/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/191001.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Tuesday, October 1, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 196

                           Headlines



B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Fearing Boycott, Meatpackers Prepare Campaigns


C H I L E

AES GENER: Moody's Rates Proposed $450MM Jr. Sub. Notes 'Ba2'
LATAM AIRLINES: Delta to Buy 20% of Airline for $1.9 Billion


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Big Business Says Dollar Rise is Seasonal
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Fuel Oil Crunch Worries Energy Chief


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: S&P Hikes Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'B+', Outlook Stable
NCB INSURANCE: A.M. Best Affirms B(Fair) Financial Strength Rating


M E X I C O

FOREVER 21: Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
THOMAS COOK: Mexico Tourism Mostly Unaffected by Closure
VERACRUZ: Moody's Hikes Global Issuer Ratings to B1, Outlook Stable


P U E R T O   R I C O

PUERTO RICO PUBLIC: Chapter 9 Case Summary & Unsecured Creditors
PUERTO RICO: Road Map Exit From Bankruptcy Filed in U.S. Court
PUERTO RICO: Unveils Plan to Restructure $35 Billion of Debt
STONEMOR PARTNERS: Commences Rights Offering

                           - - - - -


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B R A Z I L
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BRAZIL: Fearing Boycott, Meatpackers Prepare Campaigns
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Iolanda Fonseca at Rio Times Online reports that in a move to
anticipate a crisis that could affect Brazilian beef exports, the
main domestic meatpackers, such as JBS, Marfrig and Minerva, are
preparing individual institutional campaigns against a potential
boycott of countries and importers of the Brazilian commodity in
the midst of the crisis caused by the fires in the Amazon,
according to O Estado de S.Paulo newspaper.

               About Brazil

The Federal Republic of Brazil is the largest country in Latin
America.  Sao Paulo is the most populated city and Brasilia is the
capital.  The federation is composed of the union of 26 states, the
Federal District and more than 5,000 municipalities.  Its
government is headed by President Jair Bolsonaro.  Among other
things, Brazil's government is hounded by corruption allegations.

Brazil has an advanced emerging economy.  Amid growth in recent
decades, the country entered an ongoing recession in 2014 amid a
political corruption scandal and nationwide protests.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Brazil stands at BB- with
stable outlook (January 2018). Moody's credit rating for Brazil was
last set at Ba2 with stable outlook (April 2018). Fitch's credit
rating for Brazil was last reported at BB- with stable outlook
(February 2018). DBRS's credit rating for Brazil is BB (low) with
stable outlook (March 2018).




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C H I L E
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AES GENER: Moody's Rates Proposed $450MM Jr. Sub. Notes 'Ba2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba2 rating to AES Gener S.A.'s
proposed $450 million junior subordinated capital notes due in
2079. The outlook for Gener is negative.

Gener intends to largely use the net proceeds from the hybrid
notes' issuance to fund the cash tender offer for up to $191.7
million of its outstanding 2021 Notes and for up to $172.4 million
of its outstanding 2025 Notes as well as any short-term debt
outstanding at its Colombian subsidiary, AES Chivor & Cia. S.C.A.
ESP. In addition, Gener intends to invest any excess cash amount in
the acquisition of the so called Eligible Green Projects, that is
renewable and battery storage projects in Chile and Colombia.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba2 rating assigned to Gener's junior subordinated capital
notes reflects the terms of the proposed hybrid instrument
including a maturity of 60 years, its deeply subordinated position
within the company's capital structure where it will rank senior
only to Gener's common shares and Gener's ability to defer coupons
on a cumulative basis. Additionally, the instrument will not cross
default with other debt of Gener, and investors will have limited
rights regarding the ability to accelerate principal repayment.

As a result, Moody's rating affords the proposed notes preferred
equivalent status, particularly because preferred shares have not
been routinely issued by Chilean companies. In addition, Moody's
considers the notes to have sufficient equity-like features to
allow the notes to receive Moody's hybrid securities basket "C"
treatment (i.e. 50% equity and 50% debt) for the purpose of
adjusting Gener's financial statements in the calculation of debt
coverage and financial leverage ratios. This basket assessment only
applies as long as Gener's senior unsecured rating remains
investment grade.

The two notch rating differential between Gener's senior Baa3
unsecured rating and the Ba2 Junior Subordinated Capital Notes is
largely driven by Moody's understanding that while interest
payments may be deferred under the hybrid notes, more junior
instruments in Gener's capital structure would be paid the Minimum
Legally Required Dividend. This minimum dividend is required under
the Issuer's by-laws and Article 79 of Law 18,046 of Chile on Stock
Corporations which stipulate that unless unanimously agreed
otherwise by the shareholders of all issued shares, listed
corporations must distribute a cash dividend to their common
shareholders on a yearly basis, pro-rated by the shares owned or
the proportion established in the company's by-laws if there are
preferred shares issued of at least 30% of the net consolidated
profits from the previous year, except when accumulated losses from
prior years need to be absorbed.

The terms of the proposed hybrid instrument are very similar to the
outstanding $550 million junior subordinated capital notes, also
due in 2079, that Gener issued in March 2019. Because both
instruments receive Moody's hybrid securities basket "C"
treatment", they are both given 50% equity credit in calculating
Gener's adjusted financial metrics. The new hybrid instruments
issuance adds complexity to Gener's capital structure with the
ratio of Hybrid Equity Credit to Adjusted Equity, per Moody's
definitions, increasing to over 18% from around 10% as of end June
2019, a credit negative. However, the ratio remains below the
threshold of 30%, cited in the methodology, that would limit the
amount of equity credit treatment applicable in Moody's calculation
of Gener's adjusted consolidated credit metrics.

Gener's Baa3 senior unsecured rating reflects its leading market
position in Chile, some geographic diversification benefits,
adequate liquidity profile and limited structural subordination
considerations. The Baa3 rating acknowledges Gener's overall
balanced commercial policy that in Chile is premised on contracting
a significant portion of its efficient generation capacity under
long-term, price-indexed contracts with regulated and unregulated
end-users.

The Baa3 also acknowledges progress in Gener's efforts to address
its re-contracting risk exposure through the gradual
implementation, since June 2018, of the multi-prone Greentegra
strategy. The different opportunities (Coal to Green, Blexten, and
GenerFex) encompassed under the Greentegra strategy are aiding
Gener to extend the weighted average life of its contracts
(currently: 10 years; before the implementation of the strategy
last year: around 9.4 years) in Chile and to enter into long power
purchase agreements (PPAs) in Colombia. Importantly, the strategy
also helps Gener to address its carbon transition risk exposure
through the gradual decarbonization of its fleet-mix, particularly
in Chile where coal-fired facilities account for the majority of
its installed capacity. To that end, Gener has disclosed that its
pipeline of non-fossil power generation projects in Colombia and
Chile, aggregates around 4.6 gigawatts (GWs). As reference for the
materiality of these projects that are under different stages of
development, Gener's current total installed capacity in Chile and
Colombia aggregates 4.4 GWs. In Chile, this pipeline comprises 868
megawatts (MWs) of projects currently under construction (including
the 531 MW hydro-electric Alto Maipo plant and 110 MW in solar
projects) as well as two new wind-farms (164 MW) ready to start
construction before year-end 2019. The identified new projects
under development include the acquisition earlier this year of the
Jemeiwaa-Kai's portfolio of five wind-farms (648 MW) located in the
Colombian La Guajira. The commission of these five projects is
expected to follow the completion of a new transmission line in the
region starting in 2022. In addition to greenfield projects,
Gener's Greentegra strategy also includes the acquisition of
operating assets such as the 110 MW Los Cururos project in Chile
(recently announced acquisition price: $138 million) that started
operations in 2014. The Baa3 rating assumes that a possible
termination of Angamos' PPAs with Minera Escondida Limitada (MEL;
Baa2 stable) and Minera Spence S.A. (unrated) will be credit
neutral for Empresa Electrica Angamos S.A. SpA (Angamos; Baa3
stable) and Gener due to the compensation clauses embedded in both
PPAs. Gener's Baa3 rating also factors in that its exposure to
Argentina (Caa2 Under Review down) is limited with the operations
of its combined 643 MW Termoandes combined cycle natural gas unit,
that has no debt outstanding, representing between 5%-6% of Gener's
consolidated EBITDA in recent years.

