/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/160725.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Monday, July 25, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 145
Headlines
A R G E N T I N A
COMPANIA LATINOAMERICANA: S&P Affirms 'B-' CCR, Outlook Stable
B R A Z I L
BANCO VOTORANTIM: Fitch Affirms Then Withdraws 'BB-' Rating
BRAZIL: Real Falls Most in Region on Central Bank Intervention
BRAZIL: Cut in Subsidies to Make Power Costlier But More Efficient
LIGHT SA: Moody's Lowers Issuer Ratings to B1/Baa3.br
ODEBRECHT SA: Brazil Banks Fall on Concern, Despite Company Denial
SAMARCO MINERACAO: Moody's Cuts Corporate Family Rating to 'C'
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
BMB COMIT XI: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 18
EAGLEVALE HELLENIC: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
EAGLEVALE HELLENIC MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
EAST RIVER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 12
FI SSA: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
GOLDMAN SACHS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
INVEST AD-IRAQ: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
JAMAICA SELECT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 16
PELIKAN GLOBAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
PERGAMON MASTER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
SONIC VISION: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 18
TRINIDAD SELECT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 16
UNITED OILS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 8
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Settles US$1.7BB Debt With IMF, IMF Says
J A M A I C A
JAMAICA: Secures IDB Loan to Support Financial System Reforms
M E X I C O
BAJA CALIFORNIA: Moody's Lowers Ratings to Ba2/A2.mx
P E R U
TERMINALES PORTUARIOS: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on US$110MM Notes
P U E R T O R I C O
CUPEYVILLE SCHOOL: Court to Take Up Plan Outline on Sept. 27
REBUS CORP: Court to Take Up Plan Outline on August 24
SPORTS AUTHORITY: Accelerates Store Closings Amid Bankruptcy
X X X X X X X X X
* BOND PRICING: For the Week From July 18 to July 22, 2016
- - - - -
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A R G E N T I N A
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COMPANIA LATINOAMERICANA: S&P Affirms 'B-' CCR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' corporate credit and issue-
level ratings on CLISA-Compania Latinoamericana de Infrastructura
& Servicios S.A. (CLISA). The outlook is stable.
The 'B-' ratings on CLISA reflect the company's high exposure to
Argentine public-sector counterparties, which often translates
into profit volatility and unexpected swings in working capital.
In addition, although CLISA has a good market position in the
construction business in Argentina, its market share in Latin
America is rather modest, with some presence in Peru and Panama.
The ratings also incorporate the currency mismatch between CLISA's
dollar-denominated debts and its domestic cash flow generation.
CLISA's experience in navigating Argentina's changing political
landscape, industry track record, and long-standing ties with
public-sector counterparties partly mitigate these factors.
On July 20, 2016, CLISA announced the issuance of its $200 million
7-year bullet senior unsecured bond. The use of proceeds includes
the tender of its outstanding $87.1 million due in 2019 and short-
term debt prepayment. After the liability management, S&P expects
CLISA's nominal debt and credit metrics to remain stable, while
its financial flexibility improves, as it will reduce the
concentration of its short-term debt, which accounted for 49% of
total debt as of March 31, 2016. On the other hand, the
transaction might exacerbate CLISA's currency mismatch risk
because the company will replace debt denominated in local
currency with the new bond, while its cash flow generation will
remain predominately in Argentine pesos. S&P estimates that,
after the bond issuance, approximately 75% of the total debt will
be denominated in foreign currency.
The new administration plans to invigorate the economy by boosting
civil works and that may benefit CLISA in the next 3 years.
However, given the uncertainties around the extension and
execution details of the infrastructure plan S&P took a
conservative approach in its base case.
The stable outlook on CLISA incorporates S&P's expectations that
the company will maintain its debt to EBITDA at levels below 5x.
S&P could lower the ratings on CLISA in the next 12 months if it
perceives that the company's capital structure is unsustainable,
which could happen if its debt to EBITDA persistently exceeds 5x,
for example. At the same time, a downward revision of the
country's T&C assessment would result in a downgrade of the
company.
In the next 12 months, any upside scenario would depend on both an
upward revision of the ratings on Argentina to 'B' (because CLISA
cannot be rated above Argentina due to its high exposure to the
country) as well as an improvement in the company's financial risk
profile. That might occur if the company starts generating
sustained operating cash flows-for example, if its OCF to debt
ratio were to exceed 25%.
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B R A Z I L
===========
BANCO VOTORANTIM: Fitch Affirms Then Withdraws 'BB-' Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and withdrawn its ratings for Banco
Votorantim S.A. at 'BB-'/Negative Outlook, and BV Leasing -
Arrendamento Mercantil S.A.s (BV Leasing) issuance at 'A+(bra)'.
Fitch is withdrawing the ratings as Votorantim and BV Leasing have
chosen to stop participating in the rating process. Fitch will no
longer have sufficient information to maintain the ratings and,
accordingly, will no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage
for Votorantim and BV Leasing.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Ratings Sensitivities are not applicable, as the ratings have been
withdrawn.
These ratings were affirmed and withdrawn:
Banco Votorantim S.A.
-- Long Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs of 'BB-'/Outlook
Negative;
-- Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs of 'B';
-- National Scale Long-Term rating of 'AA-(bra)'/Outlook
Negative;
-- National Scale Short-Term rating of 'F1+(bra)';
-- Viability Rating of 'bb-';
-- Support Rating of '3'.
BV Leasing - Arrendamento Mercantil S.A.
-- National Scale Long-Term rating of 'A+(bra)' on issuance
maturing 2026.
BRAZIL: Real Falls Most in Region on Central Bank Intervention
--------------------------------------------------------------
Paula Sambo and Vinicius Andrade at Bloomberg News report that
Brazil's real is at the mercy of the central bank.
The currency led declines in Latin America on Monday after policy
makers intervened to weaken it, offsetting the rise in commodity
prices, according to Bloomberg News. The real weakened 0.3
percent to 3.3094 per dollar on July 11 after the monetary
authority sold 10,000 reverse currency swaps, equivalent to buying
$500 million in the futures market, Bloomberg News notes. The
currency dropped as much as 0.6 percent earlier.
Policy makers revived the intervention program in March as the
real headed toward the world's biggest gains this year, dimming
the outlook for exports, and have since sold $45.8 billion of the
contracts, Bloomberg News says. The currency has strengthened
amid optimism that the government of Acting President Michel Temer
can trim the country's budget deficit, end credit-rating
downgrades and restore confidence in its ailing economy, Bloomberg
News notes.
