/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/180206.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

           Tuesday, February 6, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 26


                            Headlines



B R A Z I L

COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA: S&P Hikes Global Scale Ratings to CCC+


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Lags Behind in Exports to US Market


E C U A D O R

ECUADOR: Voters Block Former President's Return to Power


G U Y A N A

GUYANA POWER: Former OUR Head Appointed CEO


J A M A I C A

CABLE & WIRELESS: S&P Rates Subsidiary's $1.825MM Term Loan 'BB-'


P U E R T O    R I C O

CATHOLIC SCHOOL: Hires Vilarino & Associates as Attorney
CHASE MONARCH: Must Surrender Premises to Cherif Medawar
LABORATORIO CLINICO: Seeks Feb. 19 Plan Filing Extension
RYDER MEMORIAL: S&P Lowers Rating on 1994A Bonds to CCC+


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

CARIBBEAN AIRLINES: To Offer Non-Stop Service Between SVG and JFK


U R U G U A Y

COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT Issuer Default Rating
HSBC BANK: Fitch Affirms 'bb-' Viability Rating
PROVINCIA CASA: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable
SCOTIABANK URUGUAY: Fitch Affirms bb- Viability Rating


V E N E Z U E L A

VENEZUELA: Colombia Opens Border Shelter for Locals Fleeing Crisis


                            - - - - -


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B R A Z I L
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COMPANHIA SIDERURGICA: S&P Hikes Global Scale Ratings to CCC+
-------------------------------------------------------------
Brazil-based steel company CSN has announced the debt refinancing
of about R$12 billion, a significant part of which is maturing in
the next three years. This, along with better industry
fundamentals, the company's release of audited financial
statements, and other efforts to preserve cash such as no dividend
distribution, will significantly reduce liquidity pressures for
the next 12-18 months, according to S&P Global Ratings.

S&P Global Ratings raised its global scale ratings on Companhia
Siderurgica Nacional (CSN) to 'CCC+' from 'CCC'. S&P has also
raised its Brazilian national scale ratings to 'brB' from
'brCCC' on the company. At the same time, S&P has raised the
issue-level ratings on CSN Islands XI Corp., CSN Islands XII
Corp., and CSN Resources S.A.'s senior unsecured notes to 'CCC+'
from 'CCC'. S&P has removed the ratings on CSN from CreditWatch
with negative implications. The outlook on both scale corporate
credit ratings is now positive.

The issue-level ratings remain at the same level as the corporate
credit ratings, which reflect the unconditional guarantee by the
holding company and the recovery rating of '4', given the expected
average recovery of 40% (rounded estimate).

The upgrade reflects the successful negotiations to refinance a
large portion of the company's debts, including R$6.5 billion that
matures in the next three years, reducing short-term liquidity
pressures. The extended debt amortization profile, lower interest
expense, due to the sharp decline of the base interest in Brazil
in 2017, and absence of covenant breach risk following the
presentation of the 2016 financial statements in late 2017
underpin our view of CSN's cash flow relief. Nonetheless, the
'CCC+' ratings continue to reflect the significant amount of debt
coming due in 2019 and 2020, especially the $750 million and $1.2
billion senior unsecured notes, which requires the company to rely
on favorable external conditions such as better prices and
volumes and on ongoing refinancing needs for the sustainability of
its capital structure in the intermediate term.

The positive outlook means that S&P may raise the ratings in the
next 12 months if CSN benefits from the improved market conditions
and from reduced short-term cash flow pressures to continue
searching for alternatives to implement its debt refinancing
strategy, such as additional long-term debt placements and asset
sales.


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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Lags Behind in Exports to US Market
-------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that The Dominican Republic has lagged
behind in exports to the US market, compared to its counterparts,
Costa Rica and Honduras, from 2007 to 2016.

The report Monitor of Industry and Commerce Ministry notes that
the country hasn't expanded "its slice in that important pie that
is the United States market," according to Dominican Today.

The report, which compares the participation of DR-Cafta members
in their exports to the United States, says that the Dominican
Republic reached only 17%, to Costa Rica's 29% of DR-Cafta
countries' exports to the US market, followed by Honduras 18%,
Guatemala 16%, Nicaragua 10% and El Salvador 10%, Dominican Today
notes.

The slump occurs despite that the country's growing exports and
expectation to continue, Dominican Today relays.

Dominican Today discloses that Central Bank preliminary figures
for 2017 show a 2.9% climb in the export of goods, of US$281.1
million, compared to 2016.

During 2007-2016, within DR-Cafta, Dominican exports grew at an
average rate of 3.8% per year and imports 7.1%, according to the
Monitor, Dominican Today relays.  "The 'blip' in the trade balance
with the US is obvious," the report said, Dominican Today notes.

"The US sold over US$9.5 billion in goods and services to the
country in 2016, and imported more than US$9.2 million, for
US$298.0 million a trade surplus," the report added, Dominican
Today relays.

