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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Thursday, June 11, 2020, Vol. 21, No. 117

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

JOHN DEERE: Moody's Withdraws (P)Caa1/Baa3.ar Debt Ratings


B E L I Z E

BELIZE: Launches First Ever US Dollar-Denominated Treasury Note


B R A Z I L

RUMO SA: Fitch Affirms BB LongTerm Foreign Currency IDR


C O S T A   R I C A

COSTA RICA: S&P Cuts Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'B'


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Mining to Play Role in Rapid Recovery


J A M A I C A

DIGICEL GROUP: Enters Deal With French Telecoms Firm Iliad
TRANSJAMAICAN HIGHWAY: S&P Alters Outlook to Neg. & Affirms B+ ICR


M E X I C O

BANCO AHORRO FAMSA: Moody's Withdraws 'Caa1' LT Deposit Ratings
INTERJET AIRLINES: Denies Pursuing Mexican Bankruptcy


P U E R T O   R I C O

PUERTO RICO: Ambac Files Complaint Against Oversight Board


X X X X X X X X

LATAM: Countries Renew CCRIF Coverage for Hurricane Season

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================

JOHN DEERE: Moody's Withdraws (P)Caa1/Baa3.ar Debt Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo, S.A. has
withdrawn the (P)Caa1/Baa3.ar global and national scale local
currency ratings and the (P)Ca/Ca.ar global and national scale
foreign currency ratings assigned to John Deere Credit Compania
Financiera S.A.'s global senior debt program for up to Ar$11,200
million (or an equivalent amount in other currencies). The
remaining ratings assigned to the issuer are unaffected by this
rating action.

Moody's has decided to withdraw the ratings for its own business
reasons.




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B E L I Z E
===========

BELIZE: Launches First Ever US Dollar-Denominated Treasury Note
---------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Belize government has launched the
first-ever United States dollar-denominated Treasury Note with
interest to be paid semi-annually.

Prime Minister Dean Barrow said proceeds of the note are purposed
to augment the stock of official Central Bank reserves while the
maturity is tailor-made to span the COVID-19 crisis, according to
RJR News.

Mr. Barrow added that to facilitate the remittance of interest and
principal payments, successful purchasers of these notes, whether
individual, institutional or corporate, will also be eligible for
domestic US dollar accounts, the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
14, 2020, Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term
foreign-currency and local-currency issuer and senior unsecured
debt ratings of the Government of Belize to Caa1 from B3 and
changed the outlook to negative from stable.




===========
B R A Z I L
===========

RUMO SA: Fitch Affirms BB LongTerm Foreign Currency IDR
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Rumo S.A.'s Long-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating at 'BB', Long-Term Local-Currency IDR at
BB+', National Long-Term Ratings and unsecured debentures at
'AAA(bra)'. In addition, Fitch affirmed Rumo's national
subsidiaries' National long-term ratings at 'AAA(bra)', and Rumo's
unsecured bonds due in 2024 and 2025, which were issued by Rumo
Luxembourg S.a.r.l., at 'BB'. The Rating Outlook for the LC IDR and
the National long-term ratings is Stable. The Rating Outlook for
the FC IDR is Negative, constrained by Brazil's 'BB-'/Negative
Outlook, which results from the Country Ceiling or its direct link
to the Sovereign rating, for which the Outlook was revised to
Negative from Stable on May 5, 2020.

Rumo's FC IDR is capped by Brazil's 'BB' Country Ceiling, as the
company's operations are essentially in Brazil and does not have
substantial assets or cash held abroad to mitigate transfer and
convertibility risk.

The rating affirmations reflect Fitch's belief that the impact of
the coronavirus pandemic on Rumo's businesses is limited. The
company should continue to benefit from the continued expansion of
agribusiness in Brazil, maintaining solid margins, consistent
operating cash flow generation and conservative capital structure,
during the strong capex cycle. The Stable Outlook for the LC IDR
and the National long-term rating incorporates Fitch's projections
that Rumo can maintain low to moderate leverage over the medium
term, peaking at 3.3x in 2021 when capex is at its highest level,
then returning to levels below 3.0x from 2022 on, while the company
captures additional volumes, mainly coming from its newest Malha
Central network investments.