"The market is paying close attention to the signals the central
bank has been giving on the exchange rate," said Juliano Ferreira,
a fixed-income strategist at Icap do Brasil CTVM, Bloomberg News
relays.
Brazil economists have trimmed their estimates for the decline of
the real this year and next, Bloomberg News notes. The currency
will weaken to 3.55 per dollar at the end of 2017, according to a
July 8 central bank survey of about 100 analysts.
A month ago, they expected the real to end the year at 3.81 per
dollar. Analysts also see the real at 3.4 per U.S. dollar at the
end of this year, from 3.46 the prior week, the survey showed.
Since the end of March, analysts have raised their year-end
forecast for the real more than any other currency tracked by
Bloomberg
The government will target a 2017 budget gap before interest
payments of BRL139 billion ($42.1 billion), compared with this
year's target of BRL170.5 billion, Finance Minister Henrique
Meirelles said on July 7, Bloomberg News relays. The economy will
grow next year and tax income will rise, he added.
Swap rates on the contract maturing in January 2018, a gauge of
expectations for interest rates, ended the day on July 12
unchanged at 12.69 percent, Bloomberg News adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several
years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2 negative)
underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and
diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service. The
country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the
government's high level of mandatory spending.
BRAZIL: Cut in Subsidies to Make Power Costlier But More Efficient
------------------------------------------------------------------
Luciano Costa at Reuters reports that large private and foreign
groups will displace Brazil's state-led power companies in
upcoming energy auctions, causing consumer electricity bills to
rise as the BNDES development bank cuts long-standing loan
subsidies for the domestic industry.
Maria Silvia Bastos Marques, chief executive of state-owned BNDES,
said recently the bank will curtail its role in the September
transmission line and October power plant auctions, according to
Reuters.
Analysts say greater participation of foreign investors and
lenders will make Brazil's already costly electricity rates even
dearer for consumers, but add that fewer state-led investments
will increase efficiency in the sector, the report relays.
The report notes that the cuts in subsidies offered by the Rio de
Janeiro-based bank have been widely seen as inevitable, given
Brazil's budget crisis and recession.
China's State Grid, Europe's ENGIE and the United States' AES Corp
are expected to be some of the large foreign companies to be
active in the coming auctions, as subsidiaries for the
government's cash-strapped energy holding company, Eletrobras,
rein in ambitions, the report says.
BNDES, Brazil's largest provider of bank loans with terms of more
than a year, has long been used by the federal government to
direct economic growth and industrial development, the report
relays. BNDES subsidies have also helped local companies compete
against foreign rivals, which frequently have access to cheaper
credit, the report notes.
Disbursements from BNDES for the electricity generation and
distribution industries reached an all-time high of BRL22.3
billion ($6.85 billion) in 2015, rising from BRL8.8 billion in
2002, the report recalls.
Specialists told Reuters the type of investors in the energy
industry, which has benefited from generous, below-market interest
rates on loans, will change drastically in the short term.
"Initially this will be a shock to the market, which had counted
on BNDES. It will at first take the wind out of the drive to
participate in the auctions," said Edvaldo Santana, former
director of the energy sector regulator Aneel, the report notes.
Concern about BNDES' lending cuts has been rising since late 2015.
Although bank's rules allow BNDES to finance up to 70 percent of
energy sector investments, few companies or investment groups have
received more than half their financing from BNDES, forcing them
to issue convertible debt to cover the rest of their needs, the
report relays.
Erik Reto, director of Sao Paulo-based Excelencia Energetica
consultants, said the change will require higher rates of return
on investment in the auctions-meaning higher energy costs for
consumers-in order to attract investors, the report says.
"As a consequence of ending the former policy (of subsidizing
investment heavily), prices will have to rise. If not, there will
be no investment," the report quoted Mr. Reto as saying.
With the retreat of BNDES, however, investments in the energy
sector will become more efficient, said Gabriel Fiuza, a business
professor in Rio de Janeiro at IBMEC and the Getulio Vargas
Foundation, the report notes.
"There will be more agents: Private banks, investors and insurers.
You create conditions not only to stimulate capital markets but to
improve the quality of the investors, the projects and the
investments," Mr. Reto said, the report discloses.
Initially, competition will decline as large private groups,
mostly foreign investors with greater access to credit, dominate
the auctions and are more selective about the projects in which
they invest, the report relays.
"Only big private investors will be able to play. The state
companies lack financing for this. When things calm down, the
state companies will come back slowly," said Mr. Santana, the
report adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 29, 2016, severe contraction that was preceded by several
years of below-trend growth has impaired Brazil's (Ba2 negative)
underlying economic strength, despite the country's large and
diversified economy, says Moody's Investors Service. The
country's credit rating is also coming under pressure from the
government's high level of mandatory spending.
LIGHT SA: Moody's Lowers Issuer Ratings to B1/Baa3.br
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. downgraded the Corporate Family
Rating of Light S.A to B1 from Ba3 on the global scale, and to
Baa3.br from A3.br on the national scale. At the same time, the
agency downgraded the issuer ratings and senior unsecured
debentures ratings of its fully owned subsidiaries Light Servicos
de Eletricidade S.A.'s ("Light SESA") and Light Energia S.A
("Light Energia") to B1/Baa3.br from Ba3/A3.br and to B1/Baa2.br
from Ba3/A3.br respectively. The outlook remains negative for all
ratings.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The downgrade of the ratings of Light S.A, Light SESA and Light
Energia and the negative outlook reflect: (i) higher uncertainties
surrounding Light S.A's ability to comply with its financial
covenants in the next 12 months as its required Net Debt to EBITDA
ratio drops to 3.75x in December 2016 from 4.0x in September and
4.25x in June, (ii) the company's weakening credit metrics
evidenced by a CFO pre WC to Debt of 15.4% in the LTM to March
2016 compared to 16.6% and 38.9% in 2015 and 2014 respectively,
(iii) expectations that Light's cash flow generation will
deteriorate in the next 12 to 18 months in the absence of a asset
sales and/or favorable decision from the regulator on Light S.A's
request for an extraordinary tariff review this November, and (iv)
weaker operating profile compared to peers, characterized by
higher non-technical losses, challenging Light SESA's ability to
obtain future tariff reviews from the regulator.
Moody's said, "On the other hand the ratings are supported by (i)
Light S.A's large market share and strategic position within the
Rio de Janeiro region, (ii) relatively resilient consumption
levels in Light S.A's area of operations which saw a modest 0.4%
growth in Q2 2016 (-4% over the first six months of 2016), on the
back of the upcoming Olympic Games, (iii) improved cash flow
generation in 2016 on the back of the November 2015 tariff
adjustment and favorable exchange rates development, (iv) our
expectations that Light S.A will maintain unrestricted access to
the capital markets and will continue to be supported by its
creditors should the company enter into a new round of covenant
renegotiations going forward; and (v) the positive contribution
from the more stable cash flow stream coming from the power
generation assets (Light Energia)."
