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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

               Thursday, April 20, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 78


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

BANCO DE LA NACION: Fitch Affirms B Long-Term IDRs
CORDOBA PROVINCE: B3 Class 1 Notes Rating Unchanged, Moody's Says
PROVINCIA CASA: Fitch Affirms B Long-Term Local Currency IDRs
ORAZUL ENERGY: S&P Assigns 'BB' CCR on Diversified Portfolio


B R A Z I L

ODEBRECHT ENGENHARIA: S&P Cuts CCR to 'CCC+' on Capital Structure


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ARTEMIS PROPERTY: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 28
D.U.B COMPANY: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 27
EAGLEVALE PARTNERS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
EAGLEVALE PARTNERS MASTER: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
ELDOURADO ENTITY: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report

GOODLAND LTD: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
IBIS GLOBAL: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 11
IBIS GLOBAL MASTER: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 11
IOL CARETAKER: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 26
SIGNUM VERDE 2008-1: S&P Raises Rating on CLP4.8BB Notes to 'BB+'

STONEMOOR CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 19
TRANSPACIFIC VENTURES: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 21
ZUNI HOLDINGS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 28


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REP: Sectors Huddle as 20% Wage Hike Faces Challenge
DOMINICAN REP: Union Says No Excuse Against Approving Wage Hike


G U A T E M A L A

ENERGUATE TRUST: Moody's Assigns Ba2 CFR; Outlook Stable
ENERGUATE TRUST: Fitch Assigns BB Issuer Default Ratings


M E X I C O

MEXICO: Trump Trade Plans Spell Uncertainty for Shipping Terminal


P E R U

FERREYCORP S.A.A.: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR; Outlook Remains Stable


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

CL FIN'L: CLICO Eyes Return To Guyana But Ex-Pres Says Not So Fast
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: VAT Refunds Suspended, IMF Reports


U R U G U A Y

COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO: Fitch Affirms B IDRs; Outlook Negative
EXPRINTER (URUGUAY): Moody's Cuts LT Deposit Ratings to Caa2
HSBC BANK: Fitch Affirms bb- Viability Rating
SCOTIABANK URUGUAY: Fitch Affirms bb- Viability Rating


                            - - - - -


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A R G E N T I N A
=================


BANCO DE LA NACION: Fitch Affirms B Long-Term IDRs
--------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banco de la Nacion Argentina's
(Sucursal Uruguay) (BNAUY) Long-Term Foreign Currency and
Long-Term Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B'.
Fitch has also affirmed BNAUY's Support Rating (SR) at '4'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs AND SUPPORT RATINGS

BNAUY's IDRs are aligned with the Republic of Argentina's
sovereign ratings as it is an integrated branch of Banco de la
Nacion Argentina (BNA), fully owned by the Argentine government.
The sovereign guarantees BNA's liabilities (including its branches
abroad).

The valuations for BNA and BNAUY are strongly influenced by
Argentina's still volatile and adverse economic and operating
environment. Although the current government is taking steps in
the right direction by reducing policy and regulatory intervention
in the financial system, the local environment in Argentina is
still characterized by broad economic imbalances and measures are
being taken gradually; therefore, the recovery of the economy is
likely to take some time to materialize.

BNA has a leading franchise and systemic importance in Argentina.
It is the largest bank in terms of loans and deposits, with
international coverage through branches and representative offices
in nine countries that mainly attend to domestic needs related to
intraregional foreign trade supporting the commercial activity of
Argentina in the region. BNAUY is the smallest bank in the country
due to its narrow business focus.

BNAUY is fully integrated with the head office's strategies,
corporate governance practices and risk management procedures.
BNAUY operates through only one main office and its activities are
reported to the International Banking area of BNA. BNAUY has
modest profitability, a fairly liquid balance sheet and adequate
capitalization metrics.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs AND SUPPORT RATING

BNAUY's ratings are sensitive to changes in Argentina's sovereign
rating and/or willingness or ability to provide support to BNA and
its branches.

BANUY's Support Rating of '4' considers that there are significant
uncertainties as to the ability of the sovereign to provide
support, given Argentina's weak credit profile, which results in
limited probability of support.

Fitch has affirmed the following:

BNAUY

-- Long-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable;
-- Long-term Local Currency IDR at 'B';
-- Support Rating at '4'


CORDOBA PROVINCE: B3 Class 1 Notes Rating Unchanged, Moody's Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo said that
the B3 (on the Global Scale) and Baa2.ar (on Argentina's National
Scale) foreign currency ratings of Class 1 Notes for USD150
million issued by the Province of Cordoba under its Local Market
Issuance Program remain unchanged after the announced extension of
the maximum authorized amount of this Class for up to USD300
million in total. The ratings are in line with the province's long
term foreign currency issuer rating, which carry a positive
outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's originally rated the Province of Buenos Aires's
aforementioned Class 1 Notes on October 11, 2016. These Notes were
originally issued on October 27, 2016 at a 7.125% interest rate
and final maturity in 2026. They were issued within Cordoba's
Local Market Issuance Program whose maximum authorized amount was
extended to USD460 million from the previous USD260 million by
Governor's Decree Nß 379/17.

The original Class 1 Notes under the program, constitute direct,
unconditional, secured and unsubordinated obligations of the
Province, ranking at all times pari passu without any preference
among other debts. Class 1 Notes are issued and will be payable in
US dollars and sold in the local capital market. They pay 7.125%
interest rate on a quarterly basis, maturity of ten years and
amortize in 32 quarterly and equal installments equivalent to
3.125% of principal since the 27th month. The new Notes under
Class 1 will have identical terms and conditions as the original
Notes except for the issue date and issue price. They are be
subject to the Argentine Law.

The ratings to Class 1 are in line with the Province's B3 (Global
Scale) and Baa2.ar (Argentina's National Scale) foreign currency
debt ratings because the Notes do not present any credit
enhancements that differentiate them from the general solvency of
the province.

The Province of Cordoba will use the proceeds of the additional
amount of Class 1 Notes to fund infrastructure and/or social
projects, and/or to refinance outstanding debt obligations and
improve its debt maturity profile.

Following the reopening of these new Notes, Moody's anticipates
that the ratio of total debt to total revenues of the Province of
Buenos Aires will increase to an estimated 37% by the end of 2017
from the 29% calculated at the end 2016.

The assigned ratings are based on preliminary documentation
received by Moody's as of the rating assignment date. Moody's does
not expect changes to the documentation reviewed over this period
nor anticipates changes in the main conditions that the Notes will
carry. Should issuance conditions and/or final documentation of
these Notes deviate from the original ones submitted and reviewed
by the rating agency, Moody's will assess the impact that these
differences may have on the ratings and act accordingly.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the strong macroeconomic and financial linkages between the
Government of Argentina's and Sub-sovereigns an upgrade in the
Argentine sovereigns ratings and/or a systemic improvement coupled
with lower idiosyncratic risks arising from this Province -for
instance with a sustained record of cash financing and operating
surpluses in the two digits range- could exert an upward pressure
in Cordoba's current ratings. Conversely, a downgrade in
Argentina's bond ratings and/or further systemic deterioration or
idiosyncratic risks arising in this issuer -i.e. a rapid and sharp
growth in the ratio of debt to total revenues- could exert
downward pressure on the ratings assigned and could translate into
a downgrade in the near to medium term.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.


PROVINCIA CASA: Fitch Affirms B Long-Term Local Currency IDRs
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Provincia Casa Financiera's Long-Term
Foreign Currency and Long-Term Local Currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) at 'B'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs

Provincia is a branch of Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires
(BAPRO) and part of the same legal entity. Therefore, Provincia's
IDRs reflect Fitch's opinion of BAPRO's financial and business
profile, which are highly influenced by its leading franchise and
systemic importance as the second largest bank in terms of
deposits and the fourth in loans in Argentina. Fitch also
considers the bank's good asset quality, ample liquidity, moderate
profitability and low capital base.

In addition, BAPRO and Provincia are wholly-owned by the
government of the Province of Buenos Aires. BAPRO's liabilities
(including those of its branches abroad) are fully guaranteed by
the government of the Province of Buenos Aires.

In Uruguay, Provincia is small due to its narrow business focus.
Its legal status is a casa financiera, which differs from a
banking license because it is not allowed to raise resident's
deposits and has much lower regulatory costs. However, in terms of
regulatory capital limits, Provincia has to comply with the rules
applied to banks.

