/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/161109.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Wednesday, November 9, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 222 Headlines A R G E N T I N A PROVINCIA SEGUROS: Moody's Affirms 'B3' LC Insurance Fin. Rating B R A Z I L BANCO SANTANDER: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Issuer Credit Ratings BRAZIL: Health Minister Seeks to Stem Inefficiencies to Cut Costs CEAGRO AGRICOLA: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'D' Ratings PARANA BANCO: S&P Puts 'BB-' Ratings on CreditWatch Negative PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: To Prospect for Natural Gas in Bolivia C A Y M A N I S L A N D S BOWEN MIDETTE: Reaches Settlement Agreement with Stanford WILLIS TOWERS: Reaches Settlement Agreement with Stanford D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C DOMINICAN REP: Expert Sees Contradiction in Protecting Highlands DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Industries Laud Central Bank on Dollars Galore E L S A L V A D O R EL SALVADOR: Moody's Lowers Issuer Rating to B3; Outlook Negative P U E R T O R I C O E. MENDOZA & CO: Condado 2 Asks Court to Prohibit Cash Use EDUARDO MENDOZA: Condado 2 Wants to Prohibit Cash Collateral Use JOSE LUIS CRESPO LORENZO: DS Okayed; Jan. 13 Plan Hearing Set T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Jobless Rate Rises to 4.4% - - - - - ================= A R G E N T I N A ================= PROVINCIA SEGUROS: Moody's Affirms 'B3' LC Insurance Fin. Rating ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo, S.A. has affirmed its ratings on Provincia Seguros (insurance financial strength (IFS) at B3 on the global local currency scale, and at Baa1.ar on Argentina's national scale) but revised the outlook for the insurer's ratings to negative, from stable. RATINGS RATIONALE According to Moody's, Provincia Seguros' negative outlook primarily reflects a net loss reported during the fiscal year ended June 30, 2016, that represented 45% of the company's capital at the beginning of the fiscal year. This negative result was primarily driven by adjustments to the company's case reserves and deficiency premiums reserves, subsequent to a turnover in management. As a result, Provincia Seguros reported a regulatory solvency margin deficit of ARS 589 million. The company has communicated a plan (subject to regulatory approval) to remediate the solvency margin deficit by December 2019. A further deterioration of Provincia Seguros' profitability and/or capitalization or a failure to obtain regulatory approval for the remediation plan along with a lack of shareholders support in case of capital needs, could result in a rating downgrade. Despite the negative outlook, Moody's explained that Provincia Seguros' ratings affirmation is based on the insurer's ratings remaining well positioned at their current level, notwithstanding the recent financial deterioration. Moody's went on to say that Provincia Seguros' credit profile primarily considers its adequate market position, as well as the advantages provided by its access to diversified product distribution channels and the synergies maintained with its parent bank, Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. Offsetting these positive considerations are the company's very high gross underwriting leverage and sustained underwriting losses, which have resulted in Provincia Seguros becoming highly dependent on investment returns. The company's reliance on investment returns to continually offset underwriting losses remains a key challenge and weakness for the company's profitability and overall credit profile, exposing both its earnings and capital to systemic risk to a greater degree than many of its competitors. Among the factors that could lead to a downgrade of the companies' ratings are the following: (1) failure to comply with capital regulatory requirements and/or to gain approval for the 3-year capital remediation plan, absent a recapitalization by its shareholders; (2) sustained weak profitability; or (3) a downgrade of Argentina's sovereign rating. Conversely, the company's outlook could return to stable in case of: (1) a sustained improvement in capitalization (i.e.: reversing the solvency margin deficit; (2) sustained improvement in underwriting results (i.e. combined ratios consistently below 100%); or (3) improvement in Argentina's government bond rating. Provincia Seguros is 60% owned by the major Argentine financial services group, Grupo Banco Provincia S.A., which in turn is owned by the second-largest bank in Argentina, Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. Grupo Banco Provincia S.A. is engaged in multiple financial services segments and it also maintains a presence in the life insurance industry through Provincia Seguros de Vida, and in the mono-line workers' compensation segment through Provincia Seguros ART. Based in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Provincia Seguros reported a net loss of ARS 234 million and