                 Figures From the US Trade Office

Data from the Office of the US Trade Representative indicate that
the trade of goods and services of the United States with the
Dominican Republic was estimated at US$18.8 billion in 2016,
Dominican Today relays.

The exports of US goods to the RD topped US$7.0 million, while
imports reached US$4.7 billion. The US trade surplus with the
Dominican Republic was US$3.1 billion in 2016, Dominican Today
adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 20, 2017, Fitch Ratings has affirmed Dominican Republic's
Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook.



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E C U A D O R
=============


ECUADOR: Voters Block Former President's Return to Power
---------------------------------------------------------
Juan Forero at The Wall Street Journal reports that voters in
Ecuador on Sunday approved a referendum that all but blocks Rafael
Correa, a former president and leftist firebrand, from returning
to power.

With nearly all the votes counted, the National Electoral Council
said two out of every three voters had approved a ballot
initiative that limits presidents to two terms, according to The
Wall Street Journal.  That is a victory for its main proponent,
current President Lenin Moreno, and a reversal for Mr. Correa, who
feverishly campaigned against the referendum, the report notes.

Mr. Correa ruled from 2007 to 2017 and had been, along with the
late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, among the flag bearers of
21st-century socialism, the report relays.  That movement, pushed
by several allied Latin American countries, opposed U.S. policies
in the region, forged ties to authoritarian governments like
Cuba's and curbed some civil liberties, the report notes.

The results in Ecuador on Sunday bucked a trend in Latin America
that has seen Mr. Correa's old allies seek to remain in office in
coming elections, the report discloses.

In Venezuela, President Nicolas Maduro said he would run for re-
election in a vote that is expected before the end of April, an
election the U.S. and other countries say they won't recognize,
the report says.  In Bolivia, the highest court has said President
Evo Morales can run for a fourth term next year, even though
Bolivians voted in a referendum to prevent him from doing so, the
report relays.

In Ecuador, though, voters turned out to support Mr. Moreno, who
was narrowly elected to office last year, when he was considered a
placeholder until Mr. Correa's return in 2021, the report notes.

"Today, democracy has triumphed in a convincing way with the yes
vote," Mr. Moreno said via his Twitter account.  "We all
manifested ourselves clearly and forcefully, freely and
democratically, about the future we want," he added.

Though he served for six years as Mr. Correa's vice president, Mr.
Moreno shocked Ecuadoreans by turning against his former boss
nearly as soon as he took office, the report relays.

He has worked to smooth relations with business leaders,
journalists and indigenous groups, sectors that bristled during
Mr. Correa's presidency, the report notes.  He has also worked to
improve relations with the U.S. and said he would like to wash his
hands of Julian Assange, the WikiLeaks founder, whom Mr. Correa
allowed to take refuge in Ecuador's embassy in London, the report
discloses.

Mr. Moreno, a 64-year-old former tourism guru who was paralyzed
from the waist down in a carjacking two decades ago, pushed for
seven constitutional changes in Sunday's referendum, most of which
scuttle key policies of the Correa administration, the report
notes.  Those reforms received from 63% to 74% support, the report
says.

Ecuadorean voters were also supporting moves to limit mining in
protected areas, including Yasuni National Park. and to overhaul
how officials are appointed to watchdog agencies, like the
attorney general's office, the report relays.

Mr. Correa, who recently returned to Ecuador from his wife's
native Belgium to oppose the election referendum, said his former
ally had used all the powers of the state to run an unfair
campaign, the report discloses.  Via his Twitter account, Mr.
Correa said earlier Sunday that rejecting the referendum wasn't
necessarily a show of support for his return to power, the report
notes.

"This isn't supporting any one person," Mr. Correa wrote.  "It is
support for the fatherland. You know that the referendum is
unconstitutional," he added.

But Mr. Moreno, campaigning from his wheelchair, said approving
the referendum would cut into corrupt practices and make Ecuador
more democratic, the report relays.

His arguments found support among Ecuadoreans weary of an economy
that began faltering under Mr. Correa and a range of corruption
scandals, the report notes.  Among the more serious revolved
around a close aide to Mr. Correa, Jorge Glas, who briefly served
as Mr. Moreno's vice president before being sentenced to six years
in prison for accepting $13.5 million in bribes from a
construction company, the report discloses.

The results don't mean political death for Mr. Correa, the report
relays.  He could be elected to Congress or serve as mayor of
Guayaquil, giving him an important public platform, the report
notes.  A similar scenario played out in Colombia, where President
Juan Manuel Santos broke with his mentor and predecessor, Alvaro
Uribe, who then won a Senate seat and became a major obstacle to
the Santos administration, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Jan. 24, 2018, Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'B' rating to
Ecuador's USD3 billion notes maturing Jan. 23, 2028. The notes
have a coupon of 7.875%.



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G U Y A N A
===========


GUYANA POWER: Former OUR Head Appointed CEO
-------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that former head of the Office of Utilities
Regulation (OUR) Albert Gordon is the new Chief Executive Officer
of Guyana Power and Light.

