/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/170425.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Tuesday, April 25, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 81


                            Headlines



A N T I G U A  &  B A R B U D A

STANFORD INT'L: Antigua-Barbuda Not Liable to Ponzi Victims


A R G E N T I N A

BANCO DE GALICIA: S&P Affirms 'B' Ratings; Outlook Remains Stable
BANCO MACRO: Fitch to Rate ARS Denominated Senior Notes 'B'


B R A Z I L

BANCO PINE: S&P Affirms B+/B ICRs on Concentrated Business Profile
JSL S.A.: S&P Affirms 'BB' Global Scale Rating, Outlook Neg.


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ASHUMHOLD LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
BENAYAHOLD LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
FURSAHOLD LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
KIMAHOLD LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
MALINVEST LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

MARBAHOLD LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
MASULINVEST LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
RASMAL LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
RATIBHOLD LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
SANAWIHOLD LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Hailed as LatAm's Blackouts Champ, IDB Says
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Miners in the Region Assure Good Practice


E L  S A L V A D O R

EL SALVADOR: S&P Lowers Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'SD'


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Leaders Anticipate Hike in Inflation Over 12 Mos.
JAMAICA: Bank of Jamaica Act to be Submitted to Cabinet Soon


                            - - - - -


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A N T I G U A  &  B A R B U D A
===============================


STANFORD INT'L: Antigua-Barbuda Not Liable to Ponzi Victims
-----------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean News Now reports that the US Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
bars Stanford International Bank Ltd (SIBL) Ponzi scheme victims
from bringing a claim against Antigua and Barbuda, a foreign
state. The decision reversed a ruling by the US District Court for
the Northern District of Texas.

The Stanford victims successfully argued in the trial court that
the commercial activity exception allowed civil suits brought by
them, as well as the argument that Antigua and Barbuda had waived
sovereign immunity, but the Fifth Circuit disagreed, reversing the
lower court decision, on both issues, according to Caribbean News
Now.

The consolidated cases were based on Antigua and Barbuda's alleged
involvement with the Stanford Ponzi scheme, the report notes.

The convicted perpetrator of the fraud, Allen Stanford, owned and
operated multiple financial entities, including the SIBL, which
was an offshore bank located in Antigua and Barbuda, the report
relays.  Through these entities, Stanford sold certificates of
deposit (CDs) to investors, promising exceptionally high rates of
return, the report notes.  Most of the funds raised from the sale
of these CDs were never invested, as promised, but were used to
pay back other investors in the scheme, the report discloses.

When the scheme collapsed in 2009, Stanford had sold over $7
billion in fraudulent CDs.  Stanford was subsequently convicted of
multiple federal crimes and was sentenced to 110 years'
imprisonment.

The primary allegation in the lawsuits is that Antigua and Barbuda
acted as an active and willing participant in Stanford's scheme
and knowingly provided Stanford and his businesses a safe harbor
from regulatory scrutiny, the report notes.  Plaintiffs in both
suits allege that Stanford and Antigua engaged in a quid pro quo
relationship in which Stanford provided Antigua financial
incentives to encourage and ensure its involvement in his scheme
by bribing public officials and providing loans to Antigua, which
were never repaid, the report relays.

Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the "loans were merely a
way to transfer the proceeds of the Ponzi scheme to Antigua", the
report says.  In exchange for the loans, they alleged that
"Antigua assisted Stanford by conferring legitimacy on the
fraudulent enterprise and on Stanford himself, providing assurance
to investors that the activities of SIBL and Stanford were
legitimate and subject to regulatory authority," the report notes.

The plaintiffs contended that, as part of its involvement in the
Ponzi scheme, Antigua and Barbuda allowed Stanford undue influence
over the regulations his organizations would be subject to, the
report notes.  They also allege that Stanford exerted undue
influence over the individuals charged with ensuring that he and
his organizations were in compliance with the relevant
regulations, the report relays.

Crucial to Antigua and Barbuda's alleged involvement with
Stanford's scheme was the Financial Services Regulatory Commission
of Antigua (FSRC) and Leroy King, the FSRC's administrator and
chief executive officer, who were tasked with regulating SIBL, the
report discloses.  The plaintiffs alleged that Stanford bribed
King in order to allow SIBL to escape regulatory scrutiny from the
FSRC.

