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T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Friday, April 28, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 84
Headlines
A R G E N T I N A
ARGENTINA: Moody's Revises Outlook on Banking System to Positive
INVERSIONES Y REPRESENTACIONES: Fitch Affirms B Long-Term IDR
B R A Z I L
BANCO NACIONAL: S&P Affirms 'BB' Global Scale Ratings
BRAZIL: Tries to Trim Complex Labor Laws
BRAZIL: Bank Loan Recovery Rate Remain Challenging, Fitch Says
FINANCIADORA DE ESTUDOS: Fitch Assigns BB First-Time IDR
SANCOR SEGUROS: Fitch Affirms B+ IFS Rating; Outlook Stable
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
CHEERMARK GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 2
CONOCOPHILLIPS SOUTH: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
CREATINGEV INC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 9
CYRUS L2: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
GBA MINMETALS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 2
GREEN DYNASTY: Court Enters Wind-Up Order
GREY K ENVIRONMENTAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
IGUAZU HOLDINGS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
TASTOTAL LTD: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
VINCI VALUE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
C O S T A R I C A
BANCO INTERNACIONAL: Fitch Affirms B Short-Term IDRs
J A M A I C A
JAMAICA: Concern Raised About NIF Inflows
JAMAICA: TAJ Configures Reduced Property Tax Rates
M E X I C O
AVIANCA HOLDINGS: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR on Stabilized Credit Metrics
MEXICO: Registers Small Trade Deficit in March
MEXICO: S&P Affirms Ratings on 7 Metrofinanciera RMBS
P E R U
VM HOLDING: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to Proposed Sr. Unsec. Debt
T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O
PETROLEUM CO: Moody's Lowers CFR to B1 on Weak Liquidity Position
TOBAGO HOUSE: Moody's Lowers Issuer Rating to Ba1; Outlook Stable
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Moody's Cuts Issuer & Sr. Debt Ratings to Ba1
V E N E Z U E L A
VENEZUELA: To Withdraw From Organization of American States
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A R G E N T I N A
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ARGENTINA: Moody's Revises Outlook on Banking System to Positive
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Moody's Investors Service has changed its outlook on the Argentine
Banking system to positive from stable, following its decision
last month to change the outlook on Argentina's B3 sovereign bond
rating to positive from stable. The outlook on the banking system
had been stable since 2015.
Argentina's banks will be buoyed by an improving economy as an
increase in consumption and investment helps drive growth and
inflation slows. Moody's expects Argentina's economy to grow by
about 3% in 2017 and 3.5% in 2018, the fastest expansion since
late 2000.
"This improved backdrop will create new business opportunities for
banks and financial institutions, and will ease their transition
into a more competitive, market-driven operating environment,"
said Valeria Azconegui, a Vice President and Senior Analyst at
Moody's.
Capital inflows should help thaw business spending, and falling
inflation should support gains in borrowers' purchasing power and
open the door for easier monetary policy. That in turn should
kindle demand for credit among both corporates and consumers.
While an increase in lenders' risk appetite will lead to a modest
deterioration in asset quality, non-performing loans will rise
from a very low base. In addition, capital will remain relatively
strong by Latin American standards despite continued rapid nominal
loan growth and falling profitability.
Falling interest rates will weigh on bank profitability by
reducing interest income and leading to lower returns on banks'
securities holdings. In addition, credit costs are likely to
increase in line with delinquencies, though they should remain
manageable.
In nominal terms, these profitability pressures will outweigh
growing business volumes and increased fee- revenues.
Nevertheless, profitability is likely to improve on an inflation-
adjusted basis.
Although cross-border funding will continue to increase following
the country's recent return to global capital markets, banks will
remain primarily funded with retail deposits and risks associated
with cross-border funding will be limited.
The government's capacity to support banks in times of stress is
also strengthening as its fiscal position improves. Moody's
considers that the government remains willing to support the most
systemically important banks.
INVERSIONES Y REPRESENTACIONES: Fitch Affirms B Long-Term IDR
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Inversiones y Representaciones S.A.
(IRSA) Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (LT IDR)
at 'B'. Fitch has also upgraded IRSA's Local-currency IDR (LC IDR)
to 'BB-' from 'B+' and its senior unsecured notes to 'B+/RR3' from
'B/RR4'. The Rating Outlook on the corporate ratings is Stable.
The upgrade of the LC IDR is due to IRSA's resilient operating
performance during the past five years, despite high inflation and
challenging economic conditions. The upgrade of IRSA's notes to
'B+'/'RR3' reflects above-average recovery expectations for these
obligations, as it is Fitch's belief that a default on debt
denominated in a foreign currency by IRSA would be driven by
exchange controls rather than a deterioration of its solid
financial profile or strong business position.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Constrained by Argentina Economic Environment
IRSA's Long-Term Foreign Currency (FC) IDR continues to be
constrained at 'B' by the country ceiling assigned to Argentina.
Country ceilings are designed to reflect the risks associated with
sovereigns, placing restrictions upon private sector corporates,
which may prevent them from converting local currency (LC) to any
foreign currency (FC) under a stress scenario, and/or may not
allow the transfer of FC abroad to service FC debt obligations.
Strong Business Position
The company's ratings reflect IRSA's solid business position as
one of the largest owners and managers of real estate assets in
Argentina. IRSA through its subsidiary IRSA Propiedades
Comerciales S.A. (IRSA PC, LT IDR 'B'/Outlook Stable) owns 16
shopping centers (15 managed by IRSA) in Argentina with a total
GLA of 337,000 square meters (sq.m.) and six premium offices with
77,252 sqm as of Dec 31, 2016. IRSA PC's cumulative tenants' sales
in the shopping centers segment totaled ARS 17.8 billion during
the six-month period ended in Dec. 31, 2016, a 20% increase over
the prior year's same period.
Strong Parent-Subsidiary Linkage:
Importantly, both IRSA and IRSA PC own key parcels of land in
strategic areas of Buenos Aires, which could be sold to improve
the company's liquidity or for new developments. Despite lower
leverage at its subsidiary IRSA PC, the LC IDRs of IRSA and IRSA
PC have been linked at 'BB-'. This linkage reflects factors that
align the credit quality of the company and the fact that IRSA
PC's upstream dividends represent a relevant part of IRSA's cash
flow generation.
Debt Related to Operations outside Argentina Non-recourse
IRSA gained control of the Israeli conglomerate IDB Development
Corporation Ltd. (IDBD) during October 2015. The debt of IDBD is
non-recourse to IRSA and Fitch excludes its debt from the credit
metrics calculation of IRSA. IDBD is one of the largest
conglomerates in Israel. It participates through various
subsidiaries in industry sectors such as: real estate (Property &
Building Corporation), supermarkets (Shufersal), insurance (Clal
Holdings Insurance Enterprises), and telecommunications (Cellcom),
among others.
Manageable Liquidity and Unencumbered Assets
IRSA's liquidity is viewed as adequate considering the company's
capacity to cover interest expenses. It has a manageable debt
service schedule with no material debt principal payments due
during 2017 and 2018, credit access. Fitch expects the company to
continue accessing the credit market and to maintain an interest
coverage ratio in the 2x to 2.5x range during 2017-2018. The
company's asset value is estimated at around USD1.8 billion. Most
of these assets have not been used to collateralize debt.
Stable Margins, High Occupancy
The company maintains a high-quality property portfolio resulting
in consistently stable margins and high occupancy rates. As of
Dec. 31, 2016, the company's occupancy level in the shopping
center and premium offices segments were solid at 98.4% and 100%,
respectively. The company owns and manages six premium office
buildings in the City of Buenos Aires and owns certain properties
for future development in Buenos Aires and several provincial
cities. The company's Adjusted EBITDA (excluding operations in
Israel) was ARS 2.2 billion for the last 12 month period ended
Dec. 31, 2016. The company consistently kept an EBITDA margin (not
adjusted by income from expenses and collective promotion) of
around 60% in the past several years.
Leverage Expected to Remain Stable
Fitch expects IRSA's gross leverage (measured as total adjusted
debt to adjusted EBITDA ratio) to remain around 4.5x during 2017-
2018. As of Dec 31,2016, IRSA had total debt of ARS11.1 billion or
USD698 million, which consists primarily of the IRSA PC's USD360
million unsecured notes due in March 2023; IRSA PC's USD 185
million local bonds due in September 2019; and, IRSA's USD71.4
million unsecured notes due in July 2020. The company's debt
structure is primarily unsecured.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS
Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for the issuer
include:
-- Adjusted EBITDA margin in the 55% to 60% range in fiscal
year end (FYE) 2017 - 2018;
-- Adjusted net leverage (measured as total adjusted debt to
adjusted EBITDA) ratio around 4.5x in FYE 2017 - 2018;
-- Interest coverage (EBITDA/gross interest expenses)
consistently above 2x in FYE 2017-2018
RATING SENSITIVITIES
A downgrade could be triggered by a downgrade of the Argentine
sovereign rating or a significant deterioration of IRSA's credit
metrics leading to an interest coverage ratio consistently below
2x.