Provincia is fully integrated with its head office's strategies,
corporate governance practices and risk management procedures. It
operates through one office and reports to the International
Division of BAPRO. Provincia has a low, albeit improving
profitability, low credit risk, a highly liquid balance sheet and
adequate capitalization metrics. The branch's current business
plan aims to improve its profitability mainly through a more
active pricing policy, improving its cost efficiency, a more
active management of its trading portfolio and loan growth once
the Uruguayan economy resumes growth.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUPPORT RATING

The Support Rating of '5' reflects that, although possible,
external support for this bank, as with most Argentine banks,
cannot be relied upon given the ample economic imbalances. In
turn, the sovereign ability and willingness to support banks is
highly uncertain.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs

Provincia's IDRs are sensitive to changes in BAPRO's financial and
business profile.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING

Changes in Provincia's Support Rating are unlikely in the
foreseeable future.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:

Provincia Casa Financiera:
-- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable;
-- Long-Term Local Currency IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable;
-- Support Rating '5'.


ORAZUL ENERGY: S&P Assigns 'BB' CCR on Diversified Portfolio
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB' corporate credit and issue-
level ratings to Orazul Energy Egenor S. en C. por A. The outlook
is stable.

S&P's ratings on Egenor are based on S&P's view that the company
is a core subsidiary for its parent Orazul Energia Peru S.A.C.
Orazul's business comprises a diversified portfolio of
hydroelectric, thermal, electricity transmission, and natural gas
production and processing assets, with a predominant focus on Peru
(BBB+/Stable).  In S&P's view, the companies in the group bear a
single-default risk due to its high integration, both from
operating and administrative standpoints and the sharing of
controlling shareholder and top management.  The rating also
considers that within the next 18 months, the group will implement
a corporate reorganization, which includes the transfer of
ownership of Egenor's sister company Aguaytia to Egenor, and
subsequently a merge of Egenor with Orazul.

Orazul's business risk profile mainly reflects its robust
operating efficiency and resilient margins because of its balanced
portfolio of hydroelectric and thermal assets as well as its
vertical integration into the natural gas production and
transmission businesses.  Orazul operates two hydroelectric power
plants, Canon del Pato and Carhuaquero I, IV, and V, and a gas-
powered, open-cycle thermal power plant, Central Termica Aguaytia.
The company has a combined capacity of 552 megawatts (MW).  The
balanced mix of hydroelectric and thermal assets as well as the
diverse water supply--from glaciers, lagoons, and rainfall--allows
the company to mitigate seasonality in hydroelectric power
generation.  In addition, the natural gas required to fuel the
thermal power plant is produced internally, which allows for more
stable margins than those of nonintegrated peers.  Central Termica
Aguaytia is the only thermal plant in Peru with its own gas supply
and no take-or-pay gas supply contracts.  When electricity prices
are lower than those under the PPAs and marginal costs prevent
Central Termica Aguaytia from being dispatched, Orazul resells
electricity purchased in the spot market at a higher margin than
competitors do because Central Termica Aguaytia does not pay for
gas it does not use.  Lastly, the company's transmission business,
which consists of 740 km of transmission lines, is generally very
stable because to the extent its own generating assets are not
dispatched, a number of third parties use the transmission lines,
resulting in lower costs for the power generation plants.

In addition, the company holds a contracted portfolio through
long-term PPAs with solid offtakers that generally limits its
exposure to fluctuations in Peru's energy spot markets.  As of
Dec. 31, 2016, Orazul has made 79.6% of its sales under PPAs,
which have a weighted average remaining term of 5.3 years.
Moreover, Peru's regulatory, legal, and contractual framework is
transparent and includes predictable rules, in S&P's view.

These strengths mitigate Orazul being a small player in the highly
competitive Peruvian market, with a market share of 5% of the
country's capacity and gross energy generation.  In addition, the
company has a certain level of customer concentration, with Peru-
based distributor Luz del Sur generating around 30% of Orazul's
total revenue.

S&P expects Orazul's EBITDA generation to range between
$110 million and $120 million, with adjusted debt to EBITDA close
to 5x and funds from operations (FFO) to debt of 12% in the next
two years.  Although these credit metrics suggest a weaker
financial risk profile in S&P's view, the company has a certain
cushion under its FFO interest coverage that S&P expects to range
between 3.0x and 3.5x in the next two years.  This supports
Orazul's financial risk profile, given that the bulk of the
company's debt matures in the long term, so it only has to service
interest for the upcoming five years.

S&P considers these assumptions under our base-case scenario for
2017 and 2018:

   -- Macroeconomic variables that S&P views as relevant for the
      unregulated utilities, particularly GDP growth that's highly
      correlated to demand of electricity and inflation levels
      that affect certain costs.  S&P's forecast for Peru's GDP
      growth is 3.5% in 2017 and 3.8% in the following years.  S&P
      expects Peru's inflation to be 3.2% in 2017 and to drop to
      the 3.0% area afterwards.

   -- Normal hydrology conditions in the region that lead to
      adjusted generation of approximately 2,500 MW.

   -- Prices as determined under the current PPAs (that have a
      remaining life of more than five years).  Regarding spot
      prices, S&P is assuming a level of approximately $15 in the
      next two years.

   -- Adjusted EBITDA margins of 45% in the next two to three
      years.

   -- Annual capital expenditures (capex) of about $21 million in
      2017, which includes certain non-recurring projects, such as
      investments related to the construction of a new storage and
      loading plant at Aguaytia and improvements to the fire
      protection infrastructure, and decreasing to $9 million in
      2018 and $5 million in 2019 afterwards that will correspond
      to maintenance levels.

   -- The issuance of the new $550 million seven-year bullet
      international bond.

   -- Distribution of excess cash as dividends, leaving a minimum
      of $5 million in cash holdings.

Orazul Energia Holdings Ltd. (not rated) owns Orazul.  S&P views
Orazul as a core subsidiary for Orazul Energia Holdings Ltd.,
given the importance to the group's long-term strategy,
considering that Orazul operates in the same line of business and
the level of integration and synergies among the members of the
group.  In turn, Orazul Energia Holdings Ltd. is ultimately owned
by the infrastructure fund I Squared (not rated) and the
development institution International Finance Corp.

The stable outlook incorporates S&P's expectation that the company
will continue to post a net debt to EBITDA lower than 5x in the
next 12 months and that the group will complete its corporate
reorganization in the next 18 months.

In the next 18 months, S&P would downgrade Orazul if its net debt
to EBITDA rises to more than 5x and FFO interest coverage drops
below 2x.  That can occur if the company's exposure to the spot
market increases, stemming from a drop in electricity generation
to below 1,000 gigawatt hours (GWh) per year due to severe
drought.

S&P believes an upgrade is possible if Orazul's net debt to EBITDA
ratio falls below 4x, which S&P sees as unlikely in the next 18
months given the company's plans to distribute any excess cash.



===========
B R A Z I L
===========


ODEBRECHT ENGENHARIA: S&P Cuts CCR to 'CCC+' on Capital Structure
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its global scale corporate credit
rating on Odebrecht Engenharia e Construcao S.A. (OEC) to 'CCC+'
from 'B-'.  At the same time, S&P lowered its national scale
corporate credit rating on the company to 'brCCC+/brC' from
'brB-/brC '.  S&P also lowered its issue-level ratings on OEC's
sister company, Odebrecht Finance Ltd. (OFL), to 'CCC+'.  The '4'
recovery rating on this debt, indicating S&P's expectation that
lenders would receive average (30%) recovery of their principal in
the event of a payment default, remains unchanged.  The outlook on
the corporate credit ratings remains negative.

The downgrade reflects the uncertainty regarding the
sustainability of OEC's capital structure in the long term in the
absence of positive credit events, including a quick recovery in
its cash conversion cycle and collection of overdue receivables,
the receiving of about $450 million in intercompany loans that OEC
provided to its parent, Odebrecht S.A., and a business turnaround
that enables the company to replenish its backlog.  The Lava Jato
corruption probe has impaired OEC's reputation.  And even after
signing the leniency agreement with Brazilian, the U.S., and Swiss
authorities, OEC is struggling to close the investigation, which
other countries in Latin America have begun.  In addition, the
company's backlog is likely to shrink to about $17 billion at the
end of 2016 as a result of the exclusion of some projects (mainly
GSP) from $28.1 billion in 2015 and $33.9 billion in 2014.

