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      T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Wednesday, August 29, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 171

                            Headlines


A R G E N T I N A

AMES XIII: Moody's Rates Class B Debt 'Caa3'


B R A Z I L

ANDRADE GUTIERREZ: Moody's Hikes CFR to Caa2, Outlook Stable
BANCO DO ESTADO: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB-' ICR
GUACOLDA ENERGIA: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR, Outlook Remains Stable
STATE OF MINAS GERAIS: S&P Cuts Global Scale Rating to 'CCC-'


C O L O M B I A

COLOMBIA: To Withdraw from Unasur Over Venezuela Crisis


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Cutters Want More Time to Regularize Status


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Company Mergers to Face Increased Scrutiny
JAMAICA: Opposition Chides Gov't for Floating Exchange Rate Policy


P U E R T O    R I C O

BORINQUEN ANESTHESIA: Sept. 11 Plan and Disclosures Hearing
LA HABICHUELA: Plan Outline Okayed, Plan Hearing on Oct. 5
PUERTO RICO: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on &194MM Sr. Sec. Bonds


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Migrants Take Maduro's Offer to Fly Home From Peru


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
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AMES XIII: Moody's Rates Class B Debt 'Caa3'
--------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A. rates
Fideicomiso Financiero AMES XIII, a transaction that will be issued by
TMF Trust Company S.A. - acting solely in its capacity as Issuer and
Trustee.

This credit rating is subject to the fulfillment of contingencies that
are highly likely to be completed, such as finalization of documents
and issuance of the securities. This credit rating is based on certain
information that may change prior to the fulfillment of such
contingencies, including market conditions, financial projections,
transaction structure, terms and conditions of the issuance,
characteristics of the underlying assets or receivables, allocation of
cash flows and of losses, performance triggers, transaction
counterparties and other information included in the transaction
documentation. Any pertinent change in such information or additional
information could result in a change of this credit rating.

   -- ARS 41,917,922 in Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities (VRDA)
of "Fideicomiso Financiero AMES XIII", rated Aaa.ar (sf) (Argentine
National Scale) and Ba2 (sf) (Global Scale).

   -- ARS 3,810,720 in Class B Floating Rate Debt Securities (VRDB) of
"Fideicomiso Financiero AMES XIII", rated Caa2.ar (sf) (Argentine
National Scale) and Caa3 (sf) (Global Scale).

   -- ARS 23,557,179 in Certificates (CP) of "Fideicomiso Financiero
AMES XIII", rated C.ar (sf) (Argentine National Scale) and C (sf)
(Global Scale).

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rated securities are payable from the cash flows derived from the
assets of the trust, which is an amortizing pool of approximately
1,830 eligible personal loans denominated in Argentine pesos, with a
fixed interest rate, originated by the Asociacion Mutual de la
Economía Solidaria ("AMES"), for a principal amount of ARS 36,275,513.

The VRDA will bear a floating interest rate (BADLAR plus margin). The
VRDA's interest rate will never be higher than 36.0% or lower than
24.0%.

The VRDB will bear a floating interest rate (BADLAR plus margin). The
VRDB's interest rate will never be higher than 38.0% or lower than
26.0%.

These personal loans are granted to employees of the City of Buenos
Aires (rated B2/A1.ar) using a "Codigo de Descuento". The "Codigo de
Descuento" is an identifier granted by a government-related entity (in
this case the City of Buenos Aires) that allows deducting a personal
loan's installment directly from the borrowers' paycheck.

The originator accesses an Internet-based system to verify the
borrower's disposable income and originate the personal loan. The
maximum DTI ratio established by the City of Buenos Aires is 50%. In
this transaction, the City of Buenos will be instructed to send, on a
monthly basis, the scheduled principal and interest on the securitized
loans directly to the trust account. In turn, the trustee, based on
the master servicer's reports will reconcile any amounts that belong
to the originator.

The automatic payroll deduction of the loans' installments
significantly reduces the probability of default of the loans, which
is not dependent on the borrower's willingness to pay.

