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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Monday, December 21, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 251


                            Headlines



B O L I V I A

BOLIVIA: Faces Challenges to Deliver Objectives in Agenda 2025


B R A Z I L

BRAZIL: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'BB+'; Outlook Remains Negative
ITAIPU BINACIONAL: Fitch Cuts LC and FC IDR to 'BB+'
LUPATECH SA: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC-' & Puts on CreditWatch Pos.
OAS SA: Creditors OK Restructuring Plan Including Invepar Sale


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Leader Says Political Elite Has Little Clue


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: Growth Remains Weak & Unemployment High, IMF Says
JAMAICA PUBLIC: Cancels Deal With Abengoa SA


M E X I C O

BANCO VE POR: Fitch Assigns 'BB' LT IDR; Outlook Stable


N I C A R A G U A

NICARAGUA: Fitch Assigns 'B+' IDR; Outlook Stable


P E R U

INTERCORP PERU: S&P Affirms BB/Stable Global Scale Rating


P U E R T O    R I C O

HOVENSA LLC: Files Liquidating Plan Based on Sale to Limetree
HOVENSA LLC: Targeting January 2016 Confirmation of Plan
HOVENSA LLC: Virgin Islands Legislature Tackles Limetree Deal
PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: S&P Maintains 'CC' Rating on Revenue Bonds


V E N E Z U E L A

PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Issuer Default Ratings


X X X X X X X X X

LATIN AMERICA: Economies Will Contract -0.4% on Average in 2015
* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Dec. 14 to Dec. 18, 2015


                            - - - - -


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B O L I V I A
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BOLIVIA: Faces Challenges to Deliver Objectives in Agenda 2025
--------------------------------------------------------------
On November 20, the Executive Board of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation1 with Bolivia.

Benefiting from the commodity boom, Bolivia has achieved strong
economic performance and poverty reduction over the past decade.

Real GDP growth has averaged about 5 percent since 2006, and the
poverty ratio has declined by 16 percentage points.  However,
given Bolivia's dependence on commodities, lower commodity prices
pose significant challenges to deliver the objectives in the
Patriotic Agenda 2025, while maintaining debt and external
sustainability.

Real GDP growth is projected to stay relatively strong at 4.1
percent in 2015, despite the sharp decline in oil prices that is
starting to have an impact.  A sizable public investment budget,
strong credit growth to the private sector, and robust private
consumption are expected to support activity.  Growth is expected
to decelerate to 3.5 percent over the medium term, as the full
impact of the new commodity price normal is felt and given
impediments to enhancing private investment.  The fiscal deficit
is projected to widen and the current account balance to swing
into deficit in 2015, and twin deficits are expected to persist
over the medium term. The authorities are finalizing a 5-year
development plan (Plan Quinquenal), including public investment
projects in a number of areas to catalyze growth.

While headline financial indicators are solid, the 2013 Financial
Services Law is affecting the allocation of credit flows. Minimum
credit quotas to productive and social housing sectors have
accelerated loans to those sectors.

Key external risks include a slowdown in key trading partners,
additional softness in oil prices, and further dollar strength.
Bolivia-specific risks center on uncertainties related to natural
gas reserves and long-term export contracts, and large credit
cycles under the new financial services law.

                     Executive Board Assessment

Executive Directors commended the Bolivian authorities for a
prudent macroeconomic management which has supported strong non-
inflationary GDP growth and greatly improved social outcomes over
the past decade.  Looking ahead, Directors agreed that the
likelihood of a protracted period of depressed export prices poses
challenges to the outlook and risks are tilted to the downside.

They noted, however, that the sizable policy buffers built during
the commodity upcycle allow for a gradual approach in adjusting to
a less favorable external environment, and provide a strong base
for further structural and institutional reforms.

Directors concurred that prospective budgetary deficits in the
context of slower growth and tighter global financial conditions
may have an adverse impact on Bolivia's fiscal position.

Accordingly, they encouraged the authorities to improve the non-
hydrocarbons fiscal balance through a variety of tax and
expenditure measures.  A better articulated medium-term fiscal
framework centered on a clear fiscal anchor would enhance the
credibility of the authorities' fiscal plans.  In this regard,
Directors also recommended a more comprehensive system for
monitoring the quasi-fiscal activities of state enterprises to
better manage fiscal risks.

Directors welcomed the effectiveness of the authorities in
anchoring inflation expectations and promoting de-dollarization.
They shared the view that progress on these fronts would be
cemented by granting greater operational independence to the
central bank in the new law under preparation.  The credibility of
monetary policy would also be boosted by relegating direct lending
to a separate sovereign wealth fund with transparent investment
rules and strong governance. Directors generally saw merit in
creating conditions for a move toward greater exchange rate
flexibility at an appropriate time to facilitate adjustment to
large external shocks and enhance competitiveness.

While noting the overall soundness of Bolivia's financial sector,
Directors pointed to risks stemming from some regulations set
under the Financial Services Law, particularly credit quotas and
interest rate caps.  They encouraged the authorities to closely
monitor developments and modify the regulations appropriately if
financial imbalances emerge.  In this context, compilation of a
real estate price index would greatly aid policy evaluation and
design.

Directors agreed that increasing private investment is essential
to support growth both in the near and the longer term. In this
regard, they welcomed progress in strengthening the legal
framework and recommended further efforts in this area. Directors
also encouraged the authorities to address long-standing
structural impediments to private investment, notably inflexible
labor markets and pervasive state-intervention in product markets.
Directors commended the authorities for the significant declines
in inequality and poverty achieved over the past decade. In order
to preserve these gains under an expected tighter fiscal envelope,
they recommended well-targeted social transfers with a focus on
the quality of education and healthcare.

                            *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Oct.
30, 2015, Bolivia's Ba3 rating reflects strong economic growth
that is driven by high public sector investment, prudent economic
policies, and a significant external reserves buffer, says Moody's
Investors Service.


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B R A Z I L
===========


BRAZIL: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'BB+'; Outlook Remains Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Brazil's ratings:

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings
      (IDRs) to 'BB+' from 'BBB-', Outlook remains Negative;

   -- Senior unsecured foreign and local currency bonds to 'BB+'
      from 'BBB-';

   -- Country Ceiling to 'BBB-' from 'BBB';

   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR to 'B' from 'F3'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Brazil's downgrade reflects the economy's deeper recession than
previously anticipated, continued adverse fiscal developments and
the increased political uncertainty that could further undermine
the government's capacity to effectively implement fiscal measures
to stabilize the growing debt burden.  The Negative Outlook
highlights continued uncertainty and downside risks related to
economic, fiscal and political developments.  The deteriorating
domestic backdrop is increasing challenges for the authorities to
take timely corrective policy actions to support confidence and
improve prospects for growth, fiscal consolidation and debt
stabilization.

Brazil's economic slump is not abating as highlighted by the third
quarter of 2015 (3Q15) GDP figures with both consumption and
investment retreating.  The economy contracted by 1.7% (quarter-
over-quarter [QOQ]) and 4.5% (year-over-year [YOY]) in 3Q15. Fitch
now forecasts growth of -3.7% and -2.5% in 2015 and 2016,
respectively with risks skewed mainly to the downside.  Increased
unemployment rates, constrained credit, depressed confidence and
high inflation are weighing on consumption while political and
policy uncertainties, the construction sector malaise and negative
spill overs from the Petrobras corruption investigations and capex
cuts have hurt investment.  The external environment remains
difficult for Brazil with the slide in commodity prices, China's
slowdown and tightening international financial conditions.

Fiscal deterioration continues against the backdrop of weaker
economic conditions.  In December, the government secured
congressional approval for a 2% of GDP primary deficit ceiling for
2015, reflecting the adverse revenue performance, constrained
ability to cut spending and potential one-time payments (of around
1% of GDP).  The repeated changes in fiscal targets have
undermined the credibility of fiscal policy.  The weaker starting
point of fiscal accounts, deeper-than- previously projected
economic contraction in 2016 and increased political uncertainty
in recent weeks cast further doubt on the ability of the
government to secure timely legislative approval to meet its
primary surplus target for 2016.  Moreover, the passage of
measures to structurally improve the outlook for public finances
and enhance the credibility of medium term fiscal consolidation
appears difficult in the current political environment.

Consequently, Fitch's baseline fiscal projections have
deteriorated, with the agency forecasting the general government
fiscal deficit to reach over 10% of GDP in 2015 and remain
elevated, averaging over 7% of GDP during 2016-2017.  The high
deficit in 2015 is also due to higher interest payments, partly
reflecting the losses on FX swaps offered by the central bank.
Higher fiscal deficits coupled with deeper economic contraction is
leading to a faster growth in the government debt burden than
previously expected, with Fitch forecasting general government
debt to reach over 70% of GDP in 2016 and increasing further in
2017.  These ratios are significantly higher than both the 'BBB'
(43% of GDP) and 'BB' (44.4% of GDP) medians.

The recent start of impeachment proceedings against President
Rousseff is adding uncertainty to an already difficult political
environment and leading to continued political stalemate.  The
outcome of the proceedings is uncertain.  Fitch believes that they
would detract from timely and effective implementation of
corrective fiscal adjustments.  The political landscape has
already been contaminated by the growing reach of the Petrobras
investigations, often strained relationship of the government with
its congressional allies and reduced popularity of the president.
Higher unemployment rates and a deepening economic slump could
lead to additional political and governance challenges in the
coming year.

The reduction in some macro imbalances is continuing.  The
economic slump and BRL depreciation have facilitated a 36%
reduction in the current account deficit in nominal USD terms
during January-October compared to the same period of last year.
Further reduction in the current account deficit is expected
during the forecast period, which could mitigate risks related to
potential tighter external financing conditions.  On the other
hand, inflation remains high at 10.5%, and inflation expectations,
after inching downwards have reversed course and have begun to
increase for 2016 and 2017, remaining above the 4.5% inflation
target.

Brazil's 'BB+' ratings are supported by its economic diversity and
entrenched civil institutions, with its per capita income and
governance indicators better than the 'BB' median.  The country's
shock absorption capacity is boosted by its flexible exchange
rate, robust international reserves, a strong net sovereign
external creditor position, deep and developed domestic government
debt capital markets, and an adequately capitalized banking
system.  The share of foreign currency debt in total general
government debt remains low and prudent liability management has
reduced interest rate and refinancing risks.  In addition, the
government has shown some capacity to respond in difficult
conditions by implementing relative price adjustments, tightening
monetary policy amidst a deepening recession and reining in quasi-
fiscal stimulus.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that could lead to a downgrade are:

   -- Failure to arrest the pace of increase in the government
      debt burden.  Crystallization of material contingent
      liabilities would also be negative.

