/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/150915.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Tuesday, September 15, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 182 Headlines B R A Z I L BANCO INDUSTRIAL: Moody's Lowers BCA to B1, Outlook Changed to Neg BIC ARRENDAMENTO: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Subordinated Debt Rating BRAZIL: Among Emerging Markets at Risk of Bank Crisis COMPANIA MINERA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB+', Outlook Negative SAO PAULO: S&P Lowers Global Scale LT FC Credit Rating to 'BB+' SUZANO PAPEL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IDR, Outlook Positive C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ATR HOLDING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report CHEYNE CDO I: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 21 FARADAY ADVISORS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report GROVE CREDIT: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report KINKOUCHO HOLDING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report NEXUS ENERGY: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report NEXUS ENERGY SPC: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report OC 527 OFFSHORE: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report SAIREF LTD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings SUNRISE MARINE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report TREMBLANT SELECT: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report P E R U CONTINENTAL TRUSTEES LTD: S&P Lowers Rating on Notes to 'BB' CORPORACION LINDLEY: S&P Puts 'BB+' CCR on CreditWatch Positive P U E R T O R I C O BTB CORP: Had Until Sept. 14 to File Ch. 11 Plan, Disclosures HORNED DORSET: Bennazar Garcia Okayed to Handle State Court Suits PUERTO RICO: Fitch Expects to Cut Rating to 'C' on Restructuring UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO: S&P Lowers Longterm Rating to 'CC' X X X X X X X X X * Large Companies With Insolvent Balance Sheets - - - - - =========== B R A Z I L =========== BANCO INDUSTRIAL: Moody's Lowers BCA to B1, Outlook Changed to Neg ------------------------------------------------------------------ Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Banco Industrial and Comercial S.A.'s (BICBANCO) baseline credit assessment (BCA) to b1 from ba3. Moody's has also affirmed BICBANCO's adjusted BCA of baa3, the long-term global local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Baa3; the short-term global local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Prime-3; the long-term foreign-currency senior unsecured debt rating of Baa3; the senior unsecured MTN program (foreign currency) rating of (P)Baa3; the long-term foreign- currency subordinated debt rating of Ba1; the long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of Aa1.br; and the short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-1. The outlook for all ratings was changed to negative from stable. In addition, Moody's affirmed Banco Industrial e Comercial S.A., Cayman's long-term foreign-currency debt rating of Baa3 and the senior unsecured MTN program (foreign currency) rating of (P)Baa3, and changed the outlook to negative from stable. The following ratings assigned to Banco Industrial e Comercial S.A. were affirmed: Long-term global local-currency deposit ratings of Baa3; negative outlook Short-term global local-currency deposit ratings of Prime-3 Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating of Baa3; negative outlook Short-term foreign-currency deposit rating of Prime-3 Long-term foreign-currency senior unsecured debt rating of Baa3; negative outlook Senior unsecured MTN program (foreign currency) rating of (P)Baa3 Long-term foreign-currency subordinated debt rating of Ba1 Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of Aa1.br Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating of BR-1 Adjusted Baseline credit assessment of baa3 The following assessment was downgraded: Baseline credit assessment to b1, from ba3 The following assessments were affirmed: Long-term counterparty risk (CR) assessment of Baa2(cr) Short-term counterparty risk (CR) assessment of Prime-2(cr) The following ratings assigned to Banco Industrial e Comercial S.A., Cayman were also affirmed: Long-term foreign currency senior unsecured debt rating of Baa3; negative outlook Senior unsecured MTN program (foreign currency) rating of (P)Baa3 The following assessments were affirmed: Long-term counterparty risk (CR) assessment of Baa2(cr) Short-term counterparty risk (CR) assessment of Prime-2(cr) RATINGS RATIONALE The downgrade of BICBANCO's BCA to b1 from ba3 reflects the bank's weakened capital position in second-quarter 2015, when its core capital, measured as tangible common equity relative to risk- weighted assets, declined further to 5.2%, from 5.6% in the prior quarter. Continuing credit losses and high funding costs have led to five consecutive quarters of net losses, thus significantly diminishing