/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/160816.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Tuesday, August 16, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 161
Headlines
A R G E N T I N A
BALANZ CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns B3 Global LC Issuer Rating
B E L I Z E
BELIZE: Gets US$200,000 IDB Grant for Emergency Assistance
B R A Z I L
BRAZIL: Corruption Crisis Hits Interim Government
BRAZIL: Temer Reiterates Support for Private Enterprise, If Pres
GENERAL SHOPPING: Fitch Cuts LT Foreign IDR to 'RD'
JBS SA: Seeks Price Increase to Offset Real, Cost Surge in Brazil
JBS SA: S&P Lowers Rating to 'BB'; Outlook Stable
SUZANO PAPEL: S&P Affirms 'BB+' GS Ratings; Outlook Stable
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
BCC GP: Members' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 31
NUWAVE LARGE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 29
NUWAVE LONG/SHORT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 29
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: US Lifts Ban on Exports From Most Regions
E L S A L V A D O R
AES EL SALVADOR: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to Ba3
BANCO DE DESARROLLO: Moody's Lowers LT FC Issuer Rating to B1
EL SALVADOR: Moody's Cuts Issuer and Debt Ratings to 'B1'
P U E R T O R I C O
ANGEL CONTRERAS CORDERO: Unsecured Creditors to Get 60% Under Plan
AUTOS FERRER: Files Plan to Exit Chapter 11 Protection
JIMMY FUENTES FONSECA: Unsecured Creditors to Get 5% Dividend
NIKAI PR CORP: Oriental's Request for Copy of Plan Outline Okayed
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=================
A R G E N T I N A
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BALANZ CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns B3 Global LC Issuer Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo (MLA) has
assigned a B3 global local currency (GLC) issuer rating and a
national scale Baa2.ar issuer rating to Balanz Capital Valores
S.A. (Balanz Capital). MLA has also assigned a (P)B3 global debt
rating and Baa2.ar national scale debt rating, both in local and
foreign currency, to the multicurrency senior unsecured debt
program for up to ARS1,000 million, which will due in 5 years. At
the same time, MLA has assigned a B3 global senior unsecured debt
rating and a Baa2.ar national scale senior unsecured debt rating
in local currency to the first issuance under the program for up
to ARS 200 million, and a B3 global senior unsecured debt rating
and a Baa2.ar national scale debt rating in foreign currency to
the second issuance for up to ARS 200 million. Both issuances
together should not exceed ARS 200 million and will be due in 12
months.
These ratings were assigned to Balanz Capital Valores S.A.:
Global Local Currency Issuer Rating: B3
National Scale Local Currency Issuer Rating: Baa2.ar
Senior Unsecured Debt Program for up to ARS 1,000 million (or
its equivalent in other currencies):
Global Local- and Foreign Currency Senior Unsecured Debt Rating:
(P)B3
National Scale Local-and Foreign Currency Senior Unsecured Debt
Rating: Baa2.ar
Class 1 Senior Unsecured Local Currency Debt Issuance for up to
ARS 200 million:
Global Local Currency Senior Unsecured Debt Rating: B3
National Scale Local Currency Senior Unsecured Debt Rating:
Baa2.ar
Class 2 Senior Unsecured Foreign Currency Debt Issuance for up
to ARS 200 million:
Global Foreign Currency Senior Unsecured Debt Rating: B3
National Scale Foreign Currency Senior Unsecured Debt Rating:
Baa2.ar
RATINGS RATIONALE
Balanz Capital's B3 issuer rating captures its importance as the
largest brokerage house operating in fixed income instruments in
Argentina's MERVAL (Mercado de Valores de Buenos Aires), with a
share of more than 17% of trading volumes as of March 2016, and
the 4th largest player in MAE (Mercado Abierto Electronico), with
a 7% market share.
Since its inception, in 2002, the company's earnings have been
primarily generated from proprietary trading, which still accounts
for significant 70% of total income, and which exposes Balanz's
balance sheet to earnings volatility. Efforts to diversify its
franchise and improve the quality of earnings generation has led
the company to expand into trading activities for corporate and
institutional clients, assets under management, and custody
services. These lines of business represent 30% of profits, but
management intends to further grow in these segments, while
developing relationships with larger domestic and international
counterparties to achieve a more balanced and stable earnings mix.
As it expands its operations, however, Balanz's efficiency ratio
has suffered with rising personnel costs, which accounted for
45.4% of total expenses as of March 2016, up from 20.64% last
September.
The ratings also take into account Balanz Capital's funding mix,
which is highly reliant on its shareholders' resources, with
additional funding support provided by limited credit facilities
from local banks. While the company has traditionally distributed
100% of its profits, shareholders have also reinvested the
resources in the company, in support of its funding and liquidity.
The debt issuance in the local market is intended to diversify
funding sources.
As a small family-owned business, Balanz' decision making process
and management structure are concentrated. Continued expansion in
and outside of its footprint, therefore, will likely expose the
company to governance, risk management and control risks. The
issuer rating also captures the challenges that Argentina's
operating environment continue to pose to financial institutions.
Despite significant policy changes and clarity of direction
introduced by the new administration since December 2015, the
country continues to face significant economic and institutional
challenges, including high inflation and weak growth that might
affect financial institutions' performance over the coming months.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN
Balanz Capital's rating could face upward pressure if Argentina's
bond rating is upgraded or if the country's operating environment
continues to improve. On the other hand, the rating could go down
if the operating environment deteriorates, affecting the issuer
business prospects, or if Balanz's liquidity, profitability or
controls deteriorate significantly.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Securities Industry Methodology published in May 2013.
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B E L I Z E
===========
BELIZE: Gets US$200,000 IDB Grant for Emergency Assistance
----------------------------------------------------------
The Inter-American Development Bank will support the Government of
Belize's efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to communities
affected by Hurricane Earl with a US$200,000 grant.
The objective of the grant is to support the National Emergency
Management Organization's (NEMO) efforts to assist vulnerable
populations in communities damaged by high winds and floods in
various parts of the country.
Based on NEMO's initial assessment of the most immediate needs,
the Bank's assistance will support Government efforts to provide
the required relief in the hardest hit communities in the Belize,
Cayo, Orange Walk and Stann Creek Districts.
The funds will be used for food supplies, potable water, materials
for temporary shelters, transportation costs, and medicine, among
other emergency relief items.
