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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Friday, December 4, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 240


                            Headlines



A R G E N T I N A

MEDANITO SA: Fitch Assigns 'CCC' IDR; Outlook Negative
CHUBUT: Moody's Keeps Caa1 Rating on Extension of Bills Program
YPF SOCIEDAD: Moody's Rates $100MM Add-on Notes 'Caa1'


B R A Z I L

BANCO BTG: Moody's Cuts LT Global LC Deposit Rating to Ba2
BANCO BTG: S&P Lowers ICR to 'BB-' & Puts on CreditWatch Negative
BANCO BTG: Founder Cedes Control to Senior Partners
BANCO MERCANTIL: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' ICRs; Outlook Stable
BRAZIL: Abengoa Cuts 40% of Workforce in Bahia, Union Says

BRAZIL: Moody's Says Outlook for Govt. for 2016 is Negative
ELETROBRAS-CENTRAIS: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR; Outlook Negative


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

C8 SYSTEMATIC: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
C8 SYSTEMATIC MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
CHEYNE LONG/SHORT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
CHINA CHAMPION: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 10
CHINA CHAMPION HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 10

COI INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 10
DAJUCA COMPANY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 22
ERB HELLAS: S&P Raises Rating on EUR25BB Med-Term Program to 'C'
JAMES ALPHA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 10
NEW HOPE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 22

STRATHCLYDE INVESTMENTS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
VENTURI INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 7
VILLAGE INN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 10
ZELI INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 22


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Debt Concerns Business Leaders, Deloitte Says


M E X I C O

EMPRESAS ICA: S&P Lowers Rating to 'CC' & Puts on CreditWatch Neg.
EMPRESAS ICA: Moody's Cuts Senior Unsecured Ratings to Caa3


P U E R T O    R I C O

COCO BEACH: Can Sell Golf & Country Club to OHG for $2.2-Mil.
COCO BEACH: Seeks to Consign $2.2MM in Estate Funds to Court
DENISSE MARTINEZ: Bid for Leave to File Appeal Denied
EMPRESAS PLAYA: Case Summary & 16 Largest Unsecured Creditors
PUERTO RICO: COFINA Senior Creditors Comment on "Superbond"

PUERTO RICO: Avoids Default by Redirecting Revenue From Bonds
SAN JUAN OIL: Case Summary & 12 Largest Unsecured Creditors


V E N E Z U E L A

* VENEZUELA: Poverty Hurts Ruling Party's Chances in Elections


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A R G E N T I N A
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MEDANITO SA: Fitch Assigns 'CCC' IDR; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned foreign and local currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'CCC' and 'B-', respectively, to
Medanito S.A.  The Rating Outlook for the company's local currency
IDR is Negative.

Fitch has simultaneously assigned an expected rating of 'CCC+/RR3'
to Medanito's proposed international senior unsecured bond
issuance of up to USD150 million in Reg S notes with a five-year
bullet maturity (2020 maturity).  Proceeds from the transaction
would be used to refinance existing debt and for general corporate
purposes.

The 'RR3' Recovery Rating assigned to the notes reflects the
expectation of a recovery in the range of 50%-70% in the event of
default due to Fitch's belief that a default by Medanito would
most likely be driven by transfer and convertibility restrictions
imposed upon the payment of foreign debt, not a material
deterioration of the company's business or financial profile.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Medanito's ratings are constrained by the 'CCC' country ceiling of
the Republic of Argentina (Fitch local and foreign currency IDRs
of 'RD').  The company's ratings are also restricted by the high
regulatory risks associated with operating in the energy sector in
Argentina, and the long-term need to pursue a robust capital
expenditure plan to develop the company's hydrocarbon reserves and
increase production.  The company faces a volatile domestic
business environment and inflationary pressures on its cost
structures.

Country ceilings are designed to reflect the risks associated with
sovereigns placing restrictions upon private sector corporates,
which may prevent them from converting local currency (LC) to any
foreign currency (FC) under a stress scenario, and/or may not
allow the transfer of FC abroad to service FC debt obligations.
Key concerns of corporates domiciled in Argentina include high
inflation, government meddling, economic uncertainty, and limited
access to debt markets especially after the country's recent
default.

Regulatory Risk Remains High: Medanito's ratings reflect high
regulatory risk given strong government influence in the Energy
sector, though the Nov. 22, 2015 election of a conceivably more
market friendly administration could allay this risk.  Medanito
operates in a highly strategic sector where the government both
has a role as the price regulator and also controls subsidies for
industry players.  In response to the economic crisis of 2001 and
2002, the Argentine government, pursuant to the Public Emergency
Law (Law No. 25,561), established export taxes on certain
hydrocarbon products.  In subsequent years, in order to satisfy
growing domestic demand and ease inflationary pressures, this
policy was supplemented by constraints on domestic prices,
temporary export restrictions, and subsidies on imports of natural
gas and diesel fuel.  As a result, until 2008, local prices for
oil and natural gas products had remained significantly below
those prevailing in neighboring countries and international
commodity exchanges.

Hydrocarbon price increases have been seen in recent years in the
Argentine domestic market, as the government has attempted to
incentivize exploration and production (E&P) producers to increase
production.  Following the sell-off in global oil prices, this has
led to a positive dynamic in the Argentine domestic market as it
has allowed oil prices to remain at levels above global oil
prices.  Long-term prices are more difficult to project given the
Argentine government's volatile history.  The only market segment
where Medanito has been negatively impacted by the decline in
global hydrocarbon prices is in its midstream services segment, as
the company sells petroleum products in the export markets.

Higher Argentine Oil Prices: Positively, despite the global
decline in oil prices seen during the last year, the price of
light oil in the domestic Argentine market has declined by only
11% in 2015 (to USD77/bbl from USD84/bbl).  Fitch is projecting
that for 2015, the company's implied price per barrel of crude oil
sold will be USD75/bbl, which is approximately 50% higher than the
average price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) in the United
States.  In terms of gas prices, Medanito's average realized price
for gas sold increased to USD3.69/MMBTU in 2014 from USD3.18/MMBTU
in 2012 (a 16% increase), mainly driven by its contract with the
Chevron Corporation that has an annual price escalator component.

Diversified Business Model: Founded in 1993, Medanito benefits
from its diversified business portfolio.  The company was
originally founded as a midstream oil and gas company, which then
expanded into the upstream hydrocarbon E&P business.  Medanito is
currently the 13th largest oil producer in the country in terms of
production.  Besides E&P, the company's business portfolio
includes the following complementary business lines: 1) midstream;
2) power generation; and 3) oil & gas engineering services.  In
2014, 53% of the company's revenue base was composed of Upstream
sales, with Midstream making up 29%, Generation 7%, and
Engineering Services and Other Revenues 11%.

Chanares Improves Reserve Life: Via the acquisition of Chanares
S.A. (CHASA), Medanito gained a presence in a new basin (the
Cuyana basin in the province of Mendoza) and increased its reserve
life from five years to 11 years (1P reserves).  In July 2014,
Medanito closed the transaction whereby it acquired 52% of CHASA
for approximately USD59 million, with the remaining 48% purchased
by Medanito's shareholder, Exmed S.A.  Subsequently, Medanito
acquired an incremental 3% in Chanares, giving it a 55% ownership
stake.

As of year-end 2014, Medanito's consolidated net 1P reserves
totalled 26.1 million BOE (83% oil).  If the company manages to
extend concessions that are expiring in the near- to medium-term,
the company's 1P reserves will total 34.3 million BOE.  This
corresponds to a reserve life of 11 years.  Excluding CHASA,
Medanito's 1P reserves total 9.4 million BOE corresponding to a
reserve life of five years.

The CHASA acquisition not only strengthened Medanito's reserve
profile, but it provides some upside potential from its
exploration opportunities.  CHASA's concessions are not set to
expire until 2027, and Medanito sees significant potential to
increase production levels via aggressive well work and a new
drilling campaign (four exploratory prospects with low-to-medium
geological risk).  Positive results can already be seen as average
consolidated crude oil production for Medanito as of September
2015 was 3,470 bbld versus 2,664 bbld for 2014 (a 30% increase).
Total Oil and Gas production of 6,171 barrels of oil equivalent
per day (boed) increased by 15% versus 2014 average production of
5,387 boed.

