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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Monday, February 17, 2020, Vol. 21, No. 34

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Bond Prices Fall After Restructuring Warning


B R A Z I L

BANCO FIBRA: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable on Steady Capital Level


C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S

CAYMAN ISLANDS: Tagged as Uncooperative in Tax Matters


C O S T A   R I C A

BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA: Moody's Cuts LC Deposit Rating to B2
COSTA RICA: Moody's Cuts LT Issuer Rating to 'B2', Outlook Stable


P U E R T O   R I C O

EMPRESAS CARRION: Says Negotiations With Oriental Still Ongoing


T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O

CL FINANCIAL: Insists Ability to Repay $8.1 Billion Immediately


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Seeks ICC Probe of U.S. Sanctions


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week February 10 to February 14, 2020

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================

ARGENTINA: Bond Prices Fall After Restructuring Warning
-------------------------------------------------------
Hugh Bronstein at Reuters reports that Argentine bonds took a
beating on Feb. 13 after the economy minister warned that a "deep
debt restructuring" was on the way, and promised to take a tough
stance with creditors while refusing to impose fiscal austerity on
the shrinking economy.

Over the counter bond prices RPLATC fell an average 2% while
Argentina's risk spread 11EMJ shot out 118 basis points to 2,068
over safe-haven U.S. Treasury paper, according to Reuters.

The report notes that Economy Minister Martin Guzman told Congress
that while pushing out bond maturities he would not try to cut the
primary fiscal deficit this year, saying that austerity was never a
good idea for an economy in recession.

He warned that the restructuring would likely be "frustrating" for
bondholders. "But we will not allow foreign funds to set the tone
for macroeconomic policy," Guzman added, the report relays.

Citi Research, in a note to clients, referred to the comments as
"anti-market rhetoric."

"The focus to make the debt sustainable without an imminent fiscal
adjustment does not bode well for bondholders," it said, the report
relays.

The only country with a higher perceived risk of default than
Argentina is Venezuela, according to JP Morgan's Emerging Markets
Bond Index Plus, the report discloses.  Venezuela's spread was an
eye-watering 12,990 basis points over treasuries while the index as
a whole stood at a relatively miniscule 307 basis points, the
report relays.

                            Inflation Eases

On the positive side, the government reported January inflation of
2.3% on Feb. 13, well under the 3.7% reported for December. The
central bank then cut its benchmark interest rate to 44% from 48%,
saying the move was made possible by the easing of consumer price
increases, the report notes.

Lowering inflation is key to Guzman's economic plan, the report
discloses.  He says debt restructuring is necessary to avoid the
inflationary practice of printing pesos to pay for the debt
inherited from the previous government, which he calls
unsustainable, the report says.

The country's biggest creditor, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), has sent a team of economists to Buenos Aires to hammer out
a plan for the government to repay the $44 billion it owes the
multilateral lender, the report relay.  The deal will set the stage
for restructuring talks with bondholders, the report notes.

"This will be a complex negotiation, but I believe the Argentines
understand there is a limit to how much pain they can impose on the
bondholders," said Alberto Bernal, chief emerging markets
strategist at XP Investments in New York, the report discloses.

The government says it needs to push out maturities of about $100
billion in bonds and loans to give breathing room to an economy
asphyxiated by crushing debt, the report note.

The government ruffled the market when it unilaterally postponed a
$1.47 billion principal payment on its AF20 bond from Feb.13 until
Sept. 30, the report relays.

"The AF20 was very poorly handled, but I still believe that there
is some merit in deciding not to print money to pay for that
amortization," Bernal said, the report relates.  "It shows that the
government understands the clear causality that exists between
printing pesos and deterioration of inflation expectations," he
added.

Latin America's No. 3 economy is expected by private analysts to
shrink 1.5% in 2020, with inflation seen easing to 41.7% from over
50% currently, the report notes.

Guzman and the fund say initial meetings have been constructive.
But IMF spokesman Gerry Rice warned that the fund's ability to
grant debt forgiveness was limited, the report says.

"The capacity of the IMF to restructure debt, to postpone
repayments, is constrained by our legal and policy frameworks," he
told reporters in Washington.