His appointment comes as the utility company faces criticism from
customers due to constant and prolonged blackouts, according to
RJR News.

According to a statement from the power company, Gordon's
appointment forms part of GPL's plans to modernize, expand and
improve electricity supply, the report notes.

Mr. Gordon, who also served as President of the National Water
Commission, took up the post, the report says.

GPL had been without a Chief Executive Officer since February 2016
when the CEO Colin Welch was fired, the report adds.



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J A M A I C A
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CABLE & WIRELESS: S&P Rates Subsidiary's $1.825MM Term Loan 'BB-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB-' issue-level rating on Coral-
US Co-Borrower LLC's new $1.825 million secured term loan due
2026. Coral-US Co-Borrower is a subsidiary of Cable & Wireless
Communications Limited (CWC; BB-/Negative/B).

S&P said, "We view the transaction to be debt neutral because CWC
will use proceeds to repay the existing secured term loan for the
same amount -- $1.825 million -- and pay any fees in connection
with the new loan. The new loan will have several incurrence
covenants in line with previous one: net senior debt incurrence
ratio of maximum of 4.0x and net total debt ratio maximum of 5.0x.

"We believe the new term loan will somewhat improve CWC's maturity
debt profile to 7.2 years from 6.8 years, and we expect the
company to be able to reprice its new loan with a lower interest
rate and generate some interest savings in the future."

S&P related, "Our ratings on CWC reflect its leading position as a
wireline and wireless telecommunications and cable TV provider in
most of the markets in which it operates; solid profitability;
wide geographic, product, and customer diversification; intense
competitive pressures; and overall relatively high country risk.
The ratings and negative outlook on the company also reflect our
concerns regarding the macroeconomic and competitive conditions in
the Caribbean and Latin America, which could continue reducing the
average revenue per user (ARPUs) and increase churn, hampering the
company's future growth. We're also concerned about the impact of
hurricanes Maria and Irma on CWC's 2017 and 2018 EBITDA
generation, preventing the company from meeting a proportionate
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio below 5.0x for the next few years."

RATINGS LIST

Cable & Wireless Communications Limited
  Corporate credit rating                 BB-/Negative/B

Rating Assigned

Coral-US Co-Borrower LLC
  Secured term loan                       BB-



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P U E R T O    R I C O
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CATHOLIC SCHOOL: Hires Vilarino & Associates as Attorney
--------------------------------------------------------
Catholic School Employees Pension Trust seeks authority from the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ
the Law Firm of Vilarino & Associates, as attorney to the Debtor.

Catholic School requires Vilarino & Associates to:

   a. advise the Debtor with respect to its duties, powers and
      responsibilities in the bankrupty case under the laws of
      the U.S. and Puerto Rico in which the debtor in possession
      conducts its operations, do business, or is involved in
      litigation;

   b. advise the Debtor in connection with a determination
      whether a reorganization is feasible and, if not, help
      the Debtor in the orderly liquidation of its assets;

   c. assist the Debtor with respect to negotiation with
      creditors for the purpose of arranging the orderly
      liquidation of assets and propose a viable plan of
      reorganization;

   d. prepare, on behalf of the Debtor, the necessary complaints,
      answers, orders, reports, memoranda of law and any other
      legal paper of documents;

   e. appear before the bankruptcy court, or any court in which
      the Debtors assert a claim interest or defense directly or
      indirectly related to the bankruptcy case;

   f. perform such other legal services for the Debtors as may be
      required in these proceedings or in connection with the
      operation of and involvement with the Debtor's business,
      including but not limited to notarial services; and

   g. employ other professional services, if necessary.

Vilarino & Associates will be paid at these hourly rates:

     Senior Attorneys                   $275
     Associates                         $175
     Law Clerks                         $100
     Paralegals                          $85

Vilarino & Associates will be paid a retainer in the amount of
$9,000.

Vilarino & Associates will also be reimbursed for reasonable
out-of-pocket expenses incurred.

Javier Vilarino, principal of the Law Firm of Vilarino &
Associates, assured the Court that the firm is a "disinterested
person" as the term is defined in Section 101(14) of the
Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any interest adverse to the
Debtor and its estates.

Vilarino & Associates can be reached at:

     Javier Vilarino, Esq.
     LAW FIRM OF VILARINO & ASSOCIATES
     PO Box 9022515
     San Juan, PR 00902-2515
     Tel: (787) 565-9894
     E-mail: jvilarino@vilarinolaw.com

            About Catholic School Employees Pension Trust

The Catholic School Employees Pension Trust is a business trust
duly constituted under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.

The Pension Trust filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case
No. 18-00108) on Jan. 11, 2018.  In the petition signed by Ramon
Guzman, president of Board of Trustees, the Debtor estimated $1
million to $10 million to $1 million to $10 million in assets and
liabilities.  The Hon. Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan presides over
the case.  Javier Vilarino, Esq., at the Law Firm of Vilarino &
Associates, serves as bankruptcy counsel.