The B1/Baa2.br ratings for Light Energia also reflect the more
stable and predictable cash flow profile of Light S.A's generation
assets compared to the distribution assets, after the hydrology
risk has considerably receded from the last two years.
Moody's views Light S.A's liquidity profile as weak. As of March
31, 2016, Light S.A had a consolidated cash position of BRL 715
million (including BRL 70 million of marketable securities), and
around BRL 2 billion of financial debt maturing in the next 12
months. During 2016, Moody's expects the company will generate
positive free cash flows mainly supported by the release of
regulatory assets driven by the November 2015 tariff increase and
the favorable effects of a stronger domestic currency since the
beginning of the year. The agency anticipates that this trend will
reverse from 2017 however, due to an expected reduction in tariff
after the November 2016 tariff adjustment, leading Light S.A to
generate negative free cash flow in the coming years. This will
leave the company to increasingly rely on external funding to
refinance its coming debt maturities.
Given the rapid ratcheting down of the required Net debt to EBITDA
to reach 3.75x in December 2016 from 4.0x in September and 4.25x
in June under the company's covenant schedule, Moody's would not
exclude a breach of covenants in the next 18 months which would
materialize should the company miss the covenant ratio for two
consecutive quarters. However the agency believes that under such
circumstance Light SA's debenture holders, made of long dated
relationship banks, would not use such credit event to accelerate
the debt but instead seek to renegotiate a waiver for an
additional fee.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN
In light of the current rating action and the negative outlook, an
upgrade of the rating is unlikely in the near term. The outlook
could be stabilized should the company demonstrate visible
improvements in its operating performance such that CFO pre WC
interest coverage remains above 2.0x and/or CFO pre WC to debt
stays above 10% on a sustained basis.
Light S.A's ratings could be downgraded as a result of a
deterioration in the company's liquidity profile resulting from
challenges in refinancing its debt obligations and/or a breach in
its financial covenants that results in a material debt
acceleration risk. The ratings could also be downgraded in the
event of worsening consumption levels and/or negative tariff
developments leading to a deterioration in the company's metrics
such that CFO pre WC interest coverage remains below 1.0x and/or
CFO pre-WC to Debt remains negative on a sustained basis.
Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Light S.A is an
integrated utility company with activities in generation,
distribution and commercialization of electricity. In the twelve
months ended March 30, 2016, Light SA reported BRL9 billion in net
revenues (excluding construction revenues) and close to BRL 1.1
billion in EBITDA respectively.
Light S.A is ultimately controlled by Companhia Energetica de
Minas Gerais ("CEMIG", rated B1/Baa1.br, negative), the company's
major shareholder with a direct 26.1% and a 32.5% stake,
respectively, in Light S.A.
ODEBRECHT SA: Brazil Banks Fall on Concern, Despite Company Denial
------------------------------------------------------------------
Guillermo Parra-Bernal and Tatiana Bautzer at Reuters reports that
shares in Brazil's largest listed banks posted their biggest
decline in a month on July 21 on concerns about the financial
health of Odebrecht SA, the engineering group that is embroiled in
a large corruption scandal, despite a denial by the company that
it would seek an accommodation with creditors.
In a statement, Odebrecht denied plans to seek an in-court
reorganization, as reported by financial blog Brazil Journal
earlier on Thursday. Ongoing negotiations with banks as well as
efforts to sell assets "continue to be positive," the statement
said, according to Reuters.
The blog, which did not cite any sources, fanned worries over the
outlook for banks, which face a deluge of requests from companies
to restructure up from BRL100 billion ($30 billion) in problematic
loans. Brazil's banking industry has struggled with a harsh
recession and record delinquencies this year, the report notes.
A stock index grouping banking and financial shares trading in the
Sao Paulo Stock Exchange dropped as much as 2.1 percent on the
report, Reuters relays. The index recouped part of the losses
after Odebrecht denied the report, and was trading down 1.0
percent at 6,095 in late afternoon trading, Reuters notes.
With Brazilian bankruptcy filings doubling this year and the
economy poised to contract for a second straight year, lenders are
giving more repayment time, cutting borrowing costs and extending
maturities for small and large corporate borrowers alike, the
report notes. Banks had about BRL130 billion in refinanced and
restructured loans on their books last year.
Preferred shares of Itau Unibanco Holding SA, the nation's largest
bank by market value, shed 1.3 percent to BRL33.96, the report
discloses. Those of Banco Bradesco SA fell 0.7 percent, while
common shares of state-controlled Banco do Brasil SA dropped 1.7
percent on July 21, the report relays.
Odebrecht, which has about BRL100 billion in obligations, borrowed
heavily in the past decade as it expanded its business into
defense, shipbuilding and biofuels, the report notes. It
currently ranks as Brazil's largest private-sector employer, the
report says.
Reuters reported in April that Odebrecht entered talks with banks
to refinance up to BRL35 billion in loans, following the
involvement of Latin America's largest engineering group in a
major corruption scandal that curtailed access to funding. While
some asset sales have succeeded, others have hit a snag as a
result of the scandal, the report relays.
Lenders may slow the disbursement of a $4.125 billion loan to
Peruvian gas pipeline operator Gasoducto Sur Peruano GSP SA until
Odebrecht fully exits the project overseeing the construction of
the pipelines, three people said, the report adds.
SAMARCO MINERACAO: Moody's Cuts Corporate Family Rating to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to C from Caa2 the
corporate family rating of Samarco Mineracao S.A. ("Samarco") and
the ratings of its senior unsecured notes due 2022, 2023 and 2024.
Ratings Downgraded:
Issuer: Samarco Mineracao S.A.
Corporate Family Rating: to C (from Caa2 )
US$1,000 million Senior Unsecured Notes due 2022: to C (from
Caa2)
US$700 million Senior Unsecured Notes due 2023: to C (from
Caa2)
US$500 million Senior Unsecured Notes due 2024: to C (from
Caa2)
Outlook, Changed To No Outlook From Negative
RATINGS RATIONALE
The downgrade to C reflects primarily the increasingly likelihood
that Samarco will need to suspend debt principal and interest
payments in the near term, or enter into debt restructuring
transactions that would constitute defaults as per Moody's
definitions. Moody's believes that, absent of a sustainable source
of cash flow generation, which would only be possible if the
company is able to resume operations, any distressed restructuring
is likely to entail significant losses to Samarco's bondholders.