   -- A deeper and more prolonged recession which further
      undermines government debt dynamics and stokes political and
      social instability.

   -- Erosion of international reserves and deterioration in
      government debt composition.

The Rating Outlook is Negative.  Consequently, Fitch's sensitivity
analysis does not currently anticipate developments with a high
likelihood of leading to a positive rating change.  Future
developments that could individually, or collectively, result in a
stabilization of the Outlook include:

   -- An improvement in the political environment that is
      conducive to improved policy implementation and supports
      confidence, growth and reform prospects.

   -- Fiscal consolidation that leads to greater confidence in the
      capacity of the government to achieve debt stabilization.

   -- Improved investment and growth environment and a reduction
      in macroeconomic imbalances.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- Fitch assumes that China (an important trading partner for
      Brazil) will avoid a hard-landing and be able to manage a
      gradual slowdown, thus providing limited upside for
      commodity prices.  Argentina's economic performance (key
      destination of manufacturing exports) is likely to remain
      subdued over the forecast period.

   -- Fitch assumes that Brazil maintains international and
      domestic market access even if there is return of higher
      international financial volatility and further domestic
      confidence shocks.

   -- Fitch assumes that broader banking sector stability remains
      sound and the spill-overs from the recent difficulties in
      BTG Pactual are contained.

   -- Fitch assumes that political uncertainty will continue to
      hamper progress on the government's legislative agenda.


ITAIPU BINACIONAL: Fitch Cuts LC and FC IDR to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the foreign currency Issuer Default
Ratings of several Brazilian corporates following the sovereign
ratings downgrade.  Fitch has also affirmed the associated local
currency IDRs of several of the affected corporates.

Fitch has downgraded the Brazilian sovereign's foreign and local
currency IDRs to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' and the country ceiling to
'BBB-' from 'BBB'.  The Rating Outlook on the sovereign is
Negative.

Brazil's rating downgrade reflects the economy's deeper recession
than previously anticipated, continued adverse fiscal developments
and the increased political uncertainty that could further
undermine the government's capacity to effectively implement
fiscal measures to stabilize the growing debt burden.  The
Negative Outlook highlights continued uncertainty and downside
risks related to economic, fiscal and political developments.  The
deteriorating domestic backdrop is increasing challenges for the
authorities to take timely corrective policy actions to support
confidence and improve prospects for growth, fiscal consolidation
and debt stabilization.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The foreign currency ratings of the following companies could be
negatively impacted by a negative rating action on the sovereign
rating of Brazil and/or a downgrade of its country ceiling.  The
Outlook for Brazil's foreign currency rating is currently
Negative.

The Sovereign rating sensitivities include:

   -- Failure to arrest the pace of increase in the government
      debt burden.  Crystallization of material contingent
      liabilities would also be negative.

   -- A deeper and more prolonged recession which further
      undermines government debt dynamics and stokes political and
      social instability.

   -- Erosion of international reserves and deterioration in
      government debt composition.

The Rating Outlook is Negative.  Consequently, Fitch's sensitivity
analysis does not currently anticipate developments with a high
likelihood of leading to a positive rating change.  Future
developments that could individually, or collectively, result in a
stabilization of the Outlook include:

   -- An improvement in the political environment that is
      conducive to improved policy implementation and supports
      confidence, growth and reform prospects.

   -- Fiscal consolidation that leads to greater confidence in the
      capacity of the government to achieve debt stabilization.

   -- Improved investment and growth environment and a reduction
      in macroeconomic imbalances.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Ache Laboratorios Farmaceuticos S.A.

   -- Foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB';
      Outlook Negative;

   -- Local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable.

BRF S.A.

   -- Foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
   -- Local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Notes due 2018, 2022, 2023, 2024 affirmed at 'BBB'.

BFF International Ltd.

   -- Notes due 2020 guaranteed by BRF S.A. affirmed at 'BBB'.

Braskem S.A.

   -- Foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Revised to
      Negative from Stable;
   -- Local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Notes due 2017 affirmed at 'BBB-'.

Braskem Finance Limited

   -- Unsecured senior notes due 2018, 2020, 2021, 2022 & 2024
      affirmed at 'BBB-';
   -- Perpetual bonds affirmed at 'BBB-'.

Braskem America Finance Company

   -- Notes due 2041 affirmed at 'BBB-'.

Cielo S.A.

   -- Foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB';
   -- Local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB';

The Rating Outlook is Negative for both FC and LC.

Cielo USA Inc.

   -- Notes due in 2022 downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'.

Companhia de Gas de Sao Paulo-COMGAS

   -- Foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Revised to
      Negative from Stable;
   -- Local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable;

Fibria Celulose S.A.

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB-',;
   -- Long-term local currency IDR at 'BBB-';
   -- The Rating Outlook is Stable

Fibria Overseas Finance Ltd.

   -- Notes due 2024 affirmed at 'BBB-'.

Gerdau S.A.

   -- Foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable
   -- Local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable
   -- Port Auth of the City of St Paul (MN) Solid Waste Disposal
      Revs (Gerdau) 2012-7 affirmed at 'BBB-'.

Gerdau Holdings Inc.

   -- Notes due 2020 and 2024 affirmed at 'BBB-';

Gerdau Trade Inc.

   -- Notes due 2021 and 2023 affirmed at 'BBB-';

GTL Trade Finance Inc.

   -- Notes due 2017, 2024 and 2044 affirmed at 'BBB-';

Globo Comunicacao e Participacoes S.A.

   -- Foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB';
      Outlook Negative;
   -- Local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Senior unsecured notes due 2022 and 2025 downgraded to 'BBB-
      'from 'BBB'.

Itaipu Binacional (Itaipu)

   -- Foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-';
   -- Local currency IDR downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-';
      Outlook Negative.

Klabin S.A.

   -- Foreign currency IDRs affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Revised to
      Negative from Stable;
   -- Long-term local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook
      Stable

Klabin Finance S.A.

   -- Notes due in 2024 affirmed at 'BBB-'.

Sadia Overseas Ltd.

   -- Senior unsecured notes due 2017 guaranteed by BRF S.A.
      affirmed at 'BBB'.

Localiza Rent a Car S.A. (Localiza)

   -- Foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB';
      Outlook Negative;
   -- Local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable.

Odebrecht Engenharia e Construcao S.A. (OEC)

   -- Foreign currency IDRs affirmed at 'BBB-, Outlook Negative;
   -- Local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BBB-, Outlook Negative;

Odebrecht Finance Limited (OFL)

   -- Notes due 2018, 2020, 2022, 2023, 2025, 2029, 2042 and perp.
      affirmed at 'BBB-';

Raizen Energia S.A.

   -- Foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
   -- Local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable.

Raizen Combustiveis S.A.

   -- Foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
   -- Local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable.

Raizen Energy Finance Limited (Raizen Energy Finance)

   -- Notes due in 2017 affirmed at 'BBB'.

Tractebel Energia S.A. (Tractebel)

   -- Foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB',
      Outlook Negative;
   -- Local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable.

Transmissora Alianca de Energia Eletrica S.A.

   -- Foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB',
      Outlook Negative;
   -- Local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable.

Vale S.A.

   -- Foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+', Rating
      Watch Negative;
   -- Local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB+', Rating Watch Negative
      Maintained;
   -- Senior unsecured debt issuance downgraded to 'BBB' from
      'BBB+', Rating Watch Negative.

Vale Overseas Limited:

   -- Notes guaranteed by Vale downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+',
      Rating Watch Negative.

Vale Canada Limited:

   -- Notes guaranteed by Vale downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+',
      Rating Watch Negative.

Votorantim Cimentos S.A. (VCSA)

   -- Foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
   -- Notes due 2021, 2022, and 2041 affirmed at 'BBB'.

Votorantim Participacoes S.A. (Votorantim)

   -- Foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
   -- Local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable.

Votorantim Industrial S.A. (VID)

   -- Foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative.

Companhia Brasileira de Aluminio S.A. (CBA)

   -- Guaranteed notes due 2019, 2021, and 2024 affirmed at 'BBB'.

Voto-Votorantim Overseas Trading Operations IV Limited

   -- Notes due 2020 affirmed at 'BBB'.


LUPATECH SA: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC-' & Puts on CreditWatch Pos.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its corporate credit
rating on Lupatech S.A. to 'CCC-' from 'D' on global scale and to
'brCCC-' from 'brD' on Brazilian national scale.  S&P also placed
the ratings on CreditWatch positive.

On Dec. 11, 2015, the Brazilian court announced the completion of
Lupatech's judicial reorganization process after creditors
approved its restructuring plan and the company complied with all
legal requirements.

Now that the court approved the restructuring plan approval,
creditors will decide which of the plan's options they would
prefer defining final capital structure of the company.
Afterwards and following S&P's evaluation of the company's new
business plan, it will reassess its credit quality.  S&P expects
that to occur in the next 90 days.

The CreditWatch positive listing reflects a possible upgrade
within the next 90 days after S&P reassess the company's credit
quality under its new capital structure, taking into consideration
the potential improvements in its liquidity and business plan.


OAS SA: Creditors OK Restructuring Plan Including Invepar Sale
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Levin and Paula Sambo at Bloomberg News report that
Brazilian construction company OAS SA won approval for its
restructuring plan after agreeing to sell one of its most valuable
assets in order to help pay creditors.

The vote, which had been scheduled and postponed on several
occasions since September, went forward after OAS secured a deal
to sell its stake in airport operator Invepar for at least BRL1.35
billion ($343 million), the company's press office said, according
to Bloomberg News.

Debt secured by OAS Investimentos assets will get about 20 cents
on the dollar, while debt with no such guarantee will recover just
shy of 20 cents, Bloomberg News notes.  OAS SA bonds due in 2019
traded at 4.5 cents on the dollar last week.

Bloomberg News relays that OAS SA is one of the first companies to
reach a deal with creditors after a widespread corruption
investigation ensnared many of Brazil's top builders and made it
almost impossible for them to land new projects.  Prosecutors
accused executives from OAS and other construction companies of
paying bribes in exchange for contracts with state-run oil company
Petroleo Brasileiro SA, Bloomberg News notes.