Even though S&P acknowledges that OEC's bonds benefit from a long-
term maturity profile (next principal bond maturity is April 2018
with an outstanding amount of R$500 million), which reduces the
default risk in the short term, S&P's concerns have risen over the
company's cash drain and ability to restore a sustainable
liquidity and cash generation in order to avoid a debt
restructuring scenario.  S&P also views that OEC is susceptible to
a much more limited financial flexibility due to a higher scrutiny
from its counterparties (including clients and lenders) and a weak
standing in capital markets.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ARTEMIS PROPERTY: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 28
--------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Artemis Property Services Ltd. will hold their
final meeting on April 28, 2017, at 9:30 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Matthew Wright
          c/o Omar Grant
          Windward 1, Regatta Office Park
          P.O. Box 897 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949-7576
          Facsimile: (345) 949-8295


D.U.B COMPANY: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 27
------------------------------------------------------
The members of D.U.B Company Limited will hold their final meeting
on April 27, 2017, to receive the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Zedra Directors (Cayman) Limited
          c/o Enola Reid
          136 Shedden Road
          One Capital Place, 3rd Floor
          Grand Cayman KY1-1106
          P.O. Box 487, George Town
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 345 914-5413


EAGLEVALE PARTNERS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Eaglevale Partners Offshore Fund Ltd. received
on April 17, 2017, the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Eaglevale Partners LP
          Eaglevale Management LLC
          c/o Daniella Skotnicki
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877


EAGLEVALE PARTNERS MASTER: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Eaglevale Partners Master Fund Ltd. received
on April 17, 2017, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-
up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Eaglevale Partners LP
          Eaglevale Management LLC
          c/o Daniella Skotnicki
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877


ELDOURADO ENTITY: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-----------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Eldourado Entity Ltd. received on April 3,
2017, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

         Amicorp Cayman Fiduciary Limited
         c/o Nicole Ebanks-Sloley
         The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre, 1st Floor
         802 West Bay Road
         P.O. Box 10655 Grand Cayman KY1-1006
         Cayman Islands
         Telephone: (345) 943-6055


GOODLAND LTD: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
-------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Goodland Ltd. received on April 3, 2017, the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

         Amicorp Cayman Fiduciary Limited
         c/o Nicole Ebanks-Sloley
         The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre, 1st Floor
         802 West Bay Road
         P.O. Box 10655 Grand Cayman KY1-1006
         Cayman Islands
         Telephone: (345) 943-6055


IBIS GLOBAL: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 11
--------------------------------------------------
The members of Ibis Global Media Fund II will hold their final
meeting on May 11, 2017, at 4:00 p.m., to receive the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Nicola Cowan
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


IBIS GLOBAL MASTER: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 11
---------------------------------------------------------
The members of IBIS Global Media Master Fund II will hold their
final meeting on May 11, 2017, at 4:00 p.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          DMS Corporate Services Ltd.
          c/o Nicola Cowan
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877


IOL CARETAKER: Members' Final Meeting Set for May 26
----------------------------------------------------
The members of IOL Caretaker Ltd. will hold their final meeting on
May 26, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report on
the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Eddie Lopez-Paz
          c/o Forbes Hare
          Cassia Court, Camana Bay
          Suite 716, 10 Market Street
          Grand Cayman KY1-9006
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 943-7700


SIGNUM VERDE 2008-1: S&P Raises Rating on CLP4.8BB Notes to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its rating on Signum Verde Ltd.'s
Chilean peso-denominated (CLP) 4.8 billion fixed-rate notes series
2008-1 to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'BB (sf)'.

The series 2008-1 certificate issuance is an emerging markets
synthetic structured financing with a first-to-default structure
that is credit-linked to CAP S.A. (BB+/Stable/--) and
collateralized by Goldman Sachs subordinated debt ('BBB-').  In
addition, the certificate holders have exposure to The Goldman
Sachs Group Inc. (BBB+/Stable/A-2), which is the swap guarantor
for Goldman Sachs International (A+/Stable/A-1), the swap
counterparty.  The certificate issuance is credit-linked to CAP
S.A., but it does not represent a direct obligation of this
company.

The rating action follows the April 12, 2017, raising of S&P's
corporate credit and issue ratings on CAP S.A. to 'BB+' from 'BB'.

The upgrade reflects CAP S.A.'s focus on lower-cost production,
combined with higher average iron ore prices, which will support
more resilient cash flow generation and stronger financial metrics
in coming years.

S&P will continue to surveil the rating on this asset-backed
transaction and revise the rating as necessary to reflect any
changes in the transaction's underlying credit quality.


STONEMOOR CAPITAL: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 19
---------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Stonemoor Capital PTC Ltd. will hold their
final meeting on April 19, 2017, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Alexandria Bancorp Limited
          Dayra Triana-Munroe
          Barbara Conolly
          The Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre
          802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 2428 Grand Cayman KY1-1105
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 945-1111
          Facsimile: (345) 945-1122


TRANSPACIFIC VENTURES: Members' Final Meeting Set for April 21
--------------------------------------------------------------
The members of Transpacific Ventures Limited will hold their final
meeting on April 21, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Stuart Sybersma
          Deloitte & Touche
          Citrus Grove Building, 4th Floor
          Goring Avenue
          George Town KY1-1109
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 814 2223
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8258


ZUNI HOLDINGS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for April 28
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Zuni Holdings Ltd. will hold their final
meeting on April 28, 2017, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Omar Grant
          Windward 1, Regatta Office Park
          P.O. Box 897 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 949-7576
          Facsimile: (345) 949-8295



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D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REP: Sectors Huddle as 20% Wage Hike Faces Challenge
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic Labor Minister
Jose Ramon Fadul is meeting behind closed doors at the Labor
Ministry with management and labor representatives, just days
after employers vowed to challenge the 20% increase on workers'
minimum wage.

Only photojournalists were allowed to take images of the meeting
attended by Dominican Republic Industries Association (AIRD) vice
president Circe Almanzar; and labor union leaders Gabriel Del R°o
and Jacobo Ramos, according to Dominican Today.

According to the resolution approved by the Labor Ministry's
National Salaries Committed, the minimum wage will be RD$15,447.60
for companies with earnings of more than RD$4.0 million;
RD$10,620 for those with RD$2.0 to RD$4.0 million, and RD$9,411.60
for companies whose profits are up to RD$2.0 million, the report
notes.

Private security guards will receive RD$13,032.00 and farm workers
will get a daily wage of RD$320.40, when Resolution No. 05/2017
takes effect, the report relays.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 22, 2016, Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating
actions on the Dominican Republic:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
      upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'; assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
      assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Senior unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds upgraded
      to 'BB-' from 'B+';

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.


DOMINICAN REP: Union Says No Excuse Against Approving Wage Hike
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that union leader Pepe Abreu said there'll
be no excuse not to approve the 20 percent wage increase at the
meeting set between labor, management and the Minister of Labor.

Mr. Abreu said Labor minister Jose R. Fadul has the power to
ratify the increase for non-sectorized private sector workers,
even if management opts not to participate, the report notes.

Mr. Abreu called "blackmail" management's threat of possible
massive layoffs by the companies that can't absorb the increase,
the report relays.

The labor leader said employers seek to eliminate the severance
pay and for the Government to create unemployment insurance, but
warns that it won't lead to any results, the report notes.

Interviewed on Channel 25, Mr. Abreu said the low salaries lead
many to turn to informal work to avoid entering the private
sector, the report discloses.

Mr. Abreu also denounced that workers have been fired from
companies when trying to unionize, citing layoffs at the Punta
Catalina power plant, the report relays.

Mr. Abreu added that the country's industries aren't more
competitive because they don't stimulate their workers, the report
adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 22, 2016, Fitch Ratings has taken the following rating
actions on the Dominican Republic:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
      upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'; assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
      assigned Stable Outlook;

   -- Senior unsecured Foreign and Local Currency bonds upgraded
      to 'BB-' from 'B+';

   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';

   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.



=================
G U A T E M A L A
=================


ENERGUATE TRUST: Moody's Assigns Ba2 CFR; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba2 corporate family rating
(CFR) and senior unsecured rating to the proposed issuance of up
to US$350 million senior unsecured notes by Energuate Trust
(Energuate). This is the first time Moody's has assigned a rating
to Energuate. The rating outlook is stable.

