litigation is the most recent iteration of an ongoing dispute
between the parties. Two months before the commencement of this
litigation, IFSPG removed a civil action from Illinois State Court
to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. The Court took judicial notice of the pleadings and
orders filed and issued in the Northern District of Illinois and
Illinois State Court actions.
Chicago Premium and Best Chicago are limited liability companies,
both organized in Delaware and based in Chicago, Illinois. They
produce and sell meat products, including "USDA CHOICE" skirt
steaks. Beavers is the president and chief purchasing officer of
Chicago Premium. IFSPG is a Puerto Rico corporation "dedicated to,
among other things, the distribution of meat products in Puerto
Rico, the Caribbean, and South America."
On Sept. 16, 2016, IFSPG and Chicago Premium established a
distribution "relationship" concerning meat products of a specific
"grade and quality." In accordance with this relationship, IFSPG
purchased a bulk quantity of steaks from Chicago Premium on Sept.
27, 2017 and July 29, 2018. Subsequently, IFSPG distributed the
steaks to restaurants in Puerto Rico. Diners repeatedly rejected
the meat products, claiming that they were "not apt for human
consumption." In sum, diners refused to consume "around 800 to 900
meals" because the steaks were rancid and unacceptable.
IFSPG requested that Chicago Premium resolve the "problem with the
skirt steaks." The president of Chicago Premium, Chris Koziol,
allegedly apologized to Charles Maxwell, the president of IFSPG.
Koziol disclosed that a "meat producer had injected the cattle with
a certain enzyme," resulting in "inferior and defective products."
Although Chicago Premium labeled the skirt steaks "USDA CHOICE,"
the "actual product received by IFSPG was not of that grade and
quality." The vice president of Chicago Premium, Kris Ligas,
purportedly acknowledged that the company "would change the labels
to make [the meat] appear [to be] of higher quality."
After the skirt steak controversy, Chicago Premium delivered
"incomplete orders to IFSPG." By October 2018, it refused to
fulfill and process any orders for meat products. Consequently,
IFSPG lost several chain restaurant customers.
Paul Dwyer is the chief financial officer of Best Chicago and
Chicago Premium. In January 2019, he sent an e-mail to Maxwell
requesting that IFSPG remit "full payment" for "orders of defective
meat products." Before this e-mail, "IFSPG had only done business
with Chicago Premium, not Best Chicago." Dwyer informed IFSPG that
the companies "were related entities and that he was CFO for
both."
IFSPG attempts to pierce the corporate veil by contending that Best
Chicago is liable for the transgressions allegedly committed by
Chicago Premium i.e. breach of contract.
IFSPG also asserted Beavers disparaged Maxwell by referring to him
as a "deadbeat." Beavers allegedly called Gary Meixelsperger, the
president of Texas Food and "one of IFSPG's most important product
suppliers." He cautioned Meixelsperger that Maxwell "did not pay,
among other derogatory statements, and [warned] him to be careful
so that what happened between [Chicago Premium] and [IFSPG] did not
happen to [Texas Food]." After the telephone conversation with
Beavers, Meixelsperger called Maxwell to "insult him, tell him that
he owed him money . . . and to lower [IFSPG'] balance to $0.00 as
soon as possible." Consequently, IFSPG "had to reorganize all
pending business to [pay] the credit line balance with Texas
Food."
Chicago Premium commenced an action against IFSPG on Nov. 18, 2019
in the Circuit Court of Cook County, asserting account stated and
breach of contract causes of action. The allegations set forth by
Chicago Premium in Illinois State Court and by IFSPG in the
District of Puerto Rico arose from the same nucleus of facts.
IFSPG filed a voluntary petition in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico on March 20, 2020. The
petition stipulated that Chicago Premium Steaks possesses a
disputed and unsecured claim to $263,463.52.. Subsequently, IFSPG
notified the Northern District of Illinois that "pursuant to 11
U.S.C. section 362(a), the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates
as a stay, applicable to all entities, of this civil action."
After IFSPG initiated the bankruptcy petition and the Northern
District of Illinois action, Chicago Premium Steaks filed a notice
of removal before Puerto Rico District Court. IFSPG commenced an
action in the Court of First Instance, San Juan Superior Court on
Dec. 20, 2019, a month after the complaint in the Illinois State
Court action. In the Court of First Instance complaint, IFSPG sets
forth four causes of action, including: (1) breach of contract
pursuant to P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, section 3018, (2) bad faith in
the performance of contractual obligations pursuant to P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 21, section 3404, (3) termination of a distribution
agreement without just cause pursuant to Law 75, P.R. Laws. Ann.
tit. 10, section 278a, and (4) defamation pursuant to P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 32, section 3143.
The defendants filed a notice of removal on March 26, 2020. They
moved to dismiss the complaint for two reasons:
-- The defendants argued that the Puerto Rico District Court
lacked personal jurisdiction.
-- Chicago Premium, Best Chicago, and Beavers contend that
"Puerto Rico is not the proper venue."