Slightly Decreased But Stabilizing Financial Results: At YE
December 2014, the company's overall revenues of USD188 million
were 4% higher than full-year 2013 revenues of USD181 million.
Reported EBITDA of USD40 million declined by 30% versus 2013
results, as margins declined to 21% from 31%.  Financial results
in 2014 were negatively impacted by two large non-cash effects.
Adjusting for both these non-cash charges, adjusted EBITDA in 2014
would have been approximately USD54 million yielding a 29% margin,
which is slightly down versus 2013 EBITDA of USD56 million.  Fitch
uses average USD/Peso exchange rates to convert Medanito's
financial results into US dollar equivalent figures.

Revenue generation has improved on a reported basis since mid-
2014, given the closing of the CHASA acquisition in July 2014.
Revenues for the last 12 months (LTM) September 2015 period of
USD199 million have increased by 6% versus full year 2014, while
EBITDA was slightly improved at USD56 million versus normalized
2014 EBITDA of USD56 million.  This can be explained by the
upstream segment, in which the netback per BOE at CHASA is
significantly lower versus Medanito's legacy netbacks.  For
example, on a stand-alone basis Medanito's netback per barrel was
USD30.5 in the nine-month period ending September 2015.  In the
same period, CHASA registered a netback of USD8/BOE, which has
helped to drag down EBITDA generation even though revenues have
increased post-acquisition.  Now that Medanito is integrating
CHASA into its operations, the company expects to increase the
netback in CHASA's operations to more fully benefit from the
transaction.

Long-term Leverage Targeted at 2x: On a normalized EBITDA basis,
the company's leverage ratio (defined as total debt:EBITDA) is
approximately 2.9x as of September 2015, which is significantly
higher than historical leverage levels though an improvement
versus 2014.  Historically, Medanito has had a very conservative
capital structure with total debt:EBITDA of 1.5x-2.0x before 2014.
Management is still targeting long-term leverage of 2.0x total
debt:EBITDA, with incremental leverage above 2.5x requiring
unanimous board approval.  The CHASA acquisition, which increased
leverage to 3.1x on an adjusted basis (4.2x on a reported basis),
was seen by Medanito's management as a significant opportunity to
increase the company's reserve life and ramp up production despite
the fact leverage has risen to levels the company is not
comfortable with for the long term.  Fitch is projecting leverage
will decline to under 2x starting with 2017.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Future developments that could, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating actions in the short term:

   -- Further economic deterioration and the Republic of
      Argentina's inability to convert and transfer foreign
      exchange for Medanito;

   -- Short-term liquidity concerns if the company is unable to
      refinance its 2015-2016 maturities;

   -- A significant deterioration of credit metrics;

   -- Sustained declines in hydrocarbon reserves / production or
      failure to further develop new fields, would be another
      potential negative factor.

Positive: A positive rating action in the short term is considered
unlikely given Argentina's current sovereign restricted default
rating and the fact the company's ratings are constrained by the
sovereign's credit quality.  An upgrade of the sovereign rating
could be a positive rating trigger.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Negative FCF and Stretched Liquidity: Given the company's sizeable
investment requirements, the company has not generated positive
free cash flow in the last five years.  Capex in 2014 totalled a
record USD209 million, mainly accounting for the acquisition of
CHASA.  For this reason FCF in 2014 was -USD130 million versus
(USD62 million) in 2013.  Fitch projects the company will continue
registering negative FCF during 2015-2016 as it works to integrate
CHASA and ramp-up production and increase the acquired E&P assets'
netback per barrel.  Assuming it is able to do both, Fitch
projects positive FCF generation starting in 2017.

In the short- to-medium term, given expectations for continued
negative FCF and expectations for ramped-up capex to increase
production, the company's liquidity position is stretched.
Medanito currently has USD12 million of cash on hand, while it has
USD71 million in short-term debt.  To alleviate this situation,
the company is looking to issue the international Reg S bond in
the amount of USD150 million with a five-year bullet maturity.
The purpose of this issuance would be to refinance approximately
USD130 million in debt with the balance used for other corporate
purposes.  Post-issuance, the company's liquidity position would
be strengthened as a more manageable USD21 million in debt
amortizations would come due in 2015-2016.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- Double-digit currency depreciation per year;
   -- Oil & gas production ramping up from 5,400 BOED to nearly
      7,000 BOED in next five years;
   -- Oil prices straight-lining over next five years to Fitch
      Price Deck assumption of long-term price of USD70/BBL;
   -- Overall, EBITDA growing to the USD100 million in next five
      years;
   -- Contingent on international issuance, leverage levels
      peaking in 2015 and declining to 1.5-2.0x in the long term.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has assigned these ratings to Medanito S.A.:

   -- Foreign currency IDR 'CCC';
   -- Local currency IDR 'B-', Outlook Negative;
   -- International senior unsecured debt rating 'CCC+/RR3'.


CHUBUT: Moody's Keeps Caa1 Rating on Extension of Bills Program
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo said that
the Caa1 (Global Scale local currency) and Baa2.ar (Argentina
National Scale) ratings to the Province of Chubut's USD50 million
Short-Term Treasury Bills Program remain unchanged after the
extension of the maximum authorized amount by USD100 million. The
ratings are in line with the province's long term local currency
issuer ratings, which carry positive outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Short-Term Treasury Bills Program was originally created by
Resolution N§ 163/12 of the provincial Ministry of Economy for a
maximum amount of USD50 million, whereas Resolution N§693/15
increased the total permissible amount for up to USD150 million
and set the specific issuance conditions of the bills within the
program. The applied debt ratings reflect Moody's view that the
willingness and capacity of the Province of Chubut to honor these
short-term treasury notes is in line with the provincial's long-
term credit quality as reflected in the Caa1/Baa2.ar issuer
ratings in local currency.

According to the term sheet reviewed by Moody's, the short-term
bills will be issued in local currency, will mature in up to 365
days with bullet amortization. After the issuance of these new
Bills under the maximum authorized amount, Moody's anticipates
that the Province's total debt will rise to approximately 36% of
total expected revenues for 2015 fiscal year from 21% at the end
of 2014 fiscal year. This expected increase in the debt to total
revenues ratio is still consistent with Chubut current ratings.

The applied ratings are based on preliminary documentation
received by Moody's as of the rating assignment date. Moody's does
not expect changes to the documentation reviewed over this period
or anticipates changes in the main conditions that the notes will
carry. Should issuance conditions and/or final documentation of
any of the classes under this program deviate from the original
ones submitted and reviewed by the rating agency, Moody's will
assess the impact that these differences may have on the ratings
and act accordingly.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Given the strong macroeconomic and financial linkages between the
Government of Argentina's and Sub-sovereigns economic and
financial ratings, and upgrade of Argentina's sovereign bonds
ratings and/or the improvement of the country' operating
environment could lead to an upgrade of the Province of Chubut's.
Conversely, a downgrade in Argentina's bond ratings and/or further
systemic deterioration or idiosyncratic risks arising in this
Province could exert downward pressure on the ratings assigned and
could translate in to a downgrade in the near to medium term.


YPF SOCIEDAD: Moody's Rates $100MM Add-on Notes 'Caa1'
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) has assigned a Caa1 global
foreign currency rating to YPF Sociedad Anonima's (YPF)'s proposed
USD 100 million in aggregate in add-ons to its outstanding 8.875%
USD 762 million notes due in 2018. These notes were issued in the
global capital markets. The outlook on the ratings is positive.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Since YPF is majority owned and controlled by the Argentine
government, YPF's Caa1 rating reflects the application of Moody's
joint default rating methodology for government-related issuers
(GRIs). YPF's Caa1 rating combines its underlying Baseline Credit
Assessment (BCA), which expresses a company's intrinsic credit
risk, of b3; the Caa1 local currency rating and positive outlook
of the Argentine government; and Moody's view of moderate support
from and high dependence on the sovereign.