Energuate will largely use the proceeds from the notes to repay
outstanding local debt (of nearly US$310 million). In addition,
Energuate will make cash distributions to the shareholders of
Distribuidora de Electricidad de Occidente, S.A.'s (DEOCSA) and
Distribuidora de Electricidad de Oriente, S.A.'s (DEORSA) in the
form of dividends (US$57 million) and capital reductions (US$73
million). To that end, Energuate will complement the proceeds from
the notes with financing raised through a local bank on April 7,
2017 for total of up to Quetzal 1,140 million (equal to
approximately US$155 million). Thus, after completion of the
transaction the utilities' total debt obligations will aggregate
US$450 million.

The assets of the trust consist of the trust's right to receive
payments under a Participation Agreement entered with Credit
Suisse AG, Cayman Island Branch (lender of record). The Trust
Notes are structured so that funds available in the trust will be
sufficient to pay amounts due on the Notes as if they were senior
unsecured obligations of two Guatemalan utilities, namely DEOCSA
and DEORSA. These utilities also absolutely, unconditionally and
irrevocably guarantee, jointly and severally, all obligations,
including debt service payments, to the Indenture Trustee, which
acts on behalf of the Notes-holders.

The following rating actions were taken:

Assignments:

Issuer: Energuate Trust

-- Corporate Family Rating, Assigned Ba2

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned Ba2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Energuate Trust

-- Outlook Stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

"The Ba2 ratings largely reflect the utilities' credit quality
because of the structure of the transaction", said Natividad
Martel, Vice President -- Senior Analyst. "The Ba2 ratings reflect
the fully regulated nature of the utilities' operations. They also
capture the overall credit supportiveness of the regulatory
environment in Guatemala (Ba1 stable)", added Martel. They also
consider the natural hedge that results from the semi-annual
tariff adjustment-mechanisms which also drive the capital
structure, in terms of the debt-mix between US$ versus Quetzal
denominated indebtedness. The ratings further factor in the two
utilities' adequate liquidity profile which is underpinned by the
planned execution of two committed bank credit facilities for up
to US$40 million, particularly because Moody's understands that
borrowings will not be subject to material adverse change clauses.

The Ba2 ratings are tempered by the size of the utilities and
their service territory, which is largely rural. The ratings also
consider management's plan to, overtime, improve the utilities'
operational performance and cash flows for example by stepping-up
their investments in order to reduce non-technical losses and
improve service quality. The Ba2 ratings also consider the
deterioration in the combined key credit metrics, which in 2016
largely resulted from the additional debt to help fund the tax
claims from the Guatemalan tax authorities (total US$74 million).
In 2017, the incremental debt will be largely used to repay a
US$120 million bridge loan that Inkia executed last year to aid
the funding of the acquisition with the planned dividend
distributions and capital reduction also expected to further
weaken the debt to book capitalization metric.

The stable outlook assumes a credit supportive outcome of the next
tariff review (January 2019) which along with the implementation
of management's strategy allow the utilities to record combined
key metrics that remain well-positioned within the Ba-rating
category according to the guidelines provided under the Electric
and Natural Gas Regulated Utilities Methodology; Specifically,
that the CFO pre-W/C to debt will exceed 11%, on sustainable
basis. This expectation considers the track-record of prudent
financial policies of Inkia Energy Ltd (Ba3 stable; the
controlling shareholder) as well as the debt incurrence test
embedded in the financial documentation, namely a consolidated net
debt to EBITDA of 4.5x (until December 2018) and 4.0x (afterwards)
as well as an interest coverage ratio of 2.0x.

What can change the rating -- Up

Positive momentum on the rating is limited given the utilities'
size and features of their service territory; however, a material
improvement in the key credit metrics could result in an upgrade
of the ratings; Specifically, if the CFO pre-W/C to debt and
Retained Cash Flows (RCF) to debt exceed 22% and 17%,
respectively, on a sustained basis.

What can change the rating -- Down

A downgrade is likely following a downgrade of the sovereign
rating and/or if Moody's perceives that the utilities'
relationship with the Guatemalan authority deteriorates and/or the
credit supportiveness of the regulatory framework deteriorates,
for example following a less credit supportive tariff review
outcome and/or the inconsistent application of regulatory
mechanisms that is detrimental for the utilities' credit quality.
A downgrade is also likely if the utilities' credit metrics are
weaker than currently anticipated for example if they are unable
to recover on a timely manner the material increase in planned
investments and/or due to the deterioration of the utilities'
operating performance; Specifically, if the utilities' CFO pre-W/C
to debt and/or interest coverage ratio fall below 10% and 3.0x,
respectively.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regulated
Electric and Gas Utilities published in December 2013.

Headquartered in the City of Guatemala, DEORSA and DEOCSA, on a
combined basis, are one of two large energy distributors in
Guatemala. They operate under a 50 year government authorization
which is scheduled to expire in 2048. As of December 31, 2016, the
utilities' aggregated customer base represented approximately
54.3% of Guatemala's regulated distribution customers while their
supplied power accounted for 21% of the total. Energuate is the
trade name for the utilities' collective electricity distribution
business. In January 2016, Inkia (a subsidiary of IC Power Ltd,
unrated), became the controlling shareholder of DEOCSA (90.6%) and
DEORSA (92.7%).


ENERGUATE TRUST: Fitch Assigns BB Issuer Default Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned 'BB' Long-Term Foreign Currency and
Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to Energuate Trust.
Fitch has also assigned a 'BB(EXP)' rating to Energuate's proposed
senior unsecured notes to be jointly and severally guaranteed by
the operating companies Distribuidora de Electricidad del Oriente
S.A. (DEORSA) and Distribuidora de Electricidad del Occidente S.A.
(DEOCSA). The Rating Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Energuate's ratings consider the combined operations of DEORSA and
DEOCSA. They factor in its dependence upon the Guatemalan
government ('BB', Outlook Stable) for the receipt of subsidy
payments. While the company's credit profile is supported by its
natural monopoly in its concession area, its exposure to socio-
economically unstable regions within the country creates a
challenging environment for maximizing profitability and
operational efficiency. Energuate's acquisition by IC Power and
its consolidation under that company's subsidiary, Inkia Energy
('BB', Outlook Stable), provide it with a degree of support from a
growing multinational energy company.

Adequate Capital Structure

Energuate's capital structure is considered adequate for the 'BB'
rating category. Fitch estimates consolidated EBTIDA for 2017
could approach USD116 million on revenues of USD603 million. The
company intends to use the proceeds from the USD350 proposed debt
issuance to refinance existing debt and replace acquisition debt
at the IC Power level. Expected debt at year end will be
approximately USD500 million, which translates into a pro-forma
gross leverage as measured by total debt to EBITDA of 4.2x for
2017. This capital structure is supported Energuate's relatively
stable and predictable cash flow generation, characteristic of
distribution companies.

Government Subsidies Provide Stable Cashflow

As Energuate's operations are focused in rural Guatemala, the bulk
of its clients (approximately 78%) are low consumption users that
qualify for government subsidies. Although these clients represent
only 16.5% Energuate's revenues, the component of their usage that
is invoiced directly to the government has represented a reliable
and significant source of cash flow, historically equivalent to
any given year's EBITDA. Moreover, in contrast to rural clients
whose delinquency rates consistently require around USD23 million
of bad debt provisions, the government makes regular monthly
subsidy payments.

The country's weak governance indicators highlight potential
vulnerabilities to companies operating in sectors subject to
significant regulatory interference. As Fitch continues to view
Guatemala's macroeconomic condition as stable, the benefits that
this relationship confers to Energuate outweigh the risks.
Additionally, the government has been proactive in reviewing the
subsidy structure to accommodate the increased capacity of end-
users to absorb costs directly, as well as formalizing its annual
budget requirements, unlike some other energy subsidy programs in
the region.

Geographic Factors Discourage Competition

Energuate's concessions cover the northwest and northeast parts of
Guatemala. Given the low population density and high investment
requirements to reach new clients, material competition is
unlikely. This effectively mitigates risks related to the non-
exclusivity of the concession. The companies operate approximately
70,000 km of distribution lines delivering 2,316 GWh of
electricity across an area of approximately 102,000 km2.

Inefficiencies Due to Challenging Socioeconomic Conditions

The strained socioeconomic condition of rural Guatemala has
several operational consequences for Energuate, including high
incidences of energy theft, violent crime that prevents the
regular maintenance of its network, and an underdeveloped formal
economy resulting in reduced collection rates. In an attempt to
address some of these endemic challenges, Energuate has increased
its internally funded capex by approximately 75%, and expects to
remain at these levels for the foreseeable future. Particular
emphasis will be given to pursuing technological improvements
reducing energy theft and improving response times when and where
it occurs.

