/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/160211.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Thursday, February 11, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 29


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

ARGENTINA: Floats $6.5 Billion Deal to End Epic Default Battle


B R A Z I L

GOL LINHAS: Suspends Service to Venezuela on Currency Dispute


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

BAIA INVESTMENT: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
BILLUND LEASING: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CENTURION CDO II: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CHEYNE MANAGED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
COMMODORE CDO I: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

COMMODORE CDO II: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
DELACROIX MANAGED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
DIVE MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
EQUINOX FINANCE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
JECD LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up

OPHIR PARTNERS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
SAMENA ASIA: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
SAMENA ASIA MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
VIOLET 2005-1: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
ZAMIN HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings

ZEPHYR RECOVERY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings


C O S T A   R I C A

BANCO NACIONAL: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Currency Deposit Ratings
INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE: Moody's Affirms Ba1 CFR; Outlook Negative


M E X I C O

ARENDAL S. DE R.L.: Fitch Lowers Ratings to 'CCC'
PETROLEOS MEXICANOS: New CEO Expects to Spare Jobs in Cost Cuts


P U E R T O    R I C O

DF SERVICING: Court Prohibits Use of Bautista Cash Collateral
HOSPITAL DAMAS: Medical Malpractice Suit vs. Parent Dismissed
PUERTO RICO: Hearing on Feb. 25 as Lawmakers Coalesce Around Bill


X X X X X X X X X

LATAM: Fitch Sees Constant Downgrades, High Default Risk for Corp.


                            - - - - -


=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================


ARGENTINA: Floats $6.5 Billion Deal to End Epic Default Battle
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Randles at Law360.com reports that Argentine President
Mauricio Macri is floating a $6.5 billion deal to settle a slew of
litigation with holdout bondholders over the country's 2001 debt
default, a court-appointed mediator said.

Two of the six "leading" holdouts have signed agreements in
principle with Argentina, mediator Daniel Pollack of McCarter &
English LLP said in a statement obtained by Law360.com.  The deal,
which must first be approved by Argentina's Congress, followed a
week of negotiations in New York City between bondholders and
members of Macri's administration, the report notes.

The report notes that Mr. Pollack said Macri's proposal is
"historic," marking a significant step toward finally ending
nearly 15 years of litigation.  If the settlement does go through,
it "will allow Argentina to return to the global financial markets
to raise much needed capital," Mr. Pollack added.

"It is my strong hope that with continued negotiations, those
firms too will be able to resolve their differences and reach
agreements in principle with Argentina," the report quoted Mr.
Pollack as saying.  "All concerned on the 'holdout' bondholders
side are working constructively to that end," he added.

The report notes that Mr. Pollack said that he spoke with Macri
and Argentine Minister of the Economy Alfonso Prat-Gay and that
both "stand solidly behind this proposal."  The deal is the latest
sign that Argentina is making serious inroads toward peace with
bondholders and restoring Argentina's standing with international
investors, the report relays.

Last month, the White House said it will drop its years long
opposition to Argentina's obtaining development loans, in
recognition of economic reforms being sought by Macri and his
administration, the report relays.  Mr. Macri had assumed office
in December, after promising voters that he would reform
Argentina's economy and break from the policies of his
predecessor, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, the report discloses.

Mr. Pollack did not disclose which holdouts had agreed to terms.

Mr. Pollack was appointed in 2014 as a special master in ongoing
debt litigation between NML Capital Ltd., Aurelius Capital
Partners LP and Argentina for the purpose of facilitating
settlement talks.  The firms had sued the country in various
jurisdictions over unpaid judgments tied to Argentina's 2001
default.

At the time, it was the largest sovereign debt default in history,
and Argentina has sought to restructure more than $100 billion
owed to domestic and foreign creditors, the report notes.  U.S.
lawmakers have criticized Argentina for failing to satisfy
billions of dollars in creditor payments and legal judgments, the
report says.  The United Nations, meanwhile, has criticized the
U.S. for siding with the hedge funds, the report relays.

"The events . . .  were an important step in resolving Argentina's
debt crisis; more remains to be done," the report quoted Mr.
Pollack as saying.

Aurelius is represented by Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP.
NML is represented by Dechert LLP.

Argentina is represented by Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP.

The lead case is NML Capital Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina,
case number 1:08-cv-06978, in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York.

            Class Action Atty. Attacks $6.5BB Deal

Jonathan Randles at Law360.com reports that Argentina's proposed
$6.5 billion settlement with holdout bondholders was attacked in
New York court by plaintiffs' counsel overseeing a series of
separate class action lawsuits over the country's 2001 default,
saying the deal would undermine injunctions intended to make sure
parties are treated equally.

Plaintiffs attorney Marta Colomar-Garcia of Diaz Reus & Targ LLP
sent a letter criticizing the proposed settlement to U.S. District
Judge Thomas Griesa, according to Law360.com.  The deal would
resolve litigation brought against the hedge funds and other
parties but not class action litigation, the report notes.


