/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/160620.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Monday, June 20, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 120


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARCOR S.A.I.C.: Moody's Assigns B1 Foreign Currency Rating
ARGENTINA: Resumes Inflation Reporting; Consumer Prices Up 4.2%
SALTA PROVINCE: S&P Assigns 'B-' ICR; Outlook Stable


B R A Z I L

COMPANHIA ENERGETICA: S&P Affirms 'BB' NSR; Outlook Negative
EMPRESA DISTRIBUIDORA: S&P Revises Affirms 'CCC' CCR; Outlook Pos.
MIRABELA NICKEL: Goes Into Liquidation Following Creditors' Vote
RIO DE JANEIRO: Fitch Lowers Long-Term National Rating to BB-


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

AKIBARE II: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 8
EUROPEAN GROUP: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 29
GOLDENSHARES ABSOLUTE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
SADRIAN BOWMAN CAPITAL: Members' Meeting Set for June 28
SADRIAN BOWMAN COMMODITIES: Members' Meeting Set for June 28

SADRIAN BOWMAN FUND: Members' Meeting Set for June 28
SADRIAN BOWMAN INTERMEDIATE: Members' Meeting Set for June 28
SADRIAN BOWMAN MASTER: Members' Meeting Set for June 28
SAGE MASTER: Members' Final Meeting Set for June 29
SAGE OPPORTUNITY: Members' Final Meeting Set for June 29

STRAKE INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 6


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Start of Talks Toward Fiscal Pact Irreversible
RESERVAS BANK: Top Official Balks at Rumors


P A N A M A

AES PANAMA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDR; Outlook Stable


P A R A G U A Y

PARAGUAY: S&P Affirms 'BB' LT Sov. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable


P E R U

INKIA ENERGY: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IDR; Outlook Stable
PESQUERA EXALMAR: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative


T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O

CARIBBEAN AIRLINES: Guyana Threatens to Ban Airline


X X X X X X X X X

LATAM: IDB Says Regional Growth Hampered by Savings Crisis

* BOND PRICING: For the Week From June 13 to June 17, 2016


                            - - - - -



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A R G E N T I N A
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ARCOR S.A.I.C.: Moody's Assigns B1 Foreign Currency Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, assigned a B1 foreign currency rating
to Arcor S.A.I.C. (Arcor)'s $US 300 million new senior unsecured
notes. The company's B1 global scale corporate family rating and
stable outlook remain unchanged.

RATINGS RATIONALE

"Arcor's B1 rating are supported by its solid credit metrics,
strong asset coverage, adequate liquidity profile and historical
low adjusted debt leverage. Arcor's global market presence,
leading category market position, and its broadly diversified
portfolio of branded packaged food products are additional credit
positives. The ratings also reflect Arcor's leadership positions
in confectionery and the diversification of the company's product
offering across chocolate, chewing gum, cookies and candy" said
Moody's VP Analyst, Veronica Amendola. Moreover, the ratings
incorporate the limited product volatility as the majority of
revenues comes from fairly stable food businesses and the
attractive expansion opportunities that the company has in their
international business. Finally, the rating considers Moody's
expectation that Arcor will generate sufficient cash flow from
operations to maintain its credit metrics profile, including a
strong liquidity position due to the company's relatively prudent
financial strategies.

Offsetting Arcor's credit strengths is the company's country risk
exposure to Argentina as its first largest market, with
concentration of cash flows from that country. Nonetheless, the
exposure should diminish over time as geographic diversification
improves with growth outside of the country (i.e., in Chile,
Mexico, Brazil, and Peru). Moody's notes that the company's
international business still needs to achieve critical mass to
become a meaningful contributor to EBITDA. In addition,
constraining the ratings is the highly competitive environment
that Arcor faces from local and international well capitalized
players.

Moody's says, "Arcor's B1 global scale and Aa1.ar national scale
ratings continue to take into account the company's fundamental
credit quality, evidenced by its track record in servicing its
foreign currency debt obligations during past Argentine financial
crises, adequate backup liquidity available in the U.S., and
limited reliance on domestic markets for funding. As a result,
Arcor's B1 rating is positioned two notches above Argentina's B3
sovereign's rating. Moody's cautions that a downgrade of the
sovereign would likely result in a corresponding downgrade for
Arcor, as we would likely maintain the current notching gap in the
absence of significant changes in Arcor's credit quality."

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Arcor will
continue to successfully implement its business model in the
international markets, reducing its exposure to the Argentinean
market. The stable outlook also reflects Moody's expectation that
Arcor will be able to increase revenues and earnings over the near
term based on its operating plants' efficiency and commercial
initiatives thus allowing the company to preserve adequate access
to external financing sources to meet its short-term debt
obligations while maintaining adequate levels of cash generation
in relation to debt.

The rating could experience upward pressure if Argentina's B3
government bond rating is upgraded. In addition, upward pressure
could come if Arcor accomplishes solid operating performance over
the medium term, maintains an adequate $US liquidity buffer and
continues strengthening its international revenues leading to
increasing operating margins and modest financial leverage.
Quantitatively, improved credit metrics with Adjusted Debt/EBITDA
falling well below 1.5 times on a sustainable basis (vs. 2.1 times
as of the last twelve months ended March 31, 2016) under the
current business configuration could put positive pressure on
ratings.

Downward pressure on ratings could occur if Arcor's credit metrics
deteriorate because of lagging performance in key markets (e.g.
driven by an aggressive financial policy that could jeopardize
liquidity), such that adjusted Debt/EBITDA rises above 3.5x over a
prolonged period under the company's current business
configuration. If growth investments are more aggressive than
anticipated, overexpansion (i.e., investments are not matched by
near term earnings growth) could also impact ratings. Reducing $US
cash position abroad to below total short term debt on a
sustainable basis and\or lack of meaningful contribution to the
development of the international business, could also put pressure
on the notes ratings. Finally, the notes ratings would also be
downgraded if Argentina's B3 foreign currency rating is
downgraded.

Arcor S.A.I.C., Cordoba, Argentina, is one of the largest food
companies in the country with over $US 2.9 billion in sales for
the last twelve months ended March 31, 2016 (ARS 29.8 billion).
Arcor's well-known brands include: Arcor Butter Toffees, Bon o
Bon, Rocklets, Coffler, Arcor Cereal Mix, Bagley, Opera, Sonrisas,
La Campagnola, Dos en Uno, Topline, Sapito. For the last twelve
months ended March 31, 2016, Arcor generated $US 388 million in
EBITDA. Total employees are approximately 20,000.


ARGENTINA: Resumes Inflation Reporting; Consumer Prices Up 4.2%
----------------------------------------------------------------
Latin American Herald Tribune reports that Argentina's government
has resumed inflation reporting after a six-month hiatus,
revealing that consumer prices rose 4.2 percent in May from the
previous month.

After his inauguration last December, conservative President
Mauricio Macri said he would suspend the publication of inflation
figures, whose reliability under two previous leftist heads of
state -- Cristina Fernandez and her late husband Nestor Kirchner -
- had been questioned since early 2007, and develop a new method
for measuring consumer prices, according to Latin American Herald
Tribune, the report notes.

"We're clearly and definitively leaving behind a period of
manipulation of public statistics," Jorge Todesca, the director of
the National Census and Statistics Institute, or INDEC, said, the
report relays.

Inflation in May was driven by, among other things, a 5.6 percent
rise in transportation and communication prices and a 5.2 percent
increase in housing and basic services, the report discloses.

In numerous speeches since taking office, Mr. Macri has said his
priority is to lower inflation after a decade in which he said
consumer prices under Kirchner, who governed from 2003 to 2007,
and Fernandez, in office from 2007 to 2015, rose 700 percent, the
report notes.

Mr. Macri has said inflation rates will rise in the short term due
to the elimination of utility subsidies but begin to fall in the
second half of 2016, the report adds.

                        *     *     *

On April 19, 2016, the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America
reported that Moody's Investors Service upgraded on April 15,
2016, Argentina's government bond rating to B3 from Caa1, with the
outlook changed to stable from positive.  The key drivers for the
upgrade are (i) Moody's expectation that Argentina will settle
holdout creditor claims which will result in a lifting of court
injunctions and clear the way for Argentina to access
international capital markets, as well as the likelihood that
Argentina will make payments to restructured bondholders increased
significantly following an April 13, US circuit court ruling in
favor of Argentina, and (ii) the economic policy improvements
since Mauricio Macri's administration took office last December.
The new government lifted capital controls and allowed the peso to
float more freely, reduced energy and transportation subsidies and
has begun to address longstanding macroeconomic imbalances.

As previously reported by the TCR-LA, Argentina defaulted on some
of its debt late July 30, 2014, after expiration of a 30-day grace
period on a US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day,
talks with a court-appointed mediator ended without resolving a
standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking
full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.
A U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed. The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

On March 30, 2016, after more than 12 hours of debate in the
Senate, Argentina's Congress passed a bill that will allow the
government to repay holders of debt that the South American
country defaulted on in 2001, including a group of litigating
hedge funds that won judgments in a New York court. The bill
passed by a vote of 54-16.

On March 24, 2016, Fitch Ratings has upgraded Argentina's Long-
term local-currency Issuer Default Rating (LT LC IDR) to 'B' from
'CCC', with a Stable Outlook. Fitch has affirmed Argentina's Long-
term foreign-currency (FC) IDR at 'RD' and the short-term FC IDR
at 'RD'. In addition, Fitch has upgraded the Country Ceiling to
'B' from 'CCC'.