CHASE MONARCH: Must Surrender Premises to Cherif Medawar
--------------------------------------------------------
Judge Brian K. Tester of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico granted creditor Cherif Medawar's urgent
motion for immediate surrender of premises being held by Debtor
Chase Monarch International, Inc.

On Sept. 5, 2017, Debtor and Mr. Medawar executed a Lease Contract
Agreement with Option to Purchase with Debtor. On Oct. 23, 2017,
Mr. Medawar sent an email to the Tenant's email address, as stated
in the Lease, indicating that the October 2017 rent payment had
not been received and requesting that Debtor deliver the rent
payment on that date. On Oct. 31, 2017, eight calendar days after
the email was sent to Debtor, a letter was sent by a legal
representative of Mr. Medawar in effect terminating the Lease for
Tenants "due to tenant's noncompliance with the terms of the
same???." On Nov. 14, 2017, Debtor filed its bankruptcy petition
under chapter 11 of the Code.

Debtor argues that Mr. Medawar unilaterally terminated the Lease
and cites Andreu v. Popular Leasing, Inc., and Article 1208, 31
L.P.R.A. section 3373, as support. The present case is inapposite
to the issue at hand, and Debtor misconstrues and misapplies the
purpose of Article 1208 for its benefit. Andreu Fuentes dealt with
the lease of a vehicle, which the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
described as a type of lease agreement where one party, the
lessor, purchases a vehicle from a seller and then leases the same
to a third party. In Andreu Fuentes, Mr. Andreu (the third party
lessee) signed receipts and releases acknowledging that he would
still be responsible for all the monthly payments even if the
vehicle suffered damages or was lost. Thereafter, lessee Andreu
unilaterally canceled the lease agreement after the vehicle was
not operating correctly, going against the letter of the
agreements he had signed with Popular Leasing.

The Lease, which this court finds was legally binding under state
law, and legally terminated on Oct. 31, 2017, is not property of
the Debtor's estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 541(b)(2).
Therefore, the Debtor and Medawar will coordinate a date within
the next 10 days for Debtor to surrender and vacate the premises.

A full-text copy of Judge Tester's Jan. 24, 2018 Opinion and Order
is available at:

       http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb17-06841-11-91.pdf

             About Chase Monarch International, Inc.

Chase Monarch International, Inc., filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-06841) on November 14, 2017,
disclosing under $1 million in both assets and liabilities. The
Debtor is represented by Hector Juan Figueroa Vincenty, Esq.


LABORATORIO CLINICO: Seeks Feb. 19 Plan Filing Extension
--------------------------------------------------------
Laboratorio Clinico Los Robles, Inc., asks the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico to allow the extension of
time until Feb. 19, 2018 to file the Disclosure Statement and the
Chapter 11 Small Business Plan.

The Court has previously granted the Debtor's motion for extension
of time to file the Disclosure Statement and the Chapter 11 Small
Business Plan to Jan. 29, 2017.

The Debtor has previously informed the Court that due to the
damages caused by Hurricane Irma and later with Hurricane Maria,
electricity was connected only until January 26, 2018. The
situation with the electricity has impaired the Debtor's ability
to complete the Disclosure Statement, the Chapter 11 Small
Business Plan and other documents that need to be revised and
filed.

Now, the Debtor is still trying to complete all the requirements
in order to be ready to file the Disclosure and the plan. As such,
the Debtor request an extension of time until February 19, 2017
due to this exigent situation that it is more likely than not that
the Court will confirm the plan within a reasonable period of
time.

             About Laboratorio Clinico Los Robles

Laboratorio Clinico Los Robles, Inc. filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 17-03196) on May 5, 2017. The
petition was signed by the Debtor's president, Luis Armando
Berrios Diaz.  At the time of filing, the Debtor estimated
$500,000 to $1 million in assets and $100,000 to $500,000 in
liabilities.  Ada M. Conde, Esq., at Estudio Legal 1611 Corp, is
the Debtor's bankruptcy counsel.


RYDER MEMORIAL: S&P Lowers Rating on 1994A Bonds to CCC+
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its bond ratings on Puerto Rico
Industrial Medical & Higher Education & Environmental Pollution
Control Facilities Finance Authority's series 1994A bonds, issued
for Ryder Memorial Hospital, to 'CCC+' from 'B+'. S&P Global
Ratings removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where they were
placed with negative implications Oct. 31, 2017. The outlook is
negative.