                          *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America reported in Nov. 27,
2015, that Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on
Argentina's Caa1 issuer rating to positive from stable.  The
outlook on Argentina's (P)Caa2 foreign legislation and
restructured local legislation foreign currency obligations is
also changed to positive from stable.  The outlook change is based
on Moody's view that the accession of president-elect Mauricio
Macri of the Cambiemos ("Let's Change") coalition will raise the
probability of credit positive policies being implemented,
including arriving at a resolution with holdout creditors, one of
Argentina's key credit constraints.

On Aug. 1, 2014, reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its
debt late July 30 after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a
US$539 million interest payment.  Earlier that day, talks with a
court- appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff
between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking full
payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001.  A
U.S. judge had ruled that the interest payment couldn't be made
unless the hedge funds led by Elliott Management Corp., got the
US$1.5 billion they claimed.  The country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its US$95 billion
default 13 years ago.

As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.

The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.

Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.

On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.

The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD).  The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5.  The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively.  The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.

On Nov. 3, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Fitch Ratings downgraded
Argentina's rating on Par Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D'
from 'C' as Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon
payments on its par bonds issued under foreign law after the
expiration of the 30-day grace period on Oct. 30.  According to
Fitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch
has downgraded the affected securities to 'D'.  In addition, Fitch
has affirmed:

   -- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'RD';
   -- Local Currency IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR at 'RD';
   -- Country Ceiling at 'CCC'.
   -- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Global 17) at
      'C';
   -- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under
      Argentine Law at 'CCC';
   -- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law at 'D'.

On April 22, 2015, Moody's Investors Service expanded the portion
of Argentina's debt that is rated (P)Caa2. The (P)Caa2 rating
reflects the higher risk of default for both Argentina's
restructured foreign legislation debt (as before) and,
additionally now, its restructured local legislation foreign
currency obligations, as compared with the risk of default on
other debt instruments issued by Argentina.  Argentina's local
currency debt and its non-restructured foreign currency debt are
rated Caa1. The debt that remains in default since Argentina's
2001 default is rated Ca.


===========
B R A Z I L
===========


GOL LINHAS: Suspends Service to Venezuela on Currency Dispute
-------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Brazilian airline Gol Linhas Aereas
Intelegentes SA, suspended operations to Venezuela's capital
Caracas until it can settle a dispute over the transfer of money
out of the country and back to Brazil, the company said in a
statement.

The money is being held in Venezuela under the country's strict
currency controls, a system that has led other airlines to take
writedowns on Venezuelan operations or suspend ticket sales and
service to the country, according to Reuters.

Airlines have $3.9 billion of resources trapped in Venezuela,
according to the International Air Transport Association, or IATA,
the report notes.  The government requires all tickets to be sold
in local currency but makes it difficult for the airlines to
convert that local revenue into dollars, the report relays.

The Venezuelan Bolivar though has been shrinking, reducing the
foreign currency value of the local ticket sales, the report says.

"Gol temporarily suspended its operations in Caracas, Venezuela
until the issue of repatriation of company resources in the
country is resolved," the statement said, the report discloses.
"Clients affected are being re-booked on other airlines and
receiving all necessary assistance," the statement added.

Gol gave no estimate as to how long negotiations with the
government over the transfers or how long the suspension will
last, the report notes.

Financially strapped Gol has BRL351 million ($90 million) trapped
in the country according to Exame, a Brazilian newsweekly
magazine, the report relays.  It has suffered four years of deep
losses exacerbated by falling demand and a strong dollar that has
driven up the Brazilian currency cost of dollar-denominated fuel,
debt and lease payments, the report notes.

Gol is 9.5 percent owned by U.S.-based Delta Airlines Inc., a
stake made up entirely of non-voting preferred shares.

Venezuela's currency controls currently disburse dollars for
VEB6.3 to the dollar for preferential goods such as food and
medicine, but also use less advantageous rates including 12 and
200 to the dollar for less important products, the report notes.

On the black market, U.S. dollars fetch VEB1,016 -- an 81 percent
depreciation from a year ago when dollars sold for VEB187.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Feb. 9, 2016, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B-'
global scale corporate credit and issue-level ratings on Gol
Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A. (GOL) on CreditWatch with negative
implications.  At the same time, S&P lowered its national scale
corporate credit rating on the company to 'brB-' from 'brB' and
placed them on CreditWatch negative.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


BAIA INVESTMENT: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
On Dec. 10, 2015, the sole shareholder of BAIA Investment Ltd.
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 19, 2016, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808


BILLUND LEASING: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Dec. 10, 2015, the
shareholders of Billund Leasing III Limited resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


CENTURION CDO II: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Dec. 10, 2015, the
shareholders of Centurion CDO II, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


CHEYNE MANAGED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Dec. 10, 2015, the
shareholders of Cheyne Managed CSO Fund Limited resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


COMMODORE CDO I: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Dec. 10, 2015, the
shareholders of Commodore CDO I Ltd. resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


COMMODORE CDO II: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Dec. 10, 2015, the
shareholders of Commodore CDO II Ltd. resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


