/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/181123.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

          Friday, November 23, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 233


                            Headlines



B A R B A D O S

* BARBADOS: Ready to Implement VAT on Foreign Online Transactions


B R A Z I L

NACION SEGUROS: Fitch Affirms 'B' IFS Ratings, Outlook Negative
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: Vantage Drilling Signs $5MM FCPA Settlement


C O S T A   R I C A

BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA: Fitch Puts 'BB' LT IDRs on RWN
COSTA RICA: Fitch Puts BB IDR on RWN due to Financial Constraints


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Minister Says Loans Are for Private Sector


P U E R T O    R I C O

NOVA TERRA: Monthly Influx from Venture with JJW Disclosed
SEARS HOLDINGS: Committee Opposes Retention of Evercore Group
SEARS HOLDINGS: Proposes KEIP for 18 Workers, KERP for 32 Workers
SEARS HOLDINGS: Seeks $350M Jr. Term Loan From GACP Finance
SEARS HOLDINGS: Seeks Quick Sale of Up to $900M Medium Term Notes


S T.  V I N C E N T   A N D   G R E N A D I N E S

ST. VINCENT AND GRENADINES: Economy Recovering, IMF Says


                            - - - - -


===============
B A R B A D O S
===============


* BARBADOS: Ready to Implement VAT on Foreign Online Transactions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Barbadian Government is finally ready to
implement its plan to collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on foreign
online transactions by the middle of next month.

Prime Minister Mia Mottley said the mechanism for the tax
collection is now in place and the Government is targeting its
introduction by December 15, according to RJR News.

Delivering a Ministerial Statement in the House of Assembly, Ms.
Mottley explained that the necessary amendments to legislation
will be brought to Parliament shortly, the report notes.

In June, Ms. Mottley disclosed plans to charge VAT on foreign
online purchases commencing October 1, 2018, the report relays.

That start date was later shifted to December 1.

In explaining the delay, the Prime Minister revealed that
Government was held up by the technology, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin American on
Nov. 22, 2018, S&P Global Ratings raised its long- and short-
term local currency sovereign credit ratings on Barbados to 'B-/B'
from 'SD/SD' (selective default). At the same time, S&P Global
Ratings assigned its 'B-' issue-level rating to Barbados' long-
term debt issued in its debt exchange. S&P Global Ratings also
affirmed its 'SD/SD' long- and short-term foreign currency credit
ratings on the country, and its 'D' (default) ratings on Barbados'
foreign-currency issues. Finally, S&P Global Ratings raised its
transfer and convertibility assessment on the country to 'B-' from
'CC'.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


NACION SEGUROS: Fitch Affirms 'B' IFS Ratings, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Nacion Seguros S.A., Nacion Seguros de
Retiro S.A. and Nacion Reaseguros S.A.'s Insurer Financial
Strength ratings at 'B'. The Rating Outlooks have been revised to
Negative from Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch considers the three Nacion insurance companies core
subsidiaries of their parent, Banco de la Nacion Argentina. BNA is
a large, state-owned bank guaranteed by the Argentinian
government. The bank plays an important social role and supports
government policies. Fitch rates Argentina's Long-Term Foreign-
Currency Issuer Default Rating 'B'. The Rating Outlook on the
sovereign was revised to Negative from Stable on Nov. 7, 2018.

The revision of Argentina's Outlook to Negative from Stable
reflects sharply weaker economic activity and uncertain prospects
for multi-year fiscal consolidation and market financing
availability as IMF funds depleted, posing risks to sovereign debt
sustainability. Fitch assumes that in 2019 the government will
achieve the fiscal adjustment targeted in its budget, and that the
recently renegotiated IMF program will help it fully cover its
financing needs. However, Fitch sees downside risks amid a nascent
economic recession and election cycle. After 2019, prospects for
further fiscal consolidation, economic recovery and restoration of
external market access are uncertain and likely sensitive to the
election outcome.

Argentina's 'B' rating reflects high inflation and economic
volatility, which have persisted despite efforts to tighten
policies in recent years. In addition, the rating reflects a weak
external liquidity position and heavy and highly dollarized
sovereign debt burden. These weaknesses are balanced by high per-
capita income, a large and diversified economy, and improved
governance scores; however, these structural strengths have
provided limited support to the sovereign's credit profile as
demonstrated by its weak debt repayment record.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Changes in Fitch's evaluation of BNA's capacity and/or its
willingness to support the Nacion insurance companies would result
in changes to the current ratings. Changes to Argentina's
sovereign rating can also have an impact on the Nacion insurance
ratings.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings and revised the Rating
Outlooks to Negative:

Nacion Seguros S.A

  -- IFS rating at 'B'; Outlook Negative.

Nacion Reaseguros S.A

  -- IFS rating at 'B'; Outlook Negative.

Nacion Seguros de Retiro S.A

  -- IFS rating at 'B'; Outlook Negative.


PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: Vantage Drilling Signs $5MM FCPA Settlement
----------------------------------------------------------------
Samuel Rubenfeld at The Wall Street Journal reports that offshore
oil rig operator Vantage Drilling International agreed to disgorge
$5 million in a settlement with U.S. regulators related to a
corruption probe in Brazil involving Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.
(Petrobras).

Vantage Drilling, based in the Cayman Islands, settled with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission over accounting-control
deficiencies at its predecessor company that violated the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, according to The Wall Street Journal.  The
company neither admitted nor denied the SEC's findings, and it
said the Justice Department closed a related investigation in 2017
without filing charges, the report relays.

"We are very pleased with the closure of the U.S. government's
investigation into possible violations of the FCPA," Ihab Toma,
the company's chief executive, said in a statement, the report
relays.  "Vantage has been, and remains, firmly committed to
conducting its operations in compliance with all applicable laws
and regulations, including the FCPA," he added.

The case arose from allegations of improper payments made in 2009
and 2010 by a former Vantage Drilling Co. director to former
officials at Brazilian state-run oil firm Petroleo Brasileiro SA,
or Petrobras, relating to the contracting of a drillship, the
report notes.  Petrobras canceled the contract on Aug. 31, 2015,
according to the SEC, the report discloses.  The companies are in
a continuing dispute over a $622 million arbitration award granted
to Vantage, which was related to the cancellation, the report
says.

