---

       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Friday, April 10, 2020, Vol. 21, No. 73

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

AES ARGENTINA: Fitch Affirms IDR at 'CCC'


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Sov. Credit Rating, Outlook Now Stable
FINANCIADORA DE ESTUDOS: Fitch Withdraws 'BB-' LT IDR
ODEBRECHT SA: Expects to Vote on New Restructuring Plan by April 22
RIO OIL 2014-1: Fitch Affirms BB- Notes Rating, Outlook Now Neg.


C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S

COMPASS CAYMAN: S&P Withdraws 'BB-' Issuer Credit Rating


C H I L E

SKY AIRLINE: Temporarily Suspends Operations


C O S T A   R I C A

BANCO INTERNACIONAL: Fitch Places BB- LT IDR on Watch Negative
INVERSIONES CREDIQ: Fitch Corrects April 1 Ratings Release


E C U A D O R

ECUADOR: Authorities Struggle to Deal with Guayaquil Corpse Crisis


G R E N A D A

GRENADA: Implements One-Week Lockdown


G U A T E M A L A

GUATEMALA: Fitch Cuts LT IDR to BB- & Alters Outlook to Stable


J A M A I C A

DIGICEL LIMITED: Fitch Cuts 2021 & 2023 Notes Rating to 'C'
JAMAICA: Sees Mass Closure of Small Businesses Because of COVID-19


M E X I C O

GRUPO KALTEX: S&P Cuts ICR to 'CCC', Put on CreditWatch Negative
PETROLEOS MEXICANOS: Fitch Cuts LT IDRs to BB, Outlook Negative


P E R U

TERMINALES PORTUARIOS: Fitch Places BB Rating on Watch Negative

                           - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================

AES ARGENTINA: Fitch Affirms IDR at 'CCC'
-----------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed AES Argentina Generacion S.A.'s
Long-Term Foreign Currency and Local Currency Issuer Default
Ratings at 'CCC'. Fitch has also affirmed AES Argentina's
'CCC'/'RR4' ratings for the company's USD300 million senior
unsecured notes due 2024.

AAG's ratings are constrained by the Republic of Argentina's
country ceiling at 'CCC', which limits the foreign currency rating
of most Argentine corporates. Fitch's Country Ceilings are designed
to reflect the risks associated with sovereigns placing
restrictions upon private sector corporates, which may prevent them
from converting local currency to any foreign currency under a
stress scenario, and/or may not allow the transfer of foreign
currency abroad to service foreign currency debt obligations.

AAG's ratings reflect the Argentine electricity industry's
regulatory risk, which remains high. Fitch also considers the
company's counterparty risk with Compania Administradora del
Mercado Mayorista Electrico (CAMMESA) and other market participants
as the main off-takers. Finally, the ratings are constrained by the
macro-economic environment, including high inflation and steep
currency devaluation.

The 'CCC'/'RR4' ratings on the USD300 million senior unsecured
notes due 2024 are based on AAG's equal FC and LC IDRs. Fitch's
"Country-Specific Treatment of Recovery Ratings" criteria no longer
allows for a rating uplift for these obligations. AAG is capped at
an average Recovery Rating of 'RR4' since Argentina, per the
aforementioned criteria, is categorized within Group D with a soft
cap of 'RR4'. This assumes a recovery in the range of 31% to 50%,
although a bespoke recovery analysis for each of these companies
yields a higher than 70% recovery given a default.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Pesification of Energia Base: Argentine government published
Resolution 31/2020 in February 2020, which pesified Energia Base
for hydro and thermal remuneration schemes, reducing capacity
payments by 45% and 15%, respectively, with monthly adjustments for
local inflation. Fitch assumes AAG's thermal generation (gas and
coal) will represent more than 80% of the company`s total output
and not materially affect the heightened FX risk, as the company
has strong liquidity profile, with cash on hand covering short term
debt by more than 2.0x., and covering interest expensed more than
1.5x. As of December 2019, almost all of the company's cash
balances is held abroad mostly denominated in U.S. dollars,
mitigating any transfer and convertibility risk. In addition, AAG`s
has strong debt maturity profile, with international maturities due
in 2024. AAG`s exposure to RENOVAR program is not affected by the
resolution, and payments are expected to continue denominated in
U.S. dollars.

FONINVEMEM Receivables in Place: Fitch estimates AAG's EBITDA
generation affected by the pesificaction of Energia Base, will be
compensated by the company`s receivables from its FONINVEMEM
investments of approximately USD65 million during 2020. FONINVEMEM
collections will be approximately USD60 million during 2021 and
USD56 million during 2022. Unlike Energia Base, repayments of
FONINVEMEM obligations are U.S. denominated and have been made
according to schedule.

Heightened Counterparty Exposure: AAG, like all generation
companies in Argentina, depends on payments from CAMMESA, which
acts as an agent on behalf of an association representing agents of
electricity generators, transmission, distribution and large
consumers or the wholesale market participants (Mercado Mayorista
Electrico or MEM). Argentine GenCos received payments from CAMMESA
within 45 days after the close of the period but payments have been
delayed to an average of 52 days in recent months and reached 65
days in October 2019, with payments being distributed in
increments. October transaction, CAMMESA disbursed 30% in December,
45% in early January and the remaining in mid-January. On the
supply side, fuels continue to be provided by CAMMESA, with the
exception of coal, which is procured by AAG for its San Nicolas
unit.

Strong Credit Metrics: As of December 2019, the company's financial
metrics were strong, with low leverage and strong interest
coverage. AAG's total debt to EBITDA reached a peak of 3.2x,
including debt with CAMMESA, as a consequence of incremental debt
to finance a 200MW renewable expansion plan. Debt with CAMMESA is
mostly related to loans provided by the government agency for
maintenance and/or improvements of generation assets. Going
forward, Fitch estimates gross leverage below 2.5x, as the company
concludes its renewable expansion phase and starts collecting
payments from its wind farms.

Strong Competitive Position: AAG owns a portfolio of diversified
generation assets in terms of operational technologies and
geographical presence, which lowers business risk. The company has
a portfolio mix of 44% hydro and 56% thermal. This combines with a
large generation capacity of close to 2.76 gigawatts and an 8% of
installed capacity in Argentina and 6.8% of gross generation in the
SADI. In addition, the company is undergoing an expansion phase of
renewable projects totaling 200MW of installed capacity under the
Renovar and MATER programs, which is expected to be completed by
the end of first-half of 2020. Fitch views AAG as a competitive
participant in the Argentine market.

Uncertain Regulatory Environment: Fitch believes the electricity
market remains a priority of the Argentine government. Further
regulatory reform is highly probable to reduce costs and prevent
the system from becoming insolvent. However, the government is
exposed to high costs, which may increase if the Argentine peso
depreciates, given the FX mismatch in the system. Fitch estimates
the government transferred USD2.8 billion funds to CAMMESA in 2019,
which represents 38% of the total implied cost of the system of
USD8.0 billion. The USD2.8 billion subsidy represents roughly 13%
of the total Fitch-estimated deficit for 2019 of USD22.2 billion.

Structurally Negative FCF through Expansion: Fitch anticipates a
negative FCF for AAG during 2020 as the company carries the
construction of 200MW of install capacity awarded under Renovar and
MATER Programs. Going forward, Fitch estimates modest capex plans
mostly concentrated on maintenance for current generation assets in
the range of USD15 million annually, with no dividend payments
expected to its parent company. Absent any additional projects
increasing capex, extraordinary acquisitions or dividends exceeding
the established pay-out ratio, Fitch estimates the company's FCF
neutral to positive during 2021-2023, once the renewable expansion
is completed.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

AES Argentina Generacion S.A.'s LT FC IDR is constrained by
Argentina's Country Ceiling at CCC. This is the same situation for
Argentine utility and energy peers Pampa Energia S.A. (CCC), Capex
S.A. (CCC) and Genneia S.A. (CCC).

In terms of business profile compared with peers, AAG is
concentrated only in the electricity generation sector, presenting
a balanced portfolio between thermal and hydro assets. Pampa
presents a more diversified business profile as a leading company
in electricity generation, distribution, transmission, gas
production and transportation. While Capex has an advantageous
vertical integration in the thermoelectric generation with the
flexibility of having its own natural gas reserves to supply its
plants. Genneia is considered a relatively small player in the
local power generation industry (2% of the system's installed
capacity); the company is the leading wind power generation
provider in the country, with an aggressive expansion plan in
renewables, exposing the company to greater execution risk.

MSU Energy (CCC) and Albanesi (CCC) are also concentrated in the
thermoelectric generation sector. MSU Energy has a high amount of
leverage and tight near-term liquidity combined with the inherent
execution risk associated with completing its 300MW combined-cycle
expansions by mid-2020. While Albanesi's ratings reflects its
vulnerability to payment delays from CAMMESA, given its expected
tight FFO debt service coverage over the next two years as it seeks
to meet its financial and commercial debt obligations.