gross premiums of ARS 5.2 billion for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2016. As of that date, shareholders' equity was ARS 332 million, and total assets were ARS 5.1 billion. =========== B R A Z I L =========== BANCO SANTANDER: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Issuer Credit Ratings --------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB/B' global scale and 'brAA-/brA-1' national scale issuer credit ratings on Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A. The outlook on the global and national scale ratings remains negative. At the same time, S&P is leaving the bank's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at 'bbb-'. The issuer credit ratings on Banco Santander Brasil reflect S&P's assessments of its strong business position -- thanks to significant market shares in Brazil, relatively stable revenue, large and stable client base, and diversified business lines -- adequate capital and earnings based on average projected risk- adjusted capital (RAC) ratio of 7.4% in the next two years. The ratings also reflect the bank's adequate risk position that's based on asset quality in line with those of peers and good diversification, as well as S&P's view of its average funding and adequate liquidity. BRAZIL: Health Minister Seeks to Stem Inefficiencies to Cut Costs ----------------------------------------------------------------- Paulo Trevisani at The Wall Street Journal reports that Brazil's government is renegotiating contracts and searching for inefficiencies in the country's mammoth public-health system ahead of a likely tightening in public spending starting next year, Health Minister Ricardo Barros said. The government has already managed to reduce the price it pays for drugs provided to millions of patients by renegotiating contracts with labs, Mr. Barros said, according to The Wall Street Journal. Mr. Barros said the savings so far, including other measures, amount to BRL1.1 billion (US$343.3 million). The minister said the savings will grow as the ministry speeds up a plan to automate paperwork in the public-health network so that information about each user will be more readily available, the report notes. He said that would make it easier to find inefficiencies and help thwart attempts to game the system, the report relays. The cost-cutting measures come as Congress mulls capping the annual growth in public spending by the previous year's inflation rate, the report discloses. The move was approved in the lower house last month and is scheduled for a final vote on Dec. 13 in the Senate, where President Michel Temer has a majority of votes, the report notes. Critics have said the limits, which would kick in next year and stay in place for at least a decade, risk worsening public health in a country of 200 million where most people rely on government- provided hospitals and drugs, the report relays. Mr. Barros said other sectors of the government may need to compensate so health services won't suffer, the report says. "Health . . . . won't have cuts, as President Temer has promised. Other areas of the government will have to adjust," Mr. Barros said. "The equation is a simple one," he added. Brazil's 1988 Constitution entitles all citizens to taxpayer- supported health services, the report notes. But hospitals are overloaded and patients are left waiting for care, sometimes for months, the report says. The country ranks a low 68 out of 140 nations with regard to health care in the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index, the report relays. But even with low quality, public health services will cost BRL93.4 billion this year, of 7.5% of the national budget, and BRL94.9 billion, or 7.2% of the budget next year. Official data say the country has 492,472 hospital beds, of which 337,086 are part of the public network, the report discloses. Mr. Barros became the manager of this sprawling network in May. He was appointed by Mr. Temer, who became acting president in May after former President Dilma Rousseff was suspended and later ousted on impeachment charges that she broke budget laws, the report notes. Mr. Barros said public-health spending must be tightly controlled to avoid wasting taxpayer money, the report relays. "We can have significant savings that will allow us to provide [health services] with the funds available," he added. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2, negative) underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service. The country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the government's high level of mandatory spending. CEAGRO AGRICOLA: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'D' Ratings ------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'D' global and national scale ratings and its '6' recovery rating on Ceagro Agricola. S&P subsequently withdrew the ratings at the company's request. At the time of the withdrawal, Ceagro was negotiating with its debtholders to restructure its debt following a general default on its obligations since first half of 2015. PARANA BANCO: S&P Puts 'BB-' Ratings on CreditWatch Negative ------------------------------------------------------------ S&P Global Ratings placed its long term 'BB-' global scale and 'brA' national scale ratings on Parana Banco on CreditWatch negative, with the potential for a multiple notch downgrade on the national scale. On Oct. 24, 2016, Parana Banco announced that its controlling block bought the preferred shares from Cox Gestao de Recursos Ltda., which accounts for 34.4% of total preferred shares and 10.7% of the bank's total capital. The transaction was completed on Oct. 28, 2016. In addition, the board approved extraordinary dividends distribution of R$215.9 million, which should be paid starting from Nov. 3, 2016. Furthermore, the shares that the bank's controlling block acquired represent more than 33% of the free-float, which will now represent only 20.9% of Parana Banco's total shares, below the regulatory minimum of 25%. In this sense, the bank will have to make a public offering to buy back shares and cancel its registration as publicly held bank. The extraordinary dividends payment will weaken Parana Banco's RAC ratio by around 150 basis points in 2016, pressuring its strong capital and earnings score. Moreover, S&P don't have sufficient information to assess the impact of the public offering, which will depend on the market adherence and shares price at the closing date. Also, S&P needs additional information regarding Parana Banco's strategic plans for the next two years to assess the impacts on the ratings of Parana Banco, which could mitigate the impact on bank's RAC ratio. The CreditWatch negative listing on Parana Banco reflects S&P's view that the extraordinary dividends payment and the buyback could jeopardize its capital position. S&P may take a negative rating action, including a multiple-notch downgrade on the national scale, if the bank's capital ratio drops below 10% on assessing its strategy after the buyback and dividends payment. S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch listing within the next 90 days once it has sufficient information to assess the rating impact. In addition, S&P could downgrade Parana Banco if S&P was to revise Brazil's Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment to group '7' from group '6' given its negative trend, because S&P believes the bank's finances could deterioration from pressures on domestic banking system stemming from fiscal and monetary tightening. PETROLEO BRASILEIRO: To Prospect for Natural Gas in Bolivia ----------------------------------------------------------- EFE News reports that executives of Brazilian state oil company Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) and smaller Bolivian counterpart YPFB signed a contract for a $1.2 billion natural-gas exploration venture in southern Bolivia. Bolivian President Evo Morales and Brazil's minister of mines and energy, Fernando Coelho Filho, traveled to Bolivia's eastern city of Santa Cruz for the signing ceremony. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Oct. 25, 2016, Moody's Investors Service upgraded all ratings of Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras)'s and ratings based on Petrobras' guarantee, including the company's senior unsecured debt and corporate family rating to B2 from B3 given lower liquidity risk and prospects of better operating performance in the medium term. At the same time, Moody's raised the company's baseline credit assessment (BCA) to b3 from caa2. ========================== C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ========================== BOWEN MIDETTE: Reaches Settlement Agreement with Stanford --------------------------------------------------------- The Court-appointed receiver for Stanford International Bank, Ltd. and certain plaintiffs have reached an agreement to settle all claims against Bowen, Midette & Britt, Inc. As part of the settlement agreement, Stanford and Bowen, Midette have requested orders that permanently enjoin all including Stanford investors (i.e., customers of Stanford who as of Feb. 16, 2009, had funds on deposit and/or were holding certificates of deposit issued by Stanford) and all other interested parties from bringing legal proceedings or cause of action arising from Stanford entities against Bowen, Midette. Complete copies of the settlement agreement, the proposed bar orders, and other settlement documents are available on the receiver's website at: http://www.stanfordfinancialreceivership.com Interested parties may file written objections with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas by Dec. 30, 2016. WILLIS TOWERS: Reaches Settlement Agreement with Stanford --------------------------------------------------------- The Court-appointed receiver for Stanford International Bank, Ltd. and certain plaintiffs have reached an agreement to settle all claims against Willis Towers Watson Public Limited Company (f/k/a/ Willis Group Holdings Limited), several other Willis entities and Amy Baranoucky, a