As a foreign nation, Antigua and Barbuda challenged the district
court's jurisdiction in each suit under the FSIA, the report
notes.  The district court determined that it had jurisdiction
over the suits under both the commercial activity and waiver
exceptions of the FSIA, the report says.  Antigua and Barbuda
appealed these rulings.

Antigua and Barbuda did not, however, contest the application of
the so-called commercial activity exception in relation to a claim
brought by the Official Stanford Investors Committee (OSIC), which
provides that a foreign state is not immune from suit in the
United States when "[1] the action is based . . . . upon an act
outside the territory of the United States [2] in connection with
a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and [3] that
act causes a direct effect in the United States," the report
notes.

OSIC argued that Antigua and Barbuda had waived sovereign immunity
in two loan agreements it entered into with Stanford, the report
relays.  The agreement for the first of the loans, referred to as
the "$40 million loan", was provided to Antigua to "pay salaries
and for other discretionary purposes," the report notes. The
second loan, referred to as the "$31 million loan", was provided
to Antigua and Barbuda by Stanford to build a hospital, the report
says.

The district court found that provisions of both loan agreements
explicitly waived sovereign immunity for OSIC's contract claims
based on either loan, the report adds.

The complete text of the reported decision is available free at:

                         https://is.gd/BnSQ18

                        About Stanford Group

The Stanford Financial Group was a privately held international
group of financial services companies controlled by Allen
Stanford, until it was seized by United States (U.S.) authorities
in early 2009.

Domiciled in Antigua, Stanford International Bank Limited --
http://www.stanfordinternationalbank.com/-- is a member of
Stanford Private Wealth Management, a global financial services
network with US$51 billion in deposits and assets under management
or advisement.  Stanford Private Wealth Management served more
than 70,000 clients in 140 countries.

On Feb. 16, 2009, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, signed an order
appointing Ralph Janvey as receiver for all the assets and records
of Stanford International Bank, Ltd., Stanford Group Company,
Stanford Capital Management, LLC, Robert Allen Stanford, James M.
Davis and Laura Pendergest-Holt and of all entities they own or
control.  The February 16 order, as amended March 12, 2009,
directs the Receiver to, among other things, take control and
possession of and to operate the Receivership Estate, and to
perform all acts necessary to conserve, hold, manage and preserve
the value of the Receivership Estate.

The case in district court was Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 11-mc-00678, U.S.
District Court, District of Columbia (Washington).

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission charged before the
U.S. District Court in Dallas, Texas, Mr. Stanford and three of
his companies for orchestrating a fraudulent, multi-billion dollar
investment scheme centering on an US$8 billion Certificate of
Deposit program.

A criminal case was pursued against him before the U.S. District
Court in Houston, Texas.  Mr. Stanford pleaded not guilty to 21
charges of multi-billion dollar fraud, money-laundering and
obstruction of justice.  Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer,
as cited by Agence France-Presse News, said in a 57-page
indictment that Mr. Stanford could face up to 250 years in prison
if convicted on all charges.  Mr. Stanford surrendered to U.S.
authorities after a warrant was issued for his arrest on the
criminal charges.



=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


BANCO DE GALICIA: S&P Affirms 'B' Ratings; Outlook Remains Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'B' local- and
foreign-currency ratings on Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires S.A.
S&P also affirmed its 'B' senior unsecured and 'CCC' subordinated
issue-level ratings on the bank.  The outlook remains stable.

S&P's ratings on Banco Galicia reflect its good business position,
based on its solid franchise in Argentina, as well as diversified
business profile through its subsidiaries and our estimate of
risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio of 3.4% in the next 12-18
months.  The ratings also incorporate S&P's view of an adequate
risk position based on a manageable asset growth, risk
diversification, and low complexity.  These factors mitigate
credit quality metrics that are somewhat weaker than the banking
system average, given the lender's greater focus on lower-income
borrowers through its subsidiaries.  The bank benefits from a
stable, relatively low-cost, and diversified deposit base, which
continues to be its main funding source, while its liquidity is
adequate given the characteristics of the Argentine financial
system.

The stand-alone credit profile (SACP) on the bank remains 'b+'.
The sovereign ratings on Argentina continue to limit those on the
bank.  S&P rarely rates financial institutions higher than the
sovereigns where they operate, because S&P considers it unlikely
that these institutions would remain unaffected by developments in
domestic economies.