SALTA PROVINCE: S&P Assigns 'B-' ICR; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B-' foreign and local currency
issuer credit ratings on the province of Salta.  The outlook is
stable.  S&P also assigned a 'B-' issue-level rating on the
province's senior unsecured notes for up to $350 million.  The
amortizing notes will be denominated in dollars, and the province
will use the proceeds for basic infrastructure projects and the
acquisition of machinery and equipment.

                              RATIONALE

The ratings on Salta mainly reflect its very weak economy, weak
liquidity, moderate debt burden, and low contingent liabilities.
S&P expects the province's budgetary performance to remain weak in
the next two years due to likely sluggish economic growth and high
inflation.  The province's very weak budgetary flexibility and
weak financial management also constrain its ratings.  Like all
other Argentinean local and regional governments (LRGs), Salta
operates under a very volatile and unbalanced institutional
framework, which also is a rating constraint.

Overall, S&P don't believe the new issuance will hurt the
province's financial profile.  However, Salta's currently low debt
burden will increase to a level S&P considers moderate.  Including
the new issuance, S&P expects the province's debt to reach 34% of
total operating revenues by the end of 2016 from 21% in 2015.
Debt will rise nominally and in relative terms, as the new
issuance amount is above the nominal increase in revenue.  High
inflation will cushion the latter from the impact of a likely
small contraction in GDP.  At the same time, S&P estimates Salta's
foreign-currency denominated debt to increase to 65%-70% following
the new issuance of total debt from 47% in March 2016, when
foreign currency debt was largely due to the province's the
existing notes, backed by oil and gas royalties.  Higher foreign
currency debt presents a key risk, given our expectations of a
further depreciation the Argentinean peso (26% in 2016 and 12% in
2017, year-end to year-end).

The stand-alone credit profile (SACP) of the province of Salta is
'b-'.  The SACP is not a rating but a means of assessing the
intrinsic creditworthiness of an LRG under the assumption that
there is no sovereign rating cap.

S&P assess Salta's economy as very weak, with GDP per capita
estimated at $4,831 in 2015, compared with the national level of
$13,492.  S&P don't expect Argentina's economy to grow in 2016 as
the sovereign addresses economic imbalances amid recession and
sharp currency depreciation in Brazil -- Argentina's major trading
partner -- lower agricultural commodity prices, and uncertainty
related to China's growth prospects and U.S. monetary tightening.
S&P expects Argentina's economy to grow around 1.9% in 2017.

S&P views Salta's budgetary performance as weak with operating
balances of about 2.6% of operating revenue in 2014-2018.  S&P
estimates an average deficit after capital accounts of 5.2% of
total revenue for the same period due to higher capital
expenditure in upcoming years.  This would stem from greater
access to external funding, following the curing of the
sovereign's selective default, and urgent infrastructure needs in
the province.  Although Salta historically posted solid fiscal
balances, its budgetary performance has deteriorated since 2010
due to stagnant economy, low investment, and high inflation.  In
particular, public-sector personnel expenditures have risen above
inflation in the past few years, adding pressure on the province's
budgetary performance.  S&P don't expect changes in 2016 amid a
likely 0.55% contraction in GDP and inflation estimated to reach
42%.

The bulk of Salta's revenue consists of transfers from the federal
government, which undermines the province's budgetary flexibility.
Between 2014 and 2018, S&P estimates that Salta's own-source
revenue will represent 22.3% of total operating revenue.  In
addition, S&P estimates capital expenditure will remain moderate,
at an average 13% of total expenditures for the same period.
Salta has a limited ability to cut expenditures.  On top of the
province's huge infrastructure needs, high inflation has forced it
to continually negotiate with public-sector unions significant
wage raises to stem rising social and political pressure.  As a
result, the provincial government's payroll and interest payments
represent about 65% of Salta's operating spending.

Governor Juan Manuel Urtubey was reelected on May 17, 2015, for
another four-year and final term.  Mr. Urtubey is a member of the
Frente Para la Victoria faction of the Peronist Party.  S&P
expects continuity in the province's management and a stable
relationship with the national government for the next four years.
S&P assess financial management in Salta as weak, due to its
limited capital and financial planning.

Liquidity

Salta has a weak liquidity position, in S&P's view, because free
cash and reserves are low and insufficient to cover the 2016
projected debt service.  S&P estimates that debt service
(including capital and interest payments) is likely to reach
ARP1.3 billion.

Around 54% of capital payments in 2016 are in foreign currency, so
greater-than-expected depreciation of the currency would further
stress Salta's debt service payments.

Access to funding for Argentine LRGs has improved following the
curing of the sovereign default, and Salta's plan to issue
$350 million in new debt follows other LRGs that have already
issued debt in the international market.  However, S&P views
overall access to external liquidity as still uncertain given the
country's weak banking system, which carries a Banking Industry
Country Risk Assessment score of '9', and restrictions imposed by
the Fiscal Responsibility Law on the LRG use of debt, which bans
its use for operating expenditures, and requires the national
government's authorization to issue new debt.

Salta signed an agreement with the central government in 2010,
which granted a grace period on the province's debt service to the
central government.  This agreement has been periodically
extended, with the latest extension until the end of 2016.
Salta's debt stock with the federal government represents about
33% of the province's total debt as of March 2016.

                             OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Salta's increased access to funding
and its challenge to improve fiscal performance amid the economic
slump and a still very volatile and unbalanced institutional
framework.  If S&P was to raise the sovereign's transfer and
convertibility (T&C) and foreign and local currency ratings, while
the province's operating surplus balances were to average above 5%
of operating revenue and deficits after capital accounts below 5%,
and available free cash were to be more than sufficient to cover
the next 12 months' debt service, an upgrade of the province would
be possible in the next 12 months.  However, S&P views this
scenario as unlikely.  On the other hand, S&P could downgrade the
province if Argentina's T&C assessment deteriorates or if S&P was
to lower the sovereign's foreign and local currency rating.  S&P
could also lower the ratings on the province if S&P perceives that
its financial commitments are unsustainable in the long term or
that it faces a near-term payment crisis.  However, this is not in
our base case for 2016.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

New Rating

Salta (Province of)
Issuer Credit Rating                   B-/Stable/--
Senior Unsecured                       B-


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B R A Z I L
===========


COMPANHIA ENERGETICA: S&P Affirms 'BB' NSR; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' global scale and 'brAA-'
national scale ratings on CESP-Companhia Energetica de Sao Paulo
(CESP).  The outlook on the corporate credit ratings remains
negative.

In S&P's view, the foreign currency ratings on the sovereign
continue to cap those on CESP because the latter doesn't pass
S&P's hypothetical test of the sovereign's default.  This test
includes the impact of a 50% depreciation of the Brazilian real
against the dollar on the company's $220 million debt; an EBITDA
reduction of 60% due to higher costs stemming from doubling of
inflation; a freeze on electricity rates from the sales in the
regulated market; and lower demand from its free market clients.
Under this hypothetical stress scenario, S&P expects CESP's uses
and sources of liquidity to be less than 1.0x, limiting its
ratings to the ones on the sovereign.

In addition, S&P views the absence of a legal framework, which
would protect the company from the state's intervention during a
hypothetical default and/or its financial distress, as a rating
constraint on CESP.  However, S&P don't envision such a scenario
in the short term because the state doesn't have a track record of
such intervention.  The ratings on CESP are therefore also limited
to those on the state of Sao Paulo.

S&P continues to assess CESP's SACP as 'bbb-', which is based on
S&P's view of the company's fair business risk profile and minimal
financial risk profile.


EMPRESA DISTRIBUIDORA: S&P Revises Affirms 'CCC' CCR; Outlook Pos.
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Empresa Distribuidora y
Comercializadora Norte S.A. (EDENOR) to positive from stable.  S&P
also affirmed its 'CCC' corporate credit and issue-level ratings
on the company.

The 'CCC' ratings reflect EDENOR's currently weak finances and its
large amount of liabilities with CAMMESA, which result in an
unsustainable capital structure. (CAMMESA is the company's main
electricity supplier and Argentina's wholesale electricity market
administrator that works as a clearing house for the market.)
However, S&P believes that the temporary rate increase in February
2016 and the company's long term-debt maturity profile temper the
company's financial woes.  In addition, the likely new rate-
setting mechanism in the next 12 months could strengthen EDENOR's
capacity to service its future debt.  S&P's outlook revision
reflects its expectations that the new price-setting mechanism
could improve the company's ability to recover its fixed and
variable operating costs and capital expenditures, reducing short-
term financial pressures.  In S&P's view, the new regulatory
framework will bolster cash flow predictability and provide EDENOR
a more visible revenue stream that's reflective of the actual cost
of energy.

S&P believes that the payment overhaul of the company's
liabilities with CAMMESA would likely be part of a broader
negotiation with the government, which will also include the
concession contract renegotiation and the new price-setting
mechanism implementation.

S&P's base-case scenario incorporates these assumptions:

   -- A 230% rise in the average sale price of the electricity in
      2016 following the January rate increase.  A new price-
      setting mechanism as of 2017, which prompts S&P to expect
      the company's revenue growth to be in line with inflation
      expectations.

   -- A 0.5% decrease in national electricity demand for 2016 and
      a 1.9% rise based on S&P's estimates of GDP growth in 2017.

   -- Capital expenditures of around ARP2.8 billion for the next
      12 months.

   -- A nominal increase in the company's debt in Argentine pesos
      due to the latter's likely depreciation.  A gradual
      normalization of EDENOR's accounts payables as it continues
      to pay to CAMMESA for energy purchases.