Conversely, an upgrade of the Argentina sovereign rating could
trigger a positive rating action.
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B R A Z I L
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BANCO NACIONAL: S&P Affirms 'BB' Global Scale Ratings
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S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' long-term foreign and local
currency global scale ratings on Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Economico e Social (BNDES). S&P also affirmed its 'brAA-'
national scale issuer credit rating on the bank. The outlook on
both scales remains negative. At the same time, S&P affirmed its
'brAA-' issuer credit rating on BNDESPar. The outlook remains
also negative. S&P lowered BNDES's stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) to 'bbb-' from 'bbb', following S&P's revision of the
business position assessment on the bank to adequate from strong.
The ratings affirmation reflects S&P's view that BNDES continues
to be a key government-related entity (GRE) for the sovereign.
Therefore, in S&P's view, there's as an almost certain likelihood
of government support to the bank in case of financial distress.
This allows S&P to equalize BNDES's ratings to those of the
sovereign. Nevertheless, S&P views that the bank's ability to
generate predictable revenue has decreased in light of its new
strategy, which includes stricter credit underwriting. Although
new changes are likely to bolster the bank's corporate governance,
they're already curbing its portfolio growth and revenue
generation capacity. S&P views BNDES's capital as a rating
weakness, given its low quality and limited loss-absorption
capacity due to large share of hybrids of total capital. Although
S&P views its asset quality as substantially pressured amid
Brazil's recession and the bank's exposure to cyclical sectors,
guarantees and cross default clauses in the loans have mitigated
losses. S&P views its funding base as long-term and cheap because
it is very supported and concentrated in government lending. The
repayment of R$ 100Bi funding to government does not change S&P's
view of the sound funding conditions BNDES enjoys through its
shareholding structure.
S&P maintains its view that BNDES is one of the most important
GREs in the country, remains key to the government's economic
strategy, and is crucial for long-term investments and
infrastructure financing, despite recent changes to reduce the
bank's growth. S&P views the bank as having an integral link to
the sovereign, given that the latter fully controls the lender and
appoints its board members. Therefore, S&P believes that BNDES is
subject to political influence in its key strategic decisions.
The integral link also reflects S&P's view that the bank can
depend on ongoing support from the government, either through
cheap funding costs conditions or capital injections. S&P also
views that the Brazilian capital markets' ability to gradually
replace BNDES in the near future as a funding source depends on
structural changes that the government would need to implement to
foster greater liquid and broadening of the capital markets.
Nevertheless, S&P believes that the bank will continue playing a
major role in offering long-term credit in the country for some
time. BNDES's integral link to, and vital role for, the
government leads to an almost certain likelihood of government
support, under S&P's GRE criteria. Therefore, S&P equalizes its
local and foreign currency ratings on the bank with those on the
sovereign.
"In our view, BNDES's growth strategy has changed since the Temer
administration took office over almost a year ago. We believe the
new strategy is in line with the administration's priorities,
including paring the lending growth back to historical levels,
which reduces the bank's revenue stability. As a result, we
revised the business position assessment on the bank, lowering its
SACP. BNDES is the fourth-largest financial institution in the
country with R$876 billion in assets, according to the December
2016 numbers. According to the central bank's data, BNDES
accounted for roughly 11% of the system's total assets. The banks
had R$623 billion in loans, which include direct lending and fund
transfers (onlending) to commercial banks, which then lend to
borrowers. Currently, around half of the bank's loan portfolio
consists of onlending, and direct lending accounts for the
remainder. BNDES was founded in 1952 as the main long-term
financing instrument for investments in all sectors of the
economy. The bank has no branches and its client base are large
corporations and financial institutions, the latter of which take
the risk of lending to the retail and small and midsize enterprise
segments through BNDES's fund transfers. The bank also operates
in retail lending segment, but on a small scale. The bank's
subsidiary, FINAME, transfers funds to other financial
institutions, which finance the acquisition of equipment and
machinery, vehicle production, and exports of services and goods.
The lenders that receive funds from FINAME focus on the capital
goods and longer commercialization cycle consumer goods segments.
The bank also supports the capital structure of companies, which
the government deems as strategic, through minority equity
holdings through its subsidiary, BNDESPar. The latter has an
equity portfolio that totaled about R$64 billion as of December
2016, compared with R$36 billion in fiscal 2015, R$45 billion in
fiscal 2014. The subsidiary has stakes in large domestic
companies, such as Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. - Petrobras, Vale
S.A., Eletrobras-Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras S.A., and CPFL
Energia S.A., and in many other private companies. The bank's
losses in the equity holdings reduced its net worth by R$11
billion in 2014 and R$12.2 billion in 2015. In 2016, the recovery
in share prices of Petrobras, which accounts for a large part of
BNDES's equity holdings, led to a gain of R$7.2 billion, adding to
the volatility in the bank's internal capital generation. Going
forward, we expect the bank to continue originating lower to
stable volumes of loans in 2017, compared with 2016, amid the
potential adjustments on its net worth due to the likely
volatility in BNDESPar's holdings," S&P said.
S&P views BNDES's capital and earnings as one of its main
weaknesses, given the volatility in internal capital generation,
low quality of capital, and slipping profitability. S&P's average
forecasted risk-adjusted capital ratio is 4.9% for the next 24
months. High dividend payout and large equity holdings pressure
the bank's capital, despite the likely slower credit growth for
the next few years.
Although S&P doesn't expect capital injections to occur as
frequently as under the previous government, given the bank's
significant economic importance, S&P expects the federal
government to provide extraordinary support, if necessary. Given
that BNDES prioritizes strategic projects to boost the country's
economy, its profitability could be volatile during periods of
stress. The latter stems from the credit portfolio concentration
and management's decisions to whether increase provisions and
recognize equity losses during periods Brazil's falling stock
exchange. S&P believes that persistently low margins, rising
NPLs, and the potential decision to recognize some equity losses
as permanent losses on income statement could push down the bank's
earnings. S&P is also concerned that the bank is increasingly
renegotiating the existing loans in several lending segments, a
practice S&P has identified across almost all Brazilian banks. In
S&P's view, this may be only delaying bad assets from increasing
the provisions, and therefore preventing profitability from
growing and causing internal capital generation to drop.
BRAZIL: Tries to Trim Complex Labor Laws
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Paulo Trevisani and Paul Kiernan at The Wall Street Journal
reports that Brazil is moving to simplify some of the most complex
labor regulations of any major economy, but many of them are
likely to remain intact.
The lower house of Congress voted 296 to 177 to approve an
overhaul of the country's arcane, 1940s-era labor code as policy
makers seek to kindle a recovery from Brazil's worst recession on
record, according to WSJ.
The report notes that included in the bill are proposals designed
to reduce or scrap mandatory union dues, make it harder for
workers to sue their employers, and expand the scope for flexible
work arrangements and temporary employment contracts.
The bill also reduces the power of labor courts to change
contracts negotiated with unions, a provision meant to encourage
hiring as unemployment hovers around 13% after three years of
recession, the report relays.
"It will be the first major overhaul of the labor code in
decades," said Eurasia Group's Joao Augusto de Castro Neves, who
sees the bill as the second-most-important economic measure being
championed by President Michel Temer, after a planned overhaul of
Brazil's social-security system that is expected to be voted in
the lower house early next month, the report relays.
Taken all together, the reforms could increase Brazil's
competitiveness, supporters say, the report notes. They say
worker protections make it difficult for Brazilian manufacturers
to compete in global markets, and an unsustainably generous
pension system reduces workers' incentive to save, meaning less
capital is available for productive investment, the report relays.
"All of these things are interconnected, you can't just tweak one
thing and say the job is done because it needs a holistic set of
reforms," said Neil Shearing, chief emerging markets economist at
Capital Economics, the report relays.
It isn't clear, however, whether the proposed changes would
substantially improve Brazil's cumbersome labor system, the report
notes.
The bill only partially modifies Brazil's labor code, which has
more than 900 articles, and workers' rights enshrined in the
constitution will remain untouched, the report discloses.
"The volume of regulation remains very high because we have a
constitution that includes many articles about labor relations,"
said Flavio Castelo Branco of the manufacturing trade group
National Confederation of Industry, or CNI, which supports the
bill, the report says.
Mr. Branco expressed hope that the changes would reduce the number
of labor disputes in the labor courts, which had around 2.5
million cases pending as of December 2016, the report notes. "The
reform will give employers more confidence they won't be sued so
easily," he added.
But the bill, which still needs to clear the Senate, stops short
of eliminating a web of rules governing everything from the
temperature of certain workplaces to how many Sundays some
employees can work -- a remnant of the law's origin in 1943, when
most people went to church, the report relays.