Gener's negative outlook largely reflects execution risk,
particularly in connection with the construction risk of the Alto
Maipo plant and its material pipeline of other non-fossil projects
as well as the uncertainty around the financing of the latter. The
negative outlook also factors in the deterioration in Gener's
credit metrics during the first half of 2019. For the last twelve
month period ended June 2019, Gener's consolidated debt to EBITDA
was 4.1x compared to 3.7x at year-end 2018. Moody's acknowledges
the significant progress made in the construction of Alto Maipo
since its restructuring last year, with the project already
reporting total progress of around 81%, including completion of 88%
of the total tunnels of 74.6 kilometers, a key challenge. That
said, the first unit is expected to start operations in early 2021
with the project debt also expected to peak to around $1.4 billion
that year (reported end of June 2019: $972 million). This excludes
Strabag's $392 million supply loan that would only become payable
upon plant's successful completion expected in 2022. Its analysis
anticipates an improvement in Gener's consolidated credit metrics
at year-end 2019 largely due to the reduction in the adjusted debt
that results from the combination of the aforementioned 50% equity
treatment given to Gener's $1,000 million hybrid notes along with
the ongoing cash tender offer for Gener's 2021 and 2025 notes and
total annual scheduled repayments of around $130 million of the
debt of Angamos and Empresa Electrica Cochrane S.A. However,
Gener's dividends, the financing of the new projects, and the
impact of the Greentegra strategy on Gener's performance will
determine its ability to record a ratio of debt to EBITDA of
maximum 4.0x and a ratio of cash flow from operations pre-working
capital changes (CFO pre-W/C) to debt of at least 18%, particularly
as the Alto Maipo's debt peaks in 2021.

Headquartered in Santiago, Gener is the largest thermal generation
company in the Chilean Sistema Energetico Nacional (SEN) that was
created in November 2017 with the interconnection of the country's
two largest electricity systems: The group also operates in the
Colombian interconnection system, via AES Chivor's 1,020 MW
hydro-generation capacity. Located in Salta, Argentina, the 643 MW
combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plant at Termoandes currently
sells its output exclusively in the Argentinean SADI.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Unregulated
Utilities and Power Companies published in May 2017.


LATAM AIRLINES: Delta to Buy 20% of Airline for $1.9 Billion
------------------------------------------------------------
Tracy Rucinski at Reuters reports that Delta Air Lines disclosed a
deal to buy a 20% stake in LATAM Airlines Group for $1.9 billion,
creating a major new airline partnership and shaking up the Chilean
carrier's longtime ties with American Airlines.

The surprise deal, which Delta will fund with newly issued debt and
available cash in its largest investment since its merger with
Northwest Airlines a decade ago, could upend American's stronghold
on the Latin American region, according to Reuters.

LATAM has been a member of the Oneworld alliance since 2000
alongside longtime partners American, British Airways and Iberia,
with which it had been pursuing a deeper route alliance that was
rejected by the Chilean Supreme Court last May, the report notes.

Delta does not expect regulatory obstacles for its tie-up with
LATAM, where it will gain representation on the board of directors,
the report discloses.  The plan envisions growth for both carriers,
which currently overlap on only one route, Chief Executive Ed
Bastian told Reuters.  "I think it's a great fit," he said, the
report notes.

Atlanta-based Delta, which is part of the SkyTeam alliance, expects
the LATAM deal to be accretive to earnings per share over the next
two years and add $1 billion in revenue growth over five years,
Bastian said, the report notes.

Delta will also provide LATAM an additional $350 million to help it
transition out of Oneworld and plug into Delta's network, the
report relays.

The two can start code-sharing before they receive government,
regulatory and anti-trust approval for the larger tie-up, a process
Bastian said he expects to take between 12 and 24 months, the
report notes.

As part of the deal, Delta will also acquire four A350 aircraft
from LATAM and assume LATAM's commitment to purchase another 10
A350s to be delivered between 2020 and 2025 for an undisclosed sum,
the report says.

Delta also owns stakes in Grupo Aeromexico, Air France KLM, China
Eastern, Brazil's Gol , Virgin Atlantic and Korean Air Lines Co's
parent company.

It has also been negotiating a 10% stake in Alitalia . That plan
has not changed with the LATAM deal, which Delta started studying
about three months ago after an approach by a third party, Bastian
said, the report adds.

                      About LATAM Airlines

LATAM Airlines, formerly LAN Airlines S.A. and Lan Chile, is an
airline based in Santiago, Chile, and is one of the founders of
LATAM Airlines Group, Latin America's largest airline holding
company.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 14, 2019, Fitch Ratings has assigned a final rating of
'B+'/'RR4' to LATAM Airlines Group S.A.'s USD600 million unsecured
notes issued through its fully owned subsidiary LATAM Finance
Limited. The assignment of the final ratings follows the receipt of
documents confirming the information already received. The final
ratings are the same as the expected rating assigned to the senior
unsecured notes on Jan. 28, 2019.




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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Big Business Says Dollar Rise is Seasonal
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the National Business Council (Conep)
believes that exchange rate fluctuations respond to short-term
internal and external factors, including the demand for the change
of inventory of some companies, which is something normal for this
time of year.

Conep vice president Cesar Dargam said he has been in contact with
the monetary authorities who are confident that the measures
adopted contribute to the stability of the exchange market,
according to Dominican Today.

He stressed the importance of stability for national production and
the investment climate, the report notes.

The Central Bank has recently begun to inject disbursements of
US$50 million into the financial system to stabilize the dollar
rate in the Dominican Republic, which in recent weeks has averaged
as high as RD$52.80-to-US$1.00, the report adds.

                    About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported on April 4,
2019 that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the
UASD Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic stands at
BB- with stable outlook (2015). Moody's credit rating for Dominican
Republic was last set at Ba3 with stable outlook (2017). Fitch's
credit rating for Dominican Republic was last reported at BB- with
stable outlook (2016).


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Fuel Oil Crunch Worries Energy Chief
--------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that National Energy Commission (CNE)
Executive Director Angel Cano stated concern over the unexpected
drop in the supply of fuel for power plants and asked to diversify
the energy matrix to avert shortages.

He said the delays in fuel oil should alert the country about the
need to change the matrix, according to Dominican Today.  He said
the power plants of the national grid are operating with a deficit
as high as 255 megawatts, the report relays.

"This is perhaps a wake-up call to what from the CNE we have been
exposing as a way to turn our eyes in a concrete way to the problem
of our dependence on petroleum products and begin to dismantle
those barriers that can still represent obstacles for renewables
and the energy transition that we choose," he added.

                    About Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic is a Caribbean nation that shares the island
of Hispaniola with Haiti to the west. Capital city Santo Domingo
has Spanish landmarks like the Gothic Catedral Primada de America
dating back 5 centuries in its Zona Colonial district.

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported on April 4,
2019 that the Dominican Today related that Juan Del Rosario of the
UASD Economic Faculty cited a current economic slowdown for the
Dominican Republic and cautioned that if the trend continues,
growth would reach only 4% by 2023. Mr. Del Rosario said that if
that happens, "we'll face difficulties in meeting international
commitments."

An ongoing concern in the Dominican Republic is the inability of
participants in the electricity sector to establish financial
viability for the system.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic stands at
BB- with stable outlook (2015). Moody's credit rating for Dominican
Republic was last set at Ba3 with stable outlook (2017). Fitch's
credit rating for Dominican Republic was last reported at BB- with
stable outlook (2016).