To date, Samarco has not been able to obtain the required licenses
to resume operations at the Minas Gerais site (mines and
beneficiation plant). Continued uncertainties about the company's
ability to resume operations increases liquidity pressures, as
resources available to meet its financial obligations diminish
overtime. The company's cash position of BRL 1.8 billion as of
December 2015 diminished significantly during 2016 and will be
insufficient to meet Samarco's financial obligations due until the
end of the year, as well as capex, costs and operating expenses,
including payment of suppliers, wages, and taxes.
Although shareholders Vale and BHP have indicated their support to
Samarco in the response effort and are committed with the
environmental remediation of affected areas, there is no explicit
indication that there could be additional financial support other
than what has been agreed upon under the settlement signed on
March 2, 2016 with the Federal Government, the states of Minas
Gerais and Espirito Santo and other public authorities.
Since the accident, Samarco's operations at the mines and
beneficiation plants are suspended and the company's final
products' (pellets) inventories have been sold. While operations
are suspended, other potential sources of revenues contemplated by
Samarco have proved to be insufficient to meet all the
aforementioned obligations. Finally, there are still uncertainties
regarding existing and additional lawsuits and claims, which can
entail significant obligations for Samarco and its shareholders in
the future.
An upward rating consideration would require Samarco to resume
production, or find alternatives that could avoid a liquidity
shortfall, including formal support from shareholders.
Samarco Mineracao S.A. is one of the largest exporters of seaborne
iron ore pellets worldwide with operations located in Espirito
Santo and Minas Gerais, in the Southeast region of Brazil. The
company has a fully integrated business model with an installed
capacity to produce 30.5 million pellets annually. In 2015,
Samarco had BRL 6.5 billion (US$ 2.0 billion) in revenues spread
across clients in North America, Middle East, North Africa, Asia
and Europe. In the afternoon of November 5, 2015, an accident
occurred with a tailings dam, also partially affecting another dam
-- a water dam -- next to the industrial operations at the
Germano beneficiation units and next to Samarco's iron ore mines,
releasing mine tailings, flooding one nearby community and
impacting many other communities downstream. Operations at the
site are suspended since the accident.
==========================
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
==========================
BMB COMIT XI: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 18
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of BMB Comit Ventures XI LDC are required to file
their proofs of debt by Aug. 18, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.
The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 7, 2016.
The company's liquidator is:
Christopher Rowland
c/o Richard Murphy
Fund Solution Services Limited
Harbour Centre, 2nd Floor
42 North Church Street
George Town, Grand Cayman
10 Market Street, #769 Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9006
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 640 5863
EAGLEVALE HELLENIC: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------------
On July 7, 2016, the sole shareholder of Eaglevale Hellenic
Opportunity Offshore Fund Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind up the
company's operations.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Eaglevale Partners LP
c/o Ridhiima Kapoor
Ogier
89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9009
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
EAGLEVALE HELLENIC MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
---------------------------------------------------------
On July 7, 2016, the sole shareholder of Eaglevale Hellenic
Opportunity Master Fund Ltd. resolved to voluntarily wind up the
company's operations.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Eaglevale Partners LP
c/o Ridhiima Kapoor
Ogier
89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9009
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949-9877
EAST RIVER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 12
-------------------------------------------------
The creditors of East River Offshore Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by Aug. 12, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.
The company commenced wind-up proceedings on July 1, 2016.
The company's liquidator is:
Jane Fleming
Telephone: (345) 945-2187
Facsimile: (345) 945-2197
P.O. Box 30464 Grand Cayman KY1-1202
Cayman Islands
FI SSA: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------
On June 27, 2016, the sole member of FI SSA Fund Ltd resolved to
voluntarily wind up the company's operations.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Emile Wirtz
c/o Campbells
Willow House, Floor 4
Cricket Square
Grand Cayman KY1-1103
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 2648
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8613
GOLDMAN SACHS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
On July 7, 2016, the sole shareholder of Goldman Sachs Proprietary
Loan Access Fund Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Walkers Liquidations Limited
Cayman Corporate Centre
27 Hospital Road, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9008
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 0100
INVEST AD-IRAQ: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------
On June 30, 2016, the sole shareholder of Invest AD-IRAQ
Opportunity Fund resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Ken Stewart
c/o Apex Fund Services (Cayman) Limited
161a Artillery Court
P.O. Box 10085 Grand Cayman KY1 1001
Cayman Islands
JAMAICA SELECT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 16
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Jamaica Select Index Fund Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by Aug. 16, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.
The company commenced wind-up proceedings on July 6, 2016.
The company's liquidator is:
H&J Corporate Services (Cayman) Ltd
c/o Inga Thompson
Willow House, 2nd Floor, Cricket Square
P.O. Box 866 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
Cayman Islands
Telephone: 345-949-7555
PELIKAN GLOBAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
On July 7, 2016, the sole shareholder of Pelikan Global Fixed
Income Fund resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Doran + Minehane
Telephone: 00353 61 430000
Facsimile: 00353 61 408613
59/60 O' Connell Street
Limerick
Ireland
PERGAMON MASTER: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
On July 6, 2016, the sole shareholder of Pergamon Master Fund,
Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.
Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Cathy Fleming
Pergamon Offshore Advisors, L.P.
590 Madison Avenue, 30th Floor
New York, NY 10022
SONIC VISION: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 18
---------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Sonic Vision Investments I Limited are required
to file their proofs of debt by Aug. 18, 2016, to be included in
the company's dividend distribution.
The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 6, 2016.
The company's liquidator is:
Peter Goulden
Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
Mourant Ozannes
Attorneys-at-Law for the Company
94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
Cayman Islands
Reference: NDL
Telephone: (+1) 345 949 4123
Facsimile: (+1) 345 949 4647; or
TRINIDAD SELECT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 16
------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Trinidad Select Index Fund Ltd. are required to
file their proofs of debt by Aug. 16, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.
The company commenced wind-up proceedings on July 4, 2016.
The company's liquidator is:
H&J Corporate Services (Cayman) Ltd
c/o Inga Thompson
Willow House, 2nd Floor, Cricket Square
P.O. Box 866 Grand Cayman KY1-1103
Cayman Islands
Telephone: 345-949-7555
UNITED OILS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 8
-------------------------------------------------
The creditors of United Oils Limited are required to file their
proofs of debt by Aug. 8, 2016, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.
The company commenced liquidation proceedings on June 22, 2016.