DELACROIX MANAGED: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on Dec. 10, 2015, the
shareholders of Delacroix Managed Credit Fund Limited resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          David Dyer
          Telephone: (345)949-8244
          Facsimile: (345)949-5223
          P.O. Box 1984 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


DIVE MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------
On Dec. 7, 2015, the shareholder of Dive Master Inc resolved to
voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Commerce Corporate Services Limited
          P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 949 8666
          Facsimile: 949 0626


EQUINOX FINANCE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary general meeting held on Dec. 8, 2015, the
shareholder of Equinox Finance International Ltd resolved to
voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Commerce Corporate Services Limited
          P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 949 8666
          Facsimile: 949 0626


JECD LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary general meeting held on Dec. 7, 2015, the
shareholder of JECD Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the
company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Commerce Corporate Services Limited
          P.O. Box 694 Grand Cayman
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: 949 8666
          Facsimile: 949 0626


OPHIR PARTNERS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 9, 2015, the sole shareholder of Ophir Partners Master
Fund, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ophir Partners, LLC
          Michael Bleich
          120 West 45th St. Suite 3705
          New York, NY 10036
          USA
          Telephone: +1 (345) 914 6365


SAMENA ASIA: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------
On Dec. 10, 2015, the sole shareholder of Samena Asia Credit Fund
resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Avalon Ltd.
          Reference: GL
          Landmark Square, 1st Floor, 64 Earth Close
          P.O. Box 715 Grand Cayman KY1-1107
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (+1) 345 769 4422
          Facsimile: (+1) 345 769 9351


SAMENA ASIA MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 10, 2015, the sole shareholder of Samena Asia Credit
Master Fund resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Avalon Ltd.
          Reference: GL
          Landmark Square, 1st Floor, 64 Earth Close
          P.O. Box 715 Grand Cayman KY1-1107
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (+1) 345 769 4422
          Facsimile: (+1) 345 769 9351


VIOLET 2005-1: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 3, 2015, the sole shareholder of Violet 2005-1 SPC
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Michael Szymanski
          2 Bridge Avenue, Suite 322
          Red Bank, New Jersey 07701


ZAMIN HOLDINGS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 3, 2015, the sole shareholder of Zamin Holdings Limited
2004 resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Hugh Dickson
          c/o Prudence Pryce
          10 Market Street #765, Camana Bay
          Grand Cayman KY1- 9006
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 769 7207
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 7120


ZEPHYR RECOVERY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 3, 2015, the sole shareholder of Zephyr Recovery (Cayman)
2004 resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Michael Szymanski
          2 Bridge Avenue, Suite 322
          Red Bank, New Jersey 07701


===================
C O S T A   R I C A
===================


BANCO NACIONAL: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Currency Deposit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the long-term
local currency deposit and foreign currency deposit and senior
unsecured debt ratings of Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and Banco
de Costa Rica (BCR) to negative from stable.  At the same time,
Moody's affirmed the banks' long and short-term local currency
deposit ratings at Ba1/Not Prime, as well as the foreign currency
deposit ratings at Ba2/Not Prime and the foreign currency senior
debt ratings at Ba1.

The rating action follows Moody's outlook change on Costa Rica's
Ba1 government bond rating to negative from stable.

BNCR's and BCR's ba2 baseline credit assessments (BCA) and
adjusted BCAs are unaffected by this action, as are their Ba1(cr)
and Not Prime(cr) long and short term counterparty risk
assessments.

These ratings were affirmed, with the outlook changed to negative
from stable:

Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and Banco de Costa Rica:

  Long term local currency deposit rating of Ba1
  Long term foreign currency deposit rating of Ba2
  Long term foreign currency senior debt rating of Ba1

These ratings were affirmed:

Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and Banco de Costa Rica:

  Short term local currency deposit rating of Not Prime
  Short term foreign currency deposit rating of Not Prime

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's outlook change on Banco Nacional de Costa Rica's and Banco
de Costa Rica's long-term deposit and debt ratings to negative
from stable is in line with the action taken on the outlook for
Costa Rica's Ba1 government bond rating on Feb. 8.  The negative
outlook on the sovereign rating reflects Moody's expectation that
Costa Rica's high fiscal deficits will continue, leading to a
continued increase in government debt.

Both banks' local currency deposit and foreign currency debt
ratings benefit from one notch of uplift from their ba2 BCAs,
incorporating Moody's assumption of full support from the
government.  This assumption is based on the government's 100%
ownership, its guarantee of the banks' senior obligations under
Article 4 of the Banking Law, the banks' public policy mandate,
and the importance of their deposit and loan franchise within the
Costa Rican financial system.  The banks' Ba2 foreign currency
deposit ratings are constrained by Costa Rica's sovereign ceiling
for foreign currency deposits.  Should Costa Rica's government
bond rating be downgraded and its foreign currency deposit
ceiling, which is one notch below the sovereign bond rating, be
lowered, BNCR's and BCR's deposit and debt ratings would also face
downward pressure.