The lack of consistency and predictability in the regulatory
framework in the past few years had resulted in EDENOR's EBITDA
shortfalls -- if subsidies are excluded -- and undermined its
capital structure.  S&P expects the recent rate increase and the
regulator's commitment to implement a new price-setting mechanism
by 2017 to improve EDENOR's debt metrics.  S&P also expects the
company to generate EBITDA for 2016 and 2017, although there are
still some uncertainties regarding the actual implementation-such
as litigations-and final impact of the recent rate increase and
the new price-setting mechanism.

S&P reassessed its view of EDENOR's liquidity to less than
adequate from weak.  S&P now estimates that its cash sources to be
slightly above uses in the next 12 months.  Although S&P expects
the company's liquidity to improve, the degree to which it will do
so is likely to depend on the extent of the January rate increase
and a new price-setting mechanism.  Moreover, EDENOR has a large
amount of accounts payables that have been accumulating in the
past few years because the company prioritized debt payments and
capex over payments to suppliers, particularly CAMMESA.
Therefore, S&P expects EDENOR's balance sheet to improve over a
long period because it will likely focus on reducing its accounts
payables and on generating free operating cash flow.


MIRABELA NICKEL: Goes Into Liquidation Following Creditors' Vote
----------------------------------------------------------------
metalbulletin.com reports that creditors of Mirabela Nickel and
Mirabela Investment (MBI) voted to place the companies into
liquidation after the sale of the Santa Rita mine in Brazil failed
to attract a suitable bid.

The mine, located in the north-eastern state of Bahia, has been
placed in care and maintenance since around April this year,
Mirabela said on June 15, according to metalbulletin.com.

Towards the end of last year, Mirabela Nickel had announced that
it was cutting Santa Rita's nickel concentrates production by one-
third and laying off hundreds of employees to reduce costs amid
the significant decline in prices, the report notes.  Santa Rita
achieved commercial operation in January 2010 and was initially
expected to produce 16,500-18,000 tonnes of nickel concentrates in
2015, the report addes.


RIO DE JANEIRO: Fitch Lowers Long-Term National Rating to BB-
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Brazilian state of Rio de
Janeiro's Long-Term National rating to 'BB-(bra)' from 'A-(bra)'.
The agency has also downgraded the Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'B-' from 'B+'.  The ratings were removed from Rating
Watch Negative and assigned a Stable Outlook.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade to 'B-' from 'B+' reflects a fast-deteriorating
liquidity position that may lead to further delays in debt
services in 2016 and 2017.  In Fitch's opinion, State of Rio de
Janeiro (ERio) is no longer able to present operating margins
compatible with historical values, as pension payment should
consume an increasing portion of the state's revenues at least in
the following 10 years.  The state has been resorting to
nonrecurring revenues to cover for operating expenditures.

As a response to the downward trend in operating revenues, ERio
has launched a refinance agreement program and intensified
collection efforts with positive results in 2015.  The state is
counting on non-recurring revenues to meet the rising pension
payments in 2016.  Among the non-recurring revenue sources, Fitch
highlights the issuance of debentures linked to the flow of taxes
in arrears and bus concessions, which may not be sufficient to
cover for the relevant financial shortfall in the pension scheme
expected for 2016.

In a growing trend, ERio's personnel expenditures could consume
58% of the state's operating revenues in 2018 from the already
high 52% of operating revenues in 2015.  ERio projects personnel
expenditures will grow to an annual average of 12% over the next
three years, which is higher than the 5% posted in 2015,
reflecting political pressures to update salaries.

ERio must allocate BRL12 billion to fund one of its pension fund
(FF-Fundo Financeiro) in 2016.  In 2015, the entity that manages
the state's pension system (Rioprevidencia) received some BRL6.6
billion from the use of judicial deposits held by the state.  In
2014, Rioprevidencia issued the equivalent of USD3.1 billion in
oil royalties instruments.  Fitch considers these obligations as
net indirect debt.

Given the high demand for investments in urban mobility and
infrastructure associated with the World Cup and the Olympic Games
to be held this year, ERio has entered into significant credit
agreements.  The state expects to raise BRL4.4 billion until 2018.
ERio's debt burden increased 42.8% in 2015, reaching BRL36.7
billion, in long-term agreements.  Fitch notes that only 1.4% of
that amount is not guaranteed by the Federal Government.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

Guaranteed Debt: Fitch does not expect to rate ERio below 'B-',
since virtually all debt is guaranteed by the Federal Government.
The small unsecured debt is against Federal institutions entities
and could be renegotiated under more favorable conditions.

Reforms to Provide Sustainability: Though unlikely in the short
term, should Erio and/or the Federal Government pass measures to
provide long-term sustainability to the state's pension scheme and
debt with the Federal Government, an upgrade would be warranted.

                         KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The ratings and Outlooks are sensitive to these assumptions:

   -- Fitch assumes a high level of sovereign support for ERio
      given that the state's most relevant creditor is the Federal
      Government;

   -- Fitch assumes that any political transition to a new
      government during the impeachment process will be smooth and
      peaceful but with some delays in progress on the
      government's legislative agenda, especially the ones
      affecting subnationals such as federal debt changes in terms
      and conditions.

Located in the southeast region of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro posted
an estimated gross domestic product of BRL567 billion, ranking as
the 2nd largest state in Brazil, close to the ranking of the
largest consumer market, the State of Sao Paulo.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

State of Rio de Janeiro:

   -- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR downgraded to 'B-' from 'B+';
      Stable Outlook
   -- Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';
   -- Long-Term Local Currency IDR downgraded to 'B-' from 'B+';
      Stable Outlook
   -- Short-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B';
   -- Long-term National downgraded to 'BB-(bra)' from 'A-(bra)';
      Stable Outlook
   -- Short-term National rating downgraded to 'B(bra)' from
      'F1(bra)'.


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C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


AKIBARE II: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 8
------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Akibare II Ltd. are required to file their proofs
of debt by July 8, 2016, to be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on May 4, 2016.

The company's liquidators are:

          Kevin Poole
          James Trundle
          P.O. Box 10233
          171 Elgin Avenue Willow House
          Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (914) 2270/ 949-5263
          Facsimile: (949) 6021


EUROPEAN GROUP: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for June 29
-----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of European Group Financing Company Limited will
hold their final meeting on June 29, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Genworth Financial International Holdings, LLC
          6620 West Broad St Building 1
          Richmond VA, 23230
          United States of America


GOLDENSHARES ABSOLUTE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------------
On May 9, 2016, the shareholders of Goldenshares Absolute Return
Fund Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
June 13, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Yi-Kuo Ho
          11th Floor., No.7, Ln. 83
          Yong'an St. Xindian Dist.
          New Taipei City 231
          Taiwan
          Telephone: +886 2 25856262
          Facsimile: +886 2 25856262


SADRIAN BOWMAN CAPITAL: Members' Meeting Set for June 28
--------------------------------------------------------
The members of Sadrian Bowman Capital (GP) Ltd will hold their
final meeting on June 28, 2016, at 12:00 noon, to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andrew Childe
          c/o Trudy-Ann Scott
          Fund Solution Services Limited
          Telephone: +1 (345) 947 5855


SADRIAN BOWMAN COMMODITIES: Members' Meeting Set for June 28
------------------------------------------------------------
The members of Sadrian Bowman Commodities Offshore Fund Limited
will hold their final meeting on June 28, 2016, at 10:30 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andrew Childe
          c/o Trudy-Ann Scott
          Fund Solution Services Limited
          Telephone: +1 (345) 947 5855


SADRIAN BOWMAN FUND: Members' Meeting Set for June 28
-----------------------------------------------------
The members of Sadrian Bowman Capital Fund (GP) Limited will hold
their final meeting on June 28, 2016, at 11:30 a.m., to receive
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andrew Childe
          c/o Trudy-Ann Scott
          Fund Solution Services Limited
          Telephone: +1 (345) 947 5855


SADRIAN BOWMAN INTERMEDIATE: Members' Meeting Set for June 28
-------------------------------------------------------------
The members of Sadrian Bowman Intermediate Ltd will hold their
final meeting on June 28, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andrew Childe
          c/o Trudy-Ann Scott
          Fund Solution Services Limited
          Telephone: +1 (345) 947 5855


SADRIAN BOWMAN MASTER: Members' Meeting Set for June 28
-------------------------------------------------------
The members of Sadrian Bowman Commodities Master Fund Limited will
hold their final meeting on June 28, 2016, at 11:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andrew Childe
          c/o Trudy-Ann Scott
          Fund Solution Services Limited
          Telephone: +1 (345) 947 5855


SAGE MASTER: Members' Final Meeting Set for June 29
---------------------------------------------------
The members of Sage Master Investments Ltd. will hold their final
meeting on June 29, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andre Slabbert
          Estera Trust (Cayman) Limited
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4900
          c/o Estera Trust (Cayman) Limited
          75 Fort Street
          P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


SAGE OPPORTUNITY: Members' Final Meeting Set for June 29
--------------------------------------------------------
The members of Sage Opportunity Fund (Offshore) Ltd. will hold
their final meeting on June 29, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

          Andre Slabbert
          Estera Trust (Cayman) Limited
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4900
          c/o Estera Trust (Cayman) Limited
          75 Fort Street
          P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


STRAKE INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due July 6
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Strake Investments Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt by July 6, 2016, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on May 18, 2016.

The company's liquidator is:

          Maricorp Services Ltd.
          c/o Steven J. Barrie
          P.O. Box 2075 Grand Cayman KY1-1105
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 345-949-9710


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Start of Talks Toward Fiscal Pact Irreversible
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the industries of Herrera and Santo
Domingo Province grouped in the AEIH considered the start of talks
leading to a fiscal pact at this time is "irreversible."