S&P's bank criteria uses its Banking Industry Country Risk
Assessment (BICRA) economic and industry risk scores to determine
a bank's anchor, the starting point in assigning an issuer credit
rating.  S&P's anchor SACP for a commercial bank operating only in
Argentina is 'b+'.

The stable outlook on Banco Galicia mirrors that on the sovereign,
because the ratings on the bank continue to be limited by those on
Argentina.  The sovereign rating reflects S&P's expectation for
broad continuity in overall policies in the next two years.  It
also incorporates uncertainties on the pace of implementation of
the government's corrective economic plan given ongoing political
challenges.  S&P also expects the government to gradually achieve
its fiscal and inflation targets.

S&P could raise the ratings on the bank in the next 12 months if
it raises the sovereign local- and foreign-currency ratings or if
the bank's RAC ratio remains above 3%.

S&P could lower the ratings on Banco Galicia in the next 12 months
following a similar action on the sovereign.  Failure to gradually
reduce inflation toward the central bank's target, unexpected
lower economic growth, deterioration in economic policy, and
political instability could erode investor and consumer confidence
and limit the government's ability to implement its economic plan,
which could lead to a downgrade on the sovereign.  Additionally,
deterioration in the bank's credit fundamentals won't lead to
automatic downgrades because the SACP on Banco Galicia is one
notch higher than the issuer credit ratings.


BANCO MACRO: Fitch to Rate ARS Denominated Senior Notes 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned an expected rating of 'B(EXP)/RR4' to
Banco Macro S.A.'s upcoming issuance of ARS denominated senior
unsecured medium term notes. The assignment of the final rating is
contingent on the receipt of final documents conforming to the
information received to date.

The upcoming issuance will be for an amount up to the equivalent
of USD 300 million, denominated in ARS but payable in USD as
calculated by the Calculation Agent by converting the ARS amounts
due into USD at the applicable exchange rate on the relevant
calculation date.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
SENIOR DEBT

The ratings assigned to Macro's upcoming senior debt issuance are
at the same level as the bank's long-term local currency Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) of 'B'. The notes will rank pari passu with
all other existing and future senior unsecured debt.

Macro's IDRs are driven by the still adverse operating
environment, notwithstanding recent improvements to Argentina's
policy framework and access to financing which could benefit the
bank's performance. The ratings also consider the bank's sound
franchise, resilient earnings, stable asset quality and high loss-
absorption capacity.

Macro is Argentina's third largest private sector bank by loan
portfolio with one of the largest branch networks in the country,
focused primarily on serving low- and middle-income individuals
and small- and medium-sized companies.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
SENIOR DEBT

Macro's senior debt ratings are sensitive to a change in Macro's
local currency IDR. Given their low level, Macro's ratings would
move in line with any change of Argentina's sovereign rating.
Under current circumstances, Fitch considers it unlikely that
Argentine banks could be rated above the sovereign. Therefore,
upside potential for Macro's ratings is heavily contingent upon
positive developments in the sovereign rating dynamic. Macro's
ratings could be negatively affected by material deterioration in
asset quality, earnings, and/or loss absorption capacity, as well
as increases in liquidity and/or refinancing risks.

Fitch has assigned Macro the following rating:

-- Senior unsecured debt 'B(EXP)/RR4'.

Fitch currently rates Macro:

-- Foreign and Local Currency Long-Term IDR 'B'; Outlook Stable;
-- Foreign and Local Currency Short-Term IDR 'B';
-- Viability rating 'b';
-- Support Rating '5';
-- Support Rating Floor 'NF';
-- Subordinated debt 'B-/RR6'.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


BANCO PINE: S&P Affirms B+/B ICRs on Concentrated Business Profile
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+/B' global-scale and 'brBBB-'
Brazilian national-scale issuer credit ratings on Banco Pine S.A.
The outlook remains negative.  The stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) on the bank remains 'b+'.

