/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/180927.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Thursday, September 27, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 192 Headlines A R G E N T I N A AEROPUERTOS ARGENTINA 2000: S&P Stays 'BB-' ICR on Watch Negative ARGENTINA: On Eve of IMF Deal, Central Bank Pres. Replaced BANCO MACRO: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT IDR, Outlook Stable B R A Z I L BANCO SANTANDER: Fitch Affirms B+ LT LC IDR, Outlook Stable MAGNESITA REFRATARIOS: Fitch Withdraws BB LT Issuer Default Rating OI SA: S&P Rates Existing $1.6BB Senior Unsecured Notes 'B' RIO DE JANEIRO: Fitch Affirms BB- LT IDRs, Outlook Stable C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ARABELLA EXPLORATION: Second Final Cash Collateral Order Entered FAIRHOLD SECURITISATION: Seeks to Invalidate Admin. Appointment D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 2019 Budget Bill's Fiscal Deficit Will Up Debt DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Free Zone Exports Jump 11.1% J A M A I C A DIGICEL GROUP: Request for Bond Repayment Delay Rejected JAMAICA: S&P Affirms 'B' Sovereign Credit Rating, Outlook Now Pos. T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O SANDALS INC: Deal With Trinidad and Tobago Could Close Off by Nov - - - - - ================= A R G E N T I N A ================= AEROPUERTOS ARGENTINA 2000: S&P Stays 'BB-' ICR on Watch Negative ------------------------------------------------------------------ S&P Global Ratings maintained its 'BB-' issuer credit and issue- level ratings on Aeropuertos Argentina 2000 (AA2000) on CreditWatch negative. Its stand-alone credit profile (SACP) remains at 'bb+'. AA2000's credit quality continues to be limited to one notch above that of the sovereign. S&P continues to expect that AA2000 would be able to withstand a hypothetical sovereign stress scenario given its strong cash flow generation, in which 80% of revenues are linked to the U.S. dollar, whereas costs are mostly in domestic currency. Still, the company's operations heavily rely on the regulator, which defines concession terms, sets aeronautical tariffs, and mandates investments. For this reason, S&P limits its ratings on AA2000 to only one notch above that on the sovereign. The CreditWatch negative listing of AA2000 mirrors that of the sovereign, given that the ratings on the company are limited to one notch above Argentina's credit quality. S&P said, "This reflects our view that AA2000 has a high exposure to the Argentina's regulatory framework, while the company would still survive our solvency stress test in case of a hypothetical sovereign default scenario. We expect to resolve the CreditWatch in the upcoming 90 days, when the sovereign's CreditWatch listing is likely to be resolved." ARGENTINA: On Eve of IMF Deal, Central Bank Pres. Replaced ---------------------------------------------------------- Ignacio Olivera Doll and Patrick Gillespie at Bloomberg News report that Argentine Central Bank President Luis Caputo resigned, a day after President Mauricio Macri said a revised aid deal with the International Monetary Fund would require a new approach to monetary policy. Just three months since moving to the central bank from the nation's finance ministry, Mr. Caputo cited "personal issues" as the reason for his departure, according to Bloomberg News. He was immediately replaced by Economy Minister Nicolas Dujovne's deputy, Guido Sandleris, Bloomberg News notes. The resignation is the latest chapter in Argentina's fight to address a collapse in its currency and in President Macri's attempt to tweak the terms of a $50 billion credit line with the IMF, Bloomberg News relays. The yield on the country's 100-year bond due in 2117 rose 20 basis points on the announcement before paring most losses to 9.19 percent on Sept. 26, the report says. The peso fell 1.2 percent to 37.75 per dollar, Bloomberg News discloses. The shortness of Mr. Caputo's tenure suggests he is taking the fall for the country's failure to stem the slide in the peso as Macri renegotiates the IMF credit line, Bloomberg News notes. Mr. Macri told Bloomberg News the revamped agreement with the IMF "will bring confidence" to markets and investors. "The positive out-take on this -- even if the IMF is pushing for a more independent central bank -- is that it could help Mr. Macri's team communicate a more unified message to the markets," said Roger Horn, senior emerging markets strategist at SMBC Nikko Securities America, Bloomberg News relays. Bloomberg News notes that Mr. Caputo raised rates in August to 60 percent, the world's highest, but the move failed to stem the currency's decline as investors questioned the country's ability to meet its financing needs amid a second recession in three years. The peso has tumbled 50 percent, the most in emerging markets this year, Bloomberg News relays. Bloomberg News discloses that the IMF was swift to respond, with spokesman Gerry Rice issuing a statement that said the lender looked forward to a "close and constructive" relationship with the central bank. "Our staff and the Argentine authorities continue to work intensively with the objective of concluding the staff level talks in very short order," Bloomberg News quoted Mr. Rice as saying. Bloomberg News notes that before taking the presidency of the central bank, Caputo -- a former JPMorgan Chase & Co and a Deutsche Bank trader -- was at the helm of the finance ministry where he helped arrange a deal for Argentina to sell century bonds, a rarity for a developing nation. He was a key figure in reaching a deal with debt holdouts from the country's 2001 default, an accord that put Argentina on the path back toward normalcy after Mr. Macri's election in 2015, Bloomberg News relays. Unlike his predecessor, Sandleris has spent most of his career in academics, Bloomberg News notes. He has degrees from Columbia University, the London School of Economics and the University of Buenos Aires, Bloomberg News relays. Mr. Sandleris has been one of the top Argentine officials at the negotiating table with the renewed IMF talks, Bloomberg News notes. Mr. Dujovne, the economy minister, said that Sandleris has been deeply involved in reshaping monetary policy during the IMF talks, Bloomberg News discloses. Mr. Dujovne called his former deputy a brilliant person, Bloomberg News notes. In addition, officials disclosed that Veronica Rappoport, a professor at the London School of Economics who received a PhD in economics from M.I.T., will be second vice president at the central bank, Bloomberg News says. Ms. Rappoport also taught at Columbia Business School prior to LSE, Bloomberg News relays. Her appointment comes after Lagarde told Dujovne in May that his all- male team was "short on women," Bloomberg News notes. Pablo Quirno, a director at the bank, is said to be leaving, Bloomberg News discloses. And Gustavo Canonero, the first vice president, will stay as Mr. Sandleris' deputy, Bloomberg News notes. Still, analysts said they were underwhelmed because Caputo had market experience whereas Mr. Sandleris is a relatively unknown deputy with an academic background, Bloomberg News relays. "The market doesn't know Mr. Sandleris as well. He's good on paper and has the credentials, but he's not as much of a heavy-hitter as Caputo," said Kathryn Rooney Vera, head of global research at Bulltick Capital Markets, Bloomberg News adds. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Sept. 4, 2018, S&P Global Ratings placed on Aug. 31, 2018, its 'B+' long-term and 'B' short-term sovereign credit ratings on Argentina on CreditWatch with negative implications. At the same time, S&P placed its 'raAA' national scale rating on CreditWatch negative and affirmed its 'BB-' transfer and convertibility assessment. The CreditWatch negative reflects the risk of worsening creditworthiness due to potentially weakened implementation of the government's strategy to stabilize the economy. Exchange rate volatility, as shown by recent pressure on the Argentine currency, could jeopardize the effective implementation of economic adjustment measures, absent further steps to boost investor confidence. Consequently, S&P Global Ratings corrected its short-term ratings on Argentina by removing them from CreditWatch with negative implications. Fitch Ratings affirmed on May 8, 2018, Argentina's Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and revised the Outlook to Stable from Positive. On December 4, 2017, Moody's Investors Service upgraded the Government of Argentina's local and foreign currency issuer and senior unsecured ratings to B2 from B3. The senior unsecured shelves were upgraded to (P)B2 from (P)B3. The outlook on the ratings is stable. At the same time, Argentina's short-term rating was affirmed at Not Prime (NP). The senior unsecured ratings for unrestructured debt were affirmed at Ca and the unrestructured senior unsecured shelf affirmed at (P)Ca. As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30- grace period on a US$539 million interest payment. Earlier that , talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001. A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to access international credit markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago. On March 30, 2016, Argentina's Congress passed a bill that will allow the government to repay holders of debt that the South American country defaulted on in 2001, including a group of litigating hedge funds that won judgments in a New York court. The bill passed by a vote of 54-16. BANCO MACRO: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT IDR, Outlook Stable ----------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Macro S.A.'s (Macro) Foreign- and Local-Currency Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) of 'B' and its viability rating (VR) of 'b'. The Rating Outlook is Stable. KEY RATING DRIVERS IDRS AND VIABILITY RATING Argentina's operating environment remains an important driver and constraint of Macro's VR and IDRs. In Fitch's view, a reduction in regulatory risk, a correction of macroeconomic imbalances and economic recovery, will take time to materialize especially following the recent policy frictions and political headwinds that have led to market sentiment erosion and have significantly increased the downside risks to the macroeconomic outlook. Macro's ratings also reflect the bank's risk appetite and growth strategy relative to peers, its ample capital cushion, as well as its diverse funding and comfortable liquidity metrics (LCR of 210%). Macro focuses primarily on low- and middle-income individuals and small- and medium-sized companies, ranking fourth among private sector banks with a market share of 6% of the banking system by assets. Macro has a very widespread geographic presence throughout Argentina. As of June 2018, Macro had the largest private-sector branch network with 454 branches, 1,463 ATMs and 918 self-service terminals. Macro's ample capitalization is supported by earnings retention and a significant reduction in risk weighted assets since 2015. At June 2018, Fitch Core Capital remained comfortable at 23.1% of risk weighted assets even though it was slightly lower than the 24.6% at year-end 2017. Banco Macro's regulatory Tier I capital ratio of 21.5% and the total capital ratio of 27.6% are nearly twice the regulatory minimum requirement. The bank's excess capital of ARS41.5 billion is expected to decline over the medium term, subject to risk-weighted asset growth exceeding internal capital generation. Macro has a diverse funding profile, reliant on a stable retail deposit base, complemented by demonstrated access to capital markets. As of June 2018, customer deposits accounted for 76% of total funding. Macro provides financial agency services to provincial governments and thus benefits from the related mobilization of public sector institutional deposits. In addition, the bank provides payroll services to over 2 million retail clients that also provide another source of stable, low-cost funding for the bank. Macro's risk appetite is relatively higher than its closest peers due to its middle market, retail focus and growth strategy. Nevertheless, it demonstrates sound risk control. The bank's impaired loans to gross loans ratio as calculated by Fitch remained low at 1.1%, which compares well with the averages of its domestic private sector peers. Like other players in the banking system, Macro's loan quality has been supported by high credit growth, which in turn has been facilitated by elevated inflation. Macro's nominal profitability compares favorably with the banking system average. The bank's Operating profit to Risk-Weighted Asset ratio at June 2018 remained stable at 8.9%, slightly higher than the 8.6% ratio reported at year-end 2017. Its performance benefits from its diversified revenue base, a favorable operating efficiency ratio (38.8% as of June 2018, which compares well with those of its peers), and relatively low credit costs despite its consumer loan orientation. SENIOR UNSECURED DEBT Ratings on Macro's senior unsecured issuance are in line with the bank's Long-Term, Local-Currency IDR as the notes rank pari passu with all other existing and future senior unsecured debt. The Recovery Rating of 'RR4' assigned to Macro's senior debt issuance reflects the average expected recovery in case of bank liquidation. SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR The Support Rating of '5' and the Support Rating Floor of 'NF' reflect that, although possible, external support for Macro cannot be relied upon given the sovereign's track record. SUBORDINATED DEBT The 'B-'/'RR6' ratings of Macro's subordinated debt reflect the low expected recoveries for these bonds in case of bank liquidation. However, these are notched only once due to ratings compression arising from the low VR of the issuer. These securities are plain-vanilla subordinated liabilities, without any deferral feature on coupons and/or principal. RATING SENSITIVITIES IDRS, SUPPORT and VR Macro's IDRs, VR and senior debt ratings would likely move in line with a change in Argentina's sovereign rating. In addition, Macro's ratings could be negatively affected in the event of an unlikely material deterioration in its profitability and/or asset quality metrics that would lead to a sustained decrease in the bank's Fitch Core Capital to below 9.5%. In addition, the bank's ratings could be negatively affected by changes in the political scene that result in a return to unorthodox policies resulting in political and regulatory intervention in the banking system. Contrarily, these