On Nov. 27, 2015, TCRLA reported that Standard & Poor's Ratings
Services revised its outlook on the long-term ratings on Belize to
stable from positive. S&P also affirmed its 'B-/B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Belize. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B-' transfer and
convertibility assessment.
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B R A Z I L
===========
BRAZIL: Corruption Crisis Hits Interim Government
-------------------------------------------------
Buenos Aires Herald reports that the fanfare during the weekend
over the Olympic Games currently underway in Rio de Janiero did
little to distract prosecutors working on one of the largest
corruption probes ever seen in Brazil -- as both interim-President
Michel Temer and Foreign Minister Jose Serra have both been
implicated in the latest leaks from the investigation into the
corruption scandal at state oil firm Petrobras.
In a further sign that the Petrobras scandal may swallow Brazil's
entire political class, having already ousted suspended President
Dilma Rousseff's Workers Party (PT) from power, popular national
magazine Veja claimed on August 13 that jailed Brazilian
construction magnate Marcelo Odebrecht told prosecutors in a plea
bargain testimony that he contributed US$1.8 million illegally to
Temer's 2014 election campaign, and other executives from the
Odebrecht group claimed they handed over almost US$7.25 million in
cash to Serra's failed 2010 presidential campaign, newspaper Folha
de Sao Paulo reported, according to Buenos Aires Herald.
The report notes that defeated by Ms. Rousseff, Mr. Serra was
appointed Brazil's foreign minister by Mr. Temer after he took
over from her when she was suspended in May pending an impeachment
trial. Also defeated by Ms. Rousseff's predecessor, Luiz Inacio
Lula da Silva, in 2002, Mr. Serra is widely believed to be
preparing for a third try at the presidency in 2018, the report
discloses.
Mr. Odebrecht, whose family owns Latin America's largest
engineering and construction group, was sentenced in March to 19
years in jail for bribery, money-laundering and organized crime in
the Petrobras kickback scandal.
In a plea-bargain statement seen by Veja, Mr. Odebrecht said Mr.
Temer asked him for campaign funds in 2014 when the latter was
vice-president and seeking re-election on the ticket of the now-
suspended Ms. Rousseff, the report relays. Mr. Odebrecht said he
contributed BRL6 million from an office in his company that
handled secret payments.
A spokesman for Mr. Temer confirmed the meeting had taken place in
2014 during which Mr. Temer and his aide, Eliseu Padilha, asked
Odebrecht for a campaign contribution, the report notes.
"But it was all legal," the Herald quoted spokesman Marcio de
Freitas as saying. He said the donated money had been duly
registered with Brazil's electoral authorities, but gave no
details.
The executives who have implicated Foreign Minister Serra said
that the money was delivered outside Brazil and promised to
present the bank receipts as evidence, Mr. Folha said, the report
relays.
If Mr. Odebrecht's allegation is true and accepted as legal
testimony in court, it will complicate Mr. Temer's efforts to
secure his presidency by turning undecided senators against the
conviction of Ms. Rousseff in her impeachment trial, notes the
report. The Senate is due to decide by the end of the month on
whether to remove Mr. Rousseff permanently from office for
breaking budget laws.
The scandal at Petroleo Brasileiro SA, as the oil company is
formally called, led to the arrest of executives of Brazil's top
construction firms and the investigation of dozens of politicians
for allegedly receiving graft money, the report notes. Mr.
Odebrecht's plea bargain is expected to implicate many more of
them.
Additionally, says the Herald, the Attorney General's Office said
it had evidence to prove that former president Lula also actively
participated in the graft scheme at Petrobras and received
directly and indirectly, undue benefits from that network.
Booing, Jeering
According to the Buenos Aires Herald, the accusations place Mr.
Temer's government in a difficult position as he struggles with
poor popularity and questions over his government's legitimacy.
The interim president hoped to dismiss those doubts as he
officially opened the Games at the ceremony.
However, when Mr. Temer spoke in the 80,000-capacity Macarana
Stadium there was audible booing and jeering as he declared the
Games open. Mr. Rousseff suffered the same treatment at the
opening ceremony of the 2014 Soccer World Cup, the report recalls.
Police at several Olympic venues removed spectators for protesting
against the country's president, the report relays.
Twice, spectators were removed from their seats or expelled from
stadiums because they called for the ouster of the interim
president, the report notes. Videos of both incidents circulated
on social media and were widely condemned.
Moreover, an alternative opening ceremony was held close by in
protest. The political concert staged by demonstrators occupying
a cavernous, abandoned concert hall called the Canecao -- or "Big
Saucer," was named a tongue-twisting "Ceremony-Party-Act of
Olympic Re-existence," the report relays.
"This is the anti-Olympics," said Bernardo Santos, a 42-year-old
rapper, reports the Herald. He attacked the official games for
alleged, over-inflated construction contracts and the removal of
lower-income communities, the report notes.
Rousseff 'Sad' to Miss Out
Meanwhile, suspended President Ms. Rousseff said she was "sad" not
to be present at the opening ceremony, notes the Buenos Aires
Herald.
Ms. Rousseff, who was suspended from office in May pending her
trial by the Senate this month on charges of breaking budget laws,
said on her Twitter account she was "sad not to be at the party
'live and in color' but I will be following it, rooting for
Brazil," the report relays.
Ms. Rousseff turned down an invitation to the opening ceremony
last month, the report relays. Mr. Temer was her former vice-
president before their alliance broke apart. Ms. Rousseff has
insisted she has done nothing wrong and calls her removal a
"coup," is expected to be dismissed from office at the final
hearing at the end of this month, the report adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several
years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2 negative)
underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and
diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service. The
country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the
government's high level of mandatory spending.
BRAZIL: Temer Reiterates Support for Private Enterprise, If Pres
----------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that the acting president of Brazil, Michel
Temer, received the firm support of the construction sector,
whereupon he promised the businessmen to rebuild confidence in the
economy and promote private investment.
"I'm exercising the office of president on an interim basis, but
I'm acting as if it were permanent," said Mr. Temer upon welcoming
the businessmen, alluding to fact that his possible continuance in
power depends on President Dilma Rousseff's ouster, which could
occur as a result of her impeachment trial although she was
temporarily removed from her post in May, according to EFE News.
Mr. Temer promised to adopt measures to reactivate the
construction industry, above all the sector's capacity to create
jobs, given that 12 million Brazilians are currently unemployed,
the report notes.
"Employment is the first among social rights, because there is
nothing more undignified for a citizen than being unemployed,"
said Mr. Temer, who announced that his administration will
contract with the construction sector to build 40,000 new homes,
the report says.