S&P said, "The downgrade reflects our view of Ryder's weakened
operating and financial profiles and ongoing uncertainty related
to the hospital's ability to return to full operations following
the devastating impact of Hurricane Maria. Management indicates
Ryder's main hospital is significantly damaged, having been closed
since the storm. Working from a temporary location, outpatient
services are open, but inpatient services have been very limited.
Ryder continues to rely on generators for power, because there is
still no electricity across much of the island, especially in the
hospital's service area. In addition, management has been unable
to provide us with updated financial statements. Management has
indicated it will pay its next debt service payment through its
debt service reserve fund. We believe Ryder is vulnerable to
default given the catastrophic damage to the hospital's operations
and cash flow, combined with the very limited liquidity. In our
view, there is a moderate likelihood that Ryder will not make debt
service payments in the next two years, because the recovery will
be long and volumes and cash flow are very weak."

The hospital's operating profile includes a dominant market share
across a large primary service area, although its population
continues to decline and carries weak wealth and income
indicators. In recent years, Ryder's financial profile has been
vulnerable, with weak financial operating performance and
thin balance-sheet metrics for the rating level. The hospital's
revenue base is small and relies heavily on government
reimbursement. Although insurance is covering hurricane damage,
management indicated there are potential delays in the payment of
proceeds, which could affect the timing of the facility's repairs
and further stress Ryder's operating profile. Given these expected
delays, overall liquidity has declined to the point where
management will pay debt service from the debt service reserve.
Although it has not seen formal financial results, S&P believes
the draw means the hospital has a bare minimum of working capital
and little-to-no reserves.

The negative outlook reflects the uncertainty of Ryder's ability
to resume historical operations and volumes, both of which were
strained prior to the hurricane. Furthermore, delays in insurance
proceeds and government aid, coupled with extensive repairs to the
facility, will likely mean liquidity and operational capacity will
remain at dangerously low levels indefinitely. Together, these
factors threaten the hospital's ability to pay its debt service
payments.

S&P said, "We could lower the rating if Ryder's financial profile
indicates a greater likelihood of default on its bond
obligations."

While a higher rating is unlikely in the outlook period, an
outlook revision to stable is possible if Ryder stabilizes factors
that will lead to a near-term rebound of volumes, revenue, and
operations. In addition, if the hospital generates even a modest
increase in unrestricted reserves, S&P would view this favorably
in combination with stabilized operations.



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T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


CARIBBEAN AIRLINES: To Offer Non-Stop Service Between SVG and JFK
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Caribbean Airlines Limited disclosed the
start of non-stop service between St. Vincent and the Grenadines'
Argyle International Airport and John F. Kennedy International
Airport in New York.

The weekly service will operate every Wednesday beginning on March
14, according to RJR News.

Caribbean Airlines says customers will now benefit from the non-
stop service between St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Caribbean
Airlines' other international and regional destinations, the
report notes.

Caribbean Airlines Chief Executive Officer, Garvin Medera, says
the aim is to provide closer links for travel and commerce between
the eastern Caribbean and North America, the report adds.

Caribbean Airlines Limited -- http://www.caribbean-airlines.com/
-- provides passenger airline services in the Caribbean, South
America, and North America.  The company also offers freighter
services for perishables, fish and seafood, live animals, human
remains, and dangerous goods.  In addition, it operates a duty
free store in Trinidad.  Caribbean Airlines Limited was founded in
2006 and is based in Piarco, Trinidad and Tobago.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
November 2, 2015, RJR News said that Michael DiLollo, Chief
Executive Officer of Caribbean Airlines Limited has quit after
just 17 months on the job. The 48-year-old Canadian national,
citing personal reasons, resigned with immediate effect.  His
resignation was accepted by the airline's board of directors. Mr.
DiLollo was appointed Caribbean Airlines CEO in May 2014,
following the sudden resignation of Robert Corbie in September
2013.

In early February 2015, Larry Howai, then Finance Minister, told
Parliament that unaudited accounts for 2014 showed the airline
made a loss of US$60 million, inclusive of its Air Jamaica
operations, and the airline planned to break even by 2017.
Mr. Howai told the Parliament that a five-year strategic plan had
been completed and was in the process of being approved for
implementation.

In an interview with the Trinidad & Tobago Guardian in early
November 2015, Mr. DiLollo said CAL did not need a bailout just
yet. Mr. DiLollo said the airline had benefited from extremely
patient shareholders for years and he believed the airline was
strategically positioned to break even in three years.



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U R U G U A Y
=============


COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT Issuer Default Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito's
(FUCEREP) Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' and
Viability rating (VR) at 'b'. The Rating Outlook remains Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDR and VR

FUCEREP's IDR and VR are highly influenced by its small size
within the financial system and the challenges the cooperative
faces to improve its overall financial performance. The company's
performance has been weak, posting net losses for four years in a
row, and this has affected its capital levels.

Additionally, the ratings also consider Fitch's perception of a
higher risk appetite as the cooperative diversifies its operations
into riskier businesses, and the entity's deteriorating asset
quality.