Strategic Importance to Its Parent

At the beginning of 2016, the energy holding company IC Power
acquired DEORSA and DEOCSA for USD265 million from the private
equity fund Actis, consolidating these companies in the group
structure headed by Inkia Energy Ltd ('BB', Outlook Stable).
Energuate adds material cashflows and business diversification to
an already growing group. Although IC Power has a history of
aggressively redirecting cash from its subsidiaries up to its
ultimate parent, Energuate's long-term value to the group should
ensure that its parent maintains a sustainable policy with respect
to Energuate's liquidity.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- GDP of approximately 3.5%/ year (in line with sovereign
    forecast), translated to demand growth;

-- Inflation of around 3%, in line with historicals;

-- Minimal FX fluctuation, reflecting Guatemala's managed float;

-- Extraordinary dividends and capital reduction, followed by
    annual dividends of USD20 million thereafter;

-- Capex of around 40 million annually through the medium term.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A negative rating action could be possible if there were a
downgrade to Guatemala's sovereign rating. Alternately, a
significant weakening in the country's electricity regulation
system, either vis-a-vis tariff adjustments or a material change
in the subsidies received by Energuate, would also prompt a review
of the credit. A downgrade of Energuate's parent, Inkia Energy
Ltd, coupled with significant interference in Energuate's capital
structure could also result in a negative rating action.

Considering Energuate's geographically limited operations and
fundamental exposure to macroeconomic conditions, an upgrade is
unlikely barring a positive rating action on the sovereign.

LIQUIDITY

Energuate maintains restricted cash accounts of around USD4 or 5
million for debt service. Fitch expects these account will be
discontinued upon the issuance of the proposed debt and the
repayment of DEORSA & DEOCSA's remaining debt. Otherwise, the
company has not communicated any minimum cash policy. While Fitch
expected cash to be elevated at year end, or even through the
extended short term, it is likely that ICPower (through Inkia)
will upstream as much cash as they deem sustainable. Fitch's
forecast assumes upstreaming of approximately USD120 million to
their parent this year, effectively for the repayment/transfer of
the debt that IC Power incurred in acquiring Energuate in January
2016.

The company expects to issue up to USD350 million in international
bonds this year with a 10-year bullet maturity. Additionally,
through its operating companies, it will take out local bank loans
up to USD155 million in aggregate. These bank loans will have a
10-year tenor, with amortizations beginning after September 2020
grace period.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has assigned the following ratings:

Energuate Trust:

-- Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating 'BB';
-- Long-Term Local Currency Issuer Default Rating 'BB';
-- USD$340 million Senior unsecured proposed bond issuance
    'BB(EXP)'.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


MEXICO: Trump Trade Plans Spell Uncertainty for Shipping Terminal
------------------------------------------------------------- ----
Robbie Whelan at The Wall Street Journal reports that the new
high-tech shipping terminal at the Port at Lazaro Cardenas opened
in Mexico early this month, with a ceremony attended by heads of
state and shipping industry royalty.

But the ambitious project faces an uncertain future as U.S.
President Donald Trump weighs new trade barriers, according to
WSJ.

Major importers such as Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Samsung Electronics
Co. and Target Corp. see Lazaro Cardenas as a key link between
Asia's factories and Mexico's growing middle class, The Journal
notes.  They also hope to use the port as a backdoor to the U.S.,
bypassing congested West Coast ports via the "Nafta Railway," a
network of track operated by U.S. railroad Kansas City Southern
that can shuttle goods as far north as Memphis, the report relays.

APM Terminals, a unit of the world's biggest shipping company,
A.P. Moller-Maersk, spent five years and $568 million on the new
terminal, according to The Journal.  APM hopes to spend up to $900
million to expand capacity at the terminal to rival the Port of
New York and New Jersey by the end of the next decade, the report
discloses.

But what looked like a sure bet five years ago is less certain
today.  President Trump has threatened to penalize manufacturers
that move operations to Mexico and wants to renegotiate the North
American Free Trade Agreement, the report relays.  Republicans in
Congress have floated a "border-adjusted tax" that would raise the
cost of imports, the report notes.

Any of these measures could deal a blow to U.S.-Mexico trade,
shipping companies and analysts say, The Journal points out.
Mexico's imports have grown more than 30% since 2010, according to
the World Bank, and container volumes are up 60% in the past three
years at Lazaro Cardenas' older facilities, according to trade
data firm Panjiva. Auto parts make up a big part of those gains,
the report relays.

"The port is a microcosm of global trade flows," said Christopher
Rogers, a research analyst with Panjiva.  He added: "it's very
exposed to the auto industry."

Danish conglomerate Maersk, which once touted the new terminal's
"near-sourcing benefits," a reference to manufacturers producing
goods in Mexico and selling them in the U.S., now says it is
focusing more on using the port to import goods for Mexico's
consumer market, the report notes.

In an interview this month, Maersk Chief Executive Soren Skou said
"the main purpose of the terminal is to be a gateway terminal for
the Mexico City market," with cross-border trade secondary, the
report relays.

"The U.S. administration has made a number of statements that
impact our business on the positive side," Mr. Skou said.  "Then
there are the discussions about trade deals, and some of the
rhetoric seems more protectionist . . . .  It's really hard for us
to judge how this will affect our business," Mr. Skou added.

APM's terminal unloaded its first ship in February, and the port
formally opened with a ceremony in early April attended by
Mexico's president Enrique Pena Nieto and Danish Prime Minister
Lars Lokke Rasmussen, the report relays.

Mexico's government sees developing the port as a priority.  In
2013, amid rising drug cartel violence and illegal smuggling, Mr.
Pena Nieto deployed thousands of troops to the port and handed
over its security to the navy, which still maintains a garrison
there, the report notes.

At the ceremony earlier this month, he called the terminal "a
testimony to how Mexico has been growing, how it has become a
trustworthy destination . . . . that is crucial for the transit of
goods bound for the important consumer market that is Mexico, and
from here to other important consumer markets," the report
discloses.

However, in recent months, Mexico's president has also said the
country will pursue trade deals with Vietnam and Japan and work
more closely with China.

"Mexico's path forward is to participate more in world trade, not
just to trade with North America," said Walter Kemmsies, an
economist who specializes in ports and shipping. "The investment
at Lazaro Cardenas makes sense, because it's a gateway to trade
with Asia."

On a stiflingly hot morning in late March, giant cranes lifted
hundreds of metal boxes from the container ship Charlotte Maersk
amid the soft hum of robotic machinery.

The new terminal features towering 300-foot-tall ship-to-shore
cranes that can span the largest container ships currently plying
routes between Asia to North America.

The cranes can pluck two containers at a time from ships, then
deposit them in piles, the report notes.  Robotic stacking cranes
that run on electricity -- rather than the usual diesel -- use
artificial intelligence to arrange the piles in the most time and
cost-efficient order, the report discloses.  Such semi-automated
systems are common at port terminals in the Netherlands and
Singapore, but have never been used in Latin America, the report
relays.

The facility is expected to employ about 550 people or 250 fewer
than a similar-size terminal without automation, which makes for
fewer accidents and lowers container handling costs by 20%, APM
says, the report notes.



=======
P E R U
=======


FERREYCORP S.A.A.: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR; Outlook Remains Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+' corporate credit and issue-
level ratings on Ferreycorp S.A.A.  The outlook on the corporate
credit rating remains stable.

The rating affirmation reflects S&P's view that Ferreycorp's
credit metrics will remain overall stable in the next 12 months
thanks to its resilient business model and prudent financial
policy.  S&P believes that some of its business lines, such as
spare parts and rental services, cushion the impact from potential
economic slowdown, because despite deferrals of new equipment
purchases, companies continue to service their existing fleets.
In 2016, despite difficult business conditions which reduced the
company's sales by 7%, it managed to control its operating
expenses and to post an EBITDA margin of 11.8%, coupled with an
increased FOCF generation than in 2015.  These factors allowed
Ferreycorp to continue to pay down dividends, perform share
buybacks for about PEN38 million, and to reduce its gross debt by
approximately PEN154 million.  Through the year, the company also
repurchased $120 million of its notes due 2020 with a medium-term
local financing.