The report relays that Mr. Temer admitted that the "country's
shortages in infrastructure are notorious," adding that he is
relying on the construction industry to rejuvenate the economy,
which last year contracted by 3.8 percent and this year should
decline by about 3 percent.
Despite this forecast, he urged businessmen to "believe" in the
country and said that "Brazil has an answer . . . . (and) although
it may be in crisis at this time, it's going to overcome that
crisis," the report says.
Participating in the ceremony were some 800 businessmen in the
civil construction sector, which declined by 7.6 percent last
year, still has not recovered and -- according to industry figures
-- over the last 12 months has lost one million jobs, the report
notes.
At the ceremony, the president of the Brazilian Construction
Industry Chamber, Jose Carlos Rodrigues Martins, expressed support
for the measures adopted by Temer to reduce public spending, as
well as the government's severe fiscal adjustment measures, the
report says.
Rodrigues Martins said that measures of this kind say that "things
are going along the proper road," adding that "if Brazil is OK"
businessmen and workers will be OK and that "together they will
reestablish the confidence to generate employment, profits and
taxes," the report relays.
He also declared that private enterprise only needs "legal
security and some better regulations" to recover its footing and
make up for "a state that . . . doesn't have the ability to
invest," the report adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several
years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2 negative)
underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and
diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service. The
country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the
government's high level of mandatory spending.
GENERAL SHOPPING: Fitch Cuts LT Foreign IDR to 'RD'
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded General Shopping Brasil S.A.'s (GSB)
Long-Term Foreign and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
to 'RD' from 'C' and its National Scale rating to 'RD(bra)' from
'C (bra)'. Fitch has also affirmed GSB's USD250 million perpetual
notes at 'C/RR4' and its USD150 million subordinated perpetual
notes at 'C/RR5'.
The downgrades follow the conclusion of GSB's debt exchange
offering. According to Fitch's methodology, the offering imposed a
material reduction in terms vis-a-vis the original terms of the
exchanged unsecured notes.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Debt Exchange Outcome Incorporated
GSB recently announced the settlement of the debt exchange offer
of the outstanding USD150 million principal amount of 12%
perpetual subordinated notes. A total amount of USD34.4 million in
perpetual subordinated notes was exchanged, for a total amount of
USD8.9 million (representing a 23% acceptance level) in new
10%/12% senior secured PIK Toggle Notes due 2026 and 34,413 Global
Depositary Shares (GDS). The GDS represent common shares issued by
GSB, with the ratio of 73 common shares for each one GDS. The new
notes will also be secured by a second mortgage (hipoteca de
segundo grau) on 50.1% of GBS' interest in Parque Shopping Maia.
The low acceptance level of 23% of the debt exchange offer for the
subordinated perpetual notes has resulted in no material change in
the company's capital structure.
High Leverage, Weakening Liquidity:
Fitch views GSB's capital structure as unsustainable due to
excessive financial leverage. GSB's last 12-month period ended
March 31, 2016 (LTM March 2016) saw EBITDA of BRL178 million and
total debt of BRL2 billion, with net total debt-to-EBITDA of 9.4x.
GSB's FCF is expected to remain negative due to excessive cash
interest payments during 2016. The company's high leverage and
interest rates on its debt has led to high cash interest payments
and declining interest coverage.
Quality Assets and Subordination Incorporated in Debt Recovery:
As of LTM March 2016, GSB's total assets were valued at an
estimated BRL2.9 billion, with encumbered and unencumbered assets
representing approximately 84% and 16%, respectively, of the total
assets value. The Recovery Rating (RR) of 'RR4' for the USD250
million perpetual notes reflects the average recovery prospects
(the 31% to 50% range) in an event of default. The 'RR5' for the
USD150 million subordinated perpetual notes reflects below average
recovery prospects of approximately 11-30%.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
The completion of the bond exchange offer has led to a downgrade
of GSB's Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs to 'RD'. A
positive rating action may follow after Fitch completes the
assessment of the company's credit profile.
LIQUIDITY
GSB has a cash position and short-term debt of BRL47 million and
BRL118 million, respectively, and approximately BRL466 million in
unencumbered assets as of March 31, 2016. On Sept. 8, 2015, the
company exercised its right to defer the payment of interest under
its USD150 million 12% perpetual subordinated notes. The interest
payment deferral does not constitute an event of default under the
indenture.
Without the reversal in GSB's negative FCF trend and absent
extraordinary measures to enhance the capital structure, Fitch
expects substantial deterioration in GSB's liquidity during 2016
and default risk will remain elevated.
FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS
Fitch has taken the following rating actions:
General Shopping Brasil S.A. (GSB)
-- Foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'RD' from 'C';
-- Local currency IDR downgraded to 'RD' from 'C';
-- National Scale rating downgraded to 'RD(bra)' from 'C(bra)'.
General Shopping Finance Limited (GSF)
-- USD250 million perpetual notes affirmed at 'C/RR4'.
General Shopping Investment Limited (GSI)
-- USD150 million subordinated perpetual notes affirmed at
'C/RR5'.
JBS SA: Seeks Price Increase to Offset Real, Cost Surge in Brazil
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Gerson Freitas Jr. at Bloomberg News reports that JBS SA, the
world's largest meat producer, said it will need to raise prices
and cut production as it seeks to offset a surge in costs and the
local currency, which have slashed profit margins in its homeland.
Wesley Batista, the company's chief executive officer, told
investors that the meatpacker's recent efforts to pass through the
higher costs to clients haven't been enough to make up for
skyrocketing prices for domestic corn used to feed chickens, while
export revenue is being curbed by a faster-than-expected
appreciation of the Brazilian real, according to Bloomberg News.
"We have important challenges in South America," the report quoted
Mr. Batista as saying in a conference call to discuss company's
quarterly results. "There is more to be done," Mr. Batista added.
Adjusted earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and
amortization fell 19% from a year ago to BRL2.89 billion ($921
million) in the second quarter, with margins for the period at the
lowest level in four years, the company said, Bloomberg News
notes. Still, net income increased to BRL1.5 billion from BRL80.1
million a year earlier, helped by a currency-related financial
gain..
According tot the Bloomberg News, the Brazilian currency is up 26%
this year, the most among major currencies, slashing export
revenues when converted into reais. More than 80% of JBS's sales
are in dollars and include revenue from Pilgrim's Pride Corp., the
U.S. publicly traded poultry company it controls.