In November 2014, police jailed some of the industry's most
powerful executives, Bloomberg News discloses.  The probe has
helped deepen the crisis in Latin America's largest economy,
putting it on pace for the worst recession since the 1930s,
Bloomberg News notes.

The restructuring deal doesn't free the company from further
investigation.  OAS SA confirmed on its website that federal
police visited its offices Dec. 11 to perform a search and seizure
regarding a suspicious contract, Bloomberg News relays.  The
company provided "all the information requested and was always at
the disposal of the authorities," it said, adding that it is
displeased with the "unnecessary imprisonment" of Chief Executive
Officer Elmar Varjao, Bloomberg News adds.

                          About OAS S.A.

The OAS Group is among the largest and most experienced
infrastructure companies in Brazil, focusing on heavy engineering
and equity investments in infrastructure projects located in and
outside Brazil and abroad for both public and private clients.
The OAS Group provides services in 22 countries in Latin America,
the Caribbean and Africa.

Based in Sao Paulo, Brazil, OAS S.A. is the holding company at the
apex of the OAS Group.  Its share capital is divided between CMP
Participacoes Ltda. (owned by Mr. Cesar de Araujo Mata Pires),
which has a 90% stake, and LP Participacoes e Engenharia Ltd.
(owned by Mr. Jose Adelmario Pinheiro Filho, which has a 10%
stake.

Amid an investigation into alleged corruption and money
laundering, and missed interest payments, OAS S.A. and its
affiliates Construtora OAS S.A., OAS Investments GmbH, and OAS
Finance Limited on March 31, 2015, commenced judicial
reorganization proceedings before the First Specialized Bankruptcy
Court of Sao Paulo pursuant to Federal Law No. 11.101 of February
9, 2005 of the laws of the Federative Republic of Brazil.

On April 15, 2015, OAS S.A., et al., filed Chapter 15 bankruptcy
petitions (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 15-10937) in Manhattan,
in the United States to seek U.S. recognition of the Brazilian
proceedings.  Renato Fermiano Tavares, as foreign representative,
signed the petitions.  The cases are assigned to Judge Stuart M.
Bernstein. White & Case, LLP, serves as counsel in the U.S. cases.

OAS S.A. listed at least US$1 billion in assets and liabilities.


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Leader Says Political Elite Has Little Clue
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Herrera and Santo Domingo Province
Industries Association (AEIH) President Antonio Taveras said the
Dominican Republic has great challenges which in his view aren't
often understood by its political elite.

The business leader said since the fail to understand those
challenges, "they act as they're acting," according to Dominican
Today.

"And I say the political elite because ultimately we the
entrepreneurs, from our associations, cannot make the changes this
country needs.  We help make the changes and participate in those
changes," the report quoted Mr. Taveras as saying.

During a Christmas gathering with the press the business leader
said that if the politician, who can make decisions, aren't aware
of the great challenges facing the country, then they won't be
accomplished, the report notes.

Mr. Taveras said the country faces big challenges in the world
markets for next year, due in his view to the opening of the
Dominican economy.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 3, 2015, Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Dominican Republic's
long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
at 'B+'.

The Rating Outlooks on the long-term IDRs are revised to Positive
from Stable. The issue ratings on the Dominican Republic's senior
unsecured foreign and local currency bonds are affirmed at 'B+'.
The Country Ceiling is affirmed at 'BB-' and the short-term
foreign currency IDR at 'B'.


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: Growth Remains Weak & Unemployment High, IMF Says
----------------------------------------------------------
The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund completed
the tenth review of Jamaica's economic performance under the
program supported by a four-year, SDR 615.38 million (about US$932
million at the time of approval) arrangement under the Extended
Fund Facility (EFF).

The completion of the review enables an immediate purchase of an
amount equivalent to SDR 28.32 million (about US$39.3 million).

The EFF arrangement was approved on May 1, 2013.

Following the Board discussion of the review, Mr. Min Zhu, Deputy
Managing Director and Acting Chair, made the following statement:

"The authorities continue to have an impressive track record of
strong program implementation under the Extended Fund Facility.
Macroeconomic stability continues to strengthen, vulnerabilities
have reduced substantially, and structural reforms have progressed
well.

"Jamaica has made important achievements under the economic
program. Inflation and the current account deficit have fallen
significantly, supported by low oil prices. Business confidence
continues to be strong and private credit growth is showing signs
of recovery, while public debt is falling. Nevertheless, overall
growth remains weak and unemployment, though declining, remains
high. Continued structural reforms should help boost investment
and growth by sustainably reducing energy costs, improving
financial access, and upgrading public infrastructure.

"With macroeconomic stability well-established, the recalibration
of fiscal and monetary targets should help support growth and job
creation. The modest relaxation of fiscal policy is intended to
increase growth-enhancing capital expenditures, while continuing
to protect social spending. A looser monetary stance, with a
faster pace of monetary growth to create more room for private
sector lending, will complement fiscal policy in supporting
growth.

"Fiscal sustainability requires continued reduction in the
government wage bill and safeguarding revenues. In this regard,
concrete efforts are needed to modernize the public sector and
improve the efficiency of public services. It is also essential to
strengthen fiscal revenues by improving customs and tax
administration and broadening the tax base. The liquidity
injection associated with the upcoming government bond redemption
provides an opportunity to reopen the domestic bond market."

                           *     *     *

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 29,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' issue
rating on Jamaica's up to US$2 billion in bonds issued in two
tranches.  The first tranche is for up to US$1,350 million due in
2028.  The second tranche is for up to US$650 million due in 2045.
The government will use the proceeds to purchase debt that Jamaica
owes to Venezuela as well as to finance the government's 2015/2016
budget.


JAMAICA PUBLIC: Cancels Deal With Abengoa SA
--------------------------------------------
RJR News reports that Jamaica Public Service Company (JPSCo) has
decided to cancel its deal with Spanish engineering firm, Abengoa
and move to a next preferred bidder to build its new gas fired
power plant in Old Harbor, St Catherine.

The Company says it will announce the new Engineering, Procurement
and Construction contractor, by the end of the month, according to
RJR News.

In a statement, JPS said it is the final stages of negotiations
with an alternative bidder to provide engineering, procurement and
construction services for the 190 megawatt power plant, the report
notes.

The announcement follows the decision by Abengoa SA to seek
bankruptcy protection after failing to secure financing, the
report relays.

According to the JPS, Abengoa has not been able to provide the
financial assurances required as a normal part of the process of
confirming a bidder, the report discloses.

Kelly Tomblin, JPS President, has sought to assure the public that
the 190 megawatt project is not in danger as the company's
shareholders, EWP and Marubeni, have committed to bring equity
into the project, and there is keen interest from various
financing sources, the report notes.   Ms. Tomblin explained that
Abengoa was not the financier and also said the Spanish firm is
facing potential penalties for non-performance, the report relays.

The construction of the 190 megawatt power plant is particularly
important given the need to protect the Jamaican economy from
external shocks in the oil market and provide cleaner energy, the
report notes.

                               ESET

Meanwhile, the Electricity Sector Enterprise Team (ESET) has
declared that it is not surprised by JPS's decision to walk away
from Abengoa SA, the report relays.  Professor Alvin Wint, a
member of ESET, expressed confidence that the schedule for
completion of the power plant will remain on track, the report
notes.

"There are other entities that are very interested -- these
entities are not financing the plant . . .  JPS is looking at
other prospective contractors," the report quoted Mr. Wint as
saying.

Headquartered in Kingston, Jamaica, Jamaica Public Service Company
Limited is an integrated electric utility company and the sole
distributor of electricity in Jamaica.  The company is engaged in
the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity, and
also purchases power from five Independent Power Producers.


===========
M E X I C O
===========


BANCO VE POR: Fitch Assigns 'BB' LT IDR; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned 'BB' and 'B' long- and short-term
Issuer Default Ratings, respectively, to Banco Ve por Mas, S.A.
Institucion de Banca Multiple (BX+), both in foreign and local
currency.  Fitch also assigned a Viability Rating (VR) of 'bb' to
BX+.  The Rating Outlook on the long-term IDR is Stable. A Support
Rating (SR) and Support Rating Floor (SRF) were also assigned at
'5' and 'NF'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND VR

BX+'s IDRs are driven by its VR of 'bb', which reflects the bank's
sound asset quality, explained by its low non-perming loan (NPL)
ratios, moderate borrower concentrations, reasonable levels of
credit reserves and low risk trading portfolio.  The VR also
weights BX+'s robust capital ratios, although they are declining
rapidly due to its fast growth.  The adequate funding mix, based
on stable core deposits and reasonable liquidity levels also
support bank's ratings.  In turn, BX+'s ratings considers its
relatively weak profitability, which is likely to keep on the same
trend over the next three years due to ambitious expansion plans
in terms of loan and infrastructure growth.

As of September 2015, BX+'s loan growth was 29% over the past 12
months, higher than the average of the country's banking system at
the same date (14.7%), and is focused on small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) and recently on loan to individuals,
specifically mortgage loans.  Despite its rapid growth and its
orientation to SMEs and individuals, the bank's asset quality
remains sound; NPLs ratios in the last four years have been
consistently below 1.4% and shows loan reserve coverages above
100%.  Borrower concentrations are moderate and lower than its
closest peers and with reasonable guarantees schemes.  BX+'s risk
profile in its trading book is conservative; a high share of its
trading portfolio relies on low-risk securities at short-term
tenure, mainly local government securities or bank securities with
adequate credit quality.

From 2011-2014, BX+'s Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio was 12.9%.
In 2015, and as a result of an alliance with Banco Popular Espanol
(BPE) at the end of 2014, the bank received a capital infusion of
MXN1.714 billion that improved BX+'s FCC ratios to a maximum of
18%.  This action was in line with the bank's expansion strategy.
However, at end-September, the bank's FCC ratio declined to 15.6%
as a result of the portfolio's growth, especially in retail loans
that increased its risk weighted assets.  Fitch expects that BX+'s
capital ratios will tend to constrain as the growth strategy
develops, with a FCC around 13%.  The bank's main challenge will
be to compensate the decline with growing income or more capital
infusions.

