/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/180716.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Monday, July 16, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 139 Headlines A R G E N T I N A PROVINCE OF ENTRE RIOS: S&P Affirms 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable B R A Z I L CEMIG GERACAO: Fitch Rates Proposed Reopening Eurobonds 'B'/'RR4' OGX PETROLEO: Batista Gets 30-Year Jail Sentence for Corruption USJ ACUCAR: S&P Lowers Corp Credit Rating to 'CCC', Outlook Neg. C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ARABELLA PETROLEUM: Trustee, Committee File Chap. 11 Plan Outline P E R U CHINA FISHERY: Copeinca Expects to Repay $6MM Loan on August 15 CHINA FISHERY: CFPG Peru Trustee Files Lawsuit Against HSBC P U E R T O R I C O INTRADE LOGISTICS: Case Summary & 11 Unsecured Creditors KONA GRILL: Hires BDO USA as Auditors S DIAMOND STEEL: Aug. 15 Plan Confirmation Hearing YORAVI INVESTMENT: Disclosure Statement Hearing Set for Aug. 10 V E N E Z U E L A PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Accused of Fraud by ConocoPhillips PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Proposed Bankruptcy Law Faces Challenges X X X X X X X X X * BOND PRICING: For the Week From July 9 to July 13, 2018 - - - - - ================= A R G E N T I N A ================= PROVINCE OF ENTRE RIOS: S&P Affirms 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable ----------------------------------------------------------- On July 11, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term foreign and local currency issuer credit ratings on the Argentine province of Entre Rios. The outlook remains stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' issue-level ratings on the province's senior unsecured debt. OUTLOOK S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Entre Rios will continue to pursue prudent fiscal policies and reduce its fiscal deficit in the next 12 to 18 months. However, we expect that its low capital expenditures (capex) relative to total spending and its limited revenue flexibility will persist, especially in the context of slower economic growth and higher inflation in Argentina. We expect the debt burden to remain moderate, at around 33% of operating revenues in the next three years, although it will likely be highly vulnerable to exchange rate volatility. We believe interest payments will probably rise to 3.4% of operating revenues (on average) due to increased interest rates in Argentina and pressure from the Argentine peso depreciation." Downside scenario S&P said, "We could lower our ratings on Entre Rios within the next 12 months if the province is unable to improve its finances as we expect, posting persistent fiscal deficits. This could occur if the administration can't rein in spending or if Argentina's economy worsens over the next couple of years, reducing the province's revenues. Additionally, a scenario where the province relies extensively on significant levels of short-term debt could pressure the ratings downwards." Upside scenario S&P said, "We could raise our ratings on Entre Rios in the next 12 months if we observe a faster-than-expected fiscal consolidation, with operating surpluses near 5% or if it posts a surplus after capex, allowing for better long-term fiscal planning. A stronger domestic institutional framework for local and regional governments (LRGs) could also result in an upgrade if it's accompanied by improvements in Entre Rios' individual credit profile." RATIONALE S&P said, "Our 'B' ratings on Entre Rios reflect its individual credit profile and the institutional framework in which it operates. Entre Rios, like all LRGs in Argentina, operates under what we view as a very volatile and underfunded institutional framework. At the same time, the province's negative fiscal results, its limited flexibility to reduce expenditures or raise revenues, and its weak financial management constrain the ratings. On the other hand, its moderate debt levels and low contingent liabilities are rating strengths." Efforts to contain spending and additional transfers will reduce the fiscal deficit and keep debt at moderate levels S&P said, "We expect Entre Rios to keep reducing its fiscal gap in the next three years, despite Argentina's challenging macroeconomic conditions. In our base case, we expect positive operating results by 2019, compared to a deficit of 1.6% of operating revenues in 2017. We assume the province will continue to tightly control spending and keep trying to improve tax collection. In addition, Entre Rios will benefit from the steady transfer of 15% of co-participation funds, as agreed between the province and the federal government. We don't think that the December 2017 tax reform, which changed the rates of some activities in the gross receipt taxes, harmed the province's finances. Therefore, we assume its own source revenues will keep growing in line with the nominal GDP growth." "Under these assumptions, we expect modifiable revenues to remain at 48.6% of total revenues in the next three years. We believe the province's ability to raise own source revenues will be constrained by the commitment to reduce the tax burden, which it assumed when it signed the fiscal pact at the end of 2017. This pact agreed to decrease the gross receipt and stamp tax. In terms of expenses, we believe Entre Rios' flexibility is also limited, given that half of current spending relates to payroll and interest payments while capital spending is already low. In line with Entre Rios' goal of fiscal consolidation, capex over total spending decreased from 9.0% in 2015 to 6.0% in 2017. In the next three years, we expect capex over total spending to average 5.5%, leading to deficits after capex of 2.4% of total spending in the same period. However, the recent challenging macroeconomic conditions will accelerate the need for stronger fiscal consolidation at the central government and provincial levels, which could result in even lower capex than expected in the provinces, including Entre Rios, in the future. "We expect tax-supported debt to represent 30% of the province's operating revenues in 2020 and interest payments to average 3.4% of operating revenues in the next three years. As of December 2017, Entre Rios' direct debt was ARS25.6 billion, or 34% of that year's operating revenues. In February 2017, the province issued its first international bond for $350 million, which is due 2025. It reopened the bond in November 2017, and the province obtained an additional $150 million. The issuances raised debt denominated in foreign currency to 57% of the total stock; and we believe the province could be exposed to some risk given that current conditions both locally and