Otherwise, AEIH President Antonio Taveras said, within a year the
situation will be unsustainable in fiscal matters, according to
Dominican Today.

"The country deserves a far reaching fiscal revolution . . . . But
that agreement must be agreed among the social, business and
government entities," the report quoted Mr. Taveras as saying.

Quoted by eldia.com.do, the business leader said the current
taxation is based on spending, and so far this year has doubled
the amount of deficit projected, the report notes.  "It's becoming
a snowball," Mr. Taveras said, noting that they've been covering
the deficits with debt for years. "Consequently, the public debt
has risen by 600% from 2000 to 2015."

Mr. Taveras said the most loans in history have been taken since
2008 to date, during the administration of the ruling PLD party,
for which he reiterates his affirmation that the country needs a
"tax revolution," which must be accompanied by a sweeping
institutional transformation, the report relays.  "We're not going
toward a new tax formula to put more money into the government so
it meanders out of control . . . .  changes have to be made."

Mr. Taveras said the business sector is proposing the passing of a
law on fiscal transparency; and which creates an independent
Accounts Chamber which can oversee the government and fight
corruption, the report notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 3, 2015, Fitch Ratings affirmed the Dominican Republic's
long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
at 'B+'.  The Rating Outlooks on the long-term IDRs are revised to
Positive from Stable. The issue ratings on the Dominican
Republic's senior unsecured foreign and local currency bonds are
affirmed at 'B+'. The Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'BB-' and the
short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.


RESERVAS BANK: Top Official Balks at Rumors
-------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Central banker Hector Valdez Albizu
denied that the State-owned Reservas bank lacks liquidity, saying
on the contrary, "the bank has surplus reserves in dollars and
pesos."

Mr. Albizu said Reservas has a solvency ratio of 16.89%, with
which in his view "far exceeds the level required by the Monetary
and Financial Law, which is 10%," according to Dominican Today.

Mr. Albizu said the Dominican financial system's entities in
general are strong, indicating that the latest indicators reflect
that situation, the report notes.  "In fact, comparing the growth
rate of total system's assets, May 2016 with May 2015 amounted to
9.06%m with a level of return on equity of 15.49% and a portfolio
of arrears of only 1.94%," the report quoted Mr. Albizu as saying.

                             Surplus

In an emailed statement, Mr. Valdez also noted that as of June 16,
financial institutions have deposited in the Central Bank a
surplus of RD$23.2 billion in overnight deposits, and an excess of
reserve in national currency of RD$1.79 billion and foreign
currency of US$341.3 million, the report notes.

The official's statement comes in the heels of rumors that the
Reservas bank exceeded its financing limit in a loan for the
construction of the coal-fired plants at Catalina, Peravia
(south), the report says.

Mr. Albizu called the report on the Reservas bank citing the group
National Committee to Combat Climate Change (CNLCC) published by
several online outlets on June 15, "unconscionable and
defamatory," Dominican Today relays.

Dominican Today notes that Mr. Valdez stressed that the Reservas
bank hasn't undergone problems of reserve during at least the last
30 years and on the contrary, "has been characterized by strict
adherence to the reserve requirement policy and other banking
rules and prudential compliance under the provisions of the
Monetary and Financial Law 183-02 of 21 November 2002 and its
implementing regulations."

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 3, 2015, Fitch Ratings affirmed the Dominican Republic's
long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
at 'B+'.  The Rating Outlooks on the long-term IDRs are revised to
Positive from Stable. The issue ratings on the Dominican
Republic's senior unsecured foreign and local currency bonds are
affirmed at 'B+'. The Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'BB-' and the
short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.


===========
P A N A M A
===========


AES PANAMA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDR; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed AES Panama SRL's (AESP) Foreign
Currency and Local Currency Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings at
'BB+'.  Fitch has also revised the Rating Outlook to Stable from
Negative.  The rating action affects USD82 million of notes
outstanding due in 2016 and the USD300 million of notes due 2022.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed AESP's national scale rating at
'AA-(pan)'.  The Rating Outlook is Stable.  The national scale
affirmation also affects the notes due 2022.

                          KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Outlook revision to Stable from Negative reflects the recent
refinancing of AESP's 2016 notes, which alleviated liquidity
pressure in the short term.  The Stable Outlook also reflects the
recovery of the company's EBITDA margins.  Fitch expects this
improvement to continue due to reduced exposure to spot purchase
risk.

AESP began commercial operation of its power barge during the
second quarter of 2015, and Fitch expects a more flexible
contractual position for the company after 2018.

Improving Credit Metrics:

AESP's credit metrics have significantly improved since 2014, and
Fitch expects this improvement to continue.  In 2015 AESP showed
EBITDA of USD99.7 million on revenues of USD299 million (versus
USD12 million and USD261.8 million, respectively in 2014).  This
was primarily driven by improved hydrological conditions and by
lower spot prices, reflecting the global decline in oil prices.
Consequently, the company's margins recovered to 33% (vs. 5% in
2014), while leverage improved to 3.8x and interest coverage
rebounded to 4.2x.  Fitch expects to see tightening liquidity as
the company returns to its stated cash policy whereby excess funds
over USD20 million are paid out as dividends.

The hydrology forecast points to heavier rainfall in the second
half of 2016 as a result of the 'La Nina' effect.  Base case
assumptions indicate normal hydrology for the next few years,
while spot prices continue being driven down by the low price of
oil and improved energy supply dynamics, as Panama adds new
generation projects to the matrix between now and 2020.

Moderate Exposure to Hydrological Risk:
AESP maintains power purchase agreements (PPAs) that represent
approximately 90% of its installed capacity.  This elevated level
exposes AESP to changes in hydrological conditions and spot market
prices such as those observed during 2014 and 2013.  In the medium
term, AESP is considering several alternatives for managing
hydrology risk.  By adding the 72MW Estrella del Mar thermal barge
to its asset base, AESP will be able to offset some of its own
spot market costs with the barge's price-adjusted revenues.
Alternatively, after Estrella del Mar's contracts expire in 2020,
the company could use the barge's capacity to directly supply
back-up energy.

As part of the actions being taken by the company to reduce its
exposure to hydrology risk, AESP is also considering not renewing
the PPAs that expire over the next five years.  Thereafter, it
would try to enter into short-term contracts to give the company a
better degree of climatological visibility.  The company's
contractual strategy will consist in reducing or increasing its
contracted capacity based on hydrology and spot price
expectations.

Diversification of the Panamanian Energy Matrix:
Panama has nearly 1300 MW of non-hydro based generation under
various stages of constructions between now and 2020, including a
380MW natural gas plant which will be operated by AES Corp through
a joint venture with Inversiones Bahia.  The expansion of
alternative generation sources within the Panamanian power matrix
should help keep spot prices low, even in stressed hydrological
conditions.

Cash Flow Supported by Contractual Position:
AES Panama's ratings reflect company's contractual position with
low counterparty risk.  Generation companies in Panama are
permitted to enter into PPAs for up to their firm capacity
allocation.  According to the local regulator, firm capacity is
calculated based on a 30-year historical average.  The regulations
promote the use of PPAs by requiring distribution companies to
secure 100% of their peak regulated demand for the following year.
AES Panama maintains PPAs for approximately 91%, on average, of
available capacity through 2018.  Thereafter, the company has
secured contracts for 350 MW (between 70-80% of capacity) through
2030.

The company sells electricity under separate PPAs with the
country's three distribution companies, Empresa de Distribucion
Electrica Metro-Oeste S.A. (Edemet), Elektra Noreste (Fitch IDR
'BBB'), and Empresa de Distribucion Electrica Chiriqui (Edechi),
with various maturities.  Panamanian distribution companies appear
to have the sufficient credit quality and financial ability to
support their respective obligations under the PPAs with AESP.

Strong Market Position
AESP is the largest generation company in the country based on
installed capacity accounting for 18% market share (without
considering AES Changuinola installed capacity of 223MW).  AESP
benefits from a competitive portfolio of low-cost hydroelectric
generating assets, including dam-based reservoirs and run of the
river units.  The company is composed of four hydroelectric plants
throughout the country with a total installed capacity of
approximately 482 MW and different dispatch priorities.  The
thermal plant, Estrella del Mar, has an installed capacity of
72MW.  The diverse locations of the company's assets somewhat
mitigate its exposure to hydrology risk as the plants are located
in different hydrology regions.

Exposure to Regulatory Risk:
The company's ratings also reflect its exposure to regulatory
risk.  Historically, generation companies in Panama were
competitive unregulated businesses free to implement their own
commercial strategies.  In the past years, the increase in
electricity prices has resulted in increased government
intervention in the sector in order to curb the impact of high
energy prices for end-users.

                          KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- New capacity through next five years keeps spot prices low;
   -- Expiring PPAs are not renewed in 2019 & 2020;
   -- No significant El Nino effects in the near-to-medium term;
   -- Excess cash above USD20 million paid out as dividends;
   -- Barge fuel costs gradually increasing over the next several
      years.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

A downgrade could result from a combination of the following
factors: leverage above 4.0x on a sustained basis, increased
government intervention in the sector coupled with weakening
regulatory framework, inability to reduce exposure to the spot
market, and/or payment of dividends coupled with high leverage
levels

Factors that could trigger a positive rating action include: a
sustained decrease in leverage below 3.0x coupled with an
effective diversification of revenues among different fuels, and
reduced exposure to spot market risk.

                           LIQUIDITY

AESP's policy is to maintain a cash balance of USD20 million,
dividends payments are subordinated to this policy.  The company
maintains short-term credit facilities for up to USD105 million.
The company has no FX exposure, as it operates in Panama.