BX+'s profitability is weak and compares below its local and
international closest peers.  Until 2013, the bank's operating ROA
was close to 1%, however, in recent years operating expenses have
grown rapidly due to the expansion strategy.  For the next three
years the bank expects higher expenses due to the opening of 50
new branches and an expected loan growth at least higher than the
banking system.  Fitch deems that BX+ will have the challenge to
compensate the high growth with higher profits and the agency
expects that bank's operating ROA will remain under 1% at least
for the next three years.

The bank shows an adequate funding mix.  The main source of
financing comes from low cost customer deposits.  As of September
2015, the bank's deposits represented 67.6% of total funds.  The
rest comes from interbank funds (29.5%) and subordinated long-term
debt (2.9%).  Interbank funds are highly related to development
bank loans which allow BX+ for a better ALM.  Since 2013, the
loans to deposits ratio has been around 1.5x, even with the recent
growth in loans, as the deposits also grew rapidly.  If the growth
targets are met, the agency expects that this ratio will tend to
reduce, although in the long term it may level to actual figures.
The bank's Liquidity Cover Ratio under local regulator and Basel
III rules is solid and well legal requirement (2Q15: 181%).

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

BX+'s Support Rating and Support Rating Floor of '5' and 'NF',
respectively, reflects the bank's low systemic importance,
indicating that, although possible, external support cannot be
relied upon.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

BX+'s ratings could be improved in the medium term if the bank
achieves its growth plan, in a controlled manner that allows them
to improve and sustain its profitability metrics as well as
maintain its actual capital and asset quality metrics.  Fitch
believes that this process will likely take time as the
development of those factors requires a consolidation period.
Specifically, the bank's ratings would benefit from an operating
ROA consistently above 1.5% and a FCC at least to a level of 15%.

BX+'s ratings can be affected negatively from a deterioration in
performance or asset quality that results in pressures in its FCC
and drives it below 12% or operating ROA under 0.5%.  A
deterioration of its liquidity profile will also pressure the
ratings down.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Upside potential for the SR and SRF is limited and can only occur
over time with a material growth of the bank's systemic
importance.

Fitch has assigned these ratings to BX+:

   -- Foreign currency long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) 'BB';
      Outlook Stable;
   -- Foreign currency short-term IDR 'B';
   -- Local currency long-term IDR 'BB'; Outlook Stable;
   -- Local currency short-term 'B';
   -- Viability Rating 'bb';
   -- Support Rating '5';
   -- Support Rating Floor 'NF'.


=================
N I C A R A G U A
=================


NICARAGUA: Fitch Assigns 'B+' IDR; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned first-time ratings to Nicaragua as:

   -- Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings
      (IDRs) 'B+', Outlook Stable;
   -- Country Ceiling 'B+';
   -- Short-term foreign currency IDR 'B'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Nicaragua's credit ratings are underpinned by its positive
economic growth trend, track record of prudent fiscal policy and
debt reduction, and consistent exchange rate and fiscal policies
that have supported macroeconomic improvement and declining
inflation since the mid-1990s.

The ratings are constrained by Nicaragua's structural weaknesses
including the country's low per capita income, shallow domestic
capital market, and weaker social and governance indicators than
higher-rated peers.  The sovereign's debt restructuring history is
a further constraint, notwithstanding the government's
demonstrated willingness to pay maturing domestic debt.  External
vulnerabilities include the wide current account deficit, large
net external debt and the macroeconomic constraint of high
financial dollarization.

Successive Nicaraguan administrations have delivered a track
record of primary surpluses over the past 25 years, timely
implementation of tax and expenditure adjustment, and debt
reduction through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
initiative and retirement of maturing domestic debt.  As a result,
general government debt is on sustained downward trajectory,
projected to decrease to 36% of GDP in 2017 from 44% of GDP in
2014.  The low interest burden is sustainable, averaging 4.6% of
revenues over 2015-2017.  Despite large social demands, the
government has demonstrated budgetary discipline, implementing tax
reforms, reducing effective subsidies, and sustaining capital
expenditure.

The crawling peg anchors inflation expectations and supports
financial stability amid high financial dollarization.  However,
this exchange rate policy provides the trade-oriented economy with
a limited buffer against external shocks and sets a higher
inflation floor than peers.  Lower oil prices have positively
impacted inflation which could average 4% in 2015 and 6% in 2016.

Nicaragua's medium-term growth prospects, at 4.5% on average for
2015-2017, are broadly in line with rating category peers.
Factors supporting growth through 2017 include U.S. economic
growth, supporting demand for Nicaraguan exports and receipt of
remittances; sustained investment into agriculture, manufactured
and service exports, and infrastructure; and lastly the boost of
the low oil price to private consumption.  Nicaragua's relatively
low crime rates and labour costs partly compensate for
competitiveness constraints and a weak business environment
reflected by the World Bank Doing Business survey.

Nicaragua's balance of payments has steadily strengthened since
the mid-1990s, thanks to lower external debt service, investment
in alternative energy supply, and export diversification.
Although still wide, Fitch expects the narrowing current account
deficit to average 7.5% of GDP in 2015-2017 supported by export
growth, remittances, and declining oil imports as energy
generation shifts toward renewables.  External financing needs are
projected to be sustainable at an annual average of 63% of
international reserves over 2015-2017, half of which should be
covered by FDI.

External debt relief totaling USD7.3 billion through the HIPC and
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiatives has reduced the country's net
external debt stock and debt service costs to sustainable levels,
96% and 10% of CXR (2015), respectively.  However, the sovereign
remains a large net external debtor and nearly 80% of general
government debt is exposed to currency risk.

The international liquidity ratio, 200%, is stronger than the 'B'
median.  The central bank has strengthened its foreign reserves to
4.0 months of CXP and maintains contingent liquidity lines from
multilaterals to cover risks of a sudden deterioration of
PetroCaribe financing to the private sector and natural disasters.

Fitch expects the general government's fiscal policy will remain
prudent, yielding small 0.7%-of-GDP average overall deficits and
0.4%-of-GDP average primary surpluses during 2015-2017.  The
fiscal stance is projected to loosen as the government implements
public infrastructure investment financed mostly with expanded
access to World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank lending
facilities. Domestic financing flexibility is constrained by the
shallow capital market.

Despite Nicaragua's rigid expenditure profile, public financial
management has demonstrated fiscal discipline.  Nicaragua's tax
base has kept pace with managed expenditures; whereas subsidies
have been targeted, debt reduction has lowered the interest bill,
and the capital budget represents a source of flexibility to
adjust discretionary spending.  Further, the government has
implemented timely tax and expenditure adjustments in response to
shocks, including a 2pp of GDP expenditure adjustment in 2009.

The macroeconomic policy framework has demonstrated continuity
across two decades, administrations of opposite ideological
leanings, and through economic and political cycles.  The
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) administration led by
President Daniel Ortega has pursued a pragmatic political
strategy, engaging and consulting the private sector on economic
policy to offset challenges of political polarization.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to
a rating action are:

Positive:

   -- Sustained improvement in structural weaknesses, including
      stronger governance and social indicators, as well as a more
      robust business environment;

   -- Faster growth that reduces Nicaragua's per-capita income gap
      relative to peers;

   -- Sustained reduction of external vulnerabilities;

   -- Greater government financing flexibility.

Negative:

   -- Weakening of the external balance sheet and/or external
      liquidity, potentially reflecting a reduction in
      effectiveness of the crawling peg exchange rate regime;

   -- Deterioration of public financial management and government
      debt dynamics;

   -- Emergence of increased macroeconomic imbalances or financial
      instability.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- Fitch forecasts that U.S. economic growth of 2.5% in 2016
      and 2.3% in 2017 of will support Nicaragua's economic growth
      and external accounts, given the strong trade and financial
      linkages between the two countries.  Fitch does not factor
      development of the proposed interoceanic canal into its
      economic forecasts.

   -- Fitch's latest projections also factor in adjustment of the
      average Brent oil price to USD55 per barrel in 2015 and
      USD55 in 2016, maintaining reductions of the fuel imports
      and effective electricity and transportation subsidies.



=======
P E R U
=======


INTERCORP PERU: S&P Affirms BB/Stable Global Scale Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on these
companies:

   -- Grupo de Inversiones Suramericana S.A. (global scale:
      BBB/Stable/--);

   -- Intercorp Peru Ltd. (global scale: BB/Stable/--); and

   -- Andrade Gutierrez Participacoes S.A. (national scale Brazil:
      brAA/Stable/--).

S&P also kept its global scale 'B+' and national scale 'brBBB'
ratings on J&F Investimentos S.A. (J&F) on CreditWatch positive,
where S&P placed them on Nov. 23, 2015, after the acquisition
announcement of Brazil-based Alpargatas S.A.  S&P also revised its
assessment of J&F's business risk profile to "fair" from "weak".
Nevertheless, the 'less-than-adequate' liquidity continues to
constrain the final rating outcome.

At the same time, as S&P reviewed the companies based on the new
investment holding company criteria, S&P removed the UCO
identifier on all ratings.  S&P placed the ratings on UCO on
Dec. 1, 2015, because these companies fell within the scope of the
criteria.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


HOVENSA LLC: Files Liquidating Plan Based on Sale to Limetree
-------------------------------------------------------------
Hovensa, L.L.C., which has agreed to sell most of its assets to
Limetree Bay Holdings, LLC for $220 million, filed a liquidating
plan that contemplates allocating $30 million of the sale proceeds
for holders of allowed non-priority general unsecured claims.

The primary objective of the Plan is to maximize the value of
recoveries to all holders of allowed claims and to distribute all
property of the Estate that is or becomes available for
distribution in accordance with the priorities established by the
Bankruptcy Code.  The explanatory Disclosure Statement has blanks
as to the estimated recovery for holders of GVI claims, tort
claims, and general unsecured claims.  Holders of equity interests
will not receive any distribution on account of their interests.

On the Petition Date, the Debtor submitted a motion seeking
approval of proposed bidding procedures and disclosed a deal to
sell its crude oil and product storage and terminalling business
to Limetree Bay Holdings, LLC, an affiliate of ArcLight Capital
Partners, LLC, for $184 million, absent higher and better offers.

The Debtor received a rival offer from Buckeye Partners, L.P. for
$198.6 million by the Nov. 5 bid deadline, as well as nine bids
from parties interested in purchasing and liquidating the Debtor's
refinery assets, and proposals from Capswell Energy Co. and
Monarch Energy Partners, Inc.