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J A M A I C A
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JAMAICA: S&P Hikes Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'B+', Outlook Stable
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S&P Global Ratings, on Sept. 27, 2019, raised its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Jamaica to 'B+' from
'B'. The outlook is stable. At the same time, S&P Global Ratings
affirmed its 'B' short-term foreign and local currency sovereign
credit ratings on the country. S&P Global Ratings also raised its
transfer and convertibility assessment to 'BB-' from 'B+'.

Outlook

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that, in the next
12 months, Jamaica's fiscal policy will remain broadly consistent
following the expiry of its IMF Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) in
November 2019. We expect that the government will continue to
deliver robust primary fiscal surpluses, leading to a gradual
reduction in debt and interest burdens, and helping to boost
external reserves. We also expect that the country will be able to
maintain its growth momentum, with modest GDP growth, and that the
government will continue advancing toward a more effective monetary
policy framework for the central bank, including a more flexible
exchange rate."

Upside scenario

S&P could raise the ratings if, over the next couple of years,
higher and sustained economic growth strengthens Jamaica's economic
profile. In addition, continued strengthening and effectiveness of
monetary policy could bolster Jamaica's resilience to unexpected
setbacks, including external shocks, leading to an upgrade.

Downside scenario

Poor economic growth or a weather-related shock that leads to a
reversal in the improving trajectory of Jamaica's external position
could result in higher external financing needs or a significant
decline in usable foreign exchange reserves. Absent corrective
fiscal and other measures, S&P could lower the rating in such a
scenario.

Rationale

The upgrade reflects the continued improvement in Jamaica's
external liquidity. A stronger overall external position, along
with continued adherence to the government's fiscal strategy,
bolters the country's resilience against external shocks.

S&P's ratings on Jamaica continue to be limited by the country's
high debt and interest burden, which restrict its fiscal
flexibility. Despite a recent pick-up, GDP growth remains low,
constrained by structural impediments. Nevertheless, the
government's commitment to fiscal prudence fosters macroeconomic
stability--including low inflation--and supports the country's
creditworthiness. The country's external position has improved in
recent years with declining indebtedness and growing international
reserves. S&P believes that Jamaica's policymaking stability and
predictability are bolstered by the continuity and
institutionalization of fiscal consolidation policies. In addition,
ongoing changes in the governance and mandate of the central bank
could gradually improve Jamaica's currently limited monetary
flexibility.

Institutional and economic profile: Continued GDP growth, which S&P
expects will modestly accelerate over the next year, may facilitate
the implementation of further institutional reform

-- The government's commitment to sustainable fiscal policy should
underpin macroeconomic stability in the medium term.

-- Economic growth will facilitate public-sector reform as an
expanding private sector can absorb displaced public-sector
workers.

-- Nevertheless, S&P anticipates that bottlenecks, such as crime,
will continue limiting the pace of growth, despite the strong
performance of some sectors.

S&P believes that the government's commitment to fiscal
consolidation will continue to foster macroeconomic stability in
Jamaica beyond the national elections that are constitutionally due
in 2021. This political commitment has survived changes in
government and we believe is representative of bipartisan consensus
on the general direction of macroeconomic policymaking. Jamaica's
two main political parties--the ruling Jamaica Labor Party (JLP)
and the opposition People's National Party (PNP)--share a similar
outlook on economic policymaking. While S&P views Jamaica's
policymaking as relatively effective, crime continues to aggravate
civil society. This, in addition to concerns about the prevalence
of corruption and concerns about the enforcement of contracts,
continue to be key factors that hamper the country's productivity.

Since taking office in 2016, the JLP has largely continued the
macroeconomic policies of the former PNP administration, including
achieving strict fiscal targets set under the previous IMF Extended
Fund Facility program and its successor program, the three-year IMF
SBA, which expires in November 2019. The SBA serves primarily as a
precautionary liquidity backstop but also as an anchor for policy
continuity. Under the program, the government initiated a shift in
spending toward growth-inducing expenditure. To do so, local
authorities are focused on identifying redundancies and services
that public-sector entities can share; and establishing clear
controls on public-sector wages, among other measures. The
government has made progress toward these ends. Starting from
fiscal 2018, it reached a four-year agreement on public-sector
wages that helped reduce wages to 9% of GDP target in fiscal 2019.
In addition, 38 public bodies have been rationalized since 2017
through mergers, divestments, closures, and integration into parent
ministries. Nevertheless, we believe it will take time to
fundamentally shift the structure of spending, as structural growth
limitations will be hard to overcome in the near term.

Of importance, S&P expects that the government will continue with
public-sector reforms once the SBA expires. To further entrench
fiscal sustainability, the government is creating an independent
fiscal council, scheduled to be operational in the next year. The
fiscal council will be a permanent, independent, non-partisan
institution enshrined by legislation that will promote sustainable
fiscal practices and deepen government accountability, as
policymakers will have to maintain credible policies and explain
deviations to plan.

S&P said, "In our opinion, structural barriers will continue to
impede stronger economic growth in Jamaica. We expect annual real
GDP growth to average 1.8% over the next three years (or 1.4% in
per capita terms), despite stronger performance in certain sectors
of the economy. We also expect that the country's per capita GDP
will be close to US$5,800 in 2019. Tourism, agriculture, mining,
and manufacturing make the Jamaican economy diversified for a small
open economy. Nevertheless, growth is constrained by high security
costs, perceived corruption, low productivity, a lack of business
competitiveness, and vulnerability to external shocks. Some
sectors, such as tourism, which directly represents about 9% of
Jamaica's GDP, have grown quickly in the past couple of years.
Improvements in capacity utilization in the mining sector over the
past year have also contributed to economic growth. We expect
employment to rise; as of April 2019, employment grew by a healthy
2.5% year over year, while unemployment fell to a record low of
7.8% from 9.7% in the previous year. However, links between tourism
and other sectors, in particular agriculture, are limited, in our
opinion, muting the impact of tourism growth on the overall
economy. While the government continues to address this issue
through the Economic Growth Council and a dedicated department in
the Ministry of Tourism, we expect that the dividends of these
efforts will take time to translate into higher GDP growth."

Flexibility and performance profile: S&P expects continued fiscal
austerity will ease the still-high general government debt burden
while vulnerability to external shocks remains, despite a
strengthening external positon

-- S&P expects the government to meet its 6.5% of GDP primary
fiscal surplus target through the medium term.

-- Although this tight fiscal policy will slowly reduce Jamaica's
debt burden, fiscal flexibility will remain limited due to a still
high debt burden.

-- Still-high, albeit improving, external liquidity needs and
indebtedness make the country vulnerable to external shocks and
potential loss of investor confidence.

The government reduced its primary fiscal surplus target to 6.5% of
GDP (from 7%) for fiscal 2019, with the support of the IMF. S&P
expects that the government will largely meet its fiscal target
over the next four years. Higher-than-expected tax revenues from a
policy shift to indirect taxation of a broader tax base, and
improved compliance over the past year, in addition to the fiscal
space created by the lowering of the primary surplus target, will
be used to fund investments that will stimulate growth in security,
infrastructure (namely roads and rural water), and social
protection programs. Because of the success of previous tax reform
measures, no new tax measures were taken in the fiscal 2019 or
fiscal 2020 budgets. Rather, the 2020 budget includes the removal
of distortionary taxes to stimulate growth, such as the minimum
business tax and the asset tax for non-financial businesses, as
well as lowering the transfer tax for home purchases and
eliminating land registration costs. S&P expects that the
government's recent fiscal performance and debt reduction
trajectory will be sustained through further tax reform, the
divestment of some public assets, cost restraint through continued
public-sector reform, and modest GDP growth.

Continued compliance with ambitious fiscal targets will contribute
to a gradual decline in net general government debt in our
forecasts, to about 67% of GDP by 2022, while the change in general
government debt will average 0.8% over the same period. Net general
government debt represented about 79% of GDP in fiscal 2019, a
notable decline from the 93.5% it averaged in the previous three
years. In addition, the general government surplus was 1.4% of GDP
in fiscal 2019, reflecting a continued improvement compared with
the modest deficit position recorded before fiscal 2018.
Nevertheless, S&P expects that interest payments will represent a
significant portion of the budget, averaging about 19% of
government revenue over the next four years. The high interest
burden will continue to limit fiscal flexibility.

