/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/161108.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Tuesday, November 8, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 221 Headlines B R A Z I L BANCO BBM: Moody's Raises Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating to Ba1 BRAZIL: President Makes Pension Reform Early 2017 Priority VALE CANADA: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Sr. Unsecured Bond VALE SA: Brazil President Delays Pushing for New CEO Until 2017 VALE SA: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Corporate Family Rating C A Y M A N I S L A N D S BENNETT LAWRENCE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14 DLG GROUP: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up EUROPEAN PROPERTY: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up KARISHA LTD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings LENSKY FUND: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up LENSKY MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up LOTTE MART: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14 SILVERMOON LTD: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up SUMMER DEL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up UNIGOYA LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up VINTAGE BLUE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up C O L O M B I A BANCO MERCANTIL: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Global Local Deposit Rating D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Policies to Benefit Poorest, World Bank Says M E X I C O COMAPA ZC: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating & Maintains Negative Outlook DEUTSCHE BANK: Moody's Puts Ba1 Rating on Review for Downgrade P U E R T O R I C O EJS INCORPORADO: Hires Ruben Gonzalez as Attorney J TASTE: Disclosures Conditionally OK'd; Hearing Set For Nov. 30 MBTI OF PUERTO RICO: Taps Charles A. Cuprill as Legal Counsel OLIVER C&I: Names Carmen Conde Torres as Legal Counsel T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: More Oil, Gas Makes it to the US U R U G U A Y URUGUAY: To Get $6MM IDB Loan to Launch Program to Fight Crimes - - - - - =========== B R A Z I L =========== BANCO BBM: Moody's Raises Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating to Ba1 ---------------------------------------------------------- Moody's America Latina upgraded Banco BBM S.A.'s (BBM) long-term local currency senior unsecured debt rating to Ba1, from Ba2; and the long-term Brazilian national scale senior unsecured debt rating to Aaa.br, from Aa2.br. The outlook remains negative. These ratings of Banco BBM S.A. were upgraded: -- Long-term global local-currency senior unsecured debt rating: to Ba1 from Ba2, negative outlook -- Long-term Brazilian national scale senior unsecured debt rating: to Aaa.br from Aa2.br RATINGS RATIONALE The upgrade of BBM's ratings incorporates Bank of Communication's majority ownership stake and the strategic importance that the Brazilian subsidiary may have to its controlling bank. BoCom is expected to appoint executives to certain key positions at the bank and will closely engage in the subsidiary's strategic decision making process, including BBM's support to operations of Chinese related companies in Brazil. Moody's expects BBM's solvency and liquidity to remain broadly consistent with current levels, however, its deposit ratings now benefit from one notch of uplift, to Ba1, to incorporate the expectation of affiliate support to the Brazilian operation. The completion of the acquisition will likely result in BBM expanding its loan book, as it takes advantage of a new potential universe of borrowers, including large corporate and Chinese companies, and a recovering credit demand, following years of very conservative risk management. Moody's expects the bank to leverage its balance sheet, leading to capitalization ratios that will be lower than the current 14.3% tangible common equity to risk weighted assets, and the 21.1% regulatory common equity tier 1 ratio. However, its capital position is likely to accommodate at still solid levels. As the bank targets large corporations, its consistently strong asset quality may improve further, although the risk of increasing loan concentration may add volatility to asset risk and earnings. BBM's reliance on market funds is expected to remain high, but the bank will likely have access to a wider pool of investors, and it may even benefit from new funding facilities provided by the parent. This will support BBM's expanded strategic focus, enabling the bank to appropriately manage its liquidity in response to a likely extension of its assets duration. A lower cost of funding and greater scale will benefit profitability at BBM's current operational infrastructure, but we anticipate some margin compression if new corporate lending leads to lower spreads. WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN The negative outlook on BBM's ratings reflects the negative outlook on Brazil's sovereign ratings, and which constrain the bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA). In the event Brazil's sovereign rating and its country ceilings were to be lowered further, BBM's ratings would also decline Also, a multi-notch downgrade on BoCom's BCA could lead to a downgrade on BBM's ratings. A higher-than-expected deterioration of its capital position and asset risk profile, following the new strategic focus and an eventual higher balance sheet leverage, could put negative pressure on BBM's BCA and ratings. WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP BBM's ratings are unlikely to be upgraded because they have a negative outlook, in line with the sovereign rating's negative outlook. METHODOLOGIES USED The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published in January 2016. LAST RATING ACTION The last rating action on Banco BBM S.A. was on Feb. 25, 2016, when Moody's downgraded the bank's long-term local-currency senior unsecured debt rating to Ba2 from Baa3 and the long-term Brazilian national scale senior unsecured debt rating to Aa2.br from Aa1.br, following the downgrade of Brazil's government bond rating to Ba2, from Baa3. The outlook of the bank's ratings was changed to negative in line with the negative outlook on the sovereign bond rating. BRAZIL: President Makes Pension Reform Early 2017 Priority ---------------------------------------------------------- Paulo Trevisani at The Wall Street Journal reports that Brazil's government is hopeful that pension reform will pass Congress in the first half of 2017, leaving room for other reforms in the country's labor and tax systems possibly in the second half, a senior government official said. But for now, the focus is on approving an amendment to the Constitution capping public-spending annual growth by the previous year's inflation rate, Marcio de Freitas, President Michel Temer's secretary of social communication, said in an interview, according to The Wall Street Journal. The amendment was approved by the lower house of Congress last month and will go through two rounds of vote in the Senate, the last one expected to happen on Dec. 13. Its chances of passage are unclear, although the administration has a majority in the upper house, the report notes. Critics have said that the spending cap could lead to worse public services, especially in health and education. Mr. de Freitas said the government is looking to eliminate inefficiencies to make sure those areas won't suffer, the report relays. "The government doesn't spend in an efficient manner," he