/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/190904.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                 L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Wednesday, September 4, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 177

                           Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: S&P Ups Sovereign Credit Rating to CCC-/C, Outlook Neg.
BANCO DE GALICIA: S&P Places 'B-' LT ICRs on Watch Neg.
CAPEX SA: S&P Cuts Currency Ratings to 'B-', Outlook Neg.
COMPANIA LATINOAMERICANA: S&P Cuts ICR to 'CCC', Put on Watch Neg.


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Oil and Natural Gas Production Increased in July
BRAZIL: Over 5.4MM People Depend on Income from MEI Companies
BRAZIL: Private Pension Investments Have not Grown Since 2016


C O L O M B I A

COLOMBIA: To Get $15MM IMF Loan to Strengthen Public Sector Mgmt.


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Footwear -6.5% Sag Leads Free Zones Stumble


N I C A R A G U A

NICARAGUA: Unemployment, High Cost of Living are Main Problems


P U E R T O   R I C O

SEARS HOLDINGS: As Fees Reach $200M, Suppliers Seek a Stop
TECNICENTROS MUNDIAL: Hires Luis Carrasquillo as Accountant
TECNICENTROS MUNDIAL: Hires William Vidal as Counsel


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Crude Exports Fall to Lowest Level in 2019

                           - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: S&P Ups Sovereign Credit Rating to CCC-/C, Outlook Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
On Aug. 30, 2019, S&P Global Ratings raised its foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings on Argentina to 'CCC-/C' from
'SD'. The outlook on the long-term ratings is negative. In
addition, S&P raised its short-term issue ratings to 'C' from 'D'.
S&P also raised the national scale rating to 'raCCC-' from 'SD'.

Outlook

S&P said, "The negative outlook reflects the prominent downside
risks to payment of debt on time and in full per our criteria over
the coming months amid very complex political, economic, and
financial market dynamics. The Macri Administration may advance a
restructuring during its current term in office if it garners
support from the Argentine Congress. Alternatively, the outlook
reflects risks associated with failure to advance such a
restructuring proposal and the prospects for ongoing stressed
market dynamics before and after the Oct. 27 national elections,
and with it, risk of a missed payment on Argentina's debt
obligations.

"We could lower the long-term ratings to 'CC' over the coming
months if the government advances negotiation with bondholders for
a potential debt exchange that could be characterized as a
distressed exchange based on our methodology as we see the most
likely scenario would be an extension of maturities, which will not
be compensated by the issuer.

"Alternatively, absent backing for a re-profiling, we could lower
the rating should additional economic and financial stresses
threaten timely debt service under the current or next
administration."

Liquidity is extremely tight, and prospects for the fifth
disbursement under the IMF Stand-By Arrangement as well as the
direction of economic policies post the national elections both
remain uncertain.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable over the coming months if
policy signals and execution start to successfully turn around or
stabilize private-sector confidence, market turbulence subsides,
and the government regains market access for government financing.

Rationale

The 'CCC-/C' ratings on Argentina reflect pronounced credit
vulnerabilities and heightened risk of non-payment. The government
has defaulted for the third time since 2001, under S&P's
methodology. The absence of confidence in the financial markets
about policy initiatives under the next administration--complicated
by the fact elections are several months away and a new
administration assumes office only in December-–has severely
compromised the ability of the Treasury to roll over commercial
debt and the central bank to manage volatility in the peso.

Against the backdrop of declining international reserves, an
inability to place paper in the market prompted Argentina's recent
and possible forthcoming debt re-profiling. The immensely stressed
debt dynamics amid a depreciating exchange rate, a likely
acceleration in inflation, and a deepening economic recession all
weigh on Argentina's credit profile. Marked liquidity pressures
have materialized, which, coupled with the risk of not receiving
the fifth disbursement from the IMF, weigh on S&P's external and
liquidity assessments. Severe challenges confront the ability of
both the current administration and the leading presidential
candidate to contain market volatility and restore financial and
economic stability.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List

  Upgraded; Outlook Action  
                                        To From
  Argentina
   Sovereign Credit Rating CCC-/Negative/C SD/--/D

  Ratings Affirmed  

  Argentina
   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment B-

  Argentina
   Senior Unsecured                    CCC-


BANCO DE GALICIA: S&P Places 'B-' LT ICRs on Watch Neg.
-------------------------------------------------------
On Sept. 2, 2019, S&P Global Ratings kept its 'B-' long-term issuer
credit ratings on Banco De Galicia Y Buenos Aires S.A.U. (Banco
Galicia), Banco Patagonia S.A., Banco de la Provincia de Buenos
Aires (BAPRO), and Banco Hipotecario S.A. at the same level as the
new transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment. At the same time,
S&P placed these ratings on CreditWatch negative. In addition, S&P
placed its 'B' short-term issuer credit rating on Banco Patagonia,
'CCC' subordinated debt rating on Banco Galicia, and 'B-' senior
unsecured rating on Banco Hipotecario on CreditWatch negative.