Jamaica's debt burden has significant exposure to exchange rate
movements, as approximately 60% of general government debt is
denominated in foreign currency. Notably, the government is not
expected to raise new foreign currency-denominated debt in the
domestic market in the medium term. Notwithstanding, external
maturities will be refinanced from funds raised through domestic
issuances and revenue, to the extent that the private sector is not
crowded out, given the domestic market is not deep enough to
facilitate full refinancing. In addition, the country's financial
institutions have significant exposure to government debt, limiting
their capacity to lend more to the government without possibly
crowding out private-sector borrowing. More recently, with the
government's focus on debt reduction and minimal debt issuance,
this risk has abated somewhat. S&P assesses Jamaica's contingent
liabilities from the financial sector and all nonfinancial public
enterprises as limited. The limited assessment of contingent
liabilities of banks is based on our Banking Industry Country Risk
Assessment score of '8' (with '1' being the lowest-risk category
and '10' the highest) and the ratio of banking-sector assets to GDP
of under 100%.

Strong fiscal performance will serve as an anchor for external
stability. In the past couple of years, Jamaica's external profile
has benefited from favorable conditions, as reflected in a
relatively stable current account deficit (CAD) of about 2.9% of
GDP. Growth in the tourism industry has benefited Jamaica's
external profile, given that tourism receipts represent 35%-40% of
the country's current account receipts (CAR). S&P expects Jamaica
to record a CAD of about 3% of GDP for 2020-2021. In line with
recent years, the bulk of the deficit will likely be funded by
foreign direct investment. S&P also expects that, against a
backdrop of relatively stable oil prices, and a declining
contribution of oil as a fuel source, Jamaica's external financing
needs will be relatively stable. Strong growth in tourism earnings
and remittances should mitigate import growth due to increased
investment and consumption from a strengthening economy. As a
result, S&P expects Jamaica's external financing needs to average
96% of CAR and foreign exchange reserves and narrow net external
debt to average 60% of CAR over the next four years. The country's
external accounts are linked to the U.S. primarily through tourism
and personal remittances, which account for about 30% of CAR. At
the same time, S&P expects external debt net of international
reserves and liquid public- and financial-sector assets will
continue improving to about 60% of CAR, on average, during the same
period.

Despite the recent improvement in the external liquidity and debt
burden, Jamaica remains vulnerable to external shocks. Of note, in
lieu of using the SBA as a backstop for external liquidity after
its expiration, the government has created a disaster risk policy
framework as a way to build resiliency and respond quicker in the
aftermath of a weather-related event. In addition, S&P believes the
country is vulnerable to a sudden loss of external funding, given
that Jamaica's net external liability position is substantially
worse than its net external debt position. Negative developments
that undermine FDI and other private capital inflows could again
lead to falling foreign exchange reserves and put pressure on the
currency to depreciate further.

S&P believes that economic policy continuity will support
historically low inflation over the next several years and that
through accommodative monetary policy, inflation will gradually
increase to the mid-point of the central bank's target of 4%-6%
through 2022. Although it has a short track record, the central
bank will continue to facilitate orderly movements in the local
currency, in line with the country's floating exchange rate, as
shown by the two-way movement recorded against the U.S. dollar in
the past year. While dollarization is still high in the financial
system, it has steadily declined in the last couple of years. At
the end of 2018, about 41% of financial assets were denominated in
U.S. dollars, down from 46% at the end of 2016. Steps to reduce the
level of dollarization, such as capping open positions at financial
institutions, could gradually strengthen monetary policy.

In addition, the government is introducing revisions to the Bank of
Jamaica Act to support inflation targeting, such as changing the
central bank's mandate, strengthening its operational independence,
and improving market transparency. Still, it will take time before
these measures lead to fully operational inflation targeting. S&P
believes that monetary policy tools still have a limited impact on
the economy given low--albeit rising--levels of private-sector
lending and limited secondary bond market trading.

  Ratings List

  Upgraded; Outlook Action; Ratings Affirmed  
                                  To From
  Jamaica
  Sovereign Credit Rating  B+/Stable/B B/Positive/B

  Upgraded  
                                  To From
  Jamaica
  Transfer & Convertibility Assessment  
          Local Currency          BB- B+

  Jamaica
  Senior Unsecured                B+ B

  Air Jamaica Ltd.
  Senior Unsecured                B+ B

  National Road Operating and Constructing Company Ltd
  Senior Unsecured                B+ B


NCB INSURANCE: A.M. Best Affirms B(Fair) Financial Strength Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
AM Best has affirmed the Financial Strength Rating (FSR) of B
(Fair) and the Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating (Long-Term ICR) of
"bb" of NCB Insurance Company Limited (NCBIC) (Jamaica). The
outlook of these Credit Ratings (ratings) is stable. NCBIC's direct
banking parent is National Commercial Bank Jamaica Limited, which
is traded on the Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago stock exchanges.

The ratings reflect NCBIC's balance sheet strength, which AM Best
categorizes as adequate, as well as its strong operating
performance, neutral business profile and appropriate enterprise
risk management (ERM). NCBIC provides the Jamaica market primarily
with universal and creditor life insurance products, disability and
critical illness products and retirement products sold through its
banking parent. The company's balance sheet strength reflects its
high concentration of sovereign debt and long-duration instruments
and exposure to interest rate risks, offset by the absence of
financial leverage and low reinsurance leverage. In addition, a
majority of its invested asset portfolio is composed of Government
of Jamaica bonds, the creditworthiness of which is categorized as
below investment grade.

The company's historical trends of strong operating performance is
driven by the high yields associated with the company's fixed
income portfolio and resulting healthy spread income, along with
underwriting profit derived from its life and health insurance
businesses. While NCBIC has demonstrated a favorable operating
profile, the company's operations are concentrated in Jamaica,
which AM Best categorizes as a country risk tier four (CRT-4).

The CRT-4 tier denotes a stressed economic environment with
significant economic, financial and political headwinds that places
strain on wages and employment, which in turn has the potential to
constrain NCBIC's potential future growth. Despite these
challenges, AM Best notes that NCBIC has demonstrated a history of
stable financial performance and expects the company to maintain
this stable financial and operating profile going forward.




===========
M E X I C O
===========

FOREVER 21: Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
-------------------------------------------
Struggling privately held fashion retailer Forever 21 Inc. has
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection to restructure its
business.

On Sunday, Forever 21, Inc. and 7 of its U.S. subsidiaries sought
Chapter 11 protection in Delaware, adding to the already long list
of retailers that have ended up in bankruptcy.

The Company also announced that its Canadian subsidiary filed for
and was granted protection under the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
(Commercial List) in Toronto.

Forever 21 said it intends to use these proceedings to facilitate a
global restructuring that will allow the Company to focus on a
profitable core part of its operations.

As part of its restructuring strategy, the Company plans to exit
most of its international locations in Asia and Europe, but will
continue operations in Mexico and Latin America.

"This was an important and necessary step to secure the future of
our Company, which will enable us to reorganize our business and
reposition Forever 21."

"This was an important and necessary step to secure the future of
our Company, which will enable us to reorganize our business and
reposition Forever 21," Linda Chang, Executive Vice President of
Forever 21, Inc., said.

The Company enjoys and benefits from decades-long relationships
with its vendors, and dozens have already agreed to support Forever
21's restructuring efforts.

             Closing of Nearly 180 U.S. Stores

As of the Petition Date, the Debtors operate 549 stores across the
United States, and 251 stores are operated internationally by
non-Debtor affiliates.  The 534 stores in the U.S. are operated
under the Forever 21 brand while 15 stores are operated under a
beauty and wellness brand, Riley Rose.  The Company also maintain
an online presence, with their e-commerce platform accounting for
16 percent of all sales.