                        About Argentina

Argentina is a country located mostly in the southern half of South
America.  It's capital is Buenos Aires. Alberto Angel Fernandez is
the current president of Argentina after winning the October 2019
general election. He succeeded Mauricio Macri in the position.

Argentina has the third largest economy in Latin America.  The
country's economy is an upper middle-income economy for fiscal year
2019 according to the World Bank.  Historically, however, its
economic performance has been very uneven, with high economic
growth alternating with severe recessions, income maldistribution
and in the recent decades, increasing poverty.

Moody's credit rating for Argentina was last set at Caa2 from B2
with under review outlook. Moody's rating was issued on Aug. 30,
2019.  S&P Global Ratings, in December 2019, raised its foreign
currency sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CC/C' from
'SD/D'.  S&P's outlook on the long-term sovereign credit ratings is
negative. Fitch Ratings, in December 2019, upgraded Argentina's
Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating to 'CC' from 'RD',
and its Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR to 'C' from 'RD'.  DBRS,
Inc. meanwhile downgraded Argentina's Long-Term and Short-Term
Foreign Currency - Issuer Ratings to Selective Default (SD), from
CC and R-5, respectively, also in December 2019.




===========
B R A Z I L
===========

BANCO FIBRA: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable on Steady Capital Level
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Banco Fibra S.A. to
stable from negative. S&P also affirmed its 'B-/B' global and
'brBBB-/brA-3' national scale issuer credit ratings on the bank.

S&P said, "The outlook revision takes into account our view that
the risk of Fibra's balance sheet worsening further because of
Brazil's recent economic crisis has decreased. In addition, we
expect Fibra's credit growth to remain low in the next two years,
which should support stable capitalization levels."

Fibra's credit losses have fallen in the past few years, thanks to
stronger underwriting standards, improving economic conditions, and
a gradual reduction of its low quality legacy loan portfolio. S&P
said, "Moreover, we expect the Brazilian economy to continue
recovering in the next two years, supporting the bank's efforts to
stabilize its asset quality metrics and reducing the need for
additional provisions. Therefore, we believe that a deterioration
in asset quality that could impair the bank's bottom-line results
is less likely."

S&P said, "In addition, we expect Fibra's Basel III ratio to remain
at least 100 basis points (bps) above the minimum requirement of
10.5% for banks operating in Brazil. Although management has a
target of operating with a more leveraged balance sheet, with a
Basel III ratio of about 11%, Fibra hasn't been able to expand its
loan portfolio in the past few years. We believe that competitive
pressures in the middle-market and corporate lending segment may
continue to threaten Fibra's capacity to raise its revenue, which
may limit a stronger improvement in the bank's operating
performance despite the strengthening asset quality. Nevertheless,
the modest growth, coupled with modest bottom-line results, should
maintain stable capitalization levels in the next two years, in our
view.

"Fibra's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) remains at 'ccc+', but
we include a one-notch adjustment into the final 'B-' rating,
because we believe that the bank currently doesn't meet our
definition for a 'CCC+' rating. In our view, Fibra doesn't rely on
favorable business, financial, or economic conditions to meet its
financial obligations. In addition, its liquidity position is
stronger than those of peers, with broad liquid assets covering
short-term wholesale funding by 6.8x."




===========================
C A Y M A N   I S L A N D S
===========================

CAYMAN ISLANDS: Tagged as Uncooperative in Tax Matters
------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Cayman Islands is to be placed on the
European Union's list of uncooperative countries in tax matters,
when the European Council meets this week.

The Financial Times reported that the 27 EU ambassadors decided to
place the British Overseas territory on a list of nine territories
that do not effectively cooperate with the European bloc, according
to RJR News.

The European finance ministers are set to confirm the decision at a
meeting, the report relays.




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C O S T A   R I C A
===================

BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA: Moody's Cuts LC Deposit Rating to B2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term local
currency deposit ratings of both Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and
Banco de Costa Rica to B2 from B1. The banks' foreign currency
deposit ratings were downgraded to B3 from B2. At the same time,
Moody's downgraded BNCR's baseline credit assessment and adjusted
BCA to b2 from b1, while it affirmed BCR's BCA and adjusted BCA at
b2. The rating agency also downgraded BNCR's long-term foreign
currency senior unsecured debt rating to B2 from B1. The outlook on
both BNCR and BCR was changed to stable from negative.