former Willis employee. As part of the settlement agreement, Stanford and Willis Towers have requested orders that permanently enjoin all including Stanford investors (i.e., customers of Stanford who as of Feb. 16, 2009, had funds on deposit and/or were holding certificates of deposit issued by Stanford) and all other interested parties from bringing legal proceedings or cause of action arising from Stanford entities against Willis Towers. Complete copies of the settlement agreement, the proposed bar orders, and other settlement documents are available on the receiver's website at: http://www.stanfordfinancialreceivership.com Interested parties may file written objections with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas by Dec. 30, 2016. =================================== D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C =================================== DOMINICAN REP: Expert Sees Contradiction in Protecting Highlands ---------------------------------------------------------------- Dominican Today reports that Dominican Republic Academy of Sciences president Milciades Mejia said government agencies contradict each other on how to deal with the area of Valle Nuevo Constanza. Mr. Mejia said while the Environment Ministry strives to eliminate all forms of farming in the area, agro sector agencies provide various types of technical and financial assistance to squatters farming there, according to Dominican Today. The report notes that Mr. Mejia said while the Academy strongly supports president Danilo Medina's effort to recover the country's main river basins, they suggest a meeting of the National Environment Council, to send a signal to all agencies that the decision to rescue Valle Nuevo is State policy. Interviewed on Telesistema Channel 11, the expert noted that when institutions which fight to preserve the environment concentrated all their efforts to protect Los Haitises National Park, government agencies such as the Agricultural Bank, and the Dominican Agrarian Institute, among others, were offering loans to farmers to plant crops in the protected area, the report notes. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Industries Laud Central Bank on Dollars Galore ------------------------------------------------------------------ Dominican Today reports that Herrera and Santo Domingo Province Industries Association (AEIH) President Antonio Taveras lauded the Central Bank's "effective" and recent measures to ease the pressure on the dollar's exchange rate, resulting from the rationing verified in the market. Mr. Taveras called the upward adjustment in the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) "appropriate," with which the monetary authority in his view sends a clear signal that will limit any inflationary outbreak of monetary origin, according to Dominican Today. Mr. Taveras said the flow of dollars into the economy has fortunately begun to improve, after seasonal factors led to the yearend dollar shortage, the report notes. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1. ==================== E L S A L V A D O R ==================== EL SALVADOR: Moody's Lowers Issuer Rating to B3; Outlook Negative ----------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has downgraded El Salvador's issuer and long-term debt ratings to B3 from B1 and assigned a negative outlook to the ratings, concluding the review for possible downgrade initiated on Aug. 11. The downgrade to B3 is based on these key drivers: 1) The significant increase in liquidity risks as (i) the government is already under financial stress and has been forced to prioritize payments and (ii) short-term debt continues to rise reaching record-high levels that are starting to challenge local banks' capacity and willingness to absorb additional amounts. 2) The political impasse in the Legislative Assembly that leaves the government without necessary approval to issue long-term debt to retire short term debt and fund its operations. The negative outlook reflects the risk that an agreement between the main political parties in the Legislative Assembly could prove elusive in coming months further extending the government's funding problems and increasing the possibility of a credit event. Even though Moody's does not rate El Salvador's short-term government debt, the strained fiscal situation may impact the credit profile of the government's long-term debt. El Salvador's long-term foreign-currency bond and deposit ceilings were lowered to B1 from Ba2. Short-term foreign-currency bond and deposit ceilings remain unchanged at NP. RATINGS RATIONALE RATIONALE FOR DOWNGRADING TO B3 FROM B1 GOVERNMENT LIQUIDITY RISKS CONTINUE TO RISE The government of El Salvador faces increased liquidity risks, given the continued rise of short-term government paper (LETES) which currently stands above historical thresholds, challenging local banks' capacity and willingness to absorb additional amounts. As the government has been unable to secure approval from the Legislative Assembly to issue