Following an auction on Nov. 10, 11 and 16, Limetree submitted a
final bid of $220 million, including $100 million in cash, and
Buckeye submitted a final bid of $365 million, which includes $345
million in cash.  The Debtor, however, selected Limetree Bay as
the winning bidder due to the greater conditionality in the
Buckeye bid.  The Debtor pointed out that Buckeye has no agreement
with the Governor of the USVI on a concession agreement.

Limetree Bay's final offer provides:

   i. purchase price of $220 million consisting of: (a) $100
million of cash to the Government of the Virgin Islands (the
"GVI")
in satisfaction of certain of its claims and as a concession fee,
(b) $90 million to the Debtor's estate, and (c) up to $30 million
of reimbursement of post-closing wind-down costs and expenses;

  ii. an agreement to provide the Debtor with free power after the
closing to the extent that the minimum turndown amount of power
exceeds the power generation load used by Limetree Bay to operate
its business, and the first $15 million of additional power for
which the Debtor would have otherwise paid free of charge under a
power supply services agreement to be entered into at closing; and

iii. an agreement with the Governor on a concession agreement to
be taken to the Legislature, which agreement contains additional
payments and other financial consideration to be paid by Limetree
Bay to the GVI.

In an effort to obtain the Committee's support for a sale
transaction to Limetree Bay, the parties agreed that HOVIC or one
of its affiliates will assume the Debtor's ongoing pension
obligations, which will materially reduce the amount of the
Debtor's projected unsecured claims pool, in exchange for the
Committee's support for estate releases.

In advance of the Nov. 30 sale hearing, the Debtor, the JV
Parties, and the Committee engaged in further negotiations over
the form of order approving the sale.  Ultimately, the sale order
was further revised to include a paragraph that requires $30
million of the sale proceeds to be placed in a separate interest
bearing account for the sole benefit of holders of allowed non-
priority general unsecured claims other than: (1) claims held by
HOVIC or PDV-VI; (2) any claims of the GVI; and (3) any claim of
any governmental entity, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the
Committee, the Debtor, and any liquidating trustee, as
appropriate.

On Dec. 1, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court entered the Sale Order.

The Purchase Agreement provides for the Debtor's estate to receive
approximately $90 million from the sale proceeds.  Pursuant to the
Sale Order, the Debtor is required to repay in full in cash to the
DIP Lenders all accrued but unpaid DIP Obligations upon the
Closing.  In addition, based upon the Debtor's claims estimates,
the sale proceeds will permit the Debtor to cover its remaining
pre-closing administrative obligations and make the best possible
distribution to unsecured creditors under the circumstances.

In addition, the Sale Order and the Purchase Agreement provide
that, at the Closing, Limetree Bay will pay the USVI Government
the USVI Concession Fee in the amount of $100 million.  In
addition to this fee, the GVI also will receive several monetary
and non-monetary benefits directly from Limetree Bay pursuant to a
separate agreement reached among the Governor and Limetree Bay
dated Nov. 9, 2015.  On Dec. 1, 2015, the Governor held a press
conference to announce the terms of the Operating Agreement, which
includes among other things:

   * $220 million in an upfront payment to the GVI;

   * A commitment from Limetree Bay to operate the oil storage
facility for at least 25 years and up to 40 years;

   * A commitment from Limetree Bay to employ a minimum of 80
full-time workers, at least 80% of whom must be long-term USVI
residents;

   * An agreement from Limetree Bay to potentially restart the
refinery and dismantle any part that is not being used;

   * A donation of 330 acres of land and 130 units of housing
along with a vocational school and a community center to the GVI;
and

   * Payment of $150,000 annually as rent for the submerged lands
that are part of the Debtor's property, which is an increase from
the current $1 per year rent.

The Governor also stated that he believes the Operating Agreement
represents a total value to the GVI and the people of the USVI of
more than $800 million.  The Governor also announced that he
called the 31st Legislature of the Virgin Islands of the United
States into special session to be held on Dec. 17, 2015 to
consider approval of the Operating Agreement.

A copy of the Disclosure Statement explaining the Debtor's Plan of
Liquidation, dated Dec. 10, 2015, is available for free at:

           http://bankrupt.com/misc/Hovensa_421_DS.pdf

                           *     *     *

The Court will consider approval of the Disclosure Statement at a
hearing on Jan. 7, 2016.

The Debtors' attorneys:

         Richard H. Dollison
         LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD H. DOLLISON, P.C.
         48 Dronningens Gade, Suite 2C
         St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands 00802
         Telephone: (340) 774-7044
         Facsimile: (340) 774-7045

                - and -

         Lorenzo Marinuzzi, Esq.
         Jennifer L. Marines, Esq.
         MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
         250 West 55th Street
         New York, NY 10019
         Telephone: (212) 468-8000
         Facsimile: (212) 468-7900

                           About Hovensa

Hovensa, L.L.C, owns an oil refinery and an oil storage facility
business, both located on the island of St. Croix, U.S. Virgin
Islands, and both of which are currently idled.  The refinery and
storage facilities span approximately 2,000 acres of land located
on the south shore of St. Croix, including approximately 300 acres
of undeveloped land to the east of the refinery and storage.
Hovensa currently maintains its headquarters at 1 Estate Hope,
Christiansted, St. Croix, USVI.

Hovensa was formed in June 1998 and, through a series of
agreements dated October 30, 1998, became a joint venture between
Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation ("HOVIC"), a subsidiary of
Hess Corporation (f/k/a Amerada Hess Corporation), and PDVSA V.I.,
Inc. ("PDV-VI" and together with HOVIC, the "JV Parties"), a
subsidiary of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. ("PDVSA"), the national
oil company of Venezuela.

Hovensa L.L.C. filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of the Virgin Islands (Bankr.
D. V.I. Case No. 15-10003) on Sept. 15, 2015, with a deal to sell
most of the assets.  Judge Mary F. Walrath is assigned to the
case.

The Debtor estimated assets of $100 million to $500 million, and
liabilities of more than $1 billion.

The Debtors tapped Morrison & Foerster LLP as bankruptcy counsel;
The Law Offices of Richard H. Dollison as local bankruptcy
counsel; Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC to provide Thomas E.
Hill as chief restructuring officer; Lazard Frares & Co. LLC as
investment banker; White & Case LLP as special mergers and
acquisitions counsel; and Prime Clerk LLC as claims and noticing
agent and as administrative agent.

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors tapped Dentons US
LLP counsel; Hamm Eckard, LLP as its local/co-counsel; and
Berkeley Research Group, LLC as its financial advisor.

The Debtor's owners, HOVIC and PDV-VI, have agreed to provide DIP
financing in an amount not to exceed $40 million.  The DIP
facility requires the Debtors to achieve certain milestones,
including closing of the sale by Dec. 31, 2015.


HOVENSA LLC: Targeting January 2016 Confirmation of Plan
--------------------------------------------------------
Hovensa, L.L.C., has filed before the U.S. District Court of the
Virgin Islands, Bankruptcy Division, St. Croix, Virgin Islands a
motion for an order (i) granting conditional approval of the
disclosure statement explaining its proposed liquidating plan, and
(ii) setting a January 7 combined hearing to consider final
approval of the Disclosure Statement and confirmation of the Plan.

The Debtor says it lacks access to additional financing and is
expected to exhaust its liquidity in short order.  In order to
maximize the value of its estate, the Debtor hopes that the sale
transaction with Limetree Bay Holdings, LLC, will close shortly,
upon receiving the approval of the U.S. Virgin Islands
Legislature.

The Debtor wants to reduce the administrative costs associated
with the chapter 11 case and be in a position to make
distributions to creditors as soon as possible.

To that end, the Debtor seeks to proceed as expeditiously and
efficiently as possible to obtain approval of the Disclosure
Statement and confirm the Plan.

In light of the circumstances of the chapter 11 case, the Debtor
submits that the proposed timeline is reasonable and appropriate
under the circumstances:

                 Event                                  Date
                 -----                                  ----
   Voting Record Date                                12/17/2015
   Solicitation Commencement                         12/18/2015
   Solicitation Deadline                             12/21/2015
   Deadline to Send Notice to Assume Executory
     Contracts and/or Unexpired Leases               12/24/2015
   Disclosure Statement Objection Deadline           12/31/2015
   Plan Objection Deadline                           12/31/2015
   Deadline for Filing Bankruptcy Rule 3018 Motions  12/31/2015
   Voting Deadline                                   12/31/2015
   Plan Supplement Date                              01/04/2016
   Deadline to File Voting Report                    01/04/2016
   Deadline to File (a) Confirmation Brief and/or
     (b) Omnibus Reply to Any (i) Plan or Disclosure
     Statement Objection or (ii) Bankruptcy Rule
     3018 Motions                                    01/04/2016
   Hearing on Disclosure Statement and Plan          01/07/2016

                           About Hovensa

Hovensa, L.L.C, owns an oil refinery and an oil storage facility
business, both located on the island of St. Croix, U.S. Virgin
Islands, and both of which are currently idled.  The refinery and
storage facilities span approximately 2,000 acres of land located
on the south shore of St. Croix, including approximately 300 acres
of undeveloped land to the east of the refinery and storage.
Hovensa currently maintains its headquarters at 1 Estate Hope,
Christiansted, St. Croix, USVI.

Hovensa was formed in June 1998 and, through a series of
agreements dated October 30, 1998, became a joint venture between
Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation ("HOVIC"), a subsidiary of
Hess Corporation (f/k/a Amerada Hess Corporation), and PDVSA V.I.,
Inc. ("PDV-VI" and together with HOVIC, the "JV Parties"), a
subsidiary of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. ("PDVSA"), the national
oil company of Venezuela.

Hovensa L.L.C. filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of the Virgin Islands (Bankr.
D. V.I. Case No. 15-10003) on Sept. 15, 2015, with a deal to sell
most of the assets.  Judge Mary F. Walrath is assigned to the
case.

The Debtor estimated assets of $100 million to $500 million, and
liabilities of more than $1 billion.

The Debtors tapped Morrison & Foerster LLP as bankruptcy counsel;
The Law Offices of Richard H. Dollison as local bankruptcy
counsel; Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC to provide Thomas E.
Hill as chief restructuring officer; Lazard Frares & Co. LLC as
investment banker; White & Case LLP as special mergers and
acquisitions counsel; and Prime Clerk LLC as claims and noticing
agent and as administrative agent.

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors tapped Dentons US
LLP counsel; Hamm Eckard, LLP as its local/co-counsel; and
Berkeley Research Group, LLC as its financial advisor.