BICBANCO's financial flexibility and delaying its objective of achieving breakeven. This goal is likely to become more challenging in light of the deteriorating economic and credit conditions in Brazil, which may prompt the need for additional provisions for loan losses, in spite of management's more selective loan origination and early signs of declining new non- performing loan formation. Over the past 12 months, BICBANCO's loan book contracted by 18.1%, in part reflecting management's initiatives to shift the asset mix to lower risk exposures. The repositioning of the loan book would be credit positive for BICBANCO, but it may take longer than anticipated. BICBANCO has recorded a steady improvement in its liquid resources, and its dependence on market funds is dwindling, owing in part to the large amount of funding the bank has received from its parent bank, China Construction Bank (Asia) Corp. Ltd. (CCB; A1 stable, baa2 BCA), amounting to BRL1.5 billion in the second- quarter 2015. AFFIRMATION OF SUPPORTED RATINGS The affirmation of BICBANCO's deposit and senior debt ratings at Baa3 incorporates the assessment of a very high probability of parental support, which results in a four-notch uplift from its BCA of b1. The support assessment reflects CCB's majority ownership of BICBANCO, the strategic positioning of the subsidiary in light of the important trade relationship between Brazil and China, and the parent's growing funding support to the subsidiary. BICBANCO's deposit ratings, however, do not benefit from government support uplift because of the bank's modest market share of domestic deposits. OUTLOOK CHANGED TO NEGATIVE FROM STABLE The negative outlook takes into account the challenges the bank will continue to face to replenish its capital with internal earnings generation, because of the potential effect of Brazil's weak economy on the bank's asset quality and profitability. The stabilization of the bank's asset quality will be key to revert the loss making trend of recent quarters. Also, the transition to a business model that is aligned to CCB's could take longer than planned and consequently hurt profitability, to the extent it reduces the size of the bank's balance sheet and a focus on low- yielding, low risk assets limits revenues, factors that are only partially offset by the increasing share of low-cost funding sourced from the parent bank. WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN A downgrade could be driven by continuing erosion of the bank's capital in the event further provisions are required, which will indicate its inability to improve capitalization, restore profitability, or minimize asset risk. WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP A significant improvement in capitalization, a decline in asset risk supported by tighter credit risk standards, and consistent improvement in profitability could lead to an upgrade to BICBANCO's ratings. Also, downgrade (or upgrade) to CCB's BCA of baa2 could lead to a downgrade (or upgrade) of BICBANCO's deposit and debt ratings. LAST RATING ACTION The last rating action on BICBANCO and Banco Industrial e Comercial S.A., Cayman, was on June 12, 2015, when Moody's affirmed the bank's deposit and debt ratings and downgraded the BCA to ba3 from ba2. The outlook for the ratings was not changed. The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published in March 2015. BICBANCO, headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil, had total consolidated assets of BRL15.3 billion (USD4.9 billion) and shareholders' equity of BRL944 million (USD304 million), as of 30 June 2015. BIC ARRENDAMENTO: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Subordinated Debt Rating -------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's America Latina Ltda. (MAL) has affirmed BIC Arrendamento Mercantil S.A.'s (BIC Leasing) long-term global local-currency issuer rating of Baa3, the long-term local currency subordinated debt rating of Ba1, and the long-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of Aa1.br, and the long-term Brazilian national scale subordinate debt rating of Aa2.br. The outlook on BIC Leasing's issuer rating was changed to negative from stable. The following ratings assigned to BIC - Arrendamento Mercantil S.A. were affirmed: Long-term global local-currency issuer rating of Baa3; negative outlook Long-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of Aa1.br Long-term global local-currency subordinate debt rating of Ba1 Long-term Brazilian national scale subordinate debt rating of Aa2.br RATINGS RATIONALE The affirmation of the local currency issuer rating assigned to BIC Leasing follows the affirmation of ratings assigned to its parent bank Banco Industrial e Comercial S.A. (BICBANCO). BICBANCO's baseline credit assessment (BCA) was downgraded to b1 from ba3, to reflect the bank's weakened capital position in second-quarter 2015, when its core capital, measured as tangible common equity relative to risk-weighted assets, declined further to 5.2%, from 