internationally could make access to debt markets more challenging for Argentinean entities going forward. On Sept. 30, 2018, the province has to repay ARS900 million to the sovereign. We believe the province could rely on short-term debt to cover this maturing payment, as it did until December 2017, when it canceled all outstanding short-term debt. In our view, large levels of short-term debt could pressure the rating downwards. "In our view, Entre Rios' contingent liabilities are low. Eleven public companies aren't consolidated in the provincial budget. We consider them as self-supporting entities because they don't need financial support from the province, and are unlikely to receive support from it in the future. The largest of these entities are the electricity distribution company ENERSA, the insurance company Instituto Aut†rquico Provincial del Seguro Entre R°os, and Ente Interprovincial del T£nel Subfluvial, which operates the tunnel that connects Entre Rios with Santa Fe. The debt of the eleven companies amounts to ARS4.2 billion, which is equivalent to 8% of the province's operating revenues. "We estimate that Entre Rios' free cash and liquid assets will cover almost 30% of its estimated debt service of ARS8.9 billion in 2018. We also believe that the province will be able and willing to meet its debt service obligations using both internal and external sources. Although the province obtained financing in 2017, its access to external financing remains limited. Our assessment uses our evaluation of the developing domestic capital markets as well as our assessment of the domestic banking system. For the latter, our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) for Argentina is at group '8'. We group our BICRAs, which evaluate and compare global banking systems, on a scale from '1' to '10', ranging from what we view as the lowest-risk banking systems (group '1') to the highest-risk (group '10'). "Fiscal prudency somewhat offsets challenging economic conditions and a volatile and underfunded institutional framework Entre Rios' administration (Frente Para la Victoria, 2016-2020) has made progress in reducing its fiscal deficit. During 2017 and the first half of 2018, we've seen the province's revenue and expenditure management improve. We believe the financial management has adequate expertise and sufficient transparency. However, long-term capital and financial planning, as well as debt and liquidity management, remain limited. In the last few years, the province's planning focused on the short to medium term, and it mainly used debt to cover liquidity needs. "The province's GDP per capita is similar to that of the sovereign. We estimate that it averaged $12,628 during 2015-2017, compared to the national average of $14,048 during the same period. We expect Entre Rios' economy to perform in line with the sovereign; growing by 1% and 2% in 2018 and 2019, respectively. Entre Rios' main economic activities are related to services, especially wholesale and retail trade, and the food industry. Entre Rios is Argentina's main poultry and citrus producer. "We continue to view the institutional framework for Argentine LRGs as very volatile and underfunded. However, we believe the outcome of reforms and the pace of their implementation are becoming more predictable. This comes amid increased dialogue between LRGs and the national government to address various fiscal and economic challenges that we expect to remain in the short to medium term." In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected in the Ratings Score Snapshot above. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action. RATINGS LIST Ratings Affirmed Entre Rios (Province of) Issuer Credit Rating B/Stable/-- Senior Unsecured B =========== B R A Z I L =========== CEMIG GERACAO: Fitch Rates Proposed Reopening Eurobonds 'B'/'RR4' ----------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'B'/'RR4' rating to Cemig Geracao e Transmissao S.A.'s (Cemig GT) proposed reopening of up to USD500 million of its USD1 billion eurobonds due 2024. The reopening will be unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais (Cemig). The company will use the proceeds to repay certain existing debt and improve liquidity position. Fitch currently rates Companhia Energetica de Minas Gerais (Cemig) and its wholly owned subsidiaries Cemig Distribuicao S.A. (Cemig D) and Cemig Geracao e Transmissao S.A. (Cemig GT)'s Long-term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) 'B' and Long-term National Scale Rating 'BBB-(bra)' with a Stable Outlook. Cemig, Cemig D and Cemig GT's ratings reflect the group's aggressive consolidated financial profile and pressured liquidity. As of March 31, 2018, the group has to manage short-term obligations of BRL2.6 billion and roughly BRL600 million of the remainder portion of the put option related to Light S.A.'s shares. Positively, Cemig was able to deal with challenging refinancing needs since the end of 2017, as the group renegotiated around BRL3.4 billion with bank; issued the USD1 billion eurobonds; had a capital injection of BRL1.3 billion and sold around BRL 700 million in Transmissora Alian?a de Energia Eletrica S.A. (Taesa)'s shares. Nevertheless, delays in completing its strategy for asset disposal are having a negative impact on the group's ability to improve its financial metrics on a sustainable basis. The ratings also incorporate the expected additional EBITDA, by around BRL400 million to BRL500 million annually, coming from Cemig D's tariff review process, which is viewed as positive to support the group's deleveraging process. The expected better operational results of the distribution segment will help the net adjusted leverage to be around 3.5x-4.2x in the next four years, according to Fitch's base case scenario, which is low for the IDR of the a company in the power sector. Negatively, the high interest payments should continue to pressure the group's free cash flow (FCF). Cemig and its subsidiaries' credit profiles are analyzed on a consolidated basis due to cross-default clauses and cash dynamics. The group has low to moderate business risk, supported by low competition and positive asset diversification, mainly into power generation, transmission and distribution segments, being the latter the most volatile. Positively, Cemig has a relevant asset base in the Brazilian electric sector, including shared control in several companies with significant market value. The IDRs also factor in the existence of political risk, due to Cemig's condition as a state-owned company, as well as a moderate regulatory risk for the Brazilian power sector and hydrology risk currently above historical average. The Recovery Rating of Cemig GT's eurobond issuance