Vantage emerged from bankruptcy in 2016 as a private company; the
cancellation of the Petrobras contract played a role in its
bankruptcy filing, the report notes.  It first disclosed its role
in the Petrobras probe to U.S. authorities in 2015, the report
says.

The company failed to devise a system of internal accounting
controls regarding its former director, and failed to implement
internal controls relating to its use of third-party marketing
agents, the SEC said, notes the report.  "These violations
occurred against a backdrop where [Vantage] had an ineffective
anticorruption compliance program," the SEC said in an
administrative finding, the report relays.

Petrobras in September agreed to pay $853.2 million to U.S. and
Brazilian authorities to resolve yearslong investigations into one
of the biggest corruption schemes ever uncovered, the report
discloses.  The corruption scandal at Petrobras erupted in 2014
and has loomed over that country ever since, leading to prison
sentences for several executives and a former president, the
report notes.

The SEC credited Vantage with providing cooperation over the
course of its investigation, and the company, among other things,
reconstituted its board of directors, named a completely new
management team and revamped its compliance program, the report
adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 14, 2017, S&P Global Ratings raised its global scale ratings
on Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) to 'BB-' from 'B+',
including its corporate credit rating and the ratings on the
senior unsecured notes issued through the company's financing
vehicles (Petrobras International Finance Co. and Petrobras Global
Finance B.V.).



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C O S T A   R I C A
===================


BANCO NACIONAL DE COSTA RICA: Fitch Puts 'BB' LT IDRs on RWN
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed the Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) of the following Costa Rican banks and one Panamanian
subsidiary on Rating Watch Negative:

  - Banco BAC San Jose, S.A. (BAC San Jose);

  - Banco Davivienda (Costa Rica), S.A. (Davivienda CR);

  - Banco de Costa Rica (BCR);

  - Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, S.A. (BICSA);

  - Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (BNCR);

  - Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (BPDC).

These actions follow the placement of the Costa Rican sovereign on
RWN on Nov. 15, 2018. The RWN indicates that the long-term IDRs,
Support Ratings (SR) and Support Rating Floors (SRFs) of these
banks would move in tandem with the Costa Rican sovereign rating
and country ceiling, as would the local currency short-term IDRs
of BAC San Jose and Davivienda CR. The short-term IDRs of BCR,
BICSA, BNCR, BPDC and the foreign currency short-term IDRs of BAC
San Jose and Davivienda CR are affirmed in line with the sovereign
short-term IDR. Changes in the SRs and SRFs would imply a more
than one notch downgrade in Costa Rica's sovereign rating.

The RWN on the Viability Ratings (VRs) of BAC San Jose, Davivienda
CR, BCR, BNCR and BPDC reflects the high influence that the
persistent financing constraints faced by the sovereign and the
uncertainty around the fiscal reform placed on the local operating
environment, which could affect negatively the Costa Rican banks'
financial performance and growth prospects.

The RWN on BICSA's IDRs and SR is aligned with the IDRs of its
shareholders, the state-owned banks BCR and BNCR. Fitch affirmed
BICSA's VR because its credit profile is less sensitive to changes
in the Costa Rican operating environment given its geographic
diversification.

BICSA and BPDC's debt issuances' national ratings in Panama have
been placed on RWN. These ratings would be downgraded in the event
of a downgrade of their IDRs, implying a weaker credit profile
compared with other issuers rated in Panama. National scale
ratings in Costa Rica of BCR, BNCR and BPDC have been affirmed
with Stable Outlooks as part of their annual rating review, while
the national scale ratings in Costa Rica of the rest of banks
remain unchanged. National ratings are local relative rankings of
creditworthiness within a particular jurisdiction. Fitch does not
expect these relativities to change in the event of a moderate
downgrade in the sovereign rating.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

State-Owned Banks

BCR's and BNCR's IDRs and national ratings are aligned with the
sovereign, reflecting the explicit guarantee and complete
ownership by the Costa Rican government. According to the law, the
state-owned banks have the guarantee and full collaboration of the
state. Fitch also believes both banks have high systemic
importance and a relevant and long-lasting policy role. BNCR's
senior unsecured debt ratings would be aligned with the bank's
IDR.

BNCR's VR reflects with high importance, the operating environment
and the bank's risk appetite. The VR also considers BNCR's leading
franchise, reasonable asset quality, modest profitability,
appropriate capitalization levels and solid funding and liquidity
profile.

BCR's VR reflects with high importance the operating environment
and risk appetite. BCR's VR was previously on RWN reflecting
Fitch's belief that the challenges posed by corporate governance
events and risk control failures that occurred in 2017 continued
to pressure the bank's performance; however, the agency has seen
management stability through the board of directors' transition
period and the bank's ability to sustain its operation and
effectively contain the deterioration of its core financial
metrics.

BCR's and BNCR's support rating of '3' maps to a support based IDR
in the 'BB' range and is consistent with the sovereign rating. The
support rating floor is aligned with Costa Rica's sovereign
rating.

Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Popular

BPDC's IDRs and national ratings are driven by its VR. The ratings
are high influenced by the operating environment and by the bank's
company profile, given its public nature and the benefits granted
by its inception law. BPDC's ratings also consider, with moderate
importance, its higher risk appetite relative to peers, sound loss
absorption capacity, and adequate asset quality.

The bank's SR of '3' and SRF of 'BB-' reflect the moderate
probability of support from the Costa Rican government despite
having no explicit guarantee, given the nature of the bank and its
systemic importance.

The national ratings of senior unsecured debt in Panama reflect
the relative strength of this Costa Rican bank compared with other
issuers in Panama.

Foreign-Owned Commercial Banks

BAC San Jose and Davivienda CR's IDRs are rated above the
sovereign rating based on the potential support they could receive
from their respective shareholders, Banco de Bogota and Banco
Davivienda, both rated 'BBB'/Stable. The Long-Term, Foreign-
Currency IDRs are constrained by Costa Rica's Country Ceiling,
while the Long-Term, Local-Currency IDRs are given the maximum
uplift of two notches above Costa Rica's sovereign rating. This
caps the subsidiary's IDRs to a lower rating than would be
possible based solely on their parents' ability and propensity to
provide support; however, in Fitch's view, their parents'
commitment to their subsidiaries are sufficiently strong to allow
them to be rated above the sovereign rating.

BAC San Jose's VR is highly influenced by the operating
environment. Its VR reflects its relatively solid company profile,
consistent performance and risk appetite. The bank benefits from
resilient profitability, good asset quality, as well as improving
capitalization and a stable deposit base.