The CreditWatch negative listing reflects the potential impact that
the re-profiling of the sovereign debt, foreign exchange controls,
deposit base behavior booth in local and foreign currency, and
other developments until the completion of the presidential
election could have on banks and on their creditworthiness. S&P
could lower the ratings on the entities if these factors erode
banks' ability to cover financial obligations. S&P expect to
resolve the CreditWatch listing in the upcoming 90 days.

BICRA on Argentina

S&P said, "We're revising our BICRA on Argentina to group '9' from
group '8' and industry risk to '10' from '9', reflecting the rising
economic risks for banks, resulting from the weakening in the
sovereign's creditworthiness and financial conditions.
Nevertheless, the anchor (average risk) for banks operating in the
country remains at 'b+'. (We assess BICRAs on a scale that goes
from '1' [lowest risk] to '10' [highest risk].) We're revising the
economic risk trend to stable and industry risk trend to negative.

"In the upcoming quarters, we expect domestic financial
institutions to continue operating under very challenging economic
conditions, which further deteriorated following the recent market
turmoil and developments in the sovereign's debt. These factors are
hampering credit growth in real terms, banks' asset quality
metrics, and heightening the likelihood of additional credit
losses. We consider adequate provisioning, capitalization, and low
credit-to-GDP ratio--given banks' focus on formal sectors of the
economy--will allow lenders to cope with potential additional
losses. Argentine banks have been increasingly providing
dollar-denominated loans, but most of these are to borrowers that
generate income in the same currency, such as exporters, which
alleviates potential risk. The banking system remains profitable,
but with a greater share of revenue coming from holdings of central
bank securities, which should help offset higher charges for
provisions in response to rising delinquency. We will monitor
developments and impact on the sector's profitability.

"Our industry risk assessment incorporates Argentina's enhanced
regulatory framework with the implementation of Basel III and
accounting principles that align the domestic financial system more
closely with international standards. Nevertheless, risks for banks
operating in Argentina are very high, given a weak regulatory track
record, historically low confidence of depositors in the system,
and the absence of diversified long-term funding. Deposits in the
system exhibited volatility since 2018 with declines in May and
especially in August (with a 6% decline in the deposit base in
dollars). Also, deposits in domestic currency dropped about 4% and
those in foreign currency 12% after the primary elections earlier
this month, but considering high levels of liquidity and solvency.
In addition, in our opinion, the shallow domestic capital market
and limited access to foreign capital markets result in a narrow
range of funding sources for banks."

BICRA trends

S&P said, "We're revising the economic risk trend to stable from
negative after incorporation of further impacts of persistent
economic malaise and heightened risks of credit losses, mitigated
by banks' conservative approach to lending.

"In addition, we're revising our industry risk trend to negative
from stable, incorporating the potential impact that developments
in the sovereign could have on the financial system's funding and
its credit profile amid the high levels of liquidity and adequate
solvency."


CAPEX SA: S&P Cuts Currency Ratings to 'B-', Outlook Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its local and foreign currency ratings
on the following companies to 'B-' from 'B'. The outlook on these
ratings is negative:

-- Aeropuertos Argentina 2000 S.A.;
-- CAPEX S.A.;
-- Telecom Argentina S.A.; and
-- Transportadora de Gas del Sur S.A. (TGS).

S&P said, "The downgrade follows the revision of our transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment on Argentina to 'B-' from 'B',
which in turn follows our sovereign's downgrade to 'SD' from
'B-/B'. The downgrade of the sovereign follows its continued
inability to place short-term paper with private-sector market
participants, and the government decision to unilaterally extend
the maturity of all short-term paper on August 28.

"The T&C reflects our perception of the risk of the sovereign
interfering with the ability of domestic companies to access,
convert, and transfer money abroad, which is essential for the
affected companies to service their financial obligations, many of
which are denominated in foreign currency, particularly dollars.
Aeropuertos Argentina, CAPEX, TGS, and Telecom Argentina bear some
form of currency mismatch due to their large proportion of foreign
currency denominated debts and a significant portion of the cash
flows in domestic currency. A relatively low leverage among these
entities and manageable short-term debt maturities, together with
considerable cash holdings in foreign currency, mitigate these
currency risks.

"Nevertheless, we lowered the ratings on these entities in line
with the new T&C level, because we continue to believe that none of
them would be able to continue honoring their foreign currency
obligations under potential restrictions on access to foreign
currency and/or restrictions on the ability to transfer money
abroad."