The rating actions follow Moody's downgrade of Costa Rica's
government bond rating to B2 with stable outlook, from B1 with
negative outlook, and the lowering of Costa Rica's country ceilings
for debt and deposits.

The following ratings and assessments were downgraded:

Banco Nacional de Costa Rica

Baseline credit assessment and adjusted baseline credit assessment,
to b2 from b1

Long-term local currency deposit rating, to B2 from B1, outlook
changed to stable from negative

Long-term foreign currency deposit rating, to B3 from B2, outlook
changed to stable from negative

Long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating, to B2 from
B1, outlook changed to stable from negative

Long-term local and foreign currency counterparty risk ratings, to
B1 from Ba3

Long-term counterparty risk assessment, to B1(cr) from Ba3(cr)

Banco de Costa Rica

Long-term local currency deposit rating, to B2 from B1, outlook
changed to stable from negative

Long-term foreign currency deposit rating, to B3 from B2, outlook
changed to stable from negative

The following ratings and assessments were affirmed:

Banco Nacional de Costa Rica

Short-term local and foreign currency deposit and counterparty risk
ratings, at Not Prime

Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr)

Banco de Costa Rica

Baseline credit assessment and adjusted baseline credit assessment,
at b2

Long-term local and foreign currency counterparty risk ratings, at
B1

Long-term counterparty risk assessment, at B1(cr)

Short-term local and foreign currency deposit and counterparty risk
ratings, at Not Prime

Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr)

Outlook Actions:

Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and Banco de Costa Rica

Outlook changed to stable, from negative

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrades of BCR and BNCR's ratings and assessments were
prompted by the downgrade of Costa Rica's bond rating to B2, from
B1, which mainly reflect the country's sustained high fiscal
deficits in the last ten years, which have pushed its debt burden
higher than peers. Moody's expects the 2018 fiscal reform to reduce
deficits but only gradually, and therefore debt levels will likely
continue to increase in the next years. Consequently, government
funding requirements will remain high, which leaves Costa Rica
vulnerable to changes in market appetite for its debt.

The rating actions reflect the high underlying inter-linkages
between the banks' standalone credit risk profiles and that of the
sovereign, in light of their direct and indirect exposures to the
sovereign risk in the form of government securities holdings and a
potential deterioration in the operating environment. The actions
also consider the weaker fiscal capacity of the government of Costa
Rica to provide financial support to banks in an event of stress,
as reflected in the downgrade of the sovereign rating.

While the linkages with the sovereign affect both banks similarly,
BNCR BCA was downgraded to b2 while BCR's was affirmed at b2. The
affirmation of BCR's BCA reflects Moody's views that corporate
governance shortfalls that occurred in 2017 have been addressed and
BCR's ratings, therefore, no longer merit the negative adjustment
that had reduced its BCA by one notch, relative to that of BNCR.
BCR has implemented several credit positive changes to improve its
risk management and control practices, some of which will only be
proven over time, and which Moody's views as consistent to a b2
BCA.

BNCR and BCR's local currency deposit ratings, as well as BNCR's
foreign currency debt rating remain in line with Costa Rica's
government bond rating at B2. The banks' B3 foreign currency
deposit ratings are constrained by Costa Rica's sovereign ceiling
for foreign currency deposits. The ratings reflect Moody's
assessment of full support from the government, which is based on
the government's 100% ownership of the banks, its guarantee of
their senior obligations under Article 4 of the Banking Law, the
banks' public policy mandate, and the importance of their deposit
and loan franchise within the Costa Rican financial system.

In an effort to improve its fiscal strength and reduce the debt
burden, Costa Rican government has recently announced its intention
to gradually rely on government owned banks' dividend payouts to
service its debt. The government also announced its intention to
sell Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, S.A. (BICSA, b1/B1 stable),
a Panamanian based wholesale bank owned by BCR (51% of the shares)
and BNCR (49%). Although these measures do not have an impact on
BNCR and BCR's ratings at this point, they could in the future
cause downward pressure if they result in a material deterioration
in the banks' capital position and it may cause a lowering of its
assumption of full support to the banks by the government.