Davivienda CR's VR is highly influenced by the operating
environment. The bank's VR also considers its moderate franchise,
its reasonable risk appetite, good asset quality, modest
profitability, moderate capitalization levels and appropriate
funding structure.

The banks' SRs of '3' reflect their parents' moderate probability
to provide support and are mostly influenced by Costa Rica's
country ceiling.

Banco Internacional de Costa Rica

BICSA's IDR and national ratings reflect the potential support it
would receive from its shareholders. Fitch's assessment of BCR and
BNCR's propensity to support BICSA reflects the material
reputational impact that the default of this subsidiary would have
on its shareholders, its significant role in its owners' regional
objectives and the unquestioned support track record.
Fitch's base case scenario is that support would be provided by
both shareholders, and that the cost would be manageable
considering BICSA's relative size, close to 8% of its
shareholders' combined assets.

BICSA's VR reflects, with high importance, its company profile. In
Fitch's opinion, BICSA's small market share and its focus in
corporate and commercial clients results in concentrations in both
sides of its balance sheet. Fitch also considers BICSA's business
model and its competitive position, which has a wider geographic
diversification. BICSA's VR also takes into account the bank's
strengthened capital position, recovering profitability and
contained asset quality deterioration.

BICSA's Support Rating reflects Fitch's opinion on BCR's and
BNCR's ability and propensity to provide assistance to BICSA,
should the need arise. The Support Rating of '3' maps to BICSA's
IDR of 'BB' and reflects a moderate probability of support from
its shareholders.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A downgrade in Costa Rica's sovereign rating or material
deterioration on the local operating environment, may trigger a
downgrade in BAC San Jose's, Davivienda CR's, BCR's, BNCR's, and
BPDC's IDRs, SRs, SRFs, VRs and local currency short-term IDRs of
BAC San Jose and Davivienda CR.

A downgrade of BCR and BNCR's IDR will trigger a downgrade of
BICSA's support-driven IDR, SR and National Ratings in Panama.

BICSA's VR is sensitive to improvements in diversification on both
sides of the bank's balance sheet and improvements in BICSA's
funding structure in terms of stability and concentration. In
turn, a downgrade could result from material liquidity stress or
significant asset quality deterioration. A sharp deterioration of
the operating environment in Costa Rica could affect the bank's VR
if it affects funding stability or payment capacity of its Costa
Rican clients.

BPDC's debt issuances' national scale ratings in Panama will be
downgraded if its IDRs are downgraded.

As the ratings are on RWN, Fitch does not anticipate positive
rating changes. However, an Outlook revision to Stable of Costa
Rica's sovereign rating could lead a similar action on these
banks' ratings.


Fitch has placed on Rating Watch Negative the following ratings:

Banco BAC San Jose, S.A.

  -- Long-Term, Foreign-Currency IDR 'BB+';

  -- Long-Term, Local-Currency IDR 'BBB-';

  -- Short-Term, Local-Currency IDR 'F3';

  -- Support Rating '3';

  -- Viability Rating of 'bb'.

Banco Davivienda (Costa Rica), S.A.

  -- Long-Term, Foreign-Currency IDR 'BB+';

  -- Long-Term, Local-Currency IDR 'BBB-';

  -- Short-Term, Local-Currency IDR 'F3';

  -- Support Rating '3';

  -- Viability Rating 'bb-'.

Banco de Costa Rica

  -- Long-Term, Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs 'BB';

  -- Support Rating '3';

  -- Support Rating Floor 'BB'.

Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, S.A.

  -- Long-Term IDR 'BB';

  -- Support Rating '3';

  -- National scale long-term rating 'A+(pan)';

  -- National scale short-term rating 'F1(pan)';

  -- National long-term senior unsecured debt 'A+(pan)';

  -- National short-term senior unsecured debt 'F1(pan)'.

Banco Nacional de Costa Rica

  -- Long-Term, Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs 'BB';

  -- Support Rating '3';

  -- Support Rating Floor 'BB';

  -- Long-term senior unsecured bonds 'BB';

  -- Viability Rating 'bb'.

Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal

  -- Long-Term, Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs 'BB';

  -- Support Rating '3';

  -- Support Rating Floor 'BB-';

  -- Viability Rating 'bb';

  -- National long-term senior unsecured debt in Panama 'A+(pan)';

  -- National short-term senior unsecured debt in Panama
'F1(pan)'.

Fitch maintains the following BCR rating on Negative Watch:

  -- Viability Rating of 'bb-'.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Banco BAC San Jose, S.A.

  -- Short-Term, Foreign-Currency IDR at 'B'.

Banco Davivienda (Costa Rica), S.A.

  -- Short-Term, Foreign-Currency IDRat 'B'.

Banco de Costa Rica

  -- Short-Term, Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs at 'B';

  -- National scale long-term rating at 'AA+(cri)', Outlook
Stable;

  -- National scale short-term rating at 'F1+(cri)';

  -- National scale long-term rating for local senior unsecured
debt issues at 'AA+(cri)';

  -- National scale short-term rating for local senior unsecured
debt issues at 'F1+(cri)'.

Banco Internacional de Costa Rica, S.A.

  -- Short-Term IDR at 'B';

  -- Viability Rating at 'b+'.

Banco Nacional de Costa Rica

  -- Short-Term, Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs at 'B';

  -- National scale long-term rating at 'AA+(cri)', Outlook
Stable;

  -- National scale short-term rating at 'F1+(cri)';

  -- National scale long-term rating for local senior unsecured
debt issues at 'AA+(cri)'.

Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal

  -- Short-Term, Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs at 'B';

  -- National Long-Term rating at 'AA+(cri)'; Outlook Stable;

  -- National Short-term rating at 'F1+(cri)';

  -- National Long-term senior unsecured debt at 'AA+(cri)';

  -- National Short-term currency senior unsecured debt at
'F1+(cri)'.


COSTA RICA: Fitch Puts BB IDR on RWN due to Financial Constraints
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Costa Rica's 'BB' Long-Term Foreign- and
Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings on Rating Watch Negative
(RWN).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The RWN on Costa Rica's IDRs reflects acute financing constraints
facing the sovereign, which pose risks to its ability to meet
budgetary obligations and debt maturities in the remainder of
2018, including a loan from the central bank (BCCR). This comes
against the backdrop of persisting uncertainty around lawmakers'
ability to pass effective legislation to contain the country's
high and widening fiscal deficits. Fitch will review the rating in
the next one to three months in light of the outcome of the
pending fiscal reform legislation, its impact on the budget
deficit and the government's financing situation. This review to
resolve the RWN could result in a downgrade of one or more
notches.