In term of credit metrics, AAG's gross leverage as of December 2019
reached 3.2x compared with Pampa Energia at 2.8x, Genneia at 5.0x,
and Capex at 2.2x. Fitch estimates that AAG's projected gross
leverage is in the range of 2.5x, slightly below its Argentine
peers median of 3.0x. Similarly, to all its peers in the electric
sector, AAG's working capital is vulnerable to delays in payments
from CAMMESA.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

  -- Increase installed capacity of 200MW under Renovar and MATER
during 2020, reaching 2,960MW;

  -- Revenues under Energia Base under new scheme since February
2020;

  -- Gross generation of approximately 6,760GWh during 2020,
increasing to more than 7,000GWh during 2021-2022;

  -- No dividend payments;

  -- USD100 million incremental debt to finance the construction of
200MW under Renovar and MATER scheme;

  -- Total capex of USD105 million during 2020, including remaining
portion of USD91 million to conclude expansion;

  -- Annual maintenance capex of USD14 million during 2020-2022;

  -- U.S. dollar denominated receivable related to FONINVEMEM of
approximately USD65 million during 2020, and USD60 million and
USD56 million during 2021 and 2022, respectively, all related to
Guillermo Brown;

  -- USD5 million dividends received during 2020-2022 from
FONINVEMEM I & II plants.

Key Recovery Rating (RR) Assumptions:

  -- Recovery analysis assumes that AES Argentina would be
liquidated in bankruptcy, and Fitch has assumed a 10%
administrative claim;

  -- Going Concern approach uses a 4.0x EBITDA multiple, reflecting
Fitch's estimate valuation for companies' reorganizations in the
utilities sector. The waterfall results in a 50% recovery
corresponding to an 'RR4' for the senior unsecured notes (USD300
million).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  -- An upgrade to the ratings of Argentina could result in a
positive rating action;

  -- Given the issuer's high dependence on the subsidies from
CAMMESA, any further regulatory developments leading to a more
independent market less reliant on support from the Argentine
government could positively affect the company's collections/cash
flow.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  -- A significant deterioration of credit metrics and/or
significant payment delays from CAMMESA;

  -- A reversal of government policies that result in a significant
increase in subsidies coupled with a delay in payments for
electricity sales;

  -- A downgrade of Argentina's ratings would result in a downgrade
of the issuer's ratings, given that the ratings are constrained by
the sovereign's credit quality;

  -- A significant deterioration of credit metrics measured as
total debt/EBITDA consistently above 4.5x or more;

  -- Any material disruption or delays in receivables from
FONINVEMEM.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Ratings of Non-Financial Corporate issuers have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of three notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of four notches over three years.
The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========

BRAZIL: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Sov. Credit Rating, Outlook Now Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 6, 2020, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on its
long-term ratings on Brazil to stable from positive. At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and short-term foreign and
local currency sovereign credit ratings. S&P also affirmed its
'brAAA' national scale rating and its transfer and convertibility
assessment of 'BB+'. The outlook on the national scale rating
remains stable.

Outlook

The outlook revision to stable from positive reflects diminishing
prospects for an upgrade over the coming year due to the negative
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. S&P said, "We expect Brazil's GDP
growth and fiscal performance to suffer in 2020 due to the pandemic
and extraordinary government spending, before gradual economic
recovery and fiscal consolidation resumes. We also assume
slower-than-expected progress on the reform agenda to address
structural fiscal vulnerabilities and to improve low medium-term
GDP growth prospects."

S&P said, "We could raise the ratings over the next two years if
the fiscal trajectory recovers more quickly than we expect, along
with better prospects for implementing structural reforms,
suggesting stronger economic growth and debt stabilization in the
medium term. We could also raise the ratings if we perceive that
Brazil will maintain a net narrow external creditor position in the
next three years despite global uncertainty.

"Alternatively, we could lower the ratings over the next two years
if--once the effects of the pandemic dissipate--the fiscal profile
remains weaker than expected for a prolonged period, harming the
prospects for a slow decline in government deficits or quickening
the rise in debt. We could also take a negative rating action
should unforeseen weakness in Brazil's balance of payments arise
that impairs market access. Finally, a meaningful deterioration in
monetary policy credibility, marked by a weakened commitment to a
floating exchange rate, would also weigh on the rating."

Rationale

The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 substantially
changed the economic, political, and fiscal scenario for Brazil in
the near term. Given structurally large fiscal imbalances and low
economic growth, Brazil has limited fiscal room to address the
shock without a significant rise in its debt burden. On the other
hand, its large international reserves, low external debt,
proactive monetary policy, floating exchange rate, and favorable
sovereign debt composition constitute relative credit strengths
that provide key resiliency that should enable it to address the
challenging and volatile global environment.

S&P said, "Despite considerable uncertainties, we assume that
following the current shock, the fiscal deficit will only decline
slowly on prospects for moderate recovery from the economic
contraction, additional nonrecurring revenues, a lower interest
rate, and ongoing fiscal consolidation measures. However, ongoing
disagreement between the legislative and executive branches, which
could become more acute as the pandemic evolves and social pressure
increases, could limit the passage and implementation of
significant structural reforms during the rest of the
administration, in our opinion."

The number of COVID-19 cases in Brazil has increased rapidly in a
little over a month and has spread across all 27 states, with more
cases in large cities such as Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. On
March 17, the federal government declared a state of public
calamity. At first, some states ordered lockdowns, while the
federal government response has been slower, raising political and
social tensions. Nevertheless, the administration has announced an
increasing number of fiscal and monetary measures to mitigate the
health and economic crisis.

Brazil's economic growth in 2020 will be severely hurt by the
impact of COVID-19 locally and globally. On the domestic front, the
impact of containment measures, lower investor confidence, and
financial market volatility will likely constrain consumption and
investment. In addition, exports will fall as around two-thirds are
destined to China and the U.S. markets. S&P said, "We project
Brazil's economic growth will contract by 0.7%, down from growth of
1% in 2019, although the risks are tilted to the downside. At this
point, we evaluate the shock as temporary and without negative
long-term consequences on the Brazilian economy. We expect GDP
growth to accelerate to 2.9% in 2021, explained largely by a
statistical effect."

S&P said, "Brazil's growth prospects have been below those of other
countries at a similar stage of development, in our view. We expect
GDP per capita of US$7,280 for 2020."

Brazil's fiscal vulnerability poses a challenge for the government
to design measures to minimize the effects of the pandemic. The
declaration of public emergency allows for the temporary suspension
of the primary fiscal target. The authorities announced a package
of fiscal measures adding up to 3.5% of GDP, a large share
corresponding to reallocations within the 2020 budget. Compared
with other emerging markets, the response of the Brazilian
government is seen as significant (at this point, fiscal measures
announced by Russia total 0.3% of GDP, Mexico 0.7%, India 0.1%, and
Argentina 1%).

The package includes temporary income support to vulnerable
households, temporary tax breaks, credit lines for firms to protect
jobs, lower taxes and import levies on essential medical supplies,
and new transfers from the federal to state governments to support
higher health spending and as a cushion against the expected fall
in revenues. The central government will also provide support to
local governments with a temporary suspension of debt payments to
the central government, debt renegotiation with state-owned banks,
and support for credit operations through government guarantees. In
addition, legislators introduced a constitutional amendment to
implement a temporary war time budget. All spending related to the
COVID-19 pandemic would be separate from the rest of the budget,
which would allow the government to comply with the spending cap.

S&P said, "We expect the fiscal deficit and debt figures to
deteriorate throughout 2020, driven by higher spending. Revenues
would also decline due to economic contraction, tax relief related
to COVID-19, and declining oil royalties because of low crude oil
prices. We assume that in 2020 the general government fiscal
deficit will increase to 12% of GDP from 6% in 2019."

Gross general government debt would increase by almost 10
percentage points to 85% of GDP and net general government debt
would also increase about 10 percentage points to 66% of GDP. In
the following years, S&P expects net general government debt
stabilization around 70% of GDP, given its assumption of fiscal
consolidation.

In the near term, the agenda of structural reforms will take second
place as Congress will focus on measures related to the pandemic.
Afterwards, S&P expects the administration will implement
consolidation measures to reduce the large fiscal deficit, although
risks of delays are significant. Moreover, a potentially more
divisive political environment could harm the government's capacity
to build effective alliances in Congress to advance its reform
agenda during the remainder of the administration.

Since its start, the administration of President Jair Bolsonaro has
pursued policies and structural reforms aimed at strengthening
Brazil's fiscal accounts and encouraging greater private-sector
participation in the economy. Although the executive cannot rely on
a solid coalition in Brazil's fragmented Congress, legislators have
nonetheless shown broad support to implement needed fiscal and
economic reforms, as demonstrated by the passage of pension reform
in October 2019.

The list of reforms envisaged before the COVID-19 outbreak was
extensive and included bills to control mandatory spending,
simplify the tax system, and reduce the role of the state in the
economy, as well as policies to increase financial intermediation
and the formal autonomy of the central bank. Progress on aspects of
this agenda has been delayed because of different political and
social concerns.

Recently, the president's relationship with Congress, which has
been strained since he assumed office, has deteriorated further. We
now believe the government might face more challenges in advancing
the rest of the economic and fiscal agenda, in particular because
several of the reforms require constitutional amendments, a
critical and very particular condition of Brazil's institutional
framework.

On the monetary front, Brazil's central bank decided to lower the
selic rate by 0.5 percentage point to a record low of 3.75%. The
monetary authorities announced a broad set of measures--totaling
Brazilian real (R$) 1.2 billion (around 16% of the GDP)--to
maintain the stability of the financial sector and provide
liquidity to the corporate sector. The creation of a US$60 billion
swap line with the U.S. Federal Reserve for the next six months
gives the Central Bank of Brazil extra tools to smooth
exchange-rate movements in the short term.

The Central Bank of Brazil has consolidated its credibility over
the past three years. Actions under the inflation-targeting regime
enabled it to anchor inflation expectations. We expect average
annual inflation of around 4% in 2020-2023, in line with targets.

The environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors relevant to
the rating action are:

-- Strategy, execution, and monitoring; and
-- Health and safety.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List

  Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Revised  
                                    To         From
  Brazil
   Sovereign Credit Rating    BB-/Stable/B   BB-/Positive/B

  Ratings Affirmed  

  Brazil
   Sovereign Credit Rating  
   Brazil National Scale                  brAAA/Stable/--
   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   BB+
   Senior Unsecured                       BB-
   Senior Unsecured                       brAAA


FINANCIADORA DE ESTUDOS: Fitch Withdraws 'BB-' LT IDR
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos -
FINEP's 'BB-' Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default
Ratings. In addition, Fitch has withdrawn the FINEP's 'AA(bra)'
National Rating. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

The ratings were withdrawn for commercial purposes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch is withdrawing the ratings as FINEP has chosen to stop
participating in the rating process. Accordingly, Fitch will no
longer provide ratings (or analytical coverage) for FINEP.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Ratings of Public Finance issuers have a best-case rating upgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a positive direction) of three notches over a
three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of three notches over three
years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit
ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best-
and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos - FINEP

  - LT IDR WD; Withdrawn; previously at BB-

  - ST IDR WD; Withdrawn; previously at B

  - LC LT IDR WD; Withdrawn; previously at BB-

  - LC ST IDR WD; Withdrawn; previously at B

  - Natl LT WD(bra); Withdrawn; previously at AA(bra)

  - Natl ST WD(bra); Withdrawn; previously at F1+(bra)

ODEBRECHT SA: Expects to Vote on New Restructuring Plan by April 22
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tatiana Bautzer at Reuters reports that Brazilian conglomerate
Odebrecht SA expects to vote on its new restructuring plan by April
22, two sources with knowledge of the matter said.

The plan was presented to creditors in an online assembly on March
31, the sources added, according to Reuters.

A bankruptcy court will have the final word, however, on whether
the vote will happen in another online meeting on April 22 or as
early as April 14, the sources added, the report relates. Creditors
are divided over the two dates, the report adds.

On August 28, 2019, the Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America,
citing The Wall Street Journal, reported that Odebrecht and its
affiliates filed for chapter 15 bankruptcy, seeking U.S.
recognition of the largest-ever bankruptcy in Latin America.
Odebrecht SA and several of its affiliates has filed for
bankruptcy protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York on Aug. 26.  The case is assigned to Hon.
Stuart M. Bernstein.

RIO OIL 2014-1: Fitch Affirms BB- Notes Rating, Outlook Now Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the long-term rating of the Series 2014
notes and 2018-1 notes issued by Rio Oil Finance Trust at 'BB-'.
Fitch has also affirmed series 2014-2 special indebtedness
interests' national scale rating at 'AA(bra)'. The Rating Outlook
has been revised to Negative from Stable.

Rio Oil Finance Trust       

  - 2014-1 76716XAA0; LT BB-; Affirmed

  - 2014-1 REGS USU76673AA72; LT BB-; Affirmed

  - 2014-2; Natl LT AAsf(bra); Affirmed

  - 2014-3 76716XAB8; LT BB-; Affirmed

  - 2014-3 regs USU76673AB55; LT BB-; Affirmed

  - 2018-1 76716XAC6; LT BB-; Affirmed

Pressures faced by the oil industry due to the increased oil supply
war between Saudi Arabia and Russia amid uncertainty of short- to
midterm oil demand due to the coronavirus outbreak has plunged oil
prices, disrupting investment plans and future oil production.
Projected flows from royalties and special participation at current
prices still result in debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs)
commensurate with the assigned rating levels when considering
reserve accounts. However, the Negative Outlook on the notes
reflects the fact that sustained depressed oil prices, at current
levels or lower, could further negatively affect production and
translate into lower coverage levels.

The assigned ratings are not directly linked to the originator's
credit quality. The ratings are based on potential production and
generation risk, and are ultimately linked to Petroleo Brasileiro
S.A.'s (Petrobras) Issuer Default Rating (IDR), as it is the main
source of cash flow generation. The assigned ratings reflect the
transaction's increased liquidity, mitigation of diversion risk and
increased FCF given the subordination of Fundo Estadual de
Conservacao Ambiental e Desenvolvimiento Urbano (FECAM) payments.
Fitch's ratings address timely quarterly payment of interest and
principal.

The SPV initially issued USD2 billion in Series 2014-1 notes,
BRL2.4 billion of Series 2014-2 special indebtedness interests and
USD1.1 billion in Series 2014-3 notes, and issued an additional
USD600 million in Series 2018-1 notes in April 2018. The
outstanding balance of the program adds up to approximately USD2.43
billion, out of a total program of USD5 billion. All series are
pari passu, and future issuances out of the program will be subject
to certain conditions.

The issuances are backed by royalty flows and special
participations owed by oil concessionaires, predominantly operated
by Petrobras, to the government of the State of Rio de Janeiro
(RJS, BB-/AA(bra)/Stable). RJS assigned 100% of these flows to
RioPrevidencia (RP), the state's pension fund and RP sold these
rights to Rio Oil Finance Trust, the issuer.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Ratings Not Directly Linked to Originator's: RP is an autonomous
government agency that is part of the Secretary of Treasury of RJS.
Performance of the originator will not affect the collateral, as
the generation of the cash flow needed to meet timely debt service
is not dependent on either RP or RJS.

Resilience to Coronavirus Disruption and Oil Price Declines: The
global coronavirus outbreak and resulting containment measures
resulted in a highly uncertain macroeconomic outlook and dampened
global demand for oil. This, coupled with an increase in oil supply
led by Saudi Arabia and Russia, will cause significant volatility
in oil prices over the short and potentially medium term. However,
Fitch believes the structure remains resilient to these
disruptions, as the transaction is supported by cash reserves and
higher coverages. A lower price environment may also support
potential decreasing operating costs and potential lower pricing
differentials.

Impact of Oil Price Decline on Performance: The sharp decline in
oil prices and reviewed production projections led the transaction
to hit an early amortization trigger by breaching the 1.75x
forward-looking DSCR in 1Q20. However, if current oil prices are
sustained, the transaction would be able to maintain DSCR
commensurate with the assigned rating. Additionally, the
transaction benefits from a nine-month reserve account and
liquidity accounts that further enhance coverage levels. However,
continued depressed oil prices could further pressure future
production levels, limiting royalty and special participation flows
used to pay debt service, which could result in a potential rating
downgrade.

Future Production Risk: Given the current oil price scenario,
Petrobras has announced production cuts in more cost-intensive
fields as it looks to control operating costs. At the current
rating levels, the transaction withstands initial production
reductions. However, sustained low oil prices could translate into
further capex cuts by Petrobras, which could affect DSCR levels.

Cash Flows Support Rating: The expected levels of AADSCRs over 2.0x
partially mitigate the transaction's exposure to fluctuations in
oil prices and production levels at the current rating level. Fitch
expects AADSCRs to be over 2.0x for the life of the transaction,
assuming Law 12,734 is implemented after 2020.

Ample Liquidity for Timely Payment: The transaction benefits from
liquidity in the form of a debt service reserve account and a
liquidity reserve account. Funds deposited in these two accounts
will at all times be sufficient cover three principal and interest
(P&I) payments, which Fitch considers sufficient to keep debt
service current on the notes under different stress scenarios.

Largest Obligor Rating Cap: Petrobras' rating is the ultimate cap
for the proposed transaction, as it is the main source of cash flow
generation. Petrobras has local and foreign currency (LC/FC) IDRs
of BB-/AA(bra)/Stable. The company is majority controlled by the
federal government of Brazil and has the rights to exploration and
production of the vast majority of Brazil's oil fields.

Potential Political Risk Exposure Partially Mitigated: The state's
liquidity constraints, evidenced by various delays in commercial
and other payments, heightened the transaction's political risk
exposure. However, provisions included in the sixth rescission
waiver and amendment, such as the rescission of the trapping of
excess cash and of the early amortization period, will increase the
cash flows returned to the state, and in turn decrease the
transaction's exposure to potential political risk.

Oil Revenues Dedicated Account Modification Mitigates Redirection
Risk: Pursuant to the Oil Revenues Dedicated Account Modification
Legislation, the RioPrevi Oil Revenues initially deposited to the
RJS Oil Revenues Dedicated Account are no longer required by
legislation to be deposited into a state-owned account. Oil
revenues assigned to this transaction are instead deposited into an
account under the name of the issuer. This change in the account
mitigates potential redirection of flows to RJS. As Banco do Brasil
(BdB, BB-/AA(bra)/Stable) cannot be replaced as a collection bank,
the transaction is directly linked to the credit quality of BdB.

Legal Changes May Affect Collateral Stability: No amendments
affecting the distribution of royalties for the existing concession
regime have been implemented to date. However, provisions regarding
the change in allocation percentages incorporated in Law 12,734 are
currently under review. The transaction was analyzed assuming the
law will change and DSCRs remain sufficiently robust and
commensurate with the expected ratings.

True Sale Valid Under Brazilian Law: Collateral backing this
transaction was transferred to RP by RJS through a state decree,
making RP the legal owner of the royalties. This transfer gives RP
the right to sell the collateral into the trust.