According to CNBC, a spokesperson for the retailer said the company
has requested approval to close up to 178 U.S. stores. Forever 21,
whose aggressive real estate expansion weighed on its finances, has
815 stores globally.

                    $350 Million Financing

To facilitate its restructuring, Forever 21 has obtained $275
million in financing from its existing lenders with JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. as agent, as well as $75 million in new capital from TPG
Sixth Street Partners, and certain of its affiliated funds.

JPMorgan, as administrative agent, is providing a super-priority
revolving credit facility of up to $275 million while TPG Sixth
Street Partners, LLC, as agent, is providing a super-priority term
loan credit facility of up to $75 million.

With this capital, Forever 21 intends to operate in a business as
usual manner, honoring all Company policies, including gift cards,
returns, exchanges, reimbursement and sale purchases. Forever 21
will use these proceedings to right size its store base and return
to basics that allowed the Company to thrive and grow into the fast
fashion leader.

"The financing provided by JPMorgan and TPG Sixth Street Partners
will arm Forever 21 with the capital necessary to effect critical
changes in the U.S. and abroad to revitalize our brand and fuel our
growth, allowing us to meet our ongoing obligations to customers,
vendors and employees. With support from our key landlord and
vendor constituents, we are confident we will emerge as a stronger,
more competitive enterprise that is better positioned to prosper
for years to come, and we remain committed to delivering the fast
fashion trends that our customers have come to expect from Forever
21," Ms. Chang further noted.

                       Talks With Landlords

As widely reported, before seeking bankruptcy protection, Forever
21 was in talks with its biggest landlords on a restructuring plan
that would give its landlords a stake in the company while allowing
co-founder Do Won Chang to retain a share.  But Bloomberg reported
Friday that talks with Simon Property Group Inc. and Brookfield
Property Partners LP reached an impasse.

More than 7,500 U.S. retail storefronts have shuttered this year
and Forever 21's bankruptcy could leave landlords with millions
more of additional square feet of vacant space.

                     List of Equity Holders

According to court filings, the equity security holders of Forever
21 are:

                                                Percentage
                                                 of Equity
                                                 ---------
  Do Won and Jin Sook Chang Family Trust            56.48%
  Jin Sook Chang 2014 Grantor Ret. Annuity Trust    10.37%
  Do Won Chang 2014 Grantor Retained Annuity Trust  10.37%
  Too Capital, LLC                                  10.00%
  Jin Sook Chang 2009 Grantor Retained Annuity Trust 6.39%
  Do Won Chang 2009 Grantor Retained Annuity Trust   6.39%

                         About Forever 21

Founded in 1984, and headquartered in Los Angeles, California,
Forever 21, Inc. -- http://www.forever21.com/-- is a fast fashion
retailer of women's, men's and kids clothing and accessories and is
known for offering the hottest, most current fashion trends at a
great value to consumers.  Forever 21 delivers a curated assortment
of new merchandise brought in daily.

Forever 21, Inc. and 7 of its U.S. subsidiaries each filed a
voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. Del. Lead Case No. 19-12122) on Sept.
29, 2019.

According to the petition, Forever 21 has estimated liabilities on
a consolidated basis of between $1 billion and $10 billion against
assets of the same range.

Kirkland & Ellis LLP is serving as the Company's legal advisor,
Alvarez & Marsal as its restructuring advisor, and Lazard as its
investment banker.  The law firm of Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones
LLP is the local bankruptcy counsel.

Prime Clerk is the claims agent, maintaining the Web site
https://cases.primeclerk.com/Forever21


THOMAS COOK: Mexico Tourism Mostly Unaffected by Closure
--------------------------------------------------------
David Alire Garcia at Reuters reports that the collapse of British
travel firm Thomas Cook will not have a "significant impact" on
Mexico's tourist industry as it only represents about 0.4% of the
sector's foreign income, the Mexican tourism ministry said on
Tuesday.

In a statement, the ministry said it expected other travel firms to
step in and absorb the British demand hitherto covered by Thomas
Cook, according to Reuters.

Thomas Cook last year generated income from tourist spending of
$100 million for Mexico, or about 0.4% of the total, it said, the
report notes.


VERACRUZ: Moody's Hikes Global Issuer Ratings to B1, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico S.A. de C.V. upgraded the issuer ratings for the
State of Veracruz to B1/Baa2.mx from B3/B1.mx (Global Scale, local
currency/Mexico National Scale), upgraded its baseline credit
assessment to b1 from of b3 and maintained the stable outlook.

At the same time, Moody's de Mexico upgraded the debt ratings of
following enhanced loans issued by the state to Baa1/Aa1.mx (Global
Scale, local currency/Mexico National Scale) from Baa3/Aa3.mx:

  - MXN4 billion enhanced loan (original face value) from
    Banobras with a maturity of 20 years

  - MXN5.2 billion enhanced loan (original face value) from
    Banobras with a maturity of 25 years

  - MXN4 billion enhanced loan (original face value) from
    Santander with a maturity of 20 years

  - MXN1 billion enhanced loan (original face value) from Monex
    with a maturity of 15 years

  - MXN4.054 billion enhanced loan (original face value) from
    Banorte with a maturity of 20 years

  - MXN6 billion enhanced loan (original face value) from
    Santander with a maturity of 20 years

  - MXN4 billion enhanced loan (original face value) from
    Banobras with a maturity of 30 years

  - MXN 4 billion enhanced loan (original face value) from
    Banobras with a maturity of 25 years

  - MXN5 billion enhanced loan (original face value) from
    Multiva with a maturity of 25 years

  - MXN745 million enhanced loan (original face value) from
    Interacciones with a maturity of 20 years

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE BCA AND ISSUER RATINGS UPGRADE

The upgrade of the BCA to b1 from b3 and issuer ratings to
B1/Baa2.mx from B3/B1.mx reflect an improving outlook for
own-source revenue growth and projected modest financial benefits
from a planned refinancing of the state's long-term debt, as well
as continuing improvements in liquidity and operating performance
evident in the state's 2019 quarterly statements and the
maintenance of solid governance and transparency practices.

Veracruz is implementing measures that aim to boost its relatively
low own-source revenues, including incentive programs to encourage
residents to pay past-due vehicle taxes and other proposals that
will boost tax collections on an ongoing basis. These efforts
reflect improved financial management and planning and Moody's
expects they will modestly accelerate growth in own-source
revenues. In addition, the state in August launched a bidding
process to refinance all of its existing long-term debt in an
effort to obtain more favorable financing conditions.

The action also captures sustained improvements in the state's
liquidity position, including a continued improving trend during
the first six months of 2019. Building on the improvement seen in
2018, when Veracruz's cash rose to 0.6x current liabilities at the
end of the year from a very weak 0.04x in 2015, as of midyear 2019
the state's liquidity ratio rose further to 1.5x from 1.0x at the
same period a year earlier. While a degree of uncertainty about
significant off balance sheet items accrued under previous
administrations remains, the current administration is working to
resolve those potential liabilities.

In addition, current spending has been contained during the first
half of the year and the state has benefited from strong growth in
non-earmarked federal transfers (participaciones), which Moody's
projects will allow the state to post a modest surplus in 2019. In
the coming years, Moody's expects Veracruz will continue to report
modest cash financing deficits given recurring current and capital
spending pressures, but that these shortfalls will be manageable
and should allow the state to maintain its liquidity position at
around 0.5x at the end of 2019 and 2020, well above levels reported
in previous years, and to maintain smaller balances of short term
debt than those observed as recently as 2017.

Finally, Veracruz is now publishing its quarterly and annual
financial statements in a more timely manner than in previous
years, and is complying with disclosure practices required under
Mexico's Financial Discipline Law for regional and local
governments, which addresses a key concern about the state's level
of transparency.