In this type of loan the main causes of delinquency are: (i)
termination of the work relationship between the borrower and the
Government of the City of Buenos Aires, (ii) judicial embargos, that
may limit the maximum disposable income that can be deducted by the
GCBA, (iii) increases in the Minimum Wage that increases the minimum
disposable income that the employee must receive net of deductions,
(iv) variable components of the wages that are not collected in a
particular month and therefore decreases the disposable income (v) and
unpaid work licenses.

The initial negative overall credit enhancement is mitigated by a
turbo sequential structure and a significant level of excess spread,
which allow for the building of credit enhancement starting with the
first coupon payment. In addition the transaction has various reserve
funds.

In assigning the ratings to this transaction, Moody's assumed a
lognormal distribution for defaults on the pool with a mean of 7.0%
and a coefficient of variation of 70.0%. These assumptions were
derived considering the historical performance of AMES' loan pools and
prior transactions.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Factors that may lead to a downgrade of the ratings include an
increase in delinquency and prepayment levels higher than Moody's
original expectations, or a disruption in the flow of payments from
the City of Buenos Aires.

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include the
building of credit enhancement over time due to the turbo sequential
payment structure, when compared with the level of projected losses in
the securitized pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Approach
to Rating Consumer Loan-Backed ABS " published in September 2015.


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B R A Z I L
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ANDRADE GUTIERREZ: Moody's Hikes CFR to Caa2, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Andrade Gutierrez Engenharia
S.A.'s corporate family rating to Caa2 from C and assigned a stable
outlook. The C rating on the remaining $7.4 million of the defaulted
notes issued by Andrade Gutierrez International S.A. and guaranteed by
AGE was not changed.

Ratings upgraded:

Issuer: Andrade Gutierrez Engenharia S.A.

  - Corporate family rating: to Caa2 from C

Ratings unchanged:

Issuer: Andrade Gutierrez International S.A. (AGInt)

  - $7.4 million senior unsecured notes due 04/30/2018: C

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Andrade Gutierrez Engenharia S.A.

  - Outlook: Stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of AGE's CFR to Caa2 follows AGE's announcement on August
21, 2018 that it had settled its newly issued $336 million
(approximately BRL1.3 billion) 11% senior secured payment-in-kind
(PIK) toggle notes due in 2021 in exchange for its defaulted $345
million 4% senior unsecured C-rated notes that were due in April 2018.

The settlement of the exchange offer resolved the default on the $345
million notes and extended the company's main short-term financial
obligation to 2021. That will provide some relief to the company's
tight liquidity position despite the new notes paying 11% interest
rate, up from 4% for the defaulted notes, which will result in
approximately $37 million of interest payments per year.

The final acceptance rate was of 97.86%, above AGE's threshold of 95%
that was necessary to move forward with the exchange offer. A small
portion of $7.4 million of the defaulted notes will still be
outstanding until further notice.

Even after the settlement of the transaction, AGE will still have a
highly leveraged balance sheet and will need to deal with a weak
operating environment in Latin America, especially in Brazil. As of
December 2017, AGE had a project backlog of BRL11.3 billion, a BRL 7.1
billion decrease over the third quarter of 2017, reflecting the
removal of BRL7.5 billion in backlog in Venezuela and Congo
demonstrating a more conservative approach due to the low expectation
of resumption of these projects in the near future. Currently most of
the projects are with private sector clients.

AGE's operating performance has been affected by unexpected events,
such as the Lava Jato corruption investigations in Brazil, contract
cancellations, foreign-exchange losses and delays in the collection of
receivables.

As of the end of March 2018, AGE had BRL573 million of cash on its
balance sheet, equal to approximately 42% of the notes that were due
in April. Moody's estimates that the company's operating activities
currently consume around BRL100 million per quarter, an amount that
will consume a sizable part of AGE's liquidity position as time
progresses. Moody's nevertheless expects the start of new projects and
related increase in revenue and cash flow to help reduce this cash
burn.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that AGE will have
some liquidity relief with the extended debt profile and that the
start of some new projects will increase revenue and cash flow in the
coming quarters.

The ratings could be upgraded if the company is able to further
strengthen its capital structure, improve its liquidity profile and
internal cash generation while operating performance recovers along
with the Brazilian heavy construction industry.