The outlook on these entities remains negative, reflecting the
potential further deterioration in their credit quality because of
the worsening business environment, greater volatility in exchange
rate, and the consequences of the sovereign's debt restructuring on
the domestic economy. Furthermore, either potential restrictions to
access and/or transfer funds abroad, because these entities'
obligations are mostly cross border, could increase drastically
S&P's perception of risk. The latter could result from a deeper
recession, along with increasing inflation, which could in turn
reduce the companies' ability to generate enough revenue in
domestic currency to convert into the needed funds for servicing
the foreign currency obligations. S&P could raise the ratings if
its perception of the T&C risk diminishes.

S&P said, "Most of the Argentine companies we rate now have ratings
higher than the foreign currency rating on Argentina. That is
because we believe they're likely to remain current on their
obligations, while the sovereign proceeds with its debt
restructuring. Therefore, we kept the ratings on the companies
listed below unchanged. However, the ratings on these entities will
remain at the same level as Argentina's T&C assessment, which we
identify as the most relevant source of risk to them, in the near
future."

-- AES Argentina Generacion S.A;
-- Compania de Transporte de Energia Electrica en Alta Tension
TRANSENER S.A.;
-- Compania General de Combustibles S.A.;
-- Empresa Distribuidora Y Comercializadora Norte S.A.;
-- IRSA Propiedades Comerciales S.A.;
-- IRSA Inversiones y Representaciones S.A.;
-- Pampa Energia S.A.;
-- Petroquimica Comodoro Rivadavia S.A.;
-- YPF Energia Electrica S.A.; and YPF  S.A.

S&P will continue to closely monitor how the further erosion of
macroeconomic and credit conditions would impact the cash
generation ability and refinancing risk of rated corporate and
infrastructure entities in Argentina.

COMPANIA LATINOAMERICANA: S&P Cuts ICR to 'CCC', Put on Watch Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
On Sept. 2, 2019, S&P Global Ratings lowered its issuer credit and
issue-level ratings on Argentine conglomerate CLISA - Compania
Latinoamericana de Infraestructura y Servicios S.A. (CLISA) to
'CCC' from 'B-' and placed the ratings on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

S&P said, "The downgrade reflects our opinion that CLISA faces high
refinancing risks over the next 12 months and may not be able to
meet its obligations on time if Argentina's (CCC-/Negative/C)
economy continues to weaken and the Argentine peso depreciates
further. The rating also reflects that we expect CLISA's revenues
and cash flows to continue eroding due to Argentina's worsening
economic conditions that have reduced CLISA's construction business
and increased its debt and interest burden, because 80% of its
debts are denominated in foreign currency while its cash flows are
in pesos."

Additionally, Argentina is two months away from holding
presidential elections, and the political scenario is turbulent,
with a high chance that the opposition candidate, Mr. Alberto
Fernandez, could win the election. The potential change in
presidency may slower public spending and make collections more
difficult, a real threat to CLISA because roughly 80% of its
revenues are with public counterparties.

The CreditWatch negative reflects that CLISA has to refinance
around ARS3.3 billion ($60 million, including $11 million of
factoring transactions with recourse) in the next six months,
including a single maturity in October for $17.6 million and
interest for about $15 million, amid very negative market
conditions for Argentine entities. To meet those obligations, CLISA
has $40 million in cash and an internal cash flow generation of
between $16.5 million and $17.0 million, which means the company
would need to refinance some $15 million in the local market. While
under normal conditions such refinancing needs would be fairly
manageable, current credit restrictions may force the company to
restructure or to temporarily stop paying its obligations.

S&P will monitor CLISA's refinancing strategies in the next few
weeks and resolve the CreditWatch once it has more clarity on those
strategies.

Macroeconomic assumptions

-- Argentina's real GDP decreases by 2.3% in 2019 and increases
0.5% in 2020, shrinking CLISA's construction backlog by 42% for
2020;

-- Inflation of about 55% in 2019 and 35% in 2020, which affects
the company's cost structure through price adjustment clauses in
contracts that are triggered after a fixed period of time or upon
cost increases from 5% to 7%, depending on the contract; and

-- A year-end exchange rate of ARS63.0 to $1 in 2019 and ARS75.0
to $1 in 2020, generating financial losses due to foreign currency
variations in CLISA's dollar denominated-debt.