The Debtor's owners, HOVIC and PDV-VI, have agreed to provide DIP
financing in an amount not to exceed $40 million.  The DIP
facility requires the Debtors to achieve certain milestones,
including closing of the sale by Dec. 31, 2015.


HOVENSA LLC: Virgin Islands Legislature Tackles Limetree Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------
According to the Web site of the Legislature of the Virgin Islands
-- http://www.legvi.org/-- legislators, chaired by Senate
President Neville A. James, stepped down into Committee of the
Whole to receive testimony from officials regarding the operating
agreement relative to the refinery on St. Croix.

Bill No. 31-0283 is an act ratifying the operating agreement by
and among the government of the Virgin Islands and Limetree Bay
Terminals LLC -- the buyers of the oil refinery, storage terminal,
and related facilities located at Limetree Bay, St. Croix.

After swearing to tell the truth under the penalty of perjury,
officials representing the Department of Finance, The Department
of Planning and Natural Resources, ArcLight Capital, Limetree Bay
Terminals, and government consultants testified on the measure.

Valdamier Collens, Commissioner of the Department of Finance, said
that the agreement "offers by far the best opportunity to
refurbish, restart, operate and potentially expand the oil storage
terminal."  Additionally, he said, the agreement leaves open the
possibility of future petroleum processing operations at the
facility.

Senators expressed dissatisfaction with the timing allotted to
digest the terms of the operating agreement and questioned
officials at length on varying aspect of the agreement including
environmental impact, liability, payout fairness etc.

Sen. Kurt A. Vialet referenced a Wall Street Journal article by
Georgi Kantchev noting that oil "inventories next year are
expected to rise by 300 million barrels."

Vialet noted that based on the growing need for oil storage, it
was likely that Arclight would meet the full 31 million barrels of
storage capacity, maximizing the government's payout.  However,
the fiscal obligation is likely worth more than the agreement
requires the buyer, ArcLight, to pay.  "It's up to us to make sure
that we have the best agreement," said Vialet.

If passed, the government of the Virgin Islands will receive an
immediate cash fusion of 220 million dollars.  Of that amount, 200
million will go directly to the treasury, while the remaining 20
million will go toward tax refunds owed to the people of the
Virgin Islands.

Subsequently, ArcLight has committed to investing at least  $125
million in the facility within the first two years, secured 12
million barrels of storage for a ten year period and expressed a
vision for the future of the refinery facility showing a vested
interested in a long-term relationship.

Collens explained the government's history with the refinery since
its closure in 2012 when Hovensa abdicated its contract 10 years
early, leaving the people of the Virgin Islands to grapple with
the loss of more than 2,000 jobs.

Bill Cline, Senior Advisor with Gaffney Cline and Associates, also
testified.  The agreement "has a 25 year term with a 15 year
extension" possibility, he said.  Additionally, "regardless of the
revenues of the facility the government will be entitled to a
minimum annual payment of $4 million in year one, rising to $5
million in year two, $6 million in year three and $7 million in
year four and each year thereafter."

Moreover, "there will also be a variable annual payment to the
government during each year of the facility's operation," said
Cline.  That variable payment will be nine percent of terminal
revenues when the latter is less than $120 million in that year.
If the refinery is restarted in whole or in part however, the
government would be entitled to 17.5% of earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA).

At press time, legislators continued to question officials.

All senators including Marvin A. Blyden, Jean A. Forde, Novelle E.
Francis, Kenneth L. Gittens, Clifford F. Graham, Justin Harrigan
Sr., Myron D. Jackson, Neville A. James, Almando "Rocky" Liburd,
Terrence "Positive" Nelson, Nereida Rivera O'Reilly, Tregenza A.
Roach, Sammuel L. Sanes, Kurt A. Vialet, and Janette Millin Young,
were present.

                        About Hovensa

Hovensa, L.L.C, owns an oil refinery and an oil storage facility
business, both located on the island of St. Croix, U.S. Virgin
Islands, and both of which are currently idled.  The refinery and
storage facilities span approximately 2,000 acres of land located
on the south shore of St. Croix, including approximately 300 acres
of undeveloped land to the east of the refinery and storage.
Hovensa currently maintains its headquarters at 1 Estate Hope,
Christiansted, St. Croix, USVI.

Hovensa was formed in June 1998 and, through a series of
agreements dated October 30, 1998, became a joint venture between
Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation ("HOVIC"), a subsidiary of
Hess Corporation (f/k/a Amerada Hess Corporation), and PDVSA V.I.,
Inc. ("PDV-VI" and together with HOVIC, the "JV Parties"), a
subsidiary of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. ("PDVSA"), the national
oil company of Venezuela.

Hovensa L.L.C. filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of the Virgin Islands (Bankr.
D. V.I. Case No. 15-10003) on Sept. 15, 2015, with a deal to sell
most of the assets.  Judge Mary F. Walrath is assigned to the
case.

The Debtor estimated assets of $100 million to $500 million, and
liabilities of more than $1 billion.

The Debtors tapped Morrison & Foerster LLP as bankruptcy counsel;
The Law Offices of Richard H. Dollison as local bankruptcy
counsel; Alvarez & Marsal North America, LLC to provide Thomas E.
Hill as chief restructuring officer; Lazard Frares & Co. LLC as
investment banker; White & Case LLP as special mergers and
acquisitions counsel; and Prime Clerk LLC as claims and noticing
agent and as administrative agent.

The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors tapped Dentons US
LLP counsel; Hamm Eckard, LLP as its local/co-counsel; and
Berkeley Research Group, LLC as its financial advisor.

The Debtor's owners, HOVIC and PDV-VI, have agreed to provide DIP
financing in an amount not to exceed $40 million.  The DIP
facility requires the Debtors to achieve certain milestones,
including closing of the sale by Dec. 31, 2015.


PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: S&P Maintains 'CC' Rating on Revenue Bonds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services maintained its 'CC' long-term
and underlying ratings (SPURs) on Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority's (PREPA) electric revenue bonds.  However, the ratings
remain on CreditWatch, where they were originally placed with
negative implications on June 18, 2014.

As of June 30, 2015, PREPA had about $8.44 billion of long-term
debt outstanding, and an additional $730 million due to
noteholders.

S&P lowered its ratings on PREPA's debt to 'CC' on July 2, 2015,
following the announcement that the utility would seek to
restructure its debt outstanding.  As per S&P's criteria, it rates
at 'CC' debt issued by "an entity that has announced its intention
to undertake an exchange offer or similar restructuring that S&P
classifies as distressed, but has not yet completed the
transaction".

In September 2015, PREPA and an ad hoc group of investors,
representing more than 60% of forbearing bondholders, reached an
agreement for PREPA to restructure its debt.  The agreement calls
for PREPA to pay 85% of its existing bond obligations.  S&P
understands that bondholders will have the option to receive
securitization bonds in lieu of cash payments that will pay cash
interest at a rate of 4.00%-4.75% for the first five years,
depending on the rating obtained, or convertible capital
appreciation securitization bonds that will accrete interest at a
rate of 4.5%-5.5% for the first five years.  No principal payments
would be due on either of the bonds in the first five years.
According to PREPA, the announced restructuring agreement is
expected to "reduce PREPA's total debt principal by approximately
$670 million, save more than $700 million in principal and
interest payments over the next five years, and substantially
reduce PREPA's interest rate expense on the exchanged bond debt."
PREPA would use the savings from this restructuring to invest in
further conversion of generation assets from high-priced oil to
lower-priced natural gas, to meet environmental compliance
mandates, and to enhance liquidity.

Under S&P's criteria, PREPA would be in default if and when a
restructuring is consummated, and S&P would then lower its rating
on the debt outstanding to 'D'.  As such, the current 'CC' rating
considers S&P's expectation that PREPA will restructure its
obligations, and it does not incorporate an assessment of a
securitized transition, or PREPA's potential credit quality post-
restructuring.  In addition, given S&P's significant and immediate
concern regarding PREPA's insufficient coverage of debt service
and lack of liquidity, the current rating gives no weight to the
reforms and goals proposed under PREPA's recovery plan.

PREPA's general credit profile and the 'CC' rating also reflect
S&P's views of these credit risks:

   -- A prolonged and deep recession in Puerto Rico (highlighted
      by low real GDP growth, persistently high unemployment, and
      labor force decline).

   -- Politicized governance and management, which have resulted
      in frequent turnover and a lack of a consistent and cohesive
      approach to solving operational and financial problems.  A
      very weak portfolio of generating assets.  A demonstrated
      unwillingness to raise base rates, contributing to a rate
      structure that provides substantial ratepayer subsidies, but
      fails to fully recover costs or fund basic capital
      improvements.

   -- Extraordinarily high debt levels that have added substantial
      fixed costs and reduced financial flexibility.

   -- Insufficient coverage of debt service (0.84x in 2015) and
      fixed costs (0.56x), exacerbated by high contributions in
      lieu of taxes to underlying municipalities, a high level of
      receivables (largely from the commonwealth and its other
      public corporations), and lost revenue associated with
      unbilled service.  This has necessitated draws on PREPA's
      debt service reserves to meet debt service requirements in
      fiscal 2015.

   -- Liquidity is virtually exhausted, and PREPA has been unable
      to repay outstanding credit lines traditionally used to
      finance fuel purchases.

"We expect to resolve the CreditWatch placement in the next three
months, either due to a missed bond repayment or the consummation
of PREPA's restructuring," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst
Jeffrey Panger.

Should the restructuring result in a distressed exchange where, in
S&P's view, bondholders receive less value than the promise of the
original securities (that is, other than full and timely payment
under the original securities), in S&P's judgment, the bonds will
be in default.  S&P continues to believe that there is at least a
50% likelihood of this occurring.  As PREPA is actively pursuing a
restructuring S&P do not view the rating as having a potential for
stability or improvement.


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Issuer Default Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.'s (PDVSA)
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'CCC'.
Fitch has also affirmed the rating for approximately USD30 billion
of senior unsecured debt outstanding at 'CCC/RR4'.  Concurrently,
Fitch has affirmed PDVSA's national long-term rating at 'AA(ven)'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

PDVSA's credit quality reflects the company's linkage to the
government of Venezuela as a state-owned entity, combined with
increased government control over business strategies and internal
resources.  This underscores the close link between the company's
credit profile and that of the sovereign.  PDVSA's cash flow
generation has historically been significantly affected by the
large amount of funds transferred to the central government each
year.