The government's financing needs have become increasingly
burdensome. Fitch estimates sovereign gross financing needs will
total 5.2% of GDP in the remainder of the year, including 1.8% of
GDP in deficit financing and USD1.9 billion (3.3% of GDP) in
scheduled debt maturities. Financing needs in 2019 total an
estimated 13.2% of GDP, including 7.9% of GDP for budget deficit
financing and 5.3% of GDP) in debt repayments.

A lack of congressional approval for an external bond issuance has
led the government to borrow heavily from the local capital
market. Reliance on local market funding has put significant
pressure on borrowing costs and prompted the Treasury to resort to
an unorthodox funding strategy. In September, the BCCR agreed to
purchase USD860 million (1.5% of GDP) of 90-day treasury bills at
a rate of 5.75% as a temporary financing option. This marks the
first time the BCCR provides financing to the government since
1994. Authorities have signalled that this is a one-time measure
intended to buy time for the fiscal reform to pass and borrowing
costs to subside, and that it will not have an inflationary impact
as they are legally restricted from rolling it over.

The Treasury has pursued several debt swaps to alleviate its near-
term financing needs, with a lacklustre response from local
investors. In late October, it exchanged CRC319 billion (USD534
million) of short-term debt maturing 2019-2020 with longer-term
notes to reduce near-term financing needs. The debt exchange had
only 16% participation, below the 25% threshold officials were
initially targeting. Officials were only able to swap debt
maturing in 2019 and 2020. Consequently, it does not provide any
year-end cash flow relief.

The government's strategy for meeting its financing needs through
year-end relies on a mechanism to sell up to USD600 million in
locally issued USD-denominated bonds to foreign investors via a
special purpose vehicle, which is not subject to the congressional
approval process over external debt, according to authorities.
However, this plan could face risks from uncertain investor
appetite, given the unconventional nature of the operation and
worries over the fiscal situation that could persist regardless of
the fate of the pending fiscal reform.

Fitch expects Congress to approve a fiscal reform proposal
currently under consideration. This was already approved by
Congress in a first vote, and is expected to have a final vote
later this year pending a ruling the Constitutional Court by Nov.
26. The court will determine if the proposal has any procedural
error and whether it requires a two-thirds (38 votes)
supermajority or a simple majority. If the court rules for the
former option, Fitch expects higher risks of a diluted reform to
secure congressional approval.

Authorities estimate that revenue measures from the fiscal reform
will yield about 1.3% of GDP over the next three years, by
converting the sales tax into value-added tax and broadening its
base to services, raising taxes on capital income, and cutting
exemptions. The authorities believe a fiscal rule included in the
reform, which caps spending, will yield additional savings by
giving the government greater ability to contain expenditure in
future budgeting exercises.

Fitch expects the passage of the fiscal reform before year end.
The reform, nevertheless, is likely to contribute a relatively
small share of the fiscal adjustment that would be needed to
stabilize rising government debt, according to Fitch's estimates.
The government's plan to comply with the spending cap is not yet
clear, and it could be challenged by pressure from public sector
unions and other legal requirements affecting budgetary
allocations. Moreover, Fitch sees a risk of reform fatigue
following the difficult political negotiations and social backlash
that faced the pending reform. These risks pose challenges to
implementing additional measures designed to further narrow the
deficit and stabilise the debt metrics.

Fitch projects the central government deficit will reach 7.3% of
GDP in 2018 and 7.9% in 2019, and central government debt burden
to reach 55% of GDP in 2018, more than doubling over the past
decade. Interest payments are expected to reach 27% of central
government revenues in 2018 further showing signs of a narrowing
fiscal space.

Economic growth continues to be relatively resilient to the
deterioration in public finances, but signs of negative spill-
overs are emerging. Continued uncertainty around the fiscal reform
and increasing government financing needs has generated pressures
on the exchange rate. The colon has depreciated by 9% over the
past three months. The Central Bank increased its monetary policy
rate by 25bps in early November - accumulating an increase of
350bps in 2017 and 2018 - citing concerns on pass through effects
and rising inflation expectations in 2019.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Costa Rica a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BBB' on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency (LT FC) IDR
scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the
SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative
to rated peers, as follows:

  -- Structural: -1 notch, to reflect a long track record of
institutional gridlock that has hindered progress on fiscal
reforms, which is not fully captured in the World Bank Governance
Indicators (WBGI) in the SRM. However, the WBGI for Costa Rica
have fallen due to weaker perception of government efficacy and
better reflected this issue and is more in line with Fitch's view.
As such, Fitch has removed an additional -1 notch previously
applied.

  -- Fiscal: -2 notches, to reflect its expectation that
government debt will continue to rise over the medium to long
term, a rigid expenditure profile and severe constraints on fiscal
financing flexibility.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within its
criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The RWN reflects the following risk factors that may individually
or collectively result in a downgrade of the ratings:

  - Failure to advance fiscal reforms of a sufficient magnitude to
reduce near-term financing needs and stabilize government debt/GDP
in the medium term;

  - Persistence of sovereign financing constraints and
uncertainties;

  - Signs of deterioration in macroeconomic stability and rising
external vulnerabilities.

As the IDRs are on RWN, Fitch's sensitivity analysis does not
anticipate developments with a high likelihood of leading to a
positive rating change. However, the main factors that could
individually or collectively lead to an Outlook revision to Stable
include:

  - Passage of fiscal reforms that deliver a significant reduction
of the fiscal deficit and place government debt/GDP metrics on a
stable path.

  - Emergence of funding sources that alleviate sovereign
financing constraints.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The global economy performs largely in line with Fitch's Global
Economic Outlook (September 2018).

The full list of rating actions is as follows:

Costa Rica

  -- Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR 'BB', placed on Rating Watch
Negative;

  -- Long-Term Local-Currency IDR 'BB', placed on Rating Watch
Negative;

  -- Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'

  -- Short-Term Local-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

  -- Country Ceiling affirmed at 'BB+';

  -- Issue ratings on long-term senior unsecured foreign-currency
bonds affirmed at 'BB'.