The ratings could be downgraded if there are no signs of improvements
in operating performance and AGE is not able to reduce its cash burn.
If the company fails to comply with its annual audited reporting
requirements, possibly triggering a debt acceleration, or enters into
another debt restructuring that results in losses to creditors the
ratings could also be downgraded.

AGE is Brazil's second-largest engineering and heavy construction
company, with net revenue of BRL1.2 billion for the 12 months that
ended March 2018. The company's backlog of BRL11.3 billion at the end
of December 2017 comprised of 35 diversified projects, including hydro
power plants, basic infrastructure projects, industrial and civil
construction and oil and gas projects. Around 52% of these projects
are located in Brazil, 32% in Africa, and the balance is located in
other Latin American countries and Asia. AGE is one of the main
subsidiaries of Andrade Gutierrez S.A., one of the largest
infrastructure conglomerates in Brazil.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Construction
Industry published in March 2017.


BANCO DO ESTADO: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB-' ICR
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its long-term 'BB-' global scale and
'brAA+' national scale issuer credit ratings on Banco do Estado do Rio
Grande do Sul S.A. (Banrisul). S&P revised the outlook on the ratings
to stable from negative.

The ratings on Banrisul reflect the bank's strong results and stable
business model, despite the weak financial position of its controlling
shareholder--the state of Rio Grande do Sul (RS)--given its robust
market share in RS that supports its stable client and funding base.
Although S&P believes the state's ability to intervene in the bank's
operations is limited, it incorporates the risk associated with
Banrisul's business concentration in the state into its ratings.


GUACOLDA ENERGIA: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR, Outlook Remains Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' long-term issuer credit and
issue-level ratings on Guacolda Energia S.A. (Guacolda). The outlook
remains stable.

S&P's 'BB' credit ratings on Guacolda continue to incorporate the low
production cost at its 760 megawatt (MW) coal-fired plant and its
favourable sale pricing mechanism that allows it to almost fully pass
through higher operating costs to its customers. They also take into
account the company's strategic location in the northern part of
Chile's largest power grid and its proximity to large industrial and
mining operations. Moreover, Guacolda currently benefits from a high
level of contracted sales with solid offtakers that shield the company
from intense competition and reduce cash flow volatility. It is
important to note that those contracts have an average life of four
years, which is relatively short compared to the average of twelve
years that other players in Chile -- that enjoy a similar business
risk assessment -- have. In particular, 40% of its contracts with
unregulated clients will mature in 2021. If Guacolda re-contract that
capacity but at significantly lower prices, that might hurt the
company's competitive and financial position, in S&P's view. S&P'll
continue to monitor the contract developments.


STATE OF MINAS GERAIS: S&P Cuts Global Scale Rating to 'CCC-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
On Aug. 24, 2018, S&P Global Ratings lowered its global scale ratings
on the state of Minas Gerais to 'CCC-' from 'B-' and its national
scale rating to 'brCCC-' from 'brBBB-'. The outlook is negative.

OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on the state reflects a one-in-two likelihood of
default in the next six months based on increasing risk of delayed
debt service payments amid heightened political uncertainty and
absence of free cash due to ongoing deficits after borrowings.

Downside scenario

S&P could lower its ratings to 'SD' (selective default) on the state
of Minas Gerais if either the federal government or the state fails to
make upcoming debt service payments during the next six months.

Upside scenario

S&P could revise its outlook on the state to stable if risks over debt
servicing were to diminish as a result of a sustainable and credible
financial plan that addresses the current fiscal imbalances to meet
debt obligations in the intermediate term. However, such a scenario is
unlikely in the next six months.