Also surviving is an employers' obligation to, on top of the
paycheck, issue to employees daily meal allowances on special
cards that can only be spent on food, the report notes. The bill
would also keep detailed instruction on how employees should take
their annual 30-calendar days' vacation, although if it passes the
Senate, workers would be entitled to break them in as many as
three blocks, provided one comprises at least two consecutive
weeks, the report discloses.
According to an annual competitiveness index published by the
World Economic Forum, Brazil ranks 132 out of 138 countries for
the flexibility of its labor market, and second to last in terms
of hiring and firing practices, the report says.
It was unclear if the proposed labor reform would help Brazil
climb up the ranking, but the bill is being saluted as a move in
the right direction, the report notes.
"We aren't creating a labor market as unregulated as the U.S.'s,"
said BBM bank economist Leandro Rothmuller, "but it is an
important step," the report relays
However, the idea of modifying a law many see as a guarantor of
labor rights is fueling anger among many Brazilians, the report
notes. A general strike has been set to protest the labor
overhaul and other proposals, including the new pension law, the
report discloses.
"The proposed labor reform is a disaster that turns employee-
employer relations into a lawless land," Brazil's largest union
group, known as CUT, said, the report says.
Opposition lawmakers likened the labor reform to an assault on
workers' rights, the report notes.
"Labor law is being killed . . . . this bills protects only
businesses" and harms workers, said Rep. Jose Guimaraes, from the
leftist Workers' Party, or PT, before voting against the bill.
"Our labor law is a stronghold of civility," he said, the report
adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 17, 2017, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook
on Brazil's rating to stable from negative and affirmed its issuer
rating, senior unsecured at Ba2 and shelf ratings at (P) Ba2.
BRAZIL: Bank Loan Recovery Rate Remain Challenging, Fitch Says
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Loan recoveries will likely remain challenging for Brazilian banks
alongside a continued tough macroeconomic environment in 2017,
says Fitch Ratings. Asset quality should also remain a key issue.
Corporate NPLs are likely to improve only marginally while
increasing unemployment should continue to weigh on retail NPLs
and household indebtedness.
Asset quality and provisioning trends in 2017 are unlikely to be
as negative as in 2016, especially considering the high
concentration of problematic cases in the corporate sector last
year. However, asset quality trends will still be challenging for
banks until there is greater evidence of recovery in certain key
sectors and more solid growth trends in the economy. Fitch
forecasts economic growth in Brazil to rise to just 0.7% this year
following deep contractions in 2015-2016 and maintains a negative
sector outlook on Brazilian banks.
Final credit losses (gross of recoveries) at Brazil's three
largest private banks have increased significantly through the
recession period of 2015-2016, reaching BRL58 billion last year
versus BRL44 billion in 2014, an increase of 32%. Similarly,
renegotiated loans for this group of banks reached BRL56 billion
in 2016, which represents an increase of 38% from the pre-
recession period in 2014.
Historically, rising revenue from loan recoveries is an important
factor in strengthening net interest margins, particularly when
asset quality has weakened and provisioning expenses remain high.
However, recovery revenues (net of taxes) were below average in
2016, averaging roughly 17% of banks' net income versus the 22%
average recorded in 2008-2010 following the global financial
crisis.
According to central bank rules, loans classified as level H --
loans already in arrears for more than 180 days -- should be
written off from banks' balance sheets after six months of
classification, and any future recovery will be recorded as
revenue and in banks' net interest margins.
The combined loss ratio (loans charged off to total loans) of the
three largest private banks rose to 5.1% in 2016 from 4.2% in 2015
and 2014. This increase reflects the prolonged rise in NPL ratios.
The system NPL ratio increased to 3.8% in December 2016 from 2.8%
in December 2013, mainly driven by corporates where NPLs rose to
3.5% from 1.8% in the same period.
Heightened losses in 2015 and 2016 highlight sizeable
concentration risks faced by an increasingly consolidated banking
sector, in addition to broad-based macroeconomic pressures.
Brazil's largest banks increased exposure to the country's leading
corporates during the period of rapid economic growth immediately
preceding the recession. At the same time, M&A activity increased
concentration, with the top six banks now holding around 80%
market share.
Large corporate defaults at major firms including Oi, Samarco and
Sete Brasil have forced banks to renegotiate their debts.
Renegotiated credits for this group of banks reached 5.0% in 2016,
up from 4.4% in 2015 and 3.9% in 2014, though renegotiated loans
may include non-problematic assets.
Fitch's base case does not incorporate a significant impact from
renegotiated loans on large private banks' solvency. They remain
strongly capitalized and well provisioned. However, forming a full
view of asset quality may be challenging until we have more
clarity on the performance of the recent vintage of renegotiated
loans. Such assets were not necessarily tested during 2016 as
renegotiations usually incorporate expanded tenors. Also, it
should be noted that NPLs can show a discrepancy arising from the
increasing amount of charged-off credits that are not being
accounted as past-due loans once removed from banks' balance
sheets.
FINANCIADORA DE ESTUDOS: Fitch Assigns BB First-Time IDR
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Rating has assigned a first-time Long-Term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) of 'BB' to the Brazilian public sector entity
Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos - FINEP. The Rating Outlook is
Negative. FINEP's Outlook reflects the Negative Outlook of Brazil
given the credit linked relation between FINEP and Brazil. Fitch
has also assigned FINEP a national long-term rating of 'AA+(bra)'
with a Stable Outlook.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Fitch has classified FINEP as a credit linked Public Sector
Enterprise (PSE) under its rating of public sector entities
criteria. This is attributable to the entity's legal status and
tight control and oversight and, to a lesser extent, its high
integration with the Federal Government and higher ability and
willingness to receive support from the Federal Government in case
of need. As a result, the ratings of FINEP are equalized with the
sponsor's ratings and are credit linked.
Fitch considers the FINEP's strategic importance as Midrange and
is therefore moderately supportive of its credit quality. Despite
the fact that FINEP undertakes a relevant and mandatory
responsibility of the government, Fitch does not believe
disruption of research and development funding services to have
serious political consequences as a number of other public sector
entities could engage in FINEP's activities.
Fitch considers that the Control and Oversight is Strong and is
therefore highly supportive of its credit quality. This is because
the Federal government has membership in the board of directors
and exerts large influence on FINEP's mission and operations.
FINEP's first and second tiers of executives are indicated by the
Federal Government, as well.
Fitch considers the entity's integration into the general
government sector as Stronger and is therefore highly supportive
of its credit quality. Ongoing operating subsidies represent a
material portion of revenue, corresponding to 47.3% of FINEP's
interest income in 2016. FINEP has not received capital injections
from the Federal Government over the last five years and none is
expected in 2017. FINEP can borrow from sponsoring government
and/or on the capital markets.
Fitch considers the Ability and Willingness of the sponsor to
extend extraordinary support as Strong and is therefore strongly
supportive of its credit quality. In Fitch's opinion, the Federal
Government's ability and willingness to provide direct
extraordinary support to FINEP exists but is limited. The Federal
support is indirect via subsidized credit lines. Despite the
expectation of increase participation of external funds Fitch
believes Federal Government to have strong incentive to guarantee
that portion.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Any rating action affecting the Federative Republic of Brazil
('BB'/Outlook Negative) will result in a similar action for FINEP.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS
The ratings and Outlooks are sensitive to these assumptions:
-- Fitch assumes a high level of sovereign support for FINEP even
considering the Weak Institutional Framework given the Federal
Government full ownership and ongoing subsidized credit lines
via other federal institutions and federal funds.
Fitch has assigned the following first-time ratings:
Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos - FINEP:
-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR 'BB'; Negative Outlook;
-- Foreign Currency Short-Term IDR 'B';
-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR 'BB'; Negative Outlook;
-- Local Currency Short-Term IDR 'B';
-- National Long-term rating 'AA+(bra)'; Stable Outlook;
-- National Short-term rating 'F1+(bra)'.
SANCOR SEGUROS: Fitch Affirms B+ IFS Rating; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Sancor Seguros S.A.'s (Sancor) Insurer
Financial Strength (IFS) rating at 'B+'. The Rating Outlook is
Stable.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
The affirmation reflects Sancor's capital strength financed by its
owner Grupo Sancor Seguros, domiciled in Argentina. The parent
group's capital contributions to Sancor have helped compensate for
operative losses and to maintain relatively adequate leverage. The
rating is constrained by Sancor's business concentration in the
auto motor insurance and its reduced market share in a highly
competitive industry. The rating also takes into account the
company's conservative investment portfolio and its improvement in
underwriting standards.
Sancor has shown an upward trend in leverage over recent years,
recording a liabilities-to-equity ratio of 3.4 times (x) in
December 2016, higher than both its previous year's ratio and its
five-year average of 2.4x. Similarly, the operating leverage (net
earned retained premiums over equity) increased to 3.0x,
reflecting a lower equity cushion compared to previous years.