The company's liquidator is:
Michael Saville
c/o John Henry
10 Market Street #765, Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9006
Cayman Islands
Telephone: (345) 769 7213
Facsimile: (345) 949 7120
===================================
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
===================================
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Settles US$1.7BB Debt With IMF, IMF Says
------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the Central Bank said the country's
commitments with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been
fully complied with disbursements related to the Stand-By
Agreement signed October 6, 2009.
It said through the Agreement, the IMF approved credit to the
Dominican State of around US$1.7 billion, equal to US$1.09 billion
in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs); of these only US$1.195 billion
(SDR US$766.2 million), were disbursed ,being available around
US$505.0 million (SDR US$328.3 million) of the resources initially
established, according to Dominican Today.
It said the undisbursed amount resulted from that some of the
conditionalities set out therein before the deadline weren't
completed, the report notes. "The aforementioned Agreement
expired on March 8, 2012. Of the total resources disbursed, the
share received by the Dominican government was US$856.9 million
(SDR US$550.0 million), which the IMF allocated resources to a
government to support budget for the first time, while the
remaining amount of US$338.1 million (SDR US$216.1 million) was
received by the Central Bank in support of international reserves,
which is the usual destination of loans to that institution," the
Central Bank said, the report relays.
"It's important to remember that the main objective of this
agreement with the IMF was to stimulate the recovery of the
economy in an environment of macroeconomic stability and
strengthen our growth prospects, through conducting a counter-
cyclical policy in the short term, achieving medium-term
sustainability, and finally to address the effects of the
international financial crisis of 2007-2009," the Central Bank
said in an emailed statement obtained by the news agency.
"With the balance of this commitment, the country leaves open the
possibility to freely use this type of credit facility with the
IMF in the future," the Central Bank said, the report notes.
It adds that thanks to this important milestone, "the authorities
contribute to improve the balance of the external public debt,
continuing the process of consolidation of fiscal accounts and
international reserves, in order to preserve macroeconomic
stability that has characterized the Dominican Republic during the
last years," the report adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
July 1, 2016, Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
the Dominican Republic's long term issuer and debt ratings to
positive from stable. The ratings have been affirmed at B1.
=============
J A M A I C A
=============
JAMAICA: Secures IDB Loan to Support Financial System Reforms
-------------------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that the Inter-American Development Bank has
loaned Jamaica another US$100 million to support reforms of the
financial system.
The reforms are aimed at improving regulation and supervision in
the banking, securities, pension funds and insurance sectors,
according to RJR News.
Therese Turner Jones, General Manager at the IDB Country office,
said with the threats in the global financial markets,
particularly as it pertains to the loss of correspondent banking
relationships, it was urgent to implement reforms to make
Jamaica's financial system more resilient, the report notes.
The program also supports the development of a framework that will
regulate the operations, registration, lending practices and
interest rates of micro financial institutions, the report adds.
* * *
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 15, 2016, Fitch Ratings has upgraded Jamaica's Long-term
foreign and local currency IDRs to 'B' from 'B-' and revised the
Rating Outlooks to Stable from Positive. In addition, Fitch
upgraded Jamaica's senior unsecured Foreign- and Local-Currency
bonds to 'B' from 'B-'. The Country Ceiling has been affirmed at
'B' and the Short- Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'.
===========
M E X I C O
===========
BAJA CALIFORNIA: Moody's Lowers Ratings to Ba2/A2.mx
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's de Mexico downgraded the State of Baja California ratings
to Ba2/A2.mx from Baa3/Aa3.mx. The state's outlook remains
negative.
RATINGS RATIONALE
RATIONALE FOR THE DOWNGRADE TO Ba2/A2.mx FROM Baa3/Aa3.mx
The downgrade is driven by Moody's expectations that the
deterioration in Baja California's debt and liquidity metrics of
the last years will continue going forward and result in a weaker
credit profile no longer comparable with Baa3 or Ba1 peers.
Between 2011 and 2015, the state's consolidated results averaged -
5% of total revenues, a low level among Mexican states rated by
Moody's. As a result, Baja California's public debt increased to
31.1% from 25.3% between 2014 and 2015. Additionally, the state's
net working capital (measured as liquid assets minus liquid
liabilities) passed from -4.3% to -7% of total expenditures over
the same period.
The downgrade is also driven by the deterioration in the state's
public workers pension fund (ISSSTECALI) that led the state to
devote MXN 1 billion (2.5% of total revenues of its budget to
extraordinary pension transfers in 2015. The state's higher
pension burden relative to peers is also reflected in the
actuarial deficit (MXN 159 billion) it registered at the end of
2015, equivalent to 400% of total revenues and one of the highest
levels among Mexican states rated by Moody's.
RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK
The negative outlook reflects Moody's view that Baja California
will continue to register high-consolidated deficits in the
foreseeable future, which will result in further increases in debt
levels. Similarly, the agency expects extraordinary transfers to
the pension fund to increase, exerting pressures on the state's
public finances.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN
Given the negative outlook, a rating upgrade in the medium-term is
unlikely. However, the state's ratings could be stabilized if it
implements a sustainable plan to recapitalize ISSSTECALI and if it
registers moderate deficits. Conversely, high consolidated
deficits, joined by an increase of total debt or a deterioration
in liquidity, will exert downward pressure on the ratings. A
downgrade of Mexico's sovereign bond could also exert downward
pressure on the state's ratings.
=======
P E R U
=======
TERMINALES PORTUARIOS: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on US$110MM Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the rating of Terminales Portuarios
Euroandinos Paita's (TPE) USD110 million senior secured notes at
'BB-'. The Rating Outlook remains Stable.
The rating affirmation reflects volume growth in line with Fitch's
base case projections, strong revenue growth, and moderate
increases in expenses. The 'BB-' rating reflects an asset with
weaker volume and price risk assessments, as a result of high
concentration of cargo types, business lines, and customers, as
well as the limited flexibility to manage toll increases. The
rating also considers the ports's obligation to make capital
investments once certain thresholds are met, which would lead to
pressured financial ratios, moderately high leverage, and
dependence on cash reserves. In Fitch's rating case, the ports's
Debt/CFADS ratio at 9.76x is commensurate with its rating, and
while the average debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 1.70x
could indicate a higher rating, required investments result in
DSCR coverages below 1.0x in at least five years, creating
dependence on cash reserves in order to meet debt service
obligations. The port depends on some growth in container volume
(2.1% every year) and is highly exposed to increases in operating
expenses. The Port of Paita is comparable to the Commonwealth
Ports Authority (the authority), with similar revenue risk
attributes and both rated 'BB-' by Fitch.