WHAT COULD CAUSE THE RATINGS TO MOVE UP OR DOWN

Considering that BNCR and BCR's ratings are already positioned at
the level of the Costa Rican sovereign rating, an upgrade would be
highly unlikely without an upgrade of the sovereign. Therefore, and
considering the strong credit interlinks between the sovereign and
the banks, an upgrade of the Costa Rican sovereign rating could
exert positive pressure on the banks' ratings, provided that this
is accompanied by an improvement of their financial fundamentals,
especially stabilization of asset risk metrics.

On the contrary, the banks' BCAs would face downward pressure if
their asset quality, profitability, or capital deteriorate
substantially. However, a downgrade of the banks' ratings without a
preceding downgrade of the sovereign is highly unlikely, due to its
assessment of full support to the banks from the government.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
Methodology published in November 2019.


COSTA RICA: Moody's Cuts LT Issuer Rating to 'B2', Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the Government of Costa Rica's
long-term issuer and senior unsecured bond ratings to B2 from B1
and changed its rating outlook to stable from negative.

The key drivers for the downgrade are as follows:

  1. High fiscal deficits leading to an upward trend in debt
     metrics which will remain above rating peers; and,

  2. Recurring funding challenges resulting from relatively large
     borrowing requirements introduce risks to Costa Rica's credit

     profile

The stable outlook on the B2 rating reflects Moody's view that
funding and liquidity pressures will remain contained even as debt
metrics continue to rise.

In a related decision, Moody's lowered Costa Rica's long-term
country ceilings: the foreign currency bond ceiling to Ba3 from
Ba2; the foreign currency deposit ceiling to B3 from B2; and the
local currency bond and deposit ceilings to Ba1 from Baa3. The
short-term foreign currency bond ceiling and the short-term foreign
currency deposit ceiling remain unchanged at Not Prime (NP).

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE DOWNGRADE TO B2

FIRST DRIVER: HIGH FISCAL DEFICITS WILL LEAD TO UPWARD TREND IN
DEBT METRICS

Fiscal deficits averaging over 6% of GDP since 2015 have pushed
government debt/GDP higher than 'B' rated peers. Despite fiscal
consolidation measures approved in 2018, Moody's expects these
adverse fiscal trends to continue. As a result, Costa Rica's fiscal
deficits, debt ratios, and interest burden will remain materially
higher than those of similarly-rated peers for the foreseeable
future.

Moody's projects government debt to reach 63% of GDP in 2020,
higher than the 56% 'B' peer median. Because the Costa Rican
government collects comparatively less revenues than its peers, its
government debt-to-revenue ratio will reach 415% in 2020 compared
to 263% for peers. Interest payments have been steadily increasing,
and will account for over 30% of government revenues this year
compared to only 10% for peers.

Although Moody's expects the 2018 fiscal reform to reduce deficits,
this will happen only gradually. Last year Costa Rica's fiscal
deficit reached 7% of GDP, more than double the median for
similarly rated sovereigns. In 2020-22, Moody's forecasts only a
small decline, with annual deficits coming just under 6% of GDP.
Based on current trends, Moody's projects debt will continue to
rise approaching 70% of GDP by 2022.

The fiscal reform approved in 2018 aimed to reduce the overall
fiscal deficit through a combination of increased revenues and
slower current expenditure growth. As full implementation will be a
multi-year process that will span more than one administration,
execution risks are material. Moreover, the 2019 fiscal results
highlight the difficulties Costa Rica faces in its fiscal
consolidation efforts. Despite an 8% increase in overall revenues
last year, the government deficit was more than 1% of GDP wider
than the authorities' original target, driven by increased interest
costs and higher capital spending.

SECOND DRIVER: RECURRING FUNDING CHALLENGES RESULTING FROM
RELATIVELY LARGE BORROWING REQUIREMENTS

A combination of high fiscal deficits and a large debt repayments
pushed the government's overall funding needs to over 12% of GDP
last year. Despite a small drop for 2020, funding needs will remain
high. Moody's expects financing requirements close to 11% of GDP in
2020, and projects average annual funding needs to remain above 12%
of GDP in 2021-22, nominal amounts that will test markets'
willingness and ability to cover the government's financing needs.