long-term debt, it has been forced to increasingly finance itself with short-term debt. As a two-thirds majority vote in the Legislative Assembly is required to approve long-term debt issuance, the ruling party (FMLN) needs support from the main opposition party (ARENA) to get approval. While the requirement to obtain legislative approval to issue long term debt has been a long standing feature of El Salvador's debt management, administrations in the past had brokered agreements with the opposition to issue long-term debt and retire LETES when the outstanding amount reached around $800 million. Since January 2016, LETES surpassed the $800 million mark, a level at which refinancing conditions began to deteriorate, as they test the absorption capacity of the relatively shallow domestic market. As of Oct. 12, latest data available, LETES had reached a record high of $1.022 billion. The official limit for outstanding LETES this year is set by the budget at 30% of the government's current revenues year-to-date, that is, approximately $1.3 billion, and higher than the currently outstanding amount. However, the market limit is more relevant in our opinion, determined by the banks' willingness to continue to buy the short-term paper. The increase of LETES beyond $800 million pushed the interest rate the government pays for them to 6.5%, more than double compared to the previous year. Interest rates have been stable since March as the government reached an understanding with local banks to continue to roll-over short-term debt without a substantial increase in interest rates. However, there is a risk that interest rates could rise further as the appetite from local banks to absorb government short-term debt declines and so does the concentration risk associated with their holdings, potentially making them less inclined to roll over LETES coming due. In a scenario we believe is unlikely, banks could decide to stop rolling over LETES, leading to a default on short- term debt. Although this is not our baseline expectation, the probability of this scenario crystallizing rises as time goes by without an agreement. Moody's baseline expectation is that if an agreement is not reached and there is no long-term financing to retire any LETES, banks would most likely continue to hold and buy LETES to avoid triggering a credit event. This baseline expectation could shift if it became increasingly unlikely that a political agreement will eventually be reached. AN AGREEMENT IN THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY TO APPROVE LONG-TERM DEBT ISSUANCE REMAINS UNCERTAIN An agreement between the ruling party and the opposition to issue long-term debt to retire short-term debt is crucial to curtail rising government liquidity risks and preserve macroeconomic and fiscal stability. Reaching such an agreement, however, has been difficult due to the contentious relationship between the two main political parties, and their disagreements on policy priorities. Negotiations have intensified in the last couple of weeks, with a meeting between President Sanchez Ceren and the new head of opposition ARENA party, Mauricio Interiano. Such engagement at the highest level of authority reflects the urgency of the situation, indicated by pressure to resolve the impasse from various stakeholders including municipalities, suppliers and local banks. RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK The negative outlook reflects the risk that an agreement between the main political parties in the Legislative Assembly could prove elusive in the next months, failing to normalize the funding situation of the government and further straining its liquidity position. WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN Given the negative outlook, an upward movement in the rating is unlikely at this time. The outlook could move to stable if the government is able to materially reduce government liquidity risks. The reduction of liquidity risks could come in the form of an agreement between the FMLN and ARENA to approve long-term debt issuance, sufficient to retire a portion of short-term debt paper and reduce arrears. In addition, a credible plan for addressing the government's persistent budget deficits and rising debt ratio, in the form of a fiscal responsibility law agreed between the main political parties or under an IMF program, would be supportive of the stabilization of the outlook. Moody's would downgrade El Salvador's B3 ratings if it appeared unlikely that an agreement allowing the government to access long- term funding would be reached early next year, since this would materially increase the probability of a credit event. Even though Moody's does not rate El Salvador's short-term government debt, the further escalation of financial stress would impact the credit profile of the government's long-term debt. GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 8,303 (2015 Actual) (also known as Per Capita Income) Real GDP growth (% change): 2.5% (2015 Actual) (also known as GDP Growth) Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 1% (2015 Actual) Non-Financial Public Sector Financial Balance/GDP: -3.3% (2015 Actual) (also known as Fiscal Balance) Current Account Balance/GDP: -3.6% (2015 Actual) (also known as External Balance) External debt/GDP: 59.9% (2015 Actual) Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been recorded since 1983. On Nov. 3, 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the rating of the El Salvador, Government of. The main points raised during the discussion were: The issuer's institutional strength/framework, have materially decreased. The issuer has become increasingly susceptible to event risks. The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond Ratings published in December 2015. The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable. ====================== P U E R T O R I C O ====================== E. MENDOZA & CO: Condado 2 Asks Court to Prohibit Cash Use ---------------------------------------------------------- Condado 2, LLC, asks the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to enter an order prohibiting E. Mendoza & Co., Inc., from using cash collateral. Condado 2 contends that it is a secured creditor, having a mortgage over the Debtor's properties located in Puerto Rico. Condado 2 further contends that the properties generate rent proceeds, which are also pledged in favor of Condado 2 and constitute cash collateral. Firstbank Puerto Rico extended to Eduardo Mendoza Vidal and his wife, Marta Fenrandez Torres, certain credit facilities in the principal amount of $3,110,000, which were secured by mortgages over five properties. The mortgages were endorsed to Condado 2, and were guaranteed by the Debtor and E.M. T-Shirt Distributors, Inc., as solidary corporate guarantors. Firstbank extended to the Debtor a certain commercial loan in the principal amount of $800,000, whereby the five previously- mortgaged properties were mortgaged. Eduardo Mendoza Vidal and Marta Fernandez Torres, Eduardo Mendoza Corporation and E.M. T- Shirt Distributors, Inc. guaranteed the obligation. Condado 2 tells the Court that it holds a first priority prepetition security interest in the cash collateral through a duly-registered Mortgage Deed and a notarized Assignment Aggreement. Condado 2 further tells the Court that although it is entitled to adequate protection, the Debtor has not alleged nor met its burden to demonstrate that Condado 2 is adequately protected. A full-text copy of Condado 2, LLC's Motion, dated Oct. 31, 2016, is available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/EMendoza&Co2016_1606661esl11_47.pdf Condado 2, LLC, is represented by: Sonia E. Colon, Esq. Gustavo A. Chico-Barris, Esq. Camille N. Somoza, Esq. FERRAIUOLI LLC PO Box 195168 San Juan, PR 00919-5168 Telephone: (787) 766-7000 E-mail: scolon@ferraiuoli.com gchico@ferraiuoli.com csomoza@ferraiuoli.com About E. Mendoza & Co., Inc. E. Mendoza & Co. Inc., based in San Juan, P.R., filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-06661) on Aug. 22, 2016. The petition was signed by Marta Fernandez Torres, secretary. The Debtor estimated $0 to $50,000 in assets and $1 million to $10 million in liabilities at the time of the filing. The Debtor is represented by Nelson Robles Diaz, Esq., at the Nelson Robles Diaz Law Offices, PSC. EDUARDO MENDOZA: Condado 2 Wants to Prohibit Cash Collateral Use ---------------------------------------------------------------- Condado 2, LLC, asks the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to prohibit Eduardo Mendoza Corporation from using cash collateral. Condado 2 contends that it is a secured creditor, having a mortgage over the Debtor's properties located in Puerto Rico. Condado 2 further contends that the properties generate rent proceeds, which are also pledged in favor of Condado 2 and constitute cash collateral. Firstbank Puerto Rico extended to Eduardo Mendoza Vidal and his wife, Marta Fenrandez Torres, certain credit facilities in the principal amount of $3,110,000, which were secured by mortgages over five properties. The mortgages were endorsed to Condado 2, and were guaranteed by the Debtor and E.M. T-Shirt Distributors, Inc., as solidary corporate guarantors. Condado 2 tells the Court that it holds a first priority pre-petition security interest in the cash collateral through a duly registered Mortgage Deed and a notarized Assignment Agreement. Condado 2 further tells the Court that although it is entitled to adequate protection, the Debtor has not even alleged nor met its burden to demonstrate that Condado 2 is adequately protected. Condado 2 tells the Court that the Debtor has not sought the authorization of the Court to use Condado 2's cash collateral, nor has it proffered any adequate protection whatsoever. Condado 2 further tells the Court that it has not consented to the use of cash collateral and that it wants the Debtor to be prohibited from using the cash collateral. A full-text copy of Condado 2, LLC's Motion, dated Oct. 31, 2016, is available at: http://bankrupt.com/misc/EduardoMendoza2016_1606672esl11_37.pdf Condado 2, LLC, is represented by: Sonia E. Colon, Esq. Gustavo A. Chico-Barris, Esq. Camille N. Somoza, Esq. FERRAIUOLI LLC PO Box 195168 San Juan, PR 00919-5168 Telephone: (787) 766-7000 E-mail: scolon@ferraiuoli.com gchico@ferraiuoli.com csomoza@ferraiuoli.com About Eduardo Mendoza Corporation Eduardo Mendoza Corporation filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-06672) on Aug. 22, 2016. The petition was signed by Mara Fernandez Torres, secretary. The Debtor estimated assets at $0 to $50,000 and liabilities at $100,001 to $500,000 at the time of the filing. The Debtor is represented by Nelson Robles Diaz, Esq., at the Nelson Robles Diaz Law Offices, PSC. JOSE LUIS CRESPO LORENZO: DS Okayed; Jan. 13 Plan Hearing Set ------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Edward Godoy approved the Disclosure Statement in support of the Chapter 11 Plan proposed by the Chapter 11 trustee in the estate of Jose Luis Crespo Lorenzo as containing "adequate information." A hearing for the confirmation of the Plan has been scheduled for Jan. 13, 2017, at 9:30 a.m., in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Written objections to the Plan should be filed 14 days before the Confirmation Hearing. As reported in the Sept. 27, 2016 edition of the TCR, Wigberto Lugo-Mender, the Chapter 11 Trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Jose Luis Crespo Lorenzo, has filed a Chapter 11 plan that states that in order to provide funds for the Debtor's intended reorganization, the Chapter 11 Trustee has determined that the best alternative for all parties in interest is to: -- use the funds in possession to pay allowed administrative and unsecured claims filed in the case; and -- turn over the commercial properties encumbered by the claim filed by Banco Popular, now ROSAN, INC. The Chapter 11 Trustee purports that it will be in the best interest of allowed unsecured creditors that the administration of these two stations be turned over to the secured creditor and that the funds currently available be distributed at the least cost possible to the allowed creditors of this estate. General unsecured claims (Class 5) are estimated to total $9,092,836. Creditors under the class will receive a lump sum payment of all proceeds deposited in the Chapter 11 Trustee account no. 8648 in Banco Santander resulting after full payment of allowed claims classified under Class 1 administrative claims, Class 6 claim of Mr. Lorenzo, and priority claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 507(a)(8) of the Code, as these are defined in the Plan of Reorganization. Each member of Class 5 holding an allowed claim will receive a pro-rata distribution of the lump sum amount distribution within 30 days from the effective date, as per the Schedule Payments under the Plan of Reorganization. A copy of the Disclosure Statement is available for free at: http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb14-04720_338_DS_JLC_Lorenzo.pdf About Jose Luis Crespo Lorenzo Jose Luis Crespo Lorenzo owns two gas service stations: one located at Malpaso Ward, Aguada, Puerto Rico, and another at Guanabanos Ward, Aguada, Puerto Rico. Jose Luis Crespo Lorenzo filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 14-04720) on June 9, 2014, and was represented by Jose Ramon Cintron. On June 23, 2016, Alberto Lozada Colon, Esq., assumed the legal representation of the Debtor. On Aug. 20, 2015, Wigberto Lugo-Mender, Esq. was named Chapter 11 Trustee of the Debtor. =============================== T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O =============================== TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Jobless Rate Rises to 4.4% --------------------------------------------- Trinidad Express reports that amid a deepening recession, unemployment rose to a four-year high, women lost more jobs than men, and the rise was the steepest in five years, according to data released by the Central Statistical Office (CSO). In the second quarter (Q2) of 2016 unemployment rose to 4.4 per cent of the 1.3 million population, the highest it has been since December 2012 when it was 4.7 per cent, the CSO data showed, according to Trinidad Express. On a year-on-year basis, unemployment also hit a four-year high, as it was 4.9 per cent in Q2 2012, the report notes. Quarter-on-quarter, unemployment rose by 60 basis points from 3.8 per cent in Q1 to 4.4 per cent in Q2, the steepest climb in unemployment in five years, the report relays. Said differently, this is the most jobs lost since the quarter ended December 2011, when unemployment climbed from 4.2 per to 5.4 per cent in the quarter ended March 2012-120 basis points, the report notes. *********** Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to publication. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com *********** S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2016. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-362-8552. * * * End of Transmission * * *