said in an interview, adding that spending in these areas may grow faster than inflation if cuts are made in other sectors, the report discloses. As for pension reform, Mr. de Freitas said the government already has a proposal, but declined to give details, the report relays. Brazil's social-security system requires yearly transfers from the Treasury as payouts surpass contributions. The cost to taxpayers this year is estimated at BRL507.8 billion ($156.5 billion), or 40% of the federal budget, going up to BRL562.4, or 42.7% of the budget in 2017, the report notes. The imbalance is due to a variety of causes, including benefits paid to poor rural workers who don't contribute into the system, the report relays. The technically insolvent system is seen by the government as a major cause of fiscal imbalances leading to the current economic recession, the report says. Both the spending cap and pension reform are seen by the Temer administration as key to taming a ballooning debt load, now at 70.1% of gross domestic product, and to plugging a budget deficit equal to 9.4% of GDP, as of August, the report discloses. President Temer's agenda has faced strong reactions from unions and other groups who fear fiscal austerity could trim labor rights. The report notes that Mr. de Freitas said the administration is working on a marketing campaign to make its case to the Brazilian voter. "We need to clarify the issue to society," he said. He said that higher social-security contributions and a single minimum-age for retirement are in the cards. Currently, Brazilians can retire as early as in their mid-50s and the rules vary based on gender and profession, the report relays. "Pension payouts in public service can be up to seven times as high as those in the private sector," he said. "We need to eliminate distortions," he added. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2, negative) underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service. The country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the government's high level of mandatory spending. VALE CANADA: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Sr. Unsecured Bond ------------------------------------------------------------ Moody's Investors Service affirmed Vale S.A. 's Ba3 ratings and related ratings, including Vale's senior unsecured rating and the ratings on the foreign currency debt issues of Vale Overseas Limited (fully and unconditionally guaranteed by Vale). The outlook was changed to stable from negative. Moody's also affirmed the B2 rating and changed to stable from negative the outlook for the senior unsecured ratings of Vale Canada Ltd. Ratings Affirmed: Issuer: Vale S.A. Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2018, Affirmed at Ba3 Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2023, Affirmed at to Ba3 Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2042, Affirmed at Ba3 Issuer: Vale Canada Ltd. Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2032, Affirmed at B2 Issuer: Vale Overseas Limited Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2019, Affirmed at to Ba3 Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2020, Affirmed at Ba3 Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2021, Affirmed at Ba3 Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2022, Affirmed at Ba3 Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2026, Affirmed at Ba3 Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2034, Affirmed at Ba3 Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2036, Affirmed at Ba3 Gtd Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture due 2039, Affirmed at Ba3 Outlook Actions: Issuer: Vale S.A. Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative Issuer: Vale Canada Ltd. Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative Issuer: Vale Overseas Limited Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative RATINGS RATIONALE The stable outlook reflects the improvement in Vale's credit metrics throughout 2016, supported by the initiatives taken by the company to improve its liquidity and expand production volumes at lower costs, and Vale's financial discipline regarding capex and dividend payments, which enhance its operating resilience. Vale's adjusted EBITDA margins increased to 31.5% in the LTM ended September 2016, from 21% in 2015, while adjusted leverage (measured by total debt/EBITDA) declined to 4.0x from 5.5x in the same period. The improvement in credit metrics also reflect the recovery observed in iron ore prices, base metals and coal relative to the levels evidenced in 2015 and early 2016. Moody's expects Vale's leverage to decline further in the next 12- 18 months considering prices at Moody's sensitivity medium-term ranges ($ 45-55/ton), as the company continues to undertake cost saving measures and reduces its annual capex to around USD4.5 billion from 2017 onwards, which will reduce debt requirements and lead to positive free cash flow generation. Moody's also expects Vale's metrics to benefit from the additional sales volume coming from the S11D project, with total iron ore production capacity of 90 million tons per year at a lower cost base after full ramp-up by 2020. Vale's Ba3 rating is supported by the company's diversified product base and competitive cost position, and substantive portfolio of long lived assets. While Vale has diversified its geographic footprint through various acquisitions in Canada, Australia and elsewhere, the dominant revenue, earnings and cash flow driver continues to be its Brazilian-based iron ore operations and its major position in the seaborne iron ore markets. The rating acknowledges Vale's more focused and disciplined approach to project development, capital allocation, resizing of its asset portfolio to strategically important business segments, divestiture of non-strategic assets, and focus on cost reduction, which better positions Vale to withstand volatility in the prices for its major products over the next twelve to eighteen months. Constraining the ratings are the challenging fundamentals for iron ore, a key earning driver, and base metals prices, and our expectation that prices will remain at lower levels for a prolonged period, as a consequence of the slowdown in China's economic growth and steel demand, which the World Steel Association (WSA) forecasts to decline to 652 mm tons in 2017, a 8% decline over 2014 levels, bringing heightened uncertainty over demand for iron ore and base metals in the next few years. Lower prices relative to 2011-2014 levels will prevent a faster recovery in credit metrics for Vale and the company will likely continue to pursue asset divestitures and other liquidity alternatives to strengthen its capital structure and reduce debt levels at a steady pace. Vale's ratings also incorporate the long term overhang represented by the uncertainties regarding the level of support Vale will provide to Samarco and the impact it would have on the company's liquidity and debt profile. Vale Canada's B2 senior unsecured rating rank two notches below Vale's rating to reflect the weaker operating performance of its business, and the fact that Vale does not guarantee the notes. The rating continues to reflect this subsidiary's major position in the global nickel market, its asset base and strategic importance to its parent. An upward rating movement would require that Vale maintains a strong liquidity position and continues with its asset divestiture and partnership strategies, which will allow Vale to materially reduce debt levels. In addition adjusted total debt/EBITDA below 3.5x and EBIT/interest expense above 3.5x times on a sustainable basis are necessary for an upgrade. The ratings or outlook could suffer negative pressure should conditions for iron ore and base metals deteriorate, leading to lower profitability, and Vale is not able to make meaningful progress in cost reduction and debt levels, with leverage ratios (total debt to Ebitda) trending towards 4x or above. A marked deterioration in the company's liquidity position could also precipitate a downgrade. Negative pressure would arise to the extent Vale is required to provide material financial support to Samarco, or faces liabilities from litigation and class actions resulting from the Samarco's accident, in addition to the amount related to the Framework Agreement set with Brazilian Authorities in March 2016 and the announced support to Samarco's working capital needs. The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Mining Industry published in August 2014. Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Vale is one of the largest mining enterprises globally, with substantive positions in iron ore and nickel, and participation in copper, coal and fertilizers, as well as supplemental positions in energy and steel production. Vale is the largest global supplier of iron ore, with approximately 345 million metric tons (t) of production in the twelve months ended September 2016 (excluding its share of Samarco), and the largest global producer of nickel, with around 310,700 t produced during the same period. Vale's principal mining operations are located in Brazil, Canada, Australia, Indonesia, and Mozambique. In addition, the company is active in exploration activities in nine countries. For the twelve months through Sept. 30, 2016, Vale had net operating revenues of $25.6 billion. VALE SA: Brazil President Delays Pushing for New CEO Until 2017 --------------------------------------------------------------- Reuters reports that Brazilian President Michel Temer will not push to replace the head of the nation's largest mining company, Vale SA, until the current executive's mandate expires in May, a local newspaper reported. Mr. Temer has been seeking a replacement for Chief Executive Murilo Ferreira, who was the preferred choice of impeached former President Dilma Rousseff and is considered by Mr. Temer's camp to be too close to the previous administration, according to Reuters. But the newspaper Folha de S.Paulo reported at the weekend, without citing sources, that Mr. Temer will not try to force Ferreira's early exit after coming up against resistance from state pension funds that have seats on Vale's board, the report notes. A person with direct knowledge of the situation told Reuters last month that Temer had met with the representative of an unnamed, major shareholder of Vale to discuss a potential change of command at the mining giant, the report relays. The same person, who was briefed on the discussion, said the company's controlling shareholders would only agree to a change of leadership next year, when Ferreira's term ends, and under a selection process conducted by an executive recruitment firm, the report notes. The government move to replace Ferreira is controversial. Vale (VALE5.SA), the world's largest producer of iron ore, is a private company that is supposedly free from state interference, the report discloses. However, Ferreira's predecessor, Roger Agnelli, was pushed out during Rousseff's first term after the government exerted pressure through state pension funds, the report says. The O Globo newspaper reported Sunday, without citing sources, that Temer's preferred candidate to replace Ferreira is Nelson Silva, head of strategy and management at state-run oil company Petrobras, the report notes. Reports earlier this year said Mr. Temer was being pressured to replace Ferreira by members of his party in the mining state of Minas Gerais, where Vale has large operations, the report relays. Vale has struggled in the face of slumping commodity prices and recorded its worst ever loss last year, the report notes. Its reputation was also damaged following the collapse of a tailings dam last November at the Samarco mine, owned by Vale SA and BHP Billiton, the report says. The accident killed 19 people and resulted in severe environmental damage across a wide swath of southeastern Brazil, the report adds. VALE SA: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' Corporate Family Rating ------------------------------------------------------ Moody's America Latina Ltda upgraded to A2.br from A3.br the corporate family rating assigned on its Brazilian National scale to Vale S.A. and the senior unsecured notes (Debentures de Infraestrutura) issued by Vale S.A. The outlook changed to stable from negative. At the same time, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Vale's Ba3 ratings in the global scale local currency, the senior unsecured rating and the ratings on the foreign currency debt issues of Vale Overseas Limited (fully and unconditionally guaranteed by Vale). The outlook changed to stable from negative. Rating Actions: Issuer: Vale S.A. LT Corporate Family Rating: affirmed at Ba3 (global scale); upgraded to A2.br from A3.br (national scale) BRL 1.35 billion Senior Unsecured Notes (Debentures de Infraestrutura) due 2020 and 2022 -- affirmed at Ba3 (global scale); upgraded to A2.br from A3. br (national scale) BRL 1.0 billion Senior Unsecured Notes (Debentures de Infraestrutura) -- affirmed at Ba3 (global scale); upgraded to A2. br from A3.br (national scale) The outlook for all ratings is stable. RATING RATIONALE The stable outlook reflects the improvement in Vale's credit metrics throughout 2016, supported by the initiatives taken by the company to improve its liquidity and expand production volumes at lower costs, and Vale's financial discipline regarding capex and dividend payments, which enhance its operating resilience. Vale's adjusted EBITDA margins increased to 31.5% in the LTM ended September 2016, from 21% in 2015, while adjusted leverage (measured by total debt/EBITDA) declined to 4.0x from 5.5x in the same period. The improvement in credit metrics also reflect the recovery observed in iron ore prices, base metals and coal relative to the levels evidenced in 2015 and early 2016. Moody's expects Vale's leverage to decline further in the next 12- 18 months considering prices at Moody's sensitivity medium-term ranges ($45-55/ton), as the company continues to undertake cost saving measures and reduces its annual capex to around USD4.5 billion from 2017 onwards, which will reduce debt requirements and lead to positive free cash flow generation. Moody's also expects Vale's metrics to benefit from the additional sales volume coming from the S11D project, with total iron ore production capacity of 90 million tons per year at a lower cost base after full ramp-up by 2020. Vale's Ba3 rating is supported by the company's diversified product base and competitive cost position, and substantive portfolio of long lived assets. While Vale has diversified its geographic footprint through various acquisitions in Canada, Australia and elsewhere, the dominant revenue, earnings and cash flow driver continues to be its Brazilian-based iron ore operations and its major position in the seaborne iron ore markets. The rating acknowledges Vale's more focused and disciplined approach to project development, capital allocation, resizing of its asset portfolio to strategically important business segments, divestiture of non-strategic assets, and focus on cost reduction, which