Company-specific assumptions

-- The construction business (which contributed 40% of EBITDA in
the six months ended in June 30, 2019) will have revenues of about
ARS21.6 billion in 2019 and ARS16.8 billion in 2020, while S&P
assumes EBITDA margins of 8%-10%, supported by a backlog that
approached $18.12 billion as of June 30, 2019;

-- At the waste management business (50% of consolidated EBITDA),
S&P expects revenues of about ARS17.7 billion in 2019 and ARS24.0
billion in 2020, while it assumes EBITDA margins of 20%-21%;

-- Stable EBITDA margin of 7% in CLISA's transportation division
(5% of consolidated EBITDA). S&P assumes the concession will
terminated in March 2020;

-- The water distribution unit (5% of consolidated EBITDA) to
increase revenues to about ARS3.2 billion in 2019 and ARS4.5
billion in 2020 with an EBITDA margin of 11%, mainly due to tariff
adjustments and a recent update of the company's revenue base
because of a cadastral survey;

-- Capital expenditures (capex) of approximately ARS800 million in
2019 and ARS600 million to ARS650 million in 2020;

-- Adjusted financial debt of ARS25.3 billion in 2019 and ARS28.8
billion in 2020, which includes about ARS1.5 billion from fiscal
liabilities (tax moratorium);

-- Interest payments increase to about ARS3.2 billion per year,
mainly due to higher peso depreciation and higher interest rates
under Argentina's struggling economy; and

-- No dividend payments in the next two years.

In S&P's base-case scenario, it expects the following credit
figures and metrics in the next two years:

-- Consolidated EBITDA margin of 14%-15%;

-- Debt to EBITDA of 3.5x-4.5x;

-- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt of 4%-9%; and

-- Negative free operating cash flow (FOCF) to debt of about 2.5%
in 2019 and turning slightly positive in 2020.

S&P said, "We assess CLISA's liquidity as weak, under our
assumption that the company will face cash shortfalls in the next
12 months. Additionally, we believe the company may encounter
delays in collection, and financing alternatives may narrow in the
future due to sluggish economic conditions in Argentina." Also, the
company may not be able to comply with financial covenants that
mandate leverage ratios below 3.5x for net debt to EBITDA and
coverage ratios above 2.0x for EBITDA to net interest expense,
further limiting its financial flexibility to incur new debt.

Moreover, exposure to currency fluctuations and the lack of hedges
represent a high risk, given that 80% of CLISA's financial
obligations are denominated in foreign currency, mainly the senior
unsecured bond due in 2023.

Principal Liquidity Sources:

-- Cash and liquid investment sources of ARS2.4 billion as of June
30, 2019 (excluding restricted cash held at Aguas Cordobesas
subsidiary that operates drinking water supply services); and

-- FFO of between ARS1.7 billion and ARS1.8 billion in the next 12
months.

Principal Liquidity Uses:

-- Debt amortization of ARS5.8 billion (including ARS2.9 billon of
factoring transactions with recourse) in the next 12 months;

-- Working capital needs approaching ARS800 million-ARS900 million
in the next 12 months;

-- Capex of ARS300 million-ARS400 million in the next 12 months;
and

-- No dividend payments in the next 12 months.

CLISA was in compliance with all applicable covenants as of June
30, 2019. However, we believe the company may not be able to comply
with financial covenants over the next 12 months.

CLISA is subject to financial covenants that limit its ability to
incur new debt if the EBITDA to net interest expense ratio is below
2.0x or net debt to EBITDA is above 3.5x. Based on our projections,
the EBITDA interest coverage ratio will stay above the limit,
although given the company's currency mismatch the ratio is highly
sensitive to foreign exchange rate variations, reducing financial
flexibility.



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B R A Z I L
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BRAZIL: Oil and Natural Gas Production Increased in July
--------------------------------------------------------
Xiu Ying at Rio Times Online reports that the National Agency of
Petroleum, Natural Gas, and Biofuels (ANP) released information on
September 2nd, that the production of oil and natural gas increased
in July compared to the previous month and the same period last
year.

Oil production was 2.775 million barrels per day (bbl/d), up 8.5
percent compared to June and 7.8 percent compared to July 2018,
according to Rio Times Online.  A total of 124 million cubic meters
of natural gas were produced per day (m3/d), up 11.7 percent over
the previous month and 7.1 percent over July 2018, the report
notes.

Rio Times says Oil and gas production totalled 3.556 million
barrels of oil equivalent per day (boe/d), 61.4 percent of which
(1.732 million boe/d) came from offshore pre-salt fields.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
27, 2019, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' with a
Stable Outlook.

BRAZIL: Over 5.4MM People Depend on Income from MEI Companies
-------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Mann at Rio Times Online reports that the income obtained
as an individual micro-entrepreneur (MEI) is the only source of
resources for 1.7 million families, as per the 6th MEI Profile
survey, conducted by the Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support
Service (Sebrae).