YPF's underlying BCA reflects the company's exposure to Argentine
economic instability, including the uncertain government energy
policy framework, and exposure to foreign currency convertibility
and transfer risk. However, we recognize that YPF has maintained a
strong financial profile since 2012, when it came under government
control.

The BCA is supported by the company's status as the largest
industrial corporation and energy company in Argentina as well as
its low leverage and high levels of retained cash flow when
compared with peers. In the last twelve months ended in September,
2015, YPF's RCF/Debt ratio was at 43.3%. YPF benefits from
upstream/downstream integration and other business
diversification, and sizeable oil and gas reserves, including
large shale resources in the longer-term.

The government of Argentina's ability to provide support to YPF is
measured by its Caa1 local currency rating and positive outlook,
weakened somewhat by the high dependence of the government and the
company on credit factors that could cause stress on both
simultaneously.

We consider the government's willingness to support YPF as
moderate. The moderate support takes into account YPF's majority
government ownership and control, as well as the importance of the
company to the Argentine economy, with a dominant market position
in the energy sector. However, our support assumptions are
constrained by the low policy transparency and predictability of
the Argentine government to date.

While YPF is expected to account for only a small part of the
government's revenue base, the high default dependence reflects
the high correlation between YPF's credit profile and Argentine
economic trends. YPF derives the majority of its revenues
domestically; also, the company and the government also both share
common exposure foreign exchange rate risk.

We consider YPF liquidity profile as weak. Its USD 1.2 billion in
cash at September 30, 2015 covers only 50% of the company's next
twelve months debt maturities, although the aggregate amount is
owed to local market participants and we believe that at least a
portion of it could be rolled over. The company has demonstrated
successful access to both local and international markets to
conduct liability managements. We expect it to continue to rely
heavily on the capital markets for its financing needs, mainly
Argentine pension and insurance funds. The company has also relied
on Argentina banks, including government-owned Banco de la Nacion
for financing.

Foreign currency risk is also high: as of September 30, 2015,
74.5% of YPF's debt was denominated in foreign currency, 35% of
the company's revenue was linked to the US dollar and 17% of its
cash was held in that currency. In addition, about 30% of its
capital spending and 40% of its operating costs are linked to the
US dollar.

As typical in Argentina, YPF does not have a committed revolving
credit facility. The company's significant capital spending
program, which we expect to be around USD 5 billion in 2016, will
continue to outstrip cash flow from operations by roughly USD 1.5
billion.

YPF's positive rating outlook is based on the positive outlook on
the Argentine government. YPF and the government's ratings are
closely linked since YPF is a government-related issuer and also
due to the uncertain impact of the government's involvement in the
energy sector going forward.

Continued growth in oil production while maintaining strong
margins and low leverage could result in positive pressure on
YPF's BCA. Over the medium term, an improvement in Argentina's
Caa1 rating and continued demonstration of a strong financial
track record could result in a ratings upgrade. However, a rating
upgrade will depend on Moody's having a more clear view about the
new government's energy policies for the next several years and
how that could affect YPF.

Conversely, YPF's ratings could be downgraded if it is unable to
maintain sufficient liquidity and access to foreign currency in
order to meet its debt service obligations. The ratings could also
be downgraded if the government of Argentina's Caa1 rating were to
be downgraded.

YPF Sociedad An¢nima (YPF) is an Argentine based integrated energy
company with operations concentrated in the exploration,
development and production of crude oil, natural gas and liquefied
petroleum gas (which represent around 35% of revenues before
consolidation adjustments), and midstream/downstream operations
(for 65% of revenues), engaged in refining, chemicals production,
retail, marketing, transportation and distribution of oil and
petroleum products. The company is 51% owned and controlled by the
Argentine government and had revenues of USD 17.3 billion and
total assets of USD 27.4 billion for the twelve months ending
September 30, 2015.


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B R A Z I L
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BANCO BTG: Moody's Cuts LT Global LC Deposit Rating to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Banco BTG Pactual S.A.'s
baseline credit assessment (BCA) to ba2 from baa3, and its
ratings, including the long-term global local- and foreign-
currency deposit ratings to Ba2 from Baa3; the short-term global
local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings to Not Prime from
Prime-3; the senior unsecured MTN program (foreign currency)
rating to (P)Ba2 from(P)Baa3; and the long-term Brazilian national
scale deposit rating to A1.br from Aa1.br. At the same time,
Moody's downgraded the ratings assigned to Banco BTG Pactual S.A.,
Grand Cayman and Luxembourg branches including the foreign
currency senior unsecured debt ratings to Ba2 from Baa3; the
foreign currency subordinate debt rating to Ba3 from Ba1; and the
foreign currency preferred stock non-cumulative debt rating to
B2(hyb) from Ba3(hyb).  The ratings of the bank and its branches
were placed on review for downgrade on 25 November 2015, and
remain on review for potential further downgrade.

RATING RATIONALE

The downgrade of BTG Pactual's ratings incorporates the challenges
the bank faces to conserve liquidity and preserve its franchise in
light of the recent developments involving its former chairman and
CEO.  BTG's dependence on confidence sensitive market funds has
led management to take measures aimed at conserving cash,
including assets sales and a halt in new loan originations, in
order to manage its financial flexibility.  Although the measures
are intended to restore confidence in its clients and
counterparties, the bank remains exposed to liquidity pressures if
these efforts are not effective.  In any event, BTG is likely to
face a higher cost of funding, which will pressure its ability to
generate high levels of profitability that have been important in
building its capital.  Moody's acknowledges the depth of BTG's
management team, and its diversified business platform that could
help mitigate the uncertainty surrounding the banks' future
performance.

During the review period, Moody's will assess the actions the firm
takes to ensure the sustainability of its liquidity and earnings
generation, and to mitigate any further effects that these
developments may have on BTG Pactual's customer and counterparty
relationships.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN

The review could result in a downgrade if: (1) BTG faces continued
liquidity pressures that could lead to greater risks of managing
its financial position; (2) the capacity to generate business is
meaningfully damaged; (3) investigations find linkages between the
actions of the CEO with the bank's operations that may have
negative franchise, regulatory or other legal implications on the
Bank;

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP

Upward pressures on BTG's BCA and ratings are unlikely, as they
are on review for downgrade.

However, BTG Pactual's ratings could be confirmed at current
levels if Moody's concludes that the company is able to maintain
its liquidity and sustain an adequate level of revenue and income
generation capacity.

These ratings and assessments assigned to Banco BTG Pactual S.A.
were downgraded, and remain on review for potential further
downgrade:

   -- Long-term global local currency deposit rating to Ba2, from
      Baa3

   -- Short-term global local currency deposit rating to Not
      Prime, from Prime-3

   -- Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating to Ba2, from Baa3

   -- Short-term global foreign-currency deposit rating to Not
      Prime, from Prime-3

   -- Senior unsecured MTN program (foreign currency) rating to
      (P)Ba2, from (P)Baa3

   -- Short-term MTN program (foreign currency) rating to (P)Not
      Prime, from (P)Prime-3

   -- Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating to A1.br,
      from Aa1.br

   -- Baseline credit assessment to ba2, from baa3

   -- Adjusted baseline credit assessment to ba2, from baa3

   -- Long-term counterparty risk assessment to Ba1(cr), from
      Baa2(cr)

   -- Short-term counterparty risk assessment to Not Prime(cr),
      from Prime 2(cr)

The rating assigned to Banco BTG Pactual S.A. remain on review for
downgrade:

   -- Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-1

These ratings and assessments assigned to Banco BTG Pactual S.A.,
Grand Cayman Branch were downgraded, and remain on review for
further downgrade:

   -- Senior unsecured MTN program (foreign currency) rating to
      (P)Ba2, from (P)Baa3

   -- Short-term MTN program (foreign currency) rating to (P)Not
      Prime, from (P)Prime-3

   -- Long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating to
      Ba2, from Baa3

   -- Subordinate debt (foreign currency) rating to Ba3, from Ba1

   -- Long-term counterparty risk assessment to Ba1(cr), from
      Baa2(cr)

   -- Short-term counterparty risk assessment to Not Prime(cr),
      from Prime-2(cr)

These ratings and assessments assigned to Banco BTG Pactual S.A.,
Luxembourg Branch were downgraded, and remain on review for
further downgrade:

   -- Preferred stock non-cumulative debt (foreign currency)
      rating to B2(hyb), from Ba3(hyb)

   -- Long-term counterparty risk assessment to Ba1(cr), from
      Baa2(cr)

   -- Short-term counterparty risk assessment to Not Prime(cr),
      from Prime2(cr)

LAST RATING ACTIONS & METHODOLOGIES

The last rating action on BTG Pactual was on 25 November 2015 when
Moody's placed on review for downgrade its baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of baa3, and its ratings, including the long-term
global local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Baa3; the
short-term global local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings of
Prime 3; the senior unsecured MTN program (foreign currency)
rating of (P)Baa3; the long-term Brazilian national scale deposit
rating of Aa1.br; and short-term Brazilian national scale deposit
rating of BR-1.  At the same time, Moody's also placed on review
for downgrade all senior, subordinated and hybrid debt ratings
assigned to Banco BTG Pactual S.A., Grand Cayman and Luxembourg
branches.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks.  NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa.