In S&P's opinion, Ferreycorp benefits from a solid and established
relationship with Caterpillar Inc. (A/Negative/A-1) as the unique
distributor of the manufacturer's machinery and equipment in Peru.
The company also maintains a leading market position in domestic
capital goods market, an extensive product portfolio with strong
brand recognition, and diversified end markets and client base.
In S&P's view, the company's long track record and expertise in
delivering premium quality after-sale services remain critical to
Caterpillar's global business model.  Nonetheless, Ferreycorp
remains exposed to the construction sector and to the cyclical,
resource-based industries, such as energy and mining, which can
bring some volatility in operating margins during downturn cycles.
S&P also believes that Ferreycorp's geographic diversification is
narrower than those of its global peers because it generates about
90% of its sales in Peru.  Although S&P expects the company to
expand its operations to the rest of Latin America, S&P believes
that its revenue base will continue to be highly concentrated in
Peru's market in the medium term.


================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


CL FIN'L: CLICO Eyes Return To Guyana But Ex-Pres Says Not So Fast
------------------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean360.com reports that the Trinidad-based CL Financial has
been wooing the Guyana Government to allow the insurance company
to resume its business there.

Finance Minister Winston Jordan and CL Financial chairman Lawrence
Duprey held talks.  And the minister said the Trinidadian
businessman "would like to renew his relationship with Guyana as
well as publicly apologize to Guyanese for the collapse of the
insurance giant," according to Caribbean360.com.

Caribbean countries, including Guyana, have said their citizens
lost millions of dollars in the collapse of CLICO and they have
been moving to establish new entities to provide services that the
Trinidad-based regional insurance giant had been providing, the
report notes.

A statement from the Ministry of Finance following the meeting
quoted Duprey as saying that CL Financial has promised to try to
make amends for the approximately US$40 million debt owed mainly
to the National Insurance Scheme (NIS), the report relays.

"Duprey, the majority shareholder of CL Financial, also informed
Minister Jordan that his company is interested in investing in
several areas including providing solar energy at competitive
prices, affordable housing, clay brick and solar for housing, as
well as introduce a financial model that will generate savings and
alleviate poverty," the statement said, the report notes.

Mr. Jordan has advised Mr. Durprey that he will discuss the matter
with Cabinet.

But former president Bharrat Jagdeo made it clear at a news
conference that there should be no red carpet treatment for CLICO
since investors and policyholders are still awaiting their
outstanding monies, the report relays.

Mr. Jagdeo stressed that the company must pay off its debts in
Guyana before being allowed to do business there, the report
notes.  Mr. Jagdeo also urged against the practice of interlocking
directors, which contributed to the collapse of the company in the
first place, the report adds.

                          *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Aug.
6, 2015, Trinidad Express related that the Constitution Reform
Forum (CRF) has called on Finance Minister Larry Howai to refrain
from embarking on an "unnecessary drain on the Treasury" by
appealing the decision of a High Court judge, who ordered that the
Minister fulfil a request by president of the Joint Consultative
Council (JCC) Afra Raymond for financial details relating to the
bailout of CL Financial Limited.  The CRF issued a release stating
that if the decision is appealed, not only will it be a waste of
finance but such a course of action will also demonstrate a "lack
of commitment by the Government to the spirit and intent of the
Freedom of Information Act FOIA", under which the request was
made, according to Trinidad Express.

On July 7, 2014, Trinidad Express said the Central Bank has placed
the responsibility of voluntary separation package (VSEP)
negotiations for workers at insurance giant Colonial Life
Insurance Company Ltd. (CLICO) with the company's board, after
which it will review accordingly, the bank said in a statement.
The bank's statement follows protest action by CLICO workers,
supported by their union, the Banking, Insurance and General
Workers' Union (BIGWU), outside the Central Bank in Port of Spain,
according to Trinidad Express.

In a separate TCRLA report on June 26, 2014, Caribbean360.com said
the Trinidad and Tobago government has welcomed an Appeal Court
ruling that the Attorney General Anand Ramlogan said saves the
country from paying out more than TT$1 billion (TT$1 = US$0.16
cents) to policyholders of the cash-strapped CLICO.  The Appeal
Court overturned the ruling of a High Court that ruled members of
the United Policyholders Group (UPG) were entitled to be paid the
full sums of their polices. CLICO financially caved in on itself
at the end of 2008 after the investment instruments of major
policyholders matured and they wanted hundreds of millions of
dollars they were owed.

On Aug. 6, 2013, the TCR-LA, citing Caribbean360.com, said over
TT$8 billion worth of CLICO's profitable business will be
transferred to Atruis, a new company that will be owned by the
state.  The Trinidad Express said that the Cabinet approved the
transfer as the Finance and General Purposes Committee continues
to discuss a letter of intent hammered out by the Ministry of
Finance and CL Financial's 400 shareholders, which envisions
taxpayers will recover the more than TT$20 billion Government has
injected since 2009 to keep CL subsidiary CLICO and other
companies afloat.

At its annual general meeting in Sept. 2013, CL Financial
shareholders voted to extend the agreement with Government until
August 25, 2014, while Cabinet decides on a new framework accord
to recover the debt owed to Government through divestment of CL
subsidiaries, including Methanol Holdings, Republic Bank,
Angostura Holdings, CL World Brands and Home Construction Ltd.,
Caribbean360.com related.  Proceeds from the divestment of these
assets will go toward Government's recovery of the billions it
pumped into CLICO.

TCRLA reported on Sept. 22, 2011 that Caribbean News Now, citing
Reuters, said that the cost of the Trinidad and Tobago government
bailout of CL Financial Limited is likely to rise to more than
TT$3 billion.


TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: VAT Refunds Suspended, IMF Reports
-----------------------------------------------------
Trinidad Express reports that the government of Trinidad and
Tobago has temporarily suspended Value Added Tax (VAT) refunds due
to lack of funding, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) senior
economist with the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department has said.

Finance Minister Colm Imbert, when contacted by phone, mobile text
and email, has not commented on the IMF's statement on VAT
refunds, th report notes.

But IMF senior economist Stephane Schlotterbeck said in a working
paper on Tax Administration Reforms in the Caribbean released on
April 4: "Large and growing excess credits pose tax policy and tax
administration problems.  In a number of countries, the expansion
of zero-rated domestic supplies of goods and services has
contributed to building up a large volume of VAT credits,
including in the retail sectors.  This has increased the number of
refund claims and put tax administrations under pressure to refund
the credits within acceptable periods (good practice is 30 days),
according to Trinidad Express.



=============
U R U G U A Y
=============


COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO: Fitch Affirms B IDRs; Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito
FUCEREP's (FUCEREP) Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B'
and Viability rating (VR) at 'b'. The Rating Outlook is Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDR and VR

FUCEREP's IDR and VR are highly influenced by its small size
within the financial system and the challenges the cooperative
faces to meet the increased regulatory capital requirements in
times when its overall financial performance has been weak,
posting net losses for four years in a row.

The ratings also consider Fitch's perception of higher risk
appetite as the cooperative diversifies its operations into
riskier businesses, and the entity's adequate, though rapidly
deteriorating, asset quality.

FUCEREP's capital ratios have markedly declined in the last four
years as a consequence of the net losses and the increase of the
intangible assets (largely IT investments) since 2015. In spite of
this, its Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio remains adequate for its
business model and rating level (25.14% at Dec. 31, 2016),
supported by the annual capital contributions made by its members.

However, since July 2013, the cooperative has been subject to a
new regulatory minimum net equity requirement that must reach 24%
of risk weighted assets, according to the regulator's phase-in
schedule by 2019. At YE16 FUCEREP did not meet the target set by
the regulator, so it agreed with the Central Bank on a plan by
which it met the regulatory requirement by March 31, 2017 through
the sale of UYU50 million of loans. In Fitch's opinion, reaching
the new minimum equity represents a challenge to planned growth.

FUCEREP's financial performance has been weak in the past four
years. While its operating revenues have increased in line with
loan growth, the entity registered operational losses in the past
two years mainly affected by lower growth, rising loan loss
provisions and a hefty cost base, which has grown due to large IT
investments; net losses were also affected by the inflation
adjustment starting with 2014. Although FUCEREP is a not-for-
profit entity, profitability is important for the cooperative as a
source of internal capital generation with which to finance its
expansion.