RATIONALE FOR THE UPGRADE OF THE ENHANCED LOAN RATINGS

The upgrade of the enhanced loan ratings to Baa1/Aa1.mx reflects
the improvement in the underlying creditworthiness of the State of
Veracruz, as well as Moody's projections that the loans will
continue to benefit from solid debt service coverage levels. The
upgrade also reflects the strong trust structure used to issue the
debt, which is based on both an irrevocable instruction and an
irrevocable mandate, the latter signed by the state, federal
government and lenders, which transfers the rights and flows of
Veracruz's general participations fund revenues to the paying
trusts. The mandate ensures that the Ministry of Finance will
transfer Veracruz's non-earmarked federal transfers
(participaciones), directly to the trust even if Veracruz
unilaterally tries to alter the agreements. In cases where the
issuer has a very low speculative grade rating, such as Veracruz,
this trust structure provides a strong level of insulation between
the loan and the issuer's idiosyncratic risks.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook of Veracruz's ratings reflects Moody's
expectation that the state will continue registering manageable
financial deficits in the coming years, allowing it to maintain
broadly stable liquidity metrics, and that recent improvements in
governance and transparency will be maintained.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS

As mentioned, Veracruz's historically weak governance practices,
especially in terms of transparency and disclosure, policy
credibility and budget management, have been a material
consideration for its ratings, and Moody's will look for recent
improvements in these governance practices be sustained over time.
Social risks related to unfavorable demographic trends in the state
workforce contribute to the state's unfunded pension liabilities.
Environmental considerations are not material to the state's
ratings.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

If Veracruz begins to consistently report balanced cash financing
results that lead to further improvements in its liquidity and
additional declines in its short-term debt balances, and provided
that it maintains recently adopted stronger transparency,
management and governance practices, the ratings could be upgraded.
Although a downgrade is currently unlikely in view of the stable
ratings outlook, Moody's would consider downgrading Veracruz's
ratings if the state's liquidity deteriorates markedly and its
dependence on short-term debt rises again, or if governance and
management practices deteriorate.

Given the links between the loans and the credit quality of the
obligor, changes in the ratings of Veracruz, either upwards or
downwards, could have symmetrical impacts on the ratings of the
enhanced loans. Additionally, downward pressure could arise if debt
service coverage levels fall materially below Moody's current
forecasts.

The principal methodology used in rating the issuer ratings was
Regional and Local Governments published in January 2018. The
principal methodologies used in rating the enhanced loans were
Enhanced Municipal and State Loans in Mexico Methodology published
in May 2019 and Regional and Local Governments published in January
2018.




=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

PUERTO RICO PUBLIC: Chapter 9 Case Summary & Unsecured Creditors
----------------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: Puerto Rico Public Buildings Authority (PBA)
           a/k/a Autoridad de Edificios Publicos de Puerto Rico
        Piso 17, Torre Norte
        Centro Gubernamental Minillas
        Apartado 41029
        San Juan, PR 00940-1029

Type of Business: The Public Buildings Authority (AEP) --
                  http://www.aep.gobierno.pr/-- is a Public
                  Corporation created by Act No. 56 of June 19,
                  1958, as amended.  The Authority is charged with
                  satisfying the needs of design, construction,
                  remodeling, improvements, operation and
                  maintenance of the structures that the agencies,
                  corporations and instrumentalities of the
                  Commonwealth of Puerto Rico need to offer their
                  services.  Among the facilities that the
                  Authority designs, builds and preserves are:
                  schools, hospitals, police facilities, prisons,
                  fire stations and government centers, among
                  others.  In addition, the Authority provides
                  property leasing services and new spaces for
                  server storage (Data Center).

Chapter 9 Petition Date: September 27, 2019

Court: United States District Court
       District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan)

Bankruptcy Case No.: 19-05523

Debtor's Counsel: Hermann D. Bauer Alvarez, Esq.
                  O'NEILL & BORGES LLC
                  American International Plaza
                  Suite 800
                  250 Munoz Rivera Ave
                  San Juan, PR 00918
                  Tel: 787-282-5723
                  Fax: 787-753-8944
                  E-mail: herman@oneillborges.com
                          hermann.Bauer@oneillborges.com

                     - and -

                  Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq.
                  PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
                  11 Times Square
                  New York, NY 10036
                  Tel: 212-969-4530
                  Fax: 212-969-2900
                  E-mail: mbienenstock@proskauer.com

                    - and -

                  Gabriel Miranda Rivera, Esq.
                  ONEILL & BORGES LLC
                  250 Munoz Rivera, Ste 800
                  San Juan, PR 00918-1813
                  Tel: 787-764-8181
                  E-mail: gabriel.miranda@oneillborges.com

                    - and -

                  Daniel J. Perez Refojos, Esq.
                  ONEILL & BORGES LLC
                  250 Munoz Rivera Ave
                  Suite 800
                  San Juan, PR 00918
                  Tel: 787-764-8181
                  E-mail: daniel.perez@oneillborges.com

                    - and -

                  Brian S. Rosen, Esq.
                  PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
                  Eleven Times Square
                  New York, NY 10036
                  Tel: 212-969-3000
                  Fax: 212-969-2900
                  E-mail: brosen@proskauer.com

Estimated Assets: Unknown

Estimated Debts: Unknown

The petition was signed by Jaime El Koury, general counsel.

A full-text copy of the petition is available for free at:

             http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb19-05523.pdf

Debtor's 21 Largest Unsecured Creditors:

  Entity                            Nature of Claim   Claim Amount

  ------                            ---------------   ------------
1. Muniz Burgos Contractors, Corp.     Trade Debt       $1,006,195
Condominio Parque de las
Fuentes PH204
680 Calle Cesar Gonzalez
San Juan, PR 00918-3912
Tel: 787-287-0212

2. Deya Elevator Service Inc.          Trade Debt         $978,178
680 Calle Cesar Gonzalez
Tel: 787-268-8777
Email: ventas@deya.com

3. Genesis Security Services Inc.      Trade Debt         $917,207
5900 Ave. Isla Verde L-2 PMB 438
Carolina, PR 00983
Tel: 787-776-2381
Email: contact@genesissecuritypr.com

4. Quintero Contruction S E            Trade Debt         $851,134
Carr 734 Km 0.5 Bo Arenas, Cidra,
Puerto Rico 00739
Tel: 787-739-6040

5. Sky High Elevator Corp.             Trade Debt         $779,613
Urb. Santa Maria
34 Calle Orquidea
San Juan, PR 00926
Tel: Tel: 787-366-9954
Email: skyhighelevators@gmail.com

6. Adm. Servicios Generales            Government         $693,304
PO Box 195568
San Juan, PR 00919-5568
Tel: 787-759-7676
Email: finanzas@asg.pr.gov

7. MAPFRE-PRAICO                      Professional        $664,772
Insurance Company                       Services
PO Box 70333
San Juan, PR 00936-8333
Tel: 787-250-6500
Email: rdesoto@mapfrepr.com

8. DRC Corporation                     Trade Debt         $612,030
PO Box 70202
San Juan, PR 00936
Tel: 787-723-7621
Email: jfnevares-law@microjuris.com

9. Crufon Construction Corp.           Trade Debt         $598,407
PO Box 4101
Vega Baja, PR 00694-4101
Tel: 787-783-9410
Email: carlos.iguina@multinationalpr.com

10. Karimar Construction Inc.          Trade Debt         $568,556
PO Box 8000
Aguada, PR 00602-7002
Tel: 787-252-2415
     787-868-0180
Email: jesther27@aol.com

11. Depto Trabajo Y                    Trade Debt         $537,600
Recursos Humanos
Edif. Prudencio Rivera Martinez
505 Ave. Munoz Rivera
San Juan PR 00919-5540
Fax: 787-754-5353
Email: lypagan@trabajo.pr.gov

12. Karimar Construction Inc.          Trade Debt         $445,313
PO Box 8000 Aguada,
PR 00602-7002
Tel: 787-252-2415 787-868-0180
Email: santos.giancarlo@gmail.com