FUCEREP's capital ratios have declined strongly in the last four
years as a consequence of the losses and the increase in
intangible assets (largely IT investments) since 2015. Its Fitch
Core Capital (FCC) ratio remains adequate for its business model
and rating level (15.16% at Sept. 30, 2017), supported by the
annual capital contributions made by its members, which partly
compensates for the losses. Fitch estimates FUCEREP's capital
adequacy will continue to be pressured in the medium term given
the expected portfolio growth and low results, although these will
be partly offset by the capital contributions made by the members
and the positive impact on equity from the adoption of IFRS from
January 2018, which will be of around 20% of equity. In May 2017
the Central Bank of Uruguay reduced the minimum regulatory capital
requirement to the level in place until 2013 (12% of risk weighted
assets), which eased the pressure on its regulatory capital, which
had restricted its growth capacity.

FUCEREP's financial performance has been weak in the past four
years. While its operating revenues have increased somewhat, the
entity has registered operational losses due mainly to low growth,
rising loan loss provisions, and a hefty cost base, which has
grown as a result of the large IT investments. Although FUCEREP is
a not-for-profit entity, profitability is important as a source of
internal capital generation.

FUCEREP's asset quality had historically been adequate,
benefitting from the payroll deduction mechanism of 75% of its
portfolio. However, asset quality has rapidly deteriorated since
2014 and its past-due loans ratio rose to 13.83% at Dec. 31, 2017
(down from 15.49% at Sept. 30, 2017), affected by the economic
slowdown, the slight decline in total loans since 2015 and the
operational problems generated by the difficult implementation of
the new core system. Fitch expects this trend to continue as the
entity expands into riskier segments, although this should be
partly mitigated by the measures taken to control the rise in NPLs
and improve collections, together with the expected improvement in
the local economy.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

FUCEREP's Support and Support Rating Floor of '5' and 'NF',
respectively, reflect Fitch's opinion that extraordinary
government support if needed, while possible, cannot be relied
upon given its small size and deposit market share.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs AND VR

FUCEREP's VR and IDR have a Negative Outlook reflecting the
challenges to meet regulatory capital requirements in times when
its overall financial performance has been weak. FUCEREP's ratings
could be downgraded if it consistently fails to meet the capital
requirements or if its weak profitability together with further
material deterioration in asset quality lead to its FCC ratio
falling and remaining below 15%.

The Outlook on FUCEREP's IDRs could return to Stable if the entity
consistently meets its regulatory capital requirements and
improves its profitability. Sustained progress in its
profitability metrics, with ROA consistently remaining above 1%,
together with asset quality and capitalization remaining at
adequate levels could lead to positive rating actions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES -SUPPORT AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Changes in FUCEREP's SR and SRF are highly unlikely in the
foreseeable future.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B'; Outlook
    Negative;
-- Viability rating at 'b'
-- Support rating at '5';
-- Support rating floor at 'NF'.


HSBC BANK: Fitch Affirms 'bb-' Viability Rating
-----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed HSBC Bank (Uruguay) S.A.'s long-term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB+',
with a Stable Outlook, and the bank's Support Rating (SR) at '2'.
Fitch has also affirmed the Viability Rating (VR) at 'bb-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

HSBC Uruguay's LC and FC IDRs, as well as its Support Rating are
driven by the strong ability and propensity of its ultimate
parent; HSBC Holdings plc (HSBC; rated AA-/Stable/VR aa-) to
provide support to HSBC Uruguay, if it would be required. HSBC
Uruguay's FC IDR of 'BBB+' is at the Country Ceiling.

Even though the Uruguayan bank does not operate in a core market
for HSBC, HSBC Uruguay's IDRs and Support Rating remain linked to
those of its ultimate parent, reflecting Fitch's view that there
is a high probability of support due to reputational
considerations and the potential negative impact this could have
on other subsidiaries. Additionally, Fitch affirmed HSBC Uruguay's
Support Rating at '2' as required support would be immaterial
relative to ability of parent to provide it. Given the above, it
is expected that HSBC Uruguay would receive timely support from
its parent, if required. The above also is supported by the
decision of HSBC to maintain its operations in Uruguay.

VR
HSBC Uruguay's business model and weaker competitive position, as
well as its low capitalization highly influence its VR. HSBC
Uruguay's market share is still moderate and does not represent a
clear competitive advantage. Additionally, the bank's business
model results in relatively high loan and deposit concentrations.

The bank's capitalization ratios are low relative to similarly
rated peers (emerging market commercial banks with bbb category
VR), partly due to the HSBC Group's capital allocation policy that
allows subsidiaries to work with minimal regulatory capital
levels. However, the agency believes that the bank will finance
its expansion with its profits and, should this not be enough, it
will continue to receive the capital injections it needs to
finance its expansion. As of June 2017, HSBC Uruguay's and
tangible equity to tangible assets was 6.47%.

The bank's operating revenues have grown along with its expansion
since 2008. From 2012 to 2015, HSBC Uruguay's performance was
driven by the increase in the level of activity, as well as the
income resulting from the depreciation of the exchange rate on its
position in U.S. dollars, as the bank follows a policy of
maintaining its capital in dollars. During 2017, the improvements
in operational revenues were offset by the higher administrative
expenses. Profitability improved on the back of regulatory changes
which eased the burden of inflation adjustments on the bank's
operating results.