Transfer and Convertibility Risk: Series 2014-1, 2014-3 and 2018-1
notes are exposed to transfer and convertibility risk as royalty
flows are paid in a Brazilian account in Brazilian reais. This
exposure caps the rating of the transaction at the Country Ceiling
of Brazil, which is currently 'BB'. To partially mitigate
operational risk that may arise from transferring and converting
flows on a daily basis to an offshore account, the transaction
includes reserve funds that covers three P&I payments.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade:

  -- The transaction is exposed to oil price and production volume
risks. Sustained low prices or further declines in prices or
production levels significantly below expectations may trigger
downgrades.

  -- The ratings are capped by the credit quality of Petrobras, the
main obligor generating cash flows to support the transaction, and
to the sovereign rating and Country Ceiling assigned to Brazil. A
downgrade of Petrobras or the sovereign would trigger a downgrade
on the notes.

  -- The ratings are sensitive to the rating of BdB as a direct
counterparty to the transaction; a downgrade of BdB would therefore
trigger a downgrade on the notes.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade:

  -- Given the Negative Outlook on notes, an upgrade on the notes
is unlikely at this time. However, an upgrade of both Petrobras and
BdB, together with a continued recovery in oil prices, which in
turn supports growth in production levels, could trigger a rating
action.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Best/Worst Case Rating Scenarios - Structured Finance:

Ratings of Structured Finance transactions have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of seven notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of seven notches over three
years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit
ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best-
and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

No third-party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).



===========================
C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S
===========================

COMPASS CAYMAN: S&P Withdraws 'BB-' Issuer Credit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings withdraws all of its ratings on Compass Cayman
SPV Ltd., including its 'BB-' issuer credit rating and its
issue-level and recovery ratings on its debt.

S&P said, "Compass Cayman SPV Ltd. has fully repaid its existing
debt and requested that we withdraw our ratings. Therefore, we are
withdrawing all of our ratings on the company and its debt,
including the 'BB-' issuer credit rating, and our issue-level and
recovery ratings on its $195 million senior secured revolving
credit facility due 2022, $225 million term loan A due 2022, and
$455 million term loan B due 2024. At the time of the withdrawal,
our outlook on the company was stable."




=========
C H I L E
=========

SKY AIRLINE: Temporarily Suspends Operations
--------------------------------------------
AirlineGeeks reports that Chile born SKY Airline disclosed it will
be temporarily suspending operations from March 25 to April 30 due
to a significant slump in demand as governments throughout the
region implement travel restrictions to slow COVID-19s contagion
curve and passengers suspend short term travel.  The news was first
reported by specialized Chilean portal Desde SCL, according to
AirlineGeeks.

The company had to suspend all of its operations in and from Peru
as the government suspended all commercial flights for 14 days as
the country entered a national quarantine, the report notes.  Since
last April SKY operates a subsidiary in Peru, where it serves 12
domestic destinations and was set to launch two international
destinations from the country's capital of Lima in the first half
of the year, the report relates.

At that time, the carrier implemented a series of contingency
measures including reducing 50 percent of international capacity
from Chile while reducing domestic operations in Chile to a
minimum, as the Chilean government hadn't implemented restrictions
on domestic travel, the report discloses.  However, as health
authorities commented that the infection curve will rise in the
next few weeks, the airline is in need to take additional measures,
grounding aircraft until April 30, the report notes.

Meanwhile, the country has also gone into lockdown and citizens are
urged to stay at home, while foreigners are temporarily not allowed
into the country, the report relates.

In a statement, Holger Paulmann, SKY's CEO said: "The health and
safety of our staff and passengers is our main priority.  This is
why we have been responsible and taken this decision, which will
allow us to manage through the peak in the virus spread and resume
operations in slightly over a moth's time.  Today it is required
that we stop flying and This is a measure of commitment and
responsibility with the world," the report relates.

The airline aims to resume operations on May 1.  Passengers
scheduled to travel before April 30 will be able to get reimbursed
the price on their tickets in the form of credits to use with the
airline to fly between May 1 and November 30, the report relates.
This is a common technique used by airlines in order to avoid
losing cash in the form of refunds and instead encourage flyers to
postpone their travels to a later date, the report notes.

SKY is both Chile and Peru's second-largest domestic operator, the
report relates.  The airline operates a fleet of 21 A320 family
aircraft, including 17 A320neos, as it undergoes a significant
fleet renewal program that would see the airline's entire fleet be
operated by next-generation aircraft, the report discloses.

Aside from domestic flights in both countries, the carrier operates
from its home in Santiago to international destinations such as
Buenos Aires in Argentina, Montevideo in Uruguay, Rio de Janeiro
and Sao Paulo, Brazil, the report says.

Additionally, the airline was set to launch flights from its Lima
base to Punta Cana in the Dominican Republic and Cancun in Mexico,
both popular holiday destinations for South American flyers, the
report relates.  At the time of writing it is not known whether
their launch will be deferred, the report adds.



===================
C O S T A   R I C A
===================

BANCO INTERNACIONAL: Fitch Places BB- LT IDR on Watch Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Banco Internacional de Costa Rica's
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating of 'BB-' on Rating Watch Negative.
Fitch has also placed the bank's Viability Rating of 'bb-', as well
as the 'A-(pan)' National Scale rating on RWN.

The RWN reflects Fitch's opinion that operating environment
uncertainty and weak economic growth amid the coronavirus pandemic
poses increased risk to the bank's financial performance and
prospects. More than 60% of BICSA's earning assets are located in
Panama and Costa Rica. Currently, the sovereign ratings of Panama
and Costa Rica have Negative Outlooks. Other operating environments
where BICSA does business are also deteriorating. Approximately 12%
of BICSA's earning asset exposures are concentrated in countries
with recent sovereign downgrades (Ecuador and Colombia) or Negative
Outlook (Guatemala) and particularly weak operating environments
(El Salvador and Nicaragua).

The economic downturn and increased unemployment as a result of
measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus will pressure the
BICSA's financial metrics, asset quality and profitability in
particular. Fitch also expects a potential tightening of the bank's
wholesale funding. A greater deterioration in BICSA's credit
profile relative to its domestic peers would also pressure its
National ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs, National Ratings and Senior Debt in Panama:

BICSA's IDRs and National ratings are driven by its VR. BICSA's VR
reflects, with high importance, Fitch's blended operating
environment assessment which considers more than 20 countries.
However, the operating environments of Costa Rica and Panama have
the most influence, as more than 60% of its earning assets are
located in these countries.

The bank's company profile also has a higher influence on the
ratings. BICSA's geographic diversification is wider than its
similarly rated peers, and the bank has a strong focus on trade
finance with a stable base of regional clients.

In light of the deteriorating operating environment, Fitch also
revised the trend on the bank's asset quality, earnings and
profitability and funding and liquidity factor scores to negative.

The agency believes that asset quality will deteriorate as the
effects of the Coronavirus unfold. As of YE2019, BICSA's asset
quality metrics were in line with its current VR, reflecting its
corporate focus. The bank's impaired loans to gross loans and net
charge-offs to gross loans ratios of 1.61% and 0.34%, respectively,
compared favorably to similarly rated peers. The bank's moderate
concentrations by debtor and business operations in trade finance,
construction, and wholesale and retail trade sectors could register
a reduced level of credit demand coinciding with Fitch's view of an
unfolding global recession. Vulnerable sectors like manufacturing,
rental and leasing services, and agribusiness could also put
pressure on asset quality.

Fitch expects BICSA's operating profitability to decline in 2020,
affected by lower business volumes and credit deterioration.
Because its business model aims at corporate banking, its
profitability is low compared to peers with more diverse
operations. As of YE2019, the bank's operating profit to
risk-weighted-assets ratio was 0.68%, consistent with its recent
history though lower than other corporate-oriented peers, most with
stronger corporate franchises and complementary lines of business.

In the current operating environment, wholesale funding could be
restricted and increase the bank's overall liability cost. Fitch
also expects wholesale-funded banks to face liquidity pressures if
a protracted economic disruption severely reduces its depositors'
cash flow, increasing the risk of deposit withdrawals. As of
YE2019, the bank's funding structure was almost evenly distributed
between customer deposits (44%) and wholesale funding (56%),
including debt issues. Wholesale funding benefits from more than 30
providers while deposits are highly concentrated by depositor —
the top 20 depositors represent 60% of total deposits. Given this
particular structure, the bank's loan/deposits ratio was a high
216%, in line with its recent history.

BICSA's capitalization, measured by its common equity Tier 1 (CET1)
ratio, remains commensurate with its VR. Capitalization benefits
from a full earning retention policy. As of YE2019, BICSA's CET1
was 12.14%, remaining in line with most of its peers and providing
the bank with a buffer above the regulatory capital requirement.

Support Ratings:

BICSA's Support Rating reflects Fitch's opinion of the entity's
shareholders', Banco de Costa Rica and Banco Nacional de Costa
Rica, and their ability and propensity to support BICSA, should the
need arise. The Support Rating of '4' reflects a limited
probability of support from its shareholders, given the
shareholders' capacity as demonstrated by their IDRs.

National Senior Debt Ratings in El Salvador:

The national rating of BICSA's senior unsecured debt issuances in
El Salvador, rated 'AAA(slv)', reflects the relative strength of
the Panamanian bank compared with other issuers in El Salvador.
BICSA's IDR is three notches above El Salvador's 'B-' Sovereign
Rating.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs, VR and National Ratings:

A downgrade of BICSA's IDR and National ratings would be limited by
its shareholders' IDRs as the ratings would return to being driven
by support. Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead
to negative rating action/downgrade include:

  -- A downgrade or material deterioration of the main operating
environments where BICSA holds its major exposures;

  -- A reduction in the bank's CET1 capital ratio consistently
below 11%;

  -- A disruption in the bank's funding stability;

  -- Support-driven IDRs would remain sensitive to a deterioration
in their ultimate parent's creditworthiness.