Courts possess discretion in "adjudicat[ing] motions for transfer
according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of
convenience and fairness." To determine whether transfer is
warranted, courts consider the following four factors: (1) the
convenience of the parties and witnesses, (2) the availability of
documents, (3) the possibility of consolidation, and (4) the order
in which the district court obtained jurisdiction." The
"first-filed" rule pertains to the fourth factor. This principle
holds that "where identical actions are proceeding concurrently in
two federal courts, entailing duplicative litigation and a waste of
judicial resources, the first-filed action is generally preferred
in a choice-of-venue decision."
According to Judge Besosa, this action could have commenced in the
Northern District of Illinois. A district court has original
jurisdiction of all civil actions between citizens of different
states where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000. The
monetary demand is ambiguous, seeking a sum "to be determined at
trial." IFSPG has set forth sufficient allegations, however, to
establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. As
evidenced by the discovery conducted in the Northern District of
Illinois action, IFSPG, Chicago Premium and Beavers are diverse.
Moreover, Chicago Best is a citizen of Illinois. Accordingly, IFSPG
could have filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois.
In the context of section 1404, "the convenience of witnesses is
probably the most important factor in deciding whether to
transfer.
Judge Besosa stated that most of the potential witnesses are
located in Illinois, including Beavers, Koziol, Ligas, Dwyer and
personnel employed by Chicago Premium and Chicago Best. Maxwell is
the only resident of Puerto Rico named in the complaint.
Accordingly, the first factor of the section 1404 analysis
militates toward transfer.
The third and fourth factors of the section 1404 analysis "prevent
duplication and inconsistent rulings." Transfer is appropriate when
the actions subject to consolidation are in the early stages of
litigation. The fourth factor establishes that "the first filed
action is generally preferred in a choice-of-venue decision."
The Northern District of Illinois and the District of Puerto Rico
actions are both in the early stages of litigation. The former is
stayed pursuant to section 362 because IFSPG filed a bankruptcy
petition. The allegations and causes of action set forth by Chicago
Premium and IFSPG are nearly identical. For instance, both parties
invoke the breach of contract statute in their respective
jurisdictions. The affirmative defense raised by IFSPG in the
Northern District of Illinois action is merely a harbinger of the
District of Puerto Rico complaint. Although the District of Puerto
Rico and the First Circuit Court of Appeals adjudicate Law 75
actions with more frequency, courts in other jurisdictions have
resolved claims arising from this statute on numerous occasions.5
Accordingly, consolidation is feasible and serves to avoid the
waste of judicial resources.
The Northern District of Illinois action predates the District of
Puerto Rico action by two months. Because the factors in favor of
transfer predominate, Judge Besosa granted the defendants' motion
to change venue.
A copy of the Court's Opinion and Order dated July 31, 2020 is
available at https://bit.ly/3kVpzkp from Leagle.com.
About International Food Service Purchasing Group
International Food Service Purchasing Group Inc. is a non-profit
organization in San Juan, P.R., that provides supply chain
analysis and management services for the restaurant industry.
International Food Service filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr.
D.P.R. Case No. 20-01458) on March 20, 2020. In the petition
signed by Charles A. Maxwell, its president, the Debtor was
estimated to have $1 million to $10 million in both assets and
liabilities.
Alexandra Bigas Valedon, Esq., at Modesto Bigas Law Office, is
Debtor's bankruptcy counsel.
=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================
PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Lost 3 Oil Supertankers to Chinese Partner
------------------------------------------------------------------
Luc Cohen and Roslan Khasawneh at Reuters report that a shipping
joint venture between Venezuela and China has fallen apart in the
wake of U.S. sanctions, resulting in the South American nation
losing three supertankers at a time when foreign shippers are
reluctant to carry its oil, court documents show.
PetroChina Co Ltd, which had been state-run Petroleos de
Venezuela's partner in the Singapore-based joint venture CV
Shipping Pte Ltd, took control of the three tankers between January
and February, according the documents from a Singapore court
reviewed by Reuters.
The transfer of the Junin, Boyaca and Carabobo very large crude
carriers (VLCC) has not been previously reported, according to
Reuters.
It came after U.S. sanctions on PDVSA left the vessels without
insurance, leading to millions of dollars in losses for CV Shipping
and prompting PetroChina to place it in bankruptcy, the report
notes. The original purpose of the venture was to ship Venezuelan
oil to China and some other export destinations, the report
relates.
PDVSA's loss of the three tankers, which carry each up to 2 million
barrels of oil, comes as it is more dependent than ever on its
in-house fleet, the report discloses. Washington is intensifying
its 18-month campaign to oust Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro
by sanctioning third-party vessels that transport the OPEC nation's
oil, the report relates.
That has prompted major Greek shipping firms, some of whose vessels
have been sanctioned for transporting Venezuelan crude, to stop
working with PDVSA, prompting Venezuelan oil exports to collapse,
the report says.
PDVSA has until now managed to retain a fourth VLCC from the
venture, the Ayacucho.
But a U.S. glass manufacturer seeking to collect a $500 million
arbitral award for Venezuela's 2010 expropriation of two factories
is suing in Singapore court to seize that tanker, Reuters
reported.