AESP's current debt consists of USD82 million of outstanding
senior unsecured notes due in December 2016, and its recently
issued USD300 million bond due 2022.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

AES Panama SRL

   -- Foreign Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB+';
   -- Local Currency Long-Term IDR at 'BB+';
   -- National Long-Term Rating at 'AA-(pan)'.
   -- USD300 million notes due 2016 (USD82 million outstanding)
      'BB+';
   -- USD300 million notes due 2022 'BB+' and 'AA-(pan)'.

The Rating Outlook has been revised to Stable from Negative.


===============
P A R A G U A Y
===============


PARAGUAY: S&P Affirms 'BB' LT Sov. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Global Ratings revised its outlook on the long-term ratings on the
Republic of Paraguay to stable from positive.  S&P also affirmed
its 'BB/B' long- and short-term foreign and local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Paraguay.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'BB+' transfer and convertibility assessment.

                            RATIONALE

The outlook revision to stable reflects S&P's view that Paraguay's
agenda and reform progress, growth trajectory, fiscal outturn, and
external liquidity and indebtedness will not outperform S&P's
previous expectations.  S&P do not believe this deterioration has
detracted from Paraguay's creditworthiness, supporting S&P's
decision to affirm the rating.  However, S&P believes that
structural challenges that will continue to limit policymaking
effectiveness, in addition to external weakening, particularly in
a context of sluggish commodity prices and continued economic
contraction in Brazil and Russia (which combined receive over 40%
of Paraguay's exports), have made the likelihood of an upgrade
more remote.  At the same time, the country's still-solid external
position has weakened since S&P's previous review.  External debt
net of public and commercial bank assets reached -7% of current
account receipts (CARs) in 2015, and S&P expects rising external
debt will push this ratio into a net external debtor position in
2018 and 2019.  S&P also expects external financing needs to
average 87% of CARs and usable reserves over the next three years.

The ratings on Paraguay reflect the sovereign's prudent
macroeconomic policy that has supported buoyant growth, which
remains at healthy, although lower-than-historical, levels for a
country with Paraguay's income per capita, which S&P expects to be
$3,682 in 2016.  Debt levels, though increasing, remain low, and
fiscal deficits are moderate.  These strengths are balanced
against still-developing institutions, with limited implementation
capacity, and weak monetary policy flexibility, particularly given
the high dollarization of the Paraguayan economy.

Although President Horacio Cartes' Partido Colorado (PC)
Administration has continued to make progress on transparency
reform measures, S&P believes that the effectiveness of
policymaking is still evolving, reflecting structural challenges
that will be difficult to materially overcome over the next two
years.  Highlighting these structural challenges, the ability of
the new Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) to anchor fiscal policy
remains limited, in S&P's opinion.  While the Administration
maintains sound fiscal credentials--a key supporting factor for
the current rating--in the first year of implementation, the
government's compliance with the FRL, which came into effect in
2015, depended on the exceptional exclusion of capital spending
financed with sovereign bonds from the calculation of the deficit
cap.  The FRL also failed to constrain the deficit outcome in
2015, which reached 1.8% of GDP.  In 2016, although the budget was
passed in compliance with the law and without expenditure
exclusions, because the FRL only considers the budget approval
process, S&P do not expect it will be effective in constraining
fiscal outcomes, and S&P expects the deficit to reach 2% of GDP
this year.

"Despite the limited effectiveness of the FRL in constraining the
government's budget execution, we expect fiscal deficits to remain
moderate over the next three years and expect the average change
in government debt to represent 2.6% of GDP from 2016-2019.
Nevertheless, we believe that infrastructure needs will continue
to limit the government's fiscal flexibility.  Addressing these
needs remains a significant part of President Cartes' agenda.  To
that end, part of the government's strategy includes boosting
infrastructure via public-private partnerships (PPPs).  The first
two public initiatives approved under this framework are the
extension of two highways and the modernization of Asuncion's
international airport.  The ability of Congress to veto PPP
tenders was eliminated in early 2016, which should help smooth the
process.  However, the execution of these first projects was
delayed, in part reflecting the government's limited experience in
the implementation of these types of projects, and we do not
expect work to begin until 2017 at the earliest.  Difficulties in
advancing the PPP projects reflect the challenges the government
will continue to face in progressing on the reform agenda," S&P
said.

"We expect moderate fiscal deficits over the next three years will
continue to grow the government's debt burden, though we believe
that debt will remain low.  By year-end 2016, we anticipate that
net general government debt will reach 14.2% of GDP and will
continue to rise to 17.3% by 2019, while general government
interest payments will average 3.9% of general government revenues
between 2016-2019.  In recent years, a growing portion of the
government's financing needs have been covered by international
bonds.  Most recently, the government issued $600 million in
international capital markets in March 2016 to refinance
outstanding debt and finance public works.  The government's
growing issuance of international bonds has also increased its
exposure to exchange rate movements, given that about 75% of its
debt stock is denominated in foreign currency," S&P noted.

Despite recent exchange rate volatility, including a 26% nominal
depreciation of the guarani against the U.S. dollar in 2015,
Paraguay's inflation remains within the central bank's target, and
S&P expects it to average 4.5% through 2019, suggesting a credible
policy commitment.  At the same time, although the Consumer Price
Index-based real effective exchange rate depreciated slightly in
2015, it remains relatively high, at close to 117, suggesting that
the local currency may still be overvalued.

The Paraguayan economy remains highly dollarized, continuing to
limit monetary policy.  Foreign currency deposits represented 54%
of private-sector deposits as of April 2016, while foreign
currency credits represented 49% of total credits in the same
period.  At the same time, strong credit growth has slowed, and
S&P expects more mild economic growth to continue this trend,
while credit quality has deteriorated slightly.  Nonperforming
loans represented 2.8% of total loans as of April 2016, up from
1.8% as of year-end 2014.  Loan rescheduling has also increased,
although the system has somewhat benefited from the central bank's
provisional easing of loan classifications to soften the impact of
weaker growth in the agricultural and meat sectors.  Reflecting
these risks, in October 2015, S&P affirmed its Banking Industry
Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) on Paraguay at group '8' but
revised the economic risk trend to negative from stable to reflect
the financial system's increasing credit risk amid high
dollarization.  S&P maintained the industry risk trend at stable.
S&P's BICRAs, which evaluate and compare global banking systems,
are grouped on a scale from '1' to '10', ranging from what S&P
views as the lowest-risk banking systems (group '1') to the
highest-risk (group '10').

                             OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectations that the
government's structural challenges and implementation capacity
limitations will continue to restrain policymaking effectiveness,
while S&P expects that the country's external profile will weaken
on rising external indebtedness, in a context of sluggish
commodity prices and weakness in trade partners.  S&P expects
these factors to be balanced against Paraguay's resilient economic
growth, which S&P expects to remain buoyant over the next three
years.  S&P also expects moderate deficits and an increasing,
though still low, debt burden.

S&P could raise its ratings on Paraguay over the next year if the
recent weakening of the country's external indebtedness were to
reverse, and if external risks, including sluggish commodity
prices and weakness in trade partners, were to subside.  This,
combined with stronger policymaking effectiveness, would lead S&P
to raise the ratings.  On the other hand, if higher-than-expected
fiscal deficits or stronger currency depreciation were to lead to
larger expected changes in general government debt in the forecast
horizon, and if S&P was to see growing contingent liability risks
from off-budget operations, including from PPPs, or from the
financial sector that lead S&P to worsen its assessment of
Paraguay's debt risks, S&P could lower its ratings.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the external assessment had deteriorated
and that all other key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Action
                                 To                 From
Paraguay (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating         BB/Stable/B        BB/Positive/B

Ratings Affirmed

Paraguay (Republic of)
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment    BB+
Senior Unsecured                        BB


=======
P E R U
=======


INKIA ENERGY: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IDR; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Local and Foreign
Currency Issuer Default Ratings of Inkia Energy Ltd at 'BB'.  The
rating action includes the affirmation of the company's senior
unsecured notes at 'BB'.  The Rating Outlook is revised to Stable
from Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
Stable Outlook:

Inkia's Stable Outlook reflects the more stable predictability of
the company's future cash flow generation and expected
deleveraging process as the company's key expansion projects go
online throughout the year.  Incremental EBITDA from the
commercial operation of these projects will allow the company to
decrease its gross leverage to around 5x in YE2016 and 4x in
YE2017 from 8.2x in YE2015.  In addition, Fitch views the
conclusion of Kallpa's debt refinancing by extending its maturity
profile and the recent acquisition of the Guatemalan electricity
distribution company - Energuate - which adds business and
geographical diversification as positive.

Credit Profile Linked to Kallpa:

Inkia's ratings are supported by the solid credit profile of its
most important subsidiary, Kallpa Generacion S.A. - Kallpa (IDR
'BBB-'/Stable), a 1,063 megawatt (MW) Peruvian thermo-electric
generation company.  Inkia has a 74.9% participation in Kallpa
which provided 60% of Inkia's consolidated EBITDA.

Kallpa's credit quality is supported by its contractual position
and competitive cost structure.  As of 2015, approximately 98.4%
(versus 96.4% in 2014) of energy by volume sales were contracted
under U.S.-dollar-denominated power purchase agreements (PPAs),
with an average life of 6.81 years.  These PPAs support Kallpa's
cash flow stability through fixed payments and pass-through
clauses related to potential increases in fuel costs or other
costs due to changes in the regulatory framework.  Kallpa has
secured 100% of its natural gas needs under long-term supply
contracts with the Camisea Consortium until 2022, further
contributing to the predictability of its cash flow generation.