Upside potential for the bank's ratings in the near future is
limited. However, factors that could, individually or collectively,
lead to positive rating action/upgrade include:

  -- The maintenance of the bank's financial profile despite the
deteriorating operating environment would support the removal of
RWN;

  -- An improvement in the bank's operating environments,
particularly in Panama and Costa Rica.

Support Ratings:

The Support Rating is sensitive to changes in BCR's and BNCR's
capacity or propensity to provide timely support to the bank.

Debt Ratings in Panama:

Although debts do not have an explicit Outlook, the global debt
ratings would mirror any potential movements on their respective
IDRs. The senior unsecured debt ratings would continue to be
aligned with the bank's IDR.

National Senior Debt Ratings in El Salvador:

The National ratings could be downgraded in response to a material
reduction in BICSA's IDR.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Ratings of Financial Institutions issuers have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of three notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of four notches over three years.
The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Banco Internacional de Costa Rica: '4'; Governance Structure: '4'

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. ESG issues are credit
neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either
due to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by
the entity.

BICSA has an ESG relevance score of '4' for Government Structure as
it is owned by Costa Rica's state-owned banks. This could
potentially influence the bank's business model and / or board
independence and effectiveness.

INVERSIONES CREDIQ: Fitch Corrects April 1 Ratings Release
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings replaced a ratings release published on April 1, 2020
to correct the name of the obligor for the bonds.

Fitch Ratings has affirmed Inversiones CrediQ Business S.A.'s Long
and Short-Term Issuer Default Ratings at 'B', and has revised the
Rating Outlook to Negative from Stable.

The Negative Outlook reflects that a potential prolonged
deterioration of the operating environment of the different
countries where ICQB operates due to the international crisis
related to the coronavirus pandemic, could result in deterioration
in economic activity and higher unemployment. The later could drive
a rise in loan delinquencies despite the relief measures taken by
ICQB, and increased pressure to access funding.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

ICQB's ratings are highly influenced by its company profile as
reflected by its concentrated business model, which focuses
essentially on vehicle financing sector, where Fitch expects asset
quality and profitability deterioration. Although ICQB has a
regional diversification, the countries where it main subsidiaries
operate: Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras, are currently
affected by the spread of the coronavirus. The ratings also reflect
ICQB's assets quality, which remains reasonable for the rating
level, but sensitive to a challenging operating environment. The
ratings also consider the group's profitability, which despite
being sound in previous years, is threatened by the current
situation, and its capitalization ratios supported by income
generation.

Although ICQB's non-performing loans ratios of 2.4% as of June
2019, and profitability indicators are above 4% since 2016, Fitch
expects ICQB's asset quality to weaken further and earnings
challenges to intensify due to weaker business volumes and rising
loan impairment charges. Deferment of payments for those affected
by the virus is a short-term mitigating factor, but ICQB's
concentrated business model is sensitive to the deterioration of
economic activity. Furthermore, difficulties in collection and
recovery of vehicles for clients in default will further increase
auto loan refinance activity.

Due to the nature of ICQB's business, its funding base is
concentrated on institutional sources. As of June 2019, it
represented 81% of the entity's total funding, while the proportion
of unsecured debt as a percentage of total debt was a relatively
low 30.7%. Commercial bank lines account for nearly 60% of total
funding, now becoming more relevant for maintaining sufficient
liquidity to meet payment obligations. Fitch believes that
refinancing risks could increase for the group and financial sector
regionally, as a result of operating environment pressures.

ICQB has exhibited adequate and stable capitalization and leverage
levels supported by stable income generation. Its capital ratios
are generally in line with risk and keep a reasonable capacity to
absorb unforeseen losses. As of June 2019, the tangible leverage
ratio (debt to tangible equity) was 5.0x. Fitch believes that even
with a further deterioration of the loan portfolio's asset quality,
lower expected portfolio growth could relieve pressures on capital
and leverage.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative Factors That Could Lead to a Downgrade: --ICQB's IDR could
be downgraded due to a sharp deterioration in asset quality such as
NPL ratios above 5%, that pressures the entity's profitability and
capitalization metrics and increasing its debt to tangible equity
ratio above 7x, as well as a disruption of its funding stability.
Positive Factors That Could Lead to an Upgrade: --The outlook could
be revised to Stable if Fitch evaluates that the entity's financial
profile remains resilient to the economic and financial
consequences related to the pandemic. Over the medium term, the
ratings can be upgraded if the entity is able to maintain good
credit quality metrics (i.e. % of impaired loans consistently below
2.5%), together with sustained enhancement in the scale of its
operations, while maintaining a good financial performance,
sustained access to funding and prudent asset-liability
management.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Ratings of Financial Institutions issuers have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of three notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of four notches over three years.
The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).



=============
E C U A D O R
=============

ECUADOR: Authorities Struggle to Deal with Guayaquil Corpse Crisis
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Latin American Herald reports that the crisis surrounding the
disposal of corpses in Ecuador's Guayaquil city continued on
Saturday [April 4] despite authorities' efforts to collect them,
amid disconsolate families still staring at uncertainty.

Days after moving social media images of dead bodies lying on
sidewalks and houses grabbed headlines and desperate family members
denounced the authorities for failing to take them away, the
government and local authorities have coordinated a joint response
in the last two days, according to The Latin American Herald.
However, they have been unable to manage the full extent of the
crisis, the report notes.

The report relates that another corpse was left on a piece of
furniture on a street in the northern Sauces 8 district with the
message: "We have called 911 and there was no help."

After midday, a team of officers from the Guayaquil metropolitan
authorities -- who are collecting the bodies along with a special
task force of the federal government -- picked up another corpse in
the Sauces 5 district and transported it to the Jardines de la
Esperanza cemetery, the report says.

The victim had been dead for more than a day, and the authorities
failed to show up until being alerted by neighbors that his mother,
an elderly women, was living in the same house, the report notes.

According to a statement by the city council, this body had now
been placed in a coffin.

Meanwhile, dozens of people gathered outside Guayaquil's Parques de
la Paz graveyard on Saturday morning to demand their family
members' last remains in order to bury them, the report says.

"They had promised to give as an official list of all the bodies
they have today, because there are more than 10 unrecognized
corpses which the Legal Medicine (forensics) department is going to
identify by some means, by fingerprints," Jorge Diaz, waiting
outside the cemetery's gates to know if his father's name figured
in one of the lists, told EFE.

The bodies belong to people who died in hospitals and houses, both
due to COVID-19 and other causes, before being collected by
authorities, the report notes.

"A list has been issued by the Los Ceibos hospital, I don't know if
it was official or a rough one, but my dad's name did not figure on
it," a visibly uncertain Diaz said, the report relates.

Around 30-odd people were also waiting outside the facility where
authorities brought the corpses they had just collected, the report
discloses.

The graveyard is set to bury the remains of the victims whose
families lack the resources to do so privately, and the
registration process has been complicated as bodies arrive from
hospitals struggling to cope with the high workload, the report
says.

"The hospitals are supposed to wait until we bring the death
certificate in order to carry the remains to the cemetery, but in
my case, and for the majority of the people who are here, this
didn't happen," said Luis Choez, breaking into tears, the report
relates.

Choez was distraught about the whereabouts of the corpse of his
brother, which was carried away on Friday night. Next to him,
Ginger Estrada, looking for the remains of her husband, nodded in
agreement, the report notes.

The Guayaquil City Council announced that they had arranged
thousands of coffins made of corrugated cardboard to facilitate the
burial of victims, the report notes.

"We thank the Association of Cardboard Manufactures for the
delivery of the first 200 pieces of the 2,000 coffins made of
pressed cardboard," the council tweeted, the report relates.

The coffins would be used at both the Jardines de Esperanza and
Parques de Paz cemeteries, and also handed to the national police
-- which is in-charge of collecting corpses -- if necessary, the
relates.

The council had arranged for refrigerated containers to store the
mortal remains, as bodies piled up in the morgues with the new
coronavirus wreaking havoc in the city, even as the country
remained under a 15-hour curfew every day to prevent new
infections, the report discloses.

Vice President Otto Sonnenholzer acknowledged that Ecuador's image
had taken a hit internationally over what was happening in
Guayaquil and announced fresh measures to tackle the epidemic, the
report notes.

"We have seen images that should never have happened. Therefore, as
your public servant, I apologize," he said in an address to the
nation, the report says.

He said that the Guayas province, which has registered the highest
2,402 cases including those in capital Guayaquil, will be provided
with 1,500 hospital beds to attend to COVID-19 cases, the report
discloses.

The nationwide death toll from the disease climbed to 172 on
Saturday, while the total number of cases stood at 3,465, with the
state of Pichincha -- surrounding national capital Quito -- being
the second worst hit after Guaya, the report adds.



=============
G R E N A D A
=============

GRENADA: Implements One-Week Lockdown
-------------------------------------
Caribbean360.com reports that a 24-hour curfew was to go into
effect in Grenada, for one week in the first instance, as
government steps up measures to stem the spread of COVID-19.

From 7 p.m. March 30 until 7 p.m. on April 6, residents were to
stay at home and were only allowed to leave to buy food on specific
days, or for emergency medical care, according to
Caribbean360.com.

Health Minister Nickolas Steele, who made the announcement, said
the government had to escalate action since some residents were not
adhering to the social distancing protocol, the report notes.