13. G RG Engineering SE                Trade Debt         $442,115
Urb. Belisa 1515 Calle Bori
San Juan, PR 00928
Tel: 787-757-8033

14. Target Engineering S E             Trade Debt         $427,864
PO Box 367
Saint Just, PR 00978
Tel: 787-257-0416
Email: rebecabarnes@bufetebarnes.com

15. Del Valle Group SP                 Trade Debt         $420,275
PO Box 2319
TOA Baja, PR 00951-2319
Tel: 787-794-0927
Email: rlatorre@delvallegroup.net

16. A & E Group, Corp.                 Trade Debt         $377,646
PMB 382
PO Box 7891 Guaynabo, PR 00978
Tel: 787-783-0959
Email: rebecabarnes@bufetebarnes.com

17. Correction Corporation of          Trade Debt         $346,767
America
10 Burton Hills
Boulevard Nashville
United States, TN 37215

18. JLG Consulting                     Trade Debt         $311,455
Engineering, P.S.C.
PO Box 9023455
San Juan, PR 00902-3455
Tel: 787-724-4545
Email: jlg@joselgarcia.com

19. Polymer Industries Inc.            Trade Debt         $287,768
PO Box 839
Bayamon, PR 00690-0839
Tel: 787-780-3387
Email: erovira@polymerpr.com

20. Evertec Group LLC                  Trade Debt         $282,965
PO Box 364527
San Juan, PR 00936-4527
Tel:787-759-9999
    787-250-7356
Email: Rafael.Echevarria@evertecinc.com

21. Plumbing & Sewer                   Trade Debt         $267,800
Cleaning Rus Corp.
PO Box 191713
San Juan, PR 00919-1713
Tel: 787-753-8000
Email: bjquintana@quintanapr.com


PUERTO RICO: Road Map Exit From Bankruptcy Filed in U.S. Court
--------------------------------------------------------------
Luis Valentin Ortiz at Reuters reports that Puerto Rico would
reduce a major portion of its debt by more than 60% under a
long-awaited restructuring proposal the bankrupt U.S.
commonwealth's federally created financial oversight board filed in
court.

The so-called plan of adjustment covering $35 billion of bonds and
claims and more than $50 billion of pension liabilities would allow
Puerto Rico to exit a form of bankruptcy that commenced in May 2017
if it wins U.S. District Court approval, according to Reuters.

"This is the beginning of the end of Puerto Rico's bankruptcy
process," Jose Carrion, chairman of the oversight board, told
reporters following a public hearing on the plan, the report
notes.

The proposal, which would reduce the value of bonds and other
claims, won the support of Puerto Rico's new governor even though
it calls for pension cuts for about 40% of the island's government
retirees, the report says.

Confirmation of the plan by U.S. Judge Laura Taylor Swain, who is
hearing Puerto Rico's bankruptcy cases, is expected in the first
half of 2020, according to Natalie Jaresko, the board's executive
director, the report discloses.

                        Challenges Ahead

But Puerto Rico faces "an uphill battle," according to James
Spiotto, managing director of Chapman Strategic Advisors, who
pointed to the proposal's relatively low support among creditors
compared with plan of adjustment filings in previous high-profile
municipal bankruptcies, Reuters discloses.

"If enough people don't accept it, how's the plan going to be
feasible?" he said, the report notes.

Plan support agreements cover $4 billion of bonds so far, up from
$3 billion when an initial deal was announced in June, according to
the board, the report says.

Assured Guaranty, which insures nearly $1.5 billion of Puerto Rico
general obligation and Public Buildings Authority (PBA) bonds, said
it does not support the plan "as it is premised on a number of
terms that violate Puerto Rico law, its constitution and PROMESA,"
the 2016 U.S. law that created the oversight board, the report
relays.

Jaresko said the board will continue to negotiate with other
creditor groups to increase support, the report discloses.

Owners of bonds issued by Puerto Rico, the PBA and Employees
Retirement System would face losses on their initial investments
ranging from 28% to 87%, with higher reductions earmarked for bonds
that the board and some creditors are seeking to invalidate, the
report says.

The board is trying to void more than $6 billion of general
obligation bonds sold in 2012 and 2014 on the basis they were
issued in violation of Puerto Rico's constitutional debt limit, the
report notes.  The proposed plan of adjustment contains a
settlement offer for challenged bonds, while postponing litigation
on the validity of the debt until after the plan is confirmed in
court, the report relays.

Annual debt service would be reduced to 9% of government revenue
from 28%, according to the board, the report notes.

                      Pension Cuts Controversy

The plan creates an independent reserve trust for Puerto Rico's
pay-as-you-go public sector retirement system and calls for a
maximum 8.5% pension cut for retirees who receive more than $1,200
in monthly benefits, the report notes.  A federal court-appointed
committee representing more than 167,000 retirees has agreed to the
plan, the report says.

Reuters relays that other groups that represent pensioners such as
the Teachers Federation and the Government Retirees and Pensioners
Federation rejected the proposal, noting that the court-appointed
committee does not represent them in the negotiations

Before former Governor Ricardo Rossello left office last month and
was eventually replaced by Wanda Vazquez, Puerto Rico's government
opposed pension cuts, the report notes.

In a televised address, Vazquez said while she opposes cuts to
pensioners in principle, her administration will support the
proposed plan of adjustment to avoid risking stiffer pension cuts
and "losing the opportunity to restructure more than $35 billion in
commonwealth debt," the report discloses.

So far, Puerto Rico has received court approval for debt
restructurings for its Government Development Bank and Sales Tax
Financing Corporation known as COFINA, the report notes.  The
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority moved closer to exiting
bankruptcy earlier this month when two holdout bond insurers joined
a deal to restructure its debt, the report adds.

                        About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70 billion,
a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in nine of the
last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III of
2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ('PROMESA').

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that may
be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery disputes,
and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                    Bondholders' Attorneys

Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP and Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera
& Sifre, P.S.C. and serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc., and
the First Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which collectively hold over
$4.4 billion of GO Bonds, COFINA Bonds, and other bonds issued by
Puerto Rico and other instrumentalities.

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP, Autonomy
Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, and Monarch Alternative
Capital LP.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ Management
II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                          Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed an official committee of retirees and an
official committee of unsecured creditors of the Commonwealth.  The
Retiree Committee tapped Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia &
Milian, C.S.P., as its attorneys.  The Creditors Committee tapped
Paul Hastings LLP and O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.


PUERTO RICO: Unveils Plan to Restructure $35 Billion of Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico on
Sept. 27, 2019, filed its proposed Plan of Adjustment to
restructure $35 billion of debt and other claims against the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Public Building Authority (PBA),
and the Employee Retirement System (ERS); and more than $50 billion
of pension liabilities.

The Plan provides a framework to reduce the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico's debt to sustainable levels and provides a path to exit
bankruptcy. It reduces the Commonwealth's $35 billion of total
liabilities -- bonds and other claims -- by more than 60%, to $12
billion.  Combined with the restructuring of COFINA debt earlier
this year, the Plan reduces the Commonwealth's annual debt service
to just under 9% of own-source revenues, down from almost 30% of
government revenues prior to PROMESA.

The Oversight Board had reached agreements with the Official
Committee of Retired Employees of the Government of Puerto Rico
(COR), the Lawful Constitutional Debt Coalition (LCDC) and QTCB
Noteholder Group (QTCB) representing certain general obligation
bondholders, and the Public Servants United of Puerto Rico
(SPU)/AFSCME Council 95 who have come together understanding the
financial situation on the island and support the Plan as a
compromise to achieve stability for Puerto Rico.

"Today [Sept. 27], we have taken a big step to put bankruptcy
behind us and start envision what Puerto Rico's future looks like
under fiscal stability and economic sustainability," said Jose
Carrion, the Oversight Board's Chairman, in the Sept. 27
announcement.  "Three years after Congress passed PROMESA and two
years after the most severe Hurricane in more than 100 years hit
Puerto Rico, after more than a decade of economic decline and
fiscal disarray, after tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans left
their island to find prosperity elsewhere, we have now reached a
turning point."