Rumo's ratings are supported by its solid business position as one
of the largest railroad operators in Brazil. The company has
competitive advantages over other transportation options, with
relatively high and stable operating profitability and robust cash
flow generation. The industry fundamentals are strong and benefit
from stable demand throughout the cycles. The rating incorporates
Rumo's conservative capital structure, as well as its sound
liquidity position, which are important credit factors, with low
debt concentration during the strong capex period. The company has
consistent access to the local and international debt and capital
markets, even under more restrictive credit scenarios. Rumo is
controlled by Cosan Limited (BB/Stable) and is part of Cosan Group,
one of the largest Brazilian conglomerates, with leading companies
in several sectors.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Business Profile Remains Strong: Fitch believes the railroad sector
risks are low, supported by consistent demand, high barriers to
entrance and low competition threats. In this sector, Rumo benefits
from its robust business position as the sole rail transport
company in the south and midwest regions of the country, with five
concessions to operate more than 13 thousand kilometers of tracks
and access to three of Brazil's main ports. Due to a lower cost
structure, the company enjoys solid competitive advantages over
truck transport, which enhances its consistent demand and limits
volume volatilities over cycles. Fitch believes the addition of the
central section of Ferrovia Norte-Sul (Rumo Malha Central) to
Rumo's portfolio in 2019, and the renewal of Rumo Malha Paulista
concession contract, have positive credit implications. The new
stretch, when operational, should increase Rumo's presence in
Brazil's midwestern region. The Rumo Malha Paulista concession
contract renewal, which is a strategic stretch to Rumo's business
model, protects the company's access to Santos Port, preserving its
business' profitability. Both projects offer vast opportunities for
capturing greater volumes of grain in the region.

Preserved Business Environment: Rumo's operations benefit from the
solid international trade flow of agricultural products in Brazil,
which has high growth potential, in addition to reducing the
company's risks of operating in one region (Brazil). Fitch
recognizes that the rail industry tends to suffer limited impacts
from the coronavirus pandemic, due to the restricted dependence on
domestic economic activity. These factors should reasonably protect
Rumo's volumes, even during the crisis. Fitch expects Rumo to
transport 65 billion revenue ton kilometer in 2020, and 70 billion
RTK in 2021, which compares favorably to 60 billion RTK reported in
2019. Fitch estimates annual volume increases of 8% in 2020, and
10% to 16% annually from 2021 onwards, when the central stretch
becomes operational. Rumo's main cargo is comprised of agricultural
products, mainly soybean (38.8%), corn (32.5%), and sugar and
fertilizers (10.7%) in 2019 for exports.

Capex Put Pressures on FCF: Fitch expects a temporary reduction in
Rumo's EBITDA margins to below 40% in 2020 and 2021, from 42.7% in
2019. Volume expansion and operational efficiency from its existing
assets boosted 2019 margins, but should not offset pre-operating
expenses related to Rumo Malha Central's new concession contract,
and the concession fee for Rumo Malha Pauista. Fitch's base
scenario foresees EBITDA and funds from operation of BRL3.0 billion
and BRL2.0 billion in 2020, and BRL3.4 billion and BRL2.2 billion
in 2021, respectively. The new cycle of investments in Rumo Malha
Paulista should put pressure on the company's FCF, which will
remain in the negative through 2023, totaling BRL4.8 billion for
the period. Fitch projects around BRL14.8 billion of capex from
2020 to 2023, and BRL7.7 billion in the next two years.

Leverage Remains Conservative: Rumo should report net leverage from
2.5x to 3.0x during the strong investment cycle over the next four
years. Fitch's baseline scenario considers net leverage ratio, as
measured by net debt/EBITDA, to reach 2.8x in 2020 and peak at 3.3x
in 2021, during the highest investment period. Improvements in
Rumo's operating cash flow generation, led by gains of scale coming
from the investments, should result in net leverage closer to 2.5x
from 2022 onwards.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Rumo's ratings reflect its strong business profile in the logistics
infrastructure industry in Brazil, which enjoys positive prospect.
The railroad's low-cost structure and Rumo's position as the sole
railroad provider in its covered region provides important
competitive advantages, allowing it to report consistent volume
improvements and increasing operating cash flow generation while
its operational capacity expands.