ratings could benefit from a medium-term consolidation of a more market-friendly political framework. Fitch considers it unlikely that Argentine banks could be rated above the sovereign, making any upside potential in Macro's ratings contingent on positive developments in the sovereign rating. Macro's senior debt ratings are sensitive to a change in Macro's local currency IDR. SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR Changes in the SRs and SRFs of Macro are unlikely in the foreseeable future. SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES Given the 'RR6' Recovery Rating and the low expected recoveries for these bonds in the case of bank liquidation, a potential upgrade of the bank's VR will not necessarily result in a similar action on outstanding subordinated notes due to the current compression in the rating of Macro's subordinated issuances. Fitch has affirmed the following ratings: Banco Macro, S.A. -- Long-Term, Foreign-Currency IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable; -- Short-Term, Foreign-Currency IDR at 'B'; -- Long-Term, Local-Currency IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable; -- Short-Term, Local-Currency IDR at 'B'; -- Viability Rating at 'b'; -- Support Rating at '5'; -- Support Rating Floor at 'NF'; -- Argentinean-peso-denominated senior unsecured, medium-term notes at 'B'/'RR4'; -- USD400 million Tier II subordinated, medium-term notes at 'B- '/'RR6'. =========== B R A Z I L =========== BANCO SANTANDER: Fitch Affirms B+ LT LC IDR, Outlook Stable ----------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Santander Rio S.A.'s (Santander Rio) Long-Term Local Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+'. Fitch has also assigned Santander Rio a 'B' Foreign Currency IDR and 'B' Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs. The Rating Outlook is Stable. KEY RATING DRIVERS IDRs, SUPPORT RATING AND VIABILITY RATING (VR) Santander Rio's IDRs and Support rating reflect the probability of parent support given that Santander Rio is viewed as a strategically important entity for Spain's Banco Santander, S.A. (SAN; A-/Stable Outlook). In addition, Argentina's volatile economic and operating environment constrain Santander's IDRs. While Santander Rio's Local Currency IDR is one notch above the Sovereign rating, its Foreign Currency IDR is constrained by Argentina's 'B' country ceiling rating. Similarly, Santander Rio's VR is highly influenced by the operating environment. Fitch also considers the bank's strong company profile and adequate financial profile in its assessment of the bank's VR. Santander Rio benefits from its strong and growing franchise as the largest private sector bank in Argentina by loans and deposits, with market shares of 10.5% and 13%, respectively, as of June 30, 2018, and the ample experience of its main shareholder. Through 1H18 the bank's expanding transactional business has allowed it to generate stable and recurrent revenues. However, higher volume of risk weighted assets (RWA) due to the effect of the peso depreciation and provisioning expenses weighed on its operating profits/risk weighted assets ratio, which declined to 3.86% at end-June 2018. Given the recent deterioration of the operating environment, and the significant change in the prospects for the economy and the financial system, as is the case across the financial system, Fitch expects Santander Rio's loan and revenue growth rates to decelerate in 2H18 and 2019, with downside risks for growth to turn negative in real terms as inflation could rise above 40% in 2018. Nevertheless, the agency expects the bank to continue generating a reasonable level of recurring earnings as higher interest rates will partly offset slower growth and greater expected fee income. Fitch notes that high inflation continues to distort the banks' profitability ratios and affects international comparability. Santander Rio's delinquency ratios have deteriorated since 2015 given adverse economic conditions and, in 2017, a change in the charge-offs policy from 180 to 360 days. However, its non- performing loans (NPLs) remain at adequate levels, favored by conservative lending policies, good risk management, strong loan growth and inflation. At June 30, 2018, NPLs represented 2.49% of total loans and were covered by loan reserves of 1.08x. Net charge-offs have increased but remain at relatively low levels. The bank has taken a series of measures to prevent a deterioration of the loan portfolio by tightening admission criteria and strengthening collections and controls. Fitch expects the bank's asset quality indicators to deteriorate further in the near future, in line with the recent deterioration of the operating environment but to remain at acceptable levels. However, high inflation distorts the figures and international comparisons. The bank's capital adequacy metrics have historically stood at adequate levels, albeit lower than its closest peers, in line with its parent's capital allocation strategy for its subsidiaries. However, the Fitch core capital to risk weighted assets ratio (RWA) declined in 2017 as a consequence of the acquisition of the retail banking operations from Citibank Argentina and at June 30, 2018 it stood at 9.67%, which Fitch considers somewhat low. To compensate for this, the bank has issued USD160 million in 10-year subordinated debt that qualifies as regulatory Tier II capital, and USD100 million of undated subordinated debt that qualifies as additional tier 1 regulatory capital, both subscribed by other units of Santander. Its total regulatory capital to RWA ratio stood at an acceptable 10.89%. Fitch estimates that the bank's capitalization will gradually return to levels closer to its historic average of FCC around 12%, helped by its earnings generation capacity and the higher regulatory capital requirements in line with Basel III standards. Santander Rio's main funding source is core customer deposits and its liquidity levels are ample and benefit from strong deposit growth and lower demand of long-term credit. Santander Rio's loan to deposits ratio is one of the strongest among the largest Argentine banks due to its retail-oriented focus and has historically been below 85% (72.6% at June 30, 2018) and its liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) was 205%. RATING SENSITIVITIES IDRs, SUPPORT and VR Santander Rio's IDRs and VR would likely move in line with any change in Argentina's sovereign rating. In addition, the bank's Long-Term Local Currency IDR and Support Rating could be negatively affected by changes in the political scene that result in a return to unorthodox policies resulting in political and regulatory intervention in the banking system. Santander Rio's VR could be downgraded if the difficult operating environment drives material deterioration in its performance that results in a sustained deterioration in its FCC ratio below 8.5%. Fitch has assigned the following ratings: Santander Rio -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B'; Outlook Stable; -- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency 'B'. Fitch has affirmed the following ratings: Santander Rio -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'B+'; Outlook Stable; -- Viability rating at 'b'; -- Support Rating at '4'. MAGNESITA REFRATARIOS: Fitch Withdraws BB LT Issuer Default Rating ------------------------------------------------------------------ Fitch Ratings has withdrawn its ratings for Magnesita Refratarios S.A. KEY RATING DRIVERS Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the ratings of Magnesita following its merger and integration into RHI Magnesita N.V., which is not rated by Fitch; the lack of sufficient information on the combined entity's financial and operational strategies limits a rating action at this point. Further, Magnesita's publically rated debt is no longer outstanding, and therefore the coverage is no longer considered relevant for Fitch, and for commercial reasons. Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage for Magnesita. FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS Fitch has withdrawn the following ratings: Magnesita Refratarios S.A. -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'BB'; -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'BB'; -- National Long-Term rating 'AA(bra)'. The Rating Outlook is Stable. OI SA: S&P Rates Existing $1.6BB Senior Unsecured Notes 'B' ----------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' issue-level rating to Oi S.A.'s (global scale: B/Stable/--; national scale: brA/Stable/--) existing $1.6 billion senior unsecured notes due 2025. S&P also assigned a '4' recovery rating to the notes, which indicates average recovery expectation of 30%-50% (rounded estimate 40%) in the event of payment default. The notes, which Oi issued on July 27, 2018, were part of the company's reorganization plan. Oi issued the notes to exchange part of its obligations that were in default. The issue-level rating on the notes is the same as the global scale issuer credit rating, given that debt is senior unsecured with around a 40% recovery expectation. Issue Ratings--Recovery Analysis S&P has assigned a recovery rating of '4' to Oi's senior unsecured notes, with an average recovery (rounded estimate 40%). Key analytical factors S&P said, "Our hypothetical default scenario would occur in 2021 amid a combination of a severe economic slowdown, reduced consumer discretionary income, and high competition in the telecom industry that would lead to a decline in cash flow generation. We analyze Oi under a going concern because we believe the company would rather be restructured than liquidated under a default, given its status as the third-largest telecom operator in Brazil. This was the case with the company's recent reorganization plan. We have valued Oi using a 5.5x multiple applied to our projected emergence-level EBITDA of R$2.9 billion, somewhat lower than the standard of 6x used for larger global telecom operators because we view the company's competitive position somewhat weaker than the industry average. With these assumptions, we reach a gross enterprise value (EV) of R$16.2 billion. "The various debt instruments at the parent level (Oi) and its subsidiaries have cross guarantees, which avoid structural subordination for the obligations. We don't include rejections of leasing contracts in the debt waterfall because we believe the company would maintain the contracts to assure the availability of the services to continue operating. And the concession payments would be transferred as liabilities to a potential new operator." Simulated default assumptions -- Simulated year of default: 2021 -- EBITDA at emergence: R$2.9 billion -- EBITDA multiple: 5.5x -- Estimated gross EV: R$16.2 billion Simplified waterfall -- Net EV, after 5% of administrative expenses: R$15.4 billion -- Secured debt: R$3.6 billion (BNDEs loans) -- Senior unsecured debt: R$26.6 billion (local banks, export credit agencies, notes) -- Non-debt unsecured claims: R$350.5 million (tax liabilities) -- Recovery expectations for unsecured bond: 30-50% (rounded to 40%) RATINGS LIST Oi S.A. Issuer credit rating Global scale B/Stable/-- National scale brA/Stable/-- Ratings Assigned Oi S.A. Senior unsecured B Recovery rating 4(40%) RIO DE JANEIRO: Fitch Affirms BB- LT IDRs, Outlook Stable --------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has affirmed the City of Rio de Janeiro's (CRio) Long-Term, Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB-'. In addition, Fitch has also affirmed the national rating at 'AA(bra)'. The Rating Outlook is Stable. The affirmations reflect the city's fiscal performance according to expectation. In 2017, operating margin was negative 0.8%, according to Fitch's calculations based on publicly available information. KEY RATING DRIVERS Fiscal Performance: Weak/Stable Fitch expects very thin operating margins until 2020. Rio presents average fiscal flexibility, as tax revenue corresponded to around 42% of operating revenue in 2017. Additionally, Rio should register negative overall results until 2020, according to Fitch's calculation. Fitch expects staff expenditure increases to be in line with inflation up to 2020 despite ongoing pressures to provide healthcare and education on behalf of the state of Rio, who is under deep fiscal distress. Personnel expenditures, including pension payments, accounted for around 53% of operating expenditures in 2017 down from roughly 62%, according to Fitch's calculation. Debt, Liabilities and Liquidity: Neutral/Stable CRio's consolidated debt of around BRL15 billion in April 2018, represented a moderate 63% of the entity's current revenues (49.5% in 2016) when compared with peers. Debt service consumed the equivalent to 4.6% of the city's operating revenues. As a positive factor, CRio does not have a significant amount of judicial debt payable, or precatorios. The liquidity position of the city has improved. As of April 2018, gross cash positions increased to BRL2.5 billion (BRL1.8 billion in December 2017) covering 95% of the city's obligations due in 2018. Unpaid commercial short-term liabilities diminished in April 2018, corresponding to less than 1% of the city's operating revenues, according to Fitch's calculation (6.9% in 2017). Economy: Neutral/Stable With an economy based on services, CRio represents around 5% of the Brazilian economy and hosts large companies related to oil production, such as Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) (BB- /Stable), and metal mining companies, such as Vale S.A. (BBB+/Stable). CRio is home to around 6.3 million people, equal to approximately 3% of the Brazilian population, thus implying a GDP per capita of around USD9,000. The unemployment rate reached 15.4% in June 2018, according to IBGE- Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatisticas, which is higher than Brazil's overall unemployment rate of 12.4%. Management and Administration: Neutral/Stable The reliance on nonrecurring revenue is above average because credit operations financed 46.3% of capex, compared with 40.7% for 'BB-'-rated peers, and accuracy of forecast is considered as average. Institutional Framework: Weak/Stable Fitch considers the institutional framework to be weak, mostly as a result of very low fiscal flexibility that stems from subdued fiscal collection coupled with rigid cost structure. Moreover, the federal government has great influence over Brazilian local and regional governments (LRGs), as expressed by the vertical issuance of laws, and due to the federal government being the largest LRG creditor in many cases. RATING