Leverage to Improve:

Inkia's stand-alone financial profile has historically been weak
for the rating category as the company adopted an aggressive
growth strategy.  The company's consolidated leverage peaked at
8.2x in YE2015 as a result of increasing debt to fund expansion
capex (approximately USD821 million as of December 2015).
Leverage is expected to decrease to around 5x in YE2016 and 4x n
YE2017 as the new power generation projects begin operations this
year.  These projects would increase Inkia's power generation
capacity by adding 1,218 MW. An EBITDA of around USD100 million in
2016 and USD160 million in 2017 is expected to come from these
projects

FCF Trending Toward Positive:

FCF has been negative in the last three years due to aggressive
capex expansion.  Total capex for the two largest power generation
projects in Peru accounted for USD1.3 billion.  Cerro del Aguila's
(CdA) capex was USD959 million (62% debt funded) and USD380
million was invested in Samay I (80% debt funded).  For 2016,
Fitch believes FCF would be positive due to operating cash flow
improvement and capex reduction.  A moderate dividend policy is
expected in order to preserve positive FCF and allow for leverage
reduction.

New Projects Coming Online in 2016:

Kanan in Panama (92 MW diesel powerplant) and Samay I in Peru (616
MW dual fuel powerplant) were completed and began commercial
operations in April and May 2016, respectively, while CdA in Peru
(510 MW hydro power plant) was 94% completed as of March 31, 2016;
commercial operations are expected to commence by second half of
2016.

Predictable and stable cash generation would come from new
projects.  CdA was awarded long-term PPA contracts for
approximately 483 MW of its 510 MW power plant capacity.  This
plant would likely benefit from an existing reservoir in the
Mantaro river basin; Inkia estimates a capacity factor close to
70% for this plant immediately after operations commencement.
Samay I is operating initially as a 616 MW cold-reserve plant and
will receive fixed capacity payments for 20 years.  Inkia has
74.9% participation in each of these projects.

Debt Structurally Subordinated:

Inkia's debt is structurally subordinated to debt at the operating
companies.  Total debt at the subsidiary level amounted to
approximately USD1.5 billion, or 72.8% of total consolidated
adjusted debt as of December 2015.  The bulk of this debt is
represented by bank debt to finance the company's projects.  This
project finance-like debt has a standard covenant package
including dividend restrictions and limitations on additional
indebtedness.  On an unconsolidated basis, Inkia's cash flow
depends on dividends received from subsidiaries and associated
companies.  The company received distributions of USD92 million in
YE2015.  Historically, Kallpa was an important contributor to
Inkia's dividends received.  With USD350 million senior unsecured
notes due May 2026, Kallpa refinanced most of its debt, including
project finance-like debt.  Following Kallpa's refinancing, USD113
million in additional dividends is expected between 2016 and 2020.

Geographic and Business Diversification:

The company is focused on diversify its energy asset base in Latin
American markets where overall and per capita energy consumption
has a higher potential for growth compared to developed markets.
Inkia adopted an aggressive plant expansion strategy during the
last three years.  The Energuate acquisition provided further
geographic and business diversification in Guatemala and in the
electricity distribution sector.  Energuate's EBITDA is expected
to be USD110 million in 2016.  Operations in Peru (rated 'BBB+'),
which includes Kallpa and cash flow from new power generation
projects (CdA and Samay I), should account for 50% of 2016
consolidated EBITDA, followed by Guatemala with 26% ('BB') and
Panama through Kanan with 5%.  The remaining EBITDA (19%) should
arise from assets located mainly in Bolivia ('BB'), Chile ('A+'),
the Dominican Republic ('B+'), El Salvador ('B+') and Nicaragua
('B+').

                          KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- Key projects start operations in 2016: CdA, Samay I and
      Kanan would add power capacity of 1,218 MW and USD100
      million of EBITDA in 2016.

   -- Consolidation of the Energuate acquisition increases EBITDA
      by USD100 million in 2016.

   -- Capex around USD226 million in 2016 mainly to complete the
      CdA and Samay I projects.  From 2017 and thereafter capex
      mainly for maintenance is projected to be around USD60
      million (including long term service agreement)

   -- Dividend payments to parent approximately 30% of net income
      (excluding non-cash items) per year from 2017 and
      thereafter.

                         RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative Drivers: A negative rating action could be triggered by a
combination of the following: Consolidated gross leverage remains
above 4.5x over the medium term following additional investment
opportunities undertaken without an adequate amount of additional
equity; reduction in cash flow generation due to adverse
regulatory issues and deterioration of its contractual position;
aggressive dividend policy; and/or Inkia's asset portfolio becomes
more concentrated in countries with high political and economic
risk.

Positive Drivers: Although a positive rating action is not
expected in the near future, a combination of the following would
be considered: A leverage reduction below 4x on a sustainable
basis while cash flow generation improves in countries with low
regulatory risk.

                             LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity Position:
Inkia's liquidity primarily relies on cash on hand and readily
monetizable assets of USD289 million by YE2015, though it is
earmarked to complete projects.  Fitch views Kallpa's large
portion of debt already refinanced to an extended amortization
profile as positive.  Most of Inkia's consolidated debt is due
after 2020.

The company benefits from access to local capital markets to
finance investment projects at the subsidiary level.  Currently,
CdA has a syndicated bank facility for up to USD591 million to
finance the construction of its hydroelectric generation plant
(project finance debt) and Samay I has negotiated a facility for
up to USD311 million to finance its thermal generation plant
(project finance debt).  Inkia acquired Energuate for
USD266 million in January 2016.  The acquisition was funded by a
USD120 million bridge loan and the remaining USD146 million was
covered by cash proceeds from the sale of Edegel.  As a result of
this transaction, total debt increased by USD400 million, which
the company is now in process of refinancing.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has affirmed these ratings:

Inkia Energy Ltd.

   -- Long-Term Foreign and Local currency Issuer Default Ratings
     (IDRs) at 'BB';
   -- Senior Unsecured Notes at 'BB'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.


PESQUERA EXALMAR: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its 'B' long-term corporate credit and
issue-level ratings on Pesquera Exalmar S.A.A. on CreditWatch
negative.

The CreditWatch listing reflects at least a one-in-two chance of a
downgrade over the next three months in light of significant
delays in announcing the fishing quota for the first season of
2016.  The latter is fueling uncertainties over the company's
operations for the rest of the year.  In S&P's opinion, such
delays will have negative implications on the company's production
volumes, which could weaken its financial performance and reduce
its liquidity for 2016.

According to biomass studies on the Peruvian coast conducted in
May, only 3.2 million metric tons were adult fish, which is below
the 5 million ton threshold at which the Peruvian government
generally limits industrial fishing activities.  Currently, a
second scientific survey is underway, and findings should help
determine the timing and size of the first 2016 fishing season.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch listing following the
announcement from Peruvian authorities on the approved quota, and
after S&P assess its effects on the company's cash flow generation
and liquidity position.


================================
T R I N I D A D  &  T O B A G O
================================


CARIBBEAN AIRLINES: Guyana Threatens to Ban Airline
---------------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Fly Jamaica could see an increase in
passenger load out of Guyana due to a dispute involving the
country's international airport and Caribbean Airlines.

Guyana's Cheddi Jagan International Airport is threatening to ban
Caribbean Airlines unless it sticks to an agreement that allows
Guyanese travelling to other destinations to take their duty --
free purchases with them, according to RJR News.

Minister responsible for Civil Aviation, David Patterson,
disclosed that the airport has written to Caribbean Airlines
giving it until July 6 to comply, the report notes.

The report notes that Mr. Patterson said Guyana never agreed for
CAL passengers who transit the Piarco International Airport to
disembark, get re-checked by Trinidad and Tobago security, and
then board again.

Mr. Patterson said, when doing so, mainly liquor, purchased from
Cheddi Jagan International Airport duty free shops, is confiscated
at the point of security screening at Piarco, the report relays.

According to Mr. Patterson, the issue has severe implications for
Guyanese businesses, the report notes.

CAL has not commented.

If the issue is not resolved, Guyana will have to rely heavily on
Fly Jamaica, Suriname Airways and Dynamic Airways to serve the
North American routes, the report addsa.

                      About Caribbean Airlines

Caribbean Airlines Limited -- http://www.caribbean-airlines.com/
-- provides passenger airline services in the Caribbean, South
America, and North America.  The company also offers freighter
services for perishables, fish and seafood, live animals, human
remains, and dangerous goods.  In addition, it operates a duty
free store in Trinidad.  Caribbean Airlines Limited was founded in
2006 and is based in Piarco, Trinidad and Tobago.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
November 2, 2015, RJR News said that Michael DiLollo, Chief
Executive Officer of Caribbean Airlines Limited has quit after
just 17 months on the job. The 48-year-old Canadian national,
citing personal reasons, resigned with immediate effect.  His
resignation was accepted by the airline's board of directors. Mr.
DiLollo was appointed Caribbean Airlines CEO in May 2014,
following the sudden resignation of Robert Corbie in September
2013.

In early February 2015, Larry Howai, then Finance Minister, told
Parliament that unaudited accounts for 2014 showed the airline
made a loss of US$60 million, inclusive of its Air Jamaica
operations, and the airline planned to break even by 2017.
Mr. Howai told the Parliament that a five-year strategic plan had
been completed and was in the process of being approved for
implementation.

In an interview with the Trinidad & Tobago Guardian in early
November 2015, Mr. DiLollo said CAL did not need a bailout just
yet. Mr. DiLollo said the airline had benefited from extremely
patient shareholders for years and he believed the airline was
strategically positioned to break even in three years.


