/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/180219.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Monday, February 19, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 35
Headlines
A R G E N T I N A
ARGENTINA: Public Employees Go On Strike to Protest Layoffs
METROGAS SA: S&P Raises CCR to B on Favorable Regulatory Framework
B E R M U D A
KILIMANJARO RE: S&P Hikes Series 2014-1 Notes Rating to 'BB-(sf)'
B R A Z I L
BANCO SANTANDER: Moody's Rates ARS5,000MM Debt Issuance 'Ba3'
BRAZIL: To Create Security Ministry to Quell Violence in Rio
BRAZIL: Military Takes Charge of Law Enforcement in Rio State
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
DOMINICAN REP: Environment Shutters Firms That Pollute Rio Ozama
M E X I C O
CREDITO REAL: S&P Affirms BB+ Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
MEXICO: Forms National Emergency Committee After Earthquake
P E R U
* PERU: Benefited From Free-Trade Deal With EU, German MEP Says
P U E R T O R I C O
ADLER GROUP: Seeks 30-Day Plan Exclusivity Period Extension
PUERTO RICO: Citigroup to Lead PREPA Restructuring
PUERTO RICO: Duff & Phelps to Probe Puerto Rico Bank Accounts
V E N E Z U E L A
VENEZUELA: S&P Affirms FC Sovereign Issuer Credit Rating to 'SD/D'
X X X X X X X X X
* BOND PRICING: For the Week From February 12 to Feb. 16, 2018
- - - - -
=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================
ARGENTINA: Public Employees Go On Strike to Protest Layoffs
-----------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Argentine government workers launched a
nationwide general strike to protest salary reductions and layoffs
being carried out by President Mauricio Macri's administration,
saying those policies were shrinking the public sector.
As part of the job action, organized by the Association of State
Workers (ATE), the Argentine Workers' Central Union (CTA) and
leftist political and labor organizations, dozens of people began
gathering to block roads and participate in other small-scale
protests, according to EFE News.
Those demonstrations were merely a prelude to a mass march to the
Plaza de Mayo, a large square in downtown Buenos Aires near the
presidential palace, the report notes.
"We're mobilizing against the layoffs and pay cuts in several
state sectors," an ATE spokesperson told EFE.
That union of public-sector workers has called for demonstrations
in different parts of the country, the report relays.
It said the government was justifying its actions by citing the
need to reduce a large budget deficit, but it warned the measures
would "get rid of a bunch of sectors that (contribute to)
scientific and cultural development," the report discloses.
In that regard, the ATE referred to the recent closure of the
National Ballet of the Dance, a move that left 50 dancers out of
work, and to 250 layoffs at the National Institute of Industrial
Technology (INTI), the report notes.
The unions also are demanding the scrapping of planned changes to
the country's labor laws and the repeal of a controversial pension
overhaul, which Congress passed in December despite a strong
social pushback and the staunch rejection by the political
opposition, the report relays.
Those organizations moreover are denouncing Macri's moves to
revamp the country's public health care system and cut teachers'
salaries, as well as austerity measures they say are now targeting
public media outlets, the report adds.
As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment. Earlier that day,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago. On March 30, 2016, Argentina's Congress
passed a bill that will allow the government to repay holders of
debt that the South American country defaulted on in 2001,
including a group of litigating hedge funds that won judgments
in a New York court. The bill passed by a vote of 54-16.
METROGAS SA: S&P Raises CCR to B on Favorable Regulatory Framework
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its global scale corporate credit and
issue-level ratings on Metrogas S.A. to 'B' from 'B-'. The outlook
remains stable.
S&P said, "The rating action reflects its view of an improvement
in the regulatory framework in the nine months since the
implementation of the Integral Tariff Review (ITR), which has set
a long-term radical change in the regulation of gas distribution
companies in Argentina. The new regulatory framework eliminates
Metrogas's dependence on discretionary tariff adjustments and
improves its cash flow predictability, liquidity, and capital
structure in the short to intermediate term. So far, the execution
of the ITR worked smoothly, and S&P doesn't expect the company to
face problems in implementing the next rate increase of 30%, which
should occur in March 2018.
On Feb. 8, 2018, Metrogas took out a bank loan of $250 million
from Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC; A/Stable/A-1)
and Itau Unibanco Holding S.A. (Itau; BB/Negative/B). The company
will use the proceeds to cancel the existing $200 million bonds
with maturity in December 2018 and to cover working capital needs.
The loan amortizes in nine quarterly installments and has a grace
period of 12 months. S&P said, "In our view, the loan represents a
short-term measure in order to cover the company's immediate
liquidity needs. As a result, our ratings continue to incorporate
certain debt concentration in the short term until Metrogas
substantially improves its debt maturity profile through a longer-
term bond issuance or bank loan."
Since the Argentinian government's approval of the ITR, the
company's overall financial performance has improved in line with
our expectations. S&P said, "We believe that Metrogas will
generate EBITDA of around $200 million in 2018 and $230 million in
2019, with a margin close to 23%, compared with $82 million and a
margin of 12% in the 12 months ended in September 2017. However,
in the same period, we expect a free operating cash flow deficit
due to the high level of capital expenditures--$110 million per
year."
Finally, S&P's assessment of Metrogas's financial risk profile as
aggressive incorporates the likelihood of higher leverage
depending on the financial policies of a new owner, because the
company's current shareholder, YPF S.A. (B+/Stable/--), has
announced the sale of Metrogas but with no specific range of time
(the sale could be in 2018 or in the following years).