A rating constrain is its business concentration in one country, as
it only serves Brazil's agribusiness and industrial regions, like
most of its Brazilian peers, but different from other railroads
worldwide, which enjoy a more diversified covered region. The
company's track record on generating strong cash generation and its
ability to improve its credit metrics over the last three years are
important credit factors that support Rumo's ratings.

Rumo's LC IDR (BB+/Stable) is positioned below Brazil's MRS S.A.
(BBB-/Negative) which is the best-positioned railroad in the
country, due to the more resilient cargo profile and track record
of positive FCF of MRS, while Rumo needs to manage the negative FCF
expectation, derived from its large investment programs. Rumo's and
MRS's ratings are below those of other mature, more geographically
diversified and less leveraged rail companies in Mexico, the U.S.
and Canada, like Kansas City Southern, rated 'BBB' by Fitch. Rumo's
LC IDR is above that of Hidrovias do Brasil S.A. (HdB, BB/Stable),
due to the railroad's ability to generate more stable operating
cash flow and to finance the large investment to increase volumes.
HdB's net leverage is higher than Rumo's, consistent with its still
immature profile, but based on predictable cash flow generation
within the coastal shipping business in Brazil, which also enjoys
low competition.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's main assumptions are:

  -- Agricultural volumes to increase 10% annually;

  -- Industrial volumes to decline 1% in 2020 and increase per GDP
from 2021 onwards;

  -- Additional 2 billion RTL and 8 billion RTK in 2021 and 2022,
respectively, coming from Rumo Malha Central;

  -- Average tariffs increasing by inflation rate in 2020 and
2021;

  -- Total capex of BRL14.8 billion from 2020 to 2023, being BRL7.7
billion over the next two years.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

  -- Upgrade in Rumo's LC IDR are unlikely in the medium term, due
to the strong capex program over the next years, which results in
leverage far from the upgrade sensitivity;

  -- Positive actions on National Scale Ratings does not applies as
the rating is at the top of the national scale category.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

  -- Inability to finance capex with long-term and low-cost debt,
putting pressure on debt amortization schedule;

  -- Substantial weakening of current EBITDA margin;

  -- Net adjusted leverage trends above 3.5x, on a sustainable
basis.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Strong Liquidity: Fitch believes Rumo's liquidity will remain
healthy over the next months and throughout the investment cycle.
The short-term debt coverage ratio has remained above 1.5x since
2017, and should be sustained higher than 1.0x. Fitch believes
Rumo' will continue to raise long-term funds to finance its
negative FCF and preserve its debt coverage by cash. At the end
March 2020, Rumo had a cash of BRL3.6 billion and consolidated
total debt of BRL11.5 billion, mainly composed of senior notes
(BRL5.5 billion), debt with BNDES (BRL3.1 billion) and debentures
(BRL2.4 billion). Debts due until 2022 totaled BRL3.1 billion. The
company raised relevant amount of debt over the next two months,
which has enhanced its liquidity.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

  -- Confirming (reverse factoring) operations adjusted Rumo's
debt.

  -- Fitch considers restricted cash (including long term) as
readily available liquidity.

  -- Net derivatives adjusted to debt; D&A excluded from COGS;
Dividends from associates and minorities are adjusting EBITDA.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Rumo S.A.: Labor Relations & Practices: 4 Rumo has an ESG score of
4 for Labor Relations & Practices as it reports labor liabilities
from the period when some of its assets were operated by the
government. Company has exposure to cash flow impact of judgement
regarding these liabilities. Except for the matters discussed, the
highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score of 3
- ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit
impact on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in
which they are being managed by the entity(ies).

Rumo Luxembourg S.a.r.l      

  - Senior unsecured; LT BB; Affirmed

Rumo Malha Paulista S.A.

  - Natl LT AAA(bra); Affirmed

Rumo Malha Norte S.A.

  - Natl LT AAA(bra); Affirmed

Rumo Malha Sul S.A.

  - Natl LT AAA(bra); Affirmed

Rumo S.A.

  - LT IDR BB; Affirmed

  - LC LT IDR BB+; Affirmed

  - Natl LT AAA(bra); Affirmed

  - Senior unsecured; Natl LT AAA(bra); Affirmed




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C O S T A   R I C A
===================

COSTA RICA: S&P Cuts Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on June 9, 2020, lowered its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Costa Rica to 'B'
from 'B+'. The outlook on the long-term ratings is negative. At the
same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term sovereign credit
ratings. S&P also revised its transfer and convertibility
assessment to 'BB-' from 'BB'.