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


LATAM: IDB Says Regional Growth Hampered by Savings Crisis
---------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean360.com reports that Latin America and the Caribbean
faces a savings crisis, with fiscal and demographic realities
making the outlook worse in the coming years, according to a new
study by the Inter-American Development Bank.

The region faces major fiscal challenges in the years ahead and
the report argues that more savings is a key element to ensure
both economic growth and resilience, according to
Caribbean360.com.

The gross national saving rate in Latin America and the Caribbean
was just 17.5 percent of GDP between 1980 and 2014, far below the
33.7 percent for Emerging Asia and 22.8 percent for advanced
economies. Only sub-Saharan Africa saved less, at 13.8 percent,
Caribbean360.com notes.

The report analyzes the reasons behind the region's chronically
low savings by households and governments, and its economic
impacts, from behavioral biases among individuals to structural
inadequacies in financial systems and fiscal budgets,
Caribbean360.com relays.  It also looks at inefficiencies in
savings by firms, which invest too little.

On the upside, the book provides a roadmap for policymakers and
other key actors to reverse the situation to bring savings rates
more in line with successful economies, Caribbean360.com notes.
The IDB said even small gains in savings could have big impacts.

For instance, for every percentage point increase in national
saving, domestic investment in the region increased by almost 0.4
percent, Caribbean360.com relays.  This means US$20 billion in
more money available to finance vital infrastructure projects, the
IDB said, Caribbean360.com notes.

"We can't just shrug off our poor savings rates by saying we are
bad at putting money away," said IDB Chief Economist Jose Juan
Ruiz, Caribbean360.com notes.  "This book shows governments,
businesses and even families have it within their power to ensure
we have the resources we need during the bad times and the good
times, and to care for an aging population."

The book, Saving for Development: How Latin America and the
Caribbean Can Save More and Better, is part of the IDB's flagship
Development In the Americas series.  It lays out the big gaps in
the savings system in the region, notes the report.

It noted that pension systems are another savings constraint. Less
than half the population in Latin America and the Caribbean saves
for retirement through a contributory pension system, a problem
that, unless corrected, will get worse as the population ages,
Caribbean360.com notes.

"The savings crisis means the region is struggling to find the
resources needed to finance new and much-needed airports, ports,
roads and other infrastructure that can boost future growth.  The
region must increase investment by between 2 and 4 percentage
points of GDP per year (depending on the country) for decades to
loosen this binding constraint to growth, or by between US$100
billion and US$200 billion a year," the IDB said, Caribbean360.com
relates.

It added that fiscal policy has also impacted savings, noting that
governments spend too much on current expenditures such as
subsidies, and too little on capital investments, reports
Caribbean360.com.  The IDB said that recent economic downturns
have made this worse as governments have opted to cut investment
spending.