In 2016, the company recorded significant losses, of UYU67.5
million, with ROAE and ROAA reaching -25.2% and -1.5%
respectively, comparing unfavorably to the average of its peers
(ROAE 6.9% and ROAA 1.8%). The losses are due to auto claims, the
company's main insurance line, as well as property claims.
Sancor has received material capital contributions from its
parent, representing 65% of Sancor's equity at December 2016.
These contributions funded the losses registered in 2015 and 2016.
However, Argentina's sovereign risk and country ceiling prevent
Fitch from reflecting this benefit in Sancor's rating.
Sancor's overall loss ratio was 61.9%, significantly above the 40%
average reported by its peers. Its main segment, the auto
insurance line, recorded a claims ratio of 74.9%, versus 58.3% for
peers. In Fitch's opinion, the company's overall claims ratio
should gradually return to its historic levels of around 55% over
the medium term, which would lead to positive operative results.
The company's investment portfolio preserves its conservative
profile, being concentrated in local fixed income instruments,
primarily from the Uruguayan government and from low risk, highly
liquid local financial institutions. In Fitch's opinion, a less
volatile and highly liquid portfolio reduces pressures on Sancor's
equity.
Sancor's retention levels remain high, in line with its business
profile, which is concentrated on risks with limited loss
severity. The company's greatest catastrophic exposure represents
5.6% of equity. Sancor operates with diversified reinsurance
coverage and limited counterparty risk.
The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's opinion about near-term
profitability and leverage, which will slowly improve within
historic ranges.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
The rating could come under pressure if leverage increase above
4x. Also, recurring pressures from the company's operating
performance, reflected in an operating ratio that exceeded 100%,
could pressure the ratings further.
Favorable rating factors would include a decline in leverage to
levels that are more in line with the market. Additional
favourable rating factors would include greater premium
diversification, combined with an improved claims ratio to levels
similar to those of its peers, reflected particularly in a
sustained combined ratio of close to 100%.
==========================
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
==========================
CHEERMARK GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 2
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Cheermark Global Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by May 2, 2017, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.
The company commenced wind-up proceedings on March 30, 2017.
The company's liquidator is:
Chan Siu Yi
KITEC, Unit 1085, 10th Floor
1 Trademart Drive, Kowloon Bay
Kowloon
Hong Kong
Telephone: +852 2780 0607
Facsimile: + 852 2780 0013
CONOCOPHILLIPS SOUTH: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Conocophillips South Asia New Ventures
Ltd., on March 30, 2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily wind
up the company's operations.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Trident Liquidators (Cayman) Ltd.
c/o Lisa Thoppil
One Capital Place, 4th Floor
P.O. Box 847, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-1103
Cayman Islands
Telephone: (345) 949 0880
Facsimile: (345) 949 0881
CREATINGEV INC: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 9
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Creatingev Inc. are required to file their proofs
of debt by May 9, 2017, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 28, 2017.
The company's liquidator is:
Maricorp Services Ltd.
c/o Steven J. Barrie
#31 the Strand, 46 Canal Point Drive
P.O. Box 2075 Grand Cayman KY1-1105
Cayman Islands
Telephone: 345-949-9710
CYRUS L2: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Cyrus L2 SPC, on March 31, 2017, passed a
resolution to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Cyrus Capital Partners, L.P.
c/o Jody Powery-Gilbert
Ogier
89 Nexus Way Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9009
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
GBA MINMETALS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due May 2
--------------------------------------------------
The creditors of GBA Minmetals Trading Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt by May 2, 2017, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.
The company commenced wind-up proceedings on March 30, 2017.
The company's liquidator is:
Chan Siu Yi
KITEC, Unit 1085, 10th Floor
1 Trademart Drive, Kowloon Bay
Kowloon
Hong Kong
Telephone: +852 2780 0607
Facsimile: + 852 2780 0013
GREEN DYNASTY: Court Enters Wind-Up Order
-----------------------------------------
The Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, on March 24, 2017, entered
an order to wind up the operations of Green Dynasty Limited.
The company's liquidators are:
Michael Saville
Grant Thornton Specialist Services (Cayman) Limited and
c/o Michal Segal
10 Market Street, P.O. Box #765 Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1- 9006
Cayman Islands
Telephone: (345) 769 7217
Facsimile: (345) 949 7120; and
David Bennett
Grant Thornton Recovery & Reorganization Limited
GREY K ENVIRONMENTAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Grey K Environmental Offshore Fund III,
Ltd., on March 31, 2017, passed a resolution to voluntarily wind
up the company's operations.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
RNK Capital LLC
c/o Justin Savage
Ogier
89 Nexus Way Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9009
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
IGUAZU HOLDINGS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Iguazu Holdings SPC, on March 31, 2017,
passed a resolution to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Cyrus Capital Partners, L.P.
c/o Jody Powery-Gilbert
Ogier
89 Nexus Way Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9009
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
TASTOTAL LTD: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Tastotal Ltd., on April 3, 2017, passed a
resolution to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Marcel Minger
Wengistrasse 1
8004 Zurich
Switzerland
Telephone: 0041 58 450 58 50
VINCI VALUE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------
The sole shareholder of Vinci Value Fund, on March 31, 2017,
passed a resolution to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Vinci Partners USA LLC
c/o Tim Cone
Ogier
89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9009
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
===================
C O S T A R I C A
===================
BANCO INTERNACIONAL: Fitch Affirms B Short-Term IDRs
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco Internacional de Costa Rica,
S.A.'s (BICSA) long- and short-term foreign currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB' and 'B', respectively. The
Viability Rating (VR) was affirmed at 'b+'. The Rating Outlook of
the long-term ratings is Stable.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
IDRS, SUPPORT AND NATIONAL RATINGS
BICSA's IDRS, support and national ratings are driven by the
support it would receive, if necessary, from its ultimate parent,
Banco de Costa Rica (BRC; 'BB'/Outlook Stable). Fitch believes
that BICSA is core to its parent given the significant role the
bank represents to its owners objectives and the shared
reputational risk given their integration; therefore the ratings
are equalised. This was proven in 2016 when BICSA received support
from its shareholders to face liquidity concerns at the time. The
affirmation of the bank's Support Rating reflects Fitch's view
that the probability of support remains unchanged.
VR
BICSA's VR reflects the high exposure it has to a weaker economic
environment (Costa Rica) and that has been translated in a mild
deterioration in impairment loans that has added some pressure to
its profits. Also, the bank faces tough challenges to improve its
depositor's diversification, which is its main funding source, and
the deposit base has proven to be less stable given the
institutional profile of most of its clients. The rating also
takes into account the adequate capital metrics that have remained
stable over the years.
In Fitch's perspective 2016 was a challenging year for the bank,
as they faced several reputational risk pressures that translated
in a deposit run of about 10% of its total deposits. The bank
focused on this issue adopting some strategies such as increasing
the share of highly-liquid assets while reducing the proportion of
loans, and they also received support from its shareholders
through the selling of some assets (loans portfolio).
The liquidity pressures forced the bank to diminish its loans
portfolio, which along with a mild deterioration of impairment
loans and higher funding costs resulted in a drop in profits. In
2016YE the operating income to Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs) ratio
fell to 0.6% from an average of 1.5% in 2013-2015. Fitch believes
that these levels are modest and weaker compared to its peers.
Fitch believes that BICSA's asset quality is reasonable. While
non-performing loans (NPLs) ratio is relatively low, the asset
quality is pressured by recurrent charge offs and high
concentrations per borrower. In 2013-2015, in average, the NPLs
ratio stood at 1%, similar to its peers. This ratio deteriorated
to 1.9% by 2016YE, on the back of certain loans that became
overdue; the reduced total loans portfolio also had an effect on
the higher NPL ratio. Around 90% of the impaired loans are
attributed to Costa Rican clients. By 2016YE, the top 20 debtors
accounted for around 1.9x its Fitch Core Capital (FCC), which is
higher than its peers.
In Fitch's view, the bank relies on customer deposits as its main
funding source which accounts for nearly 50% of total funding;
other sources include banking lines and market debt, which adds to
the bank's funding diversification. The agency thinks that
deposits are highly concentrated as the bank's top 20 clients
account for 65% of total deposits (around 30% of total funding).
At 2016YE the loans to deposits ratio stood at a high 193.5%
(2013-2015 average: 199%), a level that Fitch considers weak. Most
of its depositors are institutional clients, who are inherently
less stable than general public clients, as was proven in 2016.
Positively, the bank doesn't show mismatches in its liquid gaps
for the coming years.