better positions Vale to withstand volatility in the prices for its major products over the next twelve to eighteen months. Constraining the ratings are the challenging fundamentals for iron ore, a key earning driver, and base metals prices, and our expectation that prices will remain at lower levels for a prolonged period, as a consequence of the slowdown in China's economic growth and steel demand, which the World Steel Association (WSA) forecasts to decline to 652 mm tons in 2017, a 8% decline over 2014 levels, bringing heightened uncertainty over demand for iron ore and base metals in the next few years. Lower prices relative to 2011-2014 levels will prevent a faster recovery in credit metrics for Vale and the company will likely continue to pursue asset divestitures and other liquidity alternatives to strengthen its capital structure and reduce debt levels at a steady pace. Vale's ratings also incorporate the long term overhang represented by the uncertainties regarding the level of support Vale will provide to Samarco and the impact it would have on the company's liquidity and debt profile. An upward rating movement would require that Vale maintains a strong liquidity position and continues with its asset divestiture and partnership strategies, which will allow Vale to materially reduce debt levels. In addition adjusted total debt/EBITDA below 3.5x and EBIT/interest expense above 3.5x times on a sustainable basis are necessary for an upgrade. The ratings or outlook could suffer negative pressure should conditions for iron ore and base metals deteriorate, leading to lower profitability, and Vale is not able to make meaningful progress in cost reduction and debt levels, with leverage ratios (total debt to Ebitda) trending towards 4x or above. A marked deterioration in the company's liquidity position could also precipitate a downgrade. Negative pressure would arise to the extent Vale is required to provide material financial support to Samarco, or faces liabilities from litigation and class actions resulting from the Samarco's accident, in addition to the amount related to the Framework Agreement set with Brazilian Authorities in March 2016 and the announced support to Samarco's working capital needs. The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Mining Industry published in August 2014. Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Vale is one of the largest mining enterprises globally, with substantive positions in iron ore and nickel, and participation in copper, coal and fertilizers, as well as supplemental positions in energy and steel production. Vale is the largest global supplier of iron ore, with approximately 345 million metric tons (t) of production in the twelve months ended September 2016 (excluding its share of Samarco), and the largest global producer of nickel, with around 310,700 t produced during the same period. Vale's principal mining operations are located in Brazil, Canada, Australia, Indonesia, and Mozambique. In addition, the company is active in exploration activities in nine countries. For the twelve months through Sept. 30, 2016, Vale had net operating revenues of $25.6 billion. ========================== C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ========================== BENNETT LAWRENCE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14 ------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Bennett Lawrence Offshore Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by Nov. 14, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Sept. 30, 2016. The company's liquidator is: Suydam Van Zandt Schreiber 111 Oyster Cut, Vero Beach, FL 32963 USA Telephone: (212) 508-6408 Facsimile: (212) 593-9647 DLG GROUP: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up ----------------------------------------- At an extraordinary general meeting held on Oct. 5, 2016, the shareholder of DLG Group Ltd resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Commerce Corporate Services Limited P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman Cayman Islands Telephone: 949 8666 Facsimile: 949 0626 EUROPEAN PROPERTY: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up ------------------------------------------------- At an extraordinary general meeting held on Oct. 6, 2016, the shareholder of European Property Fund No.2 resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Commerce Corporate Services Limited P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman Cayman Islands Telephone: 949 8666 Facsimile: 949 0626 KARISHA LTD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings ---------------------------------------------- The members of Karisha Ltd., on Oct. 13, 2016, resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Jeffrey D. Johnstone Broadhurst LLC 40 Linwood Street P.O. Box 2503 Grand Cayman Cayman Islands KY1-1104 Telephone: (345) 949-7237 Facsimile: (345) 949-7725 LENSKY FUND: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up ------------------------------------------- The sole shareholder of The Lensky Fund Limited, on Oct. 12, 2016, resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Kenneth Stewart Apex Fund Services (Cayman) Ltd. P.O. Box 10085 161a Artillery Court, Shedden Road Grand Cayman KY1 1001 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 747 2739 LENSKY MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up --------------------------------------------- The sole shareholder of The Lensky Master Fund Limited, on Oct. 12, 2016, resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Kenneth Stewart Apex Fund Services (Cayman) Ltd. P.O. Box 10085 161a Artillery Court, Shedden Road Grand Cayman KY1 1001 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 747 2739 LOTTE MART: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Nov. 14 ------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Lotte Mart China Co. Ltd. are required to file their proofs of debt by Nov. 14, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Sept. 30, 2016. The company's liquidators are: Stephen Liu Yiu Keung Koo Chi Sum Telephone: (852) 2849 9404 Facsimile: (852) 2827 0715 Ernst & Young Transactions Limited 62nd Floor, One Island East 18 Westlands Road Island East Hong Kong SILVERMOON LTD: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up ---------------------------------------------- At an extraordinary general meeting held on Aug. 22, 2016, the sole shareholder of Silvermoon Ltd resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Eduardo J. Fuentes Zambrano Av. Lazaro, Cardenas 2400 Pte. Fraccionamiento Valle Oriente Edificio Losoles, Despacho A-33 San Pedro Garza Garcia Nuevo Leon, C.P. 66269 Mexico Telephone: 01 8182 6208 40 Facsimile: 01 8182 6208 47 SUMMER DEL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up ------------------------------------------ At an extraordinary general meeting held on Sept. 13, 2016, the shareholder of Summer Del Group Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Commerce Corporate Services Limited P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman Cayman Islands Telephone: 949 8666 Facsimile: 949 0626 UNIGOYA LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up ----------------------------------------------- The shareholders of Unigoya Limited, on Oct. 6, 2016, resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Commerce Corporate Services Limited P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman Cayman Islands Telephone: 949 8666 Facsimile: 949 0626 VINTAGE BLUE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up -------------------------------------------- At an extraordinary general meeting held on Oct. 6, 2016, the shareholder of Vintage Blue Ltd resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Commerce Corporate Services Limited P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman Cayman Islands Telephone: 949 8666 Facsimile: 949 0626 =============== C O L O M B I A =============== BANCO MERCANTIL: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Global Local Deposit Rating ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo (MLA) has affirmed all ratings and assessments assigned to Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz S.A. (BME), including the bank's global local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Ba3 and B1, as well as its Bolivian national scale local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Aaa.bo and Aa3.bo. The ba3 baseline credit assessment (BCA) and all short term ratings were also affirmed. The outlook on the long-term global scale ratings remains negative, in line with the negative outlook on Bolivia's government bond rating. At the same time, MLA has affirmed all ratings and assessments assigned to Banco PYME Los Andes Procedit S.A. (PLA), including the bank's global local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Ba3 and B1, as well as its Bolivian national scale foreign currency deposit rating of Aa3.bo. The Bolivian national scale local currency deposit rating of Aa2.bo was placed on review for possible upgrade. The ba3 baseline credit assessment (BCA) and all short term ratings were also affirmed. The outlook on the long-term global scale ratings remains negative, in line with the negative outlook on Bolivia's government bond rating. This rating action follows the announcement that BME signed a Purchase Agreement with PLA to acquire PLA for an undisclosed sum. The completion of the transaction is subject to final regulatory approvals. These ratings and assessments assigned to Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz S.A. were affirmed: Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Ba3, with negative outlook Short-term global local currency deposit rating of Not Prime Long-term foreign currency deposit rating of B1, with negative outlook Short-term foreign currency deposit rating of Not Prime Bolivian long-term national scale local currency deposit rating of Aaa.bo Bolivian long-term national scale foreign currency deposit rating of Aa3.bo Baseline credit assessment of ba3 Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba3 Long-term counterparty rating assessment of Ba2(cr) Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr) This rating assigned to Banco PYME Los Andes Procredit S.A. was placed on review for possible upgrade: Bolivian long-term national scale local currency deposit rating of Aa2.bo, on review for possible upgrade These ratings and assessments assigned to Banco PYME Los Andes Procredit S.A. were affirmed: Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Ba3, with negative outlook Short-term global local currency deposit rating of Not Prime Long-term foreign currency deposit rating of B1, with negative outlook Short-term foreign currency deposit rating of Not Prime Bolivian short-term national scale local currency deposit rating of BO-1 Bolivian long-term national scale foreign currency deposit rating of Aa3.bo Bolivian short-term national scale foreign currency deposit rating of BO-1 Baseline credit assessment of ba3 Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba3 Long-term counterparty rating assessment of Ba2(cr) Short-term counterparty risk assessment of Not Prime(cr) RATINGS RATIONALE BANCO MERCANTIL SANTA CRUZ S.A. While the acquisition will enhance BME's position as the largest bank in the system, and in the process improve its portfolio diversification and bolster its profitability, the affirmation considers that these benefits will be offset by the negative impact on the bank's capitalization. Once regulators approve the transaction, which is anticipated by the end of 2016, BME's leading market share will increase to 16.2% from the current 12.8%. In particular, BME will substantially enlarge its footprint in the high margin small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) segment in which PLA specializes. Although PLA's operating costs are higher than BME's, the acquiring bank should be able to achieve cost-saving synergies. BME's average cost of funding may also rise following the merger, but its overall funding costs will remain below the banking system average, and well below PLA's historical funding costs. The bank's high levels of liquidity will not see a significant deterioration after the acquisition. However, the transaction is likely to reduce BME's fully adjusted core capital ratio significantly, though the precise impact will depend on the purchase price, which Moody's expects will entail a modest premium at most. Nevertheless, the bank's current ratings remain consistent with the reduction in capitalization that would result from a number of different purchase price scenarios. Moreover, the bank's enhanced profitability could allow it to replenish its capital to current levels in as few as 24 months. WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS DOWN The negative outlook on BME's ratings is in line with the negative outlook on the sovereign rating. Consequently, the bank's ratings will face downward pressure if the sovereign is downgraded. BME's BCA could also be downgraded if the purchase price of PLA ultimately entails a significantly larger premium than currently anticipated and the bank experiences a higher than expected decline in the capital levels as a result, or if the bank's profitability does not improve following the acquisition as currently anticipated, reducing the bank's capital replenishment capacity. While a downgrade of the BCA would not affect the banks' global scale deposit ratings given the high probability that BME would receive financial support from the government in the event of stress, it could potentially put downward pressure of the national scale local currency deposit rating. BANCO PYME LOS ANDES PROCREDIT S.A. The affirmation of PLA's global scale ratings and review for upgrade of its local currency national scale deposit rating considers the very high likelihood that the bank will receive support from BME once it the acquisition is complete. Although the banks' GSRs are the same, BME's local currency national scale deposit rating is currently two notches higher than PLA's deposit rating. The affirmation also considers the bank's conservative risk management practices, which have resulted in low delinquency levels despite its narrow focus on relatively risky market segments, as well as its strong capitalization ratios and stable funding and liquidity indicators. PLA's GSRs and foreign currency national scale deposit rating will not benefit from uplift from parental support because they are constrained by Bolivia's Ba3 sovereign rating and B1 foreign currency deposit ceiling. WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN The negative outlook on PLA's global scale ratings is in line with the negative outlook on the sovereign rating to reflect the strong credit interlinkages between the sovereign and the bank. Consequently, the bank's ratings will face downward pressure if the sovereign is downgraded. PLA's local currency national scale deposit rating is likely to be upgraded once the bank's acquisition by BME closes to reflect the incorporation of parental support into the