"The agenda to get countries to save more can seem overwhelming,
requiring us to act on many fronts," said IDB lead economist
Eduardo Cavallo, one of the book's coordinators and editors,
Caribbean360.com discloses.  "It may seem more convenient to rely
on foreigners to provide us with their surplus savings. The book
shows this is not a viable option anymore.  Saving more and better
will allow us to stand on our own two feet, and provide resources
for people to achieve their aspirations," Mr. Cavallo added.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From June 13 to June 17, 2016
---------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name               Cpn    Price   Maturity   Country  Curr
-----------               ---    -----   --------   -------  ----
Alpha Star Holding II Lt   8.45   66.477  3/19/2034     EC  USD
Andino Investment Holdin   5.36   74.336  11/25/2020    EC  USD
Andino Investment Holdin    8.5     37.1  4/10/2018     VE  USD
Anton Oilfield Services   11.75       41  10/21/2026    VE  USD
Anton Oilfield Services   8.875     19.5  3/29/2017     MN  USD
BA-CA Finance Cayman 2 L      8    6.625  12/31/2018    CL  USD
BA-CA Finance Cayman Ltd   5.75   69.812  12/1/2034     KY  USD
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Arg  4.375    46.75  4/25/2025     KY  USD
Banco BPI SA/Cayman Isla    7.5    61.25   4/3/2017     BR  USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayma    7.5    45.88                KY  USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayma    7.5     44.2                KY  USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayma     10  128.271  12/31/2020    KY  USD
Banco do Brasil SA/Cayma  4.625   69.075   3/1/2021     KY  USD
Banco Santander Puerto R    7.5       45  4/25/2019     HK  USD
BCP Singapore VI Cayman   8.625     68.5  11/1/2018     AE  USD
BCP Singapore VI Cayman  0.9551    42.75  12/1/2039     KY  USD
CA La Electricidad de Ca   5.93   73.652  11/1/2021     EC  USD
Caixa Geral De Depositos    9.5    29.75  4/23/2019     BR  USD
China Shanshui Cement Gr  7.375   69.875  1/31/2020     PE  USD
China Shanshui Cement Gr    6.5   69.989  12/1/2023     EC  USD
China Shanshui Cement Gr      7    47.25  4/21/2020     KY  USD
CSN Islands XI Corp        5.93   73.051   1/1/2022     EC  USD
CSN Islands XI Corp       10.75   34.639  2/12/2023     BR  USD
CSN Islands XII Corp          7    73.33  1/17/2023     CO  COP
CSN Islands XII Corp       3.95   61.977  3/15/2022     KY  USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomis  6.375   73.875  5/15/2043     CR  USD
Decimo Primer Fideicomis    7.7   68.067   7/1/2029     EC  USD
Delta Investment Horizon   5.36   75.108  12/30/2020    EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   71.389  4/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   71.389  4/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.5   65.375   4/3/2017     BR  USD
Ecuador Government Domes      6   43.875   4/5/2023     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   6.25   73.089   4/6/2017     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  6.375   73.835  5/15/2043     CR  USD
Ecuador Government Domes      6       31  5/16/2024     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   9.75    36.95  5/17/2035     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  4.625     69.5  5/21/2023     CN  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    8.5    75.01  5/25/2016     CN  USD
Ecuador Government Domes      3   74.109  5/26/2020     ID  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   65.784  5/30/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   9.25       35   5/7/2028     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  4.875   75.819   6/1/2027     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   5.75   74.625  6/11/2025     DO  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   5.75   74.625  6/11/2025     DO  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.164  6/11/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.201  6/11/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.201  6/11/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   65.975  6/11/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.415  6/11/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.415  6/11/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.158  6/12/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.195  6/12/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.408  6/12/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.408  6/12/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   70.121  6/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   71.073  6/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   7.75   71.073  6/25/2028     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  5.125    43.35  6/26/2022     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  5.125   44.625  6/26/2022     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  7.125     43.5  6/26/2042     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes  7.125       42  6/26/2042     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   5.25       43  6/27/2029     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   6.35    31.25  6/30/2021     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   6.35     31.5  6/30/2021     KY  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.032   7/1/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes    7.7   68.067   7/1/2029     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.291   7/1/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   65.863   7/1/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes   8.45   67.291   7/1/2034     EC  USD
Ecuador Government Domes 13.625       62  8/15/2018     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes 13.625       45  8/15/2018     VE  USD
Ecuador Government Domes 13.625   49.881  8/15/2018     VE  USD
Empresa de Telecomunicac   5.64   71.931  12/30/2021    EC  USD
Empresa de Telecomunicac   5.42       50  3/28/2019     NO  NOK
Empresa Generadora de El   8.25    45.75  4/25/2018     KY  BRL
Empresa Generadora de El  4.625   72.512  5/21/2023     CN  USD
ESFG International Ltd     5.25       52  4/12/2017     VE  USD
General Exploration Part  5.125    34.75  12/15/2017    BR  EUR
General Shopping Finance   6.21   71.552  11/25/2023    EC  USD
General Shopping Finance  11.75    70.75  4/23/2018     KY  USD
Global A&T Electronics L   7.75   69.333  11/7/2028     EC  USD
Global A&T Electronics L   5.93   73.359  12/1/2021     EC  USD
Global A&T Electronics L     10    62.75   2/1/2019     SG  USD
Global A&T Electronics L   8.45   66.646   2/6/2034     EC  USD
Gol Finance Inc            6.75    23.75  10/1/2022     KY  USD
Gol Finance Inc           8.625    67.75  11/1/2018     AE  USD
Gol Finance Inc            4.15     71.5  11/14/2035    KY  EUR
Gol Finance Inc            5.25    47.25  3/15/2042     KY  USD
Gol Finance Inc           5.375    31.45  4/12/2027     VE  USD
Gol Finance Inc             5.5    32.64  4/12/2037     VE  USD
Gol Finance Inc            8.25    45.75  4/25/2018     KY  BRL
Golden Eagle Retail Grou      6    70.25  10/25/2041    PA  USD
Golden Eagle Retail Grou   6.95       65   4/1/2025     KY  USD
Greenfields Petroleum Co  12.75     42.4  2/17/2022     VE  USD
Honghua Group Ltd           6.5    67.24  11/15/2020    KY  USD
Honghua Group Ltd          8.45   66.414   4/2/2034     EC  USD
Instituto Costarricense    7.75   69.149  11/8/2028     EC  USD
Instituto Costarricense     7.5   51.602  4/15/2031     KY  USD
Inversiones Alsacia SA      7.5   46.274  11/6/2018     CN  USD
Inversiones Alsacia SA       10    62.75   2/1/2019     SG  USD
Inversora Electrica de B    7.5       34  4/25/2019     HK  USD
Kaisa Group Holdings Ltd   5.64   70.192  11/25/2021    EC  USD
Kaisa Group Holdings Ltd   5.61   68.567  12/1/2022     EC  USD
MIE Holdings Corp          7.75   70.495  10/23/2028    EC  USD
MIE Holdings Corp          6.21   71.691  11/1/2022     EC  USD
MIE Holdings Corp             8    57.65  4/15/2021     KY  USD
Mongolian Mining Corp       5.5     36.5  10/23/2020    BR  USD
Mongolian Mining Corp     8.875       16  3/29/2017     MN  USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayman Is   7.75   69.111  11/8/2028     EC  USD
Newland International Pr  12.75    44.25  2/17/2022     VE  USD
Newland International Pr      7   46.125  4/21/2020     KY  USD
Noble Holding Internatio  6.625       22  10/1/2022     KY  USD
Noble Holding Internatio   5.75    61.11  10/24/2023    BR  USD
Noble Holding Internatio  4.125    61.46  11/1/2022     BR  USD
Noble Holding Internatio      6    30.75  11/15/2026    VE  USD
Noble Holding Internatio   5.93   71.815  11/25/2022    EC  USD
Noble Holding Internatio    7.5     46.5  11/6/2018     CN  USD
Noble Holding Internatio   7.75   69.371  11/7/2028     EC  USD
Noble Holding Internatio  9.875    31.05  11/9/2019     BR  USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe   7.25   53.375  1/18/2018     KY  USD
Odebrecht Drilling Norbe   7.75   69.102  12/19/2028    EC  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7    38.55                BR  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7     39.5                BR  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     5.753        1                KY  EUR
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.75    37.25  10/13/2019    VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      8.25    35.75  10/13/2024    VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         9    35.75  11/17/2021    VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         4   70.666  11/4/2023     AR  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd    0.9551    42.75  12/1/2039     KY  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.75   69.102  12/19/2028    EC  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         8     74.5  12/20/2049    CN  CNY
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         6    33.25  12/9/2020     VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      3.38   63.175   2/7/2035     KY  EUR
Odebrecht Finance Ltd    3.8734       98  3/21/2017     KY  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd         7       36  3/31/2038     VE  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd      7.45    53.07  4/15/2027     KY  USD
Odebrecht Finance Ltd     6.875   73.411  4/22/2016     CN  CNY
Odebrecht Offshore Drill  9.375    37.75  1/13/2034     VE  USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drill      6   29.125  10/28/2022    VE  USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drill  7.125    65.73  12/15/2021    KY  USD
Odebrecht Offshore Drill   7.75   69.066  12/19/2028    EC  USD
Oi SA                         7    73.33  1/17/2023     CO  COP
Oi SA                         8        6  12/31/2018    CL  USD
Pesquera Exalmar SAA     2.8791   73.715  11/30/2032    CL  USD
Pesquera Exalmar SAA       7.65     35.5  4/21/2025     VE  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   6.25    54.25                KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   8.75    28.25                BR  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   0.99   43.333                KY  EUR
Petroleos de Venezuela S   5.95    50.25  1/30/2018     NO  NOK
Petroleos de Venezuela S  7.375     73.5  1/31/2020     PE  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   5.93   73.967  10/1/2021     EC  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S  6.625   22.375  10/1/2022     KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S    5.5    35.59  10/23/2020    BR  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S  4.125       62  11/1/2022     BR  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S     11   70.125  11/13/2020    PE  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S     10    63.75   2/1/2019     SG  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S  10.75   34.125  2/12/2023     BR  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   6.05       49   3/1/2041     KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S    6.8       50  3/15/2038     KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S   7.95    55.25   4/1/2045     KY  USD
Petroleos de Venezuela S      8    66.25  4/15/2021     KY  USD
Polarcus Ltd               7.75   69.371  11/7/2028     EC  USD
Provincia del Chaco           6       45   4/5/2023     KY  USD
PSOS Finance Ltd              7     41.5  12/1/2018     VE  USD
Rabobank Chile             5.25    41.55  6/27/2029     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   65.752  5/30/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini      9    37.25   5/7/2023     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.4   72.465  6/12/2024     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.4   72.563  6/12/2024     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.4   72.563  6/12/2024     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45    65.97  6/12/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   67.196  7/17/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   65.789  7/17/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   67.196  7/17/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.25     36.1  7/20/2020     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.25       38  7/20/2020     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   69.949  7/24/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.932  7/24/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.932  7/24/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    9.5   23.375   7/3/2017     PA  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    9.5   23.375   7/3/2017     PA  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    4.9   73.401   8/1/2020     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   69.885   8/1/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.899   8/1/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.899   8/1/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.2   50.923   8/1/2040     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  12.75       43  8/23/2022     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  11.95     40.5   8/5/2031     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7    67.63  9/10/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   67.663  9/10/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   67.663  9/10/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   65.552  9/10/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   66.897  9/10/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   66.897  9/10/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   69.687  9/11/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.719  9/11/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.75   70.719  9/11/2028     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  5.625    72.25  9/11/2042     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.75   33.382  9/15/2016     BR  BRL
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.75   33.625  9/15/2016     BR  BRL
Republic of Ecuador Mini  9.125   67.887  9/15/2017     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   9.25       40  9/15/2027     VE  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  6.875    55.25  9/21/2019     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  6.875       57  9/21/2019     KY  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.45   45.015  9/25/2019     CN  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   7.45   45.125  9/25/2019     CN  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    6.5     58.5  9/26/2017     AR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  5.375    61.25  9/26/2024     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini  5.375    53.75  9/26/2024     BR  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   67.506  9/30/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   68.779  9/30/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini    7.7   68.779  9/30/2029     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   65.454  9/30/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   66.784  9/30/2034     EC  USD
Republic of Ecuador Mini   8.45   66.784  9/30/2034     EC  USD
Samarco Mineracao SA      0.719       43                KY  EUR
Samarco Mineracao SA       7.75   69.436  10/23/2028    EC  USD
Samarco Mineracao SA       11.5   35.375  11/13/2018    CA  USD
Samarco Mineracao SA      1.353   73.375  12/17/2017    KY  EUR
Samarco Mineracao SA       6.21   68.503  12/30/2023    EC  USD
Samarco Mineracao SA       8.45   66.646   2/6/2034     EC  USD
Seagate HDD Cayman         7.75   70.495  10/23/2028    EC  USD
Seagate HDD Cayman          6.5   69.477  11/25/2024    EC  USD
Shelf Drilling Holdings   5.125   34.584  12/15/2017    BR  EUR
Shelf Drilling Holdings       8    52.15  4/15/2027     KY  USD
Siem Offshore Inc            10    67.99   2/1/2019     SG  USD
Siem Offshore Inc           7.5     79.5  3/10/2020     CN  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA        9       68                KY  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA     6.25    50.25                KY  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA     5.75    61.25  10/24/2023    BR  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA     7.75   69.149  11/8/2028     EC  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA    6.875       49   2/6/2018     HK  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA     5.25   43.273  3/21/2019     VE  USD
Telemar Norte Leste SA      5.6       45  3/30/2022     AE  USD
Transocean Inc               10       55                KY  USD
Transocean Inc                9    69.75                KY  USD
Transocean Inc             7.25       54  1/18/2018     KY  USD
Transocean Inc             4.54   58.625  10/25/2041    PA  USD
Transocean Inc               11       70  11/13/2020    PE  USD
Transocean Inc             6.75  104.4036 11/5/2021     PY  USD
Transocean Inc              7.5   75.375  12/10/2028    PR  USD
Transocean Inc             8.45   66.618   2/6/2034     EC  USD
US Capital Funding IV Lt   7.75   70.502  4/25/2028     EC  USD
US Capital Funding IV Lt   9.75    37.65  5/17/2035     VE  USD
Usiminas Commercial Ltd      10       55                KY  USD
Usiminas Commercial Ltd    8.45   66.451  3/19/2034     EC  USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA      6.5   69.901   1/1/2024     EC  USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool SA     5.93   73.323  12/30/2022    EC  USD
Vale SA                    6.21   71.086   1/1/2023     EC  USD
Vantage Drilling Interna  9.875    33.25  11/9/2019     BR  USD
Venezuela Government Int    6.5   69.654                IE  USD
Venezuela Government Int   8.75   30.125                BR  USD
Venezuela Government Int   6.75    24.01  10/1/2022     KY  USD
Venezuela Government Int    4.3   54.766  10/15/2022    KY  USD
Venezuela Government Int    5.5     35.5  10/23/2020    BR  USD
Venezuela Government Int    6.5   70.288  11/1/2023     EC  USD
Venezuela Government Int      6    31.21  11/15/2026    VE  USD
Venezuela Government Int      9     33.9  11/17/2021    VE  USD
Venezuela Government Int    8.5    53.55  11/2/2017     VE  USD
Venezuela Government Int   8.45   66.477  3/19/2034     EC  USD
Venezuela Government Int    7.5   68.052   4/3/2017     BR  USD
Venezuela Government Int      6    30.25  5/16/2024     VE  USD
Venezuela Government Int    8.5    75.01  5/25/2016     CN  USD
Venezuela Government Int   8.45   65.784  5/30/2034     EC  USD
Venezuela Government Int      9     12.5  5/31/2017     US  CAD
Venezuela Government Int    7.7   68.195  6/12/2029     EC  USD
Venezuela Government TIC   8.45   66.414   4/2/2034     EC  USD
Venezuela Government TIC    9.5    30.05  4/23/2019     BR  USD
Venezuela Government TIC  4.375       41  4/25/2025     KY  USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA        8.1   53.131  12/15/2041    KY  USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA       8.45   66.386   4/2/2034     EC  USD
XLIT Ltd                    8.5       53  11/2/2017     VE  USD



                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any comillionercial use, resale
or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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