Grenada currently has nine cases of COVID-19.

During the one-week period of the curfew, "every person shall
remain confined to their place of residence (inclusive of their
yard space), to avoid contact outside of their household, except as
provided in the Regulations or as may be authorized in writing by
the Commissioner of Police", he said, the report relates.

"This means that you are not permitted to go to the beach, go for a
walk or visit your neighbor. You are only to leave for food or
medical emergency, and grocery stores and shops will be open, but
only on specified days," the report discloses.

Under the new measure, grocery shops will be open from 8 a.m. to
noon on days specified by the Commissioner of Police, and only one
person from each household will be allowed to leave their residence
once during a grocery day to buy groceries in their own parish, the
report relates.  If a bus is used to transport people for that
purpose, it can only carry one person per row of seats; and if a
car is used, only one person other than the driver is allowed.
Hired vehicles will not be allowed, the report notes.

There will be no sale or consumption of alcohol in or in the
vicinity of any shop, grocery store, or supermarket or in any
public place, the report says.

Suppliers who are approved by the Commissioner of Police will be
allowed to work to supply shops which sell groceries, grocery
stores on the days that those shops, grocery stores and
supermarkets are open in accordance to permission given by the
Commissioner of Police, the report discloses.

A limited state of emergency was declared but the Health Minister
said that despite pleas to residents to stay indoors and observe
social distancing, "many have ignored us," the report relates.

"What is more alarming, they have ignored the medical experts, and
they have seemingly blocked out the gruesome images of the impacts
of this virus that they have seen around the world.  Those images
alone should have been enough to show you how very dire the
situation is, and that we are not to take the chances that many of
you continue to take," the report quoted Mr. Steele as saying.
"Every time you venture outside of your house, you put yourself and
others at risk. Every time you leave your house, you are in danger
of getting infected or killed. Every time you break or ignore
guidelines to quarantine when you have been exposed, you are
potentially taking the life of one of our citizens. Maybe you are
prepared to take the gamble, but unfortunately, it's not only to
your detriment. You are endangering the lives of each of us."

Minister Steele said the new curfew will give medical authorities
the necessary mechanisms to contain the very real possibility of a
community spread of COVID-19, and also ensure that there is proper
maintenance of supplies and services, the report discloses.

The other measures announced include the closure of all businesses,
including restaurants and gas stations, the report says.

Hotels can remain open, but not their amenities, except takeaway
from restaurants or room service, the report notes.  Where a hotel
remains open, the staff must remain on the premises for the
duration of the one-week curfew period, the report relates.  Hotel
employers have been told they have to bear the costs of the board
and lodging of such staff members, the report notes.

"I am confident that where if we all do our part, for the next
seven days, in the first instance, we will see the COVID-19 tide
changing in our tri-island state," Minister Steele said, the report
adds.



=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================

GUATEMALA: Fitch Cuts LT IDR to BB- & Alters Outlook to Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Guatemala's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'BB-' from 'BB' and revised the Rating
Outlook to Stable from Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade of Guatemala's IDRs reflects diminishing fiscal
flexibility due to the government's low tax collection amid
continuous political gridlock preventing forceful fiscal measures,
as well as a downward revision to growth prospects related to the
global pandemic. Congressional elections in 2019 resulted in a
fractured Congress, leading to continued political gridlock and
diminished reform prospects. A continued failure to enact reforms
in the tax administration and pass new tax measures will lead to
further erosion of revenues. Low tax collection, coupled with high
budget rigidity, limits the government's capacity to address large
infrastructure and social needs, which will be further stretched by
the public health crisis represented by COVID19 and the consequent
shock to the economy.

Fitch projects real GDP will not grow in 2020 after a 3.5%
expansion in 2019 due to the global coronavirus impact and the
government's measures to contain the outbreak. Its estimates
incorporate a contraction of private consumption over the year
driven by lower remittances inflows. Commerce is the largest sector
in the economy (18% of GDP) and will be disproportionately affected
by social distancing measures. Tourism (accommodation and
restaurant services) will also be severely affected; however, it
accounts for only 3% of GDP (and 9% of current account receipts),
limiting its direct impact on growth.

Risks remain tilted to the downside as remittances, a key growth
driver, are highly vulnerable to coronavirus impact on the U.S.
economy. Guatemala's economic activity relies heavily on private
consumption (86% of GDP), which in turn is financed by workers'
remittances from the U.S. (21% of total private consumption, 13.8%
of GDP). Remittances have grown on average 13% per year over the
past five years as Hispanic unemployment in the U.S. reached
historical lows. However, containment policies in the U.S. have
disproportionally affected the service sector, which accounts for
24% of Hispanic employment. A significant unemployment rise in the
U.S. could disrupt remittances flow and affect Guatemala's private
consumption, exchange rate volatility and the current account
balance.

Fitch estimates the fiscal deficit will reach 3.8% of GDP in 2020,
up from 2.3% in 2019 due to the impact of COVID-19. Tax revenues
are expected to fall given the economic slowdown. The health crisis
is likely to increase government expenditures, adding pressure on
an already-growing deficit. On March 18, 2020, the government
presented to Congress a budget expansion for Q7 billion (1.2% of
GDP) to mitigate the impact of the current health crisis. The
government had previously planned to present a budget expansion of
similar magnitude. Congressional gridlock resulted in a failure to
approve the 2020 budget and the 2019 budget remained in effect,
restricting the government's expenditure capacity. Political
polarization has prevented budget approvals in the past, with the
most recent in 2018.

Despite the fact that Guatemala's fiscal deficits have remained
below the 'BB' median and led to a low debt burden relative to GDP,
other key fiscal metrics are weaker relative to rating peers.
Interest/revenues at 13.0% is higher than the 'BB' median of 7.8%
signaling lower debt tolerance than similarly rated peers due to
weak tax collection. Guatemala's government revenue/GDP ratio is
the lowest of its rated sovereigns, except for Bangladesh and
Nigeria. Government revenue growth has lagged economic growth,
gradually declining to 11.4% of GDP in 2019 from its peak of 12.8%
in 2007. The Central Bank's revision to national accounts, which
resulted in a lower nominal GDP level, benefited the revenue/GDP
ratio.

Low revenue levels and weak tax collection performance reflect
institutional challenges at the tax authority, high levels of tax
evasion, a narrow tax base and weak control of corruption. VAT
evasion is estimated above 30% of potential collection, while
income tax evasion is estimated close to 70%, according to the tax
authority. Administrative measures tackling tax evasion (e.g. broad
usage of electronic billing) could improve VAT collection; however,
Fitch expects such measures to have a moderate impact.

In late 2019, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of
Guatemala's public university on how the government calculates
budget transfers, which will increase budget rigidity. Guatemala
already has a rigid expenditure profile; earmarked expenditure
items account for 90% of expenditures. Revisions to budget
transfers would also apply to municipalities. The new calculation
will result in a budget reallocation of Q8 billion (1.3% of GDP),
according to authorities. Budget rigidity, coupled with low tax
collection, limits the government's investment capacity on
infrastructure and economic development.

Central government debt rose to 26.9% of GDP in 2019 after hovering
around 25% since 2010. The debt burden will continue to increase
reaching 30% of GDP by 2021 due to the impact of coronavirus,
according to Fitch estimates. Guatemala's general government
debt/GDP of 24.5% of GDP (net of social security government debt
holdings) remains one of the lowest in the 'BB' category.
Nevertheless, Guatemala's general government debt/revenues rose to
215% in 2019 from 199% two years ago, due to weak revenue
performance; central government ratio reached 236%. This ratio is
above the 'BB' median of 184%, also signaling lower debt tolerance
relative to peers.

The current account has shown surpluses over the last four years,
averaging 1% of GDP as large remittance inflows (14% of GDP) offset
a large trade deficit (12% of GDP). Fitch expects a narrowing of
the current account surplus to 1% of GDP in 2020 from 2.1% of GDP
in 2019, assuming a 20% decline in remittances coupled with a
contraction in imports. Foreign reserves remain high, covering more
than seven months of imports, and one of the highest liquidity
ratios among rating peers.

General elections - electing the president, local government and
the unicameral legislature - were held in June 2019, with a
presidential second-round runoff in August. Alejandro Giammattei,
from conservative political party Vamos, was elected president and
sworn in to office in Jan. 14, 2020 for a four-year term. The
presidential election outcome has resulted in a marked improvement
in business confidence as the campaign focused on reducing red
tape, fostering investment and reducing security concerns.

Legislative elections led to a fractured Congress resulting in
continued political gridlock and diminishing reform prospects. The
official party attained 17 out of 160 seats. Opposition party UNE
won the largest share, 44 seats of the unicameral assembly. The
remaining seats were split among more than 15 political parties.

Corruption scandals and weak judicial institutions underpin
Guatemala's weak governance indicators, particularly rule of law
and control of corruption. Entrenched corruption and impunity are
likely to continue as outgoing President Jimmy Morales did not
renew the UN-backed International Commission Against Impunity in
Guatemala's (CICIG) two-year mandate. CICIG was a UN-backed body
that investigated corruption cases within the country since 2007;
the last two-year mandate expired in September 2019. President
Giammattei formed a new commission to tackle corruption under the
executive branch. However, this will be employed for administrative
tasks improving government transparency.

Guatemala's ratings are supported by a track record of prudent
monetary and fiscal policies, macroeconomic stability, low public
debt to GDP and sound external liquidity. These strengths are
counterbalanced by a narrow tax base that constrains policy
flexibility and limits debt tolerance. They are also
counterbalanced by reliance on remittances inflows to offset large
trade deficits and weak governance, investment levels and human
development indicators.