Fitch believes adequate capital metrics are one of the bank's
strengths. By 2016YE, the bank's FCC to RWAs ratio stood at 14.1%,
improving considerably from its 2013-2015 average of 11.9%, as a
result of a modest but consistent internal capital generation
along with smaller risk weighted assets due to the loans portfolio
decline. This level partially absorbs some asset quality
weaknesses such as borrower concentrations. Fitch expects that the
FCC to RWAs ratio will reduce to levels close to 12% as long as
the bank returns to previous growth ratios.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS, SUPPORT AND NATIONAL RATINGS
As the IDRs, Support and national ratings are driven by the
support of BCR, any changes in the ratings of the latter would
result in similar actions to BICSA's ratings. Ratings could be
downgraded if Fitch perceives a diminished importance of the bank
to its parents or if the capacity or willingness for support
changes.
VR
BICSA's VR could be upgraded as a result of sustained improvements
in profitability metrics as well as a more stable, less
concentrated funding. In turn, a downgrade could result from
further asset quality deterioration or liquidity stress that
result in a considerable compression of its capital base.
The rating actions are as follows:
Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:
-- Foreign currency long-term IDR at 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
-- Foreign currency short-term IDR at 'B';
-- Viability Rating at 'b+';
-- Support Rating at '3';
-- National Long Term Rating at 'A+(pan)'; Outlook Stable;
-- National Short Term Rating at 'F1(pan)';
-- Senior unsecured debt National Long-Term Rating at 'A+(pan)';
-- Senior unsecured debt National Short-Term Rating at 'F1(pan)';
-- National Long-Term Rating for a bond program in El Salvador
(BCBICSA1) at 'AAA(slv)'.
=============
J A M A I C A
=============
JAMAICA: Concern Raised About NIF Inflows
-----------------------------------------
RJR News reports that concern has been raised that inflows to the
National Insurance Fund (NIF) continue to lag behind the amount
being disbursed. The Fund manages National Insurance Scheme (NIS)
contributions, according to RJR News.
Social Security Minister Shahine Robinson provided details on the
gap while making her contribution to the Sectoral Debate, the
report notes.
"In the last financial year, we collected approximately J$14
billion in contributions but paid out over $15 billion in
benefits. Through a prudent diversification strategy, the NIS
major investments are tourism, Manufacturing, banking and finance
as well as the real estate sectors," she said, the report relays.
At the end of the 2016/17 financial year, the National Insurance
Fund was valued at $95 billion reflecting an increase of over 17
per cent during the year, the report discloses.
Meanwhile, the NIF will increase the amount of funds it lends to
the business sector from $1.5 billion to $3 billion, the report
notes.
The funds are disbursed through approved Participating Financial
Institutions, the report adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 9, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Jamaica's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs are Stable. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign Currency and Local
Currency IDRs at 'B'.
JAMAICA: TAJ Configures Reduced Property Tax Rates
--------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Tax Administration Jamaica (TAJ) said the
reduced property tax rates for fiscal year 2017-18, recently
announced by the Minister of Finance in his address to Parliament,
have now been reconfigured on the administration's Property Tax
System.
The reduced assessments are now reflected on the TAJ's website
through the Property Tax Online Query, when making an online
payment, as well as at a tax office, according to RJR News.
Owners of Strata properties are, however, advised that further
work is being undertaken to configure the system to reflect
changes to how the property tax on these properties will be
calculated, the report adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 9, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Jamaica's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs are Stable. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign Currency and Local
Currency IDRs at 'B'.
===========
M E X I C O
===========
AVIANCA HOLDINGS: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR on Stabilized Credit Metrics
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed the 'B' corporate credit rating on
Avianca Holdings S.A. S&P also affirmed the 'B-' issue-level
rating on the company's $550 million senior unsecured notes due
2020. The outlook is stable.
The affirmation reflects S&P's view that Avianca's credit metrics
have been stabilizing as a result of improved operating
performance. S&P expects that to continue in the next two years.
Over that period S&P expects that the regional economy will
improve modestly, foreign exchange volatility will ease, jet fuel
prices will remain low, and the company will continue its
initiatives to improve operating efficiency. Taken together, S&P
expects these factors to result in more traffic and improved cash
flow.
S&P's analysis does not incorporate the potential strategic
alliance with United Airlines Inc. (BB-/Positive/--) that the
airlines announced in January 2017. Because the alliance is still
in negotiation and subject to regulatory approval its impact on
Avianca cannot yet be assessed.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Avianca will
post key credit metrics with a debt to EBITDA of about 5x and FFO
to debt of about 14% in the next 12 months, commensurate with its
debt-financed fleet expansion. S&P also expects that the company
will continue to maintain its margins over the next two years
mainly through continued operating efficiencies and benefits from
its newer fleet and low jet fuel prices.
Ratings List
Ratings Affirmed
Avianca Holdings S.A.
Corporate Credit Rating B/Stable/--
Avianca Holdings S.A.
Senior Unsecured B-
MEXICO: Registers Small Trade Deficit in March
----------------------------------------------
Anthony Harrup at The Wall Street Journal reports that Mexico
registered a modest trade deficit in March as a surplus in
manufacturing and other goods partially offset a deficit in
petroleum trade, the National Statistics Institute said.
Exports rose 14.1% from a year earlier to $35.93 billion, while
imports were up 15% at $36.11 billion, for a deficit of $183
million, according to WSJ. The shortfall brought the trade
balance for the first quarter to a deficit of $2.79 billion, the
report notes.
A recovery in oil prices from a year before led to 34.7% increase
in petroleum exports, but also contributed to a 68.4% rise in
imports of petroleum products such as gasoline and diesel, the
report discloses. State oil company Petroleos Mexicanos exported
1 million barrels a day of crude oil last month, down from 1.22
million in February and 1.06 million in March 2016, the report
relays.
WSJ notes that the deficit in petroleum trade was $1.72 billion
for the month, compared with a $1.53 billion surplus in
nonpetroleum goods.
Exports of manufactured goods rose 13.9% from March of 2016 to
$32.22 billion, led by an 18.7% gain in shipments of vehicles and
auto parts, the report relays. The Mexican auto industry
association earlier this month attributed a big jump in vehicle
production and exports to new plants that have gone into operation
and to the shift in the Easter holiday to April this year from
March, the report notes. Mexican economic activity slows sharply
during Holy Week.
Mexico's trade surplus with the U.S., which was around $63 billion
in 2016 and $9.7 billion in the first two months of this year, has
been a point of contention for President Donald Trump who has been
critical of U.S. companies that move production abroad and then
export goods to the U.S, the report adds.
A planned renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
is expected among other things to include measures to increase the
amount of U.S.-made components in Mexican exports under so-called
rules of origin, the report notes.
The White House said, however, that the Trump administration is no
longer considering pulling out of the three-nation pact, but will
keep that option open if the U.S., Mexico and Canada don't come to
a satisfactory agreement, the report relays.
Mr. Trump tweeted that the U.S. will leave NAFTA "if we do not
reach a fair deal for all," the report adds.
MEXICO: S&P Affirms Ratings on 7 Metrofinanciera RMBS
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its long-term global and Mexico
National (CaVal) scale ratings on seven Mexican residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions originated and
serviced by Metrofinanciera S.A.P.I. de C.V. SOFOM E.R.
The rating affirmations reflect S&P's view that the transactions'
credit enhancement levels -- in the form of overcollateralization,
excess spread, cash reserves and partial cedit guarantees (PCGs,
for series METROCB 04U, METROCB 05U, MFCB 05U, and MTROFCB 08)--
combined with S&P's updated foreclosure frequency and loss
severity assumptions, continue to be sufficient to withstand S&P's
stress scenarios consistent with their current rating levels.
The affirmations also consider the portfolios' relatively stable
performance since S&P's last rating actions in February 2015, as
well as S&P's opinion that the transactions' counterparty,
operational, legal, and credit risks continue to be consistent
with their current ratings.
According to servicer reports, as of February 2017, the pools
backing each of the series showed nonperforming loans levels
(delinquencies greater than 90 days past due, measured as a
percentage over the initial balance) lower than those observed at
the time of S&P's last rating actions. This was driven by
Metrofinanciera's continued reporting of foreclosed property sales
for the transactions. The lower levels also reflect the
servicer's collection efforts and the positive effects derived
from the loan modification programs implemented in the past years.
As of February 2017, the total credit enhancement levels for
series METROCB 04U, METROCB 06U, and MTROFCB 08 increased slightly
from those observed at the time of S&P's last rating actions,
partly because of the additional flows realized from the sales of
foreclosed properties and the recovery of the nonperforming loan
ratios.
Credit enhancement levels for series METROCB 05U and MFCB 05U have
dropped; however, S&P believes that they continue to be consistent
with their current rating levels. Finally, credit enhancement for
series MTROCB 07U and MTROCB 08U decreased to -115.22% and -
127.42%, respectively, from -88.10% and -88.48% as of December
2014.
The PCGs provided by Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal S.N.C. for
series METROCB 05U and MFCB 05U can be only be disbursed to cover
interest shortfalls under possible liquidity events or principal
at maturity. However, they cannot be disbursed to restore the
parity between current assets and liabilities; therefore, their
capacity to absorb losses is limited.