SENSITIVITIES Fiscal Performance and Debt: An operating margin that is consistently negative will exert a negative pressure on CRio's ratings. Additionally, a significant increase in financial debt should also exert a negative pressure on its ratings. FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS Fitch has affirmed the following ratings: City of Rio de Janeiro: -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB-'; -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B'; -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'BB-'; -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR at 'B'; -- Long-Term National at 'AA(bra)'; -- Short-Term National rating at 'F1+(bra)' ========================== C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ========================== ARABELLA EXPLORATION: Second Final Cash Collateral Order Entered ---------------------------------------------------------------- The Hon. Russell F. Nelms of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas has signed a second final order authorizing Arabella Exploration, LLC, and its affiliates to use the cash collateral Platinum Partners Credit Opportunities Master Fund, LP, on a final basis solely in accordance with and to the extent set forth in the Budget. The Debtors have an immediate need for cash to preserve and protect the assets of the Estates, to facilitate the settlement of ongoing litigation filed by Founders Oil & Gas III, LLC, and Founders Oil & Gas Operating, LLC, against the Debtors in the Chapter 11 cases, and to facilitate the sale of substantially all assets of Debtors for the benefit of Debtors' creditors. The Debtors are authorized on a final basis to use the Cash Collateral for the sole purpose of paying the Founders JIBs Payments. The Debtors may not use cash collateral in any manner or for any purpose other than as explicitly set forth in the Second Final Order or further order of the Court. However, none of the Cash Collateral which the Debtors propose to use includes collateral or proceeds thereof which are subject to liens, of (i) Sooner Pipe, LLC, or (ii) other parties in interest, in each case, to the extent that Sooner Pipe, LLC or such party in interest is determined by the Court to have a valid and existing secured claim against any asset of a Debtor in these Cases, which such finding is outside the scope of the Second Final Order. Platinum Partners is granted valid, binding, enforceable and perfected replacement liens upon and security interests in all of each Debtor's property and assets, pursuant to Sections 361 and 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. However, nothing in the Second Final Order will be construed to prime or subordinate (i) the tax liens of the ad valorem taxing entities or (ii) the liens of Sooner Pipe, LLC, to the extent Sooner Pipe, LLC, is determined by the Court to have a valid and existing secured claim against any asset of a Debtor in these Cases. Platinum Partners is also granted pursuant to Sections 503, 507(a) and 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, an allowed superpriority administrative expense claim in an amount equal to the Diminution in Value. A full-text copy of the Second Final Order is available at: http://bankrupt.com/misc/txnb17-40120-436.pdf About Arabella Exploration Arabella Exploration, LLC, formed on Oct. 2, 2009, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Arabella Exploration, Inc., a Cayman Islands corporation. It is an oil and gas exploration company that owns working interests in a number of oil and gas properties and interests. Arabella Exploration filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Case No. 17-40120) on Jan. 8, 2017. Charles (Chip) Hoebeke, manager, signed the petition. Arabella Operating, LLC, filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Case No. 17-41479) on April 4, 2017. The case is being jointly administered with that of Arabella Exploration. Arabella Exploration estimated $1 million to $50 million in assets and liabilities. Judge Russell F. Nelms in Ft. Worth, Texas, is the case judge. Raymond W. Battaglia, Esq., of the Law Offices of Ray Battaglia, PLLC, serves as counsel to the Debtor. Miller Johnson serves as Battaglia's co-counsel. Rehmann Turnaround and Receivership's Charles Hoebeke is the Debtor's chief restructuring officer. EnergyNet.com, Inc., is the oil and gas broker. No trustee, examiner or committee has been appointed in the case. FAIRHOLD SECURITISATION: Seeks to Invalidate Admin. Appointment --------------------------------------------------------------- Asad Asali at Global Capital reported that the High Court was standing room only as Fairhold Securitisation Limited and the note trustee Global Loan Agency Services Limited (GLAS), tried to invalidate the appointment of three individuals as administrators of Fairhold. Clifden, the real estate focused fund manager, had bypassed GLAS to make the appointment. Clifden IOM, the fund which failed in its tender offer for UK non- conforming bonds from the RMAC series earlier this year, is still on the hunt for assets from the issuer of Fairhold Securitisation, a pre-crisis distressed CMBS backed by UK ground rents, Global Capital had disclosed. According to Global Capital, a court heard on Aug. 8, Clifden IOM's claims to have appointed administrators to Fairhold, were "fanciful" and "incredible". Out-law.com recounts that in a securitisation transaction dated March 30, 2006, Cayman-registered Fairhold Securitisation Ltd issued two classes of notes backed by the income receivables from a complex portfolio of sheltered housing properties in England and Wales. The notes were due to mature in October 2017. By 2015, the transaction was in trouble. Cash flow from the properties was insufficient to support both Fairhold's liability to the noteholders, and its liability to two issuer swap counterparties, UBS and HBOS. Fairhold had entered into swaps with the banks to hedge its obligations under the notes. On October 2, 2015, UBS exercised its right to early termination, triggering a payment of GBP311 million. Subsequently, GLAS had replaced Deutsche Trustee Company Ltd. This was followed within days by a potential default event, when the issuer failed to pay the interest due on the notes. Fairhold then claimed to be entitled to rescind the swaps on the grounds that the banks had made fraudulent misrepresentations. At the same time, the parties had been discussing a possible restructuring, in the course of which the same group of noteholders incurred the GBP2.5 million professional fees at the centre of the dispute. Following an extraordinary meeting of the noteholders which resolved to direct the trustee to pay these fees, the trustee entered into an agreement to pay them as if they were 'trustee costs and expenses'. As trustee expenses, the fees had first priority under the payment waterfall at the expense of UBS. UBS therefore challenged the trustee's rights to pay the fees as a matter of interpretation of the trust deed and associated charge over the Fairhold's assets. Pending resolution of the dispute, no fees had been paid. The law firm of Simons and Simons said they represent UBS in the restructuring. =================================== D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C =================================== DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 2019 Budget Bill's Fiscal Deficit Will Up Debt ------------------------------------------------------------------ Dominican Today reports that the Dominican College of Economists warned that the 2019 Budget bill submitted by the Government includes a fiscal deficit that will raise the public debt, which accounted for 49.3% of GDP as of June 2018. "The authorities should make the necessary efforts to avoid incurring fiscal deficit, because that is one of the main causes of the accelerated growth of public debt," the economists said, according to Dominican Today. In a statement to Listin Diario, College president, Alejandro de Jesus, said that it's necessary to make more efficient the management of the revenue agencies to avert "the strong evasion and dodging of taxes, since it is estimated that in our country the ITBIS evasion is greater than 40%," the report relays. Mr. De Jesus noted that the country needs an integral Tax Code reform to dismantle existing exemptions and exonerations, through which he affirms that tax expenditures estimated at RD$234.6 billion granted for this year were 6.1% of GDP, the report discloses. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Sept. 24, 2018, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Dominican Republic's Long-Term, Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' with a Stable Outlook. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Free Zone Exports Jump 11.1% ------------------------------------------------ Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic's free zone exports jumped 11.1% in the first half this year, and total value is expected to exceed US$6.0 billion by yearend 2018, Industry and Commerce minister Nelson Toca Simo revealed. Speaking at the Dominican Exporters Association (Adoexpo) conference, the official said the sector accounts for 55% of the country's total exports, climbing by 19.4% in 2017 and an average annual growth of 3.0% since 2012, according to Dominican Today. Moreover, the official said the number of free zone companies in operation posted a relative growth of 17.3%, from 584 in 2012 to 685 in 2018, the report relays. In a statement, Mr. Toca also said that 20 new free zone parks started operations, rising from 53 in 2012 to 73 in 2018, "which shows a relative growth of 37.7%," the report discloses. "The number of workers, technicians and administrative staff employed by the free zones reaches the figure of 170,267," the official, as quoted by EFE, said, the report adds. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Sept. 24, 2018, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Dominican Republic's Long-Term, Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-' with a Stable Outlook. ============= J A M A I C A ============= DIGICEL GROUP: Request for Bond Repayment Delay Rejected -------------------------------------------------------- Arthur Beesley at The Financial Times reports that Denis O'Brien's effort to buy more time for Digicel Group to repay about $3 billion in debt comes at a critical time for the company, amid anxiety about a possible default on a $2 billion bond due in 2020. Now bondholders have dismissed Mr. O'Brien's proposal to extend by two years this debt and a $1 billion 2022 note, saying the terms he has offered were "unacceptable," according to The Financial Times. A statement from a bondholder committee suggests it will take a robust approach to talks with Mr. O'Brien, who took Digicel into 31 markets after founding the company in Jamaica in 2001, the report relays. Digicel Group's bondholders are known to include Ashmore, BlackRock and Eaton Vance but their precise stance is unknown and it is not clear whether they are represented on the committee, the report relays. Mr. O'Brien faces the prospect of having to sweeten the terms of a restructuring proposal that has led to downgrades from rating agencies Moody's and Fitch, the report relays. The company has been a lucrative investment for Mr. O'Brien but its bonds have been trading at 60 cents and 70 cents on the dollar, as concern mounts about its indebtedness at a time of anxiety over risks to emerging markets more generally, the report notes. The report says that revenues and earnings have declined and Digicel has cut tariffs for data to boost the slow uptake of services introduced after a $2.4bn investment in networks. Law firm Akin Gump, which is advising the bondholder committee, said investors holding more than 60 per cent of each bond have "entered into a lock-up agreement" in which they resolved not to tender their notes in response to Mr. O'Brien's proposal to prolong the debt, the report discloses. In response, Digicel said that it was extending by three weeks the early tender deadline for the offer until October 19, the report notes. Without naming any Digicel investors, Akin Gump said it has held two teleconferences for multiple financial institutions who together hold $2.8 billion of bonds issued by the company, the report relays. "Based on the strong feedback received from Digicel Group Ltd note holders, Akin Gump has informed Digicel Group Ltd and its advisers that the current terms of the proposal set out in the offering memorandum are unacceptable to . . . note holders," it said, the report notes. The committee has directed Akin Gump to communicate a request to other bondholders to refuse to tender their notes "and thereby further increase the already sizeable majority of Digicel Group Ltd note holders" who oppose it, the report relays. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 5, 2018, Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative from stable the outlook on the ratings of Digicel Group Limited ("Digicel", "DGL" or the "company") and Digicel Limited ("DL") and assigned a negative outlook to Digicel International Finance Limited ("DIFL"). At the same time, Moody's has affirmed DGL's B2 corporate family rating (CFR) and B2-PD probability of default rating (PDR), as well as the B1 rating on the unsecured notes of DL and the Ba2 rating on the secured bank credit facilities of DIFL. JAMAICA: S&P Affirms 'B' Sovereign Credit Rating, Outlook Now Pos. ------------------------------------------------------------------ On Sept. 25, 2018, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Jamaica to positive from stable. At the same time, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long- and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings, and its 'B+' transfer and convertibility assessment on the country. OUTLOOK The positive outlook reflects the at least one-in-three likelihood of an upgrade if, in the next 12 months, Jamaica further strengthens its external liquidity positon while maintaining tight fiscal policy and high primary surpluses. The combination of modest GDP growth and better external liquidity, as reflected in improvement in gross external financing needs to less than 100% of current account receipts (CAR) plus usable reserves could boost the sovereign's credit rating. S&P said, "We expect that the government will continue to meet strict fiscal targets, and maintain its commitment to a gradual reduction in its debt and interest burdens. We also expect that the government will continue advancing toward a more effective monetary policy