of 'RR4' reflects the bulk of Cemig group's assets being in the Brazilian jurisdiction, which means limiting recovery prospects at the range of 31%-50% in the event of default, given the group's cash flow generation and assets portfolio. KEY RATING DRIVERS Higher EBITDA: Fitch believes that Cemig's consolidated FCF will be positive at around BRL160 million in 2018 and BRL300 million in 2019, as Cemig D is expected to obtain annual additional EBITDA of BRL400 million-BRL500 million after the implementation of the fourth tariff review cycle, concluded in May 2018. The higher EBITDA should contribute to boost the group's cash flow from operations (CFFO). Cemig D's reported EBITDA of BRL831 million in 2017 is far from the regulatory EBITDA of BRL1.7 billion, so the company needs to improve efficiency. In the LTM ended March 31, 2018, consolidated CFFO was negative BRL880 million due to the impact of non-manageable costs of around BRL1.1 billion at Cemig D, compared with a positive impact of BRL1.6 billion in the year- earlier period. Capex of BRL1.1 billion and BRL540 million in dividend payments resulted in negative FCF of BRL2.5 billion. Moderate Leverage: Fitch expects Cemig's consolidated net adjusted leverage to reduce to the range of 3.5x to 4.2x in the next four years. As of March 31, 2018, Cemig reported consolidated net adjusted debt/adjusted EBITDA of 5.0x after almost 6.0x in 2016. Fitch includes the guarantees of BRL5.9 billion to non- consolidated companies, mainly to the Belo Monte and Santo Antonio hydro plants, and the exercised put option in total adjusted debt. On the other hand, dividends received from non-consolidated investments of BRL390 million were added to EBITDA. Favorable Business Model: The group benefits from diversification of segments and assets, which mitigates operational risks and reduces cash flow volatility. Cemig is one of Brazil's largest power companies, with 8.4 million clients in the distribution segment, 5.7GW of power generation installed capacity and 8.2 thousand of transmission lines. The company is not expected to enter in greenfield projects and in the acquisition of assets, after having historically a very aggressive growth strategy. The debt associated with the acquisitions at relevant levels and strong dividend payments in the past have significantly affected the group's credit quality. Strategic Sector for the Country: In Fitch's analysis, the credit profile of agents in the Brazilian power sector benefits from its strategic importance to sustain the country's economic growth and to foster new investments. The federal government has acted to circumvent systemic problems that impact the cash flow of companies and guided discussions to improve the current regulatory framework in order to reduce the sector's risk. DERIVATION SUMMARY Comparing to peers in the power sector, Cemig presents higher leverage and weaker liquidity than Eletropaulo Metropolitana de Eletricidade de Sao Paulo (Local and Foreign Currency IDRs 'BB') and its affiliated company Light S.A. (Local and Foreign Currency IDRs 'BB-'), despite of its more diversified asset base that tends to reduce operational risks and cash flow volatility. When assessing other Latin American players at the power sector, although Cemig has a larger revenue base, its coverage ratios compare unfavourably with AES Argentina and Genneia, both with Local Currency IDR of 'BB-'. KEY ASSUMPTIONS Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for the issuer include: -- Average energy consumption growth in Cemig D's concession area to increase 2.75% in 2018 and 3% in 2019-2020; -- Positive annual impact of BRL400 million-BRL500 million on Cemig D's EBITDA related to the fourth tariff review cycle; -- Cemig D's non-manageable costs fully passed through tariffs; -- Average consolidated capex of BRL1.5 billion during 2018- 2021; -- Dividend payout of 50% of net income or BRL420 million, considering which one presents the higher amount; -- No cash outflow to pay Light shares put option in 2018. RATING SENSITIVITIES Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive Rating Action. -- Improvement of liquidity with cash/short-term debt higher than 1.0x; -- Maintenance of net adjusted leverage lower than 3.5x; -- Ability to reduce interest rates. Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative Rating Action -- Deterioration of liquidity and reduction in financial flexibility with cash/short-term debt below 0.5x; -- Maintenance of net adjusted leverage higher than 5.0x; -- Perception of lower financial flexibility to meet short-term debt maturities. LIQUIDITY Still Weak Liquidity Profile: Cemig group still has an aggressive liquidity profile despite of the improvements in the last six months through the debt renegotiation with banks, equity injection, eurobond issuance and the sale of Taesa shares. Nevertheless, as of March 31, 2018, the group has faced the challenge of managing short-term obligations of BRL3.2 billion, coming from BRL 2.3 billion of debentures and around BRL600 million of Light's shares put options on November and BRL330 million of local bank debt and others. The group has already paid BRL 800 million debentures in February 2018. The expected additional EBITDA from the distribution segment and potential asset sales may also be important internal sources of liquidity in the next years. As of March 31, 2018, Cemig group's total adjusted debt amounted to BRL20.5 billion (including off- balance-sheet debt of BRL5.9 billion and exercised put option of BRL600 million), while cash and equivalents were BRL842 million. The proposed up to USD 500 million eurobonds re-opening (equivalent to around BRL1.8 billion) is expected to improve the group's liquidity profile. FULL LIST OF RATINGS Fitch currently rates Cemig as follows: Cemig -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B'; -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'B'; -- Long-Term National scale rating 'BBB-(bra)'. Cemig D -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B'; -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'B'; -- Long-Term National scale rating 'BBB-(bra)'; -- BRL1.6 billion senior unsecured debentures due 2018 'BBB-(bra)'. Cemig GT -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR 'B'; -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR 'B'; -- Long-Term National scale rating 'BBB-(bra)'; -- BRL1.4 billion senior unsecured debentures, with two outstanding series due 2019 and 2022, 'BBB-(bra)'; -- USD1 billion eurobonds due 2024 'B/RR4'. The Rating Outlook is Stable. OGX PETROLEO: Batista Gets 30-Year Jail Sentence for Corruption --------------------------------------------------------------- Xinhua reports that Brazilian former billionaire Eike