5.6% in the prior quarter. Continuing credit losses and high funding costs have led to five consecutive quarters of net losses, thus significantly diminishing BICBANCO's financial flexibility and delaying its objective of achieving breakeven. This goal is likely to become more challenging in light of the deteriorating economic and credit conditions in Brazil, which may prompt the need for additional provisions for loan losses, in spite of management's more selective loan origination and early signs of declining new non-performing loan formation. Over the past 12 months, BICBANCO's loan book contracted by 18.1%, in part reflecting management's initiatives to shift the asset mix to lower risk exposures. The repositioning of the loan book would be credit positive for BICBANCO, but it may take longer than anticipated. BICBANCO has recorded a steady improvement in its liquid resources, and its dependence on market funds is dwindling, owing in part to the large amount of funding the bank has received from its parent bank, China Construction Bank (CCB; A1 stable, baa2 BCA), amounting to BRL1.5 billion in the second-quarter 2015. At the same time, BICBANCO's deposit and senior debt ratings of Baa3 were affirmed, which incorporates the assessment of a very high probability of parental support, resulting in a four-notch uplift from its BCA of b1. The support assessment reflects CCB's majority ownership of BICBANCO, the strategic positioning of the subsidiary in light of the important trade relationship between Brazil and China, and the parent's growing funding support to the subsidiary. BICBANCO's deposit ratings, however, do not benefit from government support uplift because of the bank's modest market share of domestic deposits. OUTLOOK CHANGED TO NEGATIVE FROM STABLE The negative outlook takes into account the challenges BICBANCO will continue to face to replenish its capital with internal earnings generation , because of the potential effect of Brazil's weak economy on the bank's asset quality and profitability. The stabilization of the bank's asset quality will be key to revert the loss making trend of recent quarters. Also, the transition to a business model that is aligned to CCB's could take longer than planned and consequently hurt profitability, to the extent it reduces the size of the bank's balance sheet and a focus on low- yielding, low risk assets limits revenues, factors that are only partially offset by the increasing share of low-cost funding sourced from the parent bank. WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN A downgrade could be driven by continuing erosion of BICBANCO's capital in the event further provisions are required, which will indicate its inability to improve capitalization, restore profitability, or minimize asset risk. WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP A significant improvement in capitalization, a decline in asset risk supported by tighter credit risk standards, and consistent improvement in profitability could lead to an upgrade to BICBANCO's ratings. Also, downgrade (or upgrade) to CCB's BCA of baa2 could lead to a downgrade (or upgrade) of BICBANCO's deposit and debt ratings. The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published in March 2015. LAST RATING ACTIONS Moody's took its last rating action on BIC -- Arrendamento Mercantil S.A. on June 12, 2015, when Moody's America Latina affirmed all ratings assigned to BIC Leasing, including the long- term global local-currency issuer rating of Baa3; the long-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of Aa1.br; the long-term global local-currency subordinate debt rating of Ba1; and the long-term Brazilian national scale subordinate debt rating of Aa2.br. The outlook on its ratings remained stable. The rating action was in line with the rating action Moody's took on Banco Industrial and Comercial S.A. (BICBANCO), announced on June 12, 2015. BRAZIL: Among Emerging Markets at Risk of Bank Crisis ----------------------------------------------------- Credit growth in China, Brazil and Turkey doesn't only risk spurring a hangover in bad debt -- it also signals a banking crisis is on the horizon, Tom Beardsworth and Lyubov Pronina of Bloomberg News report, citing the Bank for International Settlements. According to the report, BIS said a ratio of credit to gross domestic product, a measure of how much private-sector credit has deviated from its long-term trend, stands at 25.4 percent in China. That's the highest of any major economy and compares with 16.6 percent in Turkey and 15.7 percent in Brazil, says Bloomberg News. "Early warning indicators of banking stress pointed to risks arising from strong credit growth," according to the bank, Bloomberg News relays. Historically, a country with a ratio above a 10 percent threshold has a two-thirds chance of "serious banking strains" occurring within three years, BIS said. The report says the biggest banks in Brazil, which is in the midst of the worst contraction in a quarter century, are boosting provisions