=============
B E R M U D A
=============
KILIMANJARO RE: S&P Hikes Series 2014-1 Notes Rating to 'BB-(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it raised its rating on Kilimanjaro Re
Ltd.'s Series 2014-1 Class B Notes to 'BB-(sf)' from 'B-(sf)' and
removed the rating from CreditWatch Developing, where it was
initially placed Sept. 29, 2017. The two primary drivers for this
rating action are lower Property Claims Services (PCS) loss
estimates than initially expected for hurricanes Harvey, Irma and
Maria and the conclusion of the hurricane season, both of which
significantly reduce the likelihood of the bond triggering between
now and its maturity in April 2018.
The rating is based on the lowest of the natural-catastrophe risk
factor ('bb-') for the notes, the rating on the assets in the
reinsurance account ('AAAm'), and the rating on the ceding insurer
('A+').
RATINGS LIST
Upgraded; CreditWatch Action
To From
Kilimanjaro Re Ltd.
Series 2014-B notes BB-(sf) B-(sf)/Watch Dev
===========
B R A Z I L
===========
BANCO SANTANDER: Moody's Rates ARS5,000MM Debt Issuance 'Ba3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo S.A. (MLA)
assigned a Ba3 global local currency senior unsecured debt rating
and an Aaa.ar national scale local currency debt rating to Banco
Santander Rio S.A.'s (Santander Rio) twenty second issuance up to
ARS5,000 million, which will be due in 12 months.
All ratings have stable outlook.
The following ratings were assigned to Banco Santander Rio S.A.'s
expected issuances:
Class XXII up to ARS5,000 million:
Ba3 Global Local Currency Debt Rating
Aaa.ar Argentina National Scale Local Currency Debt Rating
RATINGS RATIONALE
Santander Rio's ratings consider the high probability that the
bank will receive financial support from its parent, Banco
Santander S.A. (Spain) (Santander Spain, A3, stable, baa1), in an
event of stress. The benefits from parental support offset
challenges related to Argentina's operating environment, which
while improving has historically been very volatile. As a result
of these challenges, coupled with the close credit linkages
between banks and their sovereigns, Santander Rio's standalone
credit profile is constrained at the level of Argentina's B2
sovereign rating notwithstanding its sound financial fundamentals.
Santander Rio continues to boast good earning generation capacity
supported by diversified line of buesiness and an inexpensive and
highly granular deposit base linked to payroll accounts. Despite
declining steadily since 2012, when it equaled 3.7% of tangible
assets, net income remained strong at 1.9% of tangible assets in
the first three quarters of 2017, though these figures are
distorted by Argentina's high rate of inflation. Profitability
should be supported by the bank's acquisition early last year of
Citibank's retail business. The acquisition, which added 518,000
retail clients and 70 offices to Santander Rio's network, enlarged
its footprint among high income retail clients and strengthened
its position as the largest private bank in Argentina.
However, the acquisition had negative impacts on capitalization.
Largely due to the increase in risk-weighted assets growth,
tangible common equity fell to 9.4% of adjusted risk-weighted
assets as of September 2017, from 13.17% as of YE 2016. Although
capital remains moderate by global standards, it is now below that
of local peers.
The bank's prudent risk management practices and diversified loan
portfolio in the corporate and consumer lending segments supports
good asset quality. In the consumer segment, the bank has a
significant focus on payroll-linked loans and targets high and
medium income individuals. While nonperforming loans nevertheless
rose to 2.27% of gross loans by September 2017, up from 1.2% in
year-end 2016, loan loss reserve coverage remained adequate at
109.7%, of non performing loans.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN
The Ba3 global rating would face upward pressure if Argentina's
sovereign rating were upgraded. Conversely, the global scale
ratings would face downward pressure if the government of
Argentina were to be downgraded, and both the global and national
scale ratings could be lowered if the entity's capital base,
profitability, and/or asset quality were to deteriorate
significantly.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in September 2017.
BRAZIL: To Create Security Ministry to Quell Violence in Rio
------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the president of Brazil disclosed that a
Public Security Ministry will be created in the coming weeks,
after ordering an unprecedented military intervention in Rio de
Janeiro to quell the growing wave of violence in that state.
President Michel Temer met in Rio with several authorities
including state Gov. Luiz Fernando Pezao and Rio's new chief of
security, Gen. Walter Souza Braga Netto, in order to define
certain details of the intervention announced, according to EFE
News.
During a brief speech, the president said the situation in Rio is
"intolerable" and that the purpose of the intervention is to
protect the "most vulnerable," but gave no technical details about
how control of security in Rio will be transferred to the
military, the report notes.
The head of state said that in a week or two, a "special ministry"
will be constituted to coordinate public security nationwide, a
measure that had been debated in recent weeks in the presidency to
stop the violence that also occurs in other parts of Brazil, the
report relays.
Also present at the meeting in Rio were several of Temer's
ministers and local authorities such as the mayor of Rio and
evangelical pastor Marcelo Crivella, who was elsewhere during
Carnival -- a festival he considers sinful -- and traveled to
Europe while in the city the scenes of violence went on, the
report relays.
The decision to order a military intervention was taken three days
after the end of Carnival, the most popular festival in Brazil and
particularly in Rio de Janeiro, where this year it was marked by
grave acts of violence, even around the popular and well-guarded
Sambadrome, the report notes.