Batista was found guilty of corruption and money laundering and sentenced to 30 years in prison on July 3. The sentence marks a victory for Federal Police in their ongoing anti-corruption investigation, known as Operation Car Wash which began in 2014 after large-scale corruption at both local and federal levels of Brazilian government was uncovered, Xinhua notes. The erstwhile business tycoon was found guilty of paying million- dollar bribes to former Rio de Janeiro state governor Sergio Cabral, in exchange for his company being favored for state government contracts, Xinhua discloses. Mr. Batista's lawyers, as cited by Xinhua, said they would appeal the sentence. Mr. Batista is currently serving house arrest, Xinhua states. According to Xinhua, Mr. Batista will face further charges relating to Operation Car Wash at a later date, meaning his sentence could be added to. The former mining and oil magnate was once Brazil's richest man and the eighth richest man in the world, at one time enjoying a fortune of around USD34 billion, Xinhua relays. However, most of this was lost after OGX, the oil conglomerate Batista headed, was discovered to have forged reports to make their oil fields appear viable, despite the wells being duds, according to Xinhua. Mr. Batista's empire crumbled after the value of OGX plummeted following the discovery of the forgeries, Xinhua discloses. The company defaulted payments and filed for bankruptcy protection in 2013, Xinhua recounts. About OGX Petroleo Based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, OGX Petroleo e Gas Participacoes S.A., now known as Oleo e Gas, is an independent exploration and production company with operations in Latin America. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America on Jan. 22, 2016, Hannah Sheehan at Law360.com reports that a British High Court judge upbraided OGX Petroleo e Gas Participacoes S.A., now known as Oleo e Gas, for omitting evidence in an attempt to escape a London arbitration proceeding brought by two foreign firms. Justice Richard Snowden expressed dismay that OGX Petroleo never revealed that the dispute in arbitration over $78.73 million in unpaid ship charter fees was not subject to the company's reorganization plan, which the Fourth Corporate Court of Rio de Janeiro approved after OGX filed for bankruptcy in Brazil, according to Law360.com. OGX filed for bankruptcy in a business tribunal in Rio de Janeiro on Oct. 30, 2013, case number 0377620-56.2013.8.19.0001. The bankruptcy filing puts US$3.6 billion of dollar bonds into default in the largest corporate debt debacle on record in Latin America. The filing by the oil company that transformed Eike Batista into Brazil's richest man followed a 16-month decline that wiped out more than US$30 billion of his personal fortune. The filing, which in Brazil is called a judicial recovery, follows months of negotiations to restructure the dollar bonds, in which OGX sought to convert debt to equity and secure as much as US$500 million in new funds. OGX said Oct. 29, 2013 that the talks concluded without an agreement. USJ ACUCAR: S&P Lowers Corp Credit Rating to 'CCC', Outlook Neg. ---------------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings lowered its global scale corporate credit rating on USJ Acucar e Alcool S/A (USJ) to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'. The outlook is negative. At the same time, S&P lowered its senior unsecured debt rating to 'CC' from 'CCC-', but kept its recovery rating of '6' on USJ's unsecured debt unchanged. The downgrade reflects S&P's belief that USJ will face significant strains to meet its obligations in the next 6-12 months, which include cash interest payments on its 2021 bond beginning in November 2018, amid the currently unfavorable industry fundamentals and the company's deteriorating operating performance, which hinder USJ's cash generation. USJ posted worse-than-expected operating performance in fiscal 2018 (ended March 31, 2018) due to a steep decline in sugar prices and a drought that shrunk yields at the company's plantations, increasing idle capacity and preventing the company from diluting fixed costs. This, coupled with unexpectedly higher capital expenditures (capex), resulted in a free operating cash flow (FOCF) shortfall of close to R$70 million, weakening credit metrics and increasing refinancing risks compared with our July 2017 assessment. S&P's base-case scenario assumes that the company will be unable to meet its obligations in fiscal 2020, with mounting pressures in May 2019, when it has to service another cash interest coupon from its 2021 bond. Even though USJ has been able to roll over most bank debt as it comes due, its sources of cash won't be enough to cover its uses, especially given the low sugar prices and the depreciation of the Brazilian real, affecting the company's debt, which is mostly dollar-denominated. Absent external factors, such as substantial land sales, capital injection, or considerably stronger industry fundamentals (including higher crushing volumes, and consistently higher sugar and ethanol prices), the company's options would be to default or renegotiate its debt with its bondholders. S&P would most likely consider the latter as a distressed negotiation, which its criteria considers as tantamount to default. ========================== C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ========================== ARABELLA PETROLEUM: Trustee, Committee File Chap. 11 Plan Outline ----------------------------------------------------------------- Morris D. Weiss, the chapter 11 trustee for Arabella Petroleum Company, LLC, and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for APC filed a joint disclosure statement in support of their chapter 11 plan of reorganization, dated June 22, 2018, for APC. Class 4 general unsecured creditors will receive a prorata share of interests in the Liquidating Trust, equivalent to the ratio that their individual Allowed Claim bears to the total of Class 4 Allowed Claims. All assets of the Estate remaining as of the Effective Date, other than as necessary to pay any Allowed Secured Claims, Allowed Priority Claims, allowed Administrative Claims, pre- Effective Date U.S Trustee's fees and a reserve for wind down costs will be transferred to the Liquidating Trust. The Trustee will fund payments under the Plan with Cash on hand. Any Distributions made by the Liquidating Trustee to beneficiaries of the Liquidating Trust will consist only of Trust Assets in accordance with the Trust Agreement. A full-text copy of the Disclosure Statement is available at: http://bankrupt.com/misc/txwb15-70098-752.pdf Attorneys for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors: Kenneth Green, Esq. Blake