ESG - Governance: Guatemala has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of 5
for both Political Stability and Rights and for the Rule of Law,
Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption, as
is the case for all sovereigns. Theses scores reflect the high
weight that the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) have in its
proprietary Sovereign Rating Model. Guatemala has an average WBGI
ranking at 27.9 percentile driven by weak rule of law and a high
level of corruption.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) AND QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Guatemala a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BB+' on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency (LT FC) IDR
scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the SRM
to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative to
rated peers, as follows:

  - Structural: -1 notch, to reflect political tension and
congressional gridlock that limits the government's ability to pass
reforms, including the approval of the budget.

  - Public Finances: -1 notch, to reflect continued deterioration
of tax collection levels, which limits the government's investment
capacity in a context of large social and infrastructure needs and
to reflect a forecast deterioration in the public finances not yet
reflected in published data.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within its
criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected
in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to
negative rating action/downgrade:

  -- Lower-than-expected growth performance and weaker medium-term
growth prospects, for example, caused by lower remittances or
lasting impacts from the growth slowdown on key sectors of the
economy.

  -- Political gridlock that constrains government financing
flexibility and effective policy making or leads to a trend rise in
debt that materially undermines fiscal metrics.

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to
positive rating action/upgrade are:

  -- Improvements in tax collection that enhance fiscal policy
flexibility;

  -- Higher investment and growth medium-term prospects, for
example, by addressing Guatemala's infrastructure needs that
constrain productivity;

  -- Improvements in governance and human development indicators
relative to peers, particularly on control of corruption and rule
of law.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Public Finance issuers have a
best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile
of rating transitions, measured in a positive direction) of three
notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating
downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a negative direction) of three notches
over three years. The complete span of best- and worst-case
scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA'
to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on
historical performance.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Economic assumptions are consistent with its baseline macroeconomic
forecasts that are currently being reviewed and updated very
frequently to keep pace with developments resulting from the
coronavirus.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Guatemala has an ESG Relevance Score of 5 for Political Stability
and Rights as World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest
weight in Fitch's SRM and are relevant to the rating and a key
rating driver with a high weight.

Guatemala has an ESG Relevance Score of 5 for Rule of Law,
Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as
World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight in Fitch's
SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and are a key
rating driver with a high weight.

Guatemala has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Human Rights and
Political Freedoms as World Bank Governance Indicators have the
highest weight in the SRM and are relevant to the rating and a
rating driver.

Guatemala has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Creditor Rights as
willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating and
is a rating driver, as for all sovereigns.



=============
J A M A I C A
=============

DIGICEL LIMITED: Fitch Cuts 2021 & 2023 Notes Rating to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Digicel Limited to 'C' from 'CCC', and
its outstanding debt instruments, including the 2021 and 2023 notes
to 'C'/'RR4' from 'CCC'/'RR4'. Fitch has also downgraded Digicel
International Finance Limited to 'CCC+' from 'B-'/Negative, and its
outstanding debt instruments, including the 2024 notes and the 2025
credit facility, to 'CCC+'/'RR4' from 'B-'/'RR4'. Fitch has removed
the Negative Rating Outlook from DIFL.

On April 1, 2020, Digicel Group Limited (DGL3) announced that they
would seek creditor approval to restructure debt at multiple
levels, including Digicel Group Two Limited (DGL2), Digicel Group
One Limited (DGL1) and Digicel Limited (DL). The proposed
restructuring involves a reorganization of the corporate structure,
as well as an exchange of existing debts for new instruments at a
discount.

The reorganization involves the creation of a new holding company,
Digicel Group .5 Limited (DGL0.5) between DGL1 and DL, which would
own all of DGL1's subsidiaries. DGL0.5 would exchange DGL1 and
DGL2's existing notes for new notes at a discount to current
principal. Tendering bondholders would also receive a perpetual
convertible note that would convert into 49% of the equity in
DGL0.5 after three years. DL would also exchange its existing debts
for various instruments at the DL and DIFL level. DL would exchange
its 2021 notes for various securities at the DIFL level at a
discount to current principal. DL would also exchange its 2023
notes for 2027 DL notes at a discount. Finally, Digicel's
controlling shareholder will inject equity into DGL0.5

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Distressed Debt Exchange: The proposed restructuring qualifies as a
distressed debt exchange (DDE) for DGL2, DGL1 and DL. The reduction
in principal and the extension of maturities, qualify as material
reductions per Fitch's methodology. Fitch had previously indicated
that the company would likely restructure debt at one or more
levels to avoid insolvency, based on the group's unsustainable
capital structure and limited financial flexibility. As the IDRs
and instrument ratings of DGL1, DGL2 and DGL3 are already at 'C',
no rating action is being taken on those entities.

Increasing Leverage at DIFL: As a result of the DL exchange
transaction, leverage at DIFL will increase by approximately 1.1x.
The proposed debt, along with the company's stagnant operating
performance, and the company's inability to refinance debt at any
other level, make it likely that leverage at DIFL will continue to
increase. The proposal also includes amending certain incurrence
covenants, which could potentially enable DIFL to tap $100 million
from its liquidity facility. Finally, the exchange proposal
represents aggressive corporate governance, which will likely
impair the company's position with creditors.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Fitch will re-assess Digicel's credit profile following the
completion of the debt restructuring.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action There is limited room for an upgrade in the
near term, given Digicel's capital structure and aggressive
corporate governance. Developments That May, Individually or
Collectively, Lead to Negative Rating Action Following the
completion of the debt exchange, Fitch will lower the IDRs of the
affected issuers to 'RD', and then rate the group as appropriate.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Ratings of Non-Financial Corporate issuers have a best-case rating
upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating
transitions, measured in a positive direction) of three notches
over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of four notches over three years.
The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Fitch will re-assess Digicel's liquidity and debt structure
following the completion of the debt restructuring.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Digicel Group Limited and its subsidiaries score a 4 on Exposure to
Environmental Impacts, due to their operations in a hurricane-prone
region. Digicel Group Limited and its subsidiaries score a 4 on
each of Governance Structure, Group Structure and Financial
Transparency. Fitch has concerns about board independence from the
controlling shareholder, the willingness and ability of the company
to potentially move assets, and the timing and quality of the
group's financial disclosure.

Except for the matters discussed, the highest level of ESG credit
relevance, if present, is a score of 3. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the
entity(ies), either due to their nature or to the way in which they
are being managed by the entity(ies).

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

JAMAICA: Sees Mass Closure of Small Businesses Because of COVID-19
------------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Small Business Association of Jamaica
(SBAJ) is reporting that more than 50 per cent of its members have
now closed as the local economy takes a battering from the Covid 19
crisis.

SBAJ President Hugh Johnson contends that the J$25 billion stimulus
package will have little effect on the establishments based on the
downturn in the economy, according to RJR News.

In an interview with Radio Jamaica News, Mr. Johnson, expressed
doubt the initiative will help drive economic activity while the
country grapples with the fallout from the coronavirus, the report
notes.

"I think we are misguided by calling it a stimulus package," he
said, contending that businesses cannot be stimulated while they
are being closed, the report relates.

A true stimulus would be any support the government provides after
the ealth hcrisis has ended, he said, the report discloses.

He reported that the situation facing the small business sector is
worsening, the report notes.

"None of the announcements so far will really reach the most
vulnerable," he argued, the report relays.

Chartered accountant Dennis Chung recently said the Holness
administration was premature in unveiling the stimulus package to
minimize the economic impact of the coronavirus, the report notes.

Mr. Chung said it should have been presented after the outbreak is
contained, the report says.

He believes the measures announced by the Finance Minister might be
ineffective amid the decline in consumption, the report adds.


                          About Jamaica

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, S&P
Global Ratings in September 2019 raised its long-term foreign and
local currency sovereign credit ratings on Jamaica to 'B+' from
'B'. The outlook is stable. At the same time, S&P Global Ratings
affirmed its 'B' short-term foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings on the country. S&P Global
Ratings also raised its transfer and convertibility assessment to
'BB-' from 'B+'.

RJR News reported in June 2019 that Steven Gooden, Chief Executive
Officer of NCB Capital Markets, warned that the increasing
liquidity in the Jamaican economy might result in heightened risk
to the financial market if left unchecked.  This, he said, is
against the background of the local administration seeking to
reduce the debt to GDP to 60% by the end of the 2025/26 fiscal
year, which will see Government repaying more than J$600 billion
which will get back into the system, according to RJR News.



===========
M E X I C O
===========

GRUPO KALTEX: S&P Cuts ICR to 'CCC', Put on CreditWatch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
On April 6, 2020, S&P Global ratings lowered its issuer credit and
issue-level ratings to 'CCC' from 'B-' on the Mexico-based textile
and apparel company, Grupo Kaltex, S.A. de C.V. (Kaltex). S&P also
placed the ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications.

Kaltex's liquidity will likely tighten over the next few months in
light of the coronavirus pandemic, raising concerns over its
capacity to meet short-term financial commitments, including its
second coupon payment due October 2020 on its $320 million senior
secured notes due 2022. Moreover, this reflects the heightened
refinancing risk in relation to its short-term bank loans if the
company is unable to roll over and/or amortizes them in the
upcoming months. Despite some covenant relief granted by lenders in
2019, S&P believes Kaltex will continue breaching its leverage and
interest coverage financial maintenance covenants. The company is
currently in talks with its creditors to extend the waivers.