According to the survey, this means that 5.4 million people in
Brazil, considering four people per family, depend on the income of
a MEI, the report notes.

Rio Times notes that according to the data, 61 percent of all
registered MEI's were were attracted by the benefits of
registration (having a formal company, the possibility of issuing
invoices, being able to make cheaper purchases), 25 percent because
of social security benefits, and 14 percent for other reasons.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
27, 2019, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' with a
Stable Outlook.

BRAZIL: Private Pension Investments Have not Grown Since 2016
-------------------------------------------------------------
Lachlan Williams at Rio Times Online reports that the progress of
the welfare reform, that has as one of its changes the reduction in
the value of retirement pensions, did not serve to elevate the
number of Brazilians who invest in private welfare plans.

Rio Times Online notes that there are about 13 million investors in
private plans, the same number as in 2016, according to Fenaprevi.

Experts emphasize that everyone should have resources to save, but
this does not happen because financial education is low and also
because of the economy, notes the report.

Since 2015, the crisis has led people to have to withdraw money
instead of saving, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May
27, 2019, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brazil's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' with a
Stable Outlook.



===============
C O L O M B I A
===============

COLOMBIA: To Get $15MM IMF Loan to Strengthen Public Sector Mgmt.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Colombia will advance in the modernization of public management
through the implementation of an innovative Government Center
(Smart Delivery Unit) that will incorporate cutting-edge
technologies to support evidence-based decision-making processes
with a $15 million loan approved by the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB)

The project will contribute to improve the effectiveness in
managing government priorities by strengthening the planning,
monitoring and evaluation capacities of the central government.
Additionally, it is expected to have a positive impact on the
provision of priority public goods and services for the citizens of
Colombia.

This program marks a milestone in the Government Centers initiative
as it is the first IDB loan focused exclusively on the
implementation of Delivery units. The program complements the
traditional model of the Government Center (CoG) with the
incorporation of sophisticated cutting-edge technologies such as
artificial intelligence that will generate data and project
scenarios in order to support timely decision-making in those
strategic programs for the country.

The project will be directly managed by the Presidency of the
Republic of Colombia, which through this program will acquire
strategic information and processes for decision-making, and the
public sector institutions.

The IDB loan has a repayment term of 15 years, a grace period of 15
years and an interest rate based on LIBOR.



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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Footwear -6.5% Sag Leads Free Zones Stumble
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that free zone activity stumbled -1.1% in
the first half of the year, after the value of their exported
products decreased -0.2%, to close at US$3.1 billion.

"The result contrasts with the jump this sector took last year. In
the first half of 2018, free zones had grown 10.4%," the Central
Bank said on its website, according to Dominican Today. "The
highest incidence of the fall registered in the first half of the
year has focused on sectors that are quite representative of the
activity, such as textiles, footwear and pharmaceutical and medical
equipment, which account for half of the exports from free zones."

In the case of footwear, the report said the drop in shipments
abroad was -6.5%, from US$174.4 million in the first half of 2018
to US$163 million in the first half of 2019, the report relays.

"Meanwhile, shipments of medical equipment fell -2.4% in one year,
from US$749.3 million to 731.3 million between 2018 and 2019, while
shipments of textile apparel abroad fell -0.8%, from about US$530.9
million in the first half of last year to US$526.7 million in the
same period this year, the report adds.

Standard & Poor's credit rating for Dominican Republic stands at
BB- with stable outlook (2015). Moody's credit rating for
Dominican Republic was last set at Ba3 with stable outlook (2017).
Fitch's credit rating for Dominican Republic was last reported at
BB- with stable outlook (2016).



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N I C A R A G U A
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NICARAGUA: Unemployment, High Cost of Living are Main Problems
--------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that unemployment, the high cost of living and the
political crisis are Nicaragua's main problems as identified by
80.2 percent of its citizens, according to a survey published Sept.
2.

The study by the Nicaraguan firm M&R Consultants indicates that
31.7 percent of those questioned believe that unemployment is the
biggest problem facing the country, according to EFE News.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter Latin America on
Jan. 29, 2019, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook to
negative from stable on the Government of Nicaragua's long-term
issuer ratings and affirmed the ratings at B2.



=====================
P U E R T O   R I C O
=====================

SEARS HOLDINGS: As Fees Reach $200M, Suppliers Seek a Stop
----------------------------------------------------------
A group of creditors of Sears Holdings Corp. is asking the
bankruptcy court to halt payments to the law firms and financial
advisers of Sears and the official creditors' committee.