Hamm, Esq. Carolyn Carollo, Esq. SNOW SPENCE GREEN LLP 2929 Allen Parkway, Suite 2800 Houston, TX 77019 Telephone: (713) 335-4800 Email: kgreen@snowspencelaw.com blakehamm@snowspencelaw.com carolyncarollo@snowspencelaw.com About Arabella Exploration Arabella Exploration, LLC, formed on Oct. 2, 2009, is a wholly- owned subsidiary of Arabella Exploration, Inc., a Cayman Islands corporation. It is an oil and gas exploration company that owns working interests in a number of oil and gas properties and interests. Arabella Exploration filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Case No. 17- 40120) on Jan. 8, 2017. Charles (Chip) Hoebeke, manager, signed the petition. Judge Russell F. Nelms in Ft. Worth, Texas, is the case judge. Raymond W. Battaglia, Esq., of the Law Offices of Ray Battaglia, PLLC, serves as counsel to the Debtor. Miller Johnson serves as Battaglia's co-counsel. Rehmann Turnaround and Receivership's Charles Hoebeke is the Debtor's chief restructuring officer. Arabella Exploration estimated $1 million to $50 million in assets and liabilities. No trustee, examiner or committee has been appointed in the case. On April 4, 2017, Arabella Operating, LLC, filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Case No. 17-41479). The case is being jointly administered with that of Arabella Exploration. ======= P E R U ======= CHINA FISHERY: Copeinca Expects to Repay $6MM Loan on August 15 --------------------------------------------------------------- Jason Smith at Undercurrent News reports that Peruvian fishmeal producer Copeinca will soon repay a $6 million line of credit that it took out on the verge of its parent firm's June 30, 2016 bankruptcy filing. According to Undercurrent News, William Brandt, the trustee overseeing China Fishery's bankruptcy, said in a US court filing the "emergency working capital" loan made on May 30, 2016, by Peru's Cuantica Inversiones to Copeinca, a unit of China Fishery Group, was used to pay "employees, overdue taxes and critical suppliers" allowing it to operate for the 2016 fishing season. The loan carries a 29.3% annual interest rate plus tax, Undercurrent News discloses. Mr. Brandt, as cited by Undercurrent News, said Copeinca has paid Cuantica over $2.6 million in accrued interest in the two years, but plans to use the fishing firm's proceeds from the 2018 anchovy season to fully repay the loan's principal on Aug. 15. He noted that the bankruptcy court's approval is not needed to repay the loan but he was providing notice of his plans "out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of transparency", according to Undercurrent News. Mr. Brandt noted that he "has some concern" that entities affiliated with Hong Kong's Ng family, which ultimately owns China Fishery parent company Pacific Andes International Holdings (PAIH), "may have been involved with the Cuantica Loan", Undercurrent News relates. According to Undercurrent News, Mr. Brandt wrote this could have occurred "either by providing a guarantee for the loan or in some other capacity, but the chapter 11 trustee has not independently investigated the relationship between the Ng family and the Cuantica loan". Mr. Brandt, who was appointed in November 2016 after creditors argued they had lost "trust" in the Ng family's management, has long said that a sale of China Fishery, including Copeinca, is the best way to recoup creditors' losses in PAIH's bankruptcy, Undercurrent News recounts. Interest in China Fishery, which is expected to fetch over $1 billion in a sale, has whittled down to around a half dozen serious bidders, according to Undercurrent News. Mr. Brandt said in June that expects to receive formal offers in the coming weeks although several potential buyers have asked for a slowdown in the sales process given recent political turmoil in Peru, Undercurrent News notes. About China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman) China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman) and its affiliates sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 16-11895) on June 30, 2016. In the petition signed by CEO Ng Puay Yee, China Fishery Group estimated its assets at $500 million to $1 billion and debt at $10 million to $50 million. The cases are assigned to Judge James L. Garrity Jr. Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP has been tapped to serve as lead bankruptcy counsel for China Fishery and its affiliates other than CFG Peru Investments Pte. Limited (Singapore). Weil Gotshal replaces Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C., the law firm initially hired by the Debtors. The Debtors have also tapped Klestadt Winters Jureller Southard & Stevens, LLP, as conflict counsel; Goldin Associates, LLC, as financial advisor; RSR Consulting LLC as restructuring consultant; and Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions, LLC, as administrative agent. Kwok Yih & Chan serves as special counsel. On Nov. 10, 2016, William Brandt, Jr., was appointed as Chapter 11 trustee for CFG Peru Investments Pte. Limited (Singapore), one of the Debtors. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP serves as the trustee's bankruptcy counsel; Hogan Lovells US LLP serves as special counsel; and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, serves as special litigation counsel. CHINA FISHERY: CFPG Peru Trustee Files Lawsuit Against HSBC ----------------------------------------------------------- Cliff White at Seafood Source reports that a lawsuit suit filed by CFG Peru trustee William A. Brandt, Jr., has accused Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) of malicious behavior that contributed to the insolvency of seafood giant China Fishery. According to Seafood Source, the lawsuit was filed on June 29, the same day as a separate lawsuit alleging that HSBC forced Hong Kong-based China Fishery and its subsidiaries, including Pacific Andes and CFG Peru Singapore, to make so-called "avoidable transfers" worth more than USD22.6 million (EUR19.4 million), directly contributing to its bankruptcy filing in 2016. Mr. Brandt was appointed by U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge James Garrity in November 2016 to act as an impartial arbiter for the restructuring of CFG Peru's assets and business during China Fishery's Chapter 11 reorganization, Seafood Source recounts. CFG Peru is a holding company for three anchovy fishing and processing operations in Peru, and is considered the most lucrative asset of China Fishery, which at one time was ranked as the 12th-largest seafood company in the world, Seafood Source notes. Mr. Brandt's suit claims HSBC's conduct gives rise to common law claims for negligence, breach of duty, and tortious interference, Seafood Source