The unfavorable business conditions due to the COVID-19 outbreak
will pressure Kaltex's cash flows in the near term, making its
capital structure unsustainable and increasing the probability of a
default in the next 12 months. Despite significant uncertainty over
the effects of the pandemic, Kaltex's operating performance will
very likely deteriorate in the next six months or longer, depending
on the depth and duration of this unprecedented scenario. In light
of the large number of department store closures and current
lockdown on population movements in Kaltex's main markets,
including Mexico and the U.S., which accounted for 54% and 36% of
total sales in 2019, respectively, S&P believes the company's
sales, EBITDA, and cash flows will take a big hit. This will
inevitably dent the company's credit metrics and capacity to honor
its financial obligations in the next 12 months. As a result,
without an unforeseen positive developments, including favorable
business, financial, and economic conditions to meet its short-term
financial commitments, the probability of Kaltex's default is
rising in the short term. Although the company is currently in
talks to shed certain non-core assets in order to reduce its debt
obligations, S&P doesn't expect this to occur before the year-end.

PETROLEOS MEXICANOS: Fitch Cuts LT IDRs to BB, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Petroleos Mexicanos' Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB' from 'BB+',
National Long-Term ratings to 'A(mex)' from 'AA(mex)'. The Rating
Outlook for all ratings is Negative. The downgrade applies to
approximately USD80 billion of notes outstanding. Fitch has also
downgraded PEMEX's National Short-Term ratings to 'F1(mex)' from
'F1+(mex)'.

Its downgrades reflect the continued deterioration of the company's
stand-alone credit profile to 'ccc-' amid the downturn in the
global oil and gas industry, Fitch's lower oil price assumptions
and the weakening credit linkage between Mexico and PEMEX. PEMEX's
SCP deterioration reflects the company's limited flexibility to
navigate the downturn in the oil and gas industry given its
elevated tax burden, high leverage, rising per barrel lifting costs
and high investment needs to maintain production and replenish
reserves. Fitch estimates PEMEX's FCF will range from negative $15
billion to negative $20 billion per year. At the current Mexico's
crude basket price of below $20/bbl, PEMEX's upstream business does
not generate enough cash flow to cover operational and financial
costs (half-cycle costs) of more than $25/bbl and the company will
need extraordinary government support in the immediate future.

The downward revision of the strength of the linkage between
PEMEX's ratings and those of the sovereign reflects the delay and
uncertainty of exceptional support from the government towards the
company in light of the financial difficulties PEMEX will face as a
result of the decrease in oil prices. In line with its
government-related entities (GRE) methodology, Fitch has revised
its assessment of government support for PEMEX to "weak" from
"moderate" and that for the government incentives sub-factors to
"moderate" from "strong". Fitch continues to assess Mexico's
ownership and control of PEMEX as "very strong". This downward
revision of the linkage's strength increased the notching
differential between PEMEX's ratings and those of Mexico to three
notches from two notches.

The negative outlook reflects PEMEX's financial vulnerability to
the current depressed oil price environment and the company's need
for extraordinary and proactive government support. Fitch will
continue monitoring the company's actions to preserve liquidity and
weather the downturn in oil prices as well as Mexico's response to
support PEMEX over the coming months. Additional rating actions are
possible in the absence of proactive and extraordinary government
support. Per its GRE methodology, a further weakening of the
strength of the linkage will change the rating approach to
bottom-up, with a maximum uplift of three notches from PEMEX's SCP
versus the current top-down rating approach. This change could
result in a multi-notch downgrade to potentially mid- to low 'B'
rating category.

Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX)

  - LT IDR BB; Downgrade; previously at BB+

  - LC LT IDR BB; Downgrade; previously at BB+

  - Natl LT A(mex); Downgrade; previously at AA(mex)

  - Natl ST F1(mex;) Downgrade; previously at F1+(mex)

  - Senior unsecured; LT BB; Downgrade; previously at BB+

  - Senior unsecured; Natl LT A(mex); Downgrade; previously at
AA(mex)



=======
P E R U
=======

TERMINALES PORTUARIOS: Fitch Places BB Rating on Watch Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has conducted a review on its ratings of Latam ports
amid the current challenging scenario of the coronavirus pandemic
and the expected sharp drop in volumes and revenues for this kind
of assets due to transportation restrictions and a depressed
economic activity. The following ratings are affected and
respective actions are:

  -- Autoridad del Canal de Panama

  -- Terminales Portuarios Euroandinos Paita

  -- Administracion Portuaria Integral de Campeche, S.A. de C.V.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Autoridad del Canal de Panama (ACP)

The Negative Outlook on ACP continues to reflect its rating
constraint at three notches above Panama's sovereign rating
('BBB'/Negative Outlook) due to the linkages between ACP and the
Panamanian government. Therefore, a downgrade of the IDR of Panama
would result in a downgrade of the ratings of ACP.

The affirmation of ACP's 'A' IDR and issue ratings as well as its
'aa' Standalone Credit Profile (SCP) rating reflect the robust
liquidity that it is expected to maintain to make debt service
payments over the next two years. They also reflect very strong
DSCRs exceeding 3x and cash balances that are expected to continue
fully offsetting outstanding debt balances, even considering
potential coronavirus-inflicted reductions on the Canal's
throughput.

In light of the coronavirus pandemic, which has given rise to
transportation restrictions and is expected to interrupt trade and
cause severe cargo declines in ports, Fitch revised ACP's rating
case to assess a potential volume decline provoked by the
coronavirus outbreak. Such a scenario considered a revenue decline
of 10% in fiscal 2020 (ending Sept 30.), reflecting the impact that
lower cargo levels could have on revenues, with a recovery in 2021
to levels close to those of 2019. Under the revised rating case,
minimum DSCR is 3.7x in 2020 and returns to levels above 4x
thereafter, which are slightly lower than in the last review, but
still strong for the rating category according to applicable
criteria. Fitch also ran an additional sensitivity scenario,
considering a prolonged and steeper revenue decline into fiscal
year 2021 with delayed recovery thereafter. This scenario yields a
minimum DSCR of 2.3x in FY 2021, which returns to 4x thereafter.
These metrics remain strong and demonstrate ACP's financial
resilience to extreme cargo and revenue declines.

Terminales Portuarios Euroandinos Paita (Paita)

The Rating Watch Negative reflects tighter projected metrics as a
consequence of the reduction in volume that Fitch anticipates as a
result of the coronavirus pandemic and its effects on the economic
environment, including the potential impact on the demand and
supply dynamics for commodities, raw material and other goods, and
thus need for shipment.

In light of the coronavirus pandemic, which has given rise to
transportation restrictions, and is expected to interrupt trade and
cause severe cargo declines in ports, Fitch revised ACP's rating
case to assess a potential volume decline provoked by the
coronavirus outbreak. Such a scenario considered a decline in
volume of 15% in 2020, with a recovery in 2021 to levels close to
those of 2019. Under this scenario, average DSCR of 1.9x could
indicate a higher rating, according to applicable criteria.
However, compulsory investments result in DSCR coverages close to
or below 1.0x in two consecutive periods (2023-2024), effectively
limiting the rating. Fitch also ran an additional sensitivity
scenario, considering a delayed recovery by a quarter. This
scenario results in an average DSCR of 1.8x.

The Rating Watch Negative will be resolved once Fitch has more
information to form a view on the likely impact the coronavirus
pandemic will have on volumes, the shape of the recovery, and on
the issuer's ability to manage expenses and other obligations in
order to preserve liquidity

As indicated, the recent outbreak of coronavirus and related
government containment measures worldwide creates an uncertain
global environment for port volume in the near term. While all
related issuers and ports performance data through most recently
available issuer data may not have indicated impairment, material
changes in revenue and cost profile are occurring across the ports
sector and likely to worsen in the coming weeks and months as
economic activity suffers and government restrictions are
maintained or expanded. Fitch's ratings are forward-looking in
nature, and Fitch will monitor developments in the sector as a
result of the virus outbreak as it relates to severity and
duration, and incorporate revised base and rating case qualitative
and quantitative inputs based on expectations for future
performance and assessment of key risks.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

ACP

Developments that may, individually or collectively, lead to
Positive rating action:

  -- A positive rating action is unlikely in the short term.

Developments that may, individually or collectively, lead to
Negative rating action:

  -- A negative rating action on the sovereign rating of Panama;

  -- Volume reduction in calendar-year 2020 greater than 35% along
with the expectation of a slow and extended recovery.

  -- An observed and continual deterioration on available liquidity
levels to face operating and financial obligations.

Paita

Developments that may, individually or collectively, lead to
Positive rating action:

  -- A positive rating action is unlikely in the short term.

Developments that may, individually or collectively, lead to
Negative rating action:

  -- Volume reduction in 2020 greater than 15% along with the
expectation of a slow and extended recovery.

  -- An observed and continual deterioration on available liquidity
levels to face operating and financial obligations.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

ESG issues are credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact
on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

Ratings of Public Finance issuers have a best-case rating upgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a positive direction) of three notches over a
three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade
scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions,
measured in a negative direction) of three notches over three
years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit
ratings for all rating categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best-
and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical
performance.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

Terminales Portuarios Euroandinos Paita
      
Terminales Portuarios Euroandinos Paita/Debt/1 LT

  - LT BB; Rating Watch On

Autoridad del Canal de Panama

  - LT IDR; A; Affirmed


                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2020.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


                  * * * End of Transmission * * *