The ratings on Pine reflect its somewhat concentrated business
profile consisting mostly of lending to small and large
corporations.  The ratings also reflect S&P's expectation that the
bank will maintain its internal capital generation, leading to a
forecast risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio of about 6.2% for the
next two years.  Moreover, S&P's ratings reflect the bank's
concentrated portfolio by single-name, which makes it more
vulnerable to financial distress, despite management's
conservative credit underwriting policies since 2015.  The ratings
also reflect S&P's view of a funding structure that still lacks
broad diversification among stable funding sources, and its
liquidity position that provides adequate cushion to cope with
cash outflows over the next 12 months.

Under S&P's bank criteria, it uses its BICRA's economic risk and
industry risk scores to determine a bank's anchor, the starting
point in assigning an issuer credit rating.  S&P's anchor for a
commercial bank operating only in Brazil is 'bb+', based on the
country's economic risk score of '7' and an industry risk score of
'5'.

The negative outlook on Pine for the next 12 months reflects S&P's
view of the negative economic and industry risk trend in S&P's
BICRA on Brazil.  S&P believes Pine's finances could deteriorate
because of pressures on Brazil's banking system as a result of the
sovereign's fiscal and monetary tightening.  Under such a
scenario, S&P could revise Pine's SACP downward and lower the
ratings.  In addition, Brazil's stagnant economy could further
weaken the bank's asset quality and revenue stability.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's belief that the bank's asset
quality could continue to deteriorate as a result of the bank's
lending concentration amid Brazil's weak economy.  If its
renegotiated loan portfolio causes significant credit losses, S&P
could revise its risk position to a weaker category.  Furthermore,
if the bank's business prospects don't recover in 2017, S&P could
revise its business position downward.

S&P could revise its outlook on Pine to stable if S&P revises its
BICRA economic risk and industry risk trends on Brazil to stable,
provided that the bank's business stability improves.


JSL S.A.: S&P Affirms 'BB' Global Scale Rating, Outlook Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' global scale rating and
'brA+' national scale rating on JSL S.A.  The outlook on the
ratings remains negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'brA+' issue-level rating in
the Brazilian national scale assigned to JSL's and JSL Locacoes'
senior unsecured debentures.  The '3' recovery rating remains
unchanged and reflects S&P's expectation for meaningful recovery
(50%-70%; rounded estimate 60% for JSL's debentures and 65% for
JSL Locacoes' debentures) in a default scenario.

The ratings on JSL continue to reflect the company's resilient
cash flows through adverse market conditions, upside potential
from Movida's operational efficiency that is likely to drive
improving credit metrics, and JSL's overall cost of debt, which
continues to pressure interest coverage metrics over the next few
quarters.  In addition, JSL's ratings remain limited by the
sovereign rating of Brazil, given its exposure to the domestic
market.  In this sense, S&P believes JSL's businesses to have high
sensitivity to a sovereign default, and that it would face
significant liquidity pressures in a hypothetical sovereign stress
scenario.

JSL's logistics business continues to benefit from its leading
market position, wide array of services, and operating efficiency
to maintain a strong contracted position and offset most of the
negative effects of still slow demand resulting from the weak
economic activity in Brazil.  In addition, JSL's fleet leasing and
car rental subsidiary, Movida, has concluded its most aggressive
expansion phase and is expected to continue to ramp up operations
over coming quarters.  Higher average operating fleet and fleet
utilization rates will lead to stronger profitability, and likely
greater contribution to consolidated EBITDA.  However, though
declining interest rates in Brazil will likely have a positive
impact on overall debt cost, they can also affect tariffs for new
fleet leasing contracts.

After executing an aggressive growth plan at Movida over the past
two years, S&P expects JSL to present a more conservative growth
strategy over the next few years, supporting S&P's expectations of
positive free cash flow generation.  In this sense, S&P expects
the company to be able to fund the bulk of its capex needs using
its internal cash generation and used asset sales.  S&P also
assumes the company will continue to focus on improving its
capital structure by refinancing debt with some improvement to
debt cost and maturity profile.  S&P's base-case scenario also
includes these assumptions:

   -- Brazil GDP increasing by 0.5% in 2017, and 2% in 2018, which
      S&P considers as guidance for new contracts increase,
      combined with usual contract renewal rate and expected
      expansion of services with existing clients;

   -- Inflation in Brazil at 4.2% in 2017 and 4.0% in 2018,
      affecting costs and also contract prices, since clauses
      allow for inflation pass-through;

   -- As a result of the above factors, Logistics revenue growth
      is flat in 2017 and 5% in 2018;

   -- Movida's revenues growing by 38% in 2017 and 25% in 2018,
      driven by the aggressive capex in recent years, and need to
      continue renewing a larger portion of its fleet;

   -- Capital expenditures of BRL 2.2 billion and BRL 2.7 billion
      in 2017 and 2018, respectively;

   -- About 19% of total capex for expansion and the rest for
      fleet renewal, both for light vehicles and heavy equipment;
      and

   -- Minimum dividend payout of 25%.