Suppliers of the Debtors -- namely, Mien Co. Ltd., Helen Andrews,
Strong Progress Garment Company, Ltd., Samil Solutions, Shanghai
Fochier, Purcell Murray, A&A HK Industrial, Mingle Fashion, want
the Court to stop payments to the advisors until and unless the
Debtors establish "administrative insolvency" and all
administrative claims are reconciled.

Since the beginning of this case, retained professionals have
billed $161.4 million in fees and $6.395 million of expenses.  Of
that amount, $130.1 million plus expenses of $3.809 million have
already been approved on an interim basis per the Court's order of
June 28, 2019.  The professionals recently filed 14 more fee
applications, requesting more than $31.31 million in professional
fees and $2.586 million of expenses.  In other words, close to $200
million in professional fees and expenses have been incurred in
these cases.

Additionally, the Court's orders dated Nov. 30, 2018 and Dec. 28,
2018 are unclear as to the amount of the cap on the carve-out for
these professional fees.  Unlike other cases where carve-outs are
from a secured creditor's collateral, the funds in this carve-out
are directly impacting the recovery of all claimants, including all
similarly situated 503(b) administrative claimants, as well general
unsecured creditors.

The Objecting Parties request that no further professional fees
should be paid at this time, especially since there has been no
showing that the estate is administratively solvent.

"In fact, to the contrary, what we do know at this point is it
appears that the estate may in fact be administratively insolvent,"
says Joseph E. Sarachek, counsel to the Objecting parties.

"Based on the clear language of the Code, all administrative
expense claims under section 503(b) of the Code are of the same
priority and shall be paid pro rata."

"If the Debtors fail to establish administrative solvency, and this
case is ultimately converted to one under Chapter 7, then
professionals' fees approved on a final basis subsequent to the
conversion may have priority over the Chapter 11 503(b) claims. As
a result, regardless of the language of the Carve-out, until the
Debtors establish administrative solvency and reconcile
administrative claims, there should be no additional payments made
by the estate to estate professionals."

Mien Co. Ltd., et al.'s attorneys:

         THE SARACHEK LAW FIRM
         Joseph E. Sarachek
         101 Park Avenue, 27th Floor
         New York, NY 10178
         Telephone: (646) 517-5420
         Facsimile: (646) 861-4950
         E-mail: joe@saracheklawfirm.com

Pearl Global Industries, Ltd., the Debtors' largest vendor in India
and the world's third largest supplier of women's apparel, filed a
joinder to the objection.

"Vendors who supplied goods post-petition, as well as Sec.
503(b)(9) claimants, are no less deserving of payment than the
professionals.  Yet, the Debtors are no longer paying
administrative claims even if there is no objection to such
claims," said attorneys for Pearl Global, which asserts a Sec. 503
administrative claim of $1.5 million.

Attorneys for Pearl Global:

         David H. Wander, Esq.
         DAVIDOFF HUTCHER & CITRON LLP
         605 Third Avenue
         New York, NY 10158
         Tel: (212) 557-7200
         E-mail: dhw@dhclegal.com

Niagara Bottling, LLC, which has administrative expense claims
totaling $257,600 on account of bottled water products supplied to
the Debtors, also filed a joinder to the objection.  

Niagara Bottling's attorneys:

        Caroline R. Djang, Esq.
        BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP
        18101 Von Karman Ave., Suite 1000
        Irvine, CA 92612
        Telephone: (949) 263-2600
        E-mail: caroline.djang@bbklaw.com

                     About Sears Holdings

Sears Holdings Corporation (NASDAQ: SHLD) --
http://www.searsholdings.com/-- began as a mail ordering catalog
company in 1887 and became the world's largest retailer in the
1960s.  At its peak, Sears was present in almost every big mall
across the U.S., and sold everything from toys and auto parts to
mail-order homes.  Sears claims to be is a market leader in the
appliance, tool, lawn and garden, fitness equipment, and automotive
repair and maintenance retail sectors.

Sears and Kmart merged to form Sears Holdings in 2005 when they had
3,500 US stores between them. Kmart emerged in 2005 from its own
bankruptcy.

Unable to keep up with online stores and other brick-and-mortar
retailers, a long series of store closings has left it with 687
retail stores in 49 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands as of mid-October 2018.  The Company employs 68,000
individuals, of whom 32,000 are full-time employees.

As of Aug. 4, 2018, Sears Holdings had $6.93 billion in total
assets, $11.33 billion in total liabilities and a total deficit of
$4.40 billion.

Unable to cover a $134 million debt payment due Oct. 15, 2018,
Sears Holdings Corporation and 49 subsidiaries sought Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 18-23538) on Oct. 15,
2018.

The Hon. Robert D. Drain is the case judge.