Outlook

The negative outlook indicates the possibility of a downgrade over
the coming 12 months should Costa Rica's political leadership fail
to demonstrate a more concerted, consistent, and timely commitment
to corrective fiscal actions to stem potential increased liquidity
pressures from the sovereign's growing funding needs. Poor
policymaking or uneven policy implementation could weaken the
sustainability of Costa Rica's growth and public finance
trajectories. It could also result in a less favorable view of the
country's institutional framework--despite widespread checks and
balances and a solid democratic tradition--and lead us to lower the
rating.

Upon assuming office recently, Finance Minister Elian Villegas has
underscored the need to lower Costa Rica's high interest burden,
which has risen in recent years on higher debt and local borrowing
costs. The expected hit to Costa Rica's revenue base amid COVID-19
exacerbates the budgetary pressure from the interest bill. A
combination of large funding needs and potentially poor debt
management decisions (including reliance on central bank financing
or other unconventional financing) could also lead to a downgrade.

Conversely, S&P could revise the outlook to stable over the same
period if the government is able to:

-- Lower its fiscal deficit sufficiently to gradually stabilize
its debt burden,

-- Contain interest costs, and

-- Undertake more flexible debt management to reduce its exposure
to potential adverse movements in interest rates and the exchange
rate.

Such steps, along with a rebound in economic growth after the
pandemic, could boost investor confidence, sustain foreign direct
investment (FDI), and reduce the country's external vulnerability.

Rationale

The downgrade reflects a larger and persistent worsening in Costa
Rica's public finances following a deeper-than-expected economic
contraction in 2020. In addition, the downgrade follows mixed
signals from the government about whether it will vigorously
implement aspects of the 2018 fiscal reform. Poor policy
implementation could worsen S&P's view of Costa Rica's
institutional strengths and reduce the sovereign's access to market
funding.

In March 2020, S&P had indicated downside risk to the ratings if
there were signs of a lesser commitment to corrective fiscal
actions. In our view, increased risks have now materialized.

At the end of May 2020, former finance minister Rodrigo Chaves
resigned after Congress exempted local governments from complying
with aspects of the 2018 fiscal reform law, and President Alvarado
then signed the legislation. The negative signal these events
send--more than their direct budgetary impact--weighs on the
rating. This was the second finance minister to step down in the
last six months amid tensions within the administration over the
implementation of the landmark fiscal reform, reflecting
disagreement over its scope and comprehensiveness and the pace of
fiscal adjustment.

S&P said, "In our view, these events reinforce questions about the
administration's commitment to fiscal consolidation after the
pandemic. We now expect the general government deficit to rise to
9% of GDP in 2020 and remain little changed in 2021. National
elections in February 2022 could impede fiscal correction next
year. We also now expect net general government debt to rise above
70% of GDP in 2022 and interest to revenue to average 20% over the
next three years (because of increased interest costs from higher
debt and a hit to Costa Rica's revenue base amid the pandemic)."

Costa Rica's fiscal and external profiles are complicated because
of rigidities and long-standing vulnerabilities in the government's
debt management procedures. Congress has often held back approval
for the government to issue external debt, forcing it to rely on a
small domestic market. Such political obstacles have weakened the
predictability of debt management and reduced the government's
financial flexibility.

The constitution requires Congress to approve all individual
borrowings, and external debt, with a two-thirds majority. The
approval process has often been slow, and political resistance has
stymied multiyear borrowing authorization the finance ministry
sought to facilitate greater flexibility. This heightens the
challenges to effective debt management given the higher funding
needs associated with the government's weaker fiscal profile.

The government's reliance on external financing (from both
commercial and official creditors), given the limited size of local
markets, led to a sharp rise in Costa Rica's external indebtedness
over the past decade as well.

Despite solid FDI inflows that have generally covered the current
account deficit (CAD), vulnerabilities associated with external
debt and financing pose key rating weaknesses. Costa Rica recently
gained access to $500 million in funding from the IMF's Rapid
Financing Instrument (RFI). S&P said, "We expect that Congressional
approval of the RFI, given the absence of policy conditionality,
should move forward in the coming month. However, we expect that
political resistance in Congress would likely complicate advancing
any (as of yet not planned) potential standby arrangement with the
IMF, given the policy conditionality typically associated with it."
The government has already started negotiations for additional
borrowing from other multilateral lending institutions, including
Inter-American Development Bank, Corporación Andina de Fomento,
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Central
American Bank for Economic Integration, and Agence Française de
Développement.