Banco BTG Pactual S.A. is headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil and
had total consolidated assets of BRL290.4 billion ($78.5 billion)
and equity of BRL18.9 billion ($5.1 billion) as of Sept. 30, 2015.


BANCO BTG: S&P Lowers ICR to 'BB-' & Puts on CreditWatch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term global
scale issuer credit rating (ICR) to 'BB-' from 'BB' and its long-
term national scale credit rating to 'brA-' from 'brAA-' on Banco
BTG Pactual S.A.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' global
scale short-term rating on the bank and lowered its national scale
short-term rating to 'brA-2' from 'brA-1'.  S&P also revised its
CreditWatch implications to negative from developing on the bank.

The rating action follows S&P's revision of BTG's liquidity
position to "weak" from "adequate."  The revision is based on
S&P's analysis of the bank's liquidity since the arrest of its
former CEO and Chairman.  In S&P's opinion, the bank has a
material liquidity gap in meeting its financial obligations in the
next 60 days, unless BTG is able to sell assets or access credit
facilities with Brazilian financial regulators.  This gap, which
incorporates information S&P received from the bank following the
recent withdrawals of deposits and inflows from several sources,
underscores the bank's potential failure to meet its short-term
obligations if it doesn't take stronger action than just using its
contingency plan to increase its cash position.  The
unpredictability of such inflows--which depend on divestments,
credit portfolio sales, other asset sales, and release of margins
on trading books, etc.--substantially jeopardized the bank's cash
position, as the outflows have been proven constant.  Moreover,
the "weak" liquidity assessment on BTG reflects large and unusual
liquidity needs in the next 60 days that increased amid the rising
reputational risk.  This in turn further pressures the bank's
contingency plan and liquidity needs.  This event prompted S&P to
revise the bank's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to 'b+' from
'bb'.

Nevertheless, S&P applies one-notch uplift to the bank's SACP due
to its "moderate" systemic importance to the Brazilian financial
system, according to S&P's methodology, leading to an ICR of
'BB-'.  Consequently, S&P downgraded Banco BTG Pactual to
'brA-/brA-2' following its national scale equivalency table and
the CreditWatch implications revision to negative.

The CreditWatch negative on the bank reflects the rising pressure
on the bank's liquidity and credit fundamentals since the arrest
of its former CEO and Chairman.  S&P should resolve the
CreditWatch listing in the next 90 days if it identifies further
liquidity changes.  Likewise, S&P requires full clarity of the
impact of BSI's acquisition and higher reputational risk on the
bank's business position, capital and earnings, risk position, and
funding to resolve the listing.  S&P could lower the ratings by
multiple notches if the bank's liquidity deteriorates further in
our opinion.  This liquidity drop could occur if the bank's
contingency plans continue to fail to maintain BTG's cash position
at a comfortable level.  Additionally, a further downgrade is
possible if the bank's business position, capital and earnings,
risk position, and funding assessments deteriorated amid the
rising reputational risk, even considering the BSI acquisition has
a potentially positive impact.  Also, S&P could lower the ratings
if its assessment of the bank's "moderate" systemic importance
changes as a result of the bank's contingency and deleveraging
plan.


BANCO BTG: Founder Cedes Control to Senior Partners
---------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that BTG Pactual founder Andre Esteves, arrested
last week in a corruption case, ceded control of the investment
bank to several senior partners via a share swap, the institution
said.

The report notes that Mr. Esteves resigned as BTG's chairman and
CEO days after he was detained in connection with a $2 billion
corruption scandal centered on Petroleo Brasileiro S.A.


BANCO MERCANTIL: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' ICRs; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B-/C' global
scale issuer credit ratings on Banco Mercantil do Brasil S.A.
(BMB).  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'brB+' national scale
rating on the bank.  The outlook on global and national scale
ratings remains stable.

The rating affirmation follows BMB's announcement of a cash tender
for up to $30 million of its outstanding $180 million subordinated
notes due in 2020.

In accordance with S&P's criteria for distressed exchange and
offers, it views the proposed cash tender offer as opportunistic.
Although the bank is offering less value than the original promise
($800 for each $1,000 of principal amount), S&P don't expect a
conventional default of the bank in the short to intermediate term
if the investors don't accept the proposed offer.  The bank's
broad liquid assets to short-term wholesale funding is about 2.3x,
which S&P views as comfortable while it reflects the bank's
retail-oriented client base and funding profile.  Furthermore,
BMB's Basel III ratio was 13.1% as of Sept. 2015, and S&P expects
it to remain above 12.5% for the next two years.


BRAZIL: Abengoa Cuts 40% of Workforce in Bahia, Union Says
----------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that Abengoa SA, which has filed for preliminary
creditor protection, has laid off 2,300 employees in the
northeastern Brazilian state of Bahia, or 42.5 percent of its
workforce nationwide, union spokespersons said.

Abengoa had 5,400 employees across Brazil 20 days ago, slightly
less than half of whom were working at the company's electricity
station in Bahia, the vice president of the Sintepav-BA union,
Irairson Warneaux, told EFE News.

That station will virtually shut down until the company's
financial situation is clarified, according to EFE News.

The report notes that workers at stations in the northern and
northeastern states of Tocantins, Piaui and Maranhao also were
laid off, according to Mr. Warneaux, although that information has
not been confirmed by the regional unions.

More than 50 percent of Abengoa SA's workers nationwide have been
laid off, Mr. Warneaux said, the report relays.

Heavily indebted Abengoa SA informed the union leader of the
company's intention to keep a staff of 400 workers nationwide to
maintain its existing projects, the report notes.

The report discloses that the union has asked for the mediation of
the labor affairs division of the Attorney General's Office,
according to Mr. Warneaux, who denounced the layoffs and said the
union expected that a conciliation hearing would be held between
the two sides in the coming days.

Abengoa SA, which is struggling with gross financial debt of
nearly EUR9 billion ($9.55 billion) and also owes more than EUR5
billion ($5.31 billion) to its suppliers, applied for preliminary
creditor protection in Spain.

Abengoa SA, which entered the Brazilian market in the 1990s, has
undertaken 11 electrical transmission line projects in the South
American country in recent years.

The company's Brazilian unit declined to speak to EFE News, saying
that only the parent company was authorized to comment on the
matter


BRAZIL: Moody's Says Outlook for Govt. for 2016 is Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
The outlook for Brazil's regional and local governments for 2016
is negative, reflecting the impact that the country's recession
will have on tax revenues and their growing debt burdens, says
Moody's Investors Service.

Moody's forecasts that Brazil's economy will contract further next
year, reducing tax receipts for municipalities and states.
Consequently, their combined debt-to-revenue ratios will rise to
almost 130% in 2016 from 125% for 2015, according to the report
"Regional and Local Governments -- Brazil 2016 Outlook - Rising
deficits and debt burden drive our negative outlook."