The concessionaire is currently awaiting completion acceptance for
Phase II investments from the authority, and is also in the
process of requesting an extension of the completion date in order
to finish some projects. Fitch will closely monitor the outcome
of both events, and may hold an event-driven committee if there
are any negative impacts to the rating, as detailed below in the
Rating Sensitivities.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Exposure to Cargo Volume (Revenue Risk - Volume: Weaker): The Port
of Paita is a secondary port of call with considerable
concentration in cargo types, business lines, and customers.
Profitability has been improving given the operator's strategic
emphasis on special services. The port is exposed to cargo
volatility, as contractual agreements with shipping lines are
limited, and weak overland transportation infrastructure limits
the service area mostly to commodity exports. The region is
exposed to the material volatility of fishing-related exports due
to the area's exposure to climatic effects related to El Nino.
Limited Pricing Flexibility (Revenue Risk - Price: Weaker): Port
tariffs and fees were initially established in the concession
agreement, and are subject to regulatory modifications every five
years, beginning in 2019, reflecting limited flexibility to adjust
for increasing costs. A Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) was
granted by the Government of Peru; however, the amount of the
guarantee and the complex, extensive process of executing the
guarantee does not adequately protect the project from its
obligations.
Defined Capital Program (Infrastructure Development & Renewal:
Midrange): The concession agreement established a well-defined
capital improvement, planning, and funding process, composed of
four phases, and including mandatory and optional investments.
Phase I included the majority of investments and was finalized in
2014. Subsequent phases are triggered by defined volume levels,
and are funded by special, separate reserves.
Adequate Structural Protections (Debt Structure: Midrange): The
project's financial flexibility is sustained by adequate liquidity
reserves, available for debt service payments and construction
costs. The structure incorporates a strong distribution test in
order to trap cash to prefund future investment costs. A five-
year principal repayment grace period provides flexibility in the
initial years; however, the amortization schedule results in
significant back-loading, since half of the debt is expected to be
repaid in the last six years of the debt's 25-year term.
High Leverage: Fitch's rating case Debt/CFADS stands at 9.76x,
reflecting dependence on volume growth to maintain healthy
financial ratios. The concession agreement allows for an adequate
cash flow generation term. However, required investments for
stages II, III, and IV (additional investments), significantly
reduces the project's financial flexibility and its dependence on
reserves, with natural minimum DSCR (without cash) below 1.0x.
Peers: The Port of Paita (Paita) is most comparable to the
Commonwealth Ports Authority (CPA), both rated 'BB-'/Stable
Outlook. Both ports have weaker volume and price risk attributes,
and are classified as small ports. Paita is considered an
Operator Port, while CPA operates under a 'Landlord' scheme,
although Fitch's criteria does not directly favor one type over
the other. Under Fitch's rating cases both transactions have the
same coverage level, with an average DSCR of 1.70x; however, the
former has considerably lower leverage (2.12x vs. 9.76x).
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Negative: Failure to receive completion acceptance on the Phase II
investments, and/or failure to receive an extension in order to
perform remaining works, could allow the concession agreement to
be terminated, and result in a negative rating action.
Negative: Regardless of the reason that may cause it, a decrease
in cash available could pressure debt service obligations and/or
mandatory investments.
Positive: Sustained revenue over-performance with controlled
expenses that results in less dependence on cash reserves in order
to meet obligations could lead to an upgrade.
SUMMARY OF CREDIT
The Port of Paita is located in the region of Piura, a small city
with low economic activity, 1,030km northwest of Lima. Paita is
connected to a major highway that links it to the Yurimaguas port
(Amazon system) with no significant competition. The location
provides a competitive advantage over Callao and Guayaquil, for
serving the northwestern Peruvian market.
CREDIT UPDATE
After completing construction work in line with the initial
schedule in June 2014, the project entered into full operations
following acceptance from the grantor on September 30. In 2015,
the port operated 210,631 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs), an
increase of 9.1% over the prior year and higher than the 203,884
TEUs expected by Fitch's base case.
Revenues were considerably higher than expected, with USD34.9
million generated in 2015, against Fitch's expectation of USD24.6
million in both Fitch's base and rating Cases. Containers and
Bulk Solid revenues were almost 22.6% higher and Special Services
85% higher than originally expected.
Strong revenue increases and controlled operating expenses
resulted in Fitch calculated CFADS of USD18.6 million, 53.7% above
Fitch's projected rating case CFADS of USD12.1 million for the
same year. Debt amortization is expected to begin in 2017,
following a five-year grace period, per the amortization schedule.
As stated in the concession agreement, Phase II was triggered
after 180,000 TEUs were surpassed in 2014. The limit for the
completion of Phase II works was July 7, 2016, and most of the
required items were completed; Autoridad Portuaria Nacional's
(APN) completion approval was requested and is still pending.
However, the removal of a sunken ship, also part of Phase II, has
proven to be more complex than expected. The concessionaire
requested an extension from the Ministerio de Transportes y
Comunicaciones (MTC) on the limit date for this reason; their
response is still pending. Regardless of a possible extension,
certain delay penalties may be applied by the grantor. Any
penalties incurred for this reason will be passed on to the
provider, as stated in their contract with Terminales Portuarios
Euroandinos (TPE).
Base and Rating Case Descriptions
Fitch's base and rating case scenarios consider increased
operations and maintenance costs, two El Nino events that reduced
volumes, and a 2% reduction in tariffs in 2019 and a further 1%
each of the following five years to account for the regulatory
effect of improved productivity. The container volume CAGRs over
the life of the debt are 3.9% and 3.4% for the base and rating
cases, respectively.
As a result of the large mandatory capital expenditures that are
triggered according to container volumes attained over the life of
the transactions, the DSCR, not considering reserves funded to
address this risk, is below 1.0x in some periods under both the
base and rating case scenarios. The base case minimum and average
DSCR are 0.71x and 2.49x, respectively, while the rating case
minimum and average DSCR are 0.19x and 1.70x. Minimum DSCR for
the base and rating case scenarios considering reserves are 2.53x
and 1.62x.
======================
P U E R T O R I C O
======================
CUPEYVILLE SCHOOL: Court to Take Up Plan Outline on Sept. 27
------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico is set
to hold a hearing on September 27, at 9:00 a.m., to consider the
disclosure statement detailing Cupeyville School Inc.'s Chapter 11
plan.
Objections to the disclosure statement must be filed not less than
14 days prior to the hearing.
Cupeyville School is represented by:
Alexis Fuentes Hernandez, Esq.