rating. If PLA's assets and liabilities are directly assumed by BME as is currently expected, its ratings will then be withdrawn. The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published in January 2016. Banco Mercantil Santa Cruz S.A. is headquartered in La Paz, Bolivia and had total assets of Bs 26,882.7 million ($3,890.4 million) and equity of Bs 1,623.4 million ($234.9 million) as of Sept. 30, 2016. Banco PYME Los Andes Procredit S.A. is headquartered in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia and had total assets of Bs 5,364 million ($776.3 million) and equity of Bs 633 million ($91.6 million) as of Sept. 30, 2016. =================================== D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C =================================== DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Policies to Benefit Poorest, World Bank Says ---------------------------------------------------------------- Dominican Today reports that a World Bank report released Thursday, Nov. 3, suggests that the Dominican Republic can eradicate extreme poverty through improvements in fiscal and social policy. The study entitled "Fiscal and redistribution policy in the Dominican Republic" indicates that an additional expenditure of 1.3 percent of GDP to double the transfers to the poorest and achieve universal health coverage and public education even administrative reforms, the Caribbean country can achieve that all Dominicans rise above the extreme poverty line, according to Dominican Today. "To achieve this, the report considers essential to review fiscal policies focusing on administrative measures to reduce tax evasion and reduce informality. It also suggests a review of electricity subsidies to ensure that benefit those who need it most," the bank report says, Dominican Today notes. "The World Bank analysis confirms that the Dominican Republic is on the right track, limited only by the achievements in social terms, and contributes to our plan in this new period of implementing reforms aimed at improving the delivery of public services to the population and make more equitable economic growth," said Dominican Economy minister Isidoro Santana, Dominican Today relays. Over the past three decades, the Dominican Republic has been among the fastest growing economies in Latin America and the Caribbean, the World Bank notes, Dominican Today says. "In fact, in 2014 and 2015, it was the economy that grew an average of 7.2 percent and is forecast to continue robust economic growth in 2016, about 6 percent," the bank added. "But despite the considerable efforts of the Government to increase social spending in recent years, a limited revenue capacity has restricted the scope of its policies keeping deficiencies in the provision of public services that reduce their impact on levels of poverty and inequality," the bank said. "One of the main challenges for the Dominican Republic is to broaden the fiscal space, maintaining the progressivity of the system. In this context, the next Fiscal Pact offers a unique opportunity to address reforms to strengthen fiscal sustainability and achieve better results for equity and poverty reduction," said Alessandro Legrottaglie, World Bank representative in the country, Dominican Today notes. The report suggests priorities to close the equity gap: -- Reforming the system of indirect taxes, focusing on tax exemptions Transfer of Industrial Goods and Services (BITS), the main VAT of the Dominican Republic, which benefit mostly middle and upper classes and accounting for 3% of GDP from 2013. -- Reforming electricity subsidies and programs such as Bon-gas and Bono-luz, retaining those that benefit the poorest. -- Increase subsidies that benefit the poor such as Eating is first, Incentive for school attendance and health services, avoiding creating new ones. -- Continue implementation of the recommendations of the Pact for Education to improve quality. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1. =========== M E X I C O =========== COMAPA ZC: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating & Maintains Negative Outlook ------------------------------------------------------------------ Moody's de Mexico has affirmed the Ba2/A2.mx ratings of COMAPA Z.C. At the same time, Moody's maintained the negative outlook on COMAPA Z.C.'s ratings. RATINGS RATIONALE RATIONALE FOR THE RATINGS AFFIRMATION AT Ba2/A2.mx COMAPA Z.C. has traditionally had low debt levels. In 2015, COMAPA's direct debt represented 5.1% of total revenues, the lowest level among Mexican-rated water companies. COMAPA Z.C.'s debt is entirely composed of short-term credit line and the company does not have any long-term debt. COMAPA Z.C.'s financial results deteriorated between 2014 and 2015, as its gross operating balance decreased to -18.8% from - 2.7% of operating revenues. This deterioration was the result of personnel expenditures rising 12% while operating revenues decline 2%. COMAPA Z.C.'s liquidity also deteriorated: its net working capital (measured as current assets excluding irrecoverable receivables minus current liabilities) decreased to -17.2% of total revenues from -1.5%. Likewise, its cash-to-current liabilities ratio was 0.02X in 2015 compared to 0.09X in 2014. In spite of COMAPA Z.C.'s credit profile weakening, the final ratings incorporate Moody's expectations that the State of Tamaulipas (Ba1/A1.mx, negative) will be willing and able to provide extraordinary support if needed given the strategic role COMAPA Z.C. plays for Tampico's economy. Between 2011 and 2015, the state's transfers to the water company represented 8% of total revenues on average. DEUTSCHE BANK: Moody's Puts Ba1 Rating on Review for Downgrade -------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's de Mexico placed on review for downgrade the Ba1 long-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings of Deutsche Bank Mexico, S.A., as well as the long and short-term Mexican National Scale (NSR) deposit ratings of A1.mx / MX-1. In addition, Moody's placed on review for downgrade Deutsche Bank Mexico's ba2 standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) and ba1 adjusted BCA along with its long and short term Counterparty Risk Assessments (CRAs) of Baa3(cr) and Prime-3(cr). Moody's also placed on review for downgrade the Ba1 global long term local currency issuer rating, as well as the A1.mx / MX-1 Mexican national scale long and short-term issuer ratings of Deutsche Securities, S.A. de C.V., Casa de Bolsa (Deutsche Securities Mexico, S.A. de C.V.). RATINGS RATIONALE The action on Deutsche Bank Mexico's and Deutsche Securities Mexico's ratings follows the signing of an agreement by the companies' ultimate parent, Deutsche Bank AG (Deutsche AG, BCA ba1), to sale these operations to Mexico's InvestaBank S.A. (InvestaBank, unrated), as part of a broader scaling back of its global operations amid the 2020 strategic plan. The reviews for downgrade consider that once the transaction closes, Deutsche Bank Mexico and Deutsche Securities Mexico will no longer benefit from support from Deutsche AG. Despite the marginal business importance of the Mexican entities to their parent, Moody's currently assumes a High likelihood of parent support given their shared brand name. The reputational cost for Deutsche Bank's global business of allowing these entities to fail should their situation unexpectedly deteriorate before the parent can finish winding them down, could very well outweigh the costs of bailing them out. Moody's continues to expect an orderly wind down of the Mexican entities, which