"Tax receipts account for a significant proportion of the total
revenues of Moody's rated regional and local governments," says
Paco Debonnaire, an analyst at Moody's. "And, we don't expect tax
revenues to start growing again until 2017."

The effects of Brazil's economic contraction will outweigh the
potential benefits of debt reduction from the country's
"Indexador" law, which takes effect in February.  Under the
legislation, Brazilian regional and local governments' will have
lower interest rates on their federal debt.

Liquidity for Brazil's regional and local governments will also
remain weak next year, as the benefits of a transfer of judicial
deposits fades, and any further payments from this source will
depend on fresh litigation.  Additionally, a supreme court ruling
that states must pay arrears to their suppliers within five years
will take effect next year, further eroding liquidity.


ELETROBRAS-CENTRAIS: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' foreign
currency and 'BBB-' local currency corporate credit ratings on
Eletrobras-Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras S.A.  S&P also affirmed
its 'brA-1+' short-term national scale rating.  The outlook
remains negative.  The company's SACP of 'bb-' remains unchanged.

The ratings on Eletrobras reflect S&P's assessment of an "almost
certain" likelihood of extraordinary support from its main
shareholder, the Federative Republic of Brazil (foreign currency:
BB+/Negative/B; local currency: BBB-/Negative/A-3), under S&P's
criteria for GREs.  S&P also incorporates in its analysis the
company's 'bb-' SACP.

S&P bases its view of "almost certain" likelihood of extraordinary
government support to Eletrobras on the company's "critical" role
to and "integral" link with the government of Brazil.  If the
likelihood of support is "almost certain," S&P generally equalize
the rating on a GRE with that on the sovereign.



==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


C8 SYSTEMATIC: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
---------------------------------------------
On Sept. 28, 2015, the members of C8 Systematic Multi-Strategy
Fund Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Dec. 1, 2015, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


C8 SYSTEMATIC MASTER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------------
On Sept. 29, 2015, the sole member of C8 Systematic Multi-Strategy
Master Fund Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's
operations.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Dec. 1, 2015, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902


CHEYNE LONG/SHORT: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------
On Oct. 15, 2015, the sole shareholder of Cheyne Long/Short Credit
Fund Inc. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Dec. 1, 2015, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          c/o Jo-Anne Maher
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (345) 814-9255
          Facsimile: (345) 949-4647


CHINA CHAMPION: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 10
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of China Champion Group Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by Dec. 10, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 22, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Peter Goulden
          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          Reference: NDL
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (+1) 345 949 4123
          Facsimile: (+1) 345 949 4647


CHINA CHAMPION HOLDINGS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 10
--------------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of China Champion Holdings Limited are required to
file their proofs of debt by Dec. 10, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 21, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Peter Goulden
          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          Reference: NDL
          94 Solaris Avenue, Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: (+1) 345 949 4123
          Facsimile: (+1) 345 949 4647


COI INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 10
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Coi Investment Management (Cayman Islands)
Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by Dec. 10,
2015, to be included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 22, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


DAJUCA COMPANY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 22
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Dajuca Company Ltd are required to file their
proofs of debt by Dec. 22, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 23, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lion International Management Limited
          P.O. Box 71
          Craigmuir Chambers
          Road Town, Tortola
          British Virgin Islands
          c/o Mr. Philip C Pedro
          HSBC International Trustee Limited
          Compass Point, Bermudiana Road
          Hamilton HM 11
          Bermuda
          Telephone: (441) 299-6482
          Facsimile: (441) 299-652


ERB HELLAS: S&P Raises Rating on EUR25BB Med-Term Program to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services corrected an error by raising
to 'C' from 'D' its short-term debt rating on these programs:

   -- ERB Hellas plc's/EFG Hellas (Cayman Islands) Ltd.'s
      EUR25 bil med-term Program 02/07/2000;

   -- EFG Hellas (Cayman Islands) Ltd.'s US $2 bil med-term
      Program 03/31/2008.

On Nov. 26, 2015, S&P raised its rating on Eurobank Ergasias'
senior unsecured debt to 'CCC+' from 'D' and S&P's issue rating on
the subordinated debt to 'CC' from 'D'.  However, due to an error,
S&P did not raise the short-term rating on the above programs to
'C' from 'D'.

Eurobank announced on Nov. 23, 2015, that through private funds it
had fully covered the capital shortfall emerging from the European
Central Bank's stress test.  Consequently, S&P understood that its
outstanding senior and subordinated liabilities will not be
subject to mandatory bail-in in the near term.


JAMES ALPHA: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 10
--------------------------------------------------
The creditors of James Alpha Global Real Estate Fund, Ltd. are
required to file their proofs of debt by Dec. 10, 2015, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 23, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Nicola Cowan
          DMS Corporate Services Ltd
          Telephone: (345) 946 7665
          Facsimile: (345) 949 2877
          dms House, 2nd Floor
          P.O. Box 1344 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


NEW HOPE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 22
-----------------------------------------------
The creditors of New Hope Company Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by Dec. 22, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 26, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lion International Management Limited
          Craigmuir Chambers
          Road Town, Tortola VG 1110
          British Virgin Islands
          c/o Mr. Philip C Pedro
          HSBC International Trustee Limited
          Compass Point 9 Bermudiana Road
          Hamilton HM 11
          Bermuda
          Telephone: (441) 299-6482
          Facsimile: (441) 299-6526


STRATHCLYDE INVESTMENTS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------------
On Oct. 14, 2015, the shareholders of Strathclyde Investments
Limited resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Dec. 1, 2015, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Caroline Riou
          Wardour Management Services Limited
          Telephone: (345) 945-3301
          Facsimile: (345) 945-3302
          P O Box 10147 Grand Cayman KY1-1002
          Cayman Islands


VENTURI INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 7
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Venturi Investment Ltd. are required to file
their proofs of debt by Dec. 7, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Oct. 22, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Morval Bank & Trust Cayman Ltd.
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949-9808
          P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
          Cayman Islands


VILLAGE INN: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 10
--------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Village Inn Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by Dec. 10, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 21, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


ZELI INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Dec. 22
-------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Zeli Investments Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by Dec. 22, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Oct. 22, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Lion International Management Limited
          Craigmuir Chambers
          Road Town Tortola VG 1110
          British Virgin Islands
          c/o Mr. Philip C Pedro
          HSBC International Trustee Limited
          Compass Point, 9 Bermudiana Road
          Hamilton HM 11
          Bermuda
          Telephone: (441) 299-6482
          Facsimile: (441) 299-6526


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Debt Concerns Business Leaders, Deloitte Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that Deloitte Business Barometer's sixth
edition revealed the importance of the public debt which business
leaders cite among the main problems the country must solve,
jumping from 10% to 25%, and figures as the second in their
priorities only after the energy issue.

"Businesspersons have a less optimistic view on economic
situation," the Barometer sums up, and notes that top executives
of international firms in the Dominican Republic note that current
research continues to rank the electricity problem as the most
important priority, but with a decline in rating, from 46% to
37.4%, according to Dominican Today.

Deloitte Managing Partner Jose Luis de Ramon and Dominican
Republic economic partner Nassim Alemany presented the report
which asked 'Is the economic situation is the same, better or
worse in the last year?, on which 51.8% responded 'the same';
34.1% said 'better' and 14.1% said 'worse,' the report notes.

Dominican Today says that the percentage with respect to whether
it was "the same" was 43.3% in the previous edition, with "better"
at 48.4% and "worse" was 8.3% in the previous survey.

                            *     *     *

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on May 22,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term
sovereign credit ratings on the Dominican Republic (DR) to 'BB-'
from 'B+'.

The outlook is stable.  At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B'
short-term rating.  S&P also raised its transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment to 'BB+' from 'BB'.



===========
M E X I C O
===========


EMPRESAS ICA: S&P Lowers Rating to 'CC' & Puts on CreditWatch Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its global scale rating
on Empresas ICA S.A.B. de C.V. to 'CC' from 'CCC+' and the
national scale rating to 'mxCC' from 'mxB-'.  At the same time,
S&P lowered its issue-level ratings to 'C' from 'CCC'.  The '5'
recovery rating on the company's senior unsecured notes due 2017,
2021, and 2024 remains unchanged, which indicates a "modest" (10%
to 30%; the lower band of the range) expectation for recovery in
the event of a payment default.  S&P also placed the ratings on
CreditWatch negative.