RATIONALE

S&P said, "The downgrade reflects the heightened risk of default given
that we now detect greater uncertainties over Minas' ability to
service debt payments coming due within the next six months. Since we
last reviewed the state's credit fundamentals on April 9, 2018, we
haven't seen any changes in Minas Gerais' reliance on unsound
cost-control measures, and we have now reasons to believe the state
wouldn't prioritize timely debt service payment, contrary to what we
observed in the past. We are also monitoring closely the state's
recent delays in payments that the central government honored. Given
the state's weak liquidity position and continued operating and
after-capex deficits, its capacity to pay the estimated R$3.6 billion
in debt service costs within the next six months (R$1.9 billion in
interest and around R$1.7 billion in amortization payment) is
doubtful. We estimate that Minas Gerais won't have free cash to cover
its projected debt service costs for the next six months.

"In addition to its strained finances, we now believe that there's
greater uncertainty over the state's willingness to prioritize timely
debt service. Moreover, the upcoming elections in October pose
questions over Minas Gerais' fiscal accountability and commitment in
honoring its financial obligations. As a result, and according to
"Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', and 'CC' Ratings," the
state's default appears to be inevitable within six months absent
unanticipated, significantly favorable changes in the Minas Gerais'
circumstances.

"The state will be facing debt service payments on debt it owes to
commercial and public banks, and multilateral lending agencies in the
next 12 months. If the state misses the payments on these loans on due
dates and we don't believe payment is likely within the next five
business days or within the established grace-period no longer than 30
days (either by the state or the federal government) we would
downgrade the state to 'SD'. At the same time, we continue to view the
sovereign's guarantee mechanism on subnational government debt as well
functioning, supporting the institutional framework for local and
regional governments (LRGs) in Brazil. In an event of LRG's failure to
pay debt, we believe the sovereign will honor the guarantees it
provided to these loans within the timing established in each contract
and according to its own policies. And we will continue using our
"General Criteria: Methodology: Timeliness Of Payments: Grace Periods,
Guarantees, And Use Of 'D' And 'SD' Ratings," published Oct. 24, 2013,
to assess the state's willingness and capacity to pay debt
obligations."

Out of total debt, Minas Gerais owes 77% of it to the federal
government, 11% to public banks, and 12% to multilateral lending
agencies and commercial banks as of July 2018. The sovereign
guarantees the majority of Minas Gerais' debt. Under the guarantee
mechanism, the state relinquishes ownership on all of its revenue --
own tax revenue or the transfers it's entitled to receive from the
central government according to the constitution -- until repayment of
the state's debt has occurred and the central government decides to
release the remaining funds.

S&P  said. "We exclude a potential debt agreement between Minas Gerais
and the federal government in our base-case scenario. Therefore, we
continue to expect higher debt service costs for the state than in the
past two years. At the same time, we don't expect the state to have
access to new borrowings, but only those that were already previously
approved. Payment delays consistently occurred because of subpar
cost-control measures and sharply lower capex, both of which
underscore Minas Gerais' limited ability to cut expenditures and
higher-than-expected spending. While we expect Minas Gerais to
continue generating more than 80% of its revenue in the next three
years, capex is likely to remain at only slightly less than 2% of
total spending, reflecting fewer borrowings and limited ability to
make additional cuts in investments.

"We believe Minas Gerais' financial management continued to
deteriorate recently due to unpredictable policies and overall poor
formal medium- and long-term financial planning. Ongoing payments of
public-sector employees' salaries in installments and delays in
payments to suppliers, which totaled R$5.9 billion in 2017 (8% of
total operating revenue) highlight failure to control costs and weak
capacity to manage cash flows. We believe the state's finances will
continue to be characterized by some form of underestimated spending,
while increasing debt service costs and mandated expenses will
continue to weigh on its fiscal performance. Minas Gerais has moderate
contingent liabilities."

In addition to Minas Gerais' structural imbalances that also include a
GDP per capita estimated at $7,937 for 2018, we believe that the
intergovernmental system for Brazilian LRGs has prevented the latter
from reaching a revenue-and-expenditure balance due to the system's
intrinsic rigidities. At the same time, S&P believes the system
continues to have an adequate level of predictability and
transparency, with enhanced central government oversight of LRGs'
finances and adherence to fiscal discipline."

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating
Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the
committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level
of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the
onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information
provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been
distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee
members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative
and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking
at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected in
the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.

The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency
with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating
committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. The
weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used
in this rating action.