Before ordering the extreme measure, the government had already
deployed, halfway through last year, some 10,000 troops to Rio de
Janeiro, but with a limited scope of action that was insufficient
to bring back peace to what is called "the Marvelous City," the
report adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Jan. 15, 2018, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Federative
Republic of Brazil to 'BB-' from 'BB'. The outlook on the ratings
is stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term
foreign and local currency ratings on Brazil. S&P also lowered the
transfer and convertibility assessment to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'. In
addition, S&P affirmed the 'brAA-' national scale rating and
revised the outlook to stable.
BRAZIL: Military Takes Charge of Law Enforcement in Rio State
-------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Brazilian President Michel Temer signed an
executive order giving the military control of law enforcement and
public safety in the state of Rio de Janeiro, the scene of rising
violence in recent months.
"You know that organized crime virtually took control of the state
of Rio de Janeiro," Mr. Temer said during the signing ceremony at
Planalto palace, according to EFE News.
He went on to describe the situation in the state as "a metastasis
that expands across the country and threatens the people's
tranquility," the report relays.
The report notes that Mr. Temer ordered the federal intervention
three days after the end of Carnival.
He said the order would take effect "immediately," though Brazil's
constitution requires ratification by both houses of Congress, the
report relays.
Congressional leaders have already expressed their support and
said that the intervention will be put to a vote soon, the report
discloses.
"We cannot continue to passively accept the death of innocents. It
is unacceptable to keep burying mothers, fathers, workers, police
officers, boys and girls, and that whole neighborhoods, including
their schools, become besieged," Mr. Temer said in explaining the
reasons behind the order, the report adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Jan. 15, 2018, S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Federative
Republic of Brazil to 'BB-' from 'BB'. The outlook on the ratings
is stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term
foreign and local currency ratings on Brazil. S&P also lowered the
transfer and convertibility assessment to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'. In
addition, S&P affirmed the 'brAA-' national scale rating and
revised the outlook to stable.
===================================
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
===================================
DOMINICAN REP: Environment Shutters Firms That Pollute Rio Ozama
----------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the Ministry Environment started shuttering
the companies along the Ozama riverbanks that failed to comply
with the rules established to secure its recovery.
Environment Minister Francisco Dominguez warned that companies
must install their treatment plant, and noted that the deadline to
comply expires in June, according to EFE News. "Those who fail to
comply with the requirements will be shuttered," the report quoted
Mr. Dominguez as saying.
He said the La Isabela distillery was temporarily closed on
citizens' complaint that the company spewed pollutants from its
smokestacks at the La Isabela Industrial Zone, Santo Domingo
Norte, as verified by an Environment technical commission, the
report notes.
"The companies should also adopt the measures of place to carry
out previous treatments to acid waters of the process of washing
of gases, in biomass boiler, before its discharge to the
environment, and to evaluate an adequate treatment system for the
purification of wastewater," Environment said in a statement, the
report adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 20, 2017, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Dominican Republic's
Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook.
===========
M E X I C O
===========
CREDITO REAL: S&P Affirms BB+ Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its global scale 'BB+' issuer credit
ratings on Credito Real S.A.B. de C.V. SOFOM, E.R. (Credito Real).
S&P also affirmed its 'mxA+/mxA-1' national scale issuer credit
and issue-level ratings on the company. The outlook remains
stable.
S&P said, "Finally, we affirmed our 'B+' issue-level rating on the
subordinated perpetual notes and affirmed our 'BB+' and 'mxA-1'
issue-level rating on the lender's senior unsecured notes. The
ratings on Credito Real's senior unsecured debt incorporate that,
as of Sept. 30, 2017, secured debt represented less than 15% of
adjusted assets, and unencumbered assets completely covered
unsecured debt. Consequently, we do not apply notches of
subordination to these issuances."
The ratings on Credito Real reflect its consistently growing
operations and revenues from its core business--payroll lending.
Also, the ratings continue to reflect solid capitalization
supported by its rising internal capital generation and less
aggressive credit growth. The slowed growth translates into an
expected risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio of around 15% on
average for 2018-2019. Although credit losses increased due to
acquisitions, S&P expects those levels to improve. Credito Real
has sufficient liquidity to support its daily operations in the
next 12 months and it has offset its short-term debt refinancing
risk with debt issuance. The stand-alone credit profile (SACP)
remains 'bb+'.
S&P said, "The stable outlook on Credito Real for the next 12
months reflects our expectation that credit losses experienced
during 2017 will normalize and the company will maintain healthy
asset quality indicators with a more conservative risk appetite
and market risk management practices. We project solid internal
capital generation, less aggressive credit growth, and a lack of
acquisitions will support our forecasted RAC ratio of close to 15%
in the next two years."
MEXICO: Forms National Emergency Committee After Earthquake
-----------------------------------------------------------
EFW News reports that the President of Mexico, ordered the
installation, by "protocol", of the National Emergency Committee
at the National Center for Disaster Prevention, after the
earthquake of magnitude 7.2 that shook the center and south of the
country.
Through Twitter, Enrique Pena Nieto indicated that because it is
an earthquake of magnitude greater than 7, this body was formed,
in charge of monitoring the emergency, according to EFW News.
The Civil Protection System of Oaxaca, the state of the
earthquake's epicenter, indicated that until now there is only
evidence of some material damage, the report notes.
In Mexico City, the facade of a building in the central district
of Condesa, an area severely affected by the earthquake of Sep.