In S&P's view, a short-term interest shortfall on series MFCB 05U
is mitigated by its PCG. However, in case it is fully disbursed,
the transaction could default on its monthly interest payments
derived from its negative financial margin and its dual payment
waterfall structure.
Series MTROCB 07U missed an interest payment in June 2016, but the
transaction has resumed its monthly payments under its original
terms since July 2016. Nonetheless, S&P affirmed its global and
national 'D (sf)' rating, reflecting its view that a default on
principal repayment at the maturity date is virtually certain,
according to "Post-Default Ratings Methodology: When Does S&P
Global Ratings Raise A Rating From 'D' Or 'SD'?" published
March 23, 2015. This view is mainly based on the transaction's
current overcollateralization, which was -115.22% as of February
2017.
DEFAULT RATIOS AND CREDIT ENHANCEMENT LEVELS(i)
Series Def. (%) Def. (%) O/C (%) PCG (%) C/E
(ii)(iii) (ii)(iv) (v) (vi) (v + vi)
METROCB 04U 28.81 3.17 17.76 9.00 26.76
METROCB 05U 31.18 5.25 (43.61) 26.00 (17.61)
MFCB 05U 39.62 8.17 (56.35) 11.00 (45.35)
METROCB 06U 45.17 11.27 (41.46) 0.00 (41.46)
MTROCB 07U 53.03 18.19 (115.22) 0.00 (115.22)
MTROCB 08U 45.99 17.03 (127.42) 0.00 (127.42)
MTROFCB 08 36.18 12.90 (0.06) 46.39 43.32
(i) Calculations used data as of February 2017.
(ii) S&P Global Ratings' estimates defaults considering the
reported delinquency buckets of 61-90 days and more than 90
days.
(ii) Defaults measured over the loans' outstanding amount.
(iii) Defaults measured over the loans' initial balance.
(iv) Calculated as one minus (liabilities divided by current
assets including cash in the trusts).
(v) Available PCG amount.
O/C -- Overcollateralization.
PCG -- Partial credit guarantee.
C/E -- Credit enhancement.
S&P estimated the transactions' delinquency and default rates and
current credit enhancement levels using its RMBS methodology and
assumptions. To determine the ratings, S&P used its updated
foreclosure frequency and loss severity assumptions obtained from
S&P's LEVELS Mexico models and used its Latin America RMBS cash
flow model to assess the transactions' payment capacity of monthly
interests and principal repayment at their final maturity dates,
under our projected stress scenarios consistent with their current
rating levels. S&P also considered their financial positions,
projected performance, and payment structures. S&P modeled each
deal's expected recovery using asset liquidations that are
consistent with the outputs from the LEVELS Mexico model.
FORECLOSURE FREQUENCY AND LOSS SEVERITY LEVELS
Current
rating
Series level FF (%) LS (%) LSDP (%)
METROCB 04U mxAA (sf) 20.85 69.69 67.87
METROCB 05U mxBBB- (sf) 10.31 44.77 45.40
MFCB 05U(i) mxB- (sf) 10.82 31.89 33.16
METROCB 06U mxB- (sf) 1.68 30.92 31.30
MTROCB 07U(i) mxB- (sf) 3.45 25.77 25.18
MTROCB 08U(i) mxB- (sf) 3.13 23.66 28.70
MTROFCB 08 mxAA (sf) 14.95 22.03 30.57
(i) Classes MFCB 05U, MTROCB 07U, and MTROCB 08U could not
withstand the stress scenario consistent with the 'mxB- (sf)'
rating level.
FF -- Foreclosure frequency.
LS -- Loss severity.
LSDP -- Loss severity of the defaulted portfolio.
In S&P's view, the ratings could be affected if the transactions'
overcollateralization ratios drop or due to changes in the used
assumptions on variables, such as the additional levels of losses,
excess spread, and the timing and magnitude on which recoveries
from foreclosed properties flow to the trusts.
According to information provided by the servicer, for all
transactions in this review, a portion of the collections are
still deposited on Metrofinanceira's accounts, which could be
subject to commingling risk per "Counterparty Risk Framework
Methodology And Assumptions," published June 25, 2013. However,
in S&P's view, this risk is mitigated through several factors for
all classes, such as cash reserves, PCGs, or the frequency of the
funds being transferred to the trust's accounts.
After analyzing the operational risk per "Global Framework For
Assessing Operational Risk In Structured Finance Transactions,"
published Oct. 9, 2014, S&P Global Ratings identified
Metrofinanciera as the only performance key transaction
participant and determined that the maximum potential rating for
these transactions is 'BBB (sf)' in global scale. This is based
on S&P's view of a moderate severity risk, a moderate portability
risk, and a very high disruption risk, as a result of S&P's
vulnerable operation condition assessment and fair key performance
attributes.
RATINGS AFFIRMED
Metrofinanciera - Bursatilizaciones de Hipotecas Residenciales
Class Current Outstanding
Class type Rating amount (mil.)(i)
METROCB 04U Senior mxAA (sf) UDIs12.18
METROCB 05U Senior mxBBB- (sf) UDIs20.57
MFCB 05U Senior mxCCC (sf) UDIs8.64
METROCB 06U Senior mxB- (sf) UDIs26.37
Metrofinanciera - Bursatilizaciones de Hipotecas Residenciales II
Class Current Outstanding
Class type Rating amount (mil.)(i)
MTROCB 07U Senior D (sf) UDIs96.27
MTROCB 07U Senior D (sf) UDIs96.27
MTROCB 08U Senior CCC- (sf) UDIs116.51
MTROCB 08U Senior mxCCC (sf) UDIs116.51
MTROFCB 08 Senior mxAA (sf) MXN170.40
(i) Balances as of March 31, 2017.
UDIs -- Inflation-linked units.
MXN -- Mexican pesos.
=======
P E R U
=======
VM HOLDING: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to Proposed Sr. Unsec. Debt
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba2 foreign currency
rating to the proposed senior unsecured notes to be issued by VM
Holding S.A. (VMH), and fully guaranteed by Votorantim Metais
Zinco S.A., Votorantim Metais -- Cajamarquilla S.A. and Compania
Minera Milpo S.A.A The outlook is stable. Proceeds will be used
for liability management and general corporate purposes.
The rating of the notes assumes that the final transaction
documents will not be materially different from draft legal
documentation reviewed by Moody's to date and assume that these
agreements are legally valid, binding and enforceable.
Ratings assigned as follows:
Issuer: VM Holding S.A.
Proposed senior unsecured notes: Ba2
The outlook is stable.
RATINGS RATIONALE
VM Holding's ("VMH") Ba2 corporate family rating reflects the
company's strong presence in zinc's global markets (4th largest
concentrate producer and 5th largest in smelting production) and
its competitive cost profile. The integration of mining operations
with smelters, both in Brazil and Peru, has translated into steady
EBITDA margins over the last few years and is an additional credit
positive. The rating is also supported by adequate leverage and
interest coverage metrics, and Moody's expectations that leverage
will remain between 2x-2.3x until 2019. In this sense, Moody's
does not anticipate that the company will raise additional debt to
execute its upcoming expansion projects, but will rather
accommodate them within its own cash flow generation. The Ba2
ratings also consider VMH's strong liquidity position, with cash
balance covering 80% of total debt at the end of 2016.
Constraining the rating is VMH's exposure to commodity prices
volatility, in particular zinc and copper, and its high
concentration in zinc (66% of total mining production in FY 2016)
and in one mine (Cerro Lindo responds for 42% of total mine output
for zinc). The execution of planned greenfield projects in Brazil
and in Peru in the coming years would be seen as a positive
development to the extent it leads to further diversification.
VMH's relatively modest revenue size (USD1.8 billion at the end of
2016), as compared to global peers, is a further constraint.
The rating does not incorporate any expected support from VMH's
controlling shareholder, Votorantim S.A. (Ba2 negative), one of
the largest industrial groups in Brazil, which has a 89.35% share
in the company. Votorantim S.A. does not provide guarantees to
VMH's debt (only to BNDES debt, which represents 8% of the total),
and there are no cross acceleration or cross-default provisions
between the two entities. Still, VMH is included as a material
subsidiary in Votorantim S.A.'s financial statements. On the other
hand, the provisions in VM Holding S.A's Shareholders Agreement.,
including conservative Corporate Governance standards and
limitation on dividend distribution, as a mitigating factor to the
risk of cash upstreaming to the parent in case there is a
deterioration in Votorantim S.A.'s credit risk.