  RATINGS LIST
  Downgraded; Outlook Action
                             To                  From
  Minas Gerais (State of)
   Issuer Credit Rating
    Global Scale             CCC-/Negative/--    B-/Stable/--
    Brazil National Scale    brCCC-/Negative/--  brBBB-/Stable/--


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C O L O M B I A
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COLOMBIA: To Withdraw from Unasur Over Venezuela Crisis
-------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the President of Colombia disclosed that his
government has notified the Union of South American Nations (Unasur)
of its decision to withdraw from the bloc as the South American
organization failed to denounce Venezuela's "brutal treatment" of its
citizens.

"I want to inform the Colombians that, with precise instructions, the
Foreign Minister of the Republic sent Unasur the letter where we
denounce the constituent treaty of that entity and in six months the
withdrawal of Colombia from this organization will be effective",
President Ivan Duque told media, according to EFE News.


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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Cutters Want More Time to Regularize Status
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that dozens of sugarcane workers, of Haitian
origin, who didn't benefit from the Plan to Regularize Foreigners
protested in front of the Interior and Police Ministry demanding the
extension of the deadline to renew or change residency status.

The picketers grouped in National Cane Workers Union, also request
government pensions and asked permanent residence from the Immigration
Directorate (DGM), according to Dominican Today.

Group spokesman Jesus Nunez said the peaceful concentration also
served to deliver a document with their demands to the Interior and
Police Ministry, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 19, 2018, Fitch Ratings assigned a 'BB-' rating to
Dominican Republic's USD1.3 billion bonds, maturing July 2028. The
notes have a coupon of 6%.  Proceeds from the issuance will be
used for general purposes of the government, including the partial
financing of the 2018 budget.


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J A M A I C A
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JAMAICA: Company Mergers to Face Increased Scrutiny
---------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Executive Director of the Fair Trading
Commission (FTC) David Miller, said the agency is in the process of
creating a formal merger review framework.

This is a method through which various issues are addressed before a
merger takes place, according to RJR News.

The report notes that Mr. Miller explained that this process will mean
legislative amendments; informing stakeholders in the key sectors; and
conducting consultations with regulators.

He says the FTC will look closely at the issues, conduct interviews
with the parties and make best efforts to ensure that consumers are
not affected when an acquisition or merger takes place, the report
adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 5, 2018, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and has
revised the Rating Outlook to Positive from Stable.


JAMAICA: Opposition Chides Gov't for Floating Exchange Rate Policy
------------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Parliamentary Opposition has issued a
statement lashing out at the Holness administration and expressing
major concerns over its adoption of a new floating exchange rate
policy.

Mark Golding, Opposition Spokesman on Finance and Planning, said under
the Government's new exchange rate policy, it appears the BOJ is no
longer able to manage the foreign exchange market to promote
stability, predictability and confidence, according to RJR News.

He said the new policy has, therefore, facilitated the rapid
depreciation of the Jamaican dollar, so that in the three months, June
to August, the local currency has fallen in value by more than nine
per cent from J$126.38 to J$137.96 against the US dollar, the report
relays.

Mr. Golding argued that this rapid movement of the local currency has
created a sense of chaos and fear, after years of hard-won and
cherished stability, the report notes.

He pointed out that private sector, including small and medium sized
enterprises, are now crying out as the situation now threatens
viability, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 5, 2018, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and has
revised the Rating Outlook to Positive from Stable.


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P U E R T O    R I C O
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BORINQUEN ANESTHESIA: Sept. 11 Plan and Disclosures Hearing
-----------------------------------------------------------
Bankruptcy Judge Brian K. Tester conditionally approved Borinquen
Anesthesia Services PSC's disclosure statement dated August 7,
2018.

Acceptances or rejections of the Plan may be filed in writing on/or
before seven days prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation of
the Plan.

Any objection to the final approval of the Disclosure Statement
and/or the confirmation of the Plan must be filed on/or before 10
days prior to the date of the hearing on confirmation of the Plan.