are not currently under stress. However, the reviews for downgrade also reflect the progressive deterioration of earnings generation and business diversification that will occur as the balance sheets shrink and existing derivative operations are wound down through the transaction's closing date, which is expected to occur within the next 6 to 12 months. Moody's expects that at the sale's closing, the business being acquired by InvestaBank will largely consist of the trustee division of Deutsche Bank Mexico. The assessment of high affiliate support results in one notch of uplift in the adjusted BCA and deposit ratings of Deutsche Bank Mexico from its standalone BCA of ba2. LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS Deutsche Bank Mexico, S.A. These ratings and assessments were placed on review for downgrade: -- Baseline credit assessment of ba2 -- Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba1 -- Long-term global local currency deposit rating of Ba1 -- Long-term global foreign currency deposit rating of Ba1 -- Long-term Mexican National Scale deposit rating of A1.mx -- Short-term Mexican National Scale deposit rating of MX-1 -- Long and short term Counterparty Risk Assessments of Baa3(cr) and Prime-3(cr) Deutsche Securities, S.A. de C.V., Casa de Bolsa These ratings were placed on review for downgrade: -- Long-term global local currency issuer rating of Ba1 -- Long-term Mexican National Scale issuer rating of A1.mx -- Short-term Mexican National Scale issuer rating of MX-1 WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS DOWN Deutsche Bank Mexico's and Deutsche Securities Mexico's ratings will face increasing downward pressure as earnings decline and business diversification deteriorates in line with the winding down of their activities. Ratings would also likely be downgraded when the transaction reaches financial close. The long-term Mexican National Scale ratings of A1.mx indicate issuers or issues with above-average creditworthiness relative to other domestic issuers. The short- term Mexican National Scale ratings of issuers rated MX-1 indicate the strongest ability to repay short-term senior unsecured debt obligations relative to other domestic issuers. The principal methodology used in rating Deutsche Bank Mexico, S.A. was Banks published in January 2016. The principal methodology used in rating Deutsche Securities, S.A. de C.V., Casa de Bolsa was Global Securities Industry Methodology published in May 2013. The period of time covered in the financial information used to determine the rating is between Jan. 1, 2011, and Sept. 30, 2016. The sources and items of information used to determine the rating include 2016 interim financial statements (source: Moody's, Deutsche Bank Mexico and Deutsche Securities Mexico); year-end 2013, 2014 and 2015 audited financial statements (source: Moody's, Deutsche Bank Mexico and Deutsche Securities Mexico, audited by KPMG Cardenas Dosal, S. C. member of KPMG International). Deutsche Bank Mexico is headquartered in Mexico City, Mexico. As of Sept. 30 2016, it had total assets of Mx$43.8 billion and total shareholder's equity of Mx$4 billion. Deutsche Securities Mexico is headquartered in Mexico City, Mexico. As of Sept. 30, 2016, it had total assets of Mx$1.6 billion and total shareholder's equity of Mx$1.6 billion. ====================== P U E R T O R I C O ====================== EJS INCORPORADO: Hires Ruben Gonzalez as Attorney ------------------------------------------------- EJS Incorporado seeks authority from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ Ruben Gonzalez Marrero & Associates as attorney to the Debtor. EJS Incorporado requires Ruben Gonzalez to represent the Debtor in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Ruben Gonzalez will be paid at the hourly rate of $250. Ruben Gonzalez will be paid a retainer in the amount of $15,000. Ruben Gonzalez will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of- pocket expenses incurred. Ruben Gonzalez Marrero, member of Ruben Gonzalez Marrero & Associates, assured the Court that the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any interest adverse to the Debtor and its estates. Ruben Gonzalez can be reached at: Ruben Gonzalez Marrero, Esq. RUBEN GONZALEZ MARRERO & ASSOCIATES Carr. 174, Blq. 21-24 Urb. Santa Rosa Bayamon, PR 00959 Tel: (787) 798-8600 About EJS Incorporado EJS Incorporado aka EJS Inc. filed a chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-01647) on March 1, 2016. The petition was signed by Jose Manuel Rodriguez Amador, president. According to its bankruptcy petition, the Debtor is represented by Ada M. Conde, Esq. The case is assigned to Judge Edward A. Godoy. The Debtor estimated assets at $0 to $50,000 and liabilities at $1 million to $10 million at the time of the filing. No official committee of unsecured creditors has been appointed in the case. J TASTE: Disclosures Conditionally OK'd; Hearing Set For Nov. 30 ---------------------------------------------------------------- The Hon. Mildred Caban Flores of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico has conditionally approved J Taste Inc.'s amended disclosure statement dated Oct. 25, 2016. The hearing to consider the final approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Plan will be held on Nov. 30, 2016, at 9:0 a.m. Objections to the final approval of the Disclosure Statement and confirmation of the Plan, and acceptances or rejections of the Plan must be filed on or before 14 days prior to the date of the Confirmation Hearing. The Debtor must file with the Court a statement setting forth compliance with each requirement in U.S.C. Section 1129, the list of acceptances and rejections and the computation, within seven working days before the Confirmation Hearing. J Taste Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 15-10243). MBTI OF PUERTO RICO: Taps Charles A. Cuprill as Legal Counsel ------------------------------------------------------------- MBTI of Puerto Rico Inc. seeks approval from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to hire Charles A. Cuprill, P.S.C., Law Offices as its legal counsel. The firm will serve as the Debtor's legal counsel in connection with its Chapter 11 case. Charles Cuprill-Hernandez, Esq., will be paid an hourly rate of $350 for his services while the firm's associates will be paid $250 per hour. Mr. Cuprill-Hernandez disclosed in a court filing that the members of his firm are "disinterested persons" as defined in section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code. The firm can be reached through: Charles A. Cuprill-Hernandez, Esq. Charles A. Cuprill, P.S.C., Law Offices 356 Fortaleza Street, Second Floor San Juan, PR 00901 Tel: 787-977-0515 Fax: 787-977-0518 About MBTI of Puerto Rico MBTI of Puerto Rico, Inc. sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-08091) on Oct. 7, 2016. The petition was signed by Barbara Alozo Vila, president. The case is assigned to Judge Edward A. Godoy. At the time of the filing, the Debtor disclosed $12.99 million in assets and $16.07 million in liabilities. OLIVER C&I: Names Carmen Conde Torres as Legal Counsel ------------------------------------------------------ Oliver C&I Corp. seeks authorization from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to employ Carmen D. Conde Torres of the Law Offices of C. Conde & Assoc. as legal counsel. The Debtor requires C. Conde to: (a) advise the Debtor with respect to its duties, powers and responsibilities in this case under the laws of the United States and Puerto Rico in which the Debtor