FUCEREP's past due loans (+60 days past due) ratio has
historically been well contained at a manageable level (average of
6.33% in 2010-2015), benefitting from the payroll deduction
mechanism of 75% of its portfolio. However, its asset quality
indicators have deteriorated since 2014 and its past due loans
ratio rose to 12.88% at December 2016, affected by the economic
slowdown and the slight decline in total loans. In the medium
term, further pressures could arise from strong projected growth
and expansion into new segments. Charge-offs are low (0.79% at
YE16) and loan loss reserve coverage adequate (131.3%).

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

FUCEREP's Support and Support Rating Floor of '5' and 'NF',
respectively, reflect Fitch's opinion that if needed,
extraordinary government support, although possible, cannot be
relied upon given the bank's small size and deposit market share.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs AND VR
FUCEREP's IDRs have a Negative Outlook reflecting the challenges
to meet the increased regulatory capital requirements in times
when its overall financial performance has been weak. FUCEREP's VR
and IDR could be downgraded if it consistently fails to meet the
capital requirements or if its weak profitability together with
further material deterioration in asset quality lead to its Fitch
Core Capital ratio falling and remaining below 15%.

The Outlook on FUCEREP's IDRs could return to stable if the entity
consistently meets its regulatory capital requirements and
improves its profitability. Sustained progress in its
profitability metrics, with ROA consistently remaining above 1%,
together with asset quality and capitalization remaining at
adequate levels could lead to positive rating actions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Changes in the SR and SRF of FUCEREP are highly unlikely in the
foreseeable future.

Fitch has affirmed the following:

FUCEREP:
-- Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs at 'B'; Outlook
    Negative;
-- Viability rating at 'b'
-- Support rating at '5';
-- Support rating floor at 'NF'.


EXPRINTER (URUGUAY): Moody's Cuts LT Deposit Ratings to Caa2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term local- and
foreign-currency deposit ratings of Exprinter (Uruguay) S.A. to
Caa2 from B3 and changed the outlook on the ratings to negative
from stable. Moody's also downgraded Exprinter's long-term
Uruguayan national scale deposit rating to Caa2.uy from B2.uy and
kept the negative outlook on the rating. At the same time, Moody's
downgraded Exprinter's baseline credit assessment (BCA) and its
adjusted BCA to caa2 from b3, as well as its long-term
Counterparty Risk Assessment (CRA) to Caa1(cr) from B2(cr). This
rating action does not affect the short-term ratings and
assessments assigned to Exprinter.

Issuer: Exprinter (Uruguay) S.A.

-- Long-term global local-currency deposit rating: to Caa2 from
    B3, with negative outlook;

-- Long-term global foreign-currency deposit rating: to Caa2 from
    B3, with negative outlook;

-- Long-term Uruguayan national scale deposit rating: to Caa2.uy
    from B2.uy, with negative outlook;

-- Baseline credit assessment: to caa2 from b3;

-- Adjusted baseline credit assessment: to caa2 from b3;

-- Long-term counterparty risk assessment: to Caa1(cr) from
    B2(cr);

The following ratings and assessments of Exprinter (Uruguay) S.A.
remained unchanged:

Short-term global local-currency deposit rating of Not Prime;

Short-term global foreign-currency deposit rating of Not Prime;

Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr).

Outlook Actions:

-- Outlook, Changed To Negative From Stable(m)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of Exprinter's deposit ratings to Caa2 and its
standalone BCA to caa2 reflects the issuer's weak financial
metrics, in particular its profitability, asset quality and
funding structure. Exprinter operates as a "casa financiera" and
is not allowed to take deposits from Uruguayan residents. The
company's business model is narrower than that of commercial banks
and focuses predominantly on foreign exchange services and lending
to small and medium-sized companies (SMEs). The lack of revenue
diversification and consistently high operating expenses reported
by Exprinter have weighed on its profitability, especially after
the period of economic deceleration from 2013 to 2015. In four out
of five recent years, the entity posted net losses that eroded and
made its capital position more volatile. In December 2016, Moody's
adjusted ratio of tangible common equity (TCE) to risk-weighted
assets (RWA) for Exprinter stood at 20.04%, after a capital
injection from shareholders, as opposed to a ratio of 6.58% in
2015.

Notwithstanding Exprinter's capital cushion over regulatory
requirement, the company will report a decline in its capital
position in 2017 if salaries, administrative costs and loan loss
provisions continue to outperform core earnings. However, it will
be difficult for Exprinter to grow earnings, not only because of
the strong competition the company faces from commercial banks,
but also as a result of the sharp drop of its funding base in Q4
2016, which reduced its balance sheet to $35 million equivalent.
Dollar-denominated deposits from nonresidents dropped following
the closure of customer accounts, partially related to Argentina
government's tax amnesty that encouraged the repatriation of
undeclared overseas assets. Deposit from nonresidents account for
94% of Exprinter's funding structure.

The rating downgrade also incorporates Moody's assessment of high
asset risk for Exprinter, which reflects the ratio of problem
loans to total loans that reached 17.3% in 2016, caused by a
significant reduction of the company's loan portfolio, and by the
sizable degree of borrower concentration, as indicated by the fact
that the ten largest borrowers accounted for 106.8% of Exprinter's
TCE at the same date, increasing the potential volatility of asset
quality and earnings.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- DOWN/UP

Ratings could move down if Exprinter's asset quality continues to
deteriorate in the next 12 months. Further reduction of
Exprinter's deposit base, in particular of dollar-denominated
deposits from Argentine clients, would narrow access to low-cost
funds and hinder Exprinter's capacity to originate new loans.
Recurring negative results could rapidly erode the capital buffer
provided by shareholders through its capital injection in 2016. A
significant decline in liquidity would also work as a limiting
factor for ratings. There is limited upside for Exprinter's
ratings given the current negative outlook on the issuer's
ratings.

METHODOLOGY USED

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

Exprinter (Uruguay) S.A.is headquartered in Montevideo, Uruguay,
with assets of UYU1.05 billion and shareholders' equity of
UYU239 million as of December 31, 2016.


HSBC BANK: Fitch Affirms bb- Viability Rating
---------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed HSBC Bank (Uruguay) S.A.'s long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BBB+'
and Support Rating (SR) at '2'. Fitch has also upgraded the bank's
Viability Rating (VR) to 'bb-' from 'b+'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS & SUPPORT RATING

HSBC Uruguay's foreign and local currency IDRs, as well as its
Support Rating are driven by the strong ability and propensity of
its ultimate parent, HSBC Holdings plc (HSBC; rated 'AA-'/Stable
Outlook/VR 'aa-'), to provide support to HSBC Uruguay, if it would
be required. However, the bank's IDR remains constrained by
Uruguay's Country Ceiling. As per Fitch's criteria, the Country
Ceiling captures transfer and convertibility risks and limits the
extent to which support from foreign shareholders can be factored
into the bank's long-term foreign currency IDRs.

Even though the bank does not operate in a core market for HSBC,
HSBC Uruguay's IDRs and Support Rating remain linked to those of
its ultimate parent, reflecting Fitch's view that there is a high
probability of support due to reputational considerations and to a
potential negative impact this could have on other subsidiaries.
Additionally, Fitch affirmed HSBC Uruguay's Support Rating at '2'
as required support would be immaterial relative to ability of the
parent to provide it.

HSBC Uruguay's IDRs are constrained by Uruguay's sovereign rating.
As such its local currency long-term IDR of 'BBB+' is limited by
the maximum uplift of two notches above the sovereign rating, as
it is its long-term foreign currency IDR of 'BBB+', in line with
Uruguay's Country Ceiling.

The Stable Outlook on the IDRs is in line with that of the bank's
parent, HSBC, and is limited by Uruguay's sovereign Outlook.

HSBC's IDRs are driven by the group's leading franchise in
multiple business segments (retail, commercial, global banking and
markets), with very strong presences in its key domestic markets
Hong Kong and the UK and a strong focus on serving its clients'
international banking needs through its global network.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - VR

The upgrade of the VR reflects the improvement of the bank's
creditworthiness situation since 2012, with market share of around
10% and 7% in loan portfolio and deposits in the private banking
system in December 2016, which is more consistent with the 'bb'
rating category. These aspects reflect the relative success of
executives' efforts to increase their franchise over the years,
although HSBC Uruguay's market share is still moderate and does
not represent a clear competitive advantage. The bank's VR also
considers its tight capitalization, low profitability and
relatively high loan and deposits concentrations.