Fuentes Law Offices, LLC
P.O. Box 9022726
San Juan, PR 00902-2726
Tel: (787) 722-5216
Fax: (787) 722-5206
Email: alex@fuentes-law.com
About Cupeyville School
Cupeyville School, Inc. sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 15-09822) on December 12,
2015. The petition was signed by Ricardo Gonzalez, president.
The case is assigned to Judge Mildred Caban Flores.
At the time of the filing, the Debtor disclosed $7.01 million in
assets and $7.25 million in liabilities.
REBUS CORP: Court to Take Up Plan Outline on August 24
------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico is set
to hold a hearing on August 24, at 9:00 a.m., to consider the
disclosure statement detailing the Chapter 11 plan of Rebus Corp.
The hearing will take place at the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Jose V.
Toledo Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, Courtroom No. 1,
Second Floor, 300 Recinto, Sur, Old San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Objections to the disclosure statement must be filed not less than
14 days prior to the hearing.
Rebus Corp. is represented by:
Homel Mercado Justiniano, Esq.
Calle Ramirez Silva #8
Ensanche Martinez
Mayaguez, PR 00680
Tel: (787) 831-2577
Fax: (787) 805-7350
Email: hmjlaw2@gmail.com
About Rebus Corp.
Rebus Corp. sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code (Bankr. D. P.R. Case No. 16-02891) on April 13, 2016. The
petition was signed by Pedro Martinez, president.
The case is assigned to Judge Brian K. Tester.
At the time of the filing, the Debtor estimated its assets at
$500,000 to $1 million and debts at $1 million to $10 million.
SPORTS AUTHORITY: Accelerates Store Closings Amid Bankruptcy
------------------------------------------------------------
Peg Brickley, writing for The Wall Street Journal, reported that
Sports Authority is scrambling to close the doors on most or all
of its stores by the end of the month, according to multiple store
employees and managers, an abrupt move that comes amid a fight
over cash between lenders and suppliers.
Managers have been instructed on procedures for wiping the
computers, locking up and walking away, as the dying athletic gear
seller prepares for the final stage of its bankruptcy, according
to seven store managers interviewed by The Wall Street Journal.
The Journal said a lawyer and officials of the Englewood, Colo.,
company didn't respond to requests to discuss the accelerated
shutdown plan, including questions about whether any stores would
survive into August. In a May 25 letter to customers, Chief
Executive Michael Foss said the stores would be closed by the end
of August, the report related.
The end could be nearer than that for most Sports Authority
stores, said store managers who were summoned to a conference
call, the report further related. Sports Authority and the nearly
14,000 jobs it once supported is essentially done at the end of
July, they were told. One person who answered the phone at a New
York store said he had been told some stores would stay open
through August, the report added. His store, however, isn't one
of them, the report said.
About Sports Authority Holdings
Sports Authority Holdings, et al., are sporting goods retailers
with roots dating back to 1928. The Debtors currently operate 464
stores and five distribution centers across 40 U.S. states and
Puerto Rico. The Debtors offer a broad selection of goods from a
wide array of household and specialty brands, including Adidas,
Asics, Brooks, Columbia, FitBit, Hanesbrands, Icon Health and
Fitness, Nike, The North Face, and Under Armour, in addition to
their own private label brands. The Debtors employ 13,000 people.
Sports Authority and six of its affiliates filed Chapter 11
bankruptcy petitions (Bankr. D. Del. Case Nos. 16-10527 to
16-10533) on March 2, 2016. The petitions were signed by Michael
E. Foss as chairman & chief executive officer.
The Debtors have engaged Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP as general
counsel, Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP as co-counsel,
Rothschild Inc. as investment banker, FTI Consulting, Inc., as
financial advisor and Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC as notice,
claims, solicitation, balloting and tabulation agent.
Andrew Vara, Acting U.S. trustee for Region 3, appointed seven
creditors of Sports Authority Holdings Inc. to serve on the
official committee of unsecured creditors. Lawyers at Pachulski
Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP represent the Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors.
=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================
* BOND PRICING: For the Week From July 18 to July 22, 2016
----------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Name Cpn Price Maturity Country Curr
----------- --- ----- -------- ------- ----
Andino Investment Holding 11 70.85 11/13/2020 PE USD
Andino Investment Holding 11 68.88 11/13/2020 PE USD
Anton Oilfield Services G 7.5 69.03 11/6/2018 CN USD
Anton Oilfield Services G 7.5 66 11/6/2018 CN USD
BA-CA Finance Cayman 2 Lt 0.719 38.5 KY EUR
BA-CA Finance Cayman Ltd 0.749 38.93 KY EUR
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayman 6.25 62.84 KY USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayman 6.25 59.51 KY USD
BPI Capital Finance Ltd 2.29 40 KY EUR
CA La Electricidad de Car 8.5 43.75 4/10/2018 VE USD
Chile Government Internat 3.625 15.7 10/30/2042 CL USD
CSN Islands XI Corp 6.875 61.25 9/21/2019 KY USD
CSN Islands XI Corp 6.875 61.13 9/21/2019 KY USD
CSN Islands XII Corp 7 48.8 BR USD
CSN Islands XII Corp 7 47.75 BR USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 4.54 59.75 10/25/2041 PA USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomiso 6 71.38 10/25/2041 PA USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 70.8 2/6/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 69.35 9/10/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 70.42 4/2/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 69.72 7/17/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 69.71 5/30/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 69.23 9/30/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 70.52 3/19/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 7.75 74.84 12/19/2028 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 69.94 6/12/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 69.95 6/11/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 8.45 69.82 7/1/2034 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 7.7 73.56 7/1/2029 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 7.7 72.94 9/10/2029 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 7.75 74.95 11/8/2028 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 7.7 73.74 6/11/2029 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 7.7 73.73 6/12/2029 EC USD
Ecuador Government Domest 7.7 72.77 9/30/2029 EC USD
Empresa de Telecomunicaci 7 71.24 1/17/2023 CO COP
Empresa de Telecomunicaci 7 71.24 1/17/2023 CO COP
ESFG International Ltd 5.753 0.883 KY EUR
General Exploration Partn 11.5 36.75 11/13/2018 CA USD
General Shopping Finance 10 60.55 KY USD
General Shopping Finance 10 60.63 KY USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt 10 70.88 2/1/2019 SG USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt 10 71.88 2/1/2019 SG USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt 10 50.5 2/1/2019 SG USD
Global A&T Electronics Lt 10 54 2/1/2019 SG USD
Glorious Property Holding 13.25 74.56 3/4/2018 HK USD
Gol Finance Inc 9.25 47.35 7/20/2020 BR USD
Gol Finance Inc 8.75 37.75 BR USD
Gol Finance Inc 7.5 61 4/3/2017 BR USD
Gol Finance Inc 7.5 59.38 4/3/2017 BR USD
Gol Finance Inc 7.5 59.38 4/3/2017 BR USD
Gol Finance Inc 9.25 43.38 7/20/2020 BR USD
Gol Finance Inc 8.75 36.88 BR USD
Green Dragon Gas Ltd 10 63.75 11/20/2017 HK USD
Greenfields Petroleum Cor 9 11.35 5/31/2017 US CAD
Honghua Group Ltd 7.45 58.25 9/25/2019 CN USD
Honghua Group Ltd 7.45 58 9/25/2019 CN USD
Inversora Electrica de Bu 6.5 59.5 9/26/2017 AR USD
MIE Holdings Corp 7.5 67.25 4/25/2019 HK USD