in possession conducts its operations, do business, or is involved in litigation; (b) advise the Debtor in connection with a determination whether a reorganization is feasible and, if not, helping the Debtor in the orderly liquidation of its assets; (c) assist the Debtor with respect to negotiations with creditors for the purpose of arranging the orderly liquidation of assets and for proposing a viable plan of reorganization; (d) prepare on behalf of the Debtor the necessary complaints, answers, orders, reports, memoranda of law and any other legal papers or documents; (e) appear before the Bankruptcy Court, or any court in which the Debtor assert a claim interest or defense directly or indirectly related to this bankruptcy case; (f) perform other legal services for the Debtor as may be required in these proceedings or in connection with the operation of and involvement with the Debtor's business, including but not limited to notarial services; and (g) employ other professional services, if necessary. The firm will be paid at these hourly rates: Carmen D. Conde Torres $300 Associates $275 Junior Attorney $250 Legal Assistants $150 C. Conde will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred. C. Conde required a retainer in the amount of $30,000 and was paid by third party, MC Magraner, Corp. Carmen D. Conde Torres, senior attorney of the firm, assured the Court that the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any interest adverse to the Debtor and its estate. C. Conde can be reached at: Carmen D. Conde Torres, Esq. C. CONDE & ASSOC. 254 San Jose Street, 5th Floor Old San Juan, P.R. 00901 Tel: (787) 729-2900 Fax: (787) 729-2203 E-mail: condecarmen@condelaw.com Oliver C & I Corp., based in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-08311) on October 17, 2016. The Hon. Mildred Caban Flores presides over the case. Carmen D Conde Torres, Esq., serves as attorney In its petition, the Debtor indicated $29.94 million in total assets and $1.06 million in total liabilities. The petition was signed by Max Olivera, vice-president/treasurer. =============================== T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O =============================== TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: More Oil, Gas Makes it to the US --------------------------------------------------- Aleem Khan at Daily Express reports that despite low oil and gas prices and production, Trinidad and Tobago has found more oil and gas to export to the world's lowest-priced market, the United States, data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) released November 1 showed. The EIA said oil exports from Trinidad and Tobago to the United States more than tripled (3.2x) month-on-month in August to 1,364,000 barrels versus 421,000 barrels in July, according to Daily Express. Similarly, liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to the U.S. from Point Fortin went up 40 per cent month-on-month in August to 7,998 million cubic feet (mcf) versus 5,703 mcf in July, according to the EIA. The EIA said all of the LNG from Trinidad entered via Everett, Massachusetts, the report notes. The release came on the same day BP Group Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Brian Gilvary released BP's third quarter (Q3) 2016 results and found himself having to confirm that the London-listed oil major is in fact getting lower prices for T&T gas, but without offering a reason, the report relays. On a November 1 investor call, Mr. Gilvary said: "BP's third quarter underlying replacement cost profit was US$930 million, down 49 per cent on the same period a year ago, and 30 per cent higher than the second quarter of 2016," the report relays The report notes that during the question and answer (Q&A) of the call, analyst Irene Himona of Societe Generale SA asked: "Firstly, in Q3, your natural gas realizations outside the U.S. appear somewhat weaker than anticipated perhaps. Can you give us any sort of guidance on how the portfolio outside the U.S. is linked, operating expenses (OE) versus Hub prices perhaps?" The report relays that Mr. Gilvary responded: "On gas prices, a lot of our non-Henry Hub gas impacts come from Trinidad and Asia Pacific. So, it's really from the Tanjung development and the Trinidad development. That's really where those realizations are coming from. A lot of our new gas projects that you'll know that start up in 2017, 2018 and 2019 are linked to domestic markets, so, they won't be as exposed to that sort of softness that we've seen in the LNG pricing outside the United States." Finance Minister Colm Imbert vowed to tackle transfer pricing during the fiscal 2017 budget debate October 24, saying he was engaging the Inter-American Centre of Tax Administrators (CIAT) for help. He said since 2011, the country is estimated to have lost US$1.4 billion per year to transfer pricing in the LNG industry, the report says. According to the Energy Ministry's latest monthly bulletin, T&T produced an average of 70,914 barrels of oil per day (bopd) in September versus 65,196 barrels of oil per day (bopd) in August versus 66,159 bopd in July. As for LNG, according to the Energy Ministry bulletin, Atlantic sold and delivered 1.8 million cubic metres of LNG in September versus 1.5 million cubic metres in August versus 2.3 million in July, the report notes. Only Galeota Mix (BP) has been exported from T&T since August: 740,546 barrels of Calypso Crude and Galeota Mix left in July, but only 380,353 barrels of Galeota Mix in August, and 759,251 barrels of Galeota Mix again in September were exported, the report adds. ============= U R U G U A Y ============= URUGUAY: To Get $6MM IDB Loan to Launch Program to Fight Crimes --------------------------------------------------------------- Uruguay will implement a program to fight theft and domestic and juvenile violence with help from a $6 million loan from the Inter- American Development Bank. In order to combat theft in Montevideo, the program will promote both deterrence and prevention programs. The deterrence element will include training 1,100 police officers in community relations, dissuasion and problem solving. Crime prevention will be pursued by training 650 officers from Montevideo's 25 precincts on dispute resolution and other related issues. The program will also strengthen criminal analysis and investigation techniques, providing training as well as computing hardware and software. In order to reduce domestic and juvenile violence, the program will implement integral prevention strategies in two quarters, Marconi and Casavalle. Working with local actors, it will strengthen "Pelota al Medio a la Esperanza," a program designed to put recreation time to good use and deter school desertion; implement interventions to prevent partner violence; promote social and work reintegration of ex-convicts; create safe urban spaces; and finance violence-prevention micro-initiatives within local communities. It will also support the creation of Uruguay's Applied Criminology Center in order to stimulate the use of scientific evidence in security policy decision-making. The $6 million IDB loan is for a 25-year term, with 5.5 years of grace, at a LIBOR-based interest rate. It includes an additional $2 million in local counterpart funds. *********** Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to publication. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com *********** S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2016. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-362-8552. * * * End of Transmission * * *