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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Minister Says Loans Are for Private Sector
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the latest loans from international
organizations, such as the Central American Bank for Economic
Integration (BCIE), have earmarked for the private sector, and the
Government has only validated them with a no-objection, Finance
minister, Donald Guerrero revealed.

He said the loans result from the confidence that foreign entities
have placed in the country's public and private sectors so that
both can take advantage of the financing, according to Dominican
Today.

The most recent loans, totaling US$100.0 million will be for the
Banco Popular Dominicano, the report notes.  In the next few days,
a global credit line will be signed, according to local media, the
report relays.

The Finance Ministry also disclosed that efforts were made in
Honduras to sign a US$54.0 million loan contract for the power
company AES Dominicana, to build a 50-kilometer pipeline from the
AES Andres natural gas terminal to San Pedro de Macoris (east),
the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 24, 2018, Fitch Ratings affirmed Dominican Republic's
Long-Term, Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


NOVA TERRA: Monthly Influx from Venture with JJW Disclosed
----------------------------------------------------------
Nova Terra, Inc., filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico an amended small business disclosure
statement describing its plan of reorganization dated Nov. 9,
2018.

This latest filing provides that the Debtor will benefit from its
joint venture with J.J.W. Metal, Corp. because of the extra influx
of an additional monthly $2,575 from processing services and rent
for the use of Debtor's equipment & machinery. The Debtor
understands that the joint venture will bear fruit during the
first half of year 2019.

The previous version of the plan provided that Debtor will benefit
from the extra influx of an additional monthly 2,000 from rent for
the use of Debtor's equipment & machinery; and the Debtor will
also benefit from the receipt of 45%  of the monthly net profits
generated. The Debtor understands that the joint venture will bear
fruit during the second half of year 2018.

The proposed Plan has the following risks: The Debtor's
projections are based on the premise that recent cash flow trends
shall continue and increase and that there is no substantial
contraction in the economic forecast for the period of the Plan.
The implementation process of the outcome from the joint venture
is also a risk.

A copy of the Amended Disclosure Statement is available for free
at:

      http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb17-01968-11-123.pdf

                    About Nova Terra Inc.

Based in Arecibo, Puerto Rico, Nova Terra, Inc., sought protection
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No.
17-01968) on March 23, 2017.  The case is assigned to Judge Edward
A. Godoy. Ruben Gonzalez Marrero, Esq., at Ruben Gonzalez Marrero
& Associates, serves as the Debtor's legal counsel.


SEARS HOLDINGS: Committee Opposes Retention of Evercore Group
-------------------------------------------------------------
BankruptcyData.com reported that Sears Holdings Corp.'s Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors filed an objection to the
Debtors' application to retain Evercore Group as investment
banker.

BankruptcyData.com reported that the Committee asserts, "The
Creditors' Committee respectfully requests that the Court deny the
Evercore Application absent additional evidence establishing the
necessity of retaining Evercore in addition to A&M and
modification to the terms of Evercore's retention to ensure that
there is no duplication of services. The burden is on the moving
party to prove by evidence, not conclusory statements, that the
proposed terms and conditions of a proposed retention are
reasonable under Bankruptcy Code section 328(a). If the bankruptcy
court finds that the proposed terms of a professional retention
are unreasonable, the court may modify such the terms of retention
to render them reasonable. In short, the Debtors have failed to
establish that Evercore's retention will not result in duplication
of services that will (or can) be provided by A&M.  Moreover,
permitting the retention by the RSC of multiple, duplicative
advisors may lead to other parties in interest (including the
Restructuring Committee) determining that they too require
advisors to perform duties clearly within the purview of already
retained professionals."

The objection continues, "The Debtors propose to pay Evercore a
monthly fee of $200,000 (the 'Monthly Fees') and an additional fee
(the 'Additional Fee') if the aggregate of all Monthly Fees paid
to Evercore since the execution of the Engagement Letter are less
than $3 million. The Additional Fee will be calculated as $3
million less the aggregate amount of all Monthly Fees paid to
Evercore, such that Evercore will be paid no less than $3 million
in connection with its engagement. Finally, the Debtors have not
proven that the Additional Fee, which guarantees that Evercore
will be paid a minimum of $3 million during its employment, is
reasonable and should be pre-approved pursuant to Bankruptcy Code
section 328(a). This is particularly true because the Court will
not have the ability to revisit Evercore's compensation in the
event that there is a substantial amount of duplication of
services performed by Evercore and A&M."

                      About Sears Holdings

Sears Holdings Corporation (NASDAQ: SHLD) --
http://www.searsholdings.com/-- began as a mail ordering catalog
company in 1887 and became the world's largest retailer in the
1960s.  At its peak, Sears was present in almost every big mall
across the U.S., and sold everything from toys and auto parts to
mail-order homes.  Sears claims to be is a market leader in the
appliance, tool, lawn and garden, fitness equipment, and
automotive repair and maintenance retail sectors.

Sears and Kmart merged to form Sears Holdings in 2005 when they
had 3,500 US stores between them.  Kmart emerged in 2005 from its
own bankruptcy.

Unable to keep up with online stores and other brick-and-mortar
retailers, a long series of store closings has left it with 687
retail stores in 49 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands as of mid-October 2018.  The Company employs 68,000
individuals, of whom 32,000 are full-time employees.

As of Aug. 4, 2018, Sears Holdings had $6.93 billion in total
assets, $11.33 billion in total liabilities and a total deficit of
$4.40 billion.

Unable to cover a $134 million debt payment due Oct. 15, 2018,
Sears Holdings Corporation and 49 subsidiaries sought Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 18-23538) on Oct. 15,
2018.

The Hon. Robert D. Drain is the case judge.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP is serving as legal counsel, M-III
Partners is serving as restructuring advisor and Lazard Freres &
Co. LLC is serving as investment banker to Holdings.  DLA Piper
LLP is the real estate advisor.  Prime Clerk is the claims and
noticing agent.


SEARS HOLDINGS: Proposes KEIP for 18 Workers, KERP for 32 Workers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BankruptcyData.com reported that Sears Holdings requested Court
approval of (i) a Key Employee Incentive Plan (the "KEIP") for 18
employees and (ii) a Key Employee Retention Plan (the "KERP") for
322 non-insiders.