The ba2 BCAs for both issuers capture their modest consolidated
capitalization.  The BCAs are also limited by their weak
profitability, owing to high operating costs and mandatory
transfers to government related entities.  Earnings generation
will be further challenged by declining interest rates and rising
credit costs.  Asset quality at both banks remains relatively
strong, though pressures may arise from increases in unemployment,
notwithstanding Moody's expectation of higher economic growth
during 2016.

In addition, "the government's deteriorating finances may cause it
to rely more heavily on both BCR and BNCR to help finance public
sector deficits and lend to public infrastructure programs, which
could further compress profit margins, as these loans are usually
relatively low yield" according to Moody's analyst Georges
Hatcherian.  While project financings are also generally
relatively high risk and are often large tickets, these types of
projects typically carry either explicit or implicit government
backing.

While the colon has been much more stable than many other
currencies in the region, a significant depreciation would
increase risks to asset quality further given the significant
amount of foreign currency lending to local currency earners.

             WHAT COULD CAUSE THE RATINGS TO MOVE DOWN

Should Costa Rica's government bond rating be downgraded, BNCR's
and BCR's deposit and debt ratings would also face downward
pressure.

              WHAT COULD CAUSE THE RATINGS TO MOVE UP

Upward pressures on the banks' ratings is limited given the
negative outlook on the two issuers and on the sovereign ratings
of the Government of Costa Rica.  However, the outlook on the
banks' ratings could stabilize if the sovereign outlook
stabilizes.

The last rating action on Banco de Costa Rica and on Banco
Nacional de Costa Rica was on June 3, 2015 when Moody's lowered
both banks' BCAs to ba2 from ba1 and affirmed their deposit and
debt ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

Based in San Jose, Costa Rica, Banco Nacional de Costa Rica
reported total consolidated assets of about US$11 billion (CRC 5.8
trillion) and shareholders' equity of US$1 billion (CRC 535
billion), as of September 2015.

Based in San Jose, Costa Rica, Banco de Costa Rica reported total
consolidated assets of around US$9 billion (CRC 4.8 trillion) and
shareholders' equity of US$850 million (CRC 455 billion), as of
September 2015.


INSTITUTO COSTARRICENSE: Moody's Affirms Ba1 CFR; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Ba1 Corporate Family Rating
as well as the senior unsecured ratings of Instituto Costarricense
de Electricidad (ICE) and the senior secured ratings of Reventazon
Finance Trust.  Concurrently, Moody's changed the rating outlook
of both issuers to negative from stable.

The rating action was prompted by the Feb. 8, 2016 announcement
that Moody's had changed the rating outlook of the Government of
Costa Rica (Ba1) to negative from stable.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

Given that ICE is fully owned by the Costa Rican government, it
falls under the scope of Moody's rating methodology for
government-related issuers (GRIs).  The Costa Rican government
guarantees certain loans executed by ICE (around 10% of its
outstanding indebtedness) but does not guarantee ICE's debt
obligations rated by Moody's (around US$1 billion of notes).
However, Moody's believes that there is a "high" likelihood of
government extraordinary support in the case of financial distress
for several reasons including reputational given the company's
status as a major government-owned entity and its strategic
importance to the country's economy overall.  Furthermore, Moody's
views that the government of Costa Rica and ICE are exposed to
common risk factors as capture by the "high" default dependence
assigned to ICE.

ICE's Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA), which is a representation
of the group's intrinsic creditworthiness before taking into
account possible extraordinary support from the sovereign is ba3,
based on a scale of aaa to ca which aaa indicates the highest
credit quality.

ICE's BCA captures its key role as an autonomous government entity
established to develop the infrastructure to provide electricity
and telecommunication services in Costa Rica, and is especially
driven by its dominant position as the largest vertically
integrated utility in the country.  It also considers the fully
regulated nature of these electric operations.  Moody's believes
these are carried out under an overall credit supportive
framework.  That said, Moody's opinion is moderated by some
inconsistencies in the implementation of the cost recovery
mechanisms along with the less credit positive outcome of the
utility's recent electric tariff review to set the 2016 rates
which ICE is currently appealing.

The BCA is tempered by the modest size of ICE's operations and its
service territory.  Moody's acknowledges the diversification
benefits associated with the telecommunications operations but
there is limited upside potential to the BCA given the strong
challenges faced by ICE in this sector.  The BCA is capped by
certain corporate governance weaknesses along with the issuer's
exposure to foreign exchange risk and its dependence on the
capital markets to refinance its maturing debt and fund its
capital expenditure program.  The BCA reflects Moody's expectation
that, despite the increase leverage to finance the Reventazon
hydro-project, ICE's key credit metrics will remain commensurate
with the Ba-rating category according to the guidelines provided
for standard business risk under the Regulated Electric and Gas
Utility Methodology, published in December 2013.  Specifically,
that ICE will be able to record 3-year Retained Cash flow (RCF) to
debt and Cash flow (CFO pre-W/C) interest coverage in excess of 9%
and 3.0x, respectively.  That said, this along with ICE's ability
to further comply with its financial covenants will depend on the
outcome of its ongoing tariff appeal and/or its ability to offset
any final negative decision by the regulator with material cost
saving initiatives.