to cover their bad loans. Banco do Brasil SA, Latin America's largest bank by assets, last month increased money set aside for bad loans by 21 percent. The report recalls that state-owned bank and Banco Bradesco SA were among 13 financial-services firms in Brazil that had their global scale ratings lowered by Standard & Poor's last week after the nation's credit grade was cut to junk. "Estimated debt service ratios also pointed to continuing risks," BIS said in the report, Bloomberg News says. For example, "households and firms in Brazil, China and Turkey spent significantly more on servicing their debt than in the past." COMPANIA MINERA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB+', Outlook Negative ---------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its corporate credit and issue-level ratings on Compania Minera Milpo S.A.A. (Milpo) to 'BB+' from 'BBB-', at the same time S&P revised the outlook to negative from stable. The rating action follows the downgrade on its parent, Votorantim Participacoes S.A. (Votorantim), which was lowered as a result of the downgrade on Brazil's sovereign rating. Under S&P's group rating methodology, as it considers Milpo a "strategically important" subsidiary for its parent, the 'bb' stand-alone credit profile (SACP) on Milpo receives support from Votorantim, which owns 60% of voting stock. However, the support is capped one notch below Votorantim's "BBB-" corporate credit rating, translating into a one-notch of support for Milpo's SACP, instead of two notches. The negative outlook mirrors that of its parent company, reflecting S&P's view of the possibility of another downgrade if it further lowers the ratings on Votorantim. Given that the ratings incorporate one notch of support from Milpo's parent, S&P could lower the ratings if it perceives that there is a change in the level of parent support or if S&P further downgrades the parent company. However, the cross-default clauses in some of Votorantim's financing agreements that may be triggered if Milpo defaults reinforce our expectation for continued support. S&P could also downgrade the company if it fails to increase its production capacity as expected, if metal prices fall sharply, and if additional capital expenditures (capex) erode cash flow metrics alongside higher debt to finance the investments, leading to debt to EBITDA of more than 2.0x. An upgrade, although unlikely in the short to intermediate term, could be possible if S&P raises the rating on its parent company. SAO PAULO: S&P Lowers Global Scale LT FC Credit Rating to 'BB+' --------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its global scale long- term FC credit ratings on the states of Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Santa Catarina to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' following the similar action on the sovereign. S&P also lowered its FC rating on the state of Rio de Janeiro to 'BB' from 'BB+'. At the same time, S&P lowered the FC ratings on the city of Rio de Janeiro to 'BBB-/A-3' from 'BBB/A-2'. S&P also revised its outlook on our 'brAAA' national scale rating on the city of Rio de Janeiro to negative from stable. Additionally, S&P lowered its national scale ratings on Sao Paulo and Santa Catarina to 'brAA+' from 'brAAA', the state of Rio de Janeiro to 'brAA-' from 'brAA+', and Minas Gerais to 'brAA' from 'brAAA'. S&P maintained the negative outlooks on long-term FC and national scale ratings. RATIONALE The rating actions on these local and regional governments (LRGs) reflect a similar action on Brazil and their close links to the sovereign. Amid a deeper and longer economic contraction, Brazilian LRGs are facing increasing pressures to control or cut expenditures while their revenues have shrunk, except for the city of Rio de Janeiro. Under Brazil's economic contraction scenario, S&P expects Brazilian LRGs' economic growth, employment levels, and revenues to suffer for the rest of 2015 and 2016. In addition, they have a very limited ability to cut costs given their high and structurally rigid operating expenses and urgent infrastructure needs. Therefore, S&P expects LRGs' funding needs to increase while the central government is likely to further reduce federal transfers and freeze authorization for new borrowings to LRGs. In addition to facing similar economic challenges, the federal government and LRGs share critical links because they owe most of their debt to the federal government, receive indirect financing through public banks such as the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), Banco do Brasil, and Caixa Economica Federal, and require approval for new debt issuance. The global long- term ratings on the states of Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Santa Catarina reflect their own individual credit profile. Additionally, S&P continues to think that these states don't meet the criteria under which it would rate a LRG higher than its sovereign. Under this criteria, an LRG can have a higher rating than its sovereign