BankruptcyData related that the motion explains, "The [KEIP]
program provides a total, incentive-based award opportunity
ranging from approximately $1.06 million per quarter in the
aggregate at threshold performance, to approximately $2.12 million
per quarter in the aggregate at maximum performance, based on the
achievement of targeted Net Cash Flow for the quarterly periods
ended January 15, 2019, and April 15, 2019, respectively, and upon
an Acceleration Event, a total potential award opportunity of up
to approximately $8.50 million in aggregate for KEIP Participants,
and (b) KERP for 322 non-insider employees providing a total award
pool of approximately $16.9 million payable on a quarterly basis
over 12 months; provided that no KERP Participant shall be
eligible to receive one or more KERP Awards in excess of $150,000
in the aggregate. The KERP Participants comprise a wide and
diverse range of roles, with job titles such as 'Manager,'
'Director,' 'Vice President,' and 'Head,' and the KERP
Participants have an average salary of approximately $172,000. At
this critical juncture, KERP Participants may be understandably
concerned with their employment prospects and ability to provide
for themselves and their families at this juncture, and the
Debtors cannot afford attrition among such individuals this time.
The maximum aggregate cost of the KERP shall be $16,930,000 (the
'KERP Award Pool'); provided that no KERP Participant shall be
eligible for a total KERP Award in excess of $150,000 in the
aggregate."

The Court scheduled a December 20, 2018 hearing to consider the
motion, with objections due by November 29, 2018.

                      About Sears Holdings

Sears Holdings Corporation (NASDAQ: SHLD) --
http://www.searsholdings.com/-- began as a mail ordering catalog
company in 1887 and became the world's largest retailer in the
1960s.  At its peak, Sears was present in almost every big mall
across the U.S., and sold everything from toys and auto parts to
mail-order homes.  Sears claims to be is a market leader in the
appliance, tool, lawn and garden, fitness equipment, and
automotive repair and maintenance retail sectors.

Sears and Kmart merged to form Sears Holdings in 2005 when they
had 3,500 US stores between them.  Kmart emerged in 2005 from its
own bankruptcy.

Unable to keep up with online stores and other brick-and-mortar
retailers, a long series of store closings has left it with 687
retail stores in 49 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands as of mid-October 2018.  The Company employs 68,000
individuals, of whom 32,000 are full-time employees.

As of Aug. 4, 2018, Sears Holdings had $6.93 billion in total
assets, $11.33 billion in total liabilities and a total deficit of
$4.40 billion.

Unable to cover a $134 million debt payment due Oct. 15, 2018,
Sears Holdings Corporation and 49 subsidiaries sought Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 18-23538) on Oct. 15,
2018.

The Hon. Robert D. Drain is the case judge.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP is serving as legal counsel, M-III
Partners is serving as restructuring advisor and Lazard Freres &
Co. LLC is serving as investment banker to Holdings.  DLA Piper
LLP is the real estate advisor.  Prime Clerk is the claims and
noticing agent.


SEARS HOLDINGS: Seeks $350M Jr. Term Loan From GACP Finance
----------------------------------------------------------
BankruptcyData.com reported that Sears Holdings filed with the
Court of a term sheet detailing a $350 million debtor-in-
possession ("DIP") multiple draw term loan facility (the GACP
Junior DIP Facility") to be provided by Great American Capital
Partners Finance ("GACP") to Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corp. and
Kmart Corp. and certain of their affiliates.  GACP is affiliated
with liquidation specialist Great American Group and financial
services firm B. Riley Financial Inc.

BankruptcyData related that in its its motion for DIP financing
filed with the Court on October 15, 2018, the Debtors announced
that they had made substantial progress on a term sheet for a $300
million junior DIP term loan and that affiliates of Edward
Lampert's ESL Investment, Inc. ("ESL") and Cyrus Capital Partners
LP had each indicated an interest in providing a portion of that
junior DIP financing (the "ESL Junior DIP Financing"). Neither of
these parties is a signatory of the term sheet, ie a "DIP Lender,"
although the term sheet does allow for GACP to assign debt issued
under its proposed DIP facility. The GACP Junior DIP Facility
interest rate of LIBOR+11.5% is higher than that noted in a
summary of terms filed in respect of the earlier proposed ESL
Junior Financing (LIBOR+9.5%) and includes a 3% closing fee that
was not part of the ESL Junior Financing.

BankruptcyData further noted that the GACP Junior DIP Facility
term sheet notes the following key terms:

  * A secured debtor-in-possession multiple draw term loan
    facility up to $350.0 million (the "GACP Junior DIP Facility"
    and the loans thereunder, the 'DIP Loans'), to be made
    available to the Borrowers by the DIP Lenders after the DIP
    Facility Approval Date in accordance with the Budget and the
    final DIP documentation; provided, however, that:

     (i) no more than $250.0 million aggregate principal amount of

         the DIP Loans (the 'Interim DIP Loans') shall be funded
         by the DIP Lenders prior to the Final Closing Date, which

         Interim DIP Loans shall be funded in three draws on and
         after the Initial Closing Date in the following amounts:
         the first draw of $75.0 million on the Initial Closing
         Date, the second draw of $75.0 million and the third draw

         of $100.0 million, in the cases of the second and third
         draws, on dates when the Excess Availability is less than

         $50.0 million and

    (ii) no more than $100.0 million aggregate principal amount of

         the DIP Loans (the 'Subsequent DIP Loans') shall be
         funded by the DIP Lenders, which Subsequent DIP Loans
         shall be funded in multiple draws of amounts to be agreed

         on dates when the sum of Excess Availability and the
         Obligors' available cash is less than $50.0 million.

  * Closing Fee is 3.00%, (i) due and payable with respect to the
    full $200.0 million aggregate principal amount of the Interim
    DIP Loans, on the Initial Closing Date and (ii) due and
    payable with respect to the aggregate principal amount of
    unused commitments under the GACP Junior DIP Facility prior to

    the Final Closing Date upon the earliest to occur of (x)
    December 31, 2018 and (y) the Final Closing Date.

  * Pricing/Floor: LIBOR+11.50%, payable monthly

  * Extension Fee is 1.25%, earned on the first day of the
    extension, but payment is deferred until the Maturity Date.

  * Undrawn Fee is 0.75%.

                      About Sears Holdings

Sears Holdings Corporation (NASDAQ: SHLD) --
http://www.searsholdings.com/-- began as a mail ordering catalog
company in 1887 and became the world's largest retailer in the
1960s.  At its peak, Sears was present in almost every big mall
across the U.S., and sold everything from toys and auto parts to
mail-order homes.  Sears claims to be is a market leader in the
appliance, tool, lawn and garden, fitness equipment, and
automotive repair and maintenance retail sectors.