As a result of these assumptions S&P reaches these metrics:

   -- Revenues of R$7.5 billion in 2017 and R$8.3 billion in 2018;

   -- EBITDA of R$1.3 billion in 2017 and R$1.6 billion in 2018;

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) of about R$750 million in 2017
      and R$1 billion in 2018;

   -- Free operating cash flow of about R$100 million in 2017 and
      R$350 million in 2018;

   -- Debt to EBITDA of about 3.8x in 2017 and close to 3x in
      2018;

   -- FFO to debt of about 15% in 2017 and 20% in 2018.

The combination of a fair business risk profile and an aggressive
financial risk profile result in a 'bb-' anchor.  However, S&P
believes the ramp up potential of Movida to not be fully reflected
in JSL's figures, while Movida's stand-alone financial metrics are
stronger than consolidated metrics.  In this sense, S&P believes
JSL compares favorably to other companies in the 'BB-' category,
and therefore S&P adjusts the anchor up by one notch.

The negative outlook mirrors that on Brazil, since the company's
ratings remain capped to that of the sovereign.

The outlook also reflects that, despite S&P's expectations for
improving cash flows from Movida and more conservative expansion
strategy, credit metrics will remain pressured for JSL's rating
category, since the still sluggish market conditions in Brazil are
likely to limit potential improvements to consolidated
profitability.  In this sense, S&P expects improvements to
leverage to be modest, with FFO to debt of 14%, despite lower base
interest rates in Brazil in 2017.

S&P could downgrade JSL over the next 12 months if persistently
weak market conditions lead to operating underperformance and
prevent the company from capturing stronger cash flows from Movida
and improve metrics, leading to FFO to debt close to 12%.  A
negative rating action on the sovereign rating could also trigger
a rating downgrade on JSL, given its exposure to the Brazilian
domestic economy.

A positive rating action is currently unlikely, since it would
depend on similar action on Brazil's sovereign rating, combined
with stronger-than-expected financial metrics through higher
operating efficiency, such as FFO to debt consistently above 20%.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ASHUMHOLD LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Ashumhold Limited, on March 23, 2017, passed a
resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Neil Montgomery
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          P.O. Box 448 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Elgin Court, Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 815 8512
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


BENAYAHOLD LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Benayahold Limited, on March 23, 2017, passed
a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Neil Montgomery
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          P.O. Box 448 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Elgin Court, Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 815 8512
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


FURSAHOLD LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Fursahold Limited, on March 23, 2017, passed a
resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Neil Montgomery
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          P.O. Box 448 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Elgin Court, Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 815 8512
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


KIMAHOLD LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Kimahold Limited, on March 23, 2017, passed a
resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Neil Montgomery
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          P.O. Box 448 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Elgin Court, Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 815 8512
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


MALINVEST LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Malinvest Limited, on March 23, 2017, passed a
resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Neil Montgomery
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          P.O. Box 448 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Elgin Court, Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 815 8512
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


MARBAHOLD LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Marbahold Limited, on March 23, 2017, passed a
resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Neil Montgomery
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          P.O. Box 448 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Elgin Court, Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 815 8512
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


MASULINVEST LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Masulinvest Limited, on March 23, 2017, passed
a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Neil Montgomery
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          P.O. Box 448 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Elgin Court, Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 815 8512
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


RASMAL LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Rasmal Limited, on March 23, 2017, passed a
resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Neil Montgomery
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          P.O. Box 448 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Elgin Court, Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 815 8512
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


RATIBHOLD LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Ratibhold Limited, on March 23, 2017, passed a
resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Neil Montgomery
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          P.O. Box 448 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Elgin Court, Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 815 8512
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470


SANAWIHOLD LIMITED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Sanawihold Limited, on March 23, 2017, passed
a resolution to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Neil Montgomery
          c/o Genesis Trust & Corporate Services Ltd.
          P.O. Box 448 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          Elgin Court, Elgin Avenue, George Town
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 815 8512
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3470



===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Hailed as LatAm's Blackouts Champ, IDB Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that The Inter-American Development Bank
conducted a study which found that Dominican Republic is the
nation with the most blackouts per month, compared to others in
Latin America. It estimated that the country would have to spend
as much as US$1.6 billion annually to meet the growing electricity
demand until 2040.