19, and the collapse of a wall in Tacuba, in the west of the
capital, have been reported, the report relays.
The earthquake struck at 17.39 local time (23.39 GMT) and its
epicenter was located 11 kilometers south of Pinotepa Nacional, in
the southern state of Oaxaca, and 57 minutes later another
earthquake shook the country again, causing scenes of panic, the
report recalls.
The report discloses that people remain in the streets for fear of
new aftershocks, of which up until 18.30 local time 59 were
recorded, while from the speakers of the seismic warning system --
which did not sound on the second tremor -- it was reported that
there are no serious incidents, although the population has been
asked to be alert.
But nerves have been shaken in the country, which just last
September experienced the violence of two powerful earthquakes
that left 370 people dead, the report notes.
The mayor of the capital, Miguel Angel Mancera, warned that the
municipalities of Xochimilco and Tlahuac have no electricity
service, and noted that so far there are no reports of buildings
falling, unlike on Sep. 19 of last year when 38 buildings
collapsed, the report says.
Mancera indicated that the International Airport of Mexico City is
operating normally, although he acknowledged that some windows
have smashed there, the report relays.
The governor of the southern state of Guerrero, Hector Astudillo,
reported two fences and several fallen roofs, but without serious
damage, the report notes.
The secretary of the Interior, Alfonso Navarrete, confirmed that
he will travel immediately to the area of the epicenter in
Pinotepa Nacional to carry out an evaluation, the report adds.
=======
P E R U
=======
* PERU: Benefited From Free-Trade Deal With EU, German MEP Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the free-trade agreement linking the
European Union with Colombia and Peru, an accord that went into
effect five years ago, has greatly benefited that latter country,
a German member of the European Parliament (MEP) said.
Bernd Lange, the head of a delegation from the EP's Committee on
International Trade (INTA) that is visiting Lima, made that
assessment at a press conference, according to EFE News.
======================
P U E R T O R I C O
======================
ADLER GROUP: Seeks 30-Day Plan Exclusivity Period Extension
-----------------------------------------------------------
Adler Group, Inc., requests the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico for an extension of 30 days of the time of
the exclusivity period and of the deadline to file the Disclosure
Statement and Plan, and that the deadline to procure the votes
under the plan be extended for a term of 30 days after the order
granting the approval of the Disclosure Statement is entered.
This is the second extension of time requested by the Debtor to
present its Disclosure Statement and Plan.
The deadline to submit Proofs of Claims expired on Oct. 24, 2017,
and the Debtor has conducted an assessment of its claims in order
to further negotiations with key creditors that are necessary in
order to propose the Plan. In the process, several objections to
claim have been filed and await court determination.
The Debtor contends that it is indispensable for the Debtor to be
able to reconcile all claims in order to propose a complete,
viable and effective plan that accounts for all claims. Given that
the process of reconciling all timely filed claims and concluding
negotiations with creditors is ongoing, Debtor is not in a
position, at this juncture, to file its Disclosure Statement and
Plan.
The Debtor claims that this request for extension of time of the
exclusivity period will allow Debtor to conclude such
reconciliations and negotiations with creditors. Within such time,
the Debtor will be able to submit the Disclosure Statement and
Plan that considers all of the claims filed and the additional
agreements it may reach with its creditors.
About Adler Group Inc.
Adler Group Inc. owns the Caguas Military property located at Carr
189 km 3.1 (interior) Rincon Ward, Gurabo Puerto Rico, which is
valued at $3 million. It holds inventory and equipment worth
$513,870. For 2015, the Company posted gross revenue of $1.61
million 2015 and gross revenue of $1.91 million for 2014.
Adler Group sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 17-02727) on April 20, 2017. In the
petition signed by Jose Torres Gonzalez, authorized
representative,
the Debtor disclosed $3.52 million in assets and $4.43 million in
liabilities.
The case is assigned to Judge Mildred Caban Flores.
The Debtor hired MRO Attorneys at Law, LLC, as bankruptcy counsel.
PUERTO RICO: Citigroup to Lead PREPA Restructuring
--------------------------------------------------
The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico,
created by Congress under the bipartisan Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"), on Feb. 12,
2018, amended its engagement with financial advisor Citigroup
Global Markets, Inc., appointing Citi as the lead investment
banking advisors for the restructuring and privatization process
of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA).
Citi will advise the Board on PREPA's privatization, as well as
the restructuring of PREPA's debt pursuant to Title III
proceedings in federal bankruptcy court. Citi will take the lead
in identifying private sector solutions that fulfill the vision
laid out by Governor Rossello: a long-term concession for PREPA's
transmission and distribution and privatization of the utility's
generation assets. Ultimately, these elements will be a part of
the Plan of Adjustment filed in the Title III case.
The Oversight Board has long said that a full operational and
financial transformation of PREPA -- including private investment
- is necessary to deliver the resilient, reliable, and cost-
effective power system that Puerto Rico needs for its economic
recovery. The Board welcomed Governor Ricardo Rossello's call for
PREPA's complete transformation and looks forward to working with
the Commonwealth and the utility to rebuild PREPA's
infrastructure, restructure its debt, and attract innovative
capital solutions for the Island. The Board expects to certify
PREPA's revised Fiscal Plan by the end of the month of February.