The bank's loan quality indicators have historically been sound,
underpinned by its corporate nature. However, as other banks, the
loan portfolio quality began deteriorating in 2016 and has
remained at elevated levels due to the economic slowdown. The non-
performing loans (NPLs; credits with more than 60 days overdue)
increased to 2.9% of the total portfolio at June 2017, compared to
2.28% in December 2016, affected mainly by a major credit problem.
Loan loss reserve coverage remained high (142% of the NPLs in June
2017 and 160% in 2016), but has declined with the larger volume of
problem loans.

The bank's main source of funding is deposits from the non-
financial sector, which accounted for 81% of assets at June 2017.
The bank's liquidity is sound, but declining as a result of the
loan growth over the past year. At end-June 2017, liquid assets
(cash and equivalents and loans to the financial sector) covered
32% of deposits.

The bank's assets and liabilities, like the financial system, are
highly dollarized. While declining, Fitch believes that
dollarization will remain high over the long term due to the
Uruguayan economy culture and the type of clientele HSBC Uruguay
serves. While HSBC Uruguay's open foreign exchange positions are
commonly high, resulting in volatile earnings, it is shareholder
policy to hold the bank's equity in U.S. dollars.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

HSBC Uruguay's IDRs are limited by the Country Ceiling, which is
two notches above the sovereign rating. Additional rating actions
on HSBC Uruguay's IDRs are subject to changes in the sovereign
rating. Changes in its controlling shareholder's ability or
willingness to provide support would also negatively affect HSBC
Uruguay's ratings, but these scenarios are considered unlikely.

VR
HSBC Uruguay's VR could eventually be upgraded if the bank
achieves and maintains a FCC ratio of at least 10% through
sustainable earnings and profitability, i.e. an operating
profit/risk weighted asset ratio above 1.3%. Better
diversification of the bank's balance sheet would also be positive
for creditworthiness. In turn, the bank's VR could be negatively
affected if the bank fails to sustain recent improvements in
profitability metrics and FCC ratio.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

HSBC Uruguay

-- Long-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
-- Long-term Local Currency IDR at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
-- Support Rating at '2';
-- Viability Rating at 'bb-'.


PROVINCIA CASA: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term IDR; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Provincia Casa Financiera's Long-Term
Foreign Currency and Long-Term Local Currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) at 'B'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs

Provincia is a branch of Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires
(BAPRO) and part of the same legal entity. Therefore, Provincia's
IDRs reflect Fitch's opinion of BAPRO's financial and business
profile, which are highly influenced by its leading franchise and
systemic importance as the second largest bank in terms of
deposits and the third in loans in Argentina. Fitch also considers
the bank's good asset quality, ample liquidity, moderate
profitability and low capital base.

In addition, BAPRO and Provincia are wholly-owned by the
government of the Province of Buenos Aires. BAPRO's liabilities
(including those of its branches abroad) are fully guaranteed by
the government of the Province of Buenos Aires.

In Uruguay, Provincia is small due to its narrow business focus.
Its legal status is a casa financiera, which differs from a
banking license because it is not allowed to raise resident's
deposits and has much lower regulatory costs. However, in terms of
regulatory capital limits, Provincia has to comply with the rules
applied to banks.

Provincia is fully integrated with its head office's strategies,
corporate governance practices and risk management procedures. It
operates through one office and reports to the International
Division of BAPRO.

Provincia has an improving profitability, low credit risk, a
highly liquid balance sheet and adequate capitalization metrics.
The branch's current business plan aims to improve its
profitability mainly through a more active pricing policy,
improving its cost efficiency, a more active management of its
trading portfolio and loan growth.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUPPORT RATING

The Support Rating of '5' reflects that, although possible,
external support for this bank, as with most Argentine banks,
cannot be relied upon given the ample economic imbalances. In
turn, the sovereign ability and willingness to support banks is
highly uncertain.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs

Provincia's IDRs are sensitive to changes in BAPRO's financial and
business profile.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING

Changes in Provincia's Support Rating are unlikely in the
foreseeable future.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Provincia Casa Financiera:

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable;
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable;
-- Support Rating at '5'.


SCOTIABANK URUGUAY: Fitch Affirms bb- Viability Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Scotiabank Uruguay S.A.'s Long-Term
Foreign Currency (FC) and Local Currency (LC) Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) at 'BBB+'. Fitch has also affirmed the bank's
Viability rating (VR) at 'bb-' and its Support Rating (SR) at '2'.
The Rating Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

Scotiabank Uruguay's IDRs and SR are driven by the support that
Fitch believes the bank would receive from its parent, Bank of
Nova Scotia (BNS; AA-/aa-/Stable). Scotiabank Uruguay's LT IDRs
are constrained by Uruguay's Country Ceiling, which is two notches
above the sovereign's LT IDR. As per Fitch's criteria, the Country
Ceiling captures transfer and convertibility risks and limits the
extent to which support from foreign shareholders can be factored
into the rating.