During a meeting at the State-owned Electric Utility (CDEEE), IDB
adviser Ramon Espinasa, who presented the report, said Dominican
authorities are well aware of the problem of the blackouts and are
working to solve it, according to Dominican Today.

Among other findings, the study shows that energy in Dominican
Republic costs more than in 15 of the 25 countries analyzed,
surpassed only by Belize, Uruguay, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Bahamas, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica and Barbados, the report notes.

In contrast, the IDB study says Venezuela, Suriname, Argentina,
Trinidad and Tobago, Paraguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil,
Chile, Mexico, Panama, Costa Rica and Honduras have the lowest
prices, the report relays.

The report also shows how the Central American countries generate
electricity and notes that the Dominican Republic's is mostly oil-
based, with 52%, followed by natural gas 21%; coal 13%; hydro 9%;
solar 5% and wind and biomass 0.2%, Dominican Today discloses.

It adds that Costa Rica leads in hydro at 66%, followed by
geothermal 15%; oil by-products 10%; solar-wind 7% and biomass 2%,
Dominican Today adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 22, 2016, Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating
actions on the Dominican Republic:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
      upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'; assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
      assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Senior unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds upgraded
      to 'BB-' from 'B+';

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Miners in the Region Assure Good Practice
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Goldquest Dominicana President Julio
Espaillat said the planned mine in San Juan de la Maguana province
(south) won't harm the surrounding vegetation because it's 150
meters below the surface.

He said it will have zero impact on San Juan River, because there
will be no discharges and its waters won't be manipulated,
according to Dominican Today.

The report notes that Mr. Espaillat said chemicals that could harm
the environment won't be used, and the ore will be separated by
environment-friendly grinding and flotation.  "The company has
invested in this project around 25 million dollars since 2004 and
that at the beginning of the exploitation of mineral reserves the
total investment will be about 160 million dollars," the report
discloses.

The head of the Roundtable of Commonwealth Countries in the
Dominican Republic said the mining companies which operate in the
national territory do so responsibly, because they are regulated
both in their base country and in others as well, the report
relays.

Fernando Gonzalez admitted however that in the past mining
companies operating in the country weren't responsible, so he
called on society to be vigilant so the situation isn't repeated,
the report notes.  "The current mines are responsible and the
Energy and Mines Ministry is aware that the deposits are properly
exploited," he added.

Mr. Gonzalez cited Barrick Pueblo Viejo as a miner which he
affirms is overseen by other nations and is having a positive
impact on the country and on its around 65,000 Dominicans workers,
the report notes.

Nonetheless the business leader attributed the constant complaints
by the inhabitants near the Barrick mine to a "lack of knowledge,"
the report relays.

Mr. Gonzalez spoke after taking part in a conference hosted by the
also miner, GoldQuest Dominicana.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 22, 2016, Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating
actions on the Dominican Republic:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
      upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'; assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
      assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Senior unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds upgraded
      to 'BB-' from 'B+';

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.



=====================
E L  S A L V A D O R
=====================


EL SALVADOR: S&P Lowers Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'SD'
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term foreign and local
currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of El Salvador
to 'SD' (selective default) from 'CCC-'.  At the same time, S&P
removed the ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications,
where S&P had placed them on April 11, 2017.  In addition, S&P
lowered the short-term ratings to 'SD' from 'C', and S&P affirmed
its issue credit rating on the foreign currency senior unsecured
debt at 'CCC-'.

S&P's 'AAA' transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment is
unchanged.

                            RATIONALE

El Salvador's Congress recently failed to approve a budgetary
allocation necessary to cover payment of financial commitments for
pension-related debt.  As a result, the government missed payments
on financial obligations coming from the Certificates for Pension
Investments (CIPs) due between April 7 and April 10, 2017, adding
up to $28.8 million and set to rise to a total of $55.2 million at
the end of this month.