"The Plan of Adjustment we proposed today begins our march out of
bankruptcy.  We are not there yet. We need court approval, and it
will take time to get there.  A Plan that has the support of
certain bondholders, retirees and public employees is the best Plan
to remove the cloud that has been hanging over Puerto Rico's
economy" Carrion said.

Further, the Oversight Board published a comprehensive independent
analysis of the Government of Puerto Rico's pension systems, as
required under Section 211 of PROMESA.  The report by Ernst & Young
evaluates the fiscal and economic impact of the pension cash flows,
including the pension liabilities and funding strategy, sources of
funding, existing benefits and their sustainability, and the
system's legal structure and operational arrangements.

The Plan of Adjustment delivers meaningful reductions from
bondholders, providing, on average, a more than 60% blended
reduction in total Commonwealth liabilities.  The Plan strengthens
pensions by establishing an independent pension reserve trust to
ensure PayGo benefits can be paid regardless of the economic or
political situation.  It includes an 8.5% pension reduction for
retirees earning over $1,200 per month, so 60% of retirees would
not face any cut.

In 2016, when the Oversight Board began its work, Puerto Rico's
government and public corporations like PREPA and COFINA had
amassed more than $70 billion in debt they could not pay and owed
Puerto Rican retirees over $50 billion in unfunded pension
benefits.  The Puerto Rico government alone had to spend almost $3
of every $10 dollars in tax revenue just to service its debt.

This Plan, combined with the completed COFINA debt restructuring,
reduces the maximum annual amount of government net-tax supported
debt service from $4.2 billion to $1.5 billion.  The combined debt
service of the Commonwealth and COFINA debt falls from $82 billion
to $44 billion over a 30-year period, ensuring long-term
sustainability.

Local retail bondholders have the opportunity to receive taxable
bonds with monthly interest payments.

"Restructuring debt and putting Puerto Rico on a solid fiscal
footing are the Oversight Board's core mandates under PROMESA,"
said Natalie Jaresko, the Oversight Board's Executive Director.
"The Plan of Adjustment we filed and the support we negotiated with
retirees, unions and certain bondholders is an important first step
towards restoring solvency and creating the kind of certainty
businesses need to invest and the kind of stability the people of
Puerto Rico need to achieve prosperity."

"The Plan of Adjustment, together with the fiscal discipline
PROMESA mandates and the significant structural reforms outlined in
the Fiscal Plan that will enhance Puerto Rico's quality of life and
economic competitiveness, allow us to work towards stable and
sustainable growth," Jaresko said.

The Plan restructures general obligation (GO) bonds; claw back
claims against the Commonwealth; PBA bonds; ERS bonds; general
unsecured claims against the Commonwealth, PBA, and ERS; and the
Commonwealth's pension liabilities.  It includes these specific
recovery terms:

   * A 36% reduction for holders of GO bonds issued before 2012

   * A 28% reduction for holders of PBA bonds issued before 2012

   * A 87% reduction for holders of ERS bonds

The Plan also provides an option for holders of bonds issued after
2011, which debt has been challenged as unconstitutional as a
result of the independent review of Puerto Rico's debt by Kobre &
Kim and other professionals.

The settlement offer includes these terms for settling
bondholders:

  -- A 55% to 65% reduction for holders of challenged GO bonds and
Commonwealth guaranteed claims

  -- A 42% reduction for holders of challenged PBA bonds

This settlement mechanism reduces litigation expenses for the
Commonwealth and accelerates resolution of these claims.

The Plan builds on the Plan Support Agreement announced in June and
negotiated with holders of approximately $3 billion in claims.  As
of the filing date, the Plan includes support from holders of
approximately $4 billion in claims, representing 54% of claims from
PBA bonds issued before 2012 and 22% of all GO and PBA claims,
making the Plan Support Agreement effective.

As contemplated in the Plan Support Agreement, the Oversight Board
approved and certified the filing of a voluntary petition under
PROMESA's Title III for PBA, to enable the restructuring of the PBA
claims through the Plan.

The Oversight Board filed the Plan with the U.S. District Court for
the District of Puerto Rico, which has jurisdiction over Puerto
Rico's bankruptcy-like cases under PROMESA.

Additional information about the Plan of Adjustment is available at
the Oversight Board's website at
https://oversightboard.pr.gov/plan-of-adjustment/

                        About Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70 billion,
a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in nine of the
last 10 years.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.

The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III of
2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ('PROMESA').

The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017.  On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").

U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases.  The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that may
be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery disputes,
and management of other pretrial proceedings.

Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.

The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.

Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.

McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
is the Board's municipal investment banker.

Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent.  Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico

Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.

O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.

The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.

                    Bondholders' Attorneys

Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP and Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera
& Sifre, P.S.C. and serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc., and
the First Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which collectively hold over
$4.4 billion of GO Bonds, COFINA Bonds, and other bonds issued by
Puerto Rico and other instrumentalities.

White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP, Autonomy
Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, and Monarch Alternative
Capital LP.

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.

Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ Management
II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).

                          Committees

The U.S. Trustee formed an official committee of retirees and an
official committee of unsecured creditors of the Commonwealth.  The
Retiree Committee tapped Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia &
Milian, C.S.P., as its attorneys.  The Creditors Committee tapped
Paul Hastings LLP and O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.


STONEMOR PARTNERS: Commences Rights Offering
--------------------------------------------
StoneMor Partners L.P. is distributing to its holders of common
units as of 5:00 p.m. New York City time on Sept. 26, 2019, one
non-transferable subscription right for each common unit held by
qualified unitholders of record on the Record Date.  Each right
will entitle the holder to purchase 1.24 common units for each
common unit held by the unitholder as of the Record Date.  The
subscription price will equal the $1.20 per common unit.  The
Registration Statement on Form S-1 respecting the Rights Offering
was declared effective by the Securities and Exchange Commission on
Sept. 25, 2019.  The subscription rights will expire if they are
not exercised by 5:00 p.m. New York City time on Oct. 25, 2019.
The Partnership may, at its sole discretion, extend the
rights offering for a period not to exceed 30 days. All exercises
of subscription rights are irrevocable.

                      About StoneMor Partners

StoneMor Partners L.P., headquartered in Trevose, Pennsylvania --
http://www.stonemor.com/-- is an owner and operator of cemeteries
and funeral homes in the United States, with 321 cemeteries and 90
funeral homes in 27 states and Puerto Rico.  StoneMor's cemetery
products and services, which are sold on both a pre-need (before
death) and at-need (at death) basis, include: burial lots, lawn and
mausoleum crypts, burial vaults, caskets, memorials, and all
services which provide for the installation of this merchandise.

StoneMor reported a net loss of $72.69 million for the year ended
Dec. 31, 2018, compared to a net loss of $75.15 million for the
year ended Dec. 31, 2017.  As of June 30, 2019, the Company had
$1.76 billion in total assets, $1.76 billion in total liabilities,
$57.50 million in total redeemable convertible preferred units, and
a total partners' deficit of $60.94 million.

                           *    *    *

As reported by the TCR on Feb. 13, 2019, Moody's Investors Service
downgraded StoneMor Partners L.P.'s Corporate Family rating to Caa2
from Caa1 and Probability of Default rating to Caa3-PD from
Caa1-PD.  The Caa2 CFR reflects Moody's concern that if pre-need
cemetery selling and liquidity pressures do not abate while the
senior secured credit facility is being refinanced, a distressed
exchange or other default event could become more likely.  

As reported by the TCR on July 3, 2019, S&P Global Ratings affirmed
its 'CCC+' issuer credit rating on StoneMor Partners L.P.  The
outlook remains negative.  S&P said, "The rating affirmation
reflects our view that despite the removal of near term maturities
and sufficient liquidity over the next twelve months, we continue
to view StoneMor's capital structure as unsustainable in the long
term given our projection for persistent free cash flow deficits.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2019.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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