S&P said, "We expect Costa Rica's narrow net external debt to
average 73% of current account receipts (CAR) during 2020-2023 and
its gross external financing needs to average 105% of CAR in the
same period.

"We now expect a 3.6% contraction in real GDP this year, before a
moderate recovery in 2021. This reflects a strong hit to domestic
demand amid measures to combat COVID-19 internally and a drop in
tourism and goods exports due to the economic contraction in the
U.S. and global trading partners."

S&P expects GDP to rebound to about 3.3% growth in 2021 and 3%
growth in 2022-2023. Persistently large budget deficits will limit
the government's ability to make investments, especially in
much-needed physical infrastructure, limiting the ability of the
economy to expand at a faster pace over the coming years. Costa
Rica's pre-pandemic GDP growth trajectory had been decelerating in
recent years.

The ratings on Costa Rica also reflect its well-established
democracy, which has brought political stability amid solid checks
and balances, and a generally prosperous economy and standards of
living compared with regional peers. Amid persistent fiscal
slippage over the past decade--that led to a doubling of government
debt as a share of GDP--the political leadership's policy response
has not been proactive and timely. In 2018, passage of long-debated
(for almost a decade) fiscal reform aimed at curtailing expenditure
growth and bolstering revenue only came after pronounced financial
pressure in the local capital market throughout the year.

Monetary policy credibility and execution have benefited from an
inflation-targeting regime, more exchange rate flexibility, and a
decline and stabilization in the level of dollarization in the
financial system. That said, the moderate levels of dollarization,
around 40%, somewhat constrain monetary policy flexibility and
exchange rate management. Amid the COVID-19 shock, the central bank
has cut rates to a historical low of 1.25% in March.

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) credit factors for this
credit rating change:

-- Health and safety
-- Governance factors




===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Mining to Play Role in Rapid Recovery
---------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the former president of the Mining and
Oil Chamber of the Dominican Republic (CAMIPE), Jose Bernardo Sena,
said that with investments underway and projected for $2.6 billion,
metal and non-metal mining will play a leading role in the rapid
recovery of the economy of the Dominican Republic in the context of
the COVID-19 disease.

The approach was made by the sector consultant in the virtual
activity Un cafe con Multivalores, trading post, with the
coordination of its general manager Erick Jerez, according to
Dominican Today.

When breaking down the projected investments, he explained that
there are 1.3 billion dollars from Barrick Pueblo Viejo in gold,
silver, and copper; Falcodo for an amount of 190 million dollars in
iron and nickel; and Cerro Maimon for a billion in copper and zinc,
the report notes.

He said that in the first quarter of this year alone, and in the
midst of the crisis caused by the coronavirus, mining generated 194
million dollars when all the sectors that produce foreign exchange
were closed, the report relays.

As explained, of the two large mining companies that are currently
operating in the country, the State is obtaining around 50% of the
benefits, so it called for the mining cycle to be understood and
for the ministries to become investment facilitators instead of
blocking them, the report discloses.

He gave as an example the case of Gold Quest, which after 15 years
of investment in exploration with an investment of $ 50 million,
suddenly created a protected area where the deposits were
discovered, the report notes.

He suggested strengthening the Ministry of Energy and Mines in
competitive policies that attract investment and pointed out the
importance of the approval of the Land Planning Law to be clear
about what type of economic activity can work in each place, the
report says.

He indicated that, due to the confidence in the DR, the so-called
junior mining companies, which are nourished by funds from the
stock market, have invested nearly 70 million dollars in search of
precious metals in San Juan, Dajabon and Santiago Rodriguez in the
last 10 years, the report relays.

In Sena's opinion, the technologies and the sense of environmental
responsibility of mining in these times make the projects viable,
the report discloses. However, he understands that clear public
policies are required to clear uncertainties and foster stability
for investments, the report relates.

He valued as a fact of high importance that the Dominican Republic
has been admitted to the Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative (EITI) because it contributes to the efficient use of
resources from mining activity that reaches the State, the report
adds.