Reventazon Finance Trust's ratings reflect the ratings of ICE as
this hydro-electric project is highly dependent on the utility's
financial performance given the obligations that ICE has assumed
under contractual arrangements as Sponsor, EPC contractor, lessee,
and operator.

The negative rating outlook of ICE and Reventazon Finance Trust
reflects the negative outlook of the Ba1 Costa Rican government
rating and Moody's expectation that the high implied extraordinary
support and dependence levels from the sovereign will not change.

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

In light of the current negative outlook of the ratings of ICE and
the Costa Rican government, limited prospects exist for the rating
to be upgraded over the near to medium term.

ICE's ratings are likely to come under pressure following a
downgrade in the sovereign rating or in the case of lower than
anticipated implied sovereign support or if ICE's BCA is also
reviewed downward.  Negative rating pressure on the BCA could
surface from a deterioration in the credit supportiveness of the
Costa Rican regulatory framework or if ICE's expansion plan is
poorly executed and/or indebtedness increases significantly above
anticipated levels such that the credit metrics deteriorate and
cash flow interest coverage falls below 2.0x or RCF to debt
declines below 6% for an extended period.  In addition, ratings
could be downgraded if the issuer is not able to comply with its
covenant-package under its loan agreements.

A downgrade of ICE's ratings would also likely result in an
downgrade of Reventazon Finance Trust's ratings.  Moody's
recognizes the benefits to Noteholders of investing through a
Participation Agreement in a IDB B-loan given their preferred
creditor status including the historical performance of IDB-loans
to distressed borrowers.  However, the Ba1 ratings assigned to ICE
and to the Notes, presume a very low probability of default under
the Notes and a corresponding low probability that ICE would
become a distressed borrower whereby the benefits of having
preferred creditor status would be a factor in assessing default
and recovery risks for bondholders.  For these reasons, we believe
there is no reason to distinguish the rating and outlook of this
security which benefits from the involvement from the IDB, and the
rating and outlook for ICE's other debt securities.  To the extent
that severe credit deterioration occurred at both the sovereign
level of Costa Rica and ICE such that they would experience a
multi-notch downgrade to deep non-investment grade, we would
consider distinguishing between the rating and outlook of the
Reventazon Finance Trust Notes and ICE's other indebtedness.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regulated
Electric and Gas Utilities published in December 2013.  Other
methodologies used include Government-Related Issuers published in
October 2014.

Headquartered in San Jose, Costa Rica, ICE is a government-owned
vertically integrated electric utility as well as an integrated
telecommunications service provider.  ICE is the largest electric
utility in Costa Rica accounting for the vast majority of the
country's transmission assets as well as over 75% of the installed
capacity and electricity generation.  The group's market share in
the distribution of power also exceeds 75% after considering ICE's
98.6% ownership stake in Compania Nacional Fuerza y Luz that
serves the capital.  At the end of September 2015, ICE reported
consolidated assets of almost US$11 billion and funds from
operations (FFO) for the last twelve month period ended in
September 2015 of around US$930 million.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


ARENDAL S. DE R.L.: Fitch Lowers Ratings to 'CCC'
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Arendal, S. de R.L. de C.V.'s ratings
to 'CCC' from 'B'.

The downgrade reflects the lack of progress the company has made
toward refinancing its short term debt, including its USD100
million notes due during May 2016.  The current low oil price
scenario has caused Arendal's major customer, Pemex, to reduce
capex and extend its supplier payment terms.  This has resulted in
significant lengthening of the company's working capital cycles as
its receivables with Pemex have grown.  Positively, Arendal's
reputation and overall business profile continue to move forward
as evidenced by its increasing project backlog.  This implies,
however, that the company will need additional debt to fund the
working capital needed to support these new projects, adding one
more challenge to its current financial situation.

The expected Recovery Ratings of 'RR4' reflect average recovery
prospects given default.  'RR4' rated securities have
characteristics consistent with securities historically recovering
31%-50% of current principal and related interest.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

Customer and Project Concentration

Arendal has gained increasingly larger projects which have helped
the company grow rapidly, but this growth has come with large-
project concentration risks.  A single large project can at times
represent 40% of revenues or more.  Additionally, the company's
revenue mix is significantly oriented toward the public sector.
During 2015, Arendal generated about 80% of its revenues from
contracts with Pemex.  Considering the available backlog, revenues
from Pemex as the ultimate client will likely continue to
represent a large portion of the company's revenue source.

Recovery Prospects

In Fitch's opinion, under a stress scenario recovery of debt
instruments associated with pledged contracts would have access to
the existing accounts receivable to cover outstanding debt; the
remaining balances would form part of the mass of unsecured
creditors with average prospects of recovery between 31%-50%.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- Flat to low single digit revenue growth for 2016; revenue
      growth accelerates in 2017 as the company executes the bulk
      of its DUBA-Salina Cruz project.