VMH has maintained adequate liquidity and leverage metrics
overtime, with cash balances above USD 600 million between 2014
and 2016 and adjusted leverage below 3x. Debt balances have been
relatively stable as well. Proceeds from the proposed 10-year bond
issuance will be mainly used to refinance bank debt due in 2019
and 2021, enhancing the company's debt profile. The stable outlook
reflects Moody's expectations that VMH will maintain its
competitive cost position and will continue to invest to increase
integration and production levels. At the same time, Moody's
expects that the company will maintain adequate liquidity position
and leverage within the target set by its financial policies while
carrying out its greenfield projects.
An upward rating or outlook movement would require the company to
maintain its competitive cost position and complete planned
expansions, further diversifying its metal revenue base and
enhancing its production profile, without an increase in leverage
or a deterioration in interest coverage metrics. Besides, to the
extent that VMH is able to achieve and maintain a sound liquidity
profile, interest coverage (measured by EBIT to interest expense)
above 4x and a (CFO-dividends)/debt ratio higher than 25%, the
outlook or ratings could be positively impacted.
Ratings could be negatively impacted if profitability and cash
generation capacity materially deteriorate, as a consequence of
decline in metals prices, increase in production costs
significantly exceeding Moody's expectations, or higher than
anticipated capital expenditures, with negative impact on
liquidity, leverage and interest coverage metrics. Specifically,
if EBIT margin falls below 8% with cash generation being negative
on a sustained basis, ratings could be downgraded. Negative
pressure on the rating could result from consistently higher
dividend payout, jeopardizing its liquidity position and leading
to a CFO-dividends/Debt ratio lower than 20% on a consistent
basis. Negative pressure could also result from increase in debt
levels leading to leverage ratios trending towards 3.5x or above,
and interest coverage below 3.0x on a consistent basis.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014.
VM Holding S.A. (VMH) is a subsidiary of Votorantim S.A., with
integrated operations (mines and smelters) in Brazil and Peru,
mostly concentrated in zinc, but also with exposure to copper and
lead. VMH is the 4th largest zinc concentrate producer in the
world. In June 2016, there was a business spin-off of the
aluminum, nickel, and US zinc assets/operations, previously
managed under Votorantim Metais brand. These businesses are fully
owned subsidiaries of Votorantim S.A. In FY 2016, VMH reported
revenues of USD 1.8 billion.
================================
T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O
================================
PETROLEUM CO: Moody's Lowers CFR to B1 on Weak Liquidity Position
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Petroleum Co. of Trinidad &
Tobago corporate family rating and senior unsecured debt ratings
to B1 from Ba3. Simultaneously, Moody's lowered Petrotrin's
Baseline Credit Assessment ("BCA") to caa1 from b3. The outlook on
the ratings is stable. The rating actions are linked to Moody's
April 25, 2017 downgrade of the government of Trinidad & Tobago
bond ratings to Ba1 from Baa3, with a stable outlook.
Downgrade:
Issuer: Petroleum Co.of Trinidad & Tobago (Petrotrin)
-- Corporate Family Rating, downgraded to B1 from Ba3
-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, downgraded to B1 from
Ba3
-- Underlying Senior Unsecured, downgraded to B1 from Ba3
Outlook Actions:
Issuer: Petroleum Co.of Trinidad & Tobago (Petrotrin)
-- Outlook, Changed to Stable from Negative
RATINGS RATIONALE
Petrotrin's ratings downgrade was based on the company's sustained
weak liquidity position and its limited ability to revert negative
operating profit due to rigid cost structure, small operating
size, and an unfavorable environment of increasing expenses.
Petrotrin's B1 debt rating and its caa1 BCA reflect the company's
weak credit metrics, high refinancing risk, the cyclical nature of
earnings and cash flows, inconsistent operating performance
reflected in its low, albeit increased, refinery utilization, and
the concentration risk of its reliance on a moderately-complex
single refinery. The BCA also captures the small size and maturity
of its hydrocarbon reserves, and its considerable investment needs
given its mature asset base. However, the BCA considers
Petrotrin's effective monopoly position in the wholesale
distribution and export of refined petroleum products and the
modest degree of operational integration provided by its
exploration and production segment.
Moody's assumptions of high default correlation and very high
support by the government of Trinidad & Tobago to Petrotrin to
avoid default of its oil company result in a three-notch uplift to
Petrotrin's caa1 BCA. There is a high level of dependence on
credit factors, such as the oil and gas industry dynamics, that
could cause stress to both the government and Petrotrin and
therefore hinder the government's ability to provide extraordinary
support to the company. However, Moody's assumes a very high
probability of support from the government to Petrotrin based on
the former's 100% ownership of the company and factual elements
such as the granting of a loan guarantee and the permission to
defer tax payments in 2016. The government is also deeply involved
in the company's annual wage negotiations with the unions and has
created a committee that will analyze Petrotrin's operating and
financial situation in order to recommend an action plan. In
addition, supporting Moody's assumption of a very high support is
Petrotrin status as the only refinery in the country (supplying
100% of the local market for refined products), and as an
important employer in the country, with around 5,000 employees,
the majority of whom are unionized.
A further deterioration in the ratings of the government of
Trinidad & Tobago could lead to a reduction in the uplift provided
to the company' ratings. Trinidad and Tobago has strong dependence
on the oil and gas industry dynamics. Moody's estimates that over
35% of the country's GDP depends on the oil and gas industry,
which has suffered from and will continue to be sensitive to lower
international prices as well as the country's limited reserves.
The stable outlook on Petrotrin rating reflects Moody's
expectation that the company's could be able to revert the weak
operating performance in the next 12 to 18 months.
If Petrotrin experiences extended refinery downtime or even weaker
liquidity, its ratings could be downgraded. In addition, the B1
ratings could be downgraded if Moody's believes that there is a
lower likelihood that the government of Trinidad & Tobago would
provide extraordinary support to Petrotrin, or as a result of a
downgrade of the government's Ba1 rating.
Petrotrin's successful increase in refinery utilization rates and
growth in its oil production, in tandem with materially reduced
financial leverage (debt/capitalization sustained at below 50%),
could be positive for its B1 rating and caa1 BCA. An upgrade of
the ratings on the government of Trinidad & Tobago will not
necessarily lead to an upgrade of Petrotrin's ratings.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Refining and
Marketing Industry published in November 2016. Other methodologies
used include the Government-Related Issuers methodology published
in October 2014.
Petrotrin is an integrated petroleum company which has an
effective monopoly position in refining and wholesale marketing
operations and some exploration and production operations.
Petrotrin owns the country's sole refinery. During 2015, its total
crude oil production reached 45,960 bpd. While Petrotrin's
refinery supplies the local retail marketing sector, it is mainly
an exporter of petroleum products: roughly 80% of production is
sold in the Caribbean region and internationally.
TOBAGO HOUSE: Moody's Lowers Issuer Rating to Ba1; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Tobago House of Assembly's
issuer rating to Ba1 (Global Scale, Local Currency) from Baa3 and
changed the outlook to stable from negative.
The action follows Moody's April 25, 2017 rating action in which
the agency downgraded Trinidad and Tobago's government bond rating
to Ba1 from Baa3 and changed the outlook to stable from negative.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The rating downgrade to Ba1 from Baa3 reflects the strong linkages
between Tobago House of Assembly (THA) and Trinidad and Tobago.
More than 98% of THA's revenues come from the central government,
which prevents THA from avoiding the same revenue pressures as
felt by the sovereign. A factor of Trinidad and Tobago's rating
action is the expectation that the material impact of sustained
low energy prices and declining production from maturing oil and
gas fields will continue to negatively affect its credit profile
in the near to medium term. As such, a deterioration of Trinidad
and Tobago's revenues will continue to have a direct impact on
THA's budget.
Although THA relies on the central government for almost all of
its revenue, it has considerable flexibility over its expenditures
which has allowed THA to maintain roughly balanced consolidated
cash financing results through a delay on infrastructure
developments. While Moody's expects a short-term deterioration in
THA's gross operating balance, THA does continue to hold adequate
levels of reserves, which are expected to amount to roughly TTD
200 million in 2017.
Moody's further notes that the assigned rating is also supported
by a strong level of oversight by Trinidad and Tobago. THA
requires approval from the central government to contract
financial long-term debt.
RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK
The stable outlook reflects Moody's assumptions that THA will
continue to be able to offset any further pressure arising from
the expected weak growth in revenues and post roughly balanced
cash financing results over the rating horizon. The stable outlook
also reflects the belief that debt service payments stemming from
the near-term completion of the Administrative Complex for
Division of Agriculture P3 project will not impose undue budgetary
pressure on THA.
WHAT CAN CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN
Given the strong financial linkages between THA and the Government
of Trinidad & Tobago, along with the fact the ratings are already
at the same level, an upgrade to THA's rating would likely require
an upgrade to the ratings of Trinidad & Tobago. A deterioration of
THA's operating balance along with negative liquidity levels, or a
sharp and sustained increase in debt levels as a result of a
change of the institutional framework could also exert downward
pressure on the rating. A downgrade of Trinidad and Tobago's
rating would exert downward pressure on Tobago House of Assembly's
rating.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Moody's Cuts Issuer & Sr. Debt Ratings to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Trinidad and Tobago's
issuer and senior unsecured debt ratings to Ba1 from Baa3 and
assigned a stable outlook.