Contact:
Scott Helfman
Director | Citi Public Affairs
Markets and Securities Services
Direct: 212-816-9241
E-mail: scott.helfman@citi.com
Board's Contact Information:
E-mail: comments@oversightboard.pr.gov
Website: http://www.oversightboard.pr.gov/
About Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.
The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").
The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017. On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").
U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases. The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.
Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.
The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.
Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.
McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.
Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent. Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico
Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.
O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.
The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.
Bondholders' Attorneys
Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").
White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.
Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).
Committees
The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth. The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys. The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.
PUERTO RICO: Duff & Phelps to Probe Puerto Rico Bank Accounts
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico,
created by Congress under the bipartisan Puerto Rico Oversight,
Management and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"), on Feb. 6,
2018, announced that it has retained Duff & Phelps, LLC to conduct
an independent forensics analysis of recently published Government
bank accounts.
The Oversight Board's decision follows a December announcement to
examine the Government's liquidity and establish an accurate
picture of the sources and uses of public funds, and the legal
restrictions on these funds.
"The forensic analysis is a critical step in gaining the
information we need to improve the management of Puerto Rico's
public finances," said Natalie Jaresko, Executive Director of the
Board. "The Board considers this investigation an integral part
of its mission to restore fiscal balance, promote transparency and
support Puerto Rico's reentry into the capital markets." The
Board issued a request for proposal (RFP) on Dec. 19th.
The Board will make the findings of the investigation public.
Contact:
Jose Luis Cedeno
787-400-9245
E-mail: jcedeno@forculuspr.com
info@forculuspr.com
Board's Contact Information:
E-mail: comments@oversightboard.pr.gov
Website: www.oversightboard.pr.gov
About Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth in association with
the United States that's facing a massive bond debt of $70
billion, a 68% debt-to-GDP ratio and negative economic growth in
nine of the last 10 years.
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has sought bankruptcy protection,
aiming to restructure its massive $74 billion debt-load and $49
billion in pension obligations.
The debt restructuring petition was filed by Puerto Rico's
financial oversight board in U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico
(Case No. 17-01578) on May 3, 2017, and was made under Title III
of 2016's U.S. Congressional rescue law known as the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA").
The Financial Oversight and Management Board later commenced Title
III cases for the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
(COFINA) on May 5, 2017, and the Employees Retirement System (ERS)
and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA) on
May 21, 2017. On July 2, 2017, a Title III case was commenced for
the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA").
U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts has appointed U.S. District Judge
Laura Taylor Swain to oversee the Title III cases. The Honorable
Judith Dein, a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Massachusetts, has been designated to preside over matters that
may be referred to her by Judge Swain, including discovery
disputes, and management of other pretrial proceedings.
Joint administration of the Title III cases, under Lead Case No.
17-3283, was granted on June 29, 2017.
The Oversight Board has hired as advisors, Proskauer Rose LLP and
O'Neill & Borges LLC as legal counsel, McKinsey & Co. as strategic
consultant, Citigroup Global Markets, as municipal investment
banker, and Ernst & Young, as financial advisor.
Martin J. Bienenstock, Esq., Scott K. Rutsky, Esq., and Philip M.
Abelson, Esq., of Proskauer Rose; and Hermann D. Bauer, Esq., at
O'Neill & Borges are on-board as attorneys.
McKinsey & Co. is the Board's strategic consultant, Ernst & Young
is the Board's financial advisor, and Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. is the Board's municipal investment banker.
Prime Clerk LLC is the claims and noticing agent. Prime Clerk
maintains a case web site at
https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico
Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC is the service agent for ERS, HTA,
and PREPA.
O'Melveny & Myers LLP is counsel to the Commonwealth's Puerto Rico
Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (AAFAF), the agency
responsible for negotiations with bondholders.
The Oversight Board named Professor Nancy B. Rapoport as fee
examiner and to chair a committee to review professionals' fees.
Bondholders' Attorneys
Toro, Colon, Mullet, Rivera & Sifre, P.S.C. and Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP serve as counsel to the Mutual Fund Group,
comprised of mutual funds managed by Oppenheimer Funds, Inc.,
Franklin Advisers, Inc., and the First Puerto Rico Family of
Funds, which collectively hold over $3.5 billion in COFINA Bonds
and over $2.9 billion in other bonds issued by Puerto Rico and
other instrumentalities, including over $1.8 billion of Puerto
Rico general obligation bonds ("GO Bonds").
White & Case LLP and Lopez Sanchez & Pirillo LLC represent the UBS
Family of Funds and the Puerto Rico Family of Funds, which hold
$613.3 million in COFINA bonds.
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Robbins, Russell,
Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, and Jimenez, Graffam &
Lausell are co-counsel to the ad hoc group of General Obligation
Bondholders, comprised of Aurelius Capital Management, LP,
Autonomy Capital (Jersey) LP, FCO Advisors LP, Franklin Mutual
Advisers LLC, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Senator Investment
Group LP, and Stone Lion Capital Partners L.P.
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Reichard & Escalera are
co-counsel to the ad hoc coalition of holders of senior bonds
issued by COFINA, comprised of at least 30 institutional holders,
including Canyon Capital Advisors LLC and Varde Investment
Partners, L.P.
Correa Acevedo & Abesada Law Offices, P.S.C., is counsel to Canyon
Capital Advisors, LLC, River Canyon Fund Management, LLC, Davidson
Kempner Capital Management LP, OZ Management, LP, and OZ
Management II LP (the QTCB Noteholder Group).