Sears and Kmart merged to form Sears Holdings in 2005 when they
had 3,500 US stores between them.  Kmart emerged in 2005 from its
own bankruptcy.

Unable to keep up with online stores and other brick-and-mortar
retailers, a long series of store closings has left it with 687
retail stores in 49 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands as of mid-October 2018.  The Company employs 68,000
individuals, of whom 32,000 are full-time employees.

As of Aug. 4, 2018, Sears Holdings had $6.93 billion in total
assets, $11.33 billion in total liabilities and a total deficit of
$4.40 billion.

Unable to cover a $134 million debt payment due Oct. 15, 2018,
Sears Holdings Corporation and 49 subsidiaries sought Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 18-23538) on Oct. 15,
2018.

The Hon. Robert D. Drain is the case judge.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP is serving as legal counsel, M-III
Partners is serving as restructuring advisor and Lazard Freres &
Co. LLC is serving as investment banker to Holdings.  DLA Piper
LLP is the real estate advisor.  Prime Clerk is the claims and
noticing agent.


SEARS HOLDINGS: Seeks Quick Sale of Up to $900M Medium Term Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BankruptcyData.com reported that Sears Holdings Corp. requested
Court approval for the sale of Medium Term Notes.

BankruptcyData noted that the motion explains, "By this Motion,
the Debtors request, authority to sell certain SRAC Medium Term
Notes Series B (the "MTNs") issued by Debtor Sears Roebuck
Acceptance Corp. ('SRAC') and currently owned by various other
Debtors. The Debtors have a unique opportunity to sell the MTNs
and maximize their value for the benefit of all creditors, but
only if a sale can be accomplished expeditiously. As of the
Commencement Date, the outstanding principal amount of the MTNs
was approximately $2.3 billion, plus unliquidated amounts
including interest thereon and fees, expenses, charges, and other
obligations incurred in connection therewith as provided under the
2002 SRAC Indenture.  Approximately $1.4 billion of the MTNs are
held by Sears Reinsurance Company, a non-Debtor affiliate of the
Company.  The Auction currently is scheduled for November 14,
2018. Thus, to be able to take advantage of favorable market
forces and maximize the value of the MTNs, the Debtors must be
able to effect a transfer of the MTNs prior to November 14, 2018.
Given the extremely compressed time frame with which they are
working, the Debtors determined that the quickest and most
efficient way to sell the MTNs would be to retain a nationally
recognized broker/dealer which will contact all potentially
interested parties and run a sale process.  The Debtors' financial
advisor contacted Barclays Bank PLC, Credit Suisse Securities
(USA) LLC, Jefferies, Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, and Goldman
Sachs, all of which are eminently qualified to manage the sale
process, and requested that they provide proposals to act
as broker/principal in connection with the sale of the MTNs."

                      About Sears Holdings

Sears Holdings Corporation (NASDAQ: SHLD) --
http://www.searsholdings.com/-- began as a mail ordering catalog
company in 1887 and became the world's largest retailer in the
1960s.  At its peak, Sears was present in almost every big mall
across the U.S., and sold everything from toys and auto parts to
mail-order homes.  Sears claims to be is a market leader in the
appliance, tool, lawn and garden, fitness equipment, and
automotive repair and maintenance retail sectors.

Sears and Kmart merged to form Sears Holdings in 2005 when they
had 3,500 US stores between them. Kmart emerged in 2005 from its
own bankruptcy.

Unable to keep up with online stores and other brick-and-mortar
retailers, a long series of store closings has left it with 687
retail stores in 49 states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands as of mid-October 2018.  The Company employs 68,000
individuals, of whom 32,000 are full-time employees.

As of Aug. 4, 2018, Sears Holdings had $6.93 billion in total
assets, $11.33 billion in total liabilities and a total deficit of
$4.40 billion.

Unable to cover a $134 million debt payment due Oct. 15, 2018,
Sears Holdings Corporation and 49 subsidiaries sought Chapter 11
protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 18-23538) on Oct. 15,
2018.

The Hon. Robert D. Drain is the case judge.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP is serving as legal counsel, M-III
Partners is serving as restructuring advisor and Lazard Freres &
Co. LLC is serving as investment banker to Holdings.  DLA Piper
LLP is the real estate advisor.  Prime Clerk is the claims and
noticing agent.


=================================================
S T.  V I N C E N T   A N D   G R E N A D I N E S
=================================================


ST. VINCENT AND GRENADINES: Economy Recovering, IMF Says
--------------------------------------------------------
A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF
staff at the end of an official staff visit (or 'mission'), in
most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of
regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the
IMF's Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use
IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of
staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of
economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this
statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the
IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF's
Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this
mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management
approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for
discussion and decision.

                             Background

1. The economy of St. Vincent and the Grenadines has been
recovering. The closure of Buccament Bay Resort (the largest hotel
on the main island) and heavy rains with flooding and landslides
slowed down growth in the second half of 2016 and early 2017.
Following the opening of the new airport, however, tourist
arrivals have recovered, boosting tourism-related services (such
as hotels, restaurants, and retail). Increased demand for
reconstruction materials from Dominica (struck by Hurricane Maria
in September 2017) also helped the recovery. As a result,
quarterly data show that output growth (year-on-year) has turned
positive since the third quarter of 2017. Over the past year,
inflation has remained around 2-3 percent.

2. Nonetheless, St. Vincent and the Grenadines continues to face
challenges in sustaining the growth momentum over the longer-term.
Like other Caribbean economies, its high exposure to natural
disasters, a narrow production and exports base, and limited
physical and human capital constrain potential growth. The mission
focused on policies to achieve stronger and sustainable growth,
build fiscal buffers, bolster resilience to natural disasters, and
ensure financial stability.

Outlook and Risks

3. The growth outlook is positive. Staff expects real GDP growth
to rebound from 0.7 percent in 2017 to 2 percent in 2018, and
further to 2.3 percent in 2019, driven by increases in tourist
arrivals, tourism-related activities (including investment in
hotels and resorts), and related local production. Beyond 2020,
growth would be sustained at around 2.3 percent, assuming steady
tourism and investment growth.