relays. The 46-page complaint, the public portion of which is partially redacted to protect sensitive materials, outlines a narrative that alleges HSBC led an effort to undermine Pacific Andes' operations and valuation, either out of malice or gross negligence, Seafood Source notes. Mr. Brandt's suit primarily argues that the value of CFG Peru was hurt by HSBC's actions, Seafood Source relaes. The suit claims that China Fishery received indications of interest in a sale of the CFG Peru's assets for USD1.7 billion in the fall of 2015, and that in November 2015, China Fishery's management was in advanced negotiations with two investment groups regarding the acquisition of some or all of the CF Group, Seafood Source discloses. Furthermore, the suit claims China Fishery officials had also received signals from a group of lenders that included HSBC, Rabobank, Standard Chartered Bank, China Citic Bank, and DBS Bank, indicating they all would soon approve an extension of credit to the company, according to Seafood Source. However, HSBC -- acting alone and without the knowledge or approval of its fellow creditors -- initiated an action in a Hong Kong court on November 25, 2015, seeking the winding up of China Fishery and the appointment of joint provisional liquidators (JPLs), Seafood Source relays, citing the lawsuit. "The appointment of the Hong Kong JPLs and the specter of liquidation altered the environment in which the sale was being conducted, inviting lower bids," Seafood Source quotes Mr. Brandt as saying in the lawsuit. "The JPLs' appointment also damaged the prospects for a value-maximizing sale for the Peruvian Business. In November 2015, two investors interested in acquiring the CF Group for as much as USD 1.7 billion were in discussions with the Pacific Andes Group. A memorandum of understanding was expected to be signed on November 26, 2015. HSBC commenced the proceedings the day before, on November 25, 2015, and scuttled those negotiations." Mr. Brandt alleges furthermore, HSBC's actions scared away local lenders in Peru, forcing China Fishery to accept financing at a much higher cost and with painful stipulations, according to Seafood Source. About China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman) China Fishery Group Limited (Cayman) and its affiliates sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 16-11895) on June 30, 2016. In the petition signed by CEO Ng Puay Yee, China Fishery Group estimated its assets at $500 million to $1 billion and debt at $10 million to $50 million. The cases are assigned to Judge James L. Garrity Jr. Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP has been tapped to serve as lead bankruptcy counsel for China Fishery and its affiliates other than CFG Peru Investments Pte. Limited (Singapore). Weil Gotshal replaces Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C., the law firm initially hired by the Debtors. The Debtors have also tapped Klestadt Winters Jureller Southard & Stevens, LLP, as conflict counsel; Goldin Associates, LLC, as financial advisor; RSR Consulting LLC as restructuring consultant; and Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions, LLC, as administrative agent. Kwok Yih & Chan serves as special counsel. On Nov. 10, 2016, William Brandt, Jr., was appointed as Chapter 11 trustee for CFG Peru Investments Pte. Limited (Singapore), one of the Debtors. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP serves as the trustee's bankruptcy counsel; Hogan Lovells US LLP serves as special counsel; and Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, serves as special litigation counsel. ==================== P U E R T O R I C O ==================== INTRADE LOGISTICS: Case Summary & 11 Unsecured Creditors -------------------------------------------------------- Debtor: Intrade Logistics Corp. State Road 865 Km. 5.4 Lot A-2 Candelaria Arenas Ward Toa Baja, PR 00950 Business Description: Headquartered in Toa Baja, Puerto Rico, Intrade Logistics Corp. is in the wine and distilled beverages business. Chapter 11 Petition Date: July 5, 2018 Case No.: 18-03828 Court: United States Bankruptcy Court District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan) Debtor's Counsel: Charles A. Cuprill Hernandez, Esq. CHARLES A CURPILL, PSC LAW OFFICES 356 Calle Fortaleza Second Floor San Juan, PR 00901 Tel: 787 977-0515 E-mail: ccuprill@cuprill.com Total Assets as of July 5, 2018: $1.13 million Total Liabilities as of July 5, 2018: $1.88 million The petition was signed by Rolando Fernandez, president. A full-text copy of the petition containing, among other items, a list of the Debtor's 11 unsecured creditors is available for free at: http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb18-03828.pdf KONA GRILL: Hires BDO USA as Auditors ------------------------------------- The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of Kona Grill, Inc., has engaged BDO USA, LLP as the Company's independent registered public accounting firm. During the Company's two most recent fiscal years and the subsequent interim period through July 10, 2018, neither the Company nor anyone on its behalf consulted with BDO with respect to either (i) the application of accounting principles to a specified transaction, either completed or proposed, or the type of audit opinion that might be rendered on the Company's consolidated financial statements, and no written report or oral advice was provided to the Company that BDO concluded was an important factor considered by the Company in reaching a decision as to the accounting, auditing, or financial reporting issue or (ii) any matter that was the subject of either a "disagreement". About Kona Grill Kona Grill, Inc., headquartered in Scottsdale, Arizona, Kona Grill, Inc. - http://www.konagrill.com/- currently owns and operates 46 restaurants in 23 states and Puerto Rico. Additionally, Kona Grill has three restaurants that operate under a franchise agreement in Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Vaughan, Canada and Monterrey, Mexico. Kona Grill incurred a net loss of $23.43 million in 2017 and a net loss of $21.62 million in 2016. As of March 31, 2018, Kona Grill had $87.01 million in total assets, $83.84 million in total liabilities and $3.16 million in total stockholders' equity. The Company has incurred losses resulting in an accumulated deficit of $79.7 million, has a net working capital deficit of $7.6 million and outstanding debt of $37.8 million as of Dec. 31, 2017. The Company said in its 2017 Annual Report that these conditions together with recent debt covenant violations and subsequent debt covenant waivers and debt amendments, raise substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern. S DIAMOND STEEL: Aug. 