Committees
The U.S. Trustee formed a nine-member Official Committee of
Retirees and a seven-member Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of the Commonwealth. The Retiree Committee tapped
Jenner & Block LLP and Bennazar, Garcia & Milian, C.S.P., as its
attorneys. The Creditors Committee tapped Paul Hastings LLP and
O'Neill & Gilmore LLC as counsel.
=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================
VENEZUELA: S&P Affirms FC Sovereign Issuer Credit Rating to 'SD/D'
------------------------------------------------------------------
On Feb. 15, 2018, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its long- and short-
term foreign currency sovereign issuer credit ratings on Venezuela
at 'SD/D'. S&P said, "At the same time, we lowered seven issue
ratings on Venezuela's global bonds to 'D' from 'CC'. Our long-
and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings remain at
'CCC-/C' and are still on CreditWatch with negative implications.
In addition, we affirmed our 'CC' transfer and convertibility
assessment."
CREDITWATCH
S&P said, "Our CreditWatch negative on the local currency ratings
reflects our opinion that there is a one-in-two chance that
Venezuela could default on these local currency obligations in the
coming three months. Although the government has made no
announcement of any restructuring of its local currency debt--in
contrast with its November 2017 announcement for foreign currency
debt--in our opinion, persistent pressures on sources of domestic
financing amid the economic crisis underpin likely prospects for
default.
"We could remove our local currency ratings on Venezuela from
CreditWatch with negative implications if economic or political
conditions stabilize and Venezuela is able to secure additional
financing from private-sector or official creditors, alleviating
rollover risk.
"If the sovereign cures its default on the overdue foreign
currency coupon payments or the announced restructuring debt
operation moves forward and is completed, we would raise our long-
term foreign currency sovereign issuer credit and issue ratings
from 'SD' and 'D', respectively, to the 'CCC' category or 'B-'."
RATIONALE
Venezuela's creditworthiness reflects significant weakness in our
institutional, economic, external, fiscal, and monetary policy
assessments, all of which are among the weakest of our rated
sovereigns. S&P said, "We downgraded all the remaining 'CC' rated
foreign currency sovereign global bonds to 'D'. All of these
global bonds, which mature in 2018, 2022, 2027, 2031, 2034, and
2038, have coupon payments coming due during the first quarter of
2018. The decision to lower our ratings on these bonds to 'D'
reflects our expectation that the Venezuelan government will not
make timely coupon payments on these issues given its failure to
do so on other foreign currency issues since November 2017 amid
low liquidity and the fluid political backdrop. This is consistent
with our criteria "Methodology: Timeliness of Payments: Grace
Periods, Guarantees, And Use of 'D' And 'SD' Ratings."
The bonds we downgraded to 'D' are:
-- US$500 million 13.625% bonds due Aug. 15, 2018
-- US$300 million 13.625% eurodollar notes due Aug. 15, 2018
-- US$3 billion 12.75% bonds due Aug. 23, 2022
-- US$4 billion 9.25% bonds due Sept. 15, 2027
-- US$4.2 billion 11.95% bonds due Aug. 5, 2031
-- US$1.5 billion 9.375% bonds due Jan. 13, 2034
-- US$1.25 billion 7.00% bonds due March 31, 2038
The other bonds we previously downgraded to 'D' are:
-- US$2.496 billion 7.75% bonds due Oct. 13, 2019
-- US$2.496 billion 8.25% bonds due Oct. 13, 2024
-- US$1.6 billion 7.65% bonds due April 25, 2025
-- US$3 billion 11.75% bonds due Oct. 21, 2026
-- US$2 billion 9.00% bonds due May 7, 2023
-- US$2 billion 9.25% bonds due May 7, 2028
-- US$1 billion 7.00% bonds due Dec. 1, 2018
-- US$1.5 billion 6% bonds due Dec. 9, 2020
Institutional and economic profile: Major institutional breakdown
and severe economic crisis
In 2017, President Nicolas Maduro and his allies consolidated
control of Venezuela's political institutions, including via the
National Constitutional Assembly that superseded the
democratically elected National Assembly. Erratic and poor
economic policies have resulted in hyperinflation, widespread
shortages of key goods, profound economic crisis, and default on
sovereign debt.
High levels of violence and political polarization underpin social
unrest. S&P's assessment of Venezuela's institutional framework is
among the weakest of its rated sovereigns. It is further
constrained by a weak debt payment culture given its recent track
record of failure to make timely payment on its foreign currency
sovereign debt.
During 2017, President Maduro and his allies in the United
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV, Spanish acronym) concentrated
political power, further undermining checks and balances in
Venezuela's political system. Despite opposition parties winning a
majority in the December 2015 Congressional elections, subsequent
judicial and executive decisions eroded their ability to wield any
legislative power. Coupled with internal divisions, the inability
of opposition leaders to effect change undermined general popular
support for any consolidated opposition. In addition, amid
widespread social unrest in the first half of 2017, divisions
within Chavismo emerged, adding to an already complex political
landscape. Nonetheless, the Chavimso won an election in July 2017
to establish a National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). The NCA
became the de facto legislative governing body, superseding the
National Assembly, and is rewriting Venezuela's constitution.
Allegations of fraud in the state elections in October 2017 (which
the PSUV overwhelmingly won) led most of the splintered opposition
parties to opt out of participating in subsequent December
municipal elections. The courts ruled those parties that did not
participate in the December elections would be forbidden from
participating in any coming elections.