4. This outlook is subject to both external and domestic risks.
External risks include weaker-than-expected global growth, tighter
global financial conditions, and higher oil prices. Domestic risks
include more severe and frequent natural disasters and the loss of
correspondent banking relationships. There is also upside
potential stemming from stronger-than-expected tourist arrivals,
investor interest, concessional financing for capital projects,
and the successful completion of the geothermal power plant.

Key Policy Messages

5. Advancing structural reforms remains key to capitalize on
growth opportunities created by the new airport. Its economic
benefit is already visible with the increased number of tourists.
For its benefits to reach broader economic sectors beyond tourism,
the authorities need to make further efforts to foster private
sector activity, by improving the investment environment and
strengthening physical and human capital. More specifically:

* To enhance transparency, reduce red tape, and attract
investors, tax incentives should be streamlined, discretional tax
concessions minimized, and an investment law established. Invest
SVG (the government's investment promotion agency) should be
revamped as a one-stop-shop.

* Efforts should continue to improve infrastructure, particularly
irrigation, roads, and ports, that are resilient to natural
disasters. Developing a long-term infrastructure plan, in
collaboration with key stakeholders, would help prioritize
projects consistent with the government's strategic development
goals, solicit donors' support, and boost investors' interest.

* The government's focus on improving education is welcome, but
more efforts are warranted to reduce labor skill mismatches and
unemployment which remains very high. The effectiveness of the
ongoing Technical and Vocational Education and Training program
should be periodically reviewed.

6. The mission welcomes the government's commitment to bringing
the debt-to-GDP ratio down to 60 percent by 2030. To this end,
under the mission's baseline scenario, the primary surplus needs
to be raised by 1/2 percentage points to around 1 percent of GDP.
This could be done by containing wage bill growth at 3.5 percent a
year and setting capital expenditure at 3.9 percent of GDP.

* The 2019 budget should demonstrate the government's commitment
to fiscal consolidation, by maintaining the primary surplus at
around 0.7 percent of GDP, slightly above the 0.6 percent of GDP
(the mission's estimate) in 2018.

* The mission recommends incorporating expected fiscal costs of
natural disasters, equivalent to 1.4 percent of GDP a year (the
average of the past 15 years), in the budget framework. This could
be partly covered by the contingency fund and insurance payouts
(in total, 0.7 percent of GDP), with the balance covered through
allocating expenditure reserves for emergency operations.

* Consideration should be given to expanding the coverage of
disaster insurance, especially against floods to achieve
additional buffers.

7. Fiscal risks remain, however. If growth momentum falters or
natural disasters intensify, the 60 percent target would not
likely be achievable by 2030. The government also plans to launch
several large developmental projects in the tourism and transport
sectors to enhance growth, but this could widen the deficit if
they are not accompanied by new fiscal consolidation measures.

8. It would thus be prudent to introduce some additional measures
to increase buffers and create space for additional capital
projects, by aiming to increase the primary surplus to 1.6 percent
of GDP within the next two years. Both revenue and expenditure
measures should be explored, for instance by streamlining tax and
customs duty concessions and moving ahead with pension system
reform. In the capital budget, prioritizing projects, seeking
grants or concessional loans, and containing procurement costs
remain important.

9. Structural fiscal reforms should continue, in order to enhance
the effectiveness of fiscal policy and operations.

* Moving towards a risk-based approach to collect customs
revenues would facilitate timely customs clearance. The
effectiveness of revenue collections can be bolstered by fully
implementing the single Tax Identification Number and enacting the
Tax Administration and Procedures Act. IT systems should also be
upgraded.

* The planned submission of the Medium-term Fiscal Framework to
parliament together with the 2019 budget is welcome. The
effectiveness of the recently established Cash Management
Committee should be further enhanced by preparing cash flow
forecasts periodically, and the stock of arrears be reviewed and
cleared. Going forward, the authorities should also consider
introducing fiscal rules.

* The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is planning to issue a regulation
requiring state owned enterprises to submit timely financial
information, aimed at strengthening oversight over state-owned
enterprises. The MOF should also put in place a framework to
assess financial risks pertaining to Public-Private-Partnerships.

10. The new Contingency Fund is important to protect public
finances from natural disasters. To ensure its effectiveness, a
specific legal framework defining the governance and operational
framework should be established. Alongside, efforts should
continue to strengthen disaster preparedness, which includes
updating the National Emergency and Disaster Act, conducting a
national risk assessment for disasters, and updating river basin
flood risk maps. Enhancing public education and awareness would be
useful to improve compliance with the regulations on land use
planning and the building code. A strategy to relocate communities
facing threats from coastal erosion should also be developed,
while the National Emergency Management Office should be provided
with resources for immediate emergency disaster response.

11. The financial system remains broadly stable but has
vulnerable spots in the non-bank sector. Most credit unions report
the capital ratio above 10 percent, but t he implementation of
IFRS 9 may raise their provisioning requirements and reduce their
capital. Accordingly, the Financial Services Authority (FSA)
should remain vigilant. It should also maintain the enhanced
supervision of the Building and Loan Association. To strengthen
the FSA's power to enforce prudential standards, the regulations
of the FSA Act, the amendments to the Building Societies Act, and
the Friendly Societies Act should be enacted promptly. The review
of the adequacy of the FSA's budgetary resources is also
encouraged.

12. Efforts to safeguard financial system stability should
continue. Stress testing has been introduced as a supervisory tool
for credit unions. It should be extended to (i) analyze multi-
factor shock scenarios for credit unions, (ii) cover insurance
firms, and (iii) incorporate interlinkages among various
institutions in collaboration with the Eastern Caribbean Central
Bank (ECCB). Supervision of insurance firms can be further
strengthened by enhancing group-wide supervision. The mission
encourages the FSA to more periodically communicate its financial
stability assessment to the public. Furthermore, the authorities
should consider preparing a crisis management plan for the non-
bank financial sector, in consultation with the MOF and the ECCB,
and setting up a Financial Crisis Management Committee, involving
representatives from the FSA, MOF, and ECCB.

13. Progress has been made in addressing remaining legal
deficiencies in the AML/CFT framework. Last year, the government
amended several AML/CFT related laws, which helped close many of
the deficiencies identified in the 2010 AML/CFT assessment. The
authorities should now focus on ensuring the effectiveness of
AML/CFT preventative measures. To this end, the National Risk
Assessment should be completed by September 2019.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
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Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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