                    About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in April 2019
that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the UASD
Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic stands at
BB- with negative outlook (April 2020). Moody's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3 with stable outlook (July
2017). Fitch's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last
reported at BB- with negative outlook (May 8, 2020).




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J A M A I C A
=============

DIGICEL GROUP: Enters Deal With French Telecoms Firm Iliad
----------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Digicel Group has entered into a joint
venture agreement with French telecommunications operator Iliad.

The agreement will allow the French operator to access Digicel's
Radio Access Network capabilities in the French West Indies,
according to RJR News.

The agreement sees Digicel monetising its network assets across
five countries in the French West Indies region, while Iliad
benefits from a solution to launch its mobile services, the report
relays.

The agreement is subject to the required regulatory approvals, the
report adds.

                     About Digicel Group

Digicel Group is a mobile phone network provider operating in 33
markets across the Caribbean, Central America, and Oceania regions.
The company is owned by the Irish billionaire Denis O'Brien, is
incorporated in Bermuda, and based in Jamaica.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America April
17, 2020, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Digicel Group
Limited's probability of default rating to Caa3-PD from Caa2-PD. At
the same time, Moody's downgraded the senior secured rating of
Digicel International Finance Limited to Caa1
from B3. All other ratings within the group remain unchanged. The
outlook is negative.

On April 10, 2020, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings has
downgraded Digicel Limited to 'C' from 'CCC', and its outstanding
debt instruments, including the 2021 and 2023 notes to 'C'/'RR4'
from 'CCC'/'RR4'. Fitch has also downgraded Digicel International
Finance Limited to 'CCC+'
from 'B-'/Negative, and its outstanding debt instruments, including
the 2024 notes and the 2025 credit facility, to 'CCC+'/'RR4' from
'B-'/'RR4'. Fitch has removed the Negative Rating Outlook from
DIFL.


TRANSJAMAICAN HIGHWAY: S&P Alters Outlook to Neg. & Affirms B+ ICR
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised the outlook on Transjamaican Highway
Limited (Transjamaica or the project) to negative from stable, and
affirmed its 'B+' rating on the notes.

S&P said, "We expect the pandemic-related decline in tourism and
other sectors to dent the country's revenues, which together with
government spending will result in a fiscal deficit this year.

"In this context, we updated our GDP forecasts for the country. We
now predict GDP to contract 13% this year versus our previous
expectations of 2% growth, and forecast a recovery to a positive
path next year. Therefore, we revised our base case for
Transjamaica to include a 20% drop in Class I vehicles (light) and
a 5% decrease in class II and III vehicles (heavy) for this year.
Nevertheless, we expect a recovery back to 2019 traffic levels in
2021. More precisely, we expect Jamaica's economy to expand by
about 8% in 2021 and almost 6% in 2022, and then close to 2%
between 2023 to 2036, while traffic will continue averaging about
2.3% for 2021-2036. We also anticipate a still robust DSCR of about
2.2x for 2020 compared with last year's 2.7x, which continues to be
consistent with a stand-alone credit profile (SACP) of 'bbb+'. The
minimum DSCR remains unchanged at about 2.05x in 2022.

"We tested the project to assess if it could withstand a
hypothetical sovereign stress, and concluded that there's a
considerable likelihood that the project would default if the
sovereign were to default. The test includes severe macroeconomic
stresses such as a 100% depreciation of the Jamaican dollar, a 10%
contraction in GDP that causes traffic to plummet, and a doubling
of inflation rate. In such a scenario, the project's cash flows
would significantly worsen. Despite a six-month cash-funded reserve
account located offshore, we don't believe cash flows would be
enough to fully pay debt payments in 2022 (defined as the year of
the stress). Therefore, we don't rate TJH above the rating on
Jamaica."

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) credit factors for this
credit rating change:

-- Health and safety




===========
M E X I C O
===========

BANCO AHORRO FAMSA: Moody's Withdraws 'Caa1' LT Deposit Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico has withdrawn all ratings assigned to Banco
Ahorro Famsa, S.A.