   -- MXN1.5 billion in working capital flows for 2016 and
      subsequent recovery of MXN1.2 billion in 2017.

   -- No dividend payments.

                      RATING SENSITIVITIES

Absent a successful refinancing, Fitch could downgrade the ratings
to CC within a month of the 2016 notes maturity.

Successful debt refinancing and funding of operations through a
combination of internal and external sources could result in the
rating being upgraded to B-.

                            LIQUIDITY

Arendal's cash balance at year-end 2015 was MXN889 million,
compared to MXN3.9 billion of short-term debt maturities.  The
company's cash flow from operations was negative MXN893 million.
Free cash flow was negative MXN1.1 billion underperforming Fitch's
prior expectations, largely due to higher working capital
requirements.  Accounts receivable with Pemex including costs
incurred not yet billed total about MXN1.8 billion

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has downgraded Arendal's ratings:

   -- Long-term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR( to
      'CCC' from 'B';
   -- Long-term Local Currency IDR to 'CCC' from 'B';
   -- Unsecured notes due 2016 to 'CCC/RR4' from 'B/RR4'.


PETROLEOS MEXICANOS: New CEO Expects to Spare Jobs in Cost Cuts
---------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that New Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) Chief
Executive Officer Jose Antonio Gonzalez said that the state-owned
oil company must adjust its cost structure, but "not necessarily"
by cutting jobs.

"The main priority is to determine exactly how to implement these
cost cuts, which are necessary given the circumstances," Mr.
Gonzalez told Radio Formula, a day after Finance Secretary Luis
Videgaray revealed plans for budget cuts in 2017, the report
notes.

Mr. Videgaray did not provide specific figures, but he said the
public sector payroll would have to be trimmed, with employees
receiving the severance pay due to them under the law, according
to EFE News.

"I still have to look at all the options and what we have to look
for is the best way to make" cuts, Gonzalez, who succeeded Emilio
Lozoya as Pemex's CEO, said, the report relays.

The new Pemex chief said he planned to sit down with union leaders
to discuss the various options for slashing costs, the report
relays.

Pemex has been struggling in the wake of the collapse of oil
prices on the world market, the report relays.

The state-owned oil giant posted a net loss of nearly $20.75
billion in the first nine months of 2015, up 138.4 percent from
the same period in the previous year, the report says.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


DF SERVICING: Court Prohibits Use of Bautista Cash Collateral
-------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Enrique S. Lamoutte Inclan of the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Puerto Rico entered an order prohibiting
Debtors DF Servicing LLC, DF Investments LLC, DF Holdings LLC, and
DF Tier I LLC, from using any cash collateral of Bautista Cayman
Asset Company.

The Debtors are directed to show cause in writing why a further
order should not be entered:

   (a) Ordering the Debtors to account for all the cash collateral
received by or for the benefit of the Debtors since the petition
date, without prejudice to Debtor's compliance with other
reporting obligations under the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.

   (b) Requiring that any cash collateral of Bautista Cayman Asset
Company that is in the possession, custody or control of the
Debtor or any of the Insiders of the Debtor be turned over to
Bautista Cayman Asset Company.

   (c) Allowing Bautista Cayman Asset Company immediate access to
the Debtor's books and records, including, all annual and
quarterly financial statements for the period subsequent to
December 31, 2013, the Debtor's investment and bank accounts, and
all electronic records on any company computers, to make
electronic copies, photocopies or abstracts of the business
records of the debtor.

As previously reported by The Troubled Company Reporter, Bautista
Cayman Asset Company, as the prepetition secured lender to the
Debtors, asked the Bankruptcy Court to prohibit the Debtors' use
of cash collateral until they provide adequate protection against
the diminution in value of the Secured Lender's cash collateral
and condition the Debtors' continued use of cash collateral on
such adequate protection.

According to the Secured Lender, the Debtors have failed to move
for authorization to use its cash collateral and have
misrepresented to the Bankruptcy Court that its claims are
unsecured.

The Debtors, in response to the Secured Lender's opposition,
complained that the lender's argument that the Credit Agreement
was bifurcated from the APA and the EUFA and sold to it separately
by the FDIC is not correct because, "Under New York law,
instruments executed at the same time, by the same parties, for
the same purpose and in the course of the same transaction will be
read and interpreted together."

The Debtors asserted that they have a claim against Bautista for
its failure to fund the Future Advance in accordance with the
Credit Agreement, resulting in the payment due from Bautista of
the Trigger Event Fee of $61,936,904 for a Trigger Event that
occurred on June 24, 2015.  According to the Debtors, Bautista's
failure to either dispute or cure the breach during the Initial
Cure Period results in the imposition of the Trigger Event Fee,
which amount can be properly offsetted against the claims, which,
along with other offsets, meets or exceeds the total amounts
claimed as due by Bautista under the Credit Agreement.  Thus,
Bautista may not avoid the consequences of the obligations,
breaches and offsets arising from the APA and the EUFA under New
York law, the Debtors argued.