Relatively large funding needs will pose recurrent financing
challenges to the government. Even though funding rates have
declined since the government experienced a very tight liquidity
position in 2018 - a condition that required an emergency loan from
the central bank - Costa Rica's international borrowing rates
remain among the highest in the region, exposing the government to
changes in market appetite for its debt.

Costa Rica's main funding source is local with the domestic
financial markets providing three-quarters of all government
funding. As the country's domestic markets lack the size and depth
to meet all government funding needs over time, Costa Rica must
periodically tap international capital markets. In the past, when
access to international capital markets was constrained, it has
resulted in pressures on domestic interest rates as the government
increased its local market funding.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The recommendation to assign a stable outlook reflects reduced
funding concerns relative to 2018. Although Moody's expects debt to
continue to rise and fiscal deficits to fall only gradually, Costa
Rica has shown improved market access in the last year and Moody's
base scenario is that this will continue.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP

Given the recent downgrade, a rating upgrade is unlikely. The
current rating would be strengthened if the government effectively
implements structural budgetary adjustments that materially reduce
fiscal deficits, limiting the expected worsening in government debt
indicators and, as a result, easing funding risks.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN

Prospects of continued fiscal deterioration that result in higher
government debt metrics than what Moody's currently projects, as
well as a deterioration in market access conditions associated with
materially higher funding costs, could lead to a negative rating
action. Evidence of stress in the banking system, or a significant
increase in the level of financial dollarization could also place
downward pressure on the rating.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 17,566 (2018 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 2.6% (2018 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 2% (2018 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -5.9% (2018 Actual) (also known as
Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -3.1% (2018 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 48.4 (2018 Actual)

Economic resiliency: baa3

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.

On February 5, 2020, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Costa Rica, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's fiscal or financial
strength, including its debt profile, has materially decreased. The
issuer has become increasingly susceptible to event risks.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Ratings Methodology published in November 2019.




=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

EMPRESAS CARRION: Says Negotiations With Oriental Still Ongoing
---------------------------------------------------------------
Debtor Empresas Carrion Allende, Inc., submitted a reply to the
objection of Oriental Bank to the Amended Plan of Reorganization
and Disclosure Statement.

All objections presented by the secured creditor Oriental Bank were
taken into consideration, and disclosures include the development
of the alternate plan in which Debtor and the related Debtor Jose
Allende Valverdy have offered to acquire the combined claims of
Oriental Bank in a discounted payoff transaction.  At this point,
the Debtors have presented their offer of $2 million and the bank
has counter-offered with a request of $2.5 million, an achievable
gap that is still under negotiation.

Currently, the Debtors are in the process of requesting additional
funding from Popular Mezzanine Fund, LLC, to reach at least
$2,240,400. The investor has been provided with the documentation
required for the increase and is currently in review. Debtors are
confident that they will be able to reach an agreement with the
secured creditor within the next 30 days.

The Amended Plan does provide a scenario of alternative treatments
to the secured creditor Oriental Bank.  The first contemplates the
payment of the secured portion of the restructured loans over a
period of 30 years, with a monthly payment of $6,044.46 including
principal and interest.  The alternative is the discounted payoff
offer which is currently under negotiations with the bank.

The Debtor notes that Oriental's objection stated that the
development of the properties would result in more expenses by the
Debtor and an investment of at least $400,000.  The $400,000 were
contemplated in the appraisal for the Debtor as an adjustment to
the condition of similar properties, not as a statement of required
repairs.  This estimate also does not consider the fact that the
property is to be leased substantially as is, with the lessor's
repairs limited to the common areas and services.

A full-text copy of the Debtor's reply to objection dated January
21, 2020, is available at https://tinyurl.com/skckmhn from
PacerMonitor at no charge.

Counsel of the Debtor:

      FRANCISCO J. RAMOS & ASOCIADOS, CSP
      Francisco J. Ramos Gonzalez
      SAN JUAN PR 00919-1993
      Tel: (787)764-5134
      E-mail:fjramos@coqui.net

               About Empresas Carrion Allende

Empresas Carrion Allende, Inc., operates a grocery store in
Arecibo, Puerto, Rico.  Empresas Carrion Allende filed its petition
for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R.
Case No. 18-07111) on Dec. 6, 2018.  In the petition was signed by
Sandra I. Carrion Montalvo, president, the Debtor was estimated to
have $1 million to $10 million in both assets and liabilities.  The
case is assigned to the Hon. Mildred Caban Flores.  Francisco J.
Ramos Gonzalez, Esq., at Francisco J. Ramos & Asociados CSP,
represents the Debtor.