The Debtors tapped Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP as legal counsel;
M-III Partners as restructuring advisor; Lazard Freres & Co. LLC as
investment banker; DLA Piper LLP as real estate advisor; and Prime
Clerk as claims and noticing agent.

The U.S. Trustee for Region 2 appointed nine creditors, including
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., and landlord Simon Property
Group, L.P., to serve on the official committee of unsecured
creditors.  The committee tapped Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP
as legal counsel; FTI Consulting as financial advisor; and Houlihan
Lokey Capital, Inc. as investment banker.

The U.S. Trustee for Region 2 on July 9, 2019, appointed five
retirees to serve on the committee representing retirees with life
insurance benefits in the Chapter 11 cases.

TECNICENTROS MUNDIAL: Hires Luis Carrasquillo as Accountant
-----------------------------------------------------------
Tecnicentros Mundial, Inc., seeks authority from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ CPA Luis
Carrasquillo & CO. P.S.C., as financial consultant to the Debtor.

Tecnicentros Mundial requires Luis Carrasquillo to:

   -- assist the Debtor in the financial restructuring of its
      affairs by providing advice in strategic planning;

   -- prepare the Debtor's Plan of Reorganization, Disclosure
      Statement and business plan; and

   -- participate in negotiations with the Debtor's creditors.

Luis Carrasquillo will be paid at these hourly rates:

     Partners                     $175
     Senior CPAs               $85 to $125
     Administrative Support       $45

Luis Carrasquillo will be paid a retainer in the amount of
$20,000.

Luis Carrasquillo will also be reimbursed for reasonable
out-of-pocket expenses incurred.

Luis R. Carrasquillo, a partner at CPA Luis R. Carrasquillo & Co.,
assured the Court that the firm is a "disinterested person" as the
term is defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does
not represent any interest adverse to the Debtor and its estates.

Luis Carrasquillo can be reached at:

     Luis R. Carrasquillo
     CPA LUIS R. CARRASQUILLO & CO., P.S.C.
     28th Street, TI-26
     Caguas, PR 00725
     Tel: (787) 746-4555
     Fax: (787) 746-4564
     E-mail: luis@cpacarrasquillo.com

                    About Tecnicentros Mundial

Based in San Juan, Puerto Rico, Tecnicentros Mundial, Inc., a
distributor of tires and tubes for passenger and commercial
vehicles, filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case
No. 19-04471) on Aug. 6, 2019.  In the petition signed by Jacklin
Tirado Rivera, vice-president, the Debtor had total assets of
$3,459,283 and total liabilities of $8,891,276.  The case is
assigned to Hon. Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan.  William Vidal
Carvajal, Esq., in San Juan, Puerto Rico, is the Debtor's counsel.
Luis Carrasquillo, CPA, is the financial advisor.

TECNICENTROS MUNDIAL: Hires William Vidal as Counsel
----------------------------------------------------
Tecnicentros Mundial, Inc., seeks authority from the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ William
Vidal Carvajal Law Offices, as counsel to the Debtor.

Tecnicentros Mundial requires William Vidal to represent and
provide legal services to the Debtor in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings.

William Vidal will be paid at the hourly rate of $300.

William Vidal will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.

William Vidal Carvajal, partner of William Vidal Carvajal Law
Offices, assured the Court that the firm is a "disinterested
person" as the term is defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy
Code and does not represent any interest adverse to the Debtors and
their/its estates.

William Vidal can be reached at:

     William Vidal Carvajal, Esq.
     WILLIAM VIDAL CARVAJAL LAW OFFICES
     MCS Plaza, Suite 801
     255 Ponce De Leon Ave Suite 801
     San Juan, PR 00918
     Tel: (787) 764-6867
     Fax: (787) 764-6496
     E-mail: william.m.vidal@gmail.com

                   About Tecnicentros Mundial

Based in San Juan, Puerto Rico, Tecnicentros Mundial, Inc., a
distributor of tires and tubes for passenger and commercial
vehicles, filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case
No. 19-04471) on Aug. 6, 2019.  In the petition signed by Jacklin
Tirado Rivera, vice-president, the Debtor had total assets of
$3,459,283 and total liabilities of $8,891,276.  The case is
assigned to Hon. Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan.  William Vidal
Carvajal, Esq., in San Juan, Puerto Rico, is the Debtor's counsel.
Luis Carrasquillo, CPA, is the financial advisor.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Crude Exports Fall to Lowest Level in 2019
------------------------------------------------------------------
Marianna Parraga and Mircely Guanipa at Reuters report that overall
exports of crude and refined products by state-run oil company
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and its joint ventures declined last
month to some 770,000 barrels per day (bpd) from 992,565 bpd in
July and 1.13 million bpd in June, according to revised data.