"We did expect the real to appreciate, but it came much faster
than forecast," Mr. Batista said, Bloomberg News relays.
The executive said JBS is considering the reduction of production
volumes in Brazil as it seeks to increase margins. Still, the
company has no plans to shut plants, notes Bloomberg News.
While conditions remain challenging in Brazil, JBS says the
outlook is more favorable for its pork and beef businesses in the
U.S, Bloomberg News discloses. An expected increase in the
availability of animals for slaughter, falling grain prices and
rising export demand are seen boosting profit margins in the
country in the second half, Mr. Batista said, Bloomberg News
relates.
Hedges Unwound
The Bloomberg News report further noted that revenue climbed 12%
to BRL43.7 billion in the second quarter, boosted by increased
volumes as well as impacts from the currency, which was on average
lower than during the same three months of the previous years.
That missed the BRL44.6 billion average estimate of eight analysts
surveyed by Bloomberg.
JBS SA unwound a $12 billion hedging position used to protect its
foreign debt from the fluctuations of the real after losing BRL5.8
billion with those derivatives, the company said, Bloomberg News
relays. The hedging contributed to a record net loss of BRL2.74
billion in the first quarter, the report discloses.
Earnings at its biggest unit -- JBS USA Beef -- slumped 88% from
last year, Bloomberg News relates. Ebitda at the unit, which
includes operations in Australia and Canada, fell to $27 million,
reflecting lower cattle availability and higher production costs,
the company said, Bloomberg News notes.
Ebitda at the Mercosul beef operation rose 21% to BRL457.2 million
on improved demand in international markets, the report relays.
Bloomberg News says that adjusted net income at Pilgrim's, the
second-biggest chicken processor in the U.S., missed analysts'
estimates after falling 39% in the period on weaker chicken
prices, the unit reported on July 27.
Ebitda at Seara, Brazil's second-largest chicken producer and
foodmaker, fell 52% to BRL382 million in the period, relays the
report. Brazil's chicken and processed food producers have been
struggling with a surge in domestic corn prices, and as the worst
recession in more than a century limits JBS's ability to raise
prices, Bloomberg News adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
May 16, 2016, S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on JBS S.A.
and JBS USA LLC to negative from stable. At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'BB+' global scale and 'brAA+' national scale ratings
on JBS and JBS USA. In addition, S&P affirmed its 'BB+' issue-
level ratings on both companies. A recovery rating of '3' for the
senior secured debt -- indicating a recovery expectation of 70%-
90%, in the higher band of the range -- and a '4' recovery rating
for the unsecured debt -- indicating a recovery expectation of
30%-50%, the higher band of the range -- remain unchanged.
JBS SA: S&P Lowers Rating to 'BB'; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings downgraded JBS S.A. and JBS USA LLC to 'BB'
from 'BB+' on the global scale. S&P also downgraded JBS to
'brAA-' from 'brAA+' on the national scale. In addition, S&P
lowered all its issue-level ratings to 'BB' from 'BB+' on both
companies. A recovery rating of '3' for the senior secured
debts--indicating a recovery expectation of 70%-90%, in the higher
band of the range--and a '4' recovery rating for the unsecured
debts--indicating a recovery expectation of 30%-50%, the higher
band of the range--remain unchanged.
The downgrade reflects JBS's weaker liquidity following two
quarters of cash drain to liquidate derivative positions, poor
working capital management, and lower-than-estimated operating
cash flows. S&P revised its assessment on the company's liquidity
to less than adequate from adequate to reflect S&P's view of a
diminished financial flexibility amid still sizable short-term
maturities and difficulties to recover margins of the group's main
businesses, such as the U.S. beef and Brazilian poultry operation
at Seara. S&P expects the US beef's margins to rise to 4% in the
second half of 2016 given a stronger demand for beef and higher
cattle availability. However, high grain prices in reais will
continue to pressure Seara. Therefore, its margins will start to
rebound only in fourth quarter 2016 due to a higher share of
value-added products.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's belief that JBS's global
business and geographic diversification will help its cash flows
to bounce back, while improving cash position and leverage
metrics. S&P's view of JBS's financial policy as negative, and
ultimately the downgrade, reflects the recent earnings volatility.
And weak track record of forecast achievement reflects S&P's
recent change of management and governance assessment to fair from
satisfactory. However, another unexpected loss could prevent JBS
from maintaining debt to EBITDA below 4x and FFO to debt trending
to 20% in 2017.
SUZANO PAPEL: S&P Affirms 'BB+' GS Ratings; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its national scale rating on Suzano
Papel e Celulose S.A. to 'brAA+' from 'brAA'. In addition S&P
affirmed its 'BB+' global scale ratings on Suzano and S&P's 'BB+'
issue-level ratings on the financing vehicles Bahia Sul Holding
GMBH and Suzano Trading Ltd, which Suzano guarantees. The outlook
is stable. S&P also affirmed its '3' recovery rating on the
issue-level ratings, indicating its expectation of meaningful
recovery (50%-70% in the higher range of the band) of the notes
under a hypothetical default scenario.
Suzano's global scale ratings continue to reflect the company's
advantageous cost structure for pulp production thanks to its
access to highly productive forests, efficient pulp mills and a
satisfactory level of self-sufficiency in wood and energy.
Furthermore, it incorporates the company's solid position in the
global pulp market and Brazilian market for uncoated and coated
printing and writing paper and paperboard. These factors offset
pulp price volatility, which S&P expects to remain significant in
the next few years, as well as the company's exposure to printing
and writing paper products, which have been showing demand
declines due to digital substitution. The national scale rating
upgrade, on the other hand, is based on Suzano's improvement in
its financial metrics, which result in a favorable comparison
relative to other Brazilian issuers.
The stable outlook incorporates S&P's view that Suzano's low-cost
producing assets, efficient operations and reduced investment
needs will support solid free-operating cash flow generation and
an overall comfortable liquidity profile. It further reflects
S&P's expectation Suzano will post FFO to debt in excess of 20%
and debt to EBITDA around 2.5x.
S&P could take a negative rating action over the coming 12 months
if the company's financial metrics weaken significantly from the
current level, with net debt to EBITDA of more than 3.5x-4x and
FFO to net debt of less than 20%. This could happen if, for
example, pulp prices decline to about $650 per ton and the foreign
exchange appreciates to an average of R$3/US$, or if the company
enter in an aggressive shareholder remuneration program or an
important capex plan.