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T R I N I D A D   A N D   T O B A G O
=====================================

CL FINANCIAL: Insists Ability to Repay $8.1 Billion Immediately
---------------------------------------------------------------
CL Financial and CLICO have the capacity to repay immediately the
$8.1 billion that the Government says the group owes it for the
bailout of the conglomerate that began 11 years ago, according to
the shareholders of CL Financial, who have launched a legal
campaign to wrest control of the group.

CL Financial was one of the largest privately held conglomerate in
Trinidad and Tobago. It was originally founded as an insurance
company and has since expanded to be the holding company for a
diverse group of companies and subsidiaries.

CL Financial is the parent company of Colonial Life Insurance
Company (Trinidad) Limited (Clico).  CLICO is now the Company's
insurance division.

CL Financial however experienced a liquidity crisis in 2009 that
resulted in a "bail out" agreement by which the government of
Trinidad and Tobago loaned the company funds ($7.3 billion as of
December 2010) to maintain its ability to operate, and obtained a
majority of seats on the company's board of directors.

The companies to be bailed out were: CL Financial Ltd (CLF);
Colonial Life Insurance Company Ltd (CLICO); Caribbean Money Market
Brokers Ltd (CMMB); Clico Investment Bank (CIB) and British
American Insurance Company (Trinidad) Ltd (BAICO).


As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America in July
2017, CL Financial Limited shareholders vowed to pay back a TT$15
billion (US$2.2 billion) debt to the Trinidad Government.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================

VENEZUELA: Seeks ICC Probe of U.S. Sanctions
--------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Venezuela filed a request with the chief
prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Fatou
Bensouda, seeking an investigation of U.S. sanctions against the
Andean nation as "crimes against humanity."

The sanctions constitute "a weapon of mass destruction" wielded
against his country's people, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jorge
Arreaza said in The Hague, according to EFE News.

           About Venezuela

Venezuela, officially the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, is a
country on the northern coast of South America, consisting of a
continental landmass and a large number of small islands and islets
in the Caribbean sea.  The capital is the city of Caracas.

Hugo Chavez was president to Venezuela from 1999 to 2013.  The
Chavez presidency was plagued with challenges, which included a
2002 coup d'etat, a 2002 national strike and a 2004 recall
referendum.  Nicolas Maduro was elected president in 2013 after the
death of Chavez.  Maduro won a second term at the May 2018
Venezuela elections, but this result has been challenged by
countries including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Canada,
Germany, France and the United States who deemed it fraudulent and
moved to recognize Juan Guaido as president.

The presidencies of Chavez and Maduro have challenged Venezuela
with a socioeconomic and political crisis.  It is marked by
hyperinflation, climbing hunger, poverty, disease, crime and death
rates, social unrest, corruption and emigration from the country.

Standard and Poor's long- and short-term foreign currency Sovereign
credit ratings for Venezuela stands at 'SD/D' (November 2017).

S&P's local currency sovereign credit ratings on the other hand are
'CCC-/C'. The May 2018 outlook on the long-term local currency
sovereign credit rating is negative, reflecting S&P's view that the
sovereign could miss a payment on its outstanding local
currency debt obligations or advance a distressed debt exchange
operation, equivalent to default.

Moody's credit rating (long term foreign and domestic issuer
ratings) for Venezuela was last set at C with stable outlook (March
2018).