This, in turn, sets the stage for President Maduro or any other
PSUV candidate to win the upcoming April 22 presidential elections
despite a backdrop of basic goods scarcity and rising levels of
violence. The opposition is dispersed and demoralized. The Maduro
faction of PSUV has consolidated control across branches of
government and Venezuela's key institutions. This includes the
judiciary, the electoral authority, the legislature via the
National Constitutional Assembly, and the central bank. In
addition, the top echelons of the military remain allies with
President Maduro and retain political and economic influence.
Given these trends, our base case is for continued social and
economic stress under status quo political leadership.
The Venezuelan economy remains under significant strain amid
hyperinflation. Inflation reached 950% in 2017, according to our
estimates. S&P said, "We expect real GDP to contract by at least
1% in 2018, after an estimated decline of 7% in 2017 and 12% in
2016. GDP per capita has fallen below US$1,000 when applying
parallel foreign exchange rates; while the official exchange rate
is Venezuelan bolivar (VEF) 9.975/US$1, the parallel rate exceeds
VEF200,000/US$1 since January 2018. We estimate that growth is
below that of peers with a similar level of economic development."
S&P said, "Our 10-year weighted calculation of real GDP per capita
is -2.7%. In addition, we consider the economy to be highly
concentrated and volatile." Oil-related activities have a
significant influence on the economy and have been hurt by the end
of the commodity boom. Historically, oil activity represented at
least 15% of total GDP, and its weight is likely even higher now
given the reduction in non-oil GDP; oil accounts for over half of
government revenues and 95% of exports. Amid lower oil prices and
a lack of investment, oil production was at a historical low of
1.8 million barrels per day (mpd) in 2017, from 2.6 mpd in 2015.
There are significant gaps and inconsistencies in officially
reported data.
Flexibility and performance profile: Very low external liquidity,
large fiscal deficits, and misaligned exchange rates amid
hyperinflation International reserves have declined to critically
low levels, straining external liquidity and the government's
ability to pay its foreign currency debt. U.S. sanctions have
effectively closed off access to international capital markets for
all Venezuelan issuers.
Hyperinflation has distorted the economy though helped finance
high fiscal deficits, which have few domestic private sources. As
oil exports have declined, Venezuela's authorities continue to
tighten pervasive controls on imports in an effort to mitigate the
lack of external financing and declining international reserves.
Venezuela's central bank reported international reserves totaling
$9.5 billion at year-end 2017, while we estimate non-gold reserves
at $2 billion. The critically low level of reserves has limited
capacity to pay external obligations and led to default on
sovereign debt in 2017. S&P said, "Despite the fall in oil exports
(owing to lower prices and volumes), the current account deficit
was close to 0% of GDP in 2017, and we expect it to remain below
1% of GDP during 2018-2021 as we expect continued compression of
imports. We project gross external financing needs to average over
200% of current account receipts (CAR) plus usable reserves and
narrow net external debt above 200% of CAR during 2018-2021."
External vulnerabilities are exacerbated by U.S. sanctions on
Venezuela, which constrain Venezuela's access to external
financing and material data inconsistencies.
S&P said, "Our assessment of Venezuela's fiscal position is among
the weakest of the sovereigns we rate. Official data on fiscal
balances have not been published since 2014 when the general
government deficit was 16% of GDP. Estimates from private sources
and the International Monetary Fund suggest that the general
government deficit averaged 18% of GDP in 2015-2017. The lower
change in net general government debt from 2015-2017 reflects
significant distortions from the official exchange rate. We expect
the deficit and change in debt to be around 20%-25% of GDP in
2018. In our view, Venezuela's fiscal stance is further impaired
by a volatile and unsustainable revenue base (namely oil), a
limited ability to raise revenues given the severe economic crisis
has affected most productive sectors of the economy, and a
shortfall in basic services and infrastructure, as noted by
widespread shortages, refugee outflows, and social unrest.
"We estimate that general government debt was 18% of GDP as of
year-end 2017. However, Venezuela's lower officially reported debt
stocks (data available through June 2017) and interest burden are
misleading as the government uses the preferential foreign
exchange rate of VEF10 per $US1 when calculating the local
currency equivalent of foreign currency external debt. If the
preferential exchange rate were to depreciate at the same pace as
our inflation forecast, as assumed in our base-case scenario, net
general government debt would increase toward 40% of GDP by 2021.
"We expect interest payments of around 20% of general government
revenue in 2018. The composition of Venezuela's debt is also
weaker considering a high share of foreign currency debt, a
volatile debt service profile, and large holdings by local banks.
"We assess Venezuela as having limited contingent liabilities.
Venezuela's largest potential contingent liability is PDVSA's
(Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.) debt, which totaled US$36 billion at
year-end 2017, or 0.1% of GDP. In November 2017, we lowered our
corporate credit rating on PDVSA to 'SD' (selective default) after
it missed two coupon payments. PDVSA's debt is not guaranteed by
the government, and the government's debt does not have cross-
default clauses connected with the debt of the national oil
company."
The combination of poor monetary, fiscal, and other policies has
resulted in hyperinflation. Venezuela has in place a dual exchange
rate arrangement with extensive foreign exchange restrictions--a
preferential exchange rate at VEF9.975/US$1, which is used for
most government operations, and a floating rate, which has been
allowed to depreciate slowly, although a minimum amount of dollars
is traded with it. Meanwhile, the parallel rate has exceeded
VEF200,000/US$1 since January 2018. The latest published
information shows a 180% inflation rate in 2015. S&P's estimate
inflation was 500% in 2016 and 950% in 2017, and it assumes 800%
in 2018.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.