S&P lowered the issuer credit ratings to 'SD' because the
government did not make the missed payments during the five
business days that S&P imputes as a grace period according to its
criteria.

S&P also affirmed the existing issue credit ratings on the foreign
currency senior unsecured debt at 'CCC-' because this debt is not
in default.  The T&C assessment remains 'AAA' based on S&P's view
that the sovereign will continue to use the U.S dollar as its
currency and not restrict dollar outflows by private parties to
make debt service payments.

S&P's issuer credit ratings focus on the obligor's capacity and
willingness to meet its financial commitments as they come due.
They do not apply to any specific financial obligation, as they do
not take into account the nature and provisions of the obligation,
its standing in bankruptcy or liquidation, statutory preferences,
or the legality and enforceability of the obligation.

Once the default is cured, S&P will reassess the sovereign's
general credit standing, most likely raising the long-term foreign
and local currency ratings into the 'CCC' category, reflecting El
Salvador's long-standing monetary and fiscal rigidities, poor
growth prospects, and the political polarization that contributed
to the recent missed debt payments.  The ability of the government
and opposition parties to reach agreement on fiscal policy and
improve the sovereign's access to liquidity will be key to the
future credit rating.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that all key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST
Downgraded
                                    To           From
El Salvador (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating            SD/SD        CCC-/Watch Neg/C

Ratings Affirmed

El Salvador (Republic of)
Senior Unsecured                       CCC-
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   AAA



=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Leaders Anticipate Hike in Inflation Over 12 Mos.
----------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that there is an expectation among business
leaders that there will be an uptick in inflation in Jamaica over
the next twelve months.

The expectation was expressed by the business leaders in response
to questions on the Bank of Jamaica's Inflation Expectations
Survey for the month of February, according to RJR News.

The survey which was conducted among 306 Chief Executives,
Managing Directors and Financial Controllers across the island,
showed they expect inflation in the next 12 months to average 4.1
percent, the report notes.

That is higher than the actual inflation out turn of 3.6 per cent
for the 12 months to February 2017, the report relays.

The expectation of higher inflation was accompanied by the
perception among business leaders that the Bank of Jamaica's
control of price increases is not as strong as in the prior year,
the report notes.

Slower depreciation of local currency expected

And the business leaders say they now expect the Jamaican dollar
to depreciate at a slower pace than previously indicated, the
report discloses.

The report says that the business leaders said they expect the
Jamaican dollar to depreciate at a rate of 1.5 percent in the next
12 months.

That is a slower rate of decline than the 2.7 per cent
depreciation that was forecast by the business leaders when they
were surveyed in December, the report notes.

The Bank of Jamaica which commissions the surveys on inflation
expectations four times per year, uses the results to help chart
is policy direction, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 9, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Jamaica's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs are Stable. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign Currency and Local
Currency IDRs at 'B'.


JAMAICA: Bank of Jamaica Act to be Submitted to Cabinet Soon
------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Jamaican government has indicated to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) that a proposal for revising the
Bank of Jamaica Act, will be submitted to cabinet for
consideration by August of this year.

The reform measure was outlined by the government in its updated
Letter of Intent to the IMF dated March 29, 2017, according to RJR
News.

In that letter, the government said the BOJ Act will be revised in
line with recommendations from the IMF, the report notes.

That revised Act must then be submitted to parliament by February
next year, the report relays.

The revised BOJ Act should -- among other things -- improve the
central bank's independence, modernize arrangements for paying
dividends, making appointments to the BOJ board and provisions of
central bank financing to the government, the report notes.

The revised BOJ Act is one of the structural benchmarks the
government must meet to continue getting support from the IMF, the
report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 9, 2017, Fitch Ratings affirmed Jamaica's Long-Term Foreign
and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook. The issue ratings on Jamaica's senior unsecured
Foreign and Local Currency bonds are also affirmed at 'B'. The
Outlooks on the Long-Term IDRs are Stable. The Country Ceiling is
affirmed at 'B' and the Short-Term Foreign Currency and Local
Currency IDRs at 'B'.

                            ***********

Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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