Reuters says Venezuela's oil exports fell in August to their lowest
level in 2019, internal reports and Refinitiv Eikon data showed,
hurt by a halt in purchases by the nation's second largest
customer, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), following tougher
U.S. sanctions.

Last month, China's state-run CNPC canceled loadings of Venezuelan
crude it had scheduled for August, after Washington issued an
executive order that froze Venezuelan government property on U.S.
soil and warned foreign companies they also could face sanctions
for doing business with PDVSA, according to Reuters.

PDVSA is responsible for delivering oil to Chinese firms to repay
billions of dollars loaned to Venezuela. The United States has been
ratcheting up efforts to oust President Nicolas Maduro, whose 2018
re-election is deemed illegitimate by most western nations, the
report notes.

The drop comes even as a number of shipments are moving on tankers
that are not turning on their signaling transponders while
approaching or leaving Venezuelan waters, according to Refinitiv
Eikon vessel tracking data, the report relays.  This has made it
difficult to fully measure exports and confirm their delivery
destination, the report discloses.

Since the suspension, Russia's state-run oil company Rosneft has
increased its share of Venezuelan oil, with China as primary
destination. Rosneft lifted 65% of PDVSA's total exports in August
versus 49% in July, according to internal PDVSA trade reports, the
report notes.

The second-largest destination of Venezuelan oil last month was
Europe, where Spanish oil firm Repsol has continued swapping
refined products for Venezuelan crude, the report relays.  No. 3
was Cuba, Maduro's closest political ally. Shipments to India,
previously a preferred market for Venezuelan crude, fell to a
single 1-million-barrel cargo, the data showed, the report
discloses.

                             Silent Running

Between June and July, very large crude carrier (VLCC) Marina M
stopped signaling as it approached to pick up a cargo at
Venezuela's Jose terminal, according to independent service
TankerTrackers.com and satellite images by Planet Labs Inc seen by
Reuters.

The Malta-flagged tanker loaded Venezuelan crude on July 12. Its
transponder was picked up after completing a trip to Sikka port in
India, the report relays.  The vessel is now waiting to discharge,
according to Refinitiv Eikon.

"It was a big satellite data gap, geographically speaking," said
Samir Madani, a cofounder of TankerTrackers.com, the report
discloses.

International law requires ships at sea to have a satellite
tracking device on board. However, a ships' master has discretion
to turn off the device on safety grounds with the permission of the
vessel's flag state, the report notes.

From August through early September, two other vessels disappeared
from vessel tracking while in Venezuelan waters. Tanker Patmos I
stopped signaling its location while performing a trans-shipment
maneuver at Amuay port in Venezuela, and the Princess Mary did the
same while loading at Jose port, according to vessel tracking data.
Both have a Liberia flag, the report says.

The Marina M and the Princess Mary were chartered by Rosneft. Tipco
Asphalt chartered the Patmos I, according to the PDVSA's documents,
the report adds.

                          About Venezuela

Venezuela, officially the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, is a
country on the northern coast of South America, consisting of a
continental landmass and a large number of small islands and
islets in the Caribbean sea.  The capital is the city of Caracas.

Hugo Chavez was president to Venezuela from 1999 to 2013.  The
Chavez presidency was plagued with challenges, which included a
2002 coup d'etat, a 2002 national strike and a 2004 recall
referendum.  Nicolas Maduro was elected president in 2013 after
the death of Chavez.  Maduro won a second term at the May 2018
Venezuela elections, but this result has been challenged by
countries including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Canada,
Germany, France and the United States who deemed it fraudulent and
moved to recognize Juan Guaido as president.

The presidencies of Chavez and Maduro have challenged Venezuela
with a socioeconomic and political crisis.  It is marked by
hyperinflation, climbing hunger, poverty, disease, crime and death
rates, social unrest, corruption and emigration from the country.

Standard and Poor's long- and short-term foreign currency
sovereign credit ratings for Venezuela stands at 'SD/D'
(November 2017).

S&P's local currency sovereign credit ratings on the other hand
are 'CCC-/C'. The May 2018 outlook on the long-term local currency
sovereign credit rating is negative, reflecting S&P's view that
the sovereign could miss a payment on its outstanding local
currency debt obligations or advance a distressed debt exchange
operation, equivalent to default.

Moody's credit rating (long term foreign and domestic issuer
ratings) for Venezuela was last set at C with stable outlook
(March 2018).

Fitch's long term issuer default rating for Venezuela was last set
at RD (2017) and country ceiling was CC. Fitch, on June 27, 2019,
affirmed then withdrew the ratings due to the imposition of U.S.
sanctions on Venezuela.


                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
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USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
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Chapman, Editors.

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