LINKAGE TO SOVEREIGN

Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.'s (PDVSA) credit quality is
inextricably linked to the Venezuelan government.  Venezuela's
ratings (IDR 'CCC') reflect the sovereign's weakened external
buffers, high commodity dependence, rising macroeconomic
distortions, reduced transparency in official data, and continued
policy and political uncertainty.  The sovereign's strong
repayment record and a relatively low debt amortization profile
mitigate imminent risks to debt service.  PDVSA is fully owned by
the government and its transfers have historically represented
around 45% of the government's revenues.  It is of strategic
importance to the economic and social policies of the country as
oil accounts for around 95% of total exports.

LIMITED TRANSPARENCY

The Venezuelan government displays limited transparency in the
administration and use of government-managed funds, as well as in
fiscal operations, which poses challenges to accurately assessing
its fiscal state and the full financial strength of the sovereign.
PDVSA also displays similar characteristics, which reinforces the
linkage of its ratings to the sovereign.

UNCERTAIN LEVEL OF TRANSFERS TO GOVERNMENT

Although the excess hydrocarbon prices law eliminates transfers to
the FONDEN national development fund when oil prices are below
USD55/barrel (bbl), the low level of central government reserves
will require the government to either reduce social expenditures
or disregard the law and maintain historical levels of transfers
from PDVSA.  Fitch believes these transfers will continue to take
place either in form of royalties, social contributions, dividends
or investments.  The high level of transfers to the central
government effectively renders PDVSA's cash flow from operations
negative.

FOCUS SHIFTS TO RECOVERY

PDVSA's 'CCC' rating suggests a real possibility of default.  If a
restructuring occurs, Fitch Ratings anticipates average recovery
for PDVSA's bondholders of 31% - 50%, and likely closer to the
lower end of the range.  While Fitch's recovery analysis yields a
high recovery, the willingness of Venezuela's government to extend
concessions to investors will likely move actual recovery closer
to the lower end of the range.  In addition, should oil prices
remain depressed, an average recovery may lead to additional
future defaults to further reduce obligations and allow for
necessary transfers to the government.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Linkage to government: PDVSA's ratings assume the implicit support
from the government, given the company's strategic importance,
would materialize should the company need it.

Slow hydrocarbon price recovery: Fitch assumes West Texas
Intermediate crude prices to average approximately USD50 per
barrel and to slowly recover to approximately USD70 per bbl in the
long-term.

Stable Production: PDVSA's ratings assume the company's production
to remain relatively flat over the rating horizon

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Catalysts for a downgrade include a downgrade to Venezuela's
ratings, a substantial increase in leverage to finance capital
expenditures or government spending and a sharp and extended
commodity price downturn.  Catalysts for an upgrade include an
upgrade to Venezuela's sovereign rating and/or real independence
from the government.

LIQUIDITY WILL TIGHTEN IN 2016

As of December 2014, PDVSA reported cash of USD7.9 billion while
short-term debt was USD5.8 billion.  The company's current
liquidity position is more uncertain given that since then the
company has paid approximately USD6.0 billion of debt, which might
have driven down liquidity and cash flow generation from internal
resources for this year would have most likely been compromised by
low hydrocarbon prices during the year.  Under Fitch`s base case
scenario, which assumes USD50/bbl in 2015 and 2016 and investments
of USD25 billion annually, PDVSA's liquidity position will
continue to deteriorate; 2016 debt amortizations are estimated at
approximately USD5.4 billion.  Government international reserves,
at USD16.1 billion in June 30, 2015, are less than half of those
in 2008, when oil prices declined sharply.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch affirms these:

Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.

   -- Affirm foreign currency long-term IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Affirm local currency long-term IDR at 'CCC';
   -- Affirm National Scale long-term Rating at 'AA(ven)';
   -- Affirm Sr. unsecured notes at 'CCC/RR4'.


=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================


LATIN AMERICA: Economies Will Contract -0.4% on Average in 2015
---------------------------------------------------------------
Latin American and Caribbean economies will contract -0.4% on
average in 2015 and will grow just 0.2% next year, affected by a
complex external scenario, according to new projections unveiled
by ECLAC.

The United Nations regional organization presented in Santiago,
Chile, its annual report Preliminary Overview of the Economies of
Latin America and the Caribbean 2015, in which it updated the
estimates given last October and called again on the region's
countries to invigorate economic growth through greater investment
and higher productivity.

"It is necessary to resume growth and reverse the contractionary
investment cycle in a context of slow global recovery and a
decline in trade," Alicia B rcena, Executive Secretary of the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
said during a press conference where the document was presented.

The senior United Nations official underscored that the agreements
reached at the recent Conference of the Parties (COP21) of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change held in
Paris will enable countries to provide incentives to innovation
and investment in new sources for the production of renewable
energy, which has huge potential in the region.

"In the current context, active fiscal policies to promote smart
adjustments gain greater relevance: analyzing the level of public
spending as well as its composition to avoid excessive cuts to
public investment and social spending; reviewing the structure of
fuel subsidies and tax incentives in order to strengthen
instruments for promoting investment and financing social
spending; and reducing tax evasion/avoidance, which on average is
equivalent to 6.3 points of regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
or $320 billion dollars," B rcena added.

According to ECLAC's report, the region will have to face diverse
scenarios and risks related to the global economy in 2016, which
will undoubtedly condition its economic performance. On the
external front, global growth is forecast to remain slow and reach
2.9%, while uncertainty persists regarding China -- one of the
region's main trading partners -- which will continue decelerating
to 6.4%.

Compounding uncertainty over the global economy is low growth in
international trade (1.5% in 2015 and 2.5% forecast for 2016). In
addition, the prices of the commodities that the region exports
will stay low, meaning that Latin America and the Caribbean will
once again suffer a deterioration in its terms of trade in 2016,
especially in countries that export hydrocarbons and minerals, the
document states.

In financial terms, ECLAC explains that the volatility and
uncertainty observed in 2015 will continue next year, which means
that some emerging economies will still have difficulty obtaining
resources in international markets. On top of that, there will be
impacts from the steady appreciation of the dollar and the rise in
United States interest rates.

As in previous years, external conditions have a highly
differentiated effect in the region, which will show marked
heterogeneity. While Central America will grow around 4.3% in
2016, South America will see its GDP shrink -0.8%, mainly due to
the expected contractions in Brazil (-2.0%) and Venezuela (-7.0%).
Meanwhile, the English-speaking Caribbean will grow 1.6%.

According to ECLAC's projections, Panama will lead regional growth
next year with an expansion of 6.2%, followed by Dominica and the
Dominican Republic (5.2%), Saint Kitts and Nevis (4.7%) and
Bolivia (4.5%). It is expected that Nicaragua will grow 4.3%, Cuba
4.2%, Guatemala 4.0%, Peru 3.4%, Costa Rica and Honduras 3.3%,
Colombia and Paraguay 3.0%, Mexico 2.6%, Haiti 2.5%, El Salvador
2.4%, Chile 2.1%, Uruguay 1.5%, Argentina 0.8% and Ecuador 0.3%.

Finally, in its Preliminary Overview 2015 ECLAC emphasizes that it
is essential to advance towards fiscal rules that prioritize
capital spending. It adds that designing efficient anti-cyclical
schemes of investment protection is extremely important to face
the region's macroeconomic volatility, as well as to reactivate
aggregate demand and maintain social spending.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week From Dec. 14 to Dec. 18, 2015
----------------------------------------------------------