The Secured Lender replied that the Debtors relied on a flawed
argument that has already been rejected by two New York state
courts -- namely, that the Debtors are excused from repaying $101
million in loans owned by the Secured Lender because Doral Bank
allegedly failed to honor obligations under two separate
agreements which were never assigned to or assumed by the Secured
Lender, and that the FDIC has repudiated.

According to the Secured Lender, the Debtors also grossly
overstate the value of their assets in order to suggest that the
Secured Lender is somehow over-secured and the Debtors also fail
to meet their evidentiary burden to show that the Secured Lender
would be adequately protected solely by an equity cushion and cash
from operations, but instead, the Debtors make self-serving,
unsupported assertions that the Secured Lender is adequately
protected because its assets have an "estimated value" of
$114,979,296.  More than 80% of the claimed value of $114,979,296
is simply the principal amount of non-performing loans sold to the
Debtors by Doral Bank -- loans which even the Debtors contend they
cannot collect, the lender said.

DF Servicing, LLC, et al., are represented by:

     Charles A. Cuprill-Hernandez, Esq.
     P.S.C. LAW OFFICES
     356 Fortaleza Street - Second Floor
     San Juan, PR 00901
     Telephone: 787-977-0515
     Facsimile: 787-977-0518
     email: ccuprill@cuprill.com

Bautista Cayman Asset Company is represented by:

     Antonio A. Arias-Larcada, Esq.
     Lina M. Soler-Rosario, Esq.
     MCCONNELL VALDES LLC
     270 Munoz Rivera Avenue
     Hato Rey, PR 00918
     Telephone: (787) 250-5604
     Facsimile: (787) 759-2771
     email: aaa@mcvpr.com
             lms@mcvpr.com

        -- and --

     James M. Wilton, Esq.
     Patricia I. Chen, Esq.
     Martha E. Martir, Esq.
     ROPES & GRAY LLP
     800 Boylston Street
     Boston, Massachusetts 02199-3600
     Telephone: (617) 951-7000
     Facsimile: (617) 951-7050
     email: james.wilton@ropesgray.com
             patricia.chen@ropesgray.com
             martha.martir@ropesgray.com

                    About DF Servicing

Engaged in the business of purchase and sale of construction
projects, DF Servicing, LLC, DF Tier I, LLC, DF Investments, LLC
and DF Holdings LLC filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions (Bankr.
D.P.R. Case Nos. 15-10253 to 15-10256) on Dec. 24, 2015.  The
petitions were signed by Mark Mashburn, the president.  Charles A
Cuprill, PSC Law Office, serves as counsel to the Debtors.


HOSPITAL DAMAS: Medical Malpractice Suit vs. Parent Dismissed
-------------------------------------------------------------
Lizbeth Vargas Colon in representation of her minor daughter
L.C.V. and her sons Jaime Manuel Cedeo Vargas and Jaime Alexander
Cedeo Vargas, collectively Plaintiffs, filed an action under
diversity jurisdiction against Defendants Fundacion Damas, Inc.,
Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, and any unknown insurance companies
liable for the actions of Fundacion and BPPR for direct and
vicarious liability claim of medical malpractice against Fundacion
for negligent acts and omissions committed by Hospital Damas, a
subsidiary of Fundacion and its agents; a direct action against
any of the Defendants' insurers and a negligence action against
BPPR, as Trustee of the Hospital Damas Self Insurance Trust Fund.

Pending before this Court are Fundacion's motion for summary
judgment and BPPR's motion to dismiss.

In an Opinion and Order dated January 19, 2016, which is available
at http://is.gd/X2DPmZfrom Leagle.com, Judge Gustavo A. Gelpi of
the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
granted Fundacion's motion for summary judgment and BPPR's motion
to dismiss.

The case is LIZBETH VARGAS-COLON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FUNDACION
DAMAS, INC., BANCO POPULAR DE PUERTO RICO, et al., Defendants,
Civil No. 14-1909 (GAG).

Lizbeth Vargas-Colon, Plaintiff, is represented by David Efron,
Esq. -- David Efron Law Offices.

Fundacion Damas, Inc., Defendant, is represented by Freddie
Perez-Gonzalez, Esq. -- Freddie Perez Gonzalez & Assoc. PSC & Jose
Julian Blanco-Dalmau, Esq. -- Freddie Prez Gonalez & Asociados.

Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, Inc., Defendant, is represented by
Luis E. Padron-Rosado, Esq.


PUERTO RICO: Hearing on Feb. 25 as Lawmakers Coalesce Around Bill
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jack Casey at The Bond Buyer reports that a House committee will
hear Treasury's Antonio Weiss discuss an analysis of Puerto Rico
on Feb. 25, as lawmakers coalesce around a bill that would give
the territory's authorities bankruptcy access in return for
creation of a financial stability council.

The exact language of the bill, sponsored by Rep. Sean Duffy, R-
Wis., may not be included in final legislation, but lawmakers
think the bill could serve as the foundation for legislation that
joins the Republican support for a fiscal control or oversight
board with the Democrat's call to give the territory's authorities
the ability to restructure their debt, according to The Bond
Buyer.