A hearing for the consideration of the final approval of the
Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Plan will be held
on Sept. 11, 2018 at 10:30 A.M. at the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, U.S.
Post Office and Courthouse Building, 300 Recinto Sur, Courtroom No. 1,
Second Floor, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

As previously reported by the Troubled Company Reporter, general
unsecured creditors under the plan are classified in Class 3 and
will receive a distribution of 5% of its allowed claims to be
distributed pro-rata as follows: $1,020 per month for 60 months,
including interest at 2% per annum for a total payout of
$61,253.26.

A full-text copy of the Disclosure Statement is available for free
at:

     http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb18-00130-11-58.pdf

              About Borinquen Anesthesia

Based in Aibonito, Puerto Rico, Borinquen Anesthesia Services PSC
is a privately held company that operates in healthcare industry.
Its principal assets are located at Calle Jose C Vazquez Hospital
General ME Aibonito, PR 00705.  Borinquen Anesthesia is a small
business debtor as defined in 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(51D).

Borinquen Anesthesia sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 18-00130) on Jan. 12,
2018.

In the petition signed by Jorge A. Acevedo Orengo, president, the
Debtor disclosed $89,700 in assets and $1.20 million in
liabilities.  Juan C. Bigas Law Office is the Debtor's bankruptcy
counsel.


LA HABICHUELA: Plan Outline Okayed, Plan Hearing on Oct. 5
----------------------------------------------------------
La Habichuela Inc. is now a step closer to emerging from Chapter 11
protection after a bankruptcy judge approved the outline of its
plan of reorganization.

Judge Edward Godoy of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Puerto Rico on Aug. 16 gave the thumbs-up to the disclosure
statement after finding that it contains "adequate information."

The order required creditors to submit ballots of acceptance or
rejection of the reorganization plan and to file objections to its
confirmation on or before 14 days prior to the date of the
hearing.

A court hearing to consider confirmation of the plan is scheduled
for Oct. 5, at 9:30 a.m.  The hearing will take place at the Jose
V. Toledo Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, Courtroom 2.

                     About La Habichuela Inc.

La Habichuela, Inc., based in Carolina, Puerto Rico, filed a
Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 15-09171) on November
19, 2015.  Francisco R. Moya Huff, Esq. serves as bankruptcy
counsel.  In its petition, the Debtor estimated $164,372 in assets
and $1.23 million in liabilities. The petition was signed by
Francisco Cabello Dominguez, secretary.


PUERTO RICO: Moody's Affirms Caa1 Rating on $194MM Sr. Sec. Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Caa1 rating on approximately
$194 million of secured bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Industrial,
Tourist, Educational, Medical, and Environmental Control Facilities
Financing Authority on behalf of AES Puerto Rico, L.P. As part of this
rating affirmation, the rating outlook was revised to stable from
negative.

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: AES Puerto Rico, L.P.

Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Affirmations:

Issuer: AES Puerto Rico, L.P.


Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Caa1

Issuer: P.R. Ind Tour Ed Med & Env Ctl Facs Fin Auth

Senior Secured Revenue Bonds, Affirmed Caa1

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects the improved prospects for AES PR owing to
the re-establishment of regular payments from Puerto Rico Electric
Power Authority (PREPA; Ca negative), the Project's off-taker and sole
source of revenue. The Project has received more than $200 million in
payments from PREPA since December 2017, pursuant to its long-term
power purchase agreement (PPA) with the utility. This development is
positive for AES PR bondholders and comes after several months of
non-payment by PREPA subsequent to Hurricane Maria, which hit northern
and eastern Puerto Rico in September 2017, causing widespread damage
to the island's power grid. Moody's understands that PREPA is current
on payment obligations with AES PR.

The AES PR plant did not itself sustain significant direct damage from
Maria, given its location on the south side of the island, and both
units at the plant were brought back on line relatively soon after the
storm -- in October 2017 -- thereby making the plant available for
dispatch by PREPA and entitling AES PR to claim its capacity payment
under the PPA. However, the plant was not able to deliver power to
PREPA after the storm because of downed transmission lines that
connect AES PR to the electric grid. In the aftermath of the
hurricane, PREPA worked to restore the two transmission lines that
connect the AES PR plant with the rest of the island. The first of the
lines was restored in December 2017. The second line was not fully
repaired until April 2018. Since then, the AES PR plant has been
running at close to full capacity as well as at a nearly 100%
availability factor, underscoring the importance of the plant to
system reliability on the island.