framework for the central bank, including a more flexible exchange rate." Upside scenario S&P said, "We could raise the ratings in the next year if Jamaica continues improving its external liquidity such that the economy becomes more resilient to potential external shocks, including possibly higher oil prices. In addition, over a longer period, sustained economic growth at higher levels would strengthen Jamaica's economic profile, potentially resulting in a higher rating." Downside scenario S&P could revise the outlook to stable during the same period if the recently improving trajectory of Jamaica's external position reverses and begins to weaken, or the government misses fiscal targets, leading to an increase in debt and interest burdens. RATIONALE S&P said, "Our ratings on Jamaica continue to be limited by the country's high debt and interest burden, which restricts its fiscal flexibility. Despite a recent slow pick-up, GDP growth remains low, constrained by structural impediments. Nevertheless, the government's tight fiscal stance fosters macroeconomic stability--including low inflation--and supports the country's creditworthiness. The country's external indebtedness has improved in recent years and international reserves are growing. We believe that Jamaica's policymaking stability and predictability are bolstered by the continuity of fiscal consolidation policies. In addition, ongoing changes in the governance and mandate of the central bank could gradually improve Jamaica's currently limited monetary flexibility." Institutional and economic profile: The pace of economic growth, which we expect will modestly accelerate over the next year, may facilitate the effectiveness of further institutional reform. -- The government's commitment to sustainable fiscal policy should underpin macroeconomic stability in the medium term. -- Economic growth will facilitate public-sector reform as a growing private sector can absorb displaced public-sector workers. -- Nevertheless, S&P anticipates that bottlenecks will continue limiting the speed at which growth accelerates, despite the strong performance of some sectors. S&P said, "We believe that the government's commitment to fiscal consolidation will continue to foster macroeconomic stability in Jamaica, even through the election cycle, which is scheduled for February 2021. This commitment has spanned changes in government and we believe is representative of bipartisan consensus on the general direction of macroeconomic policymaking. Despite previous strong divisions, Jamaica's two main political parties--the ruling Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and the opposition People's National Party (PNP)--currently share a similar outlook on macroeconomic policy, in our opinion. Since taking office in 2016, the JLP has largely continued the macroeconomic policies of the former PNP administration, including achieving strict fiscal targets set under the previous IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program. "While we expect general policy continuity over the next several years, implementing the remaining public-sector reforms on the government's agenda will take time, particularly as economic growth only gradually accelerates. Before the EFF program expired in early 2017, Jamaican authorities engaged with the IMF regarding a successor program. They agreed on a three-year stand-by arrangement (SBA), which serves primarily as a precautionary liquidity backstop but also as an anchor for policy continuity. Under the program, the government is seeking to shift spending toward growth-inducing expenditure. To do so, local authorities are focused on identifying redundancies and services that public- sector entities can share; and establishing clear controls on public-sector wages, among other measures. The government has made progress toward these ends: starting from fiscal 2018, it has reached a four-year agreement on public-sector wages (with about 80% of the public service), that will help reduce wages to 9% of GDP target by fiscal 2019. S&P said, "Nevertheless, we believe it will take time to fundamentally shift the structure of spending, as structural growth limitations will be hard to overcome in the near term. Importantly, we expect that the government will continue with reforms once the SBA expires at the end of 2019." To further entrench fiscal sustainability, the government is developing an independent fiscal council, which it expects will be operational in the next two years. The fiscal council will be a permanent, independent, non-partisan institution enshrined by legislation that will promote sustainable fiscal practices and deepen government accountability as policymakers will have to maintain credible policies and explain deviations to plan. S&P said, "In our opinion, structural barriers will continue to impede stronger economic growth in Jamaica. We expect annual real GDP growth to average 1.9% over the next three years (or 1.4% in per capita terms), despite stronger performance in certain sectors of the economy. We also expect that the country's per capita GDP will be close to US$5,400 in 2018. Tourism, agriculture, mining, and manufacturing make the Jamaican economy diversified for a small open economy. Nevertheless, growth is constrained by high security costs, perceived corruption, low productivity, a lack of business competitiveness, and vulnerability to external shocks. Some sectors, such as tourism, which directly represents about 8.5% of Jamaica's GDP, have grown quickly in the past couple of years. Improvements in capacity utilization in the mining sector over the past year have also contributed to economic growth. We expect employment levels to rise; as of April 2018, employment grew by about 1.2% year-over-year, while unemployment fell to a 10-year low of 9.7% from 12.2%, in the previous year. However, links between tourism and other sectors, in particular agriculture, are limited, in our opinion, muting the impact of tourism growth the overall economy. The government established the Ministry of Economic Growth and Job Creation in early 2016, headed by the prime minister, and an Economic Growth Council under the ministry in part to address these issues. However, we expect that the dividends of these efforts will take time to translate into higher GDP growth." Flexibility and performance profile: Strict fiscal policy will continue to ease the still-high general government debt burden while vulnerability to external shocks remains, despite a strengthening external positon. -- S&P expects the government to meet its 7% of GDP primary surplus target through the medium term. -- Although this tight fiscal policy will slowly reduce Jamaica's debt burden, fiscal flexibility will be limited. -- Still-high, albeit improving, external liquidity needs and indebtedness make the country vulnerable to external shocks and potential loss in investor confidence. S&P said, "We expect that Jamaica will continue to meet or exceed its primary fiscal surplus target, which we expect will average 7.4% of GDP over the next four years. In the past year, the government implemented the second phase of its tax reform policy to shift the tax system toward indirect taxation and broaden the tax base. It raised the minimum income level required to pay personal income tax for a second