The following ratings and assessments of Banco Ahorro Famsa, S.A.
(820539657) were withdrawn:

  - Baseline Credit Assessment of caa1

  - Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment of caa1

  - Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Caa1,
Negative Outlook

  - Short-term global local currency deposit rating of Not Prime

  - Long-term global foreign currency deposit rating of Caa1,
Negative Outlook

  - Short-term global foreign currency deposit rating of Not Prime

  - Long-term Mexican National Scale deposit rating of B2.mx

  - Short-term Mexican National Scale deposit rating of MX-4

  - Long-term counterparty risk assessment of B3(cr)

  - Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr)

Outlook changed to Ratings Withdrawn from Negative outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's is obligated to withdraw the ratings in accordance with
local regulatory requirements following the termination of the
rating agreement at the request of the issuer. A recent action
prior to this withdrawal announced a downgrade of some or all of
the issuer's ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
Methodology published in November 2019. The period of time covered
in the financial information used to determine Banco Ahorro Famsa,
S.A.'s rating is between January 1, 2016 and March 31, 2020.


INTERJET AIRLINES: Denies Pursuing Mexican Bankruptcy
-----------------------------------------------------
Daniel Martinez Garbuno, writing for Simple Flying, reports that
Mexican airline company Interjet has denied reports that it applied
bankruptcy protection in Mexico.

Debtwire published on May 11, 2020, that Interjet failed "in a
first attempt to obtain protection from creditors through a
concurso, or bankruptcy proceeding."  Interjet failed to do it
because of the Mexican bureaucracy.  Due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
the Mexican legal system is working at a lesser pace, thus the
judges aren't receiving any new legal filings.  They only worked
with proceedings that were already underway prior to the pandemic.
The judge was arbitrary in its decision of not accepting the
paperwork, according to Debtwire sources.  It added that Interjet
might file for a bankruptcy proceeding.

Over the previous months, Interjet has appeared in the news
regarding its poor performance.  Simple Flying previously reported
that Interjet lost up to 58 Airbus aircraft from its fleet, which
are repossessed by leasing companies.  This led Interjet to revive
some of its already parked Sukhoi Superjet fleet.  It is operating
3 out of 22 Russian-made planes.

The International Air Transport Association (IATA) Clearing House
implemented an immediate suspension of the company due to lack of
payment. Some reports state that Interjet is in debt with the
Mexican Government, thus resulting to the withdrawal of four Sukhoi
airplanes by the authorities.

On May 10, 2020, Interjet issued a statement saying that there is a
defamation campaign against the company.  It stated:

"It is despicable that in this crisis [...some are] willing to pay
for a dirty campaign against our company and board with the
publication of messages and commentaries that do not picture the
current state of our organization."

The airline added that all "truthful" information about the company
should come from Interjet.  What has Interjet said? First, that it
is renegotiating the terms with the leasing companies and that some
airplanes lease prices are over the current market conditions.
Second, that Interjet decided to leave IATA's Clearing House, not
the other way around. Third, it says that it is paying its taxes in
Mexico.

In March 2020, Interjet experienced a 34% decline in passenger
number but the most significant fallout in its numbers happened in
April 2020, when the airline stopped flying its Airbus fleet.  At
present, Interjet reduced its number of routes from 44
international and 42 domestic to just 6 local routes. Of these 6
domestic routes, only the Mexico City-Cancun operates daily.

                        About Interjet

Interjet is an international airline based in Mexico City carrying
almost 14 million passengers annually within Mexico and between
Mexico, the United States, Canada, Central, and South America.  In
all, it provides air service to 54 destinations in 10 countries
offering its passengers greater connections and travel options
through agreements with major airlines such as Alitalia, All Nippon
Airways (ANA), American Airlines, British Airways, Emirates, Air
Canada, LATAM Group, EVA Air, Iberia, Lufthansa, Hainan
Airlines,Hahn Air, Qatar Airlines and Japan Airlines.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Sep.
3, 2019, Interjet Airlines re-iterated the airline is not in
"technical bankruptcy" as erroneously reported by a financial news
agency.

Interjet Airlines is in a dispute with Mexico's Tax Administration
Service (SAT), related to alleged taxes owed by the airline. An
attempt by SAT to seize control of the airline's bank accounts in
an effort to collect the alleged taxes was denied by the courts and
the airline is in negotiation with the tax authorities to determine
what back taxes are actually due.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

PUERTO RICO: Ambac Files Complaint Against Oversight Board
----------------------------------------------------------
Ambac Financial Group, Inc., a financial services holding company
whose subsidiaries include Ambac Assurance Corporation, a guarantor
of financial obligations in run-off ("Ambac Assurance"), on May 26,
2020, disclosed that Ambac Assurance has filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
against the Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico
("the Oversight Board").

The complaint seeks a declaration that Titles I, II, and III of the
bespoke federal statute enacted in 2016 to enable Puerto Rico to
restructure its debts, the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and
Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"), are unconstitutional and
unenforceable on the ground that they violate the uniformity
requirement of the U.S. Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause.

Under this clause, the United States Congress may legislate on the
subject of bankruptcies, but all such laws must be uniform.  This
is designed to prevent the enactment of one-off bankruptcy rules
customized to specific debtors.  By virtue of PROMESA, Congress has
singled out the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its
instrumentalities for special treatment as a debtor, in stark
contrast to the requirements of the U.S. Constitution.

Elizabeth Prelogar, Partner at Cooley LLP representing Ambac in
this complaint, said, "Armed with PROMESA provisions that apply
only to Puerto Rico and to no other territory or municipal debtor,
the Oversight Board has steered Puerto Rico's bankruptcy far afield
from any prior restructuring proceeding. No creditors of any other
territory, municipality, or governmental debtor have been subject
to the sort of discriminatory treatment being faced by creditors of
the Commonwealth" and the Constitution requires uniform bankruptcy
laws to guard against this result."

The Oversight Board's contentions regarding the scope of its powers
under PROMESA are disputed by multiple parties in the ongoing Title
III cases, including Ambac and the government of Puerto Rico.  But
they illustrate how PROMESA's unique provisions have already skewed
the bankruptcy process to the detriment of Commonwealth creditors
and the people of Puerto Rico, requiring creditors to defend
against unprecedented incursions on their property and other legal
rights.  Meanwhile the Oversight Board continues to spend hundreds
of millions of Puerto Rico taxpayer dollars on legal and other
advisors, despite calling for austerity measures and cuts to
pensioner payments.

Decisions under PROMESA have had broad-sweeping negative impacts on
the U.S. municipal market, upending longstanding investor
expectations.  No matter the ultimate outcome of the various
disputes about the Board's authority under PROMESA, these disputes
illustrate how PROMESA, as applied by the Oversight Board, departs
from ordinary debt-adjustment proceedings, with consequences that
become ever more injurious as the cases proceed.  Under existing
bankruptcy laws, no other territory, governmental entity, or
Chapter 9 debtor could threaten creditors with putative powers to
dictate priorities in contravention of state or territorial law, to
pick and choose which creditors to pay with impunity while
obtaining a discharge, or to impose allocations of assets and
available funding for debt service without meaningful judicial
scrutiny.

                           About Ambac

Ambac Financial Group, Inc.  ("Ambac" or "AFG"), headquartered in
New York City, is a financial services holding company whose
subsidiaries include Ambac Assurance Corporation, a guarantor of
financial obligations in run-off. Ambac's common stock trades on
the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol "AMBC".

                       About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70 billion,
a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in nine of the
last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III of
2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ('PROMESA').

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that may
be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery disputes,
and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                    Bondholders' Attorneys

Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP and Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera
& Sifre, P.S.C. and serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc., and
the First Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which collectively hold over
$4.4 billion of GO Bonds, COFINA Bonds, and other bonds issued by
Puerto Rico and other instrumentalities.

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP, Autonomy
Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, and Monarch Alternative
Capital LP.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ Management
II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                          Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed an official committee of retirees and an
official committee of unsecured creditors of the Commonwealth.  The
Retiree Committee tapped Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia &
Milian, C.S.P., as its attorneys.  The Creditors Committee tapped
Paul Hastings LLP and O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

LATAM: Countries Renew CCRIF Coverage for Hurricane Season
----------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that member governments in the Caribbean have
renewed their parametric insurance coverage for this Atlantic
Hurricane Season, ceding over US$1 billion in risk to the Caribbean
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) and increasing overall
coverage by eight per cent.

The insurance covers tropical cyclone, excess rainfall, earthquake
and fisheries, according to RJR News.

In the meantime, the European Union under its Global COVID-19
Response, has provided a grant of US$11 million to CCRIF for
premium support or for increasing coverage for its Caribbean
members, the report notes.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2020.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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