The downgrade follows Empresas ICA's announcement that it has
entered into the 30-day grace period with respect to the
approximately $31 million interest payment on its senior notes due
2024.  The rating on Empresas ICA reflects S&P's view that there
is a very high probability that the company won't make the payment
during this period, given the weakness in its liquidity position
and financial performance.

The negative CreditWatch listing reflects that if the company
doesn't make interest payment on the 2024 notes within the grace
period, S&P would downgrade it to 'D' or 'SD' (selective default).
An announcement of a debt exchange that S&P deems to be distressed
would also lead to a downgrade.


EMPRESAS ICA: Moody's Cuts Senior Unsecured Ratings to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the corporate family rating
(CFR) and the senior unsecured ratings of Empresas ICA S.A.B de
C.V. (ICA), to Caa3, from B3. The outlook is negative.

The following debt instruments were also affected:

-- USD 700 million in senior unsecured global notes due 2024:
    downgraded to Caa3 from B3

-- USD 500 million in senior unsecured global notes due 2021:
    downgraded to Caa3 from B3

-- USD 150 million in senior unsecured global notes due 2017:
    downgraded to Caa3 from B3

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects the announcement the company did on
November 29, 2015, that it entered into the 30-day grace period
with respect to the approximately US$31 million interest payment
on its 8.875% senior notes due 2024. The use of the 30-day grace
period does not constitute an event of default in itself. However,
it reflects the precarious liquidity of the company and is a
likely precursor to more formal refinancing process or distressed
exchange.

ICA's Caa3 rating balances the high likelihood of default with
expected recovery for bondholders, given ICA's asset coverage of
consolidated debt. The company still has a sizable portfolio of
assets that could be monetized, increasing recovery prospects for
bondholders. For example, ICA still holds a 51% stake in the
operating toll roads JV with Caisse De D‚pot Et Placement Du
Qu‚bec (CDPQ), which previously acquired its 49% stake at a MXN 3
billion price. ICA also controls the airport operator OMA through
a 33% stake. Earlier this year ICA raised about MXN 1 billion from
the sale of almost 3% of OMA. Additionally, ICA fully owns an
operating toll road, Rio de los Remedios, and four toll roads
under construction starting operations in 2016. ICA also owns 100%
of two jails for which in 2014 it received a MXN 1.5 billion offer
for a 70% stake. ICA has already been able to get MXN 5 billion
due to assets monetization, indicating that there is demand for
these kind of assets.

Also we note that ICA's MXN 37.5 million accounts receivables and
MXN 7.8 million fixed assets positively compare with the MXN 13.7
billion in accounts payables and advanced payments, further
increasing recovery prospects.

The negative outlook reflects the ongoing uncertainty as the
company enters this new phase of negotiations with its creditors,
payment risk on upcoming interest and debt maturity payments, and
the possibility that missed coupon payments beyond grace period
results in a more formal debt restructuring filing. The outlook
also entails the possibility that recovery for bondholders will
not be commensurate within the Caa3 rating, leading to further
downgrades. For example, recovery could be affected if the company
launches a distressed exchange resulting in lower than anticipated
recovery or if as a result of a distressed sale of assets the
company is not able to raise cash enough to cover outstanding
debt.

We note that corporate bonds and construction debt is unsecured
and therefore ranks below concessions and airports debt that are
secured and at opco level. Therefore, a restructure process could
result in lower recovery rates for unsecured debt. Currently, we
estimate unsecured debt at corporate level and construction
business to be 56% of total consolidated debt. Concessions debt is
36% of total debt and airports hold the balance.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

ICA's ratings could be upgraded, if the company improved its
liquidity situation to sufficient levels. Apart from financing its
ongoing operations, this should also allow the company to continue
to monetize assets and thus de-lever the company while supporting
its liquidity situation.

The rating of the CFR and the existing bonds could be further
downgraded due to a formal insolvency procedure and/or if the
company formally defaulted on its debt obligations, such as by a
distressed exchange on its outstanding bonds, or by the inability
to pay bond coupons and short term debt maturities.


======================
P U E R T O    R I C O
======================


COCO BEACH: Can Sell Golf & Country Club to OHG for $2.2-Mil.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Coco Beach Golf & Country Club, S.E., sought and obtained approval
from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto
Rico to sell substantially all of its assets, including the golf
and country club, to OHorizons Global, LLC, for $2.2 million.

The Debtor declared OHG as the Successful Bidder at the auction
conducted on November 18, 2015, after OHG increased its stalking
horse bid by $157,471 to $2,200,000.  Following approval of the
sale, the Sales Deed and related Asset Purchase Agreement were
subscribed and completed.

Cara Salvatore at Bankruptcy Law360 reported that OHG beat out
rival Platinum Capital Partners after Platinum's "highly unusual"
objection to the winner's financial qualifications.

The Court approved Coco Beach's agreement to pay OHG a break-up
fee in the amount of $60,000 and to reimburse OHG for its expenses
of up to $50,000 upon the closing of any Sale to a third party
pursuant to the Amended Bidding Procedures Order that was entered
on September 2, 2015.

The Court overruled Platinum Capital Partners, Inc.'s objection to
the approval of the sale of the assets to OHG.

Platinum, which also placed its bid for the Debtor's assets,
complained that the November 18 auction did not comply with the
Amended Bidding Procedures approved by the Court.  Platinum
asserted that it should have been named as the Successful Bidder
and the estate should have been sold to the only Qualified Over
Bidder.

The Debtor, in response to Platinum, maintained that the Sale
satisfies the "sound business purpose test" and pointed out that
the Golf & Country Club is operating using backup generators,
lacks funds to cover payroll, insurance and imminent preservation
expenses.  In sum, the Debtor can no longer afford to operate the
Golf & Country Club and the Auction has obtained the highest and
best offer for the Purchased Assets, the Debtor said.  OHG joined
in the Debtor's response to Platinum's objection.

Coco Beach Golf & Country Club, S.E. is represented by:

         Wigberto Lugo Mender, Esq.
         LUGO MENDER GROUP, LLC
         100 Carr. 165, Suite 501
         Guaynabo, PR 00968-8052
         Tel: (787) 707-0404
         Email: wlugo@lugomender.com

Platinum Capital Partners, Inc. is represented by:

         Rebeca Caquias Mejias, Esq.
         FIDDLER, GONZALEZ & RODRIGUEZ, PSC
         P.O. Box 363507
         San Juan, PR 00936-3507
         Tel: 787-759-3184
         Fax: 787-759-3124
         Email: rcaquias@fgrlaw.com

                      About Coco Beach Golf

Coco Beach Golf & Country Club, S.E., is the owner of a first
class golf and country club in Rio Grande, Puerto Rico, currently
operating under the name of Trump International Golf Club Puerto
Rico.  Trump International Golf Club has two 18-hole golf courses
and country club facilities.

The Company sought Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No.
15-05312) in Old San Juan, Puerto Rico, on July 13, 2015, and
immediately filed a motion seeking to sell most of the assets for
$2.04 million in cash to OHorizons Global, LLC, subject to higher
and better offers.


COCO BEACH: Seeks to Consign $2.2MM in Estate Funds to Court
------------------------------------------------------------
Coco Beach Golf & Country Club, S.E., asks permission from the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico to consign
estate funds with the Clerk of Court.

The Debtor asserts that in order to safeguard the distribution of
sale proceeds to conform to the provisions of Section 363(f) of
the Bankruptcy Code, it is necessary to consign the amount of
$2,200,000 corresponding to estate funds received from the sale
transaction.  Upon entry of an order allowing consignment, the
Debtor intends to deliver to the Honorable Clerk of The Bankruptcy
Court manager check number 0025967 issued by Citibank, N.A., for
the amount of $2,200,000.  These funds will be deposited in an
interest bearing deposit individual account this pursuant to FRBP
7067-1.