PREPA had stopped making any payments to AES PR from September right
after the storm until December 2017. This nearly four-month delay in
payment put stress on the Project's liquidity, particularly since the
Project had large debt maturities during 2017. Specifically, AES PR
had scheduled debt service due on its senior secured bonds of $6.8
million on December 1, 2018, as well as $32.2 million due under its
senior secured bank facilities on November 30, 2018. The $32.2 million
payment due under the bank facilities included a large balloon
principal payment on a term loan as well as the final payment under a
drawn working capital facility. AES PR made its scheduled debt service
payment of $6.8 million due to its bondholders in December from its
bond debt service reserve account. And while AES PR had the internal
resources to make the $32.2 million bank debt service payment, AES PR
and the banks signed a forbearance agreement to extend the maturity
date on the bank facilities to March 23, 2018, in an effort to
conserve its internal liquidity owing to PREPA's weak and highly
uncertain liquidity profile.

Since December 2017, PREPA has paid a total of about $209.1 million to
AES PR, with the Project using a portion of these proceeds to make the
final principal payments on the term loan and the working capital
facility before the March 23 maturity date. At this time, AES PR is
current on all of its debt obligations.

The rating action further recognizes the improved liquidity at AES PR,
which consists of fully funded debt service reserves and a more robust
operating cash position. The bond debt service reserve account
currently has $13.7 million, an amount sufficient to cover the next
two bond debt service payments of $6.8 million each due December 1,
2018 and June 1, 2019. In addition, according to management, there is
enough cash in the bank debt service reserve to cover the next two
bank debt service payments. Additionally, AES PR is funding the
required bond debt service payment account and bank debt service
payment account on a monthly basis as required under the respective
indentures, which helps to ensure that debt service can be satisfied
without touching either of the debt service reserves. Also, cash in
the operating accounts is sufficient to cover operating expenses (coal
fuel payments, operations and maintenance, payroll, etc.) through
November 2018 even if PREPA makes no further payments. Its
expectation, however, is that AES PR will continue to receive payments
from PREPA for delivered power and capacity, albeit perhaps late, as
the AES PR plant remains one of the most cost effective generation
resources on the island. In that regard and in line with the stable
outlook, its expectation is that the Project will have enough money to
make the debt service payments without touching the debt service
reserves and will be able to continue to pay debt service and fund
operations on a going forward basis.

The rating action also considers its expectations of improved
economics and financial metrics at the Project. Moody's calculates
that the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) will improve to the range
of 1.4x-2.0x on a proforma basis over the next several years from
about 1.0x in 2017, even with no growth in cash flow. Total debt
service (bond and bank) is scheduled to decline to about $40 million
in 2018 from over $100 million in 2017, enabling AES PR to comfortably
meet this year's annual debt service. While debt service will rise
again to about $72 million in 2022 as the bonds begin to amortize,
Moody's calculates that that the DSCR will remain above 1.0x even with
the scheduled 2020 decline in the capacity payment from PREPA to AES
PR under the PPA.

Having said that, the Caa1 rating affirmation incorporates a number of
uncertainties for AES PR. For one, PREPA, the PPA contract
counterparty, remains in bankruptcy. Although PREPA recently announced
that it had reached a preliminary restructuring agreement with most of
its bondholders, there remains uncertainty about the timing and final
terms of PREPA's bankruptcy restructuring. Moreover, PREPA's liquidity
remains weak, and as such, there remains ongoing uncertainty about
PREPA's ability to pay its obligations on a sustained and timely
basis.