15 Plan Confirmation Hearing -------------------------------------------------- Bankruptcy Judge Brenda K. Martin issued an order approving S Diamond Steel, Inc.'s second amended disclosure statement referring to its second amended plan. The hearing to consider the confirmation of the Second Amended Plan will be held at the United States Bankruptcy Court, 230 N. First Avenue, 7th Floor, Courtroom 701, Phoenix, Arizona on August 15, 2018 at 11 a.m. Ballots accepting or rejecting the plan must be received by the Plan Proponent at least seven days prior to the hearing date set for the confirmation of the plan. The last day for filing with the Court and serving written objections to confirmation of the plan is fixed at seven days prior to the hearing date set for confirmation of the plan. As previously reported by the Troubled Company Reporter, the Second Amended Disclosure Statement provides that the Debtor and creditor Board of Trustees of the California Ironworkers Field Pension Trust have entered into a Settlement Agreement, and a motion to approve the same has been filed with the Court. A full-text copy of the Second Amended Disclosure Statement is available at: http://bankrupt.com/misc/azb2-16-07846-246.pdf A full-text copy of the Second Amended Plan is available at: http://bankrupt.com/misc/azb2-16-07846-247.pdf About S Diamond Steel S Diamond Steel, Inc., based in Phoenix, Arizona, has been in business as a Steel fabrication and erection contractor primarily in the states of Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and California since 2001. Since 2001, S Diamond has also worked in other states as well as Puerto Rico. The Debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D. Ariz. Case No. 16-07846) on July 11, 2016. The petition was signed by Matthew Miles Stevens, president. The case is assigned to Judge Brenda K. Martin. Allan NewDelman, Esq., at Allan D. NewDelman P.C. serves as the Debtor's legal counsel. Guy W. Bluff, Esq., at Bluff & Associates represents the Debtor in connection with a $1.9 million claim filed by the Board of Trustees of the California Ironworkers Field Pension Trust in November last year. The Debtor disclosed $1.59 million in total assets and $5.58 million in total liabilities. No official committee of unsecured creditors has been appointed in the Debtor's case. YORAVI INVESTMENT: Disclosure Statement Hearing Set for Aug. 10 --------------------------------------------------------------- The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico is set to hold a hearing on August 10 to consider approval of the disclosure statement, which explains the Chapter 11 plan of reorganization for Yoravi Investment, Inc. The hearing will be held at 9:30 a.m., at Courtroom 3. Under the proposed plan, creditors holding Class 1 general unsecured claims will be paid 100% of their allowed claims in five years, plus interest at the rate of 4.25% per annum. The total amount of general unsecured claims is approximately $15,641.71. Class 1 is impaired. The plan will be funded by cash on hand on the effective Date, and future earnings of the reorganized company, according to Yoravi's disclosure statement. A copy of the disclosure statement is available for free at http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb17-05446-124.pdf About Yoravi Investment Yoravi Investments, Inc., owns a real estate property at Centro Comercial Turabo Gardens valued at $1.10 million. Yoravi Investments sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 17-05446) on Aug. 1, 2017. In the petition signed by Rafael E. Acosta Santiago, vice-president and treasurer, the Debtor disclosed $1.15 million in assets and $714,000 in liabilities. Judge Edward A. Godoy presides over the case. The Debtor tapped Godreau & Gonzalez Law, LLC, as its bankruptcy counsel, and Enrique Peral Soler, Esq., as special counsel. ================= V E N E Z U E L A ================= PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Accused of Fraud by ConocoPhillips ---------------------------------------------------------- Tom Jones at Latin Lawyer reports that US energy multinational ConocoPhillips has accused Venezuela's state-run oil company PDVSA of fraudulently trying to shield the potential proceeds of a billion-dollar fraud litigation in Florida from the reach of its arbitral creditors. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on March 19, 2018, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.(PDVSA)'s ratings to C from Ca. Moody's also lowered the company's baseline credit assessment (BCA) to c from ca. PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Proposed Bankruptcy Law Faces Challenges ---------------------------------------------------------------- Jose Ignacio Hernandez at Americas Quarterly reports that a National Assembly-proposed bankruptcy law shows the depths of the challenges PDVSA faces. Venezuela's oil industry is in a state of collapse: PDVSA, the state-oil firm, is strapped for cash and facing intense pressure from international creditors, Americas Quarterly notes discloses. Production at the company has fallen by 38 percent since 2016, Americas Quarterly notes. Against that panorama, members of the opposition-controlled National Assembly have introduced legislation to address a complex patchwork of laws that leave PDVSA unable to seek relief from creditors through bankruptcy procedures, Americas Quarterly relates. This last-ditch effort to pull PDVSA from the brink faces long odds: Even if it's approved by the Assembly, President Nicolas Maduro's Supreme Court, or his National Constituent Assembly, will likely declare it null, Americas Quarterly states. But the fact that the legislation is being debated at all is a sign of progress -- one that could be meaningful to Venezuela's eventual economic recovery, Americas Quarterly notes. The seizure of oil assets would only make it more difficult for Venezuela to emerge from its political, economic and humanitarian crisis, according to Americas Quarterly. PDVSA has struggled to ship to China, for example, since the U.S. oil firm ConocoPhillips took over crucial assets in the Caribbean after winning a $2 billion arbitration award in an international court, Americas Quarterly relays. It doesn't help that "most of the oil produced does not generate cash flow to PDVSA," in the words of energy expert Francisco Monaldi, Americas Quarterly discloses. According to Americas Quarterly, the decline in production has aggravated cash-flow problems, which are already severe due in part to the government's oil-for-cash commitments to countries like Russia and China. To complicate matters further, the U.S. government recently expanded sanctions to target PDVSA's factoring operations, a