Coco Beach Golf & Country Club, S.E. is represented by:

     Wigberto Lugo Mender, Esq.
     LUGO MENDER GROUP, LLC
     100 Carr. 165 Suite 501
     Guaynabo, Puerto Rico 00968-8052
     Phone: (787) 707-0404
     Email: wlugo@lugomender.com

                         About Coco Beach Golf

Coco Beach Golf & Country Club, S.E., is the owner of a first
class golf and country club in Rio Grande, Puerto Rico, currently
operating under the name of Trump International Golf Club Puerto
Rico.  Trump International Golf Club has two 18-hole golf courses
and country club facilities.

The Company sought Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No.
15-05312) in Old San Juan, Puerto Rico, on July 13, 2015, and
immediately filed a motion seeking to sell most of the assets for
$2.04 million in cash to OHorizons Global, LLC, subject to higher
and better offers.


DENISSE MARTINEZ: Bid for Leave to File Appeal Denied
-----------------------------------------------------
Judge Gustavo A Gelpi of the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico denied Denisse Rodriguez Martinez's motion
for leave to file an interlocutory appeal from the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico's order.

Martinez challenged the bankruptcy court's denial of her
application to employ her former attorney, Alexandra Bigas
Valedon, as the notary public for the sale of her property.  The
bankruptcy court denied the application due to conflict of
interest.

Judge Gelpi found that the bankruptcy court's denial of attorney
Bigas Valedon's request to be appointed as notary public for the
sale of Martinez's property is not a determination that may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.  As
such, the judge held that the district court's exercise of
discretionary appellate jurisdiction is not recommended.

The case is In Re: DENISSE RODRIGUEZ MARTINEZ, Debtor, CASE NO.
3:15-CV-02064-GAG, BANKR. CASE NO. 14-4946 (EAG) (D.P.R.).

A full-text copy of Judge Gelpi's November 10, 2015 opinion and
order is available at http://is.gd/AJyvABfrom Leagle.com.

Denisse J Rodriguez-Martinez is represented by:

          Modesto Bigas-Mendez, Esq.
          P.O. Box 7462
          Ponce, PR 00732
          Tel: (787) 844-1444
          Fax: (787) 842-4090

US Trustee is represented by:

          Jill E. Kelso, Esq.
          UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
          George C. Young Federal Building
          400 West Washington Street, Suite 1100
          Orlando, FL 32801
          Tel: (407) 648-6301
          Fax: (407) 648-6323

            -- and --

          Nancy Pujals, Esq.
          U.S. TRUSTEE OFFICE
          Edificio Ochoa
          500 Tanca Street Suite 301
          San Juan, PR 00901-1922
          Tel: (787) 729-7444
          Fax: (787) 729-7449


EMPRESAS PLAYA: Case Summary & 16 Largest Unsecured Creditors
-------------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: Empresas Playa Joyuda, Inc.
           dba Hotel Perichi's
           dba Perichi's Steak & Sea
        HC-03 Box 16310
        Cabo Rojo, PR 00623

Case No.: 15-09594

Chapter 11 Petition Date: December 1, 2015

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       District of Puerto Rico (Ponce)

Debtor's Counsel: Victor Gratacos Diaz, Esq.
                  GRATACOS LAW FIRM, P.S.C.
                  P.O. BOX 7571
                  Caguas, PR 00726
                  Tel: 787 746-4772
                  Email: bankruptcy@gratacoslaw.com

Total Assets: $939,685

Total Liabilities: $2.74 million

The petition was signed by Julio Cesar Perez Perichi, president
and treasurer.

A list of the Debtor's 16 largest unsecured creditors is available
for free at http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb15-09594.pdf


PUERTO RICO: COFINA Senior Creditors Comment on "Superbond"
-----------------------------------------------------------
The senior creditors of the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing
Corporation ("COFINA"), on Nov. 30, issued the following statement
with respect to recent media coverage regarding the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico's proposed "superbond":

"Recent press reports suggest that a proposed 'superbond' will
rely on a 'consolidation of revenue streams'.  While it is unclear
if this consolidation would include the portion of the sales and
use tax that is COFINA's property, it is important to note that
the usage of COFINA revenues without our consent would violate
Puerto Rican and U.S. Constitutions.  We await further details of
this proposed 'superbond' and look forward to working
constructively with all parties to reach a viable plan that places
the Commonwealth on the right path to economic sustainability.

"As one of the very few secured creditors in the Puerto Rico debt
structure, we expect that our property rights will be protected.
COFINA has been the Puerto Rico debt issue that individuals and
institutions both on and off-island have most trusted with their
capital, retirement accounts and life savings.  The Commonwealth
must respect the rights of retirees and creditors."


                        *       *       *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 14, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its
ratings on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's tax-backed debt to
'CC' from 'CCC-' and removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where
they had been placed with negative implications July 20.  The
outlook is negative.


PUERTO RICO: Avoids Default by Redirecting Revenue From Bonds
-------------------------------------------------------------
Michelle Kaske at Bloomberg News reports that Puerto Rico said it
made all principal and interest payments due Dec. 2, averting a
default on directly guaranteed bonds and allowing the commonwealth
to continue talks with creditors to reduce its $70 billion debt
burden.

Governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla signed an executive order to
permit the redirection of revenue budgeted for highway and
convention center bonds and other agencies to pay for debt issued
or guaranteed by the commonwealth, according to a Government
Development Bank statement, according to Bloomberg News.  The GDB,
which lends to the commonwealth and its agencies, had $354 million
in principal and interest payments due Dec. 2.

Bloomberg News notes that Garcia Padilla announced the so-called
claw-back provision during a Senate hearing Dec. 2, where he
received little support for his request to access bankruptcy to
help right the commonwealth's finances.  The governor said the
island is running out of cash and will focus on providing
essential services while in negotiations with creditors to accept
losses on their holdings, Bloomberg News relays.  It faces another
big bond payment at the start of January.

"Puerto Rico's financial situation remains pressured and Dec. 2's
payment does not change Moody's current ratings or outlook on the
commonwealth's debt," said Ted Hampton, an analyst in New York at
Moody's Investors Service, which rates the debt below investment
grade, Bloomberg News relays.  "Moreover, the governor's executive
order to redirect revenues allocated to certain non-general
obligation bonds underscores the severity of the commonwealth's
liquidity issues," Mr. Hampton, Bloomberg News notes.

                        Clawback Provision

Of the $354 million in payments due, $267 million of the bonds are
guaranteed by Puerto Rico.  A missed payment on those securities
would have been the first default on the commonwealth's direct
debt, Bloomberg News relays.  A Puerto Rico agency has skipped
debt payment since August on bonds repaid through legislative
appropriation.

Bloomberg News notes that the commonwealth said in a Nov. 6
financial filing that it may take revenue already used to repay
Highways and Transportation Authority bonds, convention-center
debt, and Puerto Rico Infrastructure Financing Authority bonds and
redirect that money to pay down general-obligation securities.

Those authorities have approximately $7 billion of debt, Garcia
Padilla said in his written testimony to the Senate committee,
Bloomberg News says.

Bondholders of certain highway bonds and other debt subject to the
revenue redistribution don't have a lot of recourse because bond
documents state such a risk to those revenues, said Daniel Hanson,
an analyst at Height Securities, a Washington-based broker dealer,
Bloomberg News notes.  Those investors will be seeking
confirmation that the money was redirected to paying general
obligations and not other expenses, Mr. Hanson added.

"There's going to be a legal process here to validate that any
claw back that has occurred is being used consistent with the
payment of constitutional obligations," Bloomberg News quoted Mr.
Hanson as saying.

General obligations with an 8 percent coupon and maturing July
2035 traded Dec. 2 as high as 75.7 cents on the dollar, up from as
high as 72.4 cents Dec. 1, data compiled by Bloomberg show.  The
yield traded as low as 11.1 percent Dec. 2.

Even with the redistribution of revenue, Puerto Rico may not have
enough cash to make all its payments, according to the Nov. 6
financial filing, Bloomberg News relays.

"Even assuming the use of these revenues, the commonwealth may not
have sufficient funds to service all principal and interest on its
general obligation debt without significantly curtailing
government operations," according to the document, Bloomberg News
notes.