In addition, Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and
Economic Stabilization Act (PROMESA) gives PREPA the ability to reject
contracts, including the PPA between PREPA and AES PR. While this risk
cannot be ruled out, Moody's also believe that the competitiveness of
AES PR may limit the degree to which PREPA pursues this option. This
is particularly the case given the decline in the capacity payment
under the PPA that begins in 2020, which ultimately enhances the
asset's competitiveness. Moody's notes that the PREPA Fiscal Plan,
which was approved by the PROMESA Oversight Board on April 19, 2018,
lists contract renegotiations as one of the ways for PREPA to lower
the cost of fuel and purchased power (along with generation
efficiency/flexibility investment, dispatch optimization, preventative
maintenance, improving fuel mix and new generation resource
procurement).

For these reasons, the Caa1 rating remains three notches above the
rating of the off-taker. While the probability of default risk remains
heightened at AES PR owing to the weakness of the off-taker, the Caa1
rating incorporates a high degree of recovery for bondholders in the
event that a AES PR default occurred. Other secondary considerations
include the strength of the collateral package that includes a
security interest in all of AES PR's rights, title and interest in the
Project, including contracts, revenues, personal property, along with
the various reserves.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects the improved prospects for AES PR
bondholders from recent events, such as the re-establishment of more
regular payments from PREPA and the Project's improved liquidity. In
addition, the stable outlook reflects the declining debt service,
which increases the ability for AES PR to cover its obligations on a
going forward basis barring any unexpected developments. Moody's
believes that the AES PR plant is a cost effective source of power for
PREPA, and as such believe that the PPA between AES PR and PREPA is
expected to remain materially in place.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - UP

The rating could face upward pressure if AES PR's economics improve
and PREPA continues to make regular payments on a sustained basis. The
rating could also go up if the PREPA rating goes up and the utility
makes further progress on executing a comprehensive restructuring, and
it is clear that the PPA with AES PR will remain largely intact under
Title III once PREPA emerges from its restructuring.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - DOWN

The Project's rating could face downward pressure if PREPA were
actually to take steps to reject the AES PR PPA in its entirety. The
rating could also face negative action if there were to be operational
problems at the Project resulting in lower revenues and higher
expenses, resulting in weaker financial metrics.

AES PR, an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of The AES Corporation
(AES: Ba1, stable), owns and operates a 454 megawatt (MW) coal-fired
cogeneration facility located on the southeastern coast of Puerto
Rico. The Project sells all of its firm energy and capacity pursuant
to a 25-year power purchase agreement to the PREPA, a public
corporation and governmental agency of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
(Ca negative). The Project began operating in 2002.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Power Generation
Projects published in June 2018.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Migrants Take Maduro's Offer to Fly Home From Peru
-------------------------------------------------------------
dw.com reports that around 100 Venezuelan migrants in Peru flew back
to their home country, taking part in an initiative proposed by
Caracas to mitigate the effects of mass immigration.  Over 1.6 million
people have left Venezuela since the country's economy started its
downward spiral in 2015, according to dw.com.

Many of the migrants traveling home complained of xenophobia against
Venezuelans as Peru and other countries in the region cope with the
influx, the report relays.

"I'm going to look for a job," 42-year-old Miguel Materano told the
AFP news agency, the report discloses.  "The government has promised
that it will help us," he added.

The group of 97 migrants, including 22 children and four pregnant
women, was initially put up in a Lima hotel near the Venezuelan
embassy, where they received food and medical care, according to a
Caracas representative, the report relays.  They later flew for
Caracas at the expense of Venezuelan government, the report says.

The free flight home and the job assistance are a part of the "Return
to Homeland" program announced by the socialist President Nicolas
Maduro earlier this year, the report notes.

"Venezuelans won't be slaves to anyone in the world!" he proclaimed,
describing the exodus as another ploy of his political opponents to
weaken his government, the report says.

As economic crisis in Venezuela continues, around 4,000 people leave
the country every day to cross into Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and
Brazil, the report notes.  Migration officials from the four nations
are due to meet in Bogota to decide on a regional response, the report
adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
June 1, 2018, S&P Global Ratings, on May 29, 2018, removed its
long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Venezuela from CreditWatch with negative implications and affirmed
them at 'CCC- /C'. The outlook on the long-term local currency
rating is negative. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'SD/D'
long- and short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on
Venezuela. S&P's transfer and convertibility assessment remains at
'CC'.


                            ***********

Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.  Send
announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.


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