MIE Holdings Corp 7.5 68.58 4/25/2019 HK USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayman Isl 3.38 60.22 2/7/2035 KY EUR
Newland International Pro 9.5 24.13 7/3/2017 PA USD
Newland International Pro 9.5 25.13 7/3/2017 PA USD
Noble Holding Internation 6.2 65.42 8/1/2040 KY USD
Noble Holding Internation 6.05 66.38 3/1/2041 KY USD
Noble Holding Internation 5.25 64.71 3/15/2042 KY USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc 7.25 57.75 4/1/2019 CY USD
Ocean Rig UDW Inc 7.25 55 4/1/2019 CY USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe 6.35 27 6/30/2021 KY USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe 6.35 28.5 6/30/2021 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.5 40 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 4.375 37.23 4/25/2025 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.125 33.5 6/26/2042 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.25 34.5 6/27/2029 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.125 36 6/26/2022 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 8.25 35 4/25/2018 KY BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7 53.5 4/21/2020 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6 41.51 4/5/2023 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.25 36 6/27/2029 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 4.375 36 4/25/2025 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.125 33.75 6/26/2042 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7.5 42.5 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 8.25 35 4/25/2018 KY BRL
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 5.125 35.38 6/26/2022 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 6 38.88 4/5/2023 KY USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd 7 44 4/21/2020 KY USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli 6.75 17 10/1/2022 KY USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli 6.625 17 10/1/2022 KY USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli 6.75 17.38 10/1/2022 KY USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drilli 6.625 17.38 10/1/2022 KY USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 5.25 67.5 4/12/2017 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 12.75 56.1 2/17/2022 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 9 49.38 11/17/2021 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 9.75 44.57 5/17/2035 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 6 38.5 5/16/2024 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 6 36.75 11/15/2026 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 5.375 37 4/12/2027 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 5.5 36.75 4/12/2037 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 6 32.13 10/28/2022 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 6 36.4 11/15/2026 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 6 35.35 5/16/2024 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 9.75 41.7 5/17/2035 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 9 45.25 11/17/2021 VE USD
Petroleos de Venezuela SA 12.75 46.15 2/17/2022 VE USD
Polarcus Ltd 5.6 44.93 3/30/2022 AE USD
Provincia de Rio Negro 1.6148 62 5/4/2024 AR ARS
PSOS Finance Ltd 11.75 60.13 4/23/2018 KY USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.22 9/30/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.75 74.88 12/19/2028 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 73.6 7/1/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.75 74.99 11/8/2028 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.22 9/30/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 73.77 6/12/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.39 9/10/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.75 7/17/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.39 9/10/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 72.81 9/30/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 73.78 6/11/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 73.6 7/1/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.98 6/11/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.98 6/11/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 73.77 6/12/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 72.99 9/10/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.97 6/12/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.75 74.88 12/19/2028 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 70.84 2/6/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 70.55 3/19/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.85 7/1/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 70.45 4/2/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 72.81 9/30/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.75 7/17/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.74 5/30/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.97 6/12/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.75 74.99 11/8/2028 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.85 7/1/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 70.45 4/2/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 69.74 5/30/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 73.78 6/11/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 70.84 2/6/2034 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 7.7 72.99 9/10/2029 EC USD
Republic of Ecuador Minis 8.45 70.55 3/19/2034 EC USD
Samarco Mineracao SA 4.125 37.25 11/1/2022 BR USD
Samarco Mineracao SA 5.75 36.6 10/24/2023 BR USD
Samarco Mineracao SA 5.375 35.38 9/26/2024 BR USD
Samarco Mineracao SA 4.125 37.38 11/1/2022 BR USD
Samarco Mineracao SA 5.75 39.63 10/24/2023 BR USD
Samarco Mineracao SA 5.375 37.25 9/26/2024 BR USD
Siem Offshore Inc 5.69 52.25 1/30/2018 NO NOK
Siem Offshore Inc 5.49 51.75 3/28/2019 NO NOK
Transocean Inc 5.05 74.75 10/15/2022 KY USD
Transocean Inc 6.8 63.66 3/15/2038 KY USD
Transocean Inc 7.5 65.78 4/15/2031 KY USD
Transocean Inc 9.1 70.41 12/15/2041 KY USD
Transocean Inc 7.45 74.9 4/15/2027 KY USD
Transocean Inc 8 73.55 4/15/2027 KY USD
Uruguay Notas del Tesoro 5.25 61.99 12/29/2021 UY UYU
US Capital Funding IV Ltd 0.99305 43.92 12/1/2039 KY USD
US Capital Funding IV Ltd 0.99305 43.92 12/1/2039 KY USD
Venezuela Government Inte 9.25 49.03 9/15/2027 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 11.75 49.5 10/21/2026 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 11.95 49.5 8/5/2031 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 7.75 47.38 10/13/2019 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 13.625 65.25 8/15/2018 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 9.375 45.85 1/13/2034 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 7 52.85 12/1/2018 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 7 42 3/31/2038 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 9 45.5 5/7/2023 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 9.25 45.5 5/7/2028 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 8.25 44.38 10/13/2024 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 6 43.5 12/9/2020 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 13.625 56.5 8/15/2018 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 7.65 43.25 4/21/2025 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 13.625 59.69 8/15/2018 VE USD
Venezuela Government Inte 12.75 53.5 8/23/2022 VE USD
Venezuela Government TICC 5.25 53.23 3/21/2019 VE USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA 10.75 25.63 2/12/2023 BR USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA 10.75 25.63 2/12/2023 BR USD
XLIT Ltd 6.5 70 IE USD
***********
Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices
for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication. At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com
***********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2016. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding,
electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited
without prior written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.
* * * End of Transmission * * *