The dispute marks an unceremonious end to the once-ambitious
venture launched in 2008 as oil-hungry China sought to deepen ties
with Venezuela under former President Hugo Chavez, Maduro's
predecessor and mentor, the report notes. China has since
drastically scaled back support, contributing to Venezuela's
collapse under Maduro, the report says.
"The fundamental purpose of this JV has already irretrievably
broken down," Xia Hongwei, a PetroChina executive, wrote in a Sept.
17, 2019 letter to PDVSA executives included in the court filings.
Neither PetroChina nor PDVSA responded to requests for comment for
this story.
Petrochina moved to place CV Shipping into court-administered
liquidation in Singapore in January 2020, around a year after
Washington first sanctioned PDVSA to try to cut off oil revenue to
Maduro, who remains in power, the report notes.
China remains one of the main importers of Venezuelan crude, mostly
by way of ship-to-ship transfers that make it appear as if the
origin of the crude is Malaysia, the report relays.
No Insurance, Accounts Frozen
The sanctions set off a series of cascading crises at the venture.
Bermuda-based insurer Standard Club revoked protection and
indemnity (P&I) insurance for all four vessels in May last year,
letters included in the court records show, the report notes.
CV Shipping's insurance broker, Willis Towers Watson, explained in
an email included in the case file that Standard Club made that
decision because "it did not want to be exposed to the risk of
being or becoming subject to sanctions," the report relays.
Standard Club declined to comment.
Singapore law requires vessels to have P&I insurance to set sail,
so that move rendered the tankers effectively unable to navigate,
according to an affidavit written by a PetroChina lawyer, the
report dsicloses.
In addition, CV Shipping's banks froze the company's accounts, and
the vessels' shipmanagers warned they would soon cancel their
contracts, the affidavit read, the report relays.
CV Shipping, which posted annual profits ranging from $600,000-$14
million from operating the vessels between 2013 and 2018, quickly
found itself losing $500,000 per month since it had to pay for
management fees and fuel, even though the ships could not earn
revenue by transporting oil, the affidavit showed, the report
relates.
To stem losses, PetroChina in June 2019 proposed ending the CV
Shipping venture and splitting the four vessels between the two
firms. PDVSA had taken over management of the Ayacucho in June 2019
while it was in Venezuelan waters, according to a notice to its
previous manager included in the docket, the report says.
Xia described this move as "unilateral" in a June 28 email to PDVSA
executives, but nonetheless proposed the company keep the vessel
and the Carabobo, leaving the Junin and the Boyaca to PetroChina,
the report notes.
Shares in the Ayacucho and Junin were transferred to PDVSA and
PetroChina, respectively, on Jan. 17, 2020.
PDVSA paid $17.8 million for shares in the Ayacucho while
PetroChina paid $13.8 million for the Junin shares, according to a
sale and purchase agreement included in the court docket, the
report says. The payment was deducted from loans the shareholders
had made to the venture, the report relates.
But the two parties were unable to reach a deal for the remaining
two vessels, prompting PetroChina to request CVS be placed in
liquidation, a move swiftly authorized by Singapore courts. The
appointed liquidator proposed an auction of the remaining two
tankers between the two companies, and asked both parties to
provide proof of funds, which PDVSA said it could not do because of
the sanctions, the report notes.
"Due to force majeure, expressed in the unilateral coercive
measures imposed by the Government of the United States of America
on our behalf, which is public and recognized, we are not able to
indicate a bank account," Oswaldo Vargas - who ran PDVSA's maritime
subsidiary, PDV Marina - wrote the liquidator on Feb. 22.
The U.S. Treasury Department, which enforces sanctions, did not
respond to a request for comment. Vargas was removed from the
company and arrested by Venezuelan authorities on allegations of
complicity with fuel smuggling in March, the report relays.
The liquidator, acting on CV Shipping's behalf, subsequently
reached a deal in a private negotiation with PetroChina to sell the
shares in the Carabobo and Boyaca, for 1 Singapore dollar ($0.7287)
each, after PetroChina agreed to pay off the inter-company debt the
two vessels' parent companies owed to CV Shipping for around $53
million total, the report adds.
Petrochina made the payments on Feb. 26.
About PDVSA
Founded in 1976, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) is the
Venezuelan state-owned oil and natural gas company, which engages
in exploration, production, refining and exporting oil as well as
exploration and production of natural gas. It employs around
70,000 people and reported $48 billion in revenues in 2016.
As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on June 3,
2019, Moody's Investors Service withdrew all the ratings of
Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. including the senior unsecured and
senior secured ratings due to insufficient information. At the
time of withdrawal, the ratings were C and the outlook was stable.
Citgo Petroleum Corporation (CITGO) is Venezuela's main foreign
asset. CITGO is majority-owned by PDVSA. CITGO is a United
States-based refiner, transporter and marketer of transportation
fuels, lubricants, petrochemicals and other industrial products.
However, CITGO formally cut ties with PDVSA at about February 2019
after U.S. sanctions were imposed on PDVSA. The sanctions are
designed to curb oil revenues to the administration of President
Nicolas Maduro and support for the Juan Guaido-headed party.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2020. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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* * * End of Transmission * * *