A higher rating is currently constrained by Suzano's financial
policy which, in S&P's view, is weaker than that of investment
grade peers. In particular, for a rating upgrade, S&P would
expect Suzano's financial risk profile to permanently strengthen
and the company to have clear and sustainable financial policies,
that support conservative leverage (for instance at a level of net
debt to EBITDA below 3x and FFO to debt above 30%) in the medium
to long term.
==========================
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
==========================
BCC GP: Members' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 31
----------------------------------------------
The members of BCC GP Ltd. will hold their final general meeting
on Aug. 31, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Ken Stewart
c/o Apex Fund Services (Cayman) Limited
P.O. Box 10085 161a Artillery Court
Grand Cayman KY1 1001
Cayman Islands
NUWAVE LARGE: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 29
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Nuwave Large Cap Active Alpha Master Fund Ltd.
will hold their final general meeting on Aug. 29, 2016, at
10:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Troy W. Buckner
35 Waterview Boulevard
Parsippany, NJ 07054
Telephone: 973-888-6815
Facsimile: 973-888-6810
NUWAVE LONG/SHORT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 29
--------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Nuwave Long/Short Portfolio Ltd. will hold
their final general meeting on Aug. 29, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Troy W. Buckner
35 Waterview Boulevard
Parsippany, NJ 07054
Telephone: 973-888-6815
Facsimile: 973-888-6810
===================================
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
===================================
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: US Lifts Ban on Exports From Most Regions
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the United States Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has lifted the ban on exports of
fruit and vegetables from Santo Domingo province and the National
District that host the Mediterranean fruit fly, the Agriculture
Ministry announced.
United States Department of Agriculture deputy administrator of
phytosanitary issues, Osama el-Lissy, posted the information,
contained in federal order number DA-2016-51 issuing August 10,
2016, according to Dominican Today.
"APHIS evaluated the production practices and reports reading
traps and activities of the eradication program implemented by the
Ministry of Agriculture, and determined that the provinces of
Santo Domingo and the National District, can be added to the list
of provinces from where they can export products to the United
States that host the Mediterranean Fly," the US official said, the
report relays.
The APHIS adds that there has never been captures in Santo Domingo
province and only one in the National District in the first week
of May 2015, the report notes.
The Agriculture Ministry added that there are currently nearly 200
hectares of exportable fruits and vegetables in Santo Domingo and
the National District, especially papayas and peppers, the report
discloses.
Ban Still in Effect in the East
The ban however, is still in effect for La Altagracia, La Romana,
El Seibo, Hato Mayor, San Pedro and Monte Plata, the eastern
provinces where the outbreak first occurred, the report adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to
positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.
=====================
E L S A L V A D O R
=====================
AES EL SALVADOR: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to Ba3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the senior unsecured long
debt rating and Corporate Family Rating of AES El Salvador Trust
II bis (Trustco II) to Ba3 from Ba2. At the same time, Moody's
placed the ratings of Trustco II on review for downgrade.
Trustco II issued the 10-year $310 million senior global notes due
in 2023 for the benefit of four affiliated electric distribution
companies in El Salvador: Compania de Alumbrado Electrico de San
Salvador (CAESS), Empresa Electrica de Oriente (EEO), AES Clesa y
Compania (CLESA) and Distribuidora Electrica de Usulutan (DEUSEM).
These four distribution utilities (collectively the guarantors)
unconditionally and severally guarantee the debt of Trust II bis.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The downgrade and review of the ratings of Trustco II is prompted
by the August 11 downgrade of El Salvador government bond rating
to B1 from Ba3, under review for downgrade.
Trust II's Ba3 CFR and senior unsecured ratings reflect the
guarantors' consolidated credit profile given the joint and
several guaranty provided by each of these regulated utilities
which represent a senior unsecured obligation of each guarantor.
The Ba3 ratings further reflect Trust II's dependence on the
guarantors' payments under a promissory note to service the $310
million Notes.
The rating action also considers the recent deterioration of the
guarantors' consolidated key credit metrics driven by a modest
increase in the consolidated debt (CLESA's new 3-year $18 million
term loan) and the material amount of dividends distributed last
year ($54 million). On a consolidated basis, the guarantors
recorded negative Retained Cash Flow (RCF) to debt that hovered
around (-1%) at year-end 2015 and in the last twelve months ending
March 31, 2016 compared to 12.1% at year-end 2014. Their
consolidated CFO pre-W/C to debt also dropped to around 15.5%
(2014: 18.8%); however, Moody's acknowledges that this credit
metric remains strong for the Ba-rating category. The Ba3 ratings
also capture the modest size of the guarantors, their relatively
low business risk profile as well as the overall credit supportive
regulatory framework under which they operate. The ratings
consider the financial covenant embedded in the $310 million Notes
that limits the guarantors' ability to incur incremental
indebtedness to a maximum total capitalization to debt of 65%.
The guarantors' liquidity profile is enhanced by the six month
debt service reserve account (interest only) required under the
terms of the Notes, the 3-year committed bank credit facilities
that aggregate $16.5 million which are currently fully available.
Tustco II's ratings further acknowledge the guarantors' track
record over the last several years to hold cash balances that
aggregate at least $20 million. Moody's notes that the current
low global oil prices have contributed to low power prices that
has facilitated the guarantor's ability to reduce their
significant regulated asset balances (receivables) and to record
positive changes in the working capital of $28 million in 2015.
The review of Trustco's ratings will largely focus on assessing
the impact that a potential downgrade of the sovereign ratings
could have on the assigned ratings. It will also focus on
determining whether the guarantors' liquidity profile is
sufficient to maintain a one-notch difference with the country's
government rating, particularly as this has fallen in the B-rating
category. To that end, the review will assess whether the
government's overall fiscal difficulties could impact the
guarantor's liquidity, particularly in the wake of the challenges
posed this year to the payment mechanisms of the electricity
subsidies for end-users with a monthly consumption below 99/KWh.
Moody's understands that the guarantors have not experienced to
date significant delays in the collection of these subsidies,
equivalent in 2015 to almost $95 million or 13% of the guarantors'
recorded revenues. The review will also consider whether the
guarantors are able to extend under similar conditions the
guarantors' committed credit facilities that expire in February
2017.
FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE
The prospects of an upgrade of Trustco II's Ba3 ratings are
limited given they are under review for downgrade.
A confirmation of the ratings could be considered following a
confirmation of the sovereign ratings and if Moody's review
concludes that the guarantors' financial and liquidity profile are
deemed appropriate to maintain the current one-notch difference
between ratings of Trustco II and the sovereign.
FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN DOWNGRADE
A downgrade of Trustco's Ba3 ratings is likely to follow a
downgrade of the sovereign ratings and/or if the government's
fiscal challenges impact the guarantors' liquidity profile and/or
ability to extend the committed credit facilities. Moody's
assessment that the guarantors' financial and/or liquidity
profiles are no longer appropriate to maintain the one-notch
difference between Trustco II's ratings and the sovereign rating
could also result in a downgrade.
In addition, unexpected changes in the regulatory framework that
reduces the predictability and consistency in which the regulation
is applied would exert downward pressure on the rating. A
deterioration of key credit metrics deteriorate, such that the
consolidated interest coverage ratio and the CFO pre-W/C to debt
fell below 3x and 11%, respectively, for an extended period. An
aggressive distribution policy that results in RCF to debt
remaining below 7% for an extended period, could also result in a
downgrade.
Downgrades:
Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2; Placed
Under Review for further Downgrade
Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba3 from
Ba2; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade
Outlook Actions:
Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Negative
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regulated
Electric and Gas Utilities published in December 2013.
The guarantors' service territory extends over 80% of the country
while their market share in terms of the national electricity
demand exceeds 65%. They are subject to the regulatory overview
of the Superintendencia General de Electricidad y
Telecomunicaciones (SIGET). The guarantors' ultimate parent
company is AES Corp (AES; CFR: Ba3, positive) which holds indirect
ownership stakes ranging between 64.15% and 89.11%, averaging 80%
overall.
BANCO DE DESARROLLO: Moody's Lowers LT FC Issuer Rating to B1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B1, from Ba3, the
long-term foreign currency issuer rating of Banco de Desarrollo de
El Salvador (Bandesal), and downgraded the bank's standalone
baseline credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA to b1, from ba3.
These ratings and assessments were placed on review for further
downgrade.
At the same time, Moody's downgraded Banco Agricola, S.A.'s
standalone BCA to b1, from ba3, and placed it under review for
further downgrade. Moody's also placed under review for downgrade
the bank's ba2 adjusted BCA, as well as its Ba2 long-term foreign
currency deposit rating and its Ba1(cr) long-term counterparty
risk assessment.
Moody's also placed under review for downgrade the Ba2 long-term
foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating of Agricola Senior
Trust, a Cayman Islands-based trust unconditionally and
irrevocably guaranteed by Banco Agricola.
These rating actions follow Moody's downgrade of El Salvador's
government bond rating to B1, from Ba3, on review for further
downgrade. For details on the rating action on El Salvador please
refer to Moody's press release "Moody's downgrades El Salvador's
government ratings to B1, places ratings on review for further
downgrade," published on Aug.11, 2016.
These ratings and assessments were downgraded and placed on review
for downgrade:
Banco de Desarrollo de El Salvador
Long-term foreign currency issuer rating to B1, from Ba3
Baseline credit assessment to b1, from ba3
Adjusted baseline credit assessment to b1, from ba3
Banco Agricola, S.A.
Baseline credit assessment to b1, from ba3
These ratings and assessments were placed under review for
downgrade:
Banco Agricola, S.A.
Long-term foreign currency deposit rating of Ba2
Adjusted baseline credit assessment of ba2
Long-term counterparty risk assessment of Ba1(cr)
Agricola Senior Trust
Long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating of Ba2
RATINGS RATIONALE
DOWNGRADING OF BASELINE CREDIT ASSESSMENTS
The downgrade of Bandesal's and Banco Agricola's BCAs to b1, from
ba3, results from the downgrade of El Salvador's sovereign bond
rating to B1, which caps the banks' BCAs. The lower BCAs reflect
Moody's view that the creditworthiness of both banks is
intrinsically correlated with that of the Salvadoran government as
the latter faces challenges associated with rising government debt
amid high fiscal deficits and low economic growth.
In downgrading the BCA of Bandesal, a local development bank,
Moody's also took into account that its liquidity position and
market access are closely tied to the government's own liquidity
pressures related to the legislative impasse that precludes it
from issuing long-term debt. In turn, while Banco Agr°cola
maintains a good capital position, consistent profitability and
ample liquidity, its financial strength is limited by the
creditworthiness of the Salvadoran government.
Both banks' BCAs were placed on review for downgrade in order to
reflect the review for further downgrade of El Salvador's
sovereign ratings.
SUPPORTED RATINGS
Moody's downgrade of Bandesal's issuer rating to B1 is in line
with the downgrade to B1 of El Salvador's government bond rating.
Moody's continues to regard Bandesal as an important government
policy arm which provides long-term financing to domestic
financial institutions, which in turn largely on-lend to small and
mid-sized enterprises (SMEs) and micro-entrepreneurs.
Moody's placed under review for downgrade the Ba2 foreign currency
deposit rating of Banco Agricola, despite the rating agency's
assessment of a high probability of affiliate support from its
Colombian parent bank, Bancolombia, S.A. (deposits Baa2 stable,
BCA baa3), in order to reflect the ongoing review of the
Salvadoran government's ratings. Agricola Senior Trust's Ba2
long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating was also
placed under review for downgrade in line with the review for
dowgrade of Banco Agricola's long-term foreign currency deposit
rating.
WHAT COULD CAUSE THE RATINGS TO MOVE UP OR DOWN
If and when El Salvador's government bond rating is downgraded,
Bandesal's and Banco Agricola's BCAs and their respective
supported ratings would be downgraded. Because the ratings are on
review for downgrade, there is no upward ratings pressure at this
time.
The last rating action on Bandesal was on Nov. 23, 2015.
The last rating action Banco Agricola was on June 4, 2015.
The last rating action on Agricola Senior Trust was on July 1,
2015.
The principal methodology used in rating Banco de Desarrollo de El
Salvador was Government-Related Issuers published in October 2014.
The principal methodology used in rating Banco Agricola, S.A. and
Agricola Senior Trust was Banks published in January 2016.
Bandesal is El Salvador's development bank, originally established
as Banco Multisectorial de Inversiones by special legislative act
in 1994 and transformed into Banco de Desarrollo de El Salvador by
law as of January 2012. The bank supports private sector economic
development and investment largely by lending through the
financial system. Bandesal reported total assets of
USD560 million as of March 2016.