HSBC Uruguay's operating revenues have grown along with its
expansion since 2008. From 2012 to 2015, the bank's performance
was driven by an increase in the level of activity, as well as
income resulting from the depreciation of the exchange rate on its
position in U.S. dollars, as the bank follows a policy of
maintaining its capital in dollars. In 2016 performance was
negatively affected as result of the effect of the depreciation on
the bank's foreign currency position and its loan portfolio,
beyond the higher administrative expenses due to the
implementation of additional risk and compliance controls. Results
should improve following the country's recent economic activity.

HSBC Uruguay's loan quality indicators have historically been
sound, underpinned by its corporate nature. However, as other
banks, the loan portfolio quality deteriorated in 2016 due to the
global and local economic slowdown. The non-performing loans
(NPLs; credits with more than 60 days overdue) increased to 2.3%
of the total portfolio at December 2016, compared to 0.5% in 2015,
affected mainly by the deterioration of one large creditor, being
worse than the average private peers in December 2016. Without
taking into account this problematic credit, which is in the
process of renegotiation, the indicator would be 1.2%. The loan
loss reserve coverage remains high (161% of the NPLs in December
2016 and 540% in 2015) but has strongly declined with the largest
volume of problem loans.

The bank's capitalization ratios are low, partly due to the HSBC
Group's capital allocation policy that allows subsidiaries to work
with minimal regulatory capital levels. However, Fitch believes
that the bank will finance expansion with profits and, should this
not be enough, will continue to receive the capital injections
needed to finance expansion. As of Dec. 31, 2016, HSBC Uruguay's
Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio was 7.6%, and tangible equity to
tangible assets was 6.2%.

The bank's main source of funding is deposits from the non-
financial sector, which accounted for 78% of assets at year-end
2016 (YE15). The bank's liquidity is sound but declining as a
result of the loan growth during the years. At YE16, liquid assets
(cash and equivalents and loans to the financial sector)
represented 30% of deposits (40% in 2013).

The bank's assets and liabilities, like the financial system, are
highly dollarized (75% and 70%, respectively). While declining,
Fitch believes that dollarization will remain high over the long
term due to the Uruguayan economy culture and the type of
clientele HSBC Uruguay serves. While HSBC Uruguay's open foreign
exchange positions are commonly high, resulting in volatile
earnings, it is shareholder policy to hold the bank's equity in
U.S. dollars.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS & SUPPORT RATING

HSBC Uruguay's IDR is limited by the Country Ceiling. Additional
rating actions on HSBC Uruguay's IDRs are subject to changes in
the sovereign rating. Also, changes in its shareholder's ability
or willingness to provide support (mainly the role of the
Uruguayan subsidiary into HSBC's group and the possibility of its
disposal) would negatively affect HSBC Uruguay's ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - VR

HSBC Uruguay's VR could eventually be upgraded if the bank
achieves and maintains a FCC ratio of at least 10% through
sustainable earnings and profitability, i.e. sustains operating
ROAs ratios above 1.3%. Better diversification of the bank's
balance sheet would also be positive for creditworthiness. In
turn, the bank's VR could be negatively affected if the bank fails
to sustain recent improvements in profitability metrics and FCC
ratio.

Fitch has taken the following rating actions on HSBC Uruguay:

-- Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
    Stable;
-- Support Rating affirmed at '2';
-- Viability Rating upgraded to 'bb-' from 'b+'.


SCOTIABANK URUGUAY: Fitch Affirms bb- Viability Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Scotiabank Uruguay S.A.'s foreign
currency (FC) and local currency (LC) long-term Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) at 'BBB+'. Fitch has also affirmed the bank's
Viability Rating (VR) at 'bb-' and its Support Rating (SR) at '2'.
The long-term Rating Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING
Scotiabank Uruguay's IDRs and SR are driven by the support that
Fitch believes the bank would receive from its parent, Bank of
Nova Scotia (BNS, 'AA-'/'aa-'/Stable Outlook). While Scotiabank
Uruguay's Local Currency LT IDRs are constrained by the Sovereign
Rating of Uruguay, its Long-Term FC IDR remains constrained by
Uruguay's Country Ceiling. As per Fitch's criteria, the Country
Ceiling captures transfer and convertibility risks and limits the
extent to which support from foreign shareholders can be factored
into the banks'.

Fitch's affirmation of Scotiabank Uruguay's Support rating at '2'
reflects the high probability of support to the bank from BNS, if
needed. In Fitch's view, the Uruguayan subsidiary is a strategic
operation for BNS to continue to consolidate its footprint in
Latin America and responds well to the parent's earnings
diversification strategy. One example of this importance was the
capital injection (circa USD 90 million) into Scotiabank Uruguay
for the acquisition of Discount Bank.

The Uruguayan subsidiary has strong strategic and administrative
synergies with the parent, besides sharing the same brand. Risk
management policies are also aligned to those at the parent level
and to local regulatory practices. Scotiabank Uruguay is also
small relative to the consolidated group, suggesting that
supporting the subsidiary would be relatively easy for BNS.

The Stable Outlook on the IDRs is in line with that of the bank's
parent, BNS, and is limited by Uruguay's sovereign Outlook.

BNS's ratings are driven by the company's good earnings
performance over time accompanied by a sizable earnings
contribution from its international operations concentrated
primarily within their operations in Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and
Chile. Earnings from less developed countries constituted roughly
30% of the company's net income through 2016.

VIABILITY RATING (VR)
Fitch affirmed Scotiabank Uruguay's VR at 'bb-', reflecting the
bank's still modest profitability and the need to further
consolidate its franchise after several acquisitions in order to
achieve adequate and recurring profitability. The VR benefits from
Scotiabank competitive stance in the Uruguayan corporate and
retail credit market, its diversified and ample funding profile,
besides the ordinary support from BNS.

Scotiabank earnings have been volatile since 2012, when BNS first
entered the Uruguayan banking sector. In 2015, the bank's
profitability was negatively affected due to the acquisition of
Discount Bank, which involved some nonrecurring expenses and
integration process costs. During 2016, the bank incurred some
losses in its balance sheet due to the appreciation of the
Uruguayan peso against the dollar, as well as some remaining
operational expenses of its structural reorganization after the
acquisition Discount Bank. Net losses amounted USD5.2 million in
2016 and USD17.5 million in 2015.

Capitalization at 7% when measured by the Fitch Core Capital (FCC)
to risk weighted assets ratios (RWA) remained low but is in line
with the bank's shareholder's strategy of optimize capital
utilization at the subsidiaries level. As observed with other
foreign banks operating in the region, Scotiabank Uruguay does not
operate with high capital margins. Depending on growth, the bank
might receive capital injection from the group, as evidenced by
past capital injections.

Asset quality when measured by loans NPLs over 60 days increased
during 2016 but was in line with the industry and remains adequate
considering Scotiabank Uruguay's business profile. Impaired loans
ratio increased to 3.4% at December 2016, from 2.9% in December
2015, but those were fairly covered by the bank's strong reserve
coverage stance. Loan loss reserves (LLR) covers 4.9% of total
loans and 144.3% of nonperforming loans. Obligor concentrations
are moderate, with the 10 largest borrowers representing 12% of
total loans.

Scotiabank Uruguay shows a growing, diversified, and stable
funding structure. The bank's liabilities are largely made up of
deposits, which have grown consistently % over the last two years.
While Scotiabank Uruguay operates on mostly short-term funding,
its ample liquidity, relatively short-term nature of its loan
portfolio, and potential for support from BNS facilitates ALM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS AND SUPPORTING RATING

Positive rating actions are contingent upon upgrades in Uruguay's
sovereign ratings and country ceiling. In turn, any downgrade of
Uruguay's sovereign rating and/or a reduction in Scotiabank
Uruguay's shareholder's ability or propensity to provide support
could negatively affect its ratings.

VIABILITY RATING (VR)

Scotiabank Uruguay's VR could be downgraded if the bank does not
improve its profitability and capital ratios in the short term.
Specifically, if the bank does not show operating profits to risk
weighted assets consistently above 1.25% and FCC to RWAs ratios
above 9%. In addition, NPL ratios sustained above 3% would be also
negative for the rating.

In turn, the VR could be positively affected if Scotiabank Uruguay
shows sustained operating profits to risk weighted assets above
1.25% and FCC to RWAs ratios above 9%. Improvements in asset
quality also could be positive for the ratings.

Fitch has affirmed Scotiabank Uruguay's ratings:

-- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
-- Local Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
-- Support Rating at '2';
-- Viability rating at 'bb-'.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

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                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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