Issuer Name      Cpn    Bid Price  Maturity Date  Country  Curr
-----------             ---  ---------  ----------    ----   ----
Anton Oilfield Servi     7.5       49    11/6/2018      CN     USD
Anton Oilfield Servi     7.5   44.125    11/6/2018      CN     USD
Argentina Bocon            2      500     1/3/2016      AR     ARS
Argentina Bocon     21.16875    25.73     1/4/2016      AR     ARS
Automotores Gildemei    6.75    33.66    1/15/2023      CL     USD
Automotores Gildemei    6.75       40    1/15/2023      CL     USD
Automotores Gildemei    8.25    37.65    5/24/2021      CL     USD
Automotores Gildemei    8.25   37.875    5/24/2021      CL     USD
BA-CA Finance Cayman    0.69   56.115                   KY     EUR
BA-CA Finance Cayman    0.99       56                   KY     EUR
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya    6.75  104.787    11/5/2021      PY     USD
Banco BTG Pactual SA       4       74    1/16/2020      KY     USD
Banco BTG Pactual SA    5.75    69.95    9/28/2022      KY     USD
Banco BTG Pactual SA    5.75    84.95    9/28/2022      KY     USD
Banco do Brasil SA/C       9    71.03                   KY     USD
Banco do Brasil SA/C    6.25       55                   KY     USD
Banco do Brasil SA/C       9       73                   KY     USD
Banco do Brasil SA/C    6.25     57.7                   KY     USD
Banco Mercantil do B   9.625     65.6    7/16/2020      BR     USD
Banco Mercantil do B   9.625   60.625    7/16/2020      BR     USD
BCP Finance Co         2.036   57.708                   KY     EUR
CA La Electricidad d     8.5       45    4/10/2018      VE     USD
Caja de Compensacion       6    63.73   11/15/2018      CL     CLP
CFG Investment SAC      9.75    56.25    7/30/2019      PE     USD
CFG Investment SAC      9.75       31    7/30/2019      PE     USD
China Precious Metal    7.25   26.125     2/4/2018      HK     HKD
China Shanshui Cemen     8.5     83.5    5/25/2016      CN     USD
China Shanshui Cemen     8.5     83.5    5/25/2016      CN     USD
Costa Rica Governmen   5.625   74.257    4/30/2043      CR     USD
Costa Rica Governmen   5.625   74.276    4/30/2043      CR     USD
Costa Rica Titulos d    5.06   71.505   11/25/2033      CR     USD
CSN Islands XI Corp    6.875     54.2    9/21/2019      KY     USD
CSN Islands XI Corp    6.875   54.997    9/21/2019      KY     USD
CSN Islands XII Corp       7       41                   BR     USD
CSN Islands XII Corp       7     43.5                   BR     USD
Decimo Primer Fideic       6   68.125   10/25/2041      PA     USD
Decimo Primer Fideic    4.54   56.625   10/25/2041      PA     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.36   72.084     1/1/2020      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.93   67.658     1/1/2022      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    6.21   67.112     1/1/2023      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D     6.5    67.84     1/1/2024      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.07    75.77    1/29/2019      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.36   73.412    10/1/2019      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.64   70.697    10/1/2020      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.93   68.317    10/1/2021      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D     4.3   75.672   10/29/2018      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D     4.3   76.181    10/4/2018      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.36   72.954    11/1/2019      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.64   70.321    11/1/2020      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.93   68.073    11/1/2021      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    6.21    67.42    11/1/2022      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D     6.5   67.871    11/1/2023      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.07   71.735   11/25/2019      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.36   68.083   11/25/2020      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.64   65.243   11/25/2021      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.93   67.016   11/25/2022      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    6.21   67.689   11/25/2023      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D     6.5    68.24   11/25/2024      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.36   72.505    12/1/2019      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.64   69.976    12/1/2020      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.93   67.855    12/1/2021      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.61   64.486    12/1/2022      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D     6.5   67.744    12/1/2023      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.07   72.671   12/30/2019      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.36   68.791   12/30/2020      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.64   66.536   12/30/2021      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.93   68.226   12/30/2022      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    6.21   66.454   12/30/2023      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D       7     76.3     3/6/2024      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D       7   76.625    5/20/2022      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.07   74.237    5/21/2019      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.07   74.162    5/26/2019      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D     6.4   68.535    6/12/2024      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.07   73.169    7/30/2019      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.36   73.816     9/5/2019      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.64   69.865     9/5/2020      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    5.93   70.807     9/5/2020      EC     USD
Ecuador Government D    6.21   71.717     9/5/2020      EC     USD
Empresa Generadora d    5.75   74.875    6/11/2025      DO     USD
Empresa Generadora d    5.75   74.875    6/11/2025      DO     USD
ESFG International L   5.753    0.507                   KY     EUR
General Exploration     11.5    51.25   11/13/2018      CA     USD
General Shopping Fin      10    49.75                   KY     USD
General Shopping Fin      10     49.5                   KY     USD
Gol Finance Inc         8.75    44.01                   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc         8.75   44.125                   BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc         9.25       70    7/20/2020      BR     USD
Gol Finance Inc         9.25       67    7/20/2020      BR     USD
Greenfields Petroleu       9        1    5/31/2017      US     CAD
HC International Inc       5   74.365   11/27/2019      CN     HKD
Honghua Group Ltd       7.45     50.5    9/25/2019      CN     USD
Honghua Group Ltd       7.45    48.75    9/25/2019      CN     USD
Inversiones Alsacia        8       30   12/31/2018      CL     USD
Inversiones Alsacia        8    29.25   12/31/2018      CL     USD
Inversora Electrica      6.5    52.75    9/26/2017      AR     USD
Kaisa Group Holdings   10.25   69.375     1/8/2020      CN     USD
Kaisa Group Holdings       8   65.002   12/20/2015      CN     CNY
Kaisa Group Holdings   6.875   69.017    4/22/2016      CN     CNY
Kaisa Group Holdings       9       72     6/6/2019      CN     USD
MIE Holdings Corp      6.875    56.72     2/6/2018      HK     USD
MIE Holdings Corp        7.5       56    4/25/2019      HK     USD
MIE Holdings Corp        7.5    55.75    4/25/2019      HK     USD
Mongolian Mining Cor   8.875       39    3/29/2017      MN     USD
Mongolian Mining Cor   8.875    35.25    3/29/2017      MN     USD
NB Finance Ltd/Cayma       3   74.083     2/7/2035      KY     EUR
Newland Internationa     9.5    40.75     7/3/2017      PA     USD
Newland Internationa     9.5   23.375     7/3/2017      PA     USD
Noble Holding Intern    6.05       66     3/1/2041      KY     USD
Noble Holding Intern    5.25   61.967    3/15/2042      KY     USD
Noble Holding Intern    6.95   70.088     4/1/2045      KY     USD
Noble Holding Intern     6.2    68.55     8/1/2040      KY     USD
NQ Mobile Inc              4   68.169   10/15/2018      CN     USD
Odebrecht Drilling N    6.35    50.95    6/30/2021      KY     USD
Odebrecht Drilling N    6.35    51.25    6/30/2021      KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Lt     7.5       61                   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Lt     7.5     64.2                   KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Lt       7       77    4/21/2020      KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Lt       7   68.955    4/21/2020      KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Lt    8.25     59.5    4/25/2018      KY     BRL
Odebrecht Finance Lt    8.25     59.5    4/25/2018      KY     BRL
Odebrecht Finance Lt   4.375     63.5    4/25/2025      KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Lt   4.375       64    4/25/2025      KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Lt       6       63     4/5/2023      KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Lt       6     65.5     4/5/2023      KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Lt   5.125    69.75    6/26/2022      KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Lt   5.125     72.5    6/26/2022      KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Lt   7.125    62.75    6/26/2042      KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Lt   7.125       63    6/26/2042      KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Lt    5.25    60.25    6/27/2029      KY     USD
Odebrecht Finance Lt    5.25       61    6/27/2029      KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore D    6.75     31.5    10/1/2022      KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore D   6.625     32.5    10/1/2022      KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore D    6.75    33.76    10/1/2022      KY     USD
Odebrecht Offshore D   6.625    33.51    10/1/2022      KY     USD
Odebrecht Oil & Gas        7     28.5                   KY     USD
Odebrecht Oil & Gas        7     29.5                   KY     USD
Offshore Group Inves   7.125     28.5     4/1/2023      KY     USD
Pesquera Exalmar SAA   7.375       65    1/31/2020      PE     USD
Pesquera Exalmar SAA   7.375   69.125    1/31/2020      PE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue       6       38   11/15/2026      VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue       6     38.5   11/15/2026      VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue       9    46.75   11/17/2021      VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue       9       41   11/17/2021      VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue     8.5       64    11/2/2017      VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue     8.5     58.9    11/2/2017      VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue   12.75     54.4    2/17/2022      VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue   12.75     49.5    2/17/2022      VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue    5.25     59.3    4/12/2017      VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue   5.375    37.75    4/12/2027      VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue     5.5    36.75    4/12/2037      VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue       6   39.585    5/16/2024      VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue       6    40.25    5/16/2024      VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue    9.75     48.5    5/17/2035      VE     USD
Petroleos de Venezue    9.75    41.73    5/17/2035      VE     USD
Polarcus Ltd             5.6   29.917    4/27/2018      AE     USD
Polarcus Ltd               8   13.625     6/7/2018      AE     USD
Polarcus Ltd            8.35   14.125     7/8/2019      AE     NOK
Provincia del Chaco        4    70.66    12/4/2026      AR     USD
Republic of Ecuador     7.75   74.675    4/25/2028      EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador     7.75   74.675    4/25/2028      EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador      6.5   73.859    5/20/2020      EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador      6.4   67.626    6/12/2024      EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador      6.4   67.626    6/12/2024      EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador     7.75   74.946    6/25/2028      EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador     7.75   74.946    6/25/2028      EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador     7.75   75.059    7/24/2028      EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador     7.75   75.059    7/24/2028      EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador     7.75   75.094     8/1/2028      EC     USD
Republic of Ecuador     7.75   75.094     8/1/2028      EC     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA    5.75     47.5   10/24/2023      BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA    5.75     45.5   10/24/2023      BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA   4.125     47.5    11/1/2022      BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA   4.125     46.5    11/1/2022      BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA   5.375       46    9/26/2024      BR     USD
Samarco Mineracao SA   5.375     54.5    9/26/2024      BR     USD
Siem Offshore Inc       5.85   72.875    1/30/2018      NO     NOK
Siem Offshore Inc       5.45     68.5    3/28/2019      NO     NOK
Sylph Ltd              3.349   58.262    6/22/2035      KY     USD
Telemar Norte Leste      5.5    65.51   10/23/2020      BR     USD
Telemar Norte Leste      5.5     69.5   10/23/2020      BR     USD
Telemar Norte Leste      5.5   66.125   10/23/2020      BR     USD
Tonon Bioenergia SA     9.25   33.063    1/24/2020      BR     USD
Tonon Bioenergia SA     9.25    33.25    1/24/2020      BR     USD
Transocean Inc           4.3       61   10/15/2022      KY     USD
Transocean Inc          7.85   65.311   12/15/2041      KY     USD
Transocean Inc           6.8   60.143    3/15/2038      KY     USD
Transocean Inc          7.45   72.624    4/15/2027      KY     USD
Transocean Inc             8    72.65    4/15/2027      KY     USD
Transocean Inc           7.5   64.998    4/15/2031      KY     USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool    9.875   41.775    11/9/2019      BR     USD
USJ Acucar e Alcool    9.875     41.5    11/9/2019      BR     USD
Vale SA                5.625   67.849    9/11/2042      BR     USD
Venezuela Government   9.375       44    1/13/2034      VE     USD
Venezuela Government    7.75    44.25   10/13/2019      VE     USD
Venezuela Government    8.25    42.75   10/13/2024      VE     USD
Venezuela Government   11.75     50.5   10/21/2026      VE     USD
Venezuela Government       7    49.85    12/1/2018      VE     USD
Venezuela Government       6    41.25    12/9/2020      VE     USD
Venezuela Government       7    41.25    3/31/2038      VE     USD
Venezuela Government    7.65     41.5    4/21/2025      VE     USD
Venezuela Government       9    43.75     5/7/2023      VE     USD
Venezuela Government    9.25       44     5/7/2028      VE     USD
Venezuela Government  13.625   61.314    8/15/2018      VE     USD
Venezuela Government  13.625   61.314    8/15/2018      VE     USD
Venezuela Government  13.625     61.5    8/15/2018      VE     USD
Venezuela Government   12.75    52.65    8/23/2022      VE     USD
Venezuela Government   11.95     49.5     8/5/2031      VE     USD
Venezuela Government    9.25    46.25    9/15/2027      VE     USD
Venezuela Government    5.25   49.414    3/21/2019      VE     USD
Venezuela Government    6.25    73.52     4/6/2017      VE     USD
Venezuela Government   9.125   71.351    9/15/2017      VE     USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA   10.75     59.5    2/12/2023      BR     USD
VRG Linhas Aereas SA   10.75     59.5    2/12/2023      BR     USD


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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