Banco Agricola is domiciled in San Salvador, El Salvador, and is
the largest bank in the country with market shares of 26% in loans
and deposits. As of March 2016, Banco Agricola reported
consolidated assets of USD4.3 billion and deposits of
USD2.8 billion. Agricola Senior Trust is a Cayman Islands special
purpose trust governed by the laws of the Cayman Islands and is
unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by Banco Agricola.
EL SALVADOR: Moody's Cuts Issuer and Debt Ratings to 'B1'
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded El Salvador's issuer and debt
ratings to B1 from Ba3 and placed the ratings on review for
further downgrade.
The key driver for the downgrade to B1 is the continued inability
of the authorities to arrest the upward trend in government debt
amid persistently high fiscal deficits and low economic growth.
Moody's review for further downgrade will assess the rising
government liquidity risks derived from persistently high and
rising short-term debt in a relatively shallow domestic market,
and the legislative impasse that has so far this year prevented
the approval of long-term debt issuance to retire short-term
paper. The review for further downgrade will allow Moody's to
better assess rising liquidity risks in El Salvador's credit
profile and explore possible scenarios that could materialize,
depending on the government's policy response and the outcome of
negotiations between the main political parties in the Legislative
Assembly to normalize the funding situation and, ultimately, avoid
a credit event.
Moody's would downgrade El Salvador's B1 ratings if the review
were to conclude that measures are only sufficient to temporarily
curb the increase in liquidity risks. In this case, the most
likely rating outcome is a one-notch downgrade. However, if
government liquidity risks continue to rise unabated and an
agreement to approve long-term debt issuance to retire short-term
debt remains unlikely, a downgrade of more than one notch would be
possible.
El Salvador's long-term foreign-currency bond and deposit ceilings
were lowered to Ba2 from Ba1. Short-term foreign-currency bond and
deposit ceiling remain unchanged at NP.
Ratings Rationale
Rationale for Downgrading to B1 From Ba3
Government Efforts Have Fallen Short In Addressing The Rising Debt
Trend
Moody's decision to downgrade El Salvador to B1 was driven by the
continued inability of the country's authorities to arrest the
upward trend in government debt amid persistently high fiscal
deficits and low economic growth.
El Salvador's government debt ratios have reported an upward trend
since 2009 driven by fiscal deficits of around 3.6% of GDP, which,
in addition to pension-related expenditures, have been due to an
expanding wage bill and untargeted subsidies. Moody's expects
debt-to-GDP to surpass 60% by year-end 2016. GDP growth of only 2%
implies that a stabilization of debt ratios requires the
authorities to implement aggressive fiscal consolidation measures
involving both revenues and expenditures. Political gridlock in
the Legislative Assembly and a lack of a majority by the ruling
party make this task particularly challenging.
As a result of a slow but steady rise in debt metrics, government
finances are weaker than those of other sovereigns in the Ba
category. El Salvador's debt-to-GDP ratio is 15 percentage points
higher than the Ba median projected to be 47% in 2016. The
government's interest burden (interest payments-to-government
revenues) is 4 percentage points higher than the Ba median (12.7%
vs. 8.7%). Low GDP growth complicates the government's fiscal
consolidation efforts given average annual growth of 1.7% over the
past decade, which compares to 3.7% of the median for Ba-rated
peers over the same period.
"If current fiscal and economic trends continue, without a fiscal
or pension reform, we project the gradual rise in the debt-to-GDP
ratio to continue and to approach 70% by 2020." Moody's said.
The affirmation of the Ba3 ratings last November incorporated
Moody's expectation that the government would take steps to reduce
fiscal deficits and stabilize rising debt ratios. The rating
agency expected this would be supported by approval of a pension
reform. Since then, the government has been unable to reach an
agreement with the opposition, and its efforts were sidetracked
because the ruling party (FMLN) lost support from its main ally
GANA, the third largest party in the Legislative Assembly. Without
GANA's votes, it is unlikely the FMLN will obtain the necessary
votes to approve a pension reform given strong opposition from
ARENA, the opposition party with the most seats in the Assembly.
El Salvador's pension system was privatized in 1998 and moved to a
defined-contributions system. However, the system partly operates
as a pay-as-you-go system with a portion of current pension
obligations financed by the government's budget, while most of the
contributions accrue to the private pension funds for future
pension payments. Moreover, legislative decisions over the past
decade to increase benefits under the private system, to make it
match the old system, have increased the financial costs of the
transition period. According to government estimates, pension-
related government expenditures have hovered at around 1.8% of GDP
during 2005-15 and are expected to remain roughly the same during
the next decade. The accumulation of these annual pension outlays
has led to a steady increase in debt issued to fund pensions,
which now amounts for 13.8% of GDP.
Pension expenditures represent roughly half of the fiscal deficit.
Without addressing pension-related fiscal costs, any single fiscal
effort will have only a limited effect in arresting the debt
trend.
RATIONALE FOR THE REVIEW FOR FURTHER DOWNGRADE
Moody's decision to initiate a review for further downgrade of El
Salvador's B1 rating is intended to allow the rating agency to
better assess rising liquidity risks in the country's credit
profile. The review also offers Moody's the opportunity to explore
possible scenarios that could materialize depending on the
government's policy response and the outcome of negotiations
between the main political parties in the Legislative Assembly
that could ease funding pressures and, ultimately, avoid a credit
event.
The government of El Salvador faces increased liquidity risks,
given the continued rise of short-term government paper (LETES)
which currently stands above historical thresholds, challenging
local banks' capacity and willingness to absorb additional
amounts. As the government has been unable to secure approval from
the Legislative Assembly to issue long-term debt, it has been
forced to increasingly finance itself with short-term debt. As a
two-thirds majority vote in the Legislative Assembly is required
to approve long-term debt issuance, the ruling party (FMLN) needs
support from the main opposition party (ARENA) to get approval.
Previous administrations had always been able to broker an
agreement with the opposition to issue long-term debt and retire
LETES when the outstanding amount reached $800 million. Since
January 2016, LETES surpassed the $800 million mark, a level at
which refinancing conditions began to deteriorate. In March, LETES
reached a record high of $937 million and then declined to $857
million in May as the government restrained spending and benefited
from strong revenue collection.
To date, there are no indications that an agreement between the
two main parties will be reached soon.