                             Debt Exchange

A default on commonwealth-guaranteed debt could have prompted
legal action by investors because those bonds are backed by Puerto
Rico's promise to repay, Bloomberg News says.  Officials are
negotiating with investors to reduce the island's debt load by
accepting losses through a debt exchange or by delaying principal
payments, Bloomberg News discloses.

The island faces another debt deadline on Jan. 1 when $357 million
of general-obligation interest is due.  Garcia Padilla's
administration has said for months that paying for essential
services and programs is the government's first priority,
Bloomberg News relays.

Officials have delayed tax rebates, suspended payments to
suppliers and relied on intergovernmental borrowing to help the
cash-strapped island maintain core services, Bloomberg News notes.

Lawmakers showed little indication that they will soon act.

Senator Chuck Grassley, the chairman of the judiciary committee,
said the island's strains are the result of years of fiscal
mismanagement that wouldn't be fixed with bankruptcy, Bloomberg
News discloses.  Mr. Grassley said no bill is imminent to assist
Puerto Rico given the lack of relevant information, Bloomberg News
adds.  The commonwealth hasn't filed audited financial statements
yet for 2014.

                        *       *       *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Sept. 14, 2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its
ratings on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's tax-backed debt to
'CC' from 'CCC-' and removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where
they had been placed with negative implications July 20.  The
outlook is negative.


SAN JUAN OIL: Case Summary & 12 Largest Unsecured Creditors
-----------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: San Juan Oil Company Inc.
        PO Box 4698
        Carolina, PR 00984

Case No.: 15-09593

Chapter 11 Petition Date: December 1, 2015

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan)

Debtor's Counsel: Wigberto Lugo Mender, Esq.
                  LUGO MENDER GROUP, LLC
                  Centro Internacional De Mercadeo
                  100 Carr 165 Suite 501
                  Guaynabo, PR 00968-8052
                  Tel: 787 707-0404
                  Email: wlugo@lugomender.com

Estimated Assets: $1 million to $10 million

Estimated Liabilities: $10 million to $50 million

The petition was signed by Nestor del Castillo-Hernandez,
president.

A list of the Debtor's 12 largest unsecured creditors is available
for free at http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb15-09593.pdf


=================
V E N E Z U E L A
=================


* VENEZUELA: Poverty Hurts Ruling Party's Chances in Elections
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kejal Vyas at The Wall Street Journal reports that late President
Hugo Chavez won loyalty by distributing hundreds of billions of
petrodollars to lift millions of Venezuelans out of poverty.  The
money has run out for his handpicked successor, President Nicolas
Maduro.

Less than three years into Mr. Maduro's tenure, Venezuela's
economy is in shambles amid low oil prices, and poverty is more
prevalent than it was when the leftist Chavismo movement took
power nearly 17 years ago, according to The Wall Street Journal.

The report notes that the country's economic malaise has made
poverty a central issue ahead of the parliamentary elections, in
which polls show the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela
could lose its parliamentary majority as residents struggle with
triple-digit inflation, chronic food shortages and a broad
collapse in state welfare institutions that once handed out
seemingly limitless cheap food and free housing.

"Instead of taking us out of poverty, this government has left us
poorer than ever," said Yamileth Garcia, a school aide who has
lived for 26 years in this impoverished mountainside enclave just
south of the country's capital, Caracas, the report relays.

The struggles faced by the some 20,000 residents of Turgua, which
has four public-health clinics but no doctors, reflect the
nationwide decay in living standards that is pushing many
Venezuelans back into poverty, the WSJ notes.

Many of the town's residents live in tin-roofed, hillside adobe
houses with limited supplies of water and power.  The government-
run Mercal market limits shoppers to buying one week's supply of
deeply discounted goods at a time, but recently it stayed closed
for three weeks in a row, the report discloses.  When it opened,
it allowed customers a slab of beef each and otherwise offered
only rice, pasta and powdered milk, the report says.

"This is not enough for a family," the report quoted Ms. Garcia as
saying.  "We really need a change."

A new study conducted by a consortium of Venezuelan university
professors called Encovi says 76% of citizens are now living in
poverty when measured by income, the highest level since 1975.
That compares with a peak of 55% and a low of 21% during Mr.
Chavez's tenure, the report says.

The WSJ discloses that measuring poverty, tricky anywhere, is
complicated in Venezuela by a dearth of data.  Mr. Maduro's
government stopped publishing poverty statistics after it took
over in 2013 and hasn't released basic economic indicators like
inflation or output since late 2014, the report notes.

Adding to the puzzle is Venezuela's cumbersome foreign-exchange
system, which has produced four vastly different conversion rates
for the U.S. dollar, making it difficult to compare Venezuelan
incomes on an international level, the report relays.  At the
official exchange rate of 6.3 bolivars a dollar, Venezuelans
appear to be earning a strong $1,500 a month, the report notes.
But calculated at the black-market rate commonly used on
Venezuela's streets, the wage comes out to around $12 a month --
half the income of the average Cuban, the report says.

The report discloses that the government's price caps, which keep
staples like rice and corn flour cheap, also cause distortions.
Controlled items are scarce, prompting most Venezuelans to pay
several times more than government-set prices on the black market,
the report relays.

A typical Venezuelan household needs to earn the equivalent of
eight minimum wages to buy one month's supply of food, according
to research group Cenda, the report notes.  A recent poll by the
Caracas consultancy Consultores 21 found nearly a third of
Venezuelans unable to eat three meals a day, the report says.

"In general, the advances that they achieved under the government
of Chavez have disappeared completely in the last two years," said
Daniel Fermin, a policy researcher at Andres Bello Catholic
University, who has studied the collapse in public services in
Turgua, the report notes.

The town is just a few miles from the capital, but few public
buses brave the rough, semi-paved roads to get here.

In October, the government supplied three maroon Chinese-made
Yutong buses to ease the isolation.  But given the decrepit
condition of the roads, local officials say it is just a matter of
time before the new buses end up like the last three the
government provided, rusting in a vacant lot because dollar
shortages have cut the country's capacity to import vehicle parts,
the report relays.

"The government just throws the buses at us without any
maintenance support," said Gustavo Cisneros, a community council
spokesman. "It's such a waste."

The decline in living standards has become all too apparent for
Ludiana Altuve, director of the privately run Mano Amiga La
Monta¤a school here in Turgua, the report notes.

After investigating teachers' complaints that two students -- aged
4 and 6 -- were turning up to class weak and disoriented, Ms.
Altuve found the brothers' family could no longer afford
breakfast, the report discloses.  The hungry boys had been asking
for help from a school security guard, who himself could only
sometimes afford to buy them food, the report relates.  The
children were added to a free breakfast program run by a Catholic
charity that now feeds more than twice as many students as a year
ago.

"The problem is the government didn't bring anyone here out of
poverty by giving them an education or something sustainable," Ms.
Altuve said, the report notes.

The WSJ says that Rampant crime, another hardship that
disproportionately weighs on Venezuela's poor, has also hit her
school and the surrounding community, turning the village into an
anarchic breeding ground for violent gangs who recruit
disillusioned youth and kidnap victims for ransom.

Last year, the body of a pro-government Caracas city councilman,
Eliecer Otaiza, was found in Turgua with four bullet holes, the
report notes.  One morning earlier this month, Ms. Altuve
recounted, students arriving to Mano Amiga found the body of a man
shot to death left at the school's gate, the report relays.  In
August, one of her teachers was murdered by a young family member
who she tried to pull out of a gang.

At the state-run Creacion Turgua School, located just up the hill,
director Elvis Andrade says the 10-room facility is often hit by
blackouts, and in recent weeks has been looted of a TV, three
computer monitors, fans and even one of the building's two water
pumps, the report notes.

"I try not to think about it too much and just push on," Ms.
Andrade said.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Nov. 5, 2015, Moody's Investors Service says the political outlook
in Venezuela (Caa3 stable) will likely face increased challenges
should opposition parties make significant gains in the country's
upcoming congressional elections.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

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                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                   * * * End of Transmission * * *