process that helps oil and gas companies increase cash flow, Americas Quarterly states. The National Assembly's law would give the company some breathing room, Americas Quarterly says. The proposal calls for a special bankruptcy regime for state-owned enterprises like PDVSA, since it is unclear how existing bankruptcy laws should currently be applied, according to Americas Quarterly. The proposed law would ensure non-discriminatory treatment among PDVSA's creditors, as well as compliance with due process standards following the UN's general guidelines, Americas Quarterly notes. This would allow PDVSA to request the recognition of a domestic bankruptcy procedure before any court in countries in which the company has assets, Americas Quarterly relays. Following other similar regulations, the special law could also create a procedure by which PDVSA, under the control of the court, would be able to negotiate a debt restructuring with a majority of its bondholders, Americas Quarterly says. The National Assembly is expected to approve the law in the coming months, Americas Quarterly discloses. Unfortunately, the government-controlled Supreme Court or National Constituent Assembly would likely declare it null, as they have done with other laws, Americas Quarterly states. In the meantime, PDVSA's assets overseas will continue to lack special protection and, accordingly, they will be subject to claims that could aggravate the company's production problems, according to Americas Quarterly. Claims may be presented not only by PDVSA's creditors, but also by creditors who own government debt and argue that PDVSA is an "alter ego" of the government, Americas Quarterly relays. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on March 19, 2018, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.(PDVSA)'s ratings to C from Ca. Moody's also lowered the company's baseline credit assessment (BCA) to c from ca. ================= X X X X X X X X X ================= * BOND PRICING: For the Week From July 9 to July 13, 2018 ---------------------------------------------------------- Issuer Name Cpn Price Maturity Country Curr ----------- --- ----- -------- ------- --- BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt 0.518 62.07 KY EUR AES Tiete Energia SA 6.7842 1.109 4/15/2024 BR BRL Argentina Bogar Bonds 2 39.36 2/4/2018 AR ARS Automotores Gildemeister 8.25 73.25 5/24/2021 CL USD Automotores Gildemeister 6.75 67 1/15/2023 CL USD Automotores Gildemeister 8.25 73.25 5/24/2021 CL USD Automotores Gildemeister 6.75 65.5 1/15/2023 CL USD CA La Electricidad 8.5 63.664 4/10/2018 VE USD Caixa Geral De Depositos 1.439 63.167 KY EUR Caixa Geral De Depositos 1.469 KY EUR CSN Islands XII Corp 7 68 BR USD CSN Islands XII Corp 7 66.266 BR USD Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 6 53.225 10/25/2041 PA USD Decimo Primer 4.54 43.127 10/25/2041 PA USD Dolomite Capital 13.217 73.108 12/20/2019 CN ZAR Enel Americas SA 5.75 56.172 6/15/2022 CL CLP Gol Linhas Aereas SA 10.75 35.861 2/12/2023 BR USD Gol Linhas Aereas SA 10.75 35.601 2/12/2023 BR USD Inversora Electrica 6.5 67.625 9/26/2017 AR USD Inversora Electrica 6.5 67.625 9/26/2017 AR USD MIE Holdings Corp 7.5 64.78 4/25/2019 HK USD MIE Holdings Corp 7.5 64.982 4/25/2019 HK USD NB Finance Ltd 3.88 61.816 2/7/2035 KY EUR Noble Holding 7.7 74.433 4/1/2025 KY USD Noble Holding 5.25 56.279 3/15/2042 KY USD Noble Holding 8.7 71.881 4/1/2045 KY USD Noble Holding 6.2 60.129 8/1/2040 KY USD Noble Holding 6.05 58.38 3/1/2041 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.5 42.5 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.125 56.938 6/26/2022 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7 68.053 4/21/2020 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.125 41.366 6/26/2042 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 4.375 40.002 4/25/2025 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.25 39.211 6/27/2029 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6 44.75 4/5/2023 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.25 39.018 6/27/2029 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.5 42.95 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 4.375 40.363 4/25/2025 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.125 41.635 6/26/2042 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6 52.625 4/5/2023 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.125 55.873 6/26/2022 KY USD Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7 67.368 4/21/2020 KY USD Petroleos de Venezuela 8.5 74.5 10/27/2020 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.458 5/16/2024 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.517 11/15/2026 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 9.75 35.677 5/17/2035 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 9 39.279 11/17/2021 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 5.375 30.267 4/12/2027 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 8.5 72.5 10/27/2020 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 12.75 45.278 2/17/2022 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.367 5/16/2024 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.387 11/15/2026 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 9 39.316 11/17/2021 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 9.75 35.893 5/17/2035 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 6 28.346 10/28/2022 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 5.5 30.123 4/12/2037 VE USD Petroleos de Venezuela 12.75 45.23 2/17/2022 VE USD Polarcus Ltd 5.6 75 3/30/2022 AE USD Provincia del Chubut 4 10/21/2019 AR USD Siem Offshore Inc 4.04527 69.5 10/30/2020 NO NOK Siem Offshore 3.75176 65.75 12/28/2021 NO NOK STB Finance 2.05771 56.243 KY JPY Sylph Ltd 2.367 64.438 9/25/2036 KY USD US Capital 1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039 KY USD US Capital 1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039 KY USD USJ Acucar 9.875 67 11/9/2019 BR USD USJ Acucar 9.875 67 11/9/2019 BR USD Venezuela 13.625 68.25 8/15/2018 VE USD Venezuela 7.75 44.065 10/13/2019 VE USD Venezuela 11.95 40.785 8/5/2031 VE USD Venezuela 12.75 45.19 8/23/2022 VE USD Venezuela 9.25 39.645 9/15/2027 VE USD Venezuela 11.75 40.005 10/21/2026 VE USD Venezuela 9 36.285 5/7/2023 VE USD Venezuela 9.375 37.69 1/13/2034 VE USD Venezuela 13.625 72.25 8/15/2018 VE USD Venezuela 7 34.23 3/31/2038 VE USD Venezuela 7 59.19 12/1/2018 VE USD *********** Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to publication. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com *********** S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2018. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000. . * * * End of Transmission * * *