WHAT COULD RESULT IN A FURTHER DOWNGRADE
Moody's would downgrade El Salvador's B1 rating if the review were
to conclude that an agreement between the political parties, or
other government measures, are only sufficient to temporarily curb
the increase in liquidity risks, provide temporary breathing room
to government finances, and therefore delay a comprehensive
agreement on fiscal and pension reforms. The most likely rating
outcome in that instance would be a one-notch downgrade. However,
if government liquidity risks continue to rise unabated and an
agreement to approve long-term debt issuance to retire short-term
debt is unlikely before the end of the year, a downgrade of more
than one notch is possible.
WHAT COULD CONFIRM THE RATING AT THE CURRENT LEVEL
Given Moody's decision to initiate a review for downgrade, an
upward movement in the rating is unlikely at this point in time.
El Salvador's rating could be confirmed at B1 if the government is
able to materially reduce government liquidity risks and/or if it
is granted Legislative Assembly's approval for issuance of long-
term government debt to retire LETEs. In addition, a credible and
detailed plan for addressing the government's persistent budget
deficits and rising debt ratio, agreed between the main political
parties or under an IMF program, would support a rating
confirmation.
GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 8,303 (2015 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)
Real GDP growth (% change): 2.5% (2015 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)
Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 1% (2015 Actual)
Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -3.3% (2015 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)
Current Account Balance/GDP: -3.6% (2015 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)
External debt/GDP: 59.9% (2015 Actual)
Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience
Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.
On 09 August 2016, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the El Salvador, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's institutional
strength/framework, have materially decreased. The issuer's fiscal
or financial strength, including its debt profile, has materially
decreased. The issuer has become increasingly susceptible to event
risks.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond
Ratings published in December 2015.
The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.
======================
P U E R T O R I C O
======================
ANGEL CONTRERAS CORDERO: Unsecured Creditors to Get 60% Under Plan
-----------------------------------------------------------------
General unsecured creditors will get 60% of their claims under a
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization of Angel Contreras Cordero, a
Car Factory, Inc. salesman.
Under the plan, creditors holding Class 4 general unsecured claims
will receive cash payment in the amount of $90,000 or 60% of their
claims.
Distributions will be made on a monthly basis starting on the
first day of the 38th month following the effective date of the
plan and will continue thereafter to the 218th month. Monthly
payments are estimated to be in the amount of $500, according to
the disclosure statement detailing the plan.
A copy of the disclosure statement is available for free at
http://bankrupt.com/misc/AngelCordero_1stDS07282016.pdf
The Debtor is represented by:
Jesus E. Batista Sanchez, Esq.
The Batista Law Group, PSC
420 Ave. Ponce de Leon; Suite 901
San Juan, PR 00918
Tel. 787-620-2856
Fax. 787-625-0259
About Angel Contreras Cordero
Angel Contreras Cordero sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 16-01008) on February 12,
2016.
The Debtor works as a car salesman at Car Factory, Inc. and owns a
rental income generating real property in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
The Debtor previously owned an auto dealership. As a result of
the declining economy of Puerto Rico and an expensive divorce
proceeding, the Debtor's dealership experienced a decline in
sales, which in turn impacted his ability to keep-up with his
unsecured obligations. Eventually, the Debtor defaulted on his
unsecured obligations, which caused the Debtor to file for
bankruptcy protection.
AUTOS FERRER: Files Plan to Exit Chapter 11 Protection
------------------------------------------------------
Autos Ferrer Inc. filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico its proposed plan to exit Chapter 11
protection.
The restructuring plan proposes to pay unsecured creditors from
the proceeds of the car sales operation. Under the plan, Class 3
general unsecured creditors will receive payments if, after paying
the debt to Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, there are still proceeds
to be distributed.
Banco Popular, a secured creditor of Autos Ferrer, is the holder
of several mortgages notes encumbering the company's property
located in Isabela, Puerto Rico. The bank asserts a $222,500
secured claim.
A copy of the disclosure statement detailing the plan is available
for free at http://bankrupt.com/misc/AutosFerrer_DS07282016.pdf
Autos Ferrer is represented by:
Isabel M Fullana, Esq.
Garcia-Arregui & Fullana PSC
252 Ponce de Leon Ave. Suite 1101
San Juan, PR 00918
Tel: 787-766-2530
Email: isabelfullana@gmail.com
About Autos Ferrer
Autos Ferrer Inc. sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 15-08240) on October 22,
2015.
JIMMY FUENTES FONSECA: Unsecured Creditors to Get 5% Dividend
-------------------------------------------------------------
Unsecured creditors will receive a dividend of 5% of their claims
under a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization of Jimmy Fuentes Fonseca
and two other debtors.
According to the plan, creditors holding Class 12 general
unsecured claims will receive a dividend of 5% of their claims
against Mr. Fonseca, Blanca Diaz Plaza and JB Development Corp.
Payments will start on the 25th month of the plan after priority
tax claims are paid in full.
The Debtors propose to pay the claims from cash generated from
their leasing operations, according to the latest disclosure
statement explaining the plan.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico will
consider approval of the disclosure statement at a hearing on
September 7, at 9:00 a.m.
The hearing will take place at the Jose V. Toledo Federal Building
and U.S. Courthouse, Courtroom No. 1, Second Floor, 300 Recinto,
Sur, Old San Juan, Puerto Rico. Objection must be filed not less
than 14 days prior to the hearing.
A copy of the disclosure statement is available for free at
https://is.gd/fgc8Jg
The Debtors are represented by:
Antonio I. Hernandez Santiago, Esq.
Hernandez Law Office
P.O. Box 8509
San Juan, PR 00910-0509
Tel: 787-250-0575
Email: ahernandezlaw@yahoo.com
About the Debtors
Jimmy Fuentes Fonseca and Blanca I. Diaz Plaza own properties in
Toa Baja, Puerto Rico, which they lease out to businesses and
individuals.
The Debtors sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 13-09196) on November 1, 2013. The
case is assigned to Judge Brian K. Tester.
On February 14, 2014, the case was substantively consolidated with
JB Development Inc.'s Chapter 11 case (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No.
13-09200) filed on November 1, 2013.
NIKAI PR CORP: Oriental's Request for Copy of Plan Outline Okayed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Mildred Caban Flores of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Puerto Rico grants Oriental Bank's request to be
served with a copy of the disclosure statement and plan of Nikai
PR Corp.
Nikai PR, Corp. filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case
No. 16-06097) on July 30, 2016, and is represented by represented
by: Ruben Gonzalez Marrero, Esq., at Ruben Gonzalez Marrero &
Asociados.
***********
Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
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for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to
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Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
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issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication. At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
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Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com
***********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2016. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
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