All key rating factors were unchanged.
The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.
RATINGS LIST
Ratings Affirmed
Venezuela
Sovereign Credit Rating
Foreign Currency SD/--/D
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment CC
Senior Unsecured
Foreign Currency D
Ratings Remain On CreditWatch
Venezuela
Sovereign Credit Rating
Local Currency CCC-/Watch Neg/C
Downgraded; CreditWatch Action
To From
Venezuela
Senior Unsecured
Foreign Currency D CC/Watch Neg
=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================
* BOND PRICING: For the Week From February 12 to Feb. 16, 2018
--------------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Name Cpn Price Maturity Country Curr
----------- --- ----- -------- ------- ---
BA-CA Finance Cayman Lt 0.518 62.07 KY EUR
AES Tiete Energia SA 6.7842 1.109 4/15/2024 BR BRL
Argentina Bogar Bonds 2 39.36 2/4/2018 AR ARS
Automotores Gildemeister 8.25 73.25 5/24/2021 CL USD
Automotores Gildemeister 6.75 67 1/15/2023 CL USD
Automotores Gildemeister 8.25 73.25 5/24/2021 CL USD
Automotores Gildemeister 6.75 65.5 1/15/2023 CL USD
CA La Electricidad 8.5 63.664 4/10/2018 VE USD
Caixa Geral De Depositos 1.439 63.167 KY EUR
Caixa Geral De Depositos 1.469 KY EUR
CSN Islands XII Corp 7 68 BR USD
CSN Islands XII Corp 7 66.266 BR USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 6 53.225 10/25/2041 PA USD
Decimo Primer 4.54 43.127 10/25/2041 PA USD
Dolomite Capital 13.217 73.108 12/20/2019 CN ZAR
Enel Americas SA 5.75 56.172 6/15/2022 CL CLP
Gol Linhas Aereas SA 10.75 35.861 2/12/2023 BR USD
Gol Linhas Aereas SA 10.75 35.601 2/12/2023 BR USD
Inversora Electrica 6.5 67.625 9/26/2017 AR USD
Inversora Electrica 6.5 67.625 9/26/2017 AR USD
MIE Holdings Corp 7.5 64.78 4/25/2019 HK USD
MIE Holdings Corp 7.5 64.982 4/25/2019 HK USD
NB Finance Ltd 3.88 61.816 2/7/2035 KY EUR
Noble Holding 7.7 74.433 4/1/2025 KY USD
Noble Holding 5.25 56.279 3/15/2042 KY USD
Noble Holding 8.7 71.881 4/1/2045 KY USD
Noble Holding 6.2 60.129 8/1/2040 KY USD
Noble Holding 6.05 58.38 3/1/2041 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.5 42.5 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.125 56.938 6/26/2022 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7 68.053 4/21/2020 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.125 41.366 6/26/2042 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 4.375 40.002 4/25/2025 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.25 39.211 6/27/2029 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6 44.75 4/5/2023 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.25 39.018 6/27/2029 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.5 42.95 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 4.375 40.363 4/25/2025 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.125 41.635 6/26/2042 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6 52.625 4/5/2023 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.125 55.873 6/26/2022 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7 67.368 4/21/2020 KY USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 8.5 74.5 10/27/2020 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.458 5/16/2024 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.517 11/15/2026 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 9.75 35.677 5/17/2035 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 9 39.279 11/17/2021 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 5.375 30.267 4/12/2027 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 8.5 72.5 10/27/2020 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 12.75 45.278 2/17/2022 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.367 5/16/2024 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 6 30.387 11/15/2026 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 9 39.316 11/17/2021 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 9.75 35.893 5/17/2035 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 6 28.346 10/28/2022 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 5.5 30.123 4/12/2037 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela 12.75 45.23 2/17/2022 VE USD
Polarcus Ltd 5.6 75 3/30/2022 AE USD
Provincia del Chubut 4 10/21/2019 AR USD
Siem Offshore Inc 4.04527 69.5 10/30/2020 NO NOK
Siem Offshore 3.75176 65.75 12/28/2021 NO NOK
STB Finance 2.05771 56.243 KY JPY
Sylph Ltd 2.367 64.438 9/25/2036 KY USD
US Capital 1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039 KY USD
US Capital 1.63611 54.774 12/1/2039 KY USD
USJ Acucar 9.875 67 11/9/2019 BR USD
USJ Acucar 9.875 67 11/9/2019 BR USD
Venezuela 13.625 68.25 8/15/2018 VE USD
Venezuela 7.75 44.065 10/13/2019 VE USD
Venezuela 11.95 40.785 8/5/2031 VE USD
Venezuela 12.75 45.19 8/23/2022 VE USD
Venezuela 9.25 39.645 9/15/2027 VE USD
Venezuela 11.75 40.005 10/21/2026 VE USD
Venezuela 9 36.285 5/7/2023 VE USD
Venezuela 9.375 37.69 1/13/2034 VE USD
Venezuela 13.625 72.25 8/15/2018 VE USD
Venezuela 7 34.23 3/31/2038 VE USD
Venezuela 7 59.19 12/1/2018 VE USD
***********
Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices
for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication. At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com
***********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2018. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.
.
* * * End of Transmission * * *