time, offsetting this through higher excise and consumption taxes on items such as cigarettes, fuel, and alcohol. Absent new taxes in the current fiscal year, the government expects that administrative improvements in tax collection and compliance will produce higher revenues in fiscal 2019." Continued compliance with ambitious fiscal targets will contribute to a gradual decline in net general government debt in our forecasts to about 80% of GDP by 2020, while the change in general government debt will average 2.2% over the same period. Net general government debt represented about 90% of GDP in fiscal 2018, and averaged about 115% in the previous three years. In addition, the general government balance represented 0.6% of GDP in fiscal 2018, reflecting an improvement from a modest deficit position in the three previous years. Nevertheless, S&P expects that interest payments will continue to represent a significant portion of the budget, averaging about 21.5% of government revenue over the next four years. The high interest burden will continue to limit fiscal flexibility. Jamaica's debt burden has significant exposure to exchange rate movements as approximately 60% of general government debt is denominated in foreign currency. Notably, the government is not expected to raise new foreign currency-denominated debt in the domestic market in the medium term. Notwithstanding, external maturities will be refinanced from funds raised from domestic issuances and revenue, to the extent that the private sector is not crowded-out, given the domestic market is not sufficiently deep to facilitate full refinancing. In addition, the country's financial institutions have significant exposure to government debt, limiting their capacity to lend more to the government without crowding out private-sector borrowing. S&P said, "We assess Jamaica's contingent liabilities from the financial sector and all nonfinancial public enterprises as limited. The limited assessment of contingent liabilities of banks is based on our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment score of '9' (with '1' being the lowest-risk category and '10' the highest) and the ratio of banking-sector assets to GDP of under 100%." Strong fiscal performance will serve as a solid anchor for external stability. Jamaica's external profile has benefited from favorable conditions over the past couple of years. However, rising oil prices have contributed to a moderate widening in the current account deficit, projected to be 5.4% in 2018, from 4.8% in 2017. Growth in the tourism industry has also benefited Jamaica's external profile, given that tourism receipts represent almost 40% of the country's CAR. S&P said, "We expect Jamaica to record a CAD of just below 7% of GDP for 2019-2020. In line with recent years, we expect that the bulk of the deficit will be funded by FDI. Against a backdrop of relatively stable oil prices, Jamaica's external financing needs will be relatively stable. Strong growth in tourism earnings and remittances should mitigate import growth due to increased investment and consumption from a strengthening economy. As a result, we expect Jamaica's external financing needs to average 103% of CAR and foreign exchange reserves over the next four years. The country's external accounts are linked to the U.S. primarily through tourism and personal remittances, which account for about 30% of CAR. At the same time, we expect external debt net of international reserves and liquid public- and financial-sector assets to continue improving to about 88% of CAR, on average, during the same period. Despite the recent improvement in the external debt burden, Jamaica remains vulnerable to external shocks. In addition, we believe the county is vulnerable to a sudden loss of external funding, given that Jamaica's net external liability position is substantially worse than its net external debt position. Negative developments that undermine FDI and other private capital inflows could again lead to falling foreign exchange reserves and put pressure on the currency to depreciate further." S&P said, "We believe that fiscal tightening will support historically low inflation levels over the next several years. We expect inflation to fall within the central bank's target of 4%-6% through 2021. Although it has a short track record, the central bank will, we expect, facilitate orderly movements in the local currency, in line with the country's floating exchange rate. About 47% of financial assets are denominated in U.S. dollars, limiting the effectiveness of monetary policy, down from about 43% in 2013. Steps to reduce the level of dollarization, such as capping open positions at financial institutions, could gradually strengthen monetary policy. In addition, the central bank is introducing measures to support inflation targeting, such as revising its mandate, strengthening operational independence, and improving market transparency. Still, it will take time before these measures lead to fully operational inflation targeting. We believe that monetary policy tools still have a limited impact on the economy given low--albeit rising--levels of private-sector lending and limited secondary bond market trading." In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected in the Ratings Score Snapshot above. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action. RATINGS LIST Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action To From Jamaica Sovereign Credit Rating B/Positive/B B/Stable/B Ratings Affirmed Jamaica Transfer & Convertibility Assessment Local Currency B+ Senior Unsecured B Air Jamaica Ltd. Senior Unsecured B National Road Operating and Constructing Company Ltd Senior Unsecured B ================================ T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O ================================ SANDALS INC: Deal With Trinidad and Tobago Could Close Off by Nov ----------------------------------------------------------------- Trinidad Express reports that Trinidad and Tobago's resort deal with Sandals Inc. could close off by the end of November, Prime Minister Dr. Keith Rowley said. Government has also issued proposals for the construction of a massive marina in Tobago and should have some initial details of the project to share in the next fortnight, the PM said, the report notes. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Oct. 10, 2017, Caribbean360.com reports that Hurricanes Irma and Maria have wreaked havoc on the planned construction of a mega Sandals resort in Tobago. The 750-room hotel project has been put on hold, Trinidad and Tobago's Prime Minister Dr. Keith Rowley confirmed at a press conference after holding talks with the business community on the country's financial situation, according to Caribbean360.com. He told reporters that negotiations for the project were well advanced and Sandals Chairman Gordon Butch Stewart was all set to wrap up the talks and sign a memorandum of understanding earlier in September when Hurricane Irma struck, the report noted. *********** Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to publication. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com *********** S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2018. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000. . * * * End of Transmission * * *