Fitch's long term issuer default rating for Venezuela was last set
at RD (2017) and country ceiling was CC. Fitch, on June 27, 2019,
affirmed then withdrew the ratings due to the imposition of U.S.
sanctions on Venezuela.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOND PRICING: For the Week February 10 to February 14, 2020
---------------------------------------------------------------
  Issuer Name              Cpn     Price   Maturity  Country  Curr
  -----------              ---     -----   --------  -------   ---
AES Tiete Energia SA       6.8     1.2    4/15/2024    BR     BRL
MIE Holdings Corp          7.5    56.4    4/25/2019    HK     USD
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
City of Cordoba Argent     7.9    73.1    9/29/2024    AR     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     8.3    54.2    5/24/2021    CL     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    72.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.3    74.1    11/9/2047    AR     EUR
Provincia del Chaco Ar     4.0     0.0    12/4/2026    AR     USD
Fospar S/A                 6.5     1.2    5/15/2026    BR     BRL
Empresa Electrica de l     2.5    63.8    5/15/2021    CL     CLP
Yida China Holdings Lt     7.0    74.3    4/19/2020    CN     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.1    62.0     3/1/2041    KY     USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA     9.9    74.0    11/9/2019    BR     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Provincia del Chubut A     4.5    2208    3/30/2021    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Empresa de Transporte      4.3    30.9    7/15/2020    CL     CLP
Argentina Bonar Bonds      7.6    74.4    4/18/2037    AR     USD
Avadel Finance Cayman      4.5    55.0     2/1/2023    US     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     6.9    75.2    1/11/2048    AR     USD
Polarcus Ltd               5.6    71.8     7/1/2022    AE     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    74.5   12/31/2033    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.4    12/7/2025    AR     USD
KrisEnergy Ltd             4.0    40.4     6/9/2022    SG     SGD
Noble Holding Internat     5.3    60.5    3/15/2042    KY     USD
SACI Falabella             2.3    50.6    7/15/2020    CL     CLP
Sylph Ltd                  2.4    65.1    9/25/2036    KY     USD
Banco Security SA          3.0    27.4     6/1/2021    CL     CLP
Argentine Republic Gov     4.3    70.0   12/31/2033    AR     JPY
Automotores Gildemeist     6.8    54.9    1/15/2023    CL     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
MIE Holdings Corp          7.5    56.2    4/25/2019    HK     USD
Enel Americas SA           5.8    32.7    6/15/2022    CL     CLP
Empresa Provincial de     12.5     0.0    1/29/2020    AR     USD
Cia Energetica de Pern     6.2     1.1    1/15/2022    BR     BRL
Provincia de Buenos Ai     7.9    75.3    6/15/2027    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     8.3    72.9   12/31/2033    AR     USD
MIE Holdings Corp          7.5    56.2    4/25/2019    HK     USD
China Huiyuan Juice Gr     6.5    46.6    8/16/2020    CN     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.0    17.0    4/21/2020    KY     USD
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    74.3    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Provincia de Rio Negro     7.8    70.3    12/7/2025    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Embotelladora Andina S     3.5    37.9    8/16/2020    CL     CLP
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA     9.9    74.0    11/9/2019    BR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.0    16.5    4/21/2020    KY     USD
Noble Holding Internat     6.2    62.2     8/1/2040    KY     USD
YPF SA                    16.5    67.3     5/9/2022    AR     ARS
Banco Macro SA            17.5    65.2     5/8/2022    AR     ARS
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      6.0    16.4     4/5/2023    KY     USD
Cia Latinoamericana de     9.5    73.9    7/20/2023    AR     USD
Automotores Gildemeist     8.3    54.2    5/24/2021    CL     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    75.2    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.0    16.5    4/21/2020    KY     USD
Province of Santa Fe       6.9    74.7    11/1/2027    AR     USD
Embotelladora Andina S     3.5    37.9    8/16/2020    CL     CLP
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA     9.9    74.0    11/9/2019    BR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     0.5    27.6   12/31/2038    AR     JPY
Plaza SA                   3.5    38.3    8/15/2020    CL     CLP
Banco Security SA          3.0     5.6     7/1/2019    CL     CLP
Argentina Bonar Bonds      5.8    75.2    4/18/2025    AR     USD
Corp Universidad de Co     5.9    64.2   11/10/2021    CL     CLP
Sociedad Austral de El     3.0    17.0    9/20/2019    CL     CLP
Provincia del Chaco Ar     9.4    74.8    8/18/2024    AR     USD
Argentine Republic Gov     7.1    75.7    6/28/2117    AR     USD
Provincia de Cordoba       7.1    74.7     8/1/2027    AR     USD
Metrogas SA/Chile          6.0    41.6     8/1/2024    CL     CLP
Esval SA                   3.5    49.9    2/15/2026    CL     CLP



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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2020.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

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delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
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