Mr. Weiss, a counselor to Treasury Secretary Jack Lew who has
worked to resolve Puerto Rico's debt crisis, said at a Feb. 5
panel on the commonwealth sponsored by the Bipartisan Policy
Center, that he has seen "very positive discussions taking place
on both sides of the aisle" in Congress, the report notes.  He
also pointed out that there now seems to be more agreement that
any plan to help the commonwealth should include both
restructuring and oversight, the report relays.

Treasury unveiled a four-part plan in October that included both
of those elements along with improvements to Puerto Rico's
treatment under federal healthcare programs and technical
assistance to modernize its accounting and disclosure practices.
However, the Treasury plan called for all of Puerto Rico's debt to
be restructured, not just the debt issued by its public
authorities as has been proposed by Democrats arguing for a
Chapter 9 solution, the report notes.

The Treasury's plan for Puerto Rico has drawn criticism from some
insurers of Puerto Rico bonds, which said the department's
statements are hurting creditors' consensual negotiations with the
commonwealth, the report discloses.

The report relays that Mr. Weiss clarified the administration's
position at the panel, saying Treasury still believes any solution
should look at restructuring all of the debt, but that the
restructuring could come through the Constitution's Territorial
Clause instead of through an addition to federal bankruptcy code.

The Territorial Clause says "Congress shall have power to dispose
of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory or other property belonging to the United States," notes
the report.

He also noted that all debt would not have to "be treated with a
broad brush equally" and that restructuring could take into
account the many differences between Puerto Rico's various debts,
the report relays.

"A special legislative act is required, tailored to the
territories, consistent with Article 4 of the Constitution and
that is neither for cities nor for states," the report quoted Mr.
Weiss as saying.  "It is on Congress recognizing the severity of
this problem to agree in a bipartisan fashion on what those tools
should be.  It's emergency legislation to deal with an emergency
situation," Mr. Weiss added.

Natural Resources Committee chair Rob Bishop, R-Utah, said his
committee will "continue to work with Treasury as [the committee]
moves forward on a responsible path for Puerto Rico," Mr. Weiss
said.

The Feb. 25 hearing follows two hearings by the Natural Resources
Committee's subcommittees, one in January that explored how to
reform the commonwealth's energy infrastructure and the other on
Feb. 2 that evaluated the need for a federal oversight authority
for the territory, the report notes.

Lawmakers at the Feb. 2 hearing said they planned to use the
discussions that took place to begin crafting legislation to help
Puerto Rico, the report says.

House committees with jurisdiction over Puerto Rico are working
under a March 31 deadline that Speaker Paul Ryan, R-Wis., gave
them at the end of last year to produce a responsible legislative
package to help Puerto Rico, the report relays.  The commonwealth
is currently struggling with about $70 billion in debt and has
already defaulted on several bond payments, the report notes.

Resident Commissioner Pedro Pierluisi, a member of the Natural
Resources Committee and Puerto Rico's sole representative in
Congress, responded to the hearing announcement by reiterating a
concern he and Puerto Rico officials have had that an oversight
authority may exert too much control over the local government,
the report discloses.

Mr. Pierluisi has said he will support an oversight authority as
long as it respects Puerto Rico's local governance, something both
Republicans and Democrats have agreed is important to a final
bill, the report relays.

"Congress continues to move in the direction of passing
legislation to help Puerto Rico to overcome the crisis it faces,"
Mr. Pierluisi said, the report notes.  "The hearing before the
Committee on Natural Resources . . . . is the next step," Mr.
Pierluisi added.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 28, 2015, Moody's Investors Service has downgraded $1.09
billion of Puerto Rico appropriation bonds issued by the Public
Finance Corporation (PFC) to C from Ca, while maintaining other
ratings assigned to the US territory's debt.


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


LATAM: Fitch Sees Constant Downgrades, High Default Risk for Corp.
------------------------------------------------------------------
With 32% of Fitch-rated issuers carrying either a Negative Outlook
or on Negative Watch, and 16% rated 'CCC' or below, downgrades and
high default risk will be a constant for LatAm high yield
corporates, according to a new Fitch Ratings report.

"Defaults remain at a level not seen for the past decade, with
eight issuers defaulting on USD4.5 billion of debt during 2015,"
said Joe Bormann, Managing Director at Fitch.  "Ten issuers have a
high possibility of default during 2016, while default is
considered imminent for another four."

"Capex and dividends have been slashed by high yield issuers.  But
the aggressiveness of the cuts means companies may not be able to
respond to additional downward pressure in 2016."

High-yield issuance in 2015 was mild compared to 2014.  Eight
issuers raised $8 billion compared with 37 issuers and $26 billion
in 2014.

Investors continue to shun corporates in the 'B' category due to
the small issuance size of the bonds, which limits secondary
market activity.  Slow growth prospects have left many 'BB' rated
corporate bond issuances unattractive.



                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *