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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Friday, June 29, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 129


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARCOS DORADOS: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDR & Sr. Unsec. Notes Rating
RIO CUARTO: Moody's Withdraws B2/(P)B2/A3.ar Ratings


B R A Z I L

BANCO DO BRASIL: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Counterparty Risk Ratings
BANCO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO: Moody's Assigns 'B1' CRRs


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Close Collaborator of Medina Charged
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Aussie Tobacco Packaging Case Found Baseless


J A M A I C A

SAGICOR FINANCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT IDR, Outlook Stable


N I C A R A G U A

NICARAGUA: Fitch Lowers LT IDR to 'B', Outlook Negative


P A N A M A

ENA NORTE: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating; Outlook Revised to Stable


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Charges 11 Employees With Corruption


X X X X X X X X X

LATAM: Issuers Raise US$3.8 Billion in Equity in Two Months
LATAM: Debt Taps Outside Brazil & Mexico Total US$8.2 Billion


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARCOS DORADOS: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDR & Sr. Unsec. Notes Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Arcos Dorados Holdings Inc.'s Long-Term
Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and senior unsecured
notes at 'BB+'. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Lower FCF: Fitch expects Arcos Dorados to generate slightly
negative FCF in 2018 due to increased capex and dividends despite
lethargic growth in the region and intensifying competition that
will result in stagnant EBITDA growth. In 2017, the company
reported FCF of USD80 million due to strong EBITDA growth driven
by a rebound by its Brazilian operations. Fitch's base case
scenario incorporates a period of higher capex due to the agreed
renovation and expansion plan with McDonald's Corporation
(BBB/Stable). Fitch expects lease-adjusted net leverage to remain
steady at about 3.3x which is in line with the current rating.

Country Ceiling: Arcos Dorados is headquartered in Argentina
(B/Stable), but its cash flow generation is heavily concentrated
in Brazil, which accounted for 45% of sales and 57% of EBITDA in
2017. The Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR is not constrained by
Brazil's Country Ceiling given the company's ability to cover hard
currency debt service with cumulative cash flow from higher rated
countries such as Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Uruguay, Panama,
Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guyana, U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto
Rico and Costa Rica.

Solid Business Profile: Arcos Dorados' ratings reflect a solid
business position as the sole franchisee of McDonald's restaurants
across Latin America. The company operates or franchises 2,188
McDonald's restaurants and 316 McCafes in 20 countries. Arcos
Dorados benefits from the iconic McDonald's brand but faces
various regional economic challenges. About 71% of the restaurants
are operated by Arcos Dorados, while the remainder are franchised
restaurants as of December 2017.

Expansion: Arcos Dorados has the exclusive right to own, operate
and grant franchises for McDonald's restaurants in 20 Latin
American and Caribbean countries and territories. Arcos Dorados
expects to open 200 new restaurants and to reinvest USD390 million
in existing restaurants from 2017 to 2019. Total capex for the
same period is expected to be approximately USD660 million.

McDonald's Franchise Strength: The ratings also incorporate the
strength of McDonald's as a franchisor and the long-standing
relationship with Arcos Dorados' owners and management. The master
franchise agreement (MFA) sets strict strategic, commercial and
financial guidelines for Arcos Dorados' operations, which support
the operating and financial stability of the business, and the
underlying value of the McDonald's brand in the region.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Arcos Dorados' ratings reflect its solid business position as the
sole franchisee of McDonald's restaurants across Latin America.
The company benefits from the iconic McDonald's brand but faces
various regional economic challenges. Most of Arcos Dorados'
EBITDA is generated in Brazil. The group's geographical
diversification and presence in several countries in Latin America
outside of Brazil and Argentina support the FC IDR ratings.

The business profile is constrained by the company's smaller size
relative to international peers such as McDonald's (BBB/Stable),
Starbuck's (BBB+/Stable) and Darden Restaurants (BBB/Stable). The
company also reports lower profitability than its peers due to its
presence in less mature countries. Leverage is appropriate for the
'BB' rating category, and liquidity remains strong due to the
company's long-term debt maturity profile.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within its Rating Case for the Issuer

  -- Steady EBITDA;

  -- Capex of USD200 million in 2018;

  -- USD21 million of dividend payments in 2018;

  -- Lease adjusted net leverage moving towards 3.3x by 2018.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  -- The ratings could be positively affected by higher than
     expected cash generation from investment-grade countries as
     well as an improvement in leverage metrics such as net lease-
     adjusted debt levels below 3.0x on a sustained basis.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  -- Failure to comply with the terms of the MFA;

  -- Consolidated net lease adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR ratio above
     4.0x on a sustained basis;

  -- While a one-notch downgrade of Brazil's sovereign rating is
     unlikely to cause a downgrade for Arcos Dorados, a multi-
     notch downgrade of Brazil's sovereign rating likely would.

LIQUIDITY

Fitch views Arcos Dorados' liquidity position as adequate due to
its cash position, committed bank lines and diversified debt
maturity profile. Most of the company's debt is comprised of two
U.S. notes maturing in 2023 and 2027. The company had USD257
million in cash and cash equivalents as of March 31, 2018 and
USD50 million of undrawn committed revolving credit facility with
Bank of America and JP Morgan. Most of the company's debt is long-
term. The company is exposed to currency exchange with about 50%
of debt dollar-denominated and 50% in BRL post currency swaps.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Arcos Dorados Holdings Inc.

  -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BB+';

  -- USD473 million senior unsecured notes due 2023 at 'BB+';

  -- USD265 million senior unsecured notes due 2027 at 'BB+'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


RIO CUARTO: Moody's Withdraws B2/(P)B2/A3.ar Ratings
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A. has
withdrawn Municipality of Rio Cuarto's B2/(P)B2/A3.ar ratings for
its own business reasons.

The following ratings were withdrawn:

- Long Term Issuer Rating: B2/A3.ar

- Senior Unsecured: B2/A3.ar

- Senior Unsecured MTN: (P)B2/A3.ar

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has decided to withdraw the ratings for its own business
reasons.



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B R A Z I L
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BANCO DO BRASIL: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Counterparty Risk Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned Counterparty Risk Ratings
(CRRs) to 43 Brazilian banks and foreign branches. In addition,
Moody's assigned Counterparty Risk Assessments (CRAs) to Banco
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES) and to
Banco Cooperativo Sicredi S.A. (Sicredi). At the same time, the
long-term CRA assigned to Banco Mizuho do Brasil S.A. (Mizuho
Brazil) was downgraded to Baa2(cr).

Moody's Counterparty Risk Ratings (CRR) are opinions of the
ability of entities to honor the uncollateralized portion of non-
debt counterparty financial liabilities (CRR liabilities) and also
reflect the expected financial losses in the event such
liabilities are not honored. CRR liabilities typically relate to
transactions with unrelated parties. Examples of CRR liabilities
include the uncollateralized portion of payables arising from
derivatives transactions and the uncollateralized portion of
liabilities under sale and repurchase agreements. CRRs are not
applicable to funding commitments or other obligations associated
with covered bonds, letters of credit, guarantees, servicer and
trustee obligations, and other similar obligations that arise from
a bank performing its essential operating functions.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The CRRs assigned to the aforementioned banks are positioned one
notch above the banks' Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA)
to reflect the lower probability of default of CRR liabilities and
Moody's expectation of a normal level of loss given default.
Moody's does not consider Brazil to have an operational bank
resolution regime (non-ORR), therefore, in assigning CRRs, the
rating agency employs the same approach for other rated
liabilities. The CRRs are at the same level of the banks' CRAs.

In Moody's view, secured counterparties to banks typically benefit
from greater protections under insolvency laws and bank resolution
regimes than do senior unsecured creditors, and this benefit is
likely to extend to the unsecured portion of such secured
transactions in most bank resolution regimes. Moody's believes
that in many cases regulators will use their discretion to allow a
bank in resolution to continue to honor its CRR liabilities or to
transfer those liabilities to another party who will honor them,
in part because of the greater complexity of bailing in
obligations that fluctuate with market prices, and also because
the regulator will typically seek to preserve much of the bank's
operations as a going concern in order to maximize the value of
the bank in resolution, stabilize the bank quickly, and avoid
contagion within the banking system.

In the cases of the state-owned banks Caixa Economica Federal
(Caixa) and Banco do Nordeste do Brasil S.A. (BNB), the CRAs and
CRRs also receive uplift from governmental support.

As a result, of the CRRs assigned to 43 banks and branches, 90% of
the local currency CRRs are one notch higher than their respective
senior debt and local currency deposit ratings, while remaining
four banks' CRRs are at the same level of their respective local
currency deposit ratings. Those cases in which the local currency
CRR is in line with the corresponding deposit rating are: (1)
Caixa and BNB with CRRs of Ba2, because the CRRs for these issuers
receive less uplift from government support than their debt and
deposit ratings due to their higher starting points ; (2) Mizuho
Brazil, with a Baa2 long-term local currency CRR aligned to its
adjusted BCA of baa2, because the adjusted BCA is already three
notches above Brazil's Ba2 sovereign rating due to parental
support, and (3) ING Bank N.V. -- Sao Paulo Branch, with an A3
CRR, the same level as its deposit rating and Brazil's country
ceiling.

In addition, the long-term foreign currency CRRs assigned to eight
foreign-owned banks (Banco Cetelem S.A., Banco Citibank S.A., ING
Bank N.V. Sao Paulo Branch, Banco Santander (Brasil) and to its
Cayman Branch, Banco Ford S.A., Banco RCI Brasil S.A., Mizuho
Brazil and China Construction Bank (Brasil) S.A. and to its Cayman
Branch) are constrained by Brazil's foreign currency debt ceiling
of Ba1.

BANCO MIZUHO DO BRASIL S.A.

Mizuho Brazil's CRA was downgraded to bring it into line with the
bank's adjusted BCA and deposit rating, both of which incorporate
a four-notch uplift from the bank's standalone BCA of ba3 because
of the very high probability that the bank will receive support
from its foreign owner, Mizuho Bank Ltd (A1 stable, baa1). Given
that the adjusted BCA and deposit rating are already three notches
above Brazil's sovereign rating, Moody's has concluded that the
risk of default on the operational obligations represented by the
CRA should be aligned with the adjusted BCA in recognition of
affiliate support, which allows the CRA to exceed the limit of two
notches above the sovereign rating.

The following ratings were assigned to banks in Brazil and their
respective offshore branches:

Banco Bradesco S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Bradesco S.A., Grand Cayman Branch

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

Itau Unibanco S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Itau Unibanco S.A. (Cayman Islands)

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

Banco ABC Brasil S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Alfa de Investimento S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of
  Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco BMG S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba3

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of A3.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-2

Banco BOCOM BBM S.A.

  Local currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa3

  Local currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Prime-3

  Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Ba1

  Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Not
  Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco BTG Pactual S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco BTG Pactual S.A., Grand Cayman Branch

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

Banco BTG Pactual S.A., Luxembourg Branch

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

Banco Cetelem S.A.

  Local currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa3

  Local currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Prime-3

  Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Ba1

  Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Not
  Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Citibank S.A.

  Local currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa3

  Local currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Prime-3

  Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Ba1

  Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Not
  Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Cooperativo Sicredi S.A.

  Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment of Ba1(cr)

  Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment of Not Prime(cr)

  Local currency and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk
  Rating of Ba1

  Local currency and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk
  Rating of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Daycoval S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco do Brasil S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco do Brasil S.A. (Cayman)

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

Banco do Estado de Sergipe S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of
  Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco do Estado do Para S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of
  Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba2

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aa1.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco do Nordeste do Brasil S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba2

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aa2.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Fibra S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of B2

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Ba2.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-4

Banco Ford S.A.

  Local currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa3

  Local currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Prime-3

  Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Ba1

  Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Not
  Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Industrial do Brasil S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of
  Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Mercantil do Brasil S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of B3, on review for downgrade

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of B2.br, on review for downgrade

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-4

Banco Mizuho do Brasil S.A.

  Local currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa2

  Local currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Prime-2

  Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Ba1

  Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Not
  Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Modal S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of
  Ba3

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of A2.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Nac. Desenv. Economico e Social - BNDES

  Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment of Ba1(cr)

  Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment of Not Prime(cr)

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of
  Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Pan S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba3

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of A2.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Psa Finance Brasil S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of
  Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco RCI Brasil S.A.

  Local currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Baa3

  Local currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Prime-3

  Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Ba1

  Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Not
  Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Safra S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Safra S.A. (Cayman Branch)

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A.

  Local currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings of Baa3

  Local currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings of Prime-3

  Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Ba1

  Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Not
  Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A. - Cayman Branch

  Local currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings of Baa3

  Local currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings of Prime-3

  Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Ba1

  Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Not
  Prime

Banco Sofisa S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of
  Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Votorantim S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

Banco Votorantim S.A. (Nassau Branch)

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

Caixa Economica Federal (CAIXA)

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Ba2

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aa1.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

China Construction Bank (Brasil) S.A.

  Local currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings of Baa3

  Local currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings of Prime-3

  Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Ba1

  Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Not
  Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

China Construction Bank (Brasil) S.A., Cayman

  Local currency long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings of Baa3

  Local currency short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings of Prime-3

  Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Ba1

  Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Not
  Prime

ICBC do Brasil Banco Multiplo S.A.

  Local and foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of
  Ba1

  Local and foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating
  of Not Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

ING Bank N.V. -- Sao Paulo

  Local currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of A3

  Local currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Prime-2

  Foreign currency long-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Ba1

  Foreign currency short-term Counterparty Risk Rating of Not
  Prime

  Brazilian local currency long-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of Aaa.br

  Brazilian local currency short-term national scale Counterparty
  Risk Rating of BR-1

The following assessment assigned to Banco Mizuho do Brasil S.A.
was downgraded:

  Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment to Baa2(cr), from
  Baa1(cr)

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down

For domestic banks whose BCAs are currently below Brazil's Ba2
sovereign rating, as well as for Banco Cetelem S.A. (Cetelem
Brazil), a subsidiary of BNP Paribas (Aa3 stable, baa1) in France
, their CRRs could face positive pressure as a result of steady
improvement in financial metrics, particularly profitability and
asset risk, as well as higher diversification and reducing sector
concentration in loan portfolios. For banks whose BCAs are aligned
with the sovereign rating, as well as for Caixa and BNB, whose
CRRs benefit from government support, the CRRs could face positive
pressure if the sovereign is upgraded, except for Mizuho Brazil,
Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A., Banco Ford S.A. and Banco Citibank
S.A., all of which are foreign-owned and already benefit from
affiliate support.

Negative pressure on CRRs could result from persistent
deterioration in asset quality or a decline in profitability,
except for Banco Ford S.A as well as Banco Bocom BBM S.A., Cetelem
Brazil, China Construction Bank (Brasil) S.A., and ICBC do Brasil
Banco Multiplo S.A., all of whose ratings also benefit from
support from their foreign affiliates. For banks whose BCAs are
aligned with the sovereign rating, their CRRs would face downward
pressure if the sovereign is downgraded, subject to the same
exceptions. ING's CRR would face upward or downward pressure if
Brazil's country ceiling increases or decreases. The CRRs of Banco
Ford S.A. and Banco RCI Brasil S.A would face also upward pressure
if their foreign parent's adjusted BCAs are increased, . and Banco
RCI Brasil S.A's CRRs would face downward pressure if its parent's
adjusted BCAs were lowered.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in June 2018.


BANCO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO: Moody's Assigns 'B1' CRRs
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltd. has assigned Counterparty Risk Ratings
to Banco de Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais S.A. (BDMG), Banco
Regional de Desenvolvimento do Extremo Sul S.A. (BRDE) and
Desenvolve SP- Agencia de Fomento do Estado de Sao Paulo
(Desenvolve SP). Moody's also assigned Counterparty Risk
Assessments and Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessments (BCA) to the
entities, and also affirmed the entities' issuer ratings. The
issuer outlooks for all three entities is stable.

Moody's Counterparty Risk Ratings (CRR) are opinions of the
ability of entities to honor the uncollateralized portion of non-
debt counterparty financial liabilities (CRR liabilities) and also
reflect the expected financial losses in the event such
liabilities are not honored. CRR liabilities typically relate to
transactions with unrelated parties. Examples of CRR liabilities
include the uncollateralized portion of payables arising from
derivatives transactions and the uncollateralized portion of
liabilities under sale and repurchase agreements. CRRs are not
applicable to funding commitments or other obligations associated
with covered bonds, letters of credit, guarantees, servicer and
trustee obligations, and other similar obligations that arise from
a bank performing its essential operating functions.

Moody's Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR Assessment) are opinions
on the likelihood of a default by an issuer on certain operating
obligations and other contractual commitments, such as payment
obligations associated with covered bonds (and certain other
secured transactions), derivatives, letters of credit, third-party
guarantees, servicing and trustee obligations and other similar
obligations that arise from a bank in performing its essential
operating functions.

The Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessments (BCA) expresses Moody's
opinion of a bank's probability of failure, after having exhausted
any support from affiliates.

RATINGS RATIONALE

In assigning CRAs and CRRs to the banks and branches subject to
this rating action, Moody's starts with the entities' adjusted
Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA)s, which are the banks' baseline
credit assessment notched up to consider the effect of support
from rated majority owners. Moody's assesses as very high the
probability that the state governments of both Minas Gerais and
Sao Paulo provide financial support to BDMG and Desenvolve SP
respectively if necessary in a time of stress, a sign of the
strong macroeconomic and institutional linkages with their state
government-shareholders. As a result, Desenvolve SP's adjusted BCA
benefits from one notch of uplift for affiliate support from its
ba3 BCA.However, BDMG's adjusted BCA does not receive any uplift
to its BCA, which is aligned with that of its owner. BRDE is owned
by the State of Rio Grande do Sul (unrated), the State of Parana
(Ba2, stable) and the State of Santa Catarina (unrated). As only
one of its shareholders is rated, and no shareholder can make a
capital injection unless the other two agree to do so as well, we
assess the probability of support in a time of stress as being
moderate. As a result, BRDE's adjusted BCA does not receive any
uplift from its BCA of ba3.

As Moody's does not consider Brazil to have an operational
resolution regimes, in assigning CRAs and CRRs to BDMG, BRDE and
Desenvolve- SP, the rating agency uses its existing basic Loss-
Given-Failure (LGF) approach, which provides one notch of uplift
from the banks' adjusted BCAs to reflect the lower probability of
default of counterparty financial liabilities. In Moody's view,
secured counterparties to banks typically benefit from greater
protections under insolvency laws and bank resolution regimes than
do senior unsecured creditors, and this benefit is likely to
extend to the unsecured portion of such secured transactions in
most bank resolution regimes. Moody's believes that in many cases
regulators will use their discretion to allow a bank in resolution
to continue to honor its CRR liabilities or to transfer those
liabilities to another party who will honor them, in part because
of the greater complexity of bailing in obligations that fluctuate
with market prices, and also because the regulator will typically
seek to preserve much of the bank's operations as a going concern
in order to maximize the value of the bank in resolution,
stabilize the bank quickly, and avoid contagion within the banking
system.

Moody's then incorporates incorporate governmental support into
CRAs and CRRs, as it does with the banks' issuer ratings. However,
none of the affected entities' CRAs or CRRs receive uplift from
this as Moody's assesses just a low probability that they will
benefit from financial support from the Brazilian government. This
reflects the fact that they are not deposit taking entities and do
not represent systemic risks given their small size.

The affirmations of the banks' issuer ratings follows Moody's
decision to rate the banks using its Banks Methodology to assess
both the bank's standalone credit fundamentals as well as
government support. Previously, Moody's used its Government-
Related Issuers Methodology to assess government support for these
issuers. The change in methodology does not have any impact in
Moody's assessment of the likelihood of government support for the
banks or on their issuer ratings.

The following ratings and assessment were assigned:

Banco de Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais S.A. (BDMG)

  - Local and foreign currency long-term counterparty risk ratings
    of B1

  - Local and foreign currency short-term counterparty risk
    ratings of Not Prime

  - Long and short-term national scale counterparty risk ratings
    of Baa2.br and BR-3, respectively

  - Long and short term counterpart risk assessment of B1(cr), Not
    Prime (cr), respectively

  - Adjusted baseline credit assessment of b2

Banco Regional de Desenvolvimento do Extremo Sul S.A.

  - Local and foreign currency long-term counterparty risk ratings
    of Ba2

  - Local and foreign currency short-term counterparty risk
    ratings of Not Prime

  - Long and short-term national scale counterparty risk ratings
    of Aa2.br and BR-1, respectively

  - Long and short term counterpart risk assessment of Ba2(cr),
    Not Prime (cr), respectively

  - Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba3

Desenvolve SP- Agencia de Fomento do Estado de Sao Paulo

  - Local and foreign currency long-term counterparty risk ratings
    of Ba1

  - Local and foreign currency short-term counterparty risk rating
    of Not Prime

  - Long and short-term national scale counterparty risk ratings
    of Aaa.br and BR-1, respectively

  - Long and short term counterpart risk assessment of Ba1(cr),
    Not Prime (cr), respectively

  - Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba2

The following ratings and assessment were affirmed:

Banco de Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais S.A. (BDMG)

  - Long and short-term global local currency issuer rating of B2
    and Not Prime, stable outlook

  - Long and short-term local currency Brazilian national scale
    issuer rating of Ba1.br and BR-4

Banco Regional de Desenvolvimento do Extremo Sul S.A.

  - Long and short-term global local currency issuer rating of Ba3
    and Not Prime, stable outlook

  - Long-term local currency Brazilian national scale issuer
    rating of A2.br and BR-1

Desenvolve SP- Agencia de Fomento do Estado de Sao Paulo

  - Long and short-term global local currency issuer rating of Ba2
    and Not Prime, stable outlook

  - Long-term local currency Brazilian national scale issuer
   rating  of Aa2.br and BR-1

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down -- BDMG

The bank's ratings could face upward pressure if the rating of the
State of Minas Gerais were upgraded. However, this is unlikely at
present given the downgrades of both the State and the bank's
ratings in April 2018. If the rating of its government-shareholder
is downgraded further, BDMG's ratings would face additional
downward pressure as well.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down -- BRDE

BRDE's issuer rating, CRA and CRR could face upward pressure if
asset risk falls significantly and its profitability recovers.
Meaningful diversification of the bank's funding sources would
also be positive, particularly if this funding is lower cost and
stable. A significant weakening of BRDE's financial fundamentals,
resulting from a larger than expected deterioration in the quality
of the loan book and an ensuing reduction in capitalization
levels, could have a negative effect on the bank's issuer rating,
CRA, and CRR.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down -- Desenvolve - SP

If the rating for its government-shareholder is upgraded,
Desenvolve SP's ratings could face upward pressure as well. Signs
of lower support from the local government or a downgrade of the
rating assigned to the state of Sao Paulo could negatively affect
Desenvolve SP's ratings. Because of the current very high level of
support from the state government, however, the ratings would not
be affected by either an improvement in or deterioration of the
bank's financial fundamentals.



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Close Collaborator of Medina Charged
--------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Victor Pimentel Kareh asked the
National District Office of the Prosecutor to request the
arraignment of his brother, Miguel Pimentel Kareh, who's charged
with fraud to appropriate his assets.

Miguel Pimentel Kareh is a close collaborator of president Danilo
Medina, who was forced to fire him as head of the scandal-fraught
State Works Supervisory Engineers Office OISOE, where a contractor
took his own live on pressure by a 'mafia' in the agency,
according to Dominican Today.

The report notes that Mr. Kareh sued his brother in January,
alleging that they were partners of the Caribbean Village and the
company Resort Dominicana with a 50% stake each, but his brother
pressured him to sell him his part, with insider knowledge of an
imminent major investment in the company.

According to Mr. Kareh's lawyer Tomas Castro, the defendant seeks
to declare bankruptcy and has started selling properties,
including the building that housed the Peravia bank, also the
target of an embezzlement of hundreds of millions of dollars, the
report relays.

Miguel Pimentel Kareh is also linked to the failed Union de
Seguros insurance company, which charged customers without
providing coverage for over two years, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
April 23, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Aussie Tobacco Packaging Case Found Baseless
----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that a panel of World Trade Organization
(WTO) experts has decided that the complaint by Cuba, Honduras,
Indonesia and the Dominican Republic against Australia's generic
(plain) packaging rule on tobacco is unfounded.

In a published decision, the experts of the Dispute Settlement
Body decided that the plaintiffs failed to show that the generic
packaging measures are inconsistent with Australia's obligations
in several international trade agreements, according to Dominican
Today.

The legislation that those countries questioned is in effect since
Dec. 1, 2012, and states that in Australia, only packs of tobacco
are sold in which no advertising appears and have a homogeneous
color (olive green), whereas the brand is written in a homogeneous
typeface and in small print, the report notes.

Australia's warnings against smoking take up 75 percent of the
package's front and 90 percent of the back, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
April 23, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic.
The outlook remains stable.



=============
J A M A I C A
=============


SAGICOR FINANCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT IDR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Sagicor Financial Corporation Limited's
(SFCL) long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B'. The Rating
Outlook is Stable.

SFCL's ratings are constrained by Fitch's view of the economic
environment and the sovereign risks, including transfer and
convertibility (T&C) risks, in Jamaica that are due primarily to
the regional segments' significant earnings contribution and
capital relative to the consolidated group.

Fitch's sovereign rating for Jamaica is 'B' (local- and foreign-
currency IDR) and the country ceiling is 'B'. In Fitch's view, the
funds available in external accounts, which are largely owned by
the Jamaican operating subsidiaries, are tied to Jamaica T&C risks
as those funds would potentially move back into the Jamaican
subsidiaries during an imposition of foreign exchange controls in
an adverse Jamaica scenario. Thus, Jamaica's country ceiling of
'B' has been applied to SFCL's IDR, which has been notched down to
'B' as a result.

Fitch recently affirmed the IDR and senior debt ratings of SFCL
following the announcement by the government of Barbados that it
would seek to restructure its sovereign debt. Fitch believes the
impact to SFCL's capital is manageable under the likely
restructuring scenario that would include a reduction in coupon
rates and an extension in debt maturities. However, SFCL's ratings
would be negatively affected if higher than expected losses tied
directly or indirectly to the sovereign debt restructuring were to
exceed 15% of the company's capital. See press release dated June
6, 2018 for more detail.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch's ratings on SFCL reflect the challenging operating and
economic environments of two of the main insurance subsidiaries
domiciled in Jamaica and Barbados; very high capital exposure to
below-investment-grade sovereign debt; high financial leverage;
and macroeconomic challenges associated with low interest rates.
The ratings also consider the company's strong competitive
position in its core insurance markets, good operating company
capitalization and good, stable profitability.

The capitalization of SFCL's primary insurance subsidiaries is
considered good. Management uses Canadian regulatory capital
standards to help manage capital, and the consolidated MCCSR for
SFCL is strong on an absolute basis at 258% as of year-end 2017.
Historically, MCCSR at the consolidated SFCL level has remained
relatively stable above 250% since 2011. The quality of SFCL's
insurance subsidiary capital is lower relative to Canadian or
international peers given a higher Tier 2 capital component. The
company's minimum target MCCSR range at the consolidated level is
175%.

The company's good capitalization is partially offset by high
financial leverage. SFCL's financial leverage ratio (FLR) is high
at 39% (adjusted to exclude non-controlling interests from
capital) as of year-end 2017, but down from a high of 49% as of
year-end 2015. The decline in financial leverage over the last two
years was due to the redemption of preferred shares and growth in
shareholder's equity from retained earnings. Fitch expects
leverage to remain around current levels in the intermediate term.

SFCL's investment portfolio is concentrated in the sovereign debt
of its countries of operations, including Jamaica and Barbados,
and as a result, the company has a significant concentration of
below-investment-grade debt. The concentration of investment
exposure to Barbados and Jamaica's sovereign debt could result in
sharp declines in capitalization ratios in an adverse sovereign
scenario. Over 2017, the company reported a decline in the ratio
of BIG bonds to shareholder's equity to 188% in 2017 from 233% in
2016. The decline was due to lower concentrations of BIG bonds by
5% as well as an increase in shareholders' equity due to retained
earnings. The percentage of bonds rated 'BBB' increased by 10%
over 2017, which is likely a result of higher investment due to
the reduction in BIGs as well as rating migration of higher rated
investment-grade bonds.

SFCL's pretax operating income has shown a stable, improved trend
over the last four years with strong increasing contributions from
the company's Jamaica and Trinidad operations and smaller steady
contributions from the U.S. operations and other Caribbean
operations. This was partially offset by a substantial decline in
earnings in 2017 from Barbados due to changes in actuarial
liabilities. Excluding the effects of foreign currency
retranslation, operating profitability for the consolidated SFCL
is strong and above expectations for the current rating.

SFCL is a Bermuda-based financial holding company and leading
provider of insurance products and financial services in the
Caribbean. It also provides insurance products in the U.S. as well
as banking and investment management services in Jamaica. Primary
insurance subsidiaries and the corresponding regions for SFCL
include Sagicor Group Jamaica Ltd. (Jamaica and Cayman Islands),
Sagicor Life Inc. (Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago), and Sagicor
Life USA (U.S.). Aside from these main subsidiaries and regions,
the company also has insurance operations in many of the Eastern
and Dutch Caribbean islands and select Latin American countries.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Key rating sensitivities that could result in a downgrade include:

-- Higher than expected losses directly or indirectly associated
    with an expected sovereign debt restructuring in Barbados;

-- Perceived deterioration by Fitch in the economic environments
    of Jamaica, including a downgrade in Sovereign rating of
    Jamaica;

-- Deterioration in key financial metrics, including
    consolidated MCCSR falling below 180% and financial leverage
    exceeding 50% and ROE below 5% on a sustained basis.

Key rating sensitivities that could result in an upgrade of all
the ratings for Sagicor Financial Corporation Limited include:

-- A higher country ceiling of Jamaica, without any heightened
    sovereign concerns in Barbados or decline in performance of
    the company;

-- A shift in country mix, including a significantly greater
    percentage of profitability and capital in countries with
    higher sovereign ratings and a decline in Barbados and Jamaica
    sovereign debt concentration.

A key rating sensitivity that could result in an upgrade of the
long-term IDR for Sagicor Financial Corporation Limited includes:

  -- An increase in liquid assets assigned to the Bermuda holding
     company sufficient to cover at least 1x annual debt service
     at SFCL.

Fitch affirms the following ratings with a Stable Outlook:

Sagicor Financial Corporation Limited

  -- Long-term IDR at 'B'.

Sagicor Finance (2015) Limited

  -- Senior unsecured notes at 'B'/'RR5'.



=================
N I C A R A G U A
=================


NICARAGUA: Fitch Lowers LT IDR to 'B', Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Nicaragua's Long-Term Foreign-
Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B' from 'B+'. The Outlook
is Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade and Outlook change reflect increasing political
instability and the corresponding deterioration of Nicaragua's
investment, economic growth, and public finance outlook. Declining
deposits and incipient related pressure on international reserves
have increased financial and macro stability risks in the context
of Nicaragua's crawling peg exchange rate regime and highly
dollarized financial system. Uncertainty over the course of
domestic political events presents downside risks to Fitch's
forecasts.

Domestic political unrest has claimed at least 215 lives since
April 18. Protests sparked by a social security reform reflect
political polarization surrounding President Daniel Ortega's
consolidation of influence over public institutions since his
return to power in 2007. Violence has escalated and risks of a
protracted civil conflict are increasing. The military has not
intervened to date. A national dialogue mediated by religious
officials between President Ortega and his wife and Vice President
Rosario Murillo, and a broad group of business, student, rural
activist, and civic groups has been unable to negotiate a
solution.

There has been pressure on the financial system's highly
dollarized and short-term deposit base and the central bank's
international reserves. Bank deposits have fallen by USD665
million (12%) from April 17 to June 19, of which USD285 million
net outflows occurred since May 30. In response, the central bank
has increased daily liquidity management operations and has
introduced new instruments. However, the Cordoba's crawling peg
exchange rate to the U.S. dollar, the macro policy anchor, limits
the central bank's scope to increase the money supply. The banks
had adequate capital (14.3% as of April) and liquidity (34.1% as
of June 20) ratios. Fitch placed the national scale ratings of the
rated financial institutions in Nicaragua on Rating Watch Negative
on June 15, reflecting the deterioration in their operating
environment and the potential negative impact on their financial
performance and funding.

External liquidity metrics are in line with peers. Central bank
net foreign exchange sales to commercial banks and a drawdown of
central government deposits have reduced net international
reserves by USD293 million (10%) from April 17 to June 20. Net
international reserves of USD2,623 million at June 20 cover 3.7
months of current external payments, on par with the 'B' median of
3.9 months. The central bank also has a USD200 million external
liquidity line available from the Central American Bank for
Economic Integration. Nicaragua's smooth external amortization
profile supports its international liquidity ratio at close to
200%. Its external debt service ratio, close to 11% of current
external receipts, is in line with the 'B' median of 12%.

Fitch expects the current account deficit (CAD) to widen to 8% of
GDP in 2018 due to higher fuel import payments and a likely fall
in revenues from tourism and some agricultural exports. The strong
recovery of agricultural exports and moderate oil prices during
1H17 resulted in the historically low current account deficit of
5% of GDP in 2017. Exports of Nicaragua's main agricultural and
manufactured goods plus remittance receipts continue to sustain
the inflow of foreign exchange to the trade-dependent economy.

FDI, which financed most of the CAD the past five years, is
expected to decrease by USD200 million under the baseline
scenario. Foreign investment is sensitive to further negative
shocks (property rights, security, or infrastructure quality), and
a shortfall would undermine Nicaragua's ability to finance the
CAD, which exceeds the 'B' median in most years, and potentially
put pressure on international reserves. Nicaragua's current
account deficit, net external debt (48% of GDP), and commodity
export dependence (38% of current external receipts) exceed the
'B' median.

Fitch expects under its base case scenario that the political
crisis will lower Nicaragua's economic growth to 1.7% in 2018,
from its 4.8% five-year average during 2013-2017. The road blocks
and threat of violence against civilians have suppressed retail
commerce, restaurant and tourism services, construction, and
delayed goods deliveries. The breakdown of the government's
consensus model of business-sector consultation reduces the
predictability of macroeconomic policymaking and weakens the
investment climate. Inflation is forecast to rise to 7.5% yoy in
2018, up from 3.9% in 2017. Higher fuel import prices since 4Q17
have passed through to the economy, and shortages increased food
prices in May, when inflation reached 5.2% yoy.

The general government deficit is forecast to widen to 1.9% of GDP
in 2018 from 1.3% in 2017. This assumes that tax receipts will
fall in line with lower commerce and employment and that the
government will attempt to maintain budgeted expenditure to
support economic stability. The social security institute (INSS)
deficit is expected to deteriorate during 2018-2020 from 0.6% of
GDP in 2017, and it will increase the government's financing needs
as the INSS's liquidity reserves are expected to be depleted in
2018.

The public financing strategy faces potential risks, in Fitch's
view. Domestic treasury auctions have slowed during April-June as
banks preserve liquidity, which could affect the USD100 million
the government plans to place in the local market in 2018.
Externally, human rights concerns could encumber Nicaragua's
access to concessional financing from multilateral lenders.

General government debt/GDP, at 41.8%, is in line with the 'B'
median of 44.2%, supported by Nicaragua's track record of public
financial management, domestic debt repayments, and external debt
reduction under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative.
However, the debt burden is expected to rise over 2018-2020 driven
by higher financing needs and interest expense. Nicaragua's
sovereign external debt consists largely of highly concessional
multilateral loans. Public institutions and the central bank hold
more than half of its internal debt. These factors partially
mitigate refinancing and rollover risks.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Nicaragua a score equivalent to a
rating of 'B' on the Long- Term Foreign-Currency (LT FC) IDR
scale. Fitch's sovereign rating committee did not adjust the
output from the SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centered
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within
Fitch's criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The Outlook is Negative. Future developments that could result,
individually or collectively, in a downgrade include:

  -- Protracted civil conflict that weakens growth, investment,
     and public finances or that causes macro or financial
     instability;

  -- Emergence of external financing constraints.

Future developments that could, individually or collectively,
result in the Outlook being revised to Stable include:

  -- Stabilization of the political environment resulting in the
     recovery of financial, investment, and economic conditions;

  -- Reduction of the risks of government access to external and
     domestic financing.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

  -- Fitch's baseline scenario assumes the negative impact of the
     political crisis on the economy begins to ease in the third
     quarter and that major national and productive infrastructure
     does not suffer material damage.

  -- Fitch assumes the global economy and international oil prices
     perform in line with its Global Economic Outlook.

The full list of rating actions is as follows:

  -- Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR downgraded to 'B' from 'B+';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- Long-Term Local-Currency IDR downgraded to 'B' from 'B+';
     Outlook Negative;

  -- Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

  -- Short-Term Local-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B;'

  -- Country Ceiling downgraded to 'B' from 'B+'.



===========
P A N A M A
===========


ENA NORTE: Fitch Affirms BB+ Rating; Outlook Revised to Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating actions on ENA Sur,
ENA Norte and ENA Este Trusts' notes:

  -- ENA Sur Trust (ENA Sur) affirmed at 'BBB' and 'AAA(pan)';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- ENA Norte Trust (ENA Norte) affirmed at 'BB+' and 'AA-(pan)';
     Outlook Stable;

  -- ENA Este, S.A. (ENA Este) affirmed at 'BB-' and 'A(pan)';
     Outlook revised to Stable from Negative.

The revision of ENA Este's Outlook to Stable reflects higher than
expected traffic and revenue performance in ENA Este and ENA Sur,
which has decreased the likelihood of a default over the longer
term. The Stable Outlook also reflects the build-up of reserves to
make a voluntary debt prepayment of at least USD22.8 million in
2019. Revised traffic assumptions, supported by a new independent
traffic study have allowed for improved credit metrics for both
ENA Sur and Este.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Summary: ENA Sur's rating reflects a stronger and mature asset
with significant track record. Despite the project's contractual
ability to adjust tolls according to inflation, tolls have not
been increased since the issuance of the notes and therefore,
Fitch continues to assume that tolls will remain unchanged over
the life of the notes. Debt structure is robust and has allowed
ENA Sur to benefit from past positive performance and to
deleverage to a point where it is no longer dependent on future
traffic growth. ENA Sur's Rating Case Loan Life Coverage Ratio
(LLCR) is 1.7x, and leverage, as reflected in a debt to cash flow
available for debt service (CFADS), of 4.5x. Current LLCR is
higher than previous expectations, as a result of revised traffic
assumptions, and are on the upper range of the rating category
according to the applicable criteria; however, the rating is
constrained by uncertainty about possible government action
related to this issuance and whether that action would be in the
interest of bondholders.

ENA Norte's rating is driven by the project's improving traffic
performance, which has resulted in higher than expected
prepayments thanks to its flow zero debt structure. Although the
issuer has the ability to increase tolls according to inflation,
there are no expectations of toll increases in the near future.
Under Fitch's Rating Case, the LLCR is 1.2x and debt to cash flow
available for debt service is 8.2x, in line with the applicable
criteria for the assigned rating.

ENA Este's rating reflects a young asset that is still going
through a ramp-up phase that started two years later than
initially expected. Traffic, however, has demonstrated an improved
performance by catching up with Fitch's previous expectations.
Nonetheless, ENA Este remains highly dependent to ENA Sur's
distribution of excess cash. The possibility of a default over the
longer term remains, although to a lesser degree, should the
government choose not to adjust toll rates in the coming years.
ENA Este's Rating Case Loan Life Coverage Ratio (LLCR) is 0.9x and
leverage is significant, as reflected in a debt to cash flow
available for debt service (CFADS) of 17.0x. These metrics are
still weak for the rating category, according to Fitch's sector
criteria. The government's ability to implement adjustments to
toll rates to enhance credit protection measures partially
mitigates this weakness, which supports the current rating.

Limited Volume Risk (Revenue Risk-Volume: Stronger for ENA Sur and
ENA Norte; Midrange for ENA Este): The corridors represent a
critical link for commuters and commercial traffic in the city of
Panama. Given the recent infrastructure changes in the city, the
assets have limited but increasing competition from free
alternatives and other transportation modes. While the Sur and
Norte traffic corridors have a long track record, the corridor
Este has recently started operations and traffic is currently in
the ramp-up phase.

Fixed Toll Rates (Revenue Risk-Price: Weaker): Although the
concessionaire is entitled to annually adjust toll rates at
inflationary levels, toll rates have not been increased by
inflation and are not expected to be updated in the medium term.
Toll rates are structurally protected with a covenant that
prohibits toll rate reductions if debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) does not meet a minimum threshold.

Suitable Infrastructure Plan (Infra Development & Renewal:
Midrange): Sound contractual requirements to fund capital
expenditure costs are in place for the three corridors. According
to the independent engineer, the physical condition of Corridors
Sur and Norte is not at its best and requires immediate major
maintenance. The concessionaire already has short- and medium-term
maintenance plans in place to perform the works required in
certain sections of the corridors. The capital investment program
is internally funded. Given that the Este corridor was recently
built and is in good condition, it is not expected to require
large major maintenance in the medium term.

Conservative Debt Structure (Debt Structure: Stronger for ENA Sur
and ENA Norte; Midrange for ENA Este): ENA Sur's debt carries
fixed interest rates and a fully amortizing profile. The class A
notes have scheduled principal payments while the class B notes
feature a pass-through amortization scheme (flow zero). While ENA
Norte Trust's debt structure is flow zero, ENA Este Trust's debt
is structurally subordinated to ENA Sur as debt repayment is
highly dependent on ENA Sur's distributions. There is a six-month
debt service reserve account for ENA Sur and ENA Norte, while ENA
Este maintains approximately USD28.8 million as debt reserve.

Metrics

ENA Sur's leverage has decreased over time and is now 4.5x under
Fitch's Rating Case. The project generates sufficient revenues to
maintain LLCR at 1.7x under Fitch's Rating Cases.

ENA Norte's leverage has decreased but is still relevant,
reflected by its debt to CFADS of 8.2x in Fitch's Rating Case, and
requires low traffic growth to fully repay debt. LLCR in the
Rating Case is at 1.2x. Mandatory interest payments are vastly
covered and Fitch's base and rating case projections show full
debt repayment with a cushion of almost two years.

ENA Este's leverage is significant during the first years and the
transaction requires a robust traffic growth to preserve financial
flexibility. Rating Case LLCR is 0.9x, while leverage remains
significant at 17.0x. The transaction's debt structure (flow zero)
and the view that the road is a public asset provide a
considerable timeframe for actions to be taken by the Panamanian
government to address a potential economic imbalance.

PEER GROUP

ENA Sur compares with Red de Carreteras de Occidente's (RCO) 2013
notes, rated 'BBB'/Outlook Stable. RCO's higher LLCR of 1.9x
compared to ENA Sur's 1.7x results from a longer debt term, which
is reflected in ENA Sur's lower debt to CFADS of 4.5x to 6.2x,
respectively.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action:

  -- Positive actions taken by the government to support bond
     holder's interests;

  -- Sustained traffic performance above base case expectations.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action in ENA Sur, Este and Norte:

  -- Traffic underperformance that is not offset by toll
     adjustments;

  -- O&M expenses materially above expectations that cause
     financial flexibility to be reduced and result in a
     materially lower LLCR.

CREDIT UPDATE

During 2017, ENA Sur's average annual daily traffic (AADT) reached
173,806 vehicles, representing a growth of 11.9% which exceeded
Fitch's Base Case expectation of 6.3%. Toll revenues were USD71.9
million, which represents an increase of 12.2% from 2016 and
outperformed Fitch's Base Case expectations of USD68.2 million.
According to the concessionaire, traffic increase was driven
mainly by the integration of PANAPASS (electronic toll booth
system), which improved the recording process of traffic; induced
traffic of a new connection to the corridor located in Tocumen
that started operations in August 2016; continued traffic
congestion in the competing route, Domingo Diaz road, due to
construction works of the second line of the Metro; and maintained
growth of the vehicle fleet in Panama (approximate CAGR of 6%). As
of April 2018, traffic and revenue in ENA Sur has increased 5.0%
and 3.1%, respectively.

ENA Norte's AADT was 164,447 vehicles in 2017, an increase of 5.8%
from 2016, slightly exceeding Fitch's Base Case expectation of
4.7%. Toll revenues grew 6.5% in 2017 reaching USD81.7 million,
slightly above Fitch's Base Case expectations of USD80.3 million.
As of April 2018, traffic has had a moderate increase of 1.5%,
while toll revenues have increased 2.9% when compared to the same
period of last year.

In 2017, ENA Este's AADT reached 22,911 vehicles, while Fitch
expected 18,730 vehicles. Besides going through its ramp-up phase,
the concessionaire mentioned that traffic has benefited from a
good performance from ENA Norte, which is connected to it, and the
development of the eastern region of Panama City. Revenues from
toll collections in 2017 were USD16.5 million, while Fitch
expected USD13.5 million. For the first four months of 2018,
traffic and toll revenues have increased 60.5% and 43.6%,
respectively, continuing with the solid ramp-up.

Total expenses for ENA Sur were practically in line with Fitch's
Base Case expected expenses of USD20.1 million; ENA Norte's total
expenses were USD18.3 million, below Fitch's Base Case
expectations of USD20.7 million as Fitch expected higher O&M
expenses. With respect to ENA Este, total expenses were USD4.0
million, slightly lower than the USD4.6 million expected by Fitch.

Actual debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) for ENA Sur, which
considers principal payments of class A notes and interest
payments of class A and B notes, was 2.3x, slightly higher than
Fitch's Rating Case DSCR of 2.1x. ENA Norte and ENA Este DSCRs,
that only consider interest payments, were 2.8x and 0.9x, while
Fitch expected a 2.5x and 0.8x, respectively.

The concessionaire provided an updated traffic report and an
independent engineer (IE)'s report prepared on January 2018. The
studies provided Fitch with increased visibility on expected
traffic behaviour to derive its assumptions for Base and Rating
Case, in light of the ongoing transportation infrastructure
projects in Panama City and the future major maintenance
requirements of the three corridors.

Fitch Cases

Fitch's base case assumes inflation levels of 1.4% in 2018 and
2.5% afterward. O&M and major maintenance expenses were increased
by inflation plus 5.0% for every year from the concessionaire's
budget. Toll rates are assumed to remain fixed for the term of the
three issuances. Assumed traffic CAGR for ENA Sur, ENA Norte and
ENA Este at 2.8%, 3.1% and 7.4%, respectively. Fitch's Base Case
for ENA Este considers a prepayment of principal of USD23.2
million in 2019.

Fitch's Rating Case assumes the same levels of inflation and toll
rate assumptions as the Base Case. O&M and major maintenance
expenses were increased by inflation plus 7.5% for every year from
concessionaire's budget. Traffic CAGR of 2.2%, 2.5% and 5.0% were
assumed for ENA Sur, Norte and Este, respectively. Fitch's Rating
Case for ENA Este considers a prepayment of principal of USD22.8
million in 2019.

ENA Sur's Base Case LLCR was 1.8x with a debt to CFADS ratio at
4.4x, while Rating Case metrics were 1.7x and 4.5x for LLCR and
debt to CFADS, respectively.

ENA Norte's Base Case LLCR was 1.2x with a debt to CFADS ratio at
8.0x and debt is fully paid 2 years before legal maturity, while
Rating Case metrics were 1.2x and 8.2x for LLCR and debt to CFADS,
respectively, with debt also being fully paid two years before
legal maturity.

ENA Este's Base Case LLCR was 1.0x with a debt to CFADS ratio at
16.6x and debt is paid at maturity. Under the Rating Case LLCR is
0.9x, debt to CFADS is 17.0x and 10% of debt is not paid.

The macroeconomic health of the country is supported by Fitch's
view of the Panamanian sovereign. Fitch last affirmed the
country's rating at 'BBB' with a Country Ceiling of 'A' in
February 2018.

Asset Description

Corridor Sur extends over 19.8 kilometers (approximately 12.3
miles) connecting Panama City's international airport (in the
East) to the CBD (in the West). ENA Sur operates the toll road
concession of corridor Sur, and has no other significant
commercial activities. Empresa Nacional de Autopistas holds 100%
of ENA Sur's shares. The Panama-Madden Segment (corridor Norte) is
a 13.5-kilometer (8.4-mile) toll road that intersects Phase I on
the eastern end and runs northwest, connecting to the Interstate
Colon Highway. Phase IIB (corridor Este) is an extension of
corridor Norte and is part of Phase II, connecting the eastern end
of Phase IIA with the Pan-American highway in the Tocumen at the
international airport.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Charges 11 Employees With Corruption
------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Venezuelan Attorney General Tarek Saab said
that arrest warrants were issued for 11 officials of the PDVSA
state oil company for committing "serious irregularities" that
cost the firm $14 million.

Mr. Saab said that the first case of corruption took place on June
14, when managers of PDVSA's Orinoco Oil Belt operation
"inadequately discharged and distributed naphtha" with the effect
of diminishing oil production by 175,000 barrels, according to EFE
News.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 19, 2018, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Petroleos de
Venezuela, S.A.(PDVSA)'s ratings to C from Ca.  Moody's also
lowered the company's baseline credit assessment (BCA) to c from
ca.



=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


LATAM: Issuers Raise US$3.8 Billion in Equity in Two Months
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fredrik Karlsson at Latin Lawyer reports that 21 Latin American
firms and 10 international outfits have helped Latin American
companies raise nearly US$3.8 billion through 14 equity capital
markets deals taking place in April and May.

Most of the deals, which come from information submitted to Latin
Lawyer and reporting in the news source's daily briefing, were in
Latin America's biggest economy, Brazil, where law firms helped
companies raise US$2.5 billion across eight transactions. Mexico
followed, with local companies raising almost US$1.2 billion in
three separate deals, according to Latin Lawyer.


LATAM: Debt Taps Outside Brazil & Mexico Total US$8.2 Billion
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fredrik Karlsson at Latin Lawyer reports that 29 Latin American
and 10 international firms helped Latin American companies outside
of Brazil and Mexico issue debt worth US$8.2 billion in April and
May.

Latin Lawyer's research showed that states and provincial
governments made the largest offerings by deal value, raising
US$3.3 billion in total during the two month period, according to
Latin Lawyer.  The findings come from information submitted to
Latin Lawyer and reporting in the news source's daily briefing,
the report notes.  The vast majority of the deals were made by
banking and financial services companies, accounting for nine in
total, followed by construction companies on three, the report
relays.

                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.


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