The rating action was based on the following key drivers:
1. The authorities' policy response has been insufficient to
effectively offset the impact of low energy prices on government
revenues, as fiscal consolidation efforts have mostly relied on
one-off revenue measures
2. A steady rise in debt ratios driven by large government
deficits has eroded fiscal strength
3. Declining production from maturing oil and gas fields coupled
with limited investment prospects, in a context of low energy
prices, have materially undermined medium-term growth prospects
The stable outlook on the Ba1 rating incorporates moderate
external risks as well as the benefits of the government's
sizeable fiscal buffers in offsetting further downside risks and
ample access to a relatively deep domestic financial market.
Trinidad and Tobago's foreign-currency bond and deposits ceilings
were lowered to Baa3/P-3 and Ba2/NP from Baa2/P-3 and Baa3/P-3,
respectively. At the same time, the local-currency bond and
deposits country ceilings were lowered to Baa2 from Baa1.
RATINGS RATIONALE
RATIONALE FOR DOWNGRADE TO Ba1 FROM Baa3
POLICY RESPONSE TO THE ENERGY PRICE SHOCK CONTINUES TO BE
INSUFFICIENT TO CONTAIN ELEVATED BUDGETARY PRESSURES
With the fall in oil and gas prices, energy-related government
revenues fell to only 1% of GDP in the 2016 fiscal year from 8% of
GDP in the previous fiscal year, and current revenues declined 28%
over 2015-16.
In response to the fall in revenues, the government reduced
gasoline subsidies and current transfers. Still, these measures
have not changed a rigid expenditure structure, in which wages,
subsidies and transfers account for 70% of total government
spending. Furthermore, total expenditures will continue to
increase this year amid higher debt servicing costs and larger
capital expenditures.
Measures to raise current revenues have yielded very limited
results, equivalent to 1% of GDP this fiscal year. Even though the
government eliminated exemptions from the value added tax while
lowering the overall rate to 12.5% from 15%, revenues increased
less than originally expected. Changes to the property tax will
yield modest results, but these will not be fully reflected in
revenues until next year.
The government has also been relying on dividends from National
Gas Company (NGC) and asset sales to contain the fiscal deficit.
While the government expects to earn TTD 9.69 billion (6.4% of
GDP) from one-off capital measures in 2017 fiscal year, Moody's
believes TTD 6 billion (4% of GDP) is a more likely outcome given
significant implementation risks.
Lack of timely macroeconomic data and weak policy execution
capacity have limited the effectiveness of the policy response to
the energy price decline. Government efforts have promoted only
limited economic diversification, modestly decreasing the
dependence of the economy in the energy sector.
STEADY RISE IN DEBT RATIOS DRIVEN BY LARGE GOVERNMENT DEFICITS HAS
BEEN ERODING FISCAL STRENGTH
Moody's expects the fiscal deficit will be close to 6% of GDP in
this fiscal year (2016/17), once Moody's include Moody's 4% of GDP
capital revenue estimate derived from asset sales and dividends
from National Gas Company (NGC).
Despite heavy reliance on asset sales to close the fiscal balance,
debt to GDP exceeded 56% in 2016, rising from 42% in 2014. Moody's
does not anticipate the government will achieve a debt-stabilizing
primary balance over the next 3 years and, consequently, Moody's
expects the debt ratio to rise to almost 70% of GDP by 2019. This
is substantially higher than the baseline scenario Moody's assumed
when Moody's lowered the rating to Baa3 from Baa2 one year ago.
Without meaningful fiscal adjustment to reduce double-digit fiscal
deficits excluding capital revenues, the government will likely
continue to use resources from the Heritage Stabilization Fund
(HSF). Even though its assets stand at around $5.7 billion (24% of
GDP), recurring withdrawals will erode an important credit
strength of the sovereign.
DECLINING PRODUCTION FROM MATURING OIL AND GAS FIELDS COUPLED WITH
LIMITED INVESTMENT PROSPECTS IN A CONTEXT OF LOW ENERGY PRICES
HAVE UNDERMINED MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH PROSPECTS
Trinidad and Tobago is highly dependent in the oil and gas sectors
as growth drivers. Even before the decline in energy prices,
economic growth in Trinidad and Tobago had slowed down as oil and
gas fields matured and production levels declined.
The economy contracted 2.3% in 2016 according to government
figures and Moody's expects growth this year to be in the range of
0% to 1.5%, with positive growth hinging on the timely completion
of two gas projects scheduled to become operational in the second
half of this year. Beyond 2017, increased investment is required
to reverse the declining trend in oil and gas production and lift
production in the medium term.
RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK
The stable outlook captures the effect that sizeable fiscal
buffers will have in offsetting any further downside risks. Asset
sale proceeds and dividends from the National Gas Company, as well
as drawdowns from the Heritage Stabilization Fund (HSF) will help
finance the government deficit, slowing the rate of debt
increases. The outlook also reflects moderate external risks given
very low external payments relative to foreign exchange reserves
and modest current account deficits. Low gross borrowing
requirements and access to a relatively deep domestic financial
market buffer against international financial risks.
FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE
Moody's would consider moving the outlook to positive if Moody's
concludes that fiscal consolidation will likely lead to lower
fiscal deficits in 2018-19, and stabilize government debt ratios
faster than currently anticipated. The emergence of a fiscal and
economy policy response that proves effective in containing the
deterioration in government debt metrics would be supportive of a
rating upgrade. Higher GDP growth and a recovery in government
revenues would also put upward pressure on the rating.
FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO A DOWNGRADE
Downward pressures on the rating would emerge if fiscal deficits
and government debt ratios rise at a higher rate than Moody's
currently expect. Depletion of fiscal buffers -- i.e., reduction
in assets available for sale and assets held in the Heritage
Stabilization Fund -- coupled with limited fiscal consolidation
beyond 2018, would add negative pressure to the rating. The
possibility that government support in the form of loan guarantees
to Petrotrin could be higher than Moody's currently assume would
also add downward pressure, as would a weakening balance of
payments position.
GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 32,637 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)
Real GDP growth (% change): -2.5% (2016 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)
Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 3% (2016 Actual)
Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -5% (2016 Actual) (also known as
Fiscal Balance)
Current Account Balance/GDP: -2.9% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)
External debt/GDP: 56.3
Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience
Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.
On April 24, 2017, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Trinidad & Tobago, Government of. The main points
raised during the discussion were: The issuer's economic
fundamentals, including its economic strength, have materially
decreased. The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including
its debt profile, has materially decreased.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2016.
The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.
=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================
VENEZUELA: To Withdraw From Organization of American States
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kejal Vyas at The Wall Street Journal reports that Venezuela said
it would begin a two-year process to pull out of the world's
oldest regional diplomatic body, in a move that is likely to
heighten tensions with its neighbors over President Nicolas
Maduro's authoritarian rule.
Foreign Minister Delcy Rodriguez said that Mr. Maduro ordered the
withdrawal from the Organization of American States after 19 of
the group's 34 members agreed on a resolution to discuss
Venezuela's precarious situation, according to WSJ.
In response to a collapsing economy marked by food and medicine
shortages, Mr. Maduro over the last month has faced massive street
demonstrations and civil unrest, costing at least 29 lives, the
report notes.
"Behind this coalition of countries is a sight set on our
sovereignty and the pretension to intervene, and that can never be
allowed to happen," said Ms. Rodriguez in a televised statement,
the report notes. The minister has routinely blamed Venezuela's
problems on the U.S. and opponents to the ruling Socialist Party,
the report discloses.
Venezuela's government has called the OAS a shill for U.S.
interests, the report relays. The group counts as its members all
of the region's countries except Cuba, the report notes. The
organization was founded in 1948 to strengthen regional
solidarity, as well as democratic and human rights, the report
relays.
Venezuela faces a 24-month legal process and must pay $8.7 million
in dues it owes to the organization before it can quit the group,
an OAS spokesman said, who declined to comment further, the report
discloses.
Venezuela's announcement comes after a nearly two-year feud with
OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro, who has led an aggressive
campaign to suspend Venezuela from the diplomatic body over a host
of human-rights violations, including suspending elections,
jailing political rivals and prohibiting humanitarian aid, the
report adds.
As reported by The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America
S&P Global Ratings, on Feb. 28, 2017, affirmed its 'CCC' long-term
foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The outlook on both long-term
ratings remains negative. S&P also affirmed its 'C' short-term
foreign and local currency sovereign ratings. In addition, S&P
affirmed its 'CCC' transfer and convertibility assessment on the
sovereign.
***********
Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices
for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication. At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
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Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com
***********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
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