Fitch's affirmation of Scotiabank Uruguay's SR at '2' reflects the
high probability of support to the bank from BNS, if needed. In
Fitch's view, the Uruguayan subsidiary is a strategic operation
for BNS with respect to consolidating its footprint in Latin
America and corresponds well to the parent's earnings
diversification strategy. One example of this is the capital
injection (approximately USD90 million) into Scotiabank Uruguay
for the acquisition of Discount Bank.

The Uruguayan subsidiary has strong strategic and administrative
synergies with the parent, besides sharing the same brand. Risk
management policies are also aligned to those at the parent level
and to local regulatory practices. Scotiabank Uruguay is also
small relative to the consolidated group, suggesting that
supporting the subsidiary would be relatively easy for BNS.

The Stable Outlook on the IDRs is in line with that of the bank's
parent, BNS, and is limited by Uruguay's sovereign Outlook. BNS's
ratings reflect the company's strong and stable operating
performance over an extended period, its strong capital ratios,
and good funding profile.

VR

Fitch affirmed Scotiabank Uruguay's VR at 'bb-', reflecting the
bank's still modest profitability and the need to further
consolidate its franchise after several acquisitions in order to
achieve adequate and recurring profitability. The bank's VR is
highly influenced by its competitive stance in the Uruguayan
corporate and retail credit market, which is offset by its weak
and volatile profitability. Scotiabank Uruguay's VR also considers
its diversified and ample funding profile, adequate asset quality
and capitalization levels in light of ordinary support from BNS.

Scotiabank's earnings have been volatile since 2012, when BNS
first entered the Uruguayan banking sector. The acquisition of
Discount Bank in 2015, which involved some nonrecurring expenses
and integration process costs, negatively affected the bank's
profitability. During 2017, profitability improved on the back of
regulatory changes, which eased the burden of inflation
adjustments on Scotiabank's operating results.

At 6.2%, the bank's Tangible Common Equity/Tangible Assets ratio
remained low but is in line with its shareholder's strategy to
optimize capital utilization at the subsidiary level. As observed
with other foreign banks operating in the region, Scotiabank
Uruguay does not operate with high capital margins. Depending on
growth, the bank could receive capital injections from its parent,
as evidenced by past capital injections.

Scotiabank Uruguay shows a growing, diversified, and stable
funding structure. The bank's liabilities are largely made up of
deposits, which have grown consistently over the last two years.
While Scotiabank Uruguay operates on mostly short-term funding,
its ample liquidity, relatively short-term nature of its loan
portfolio, and potential for support from BNS facilitates asset
liability management. The bank's asset quality indicators remained
in line with its current VR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

Positive rating actions are contingent upon upgrades in Uruguay's
sovereign ratings and country ceiling. In turn, any downgrade of
Uruguay's sovereign rating and/or a reduction in Scotiabank
Uruguay's shareholder's ability or propensity to provide support
could negatively affect its ratings.

VIABILITY RATING (VR)

Scotiabank Uruguay's VR could be downgraded if the bank does not
improve its profitability and capital ratios in the short term. In
turn, the VR could be positively affected if Scotiabank Uruguay
shows sustained operating profits/risk weighted assets above 1.25%
and FCC/RWAs ratios above 9%.]

Fitch has affirmed Scotiabank Uruguay's ratings:

-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'BBB+'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- Support Rating at '2';
-- Viability rating at 'bb-'.



=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


VENEZUELA: Colombia Opens Border Shelter for Locals Fleeing Crisis
------------------------------------------------------------------
Associated Press reports that Colombia's government has opened its
first shelter for Venezuelans who are pouring across the border in
increasing numbers to escape their nation's economic crisis.

The facility, opened Saturday near the border city of Cucuta, is
expected to provide shelter of up to 48 hours for 120 people a
day, according to Associated Press.  Pregnant mothers, the elderly
and minors who entered the country legally will be given priority.
It will be administered by the Red Cross, the report notes.

In recent weeks, an increasing exodus of Venezuelan migrants has
overwhelmed Cucuta, with many sleeping on the streets. Crime in
the city has grown as gangs recruit and take advantage of the
desperate migrants, the report relays.

Some 35,000 Venezuelans cross into Colombia each day, many of them
settling in with relatives or making short trips to buy food and
medicine that has been scarce back home, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Jan. 12, 2018, S&P Global Ratings lowered its issue rating on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela's global bond due 2020 to 'D'
from 'CC'. At the same time, S&P affirmed its long- and short-term
foreign currency sovereign issuer credit ratings at 'SD/D'. The
long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit ratings
remain at 'CCC-/C' and are still on CreditWatch with negative
implications, where S&P placed them on Nov. 3, 2017. Other foreign
currency senior unsecured debt issues not currently rated 'D' are
rated 'CC'.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000.



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