only if it can maintain stronger credit characteristics than the sovereign in a stress scenario, has a predictable institutional framework that limits central government's interference, and displays high financial flexibility. S&P thinks that due to the high debt levels and its overall view of "less than adequate" or "weak" liquidity, these three states don't meet this criteria. Furthermore, their economies are to a large extent tightly linked with the sovereign's. S&P also lowered its FC long-term rating on the state of Rio de Janeiro to 'BB' from 'BB+', and consequently S&P lowered its national scale on it to 'brAA-' from 'brAA+'. The outlook on both ratings is negative because S&P believes the state is likely to report wider fiscal deficits in a more depressed economy. Under such scenario, the state's fiscal performance and liquidity could further erode in the next two years, comparing weaker than its national peers. The state continues struggling to fund its ambitious infrastructure program. In addition, its budgetary constraints stem from interest payments and public payroll and pension payments that eat up most of its spending, while it has limited ability to cut its capex plans. S&P believes that a weaker economy, characterized by a longer contraction, lower business confidence, and Petrobras' likely reduced investment amid lower international oil prices, could further hurt the state's fiscal profile. "We believe that given the city of Rio de Janeiro's high cash reserves, "average" budgetary flexibility, relatively high operating surplus, moderate debt levels, and strong credit culture, its creditworthiness should be stronger than Brazil's. The track record of the city's strong financial management and its high cash position in relation to financial obligations make the city's credit quality stronger than its national peers. As a result, we continue to rate the city one notch above the sovereign. Still, we believe that as Brazilian economy deteriorates, the city's economy and finances will suffer as well. Due to our expectation of economic contraction in 2015, we will continue performing stress tests to determine whether our ratings on the city can remain above those on the sovereign. At any point, if the city doesn't pass the stress, we could downgrade it," S&P said. OUTLOOK The negative outlooks on the states of Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Santa Catarina mostly reflect the outlook on Brazil because S&P don't believe these states could have a higher rating than the one on the sovereign, according to S&P's criteria. The negative outlook on the state of Rio de Janeiro reflects S&P's view that the state is likely to face higher fiscal deficits than its peers in the next two years amid a likely deeper and longer economic contraction, hampering its ability to cut its currently high fiscal deficits. In addition, S&P expects these states to continue facing fiscal and financing challenges during 2015 and 2016. Another downgrade is possible if these states' deficits after borrowing are consistently wider than S&P's expectations. The negative outlook on the city of Rio de Janeiro reflects S&P's belief that there is also greater than one-in-three likelihood of its downgrade if Brazil's deeper and longer economic contraction prevents the city from maintaining its rating above the sovereign's. Despite the city's "average" budgetary flexibility, S&P still believes that the links to the state and federal governments are strong because the city receives about 36% of its operating revenues from them. If S&P lowered the sovereign rating, it would lower the ratings on the city. Additionally, if the city, at any point, doesn't pass the stress test due to weaker liquidity or budgetary flexibility--as a result of limited ability to adjust expenditures under a prolonged recession period--S&P would no longer rate it above the FC rating on Brazil. Brazil's negative outlook reflects S&P's view that there is a greater than one-in-three likelihood that it could lower its ratings on Brazil again. S&P anticipates that within the next year a downgrade could stem in particular from a further deterioration of Brazil's fiscal position, or from potential key policy reversals given the fluid political dynamics, including a further lack of cohesion within the cabinet. A downgrade could also result from greater economic turmoil than S&P currently expects either due to governability issues or the weakened external environment. S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Brazil's political uncertainties and conditions for consistent policy execution were to improve across branches of government to staunch fiscal deterioration and strengthen GDP growth prospects. S&P expects that these improvements would support a quicker turnaround and could help Brazil exit from the current recession, facilitating improved fiscal performance and providing more room to maneuver in the face of economic shocks. In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected in the Ratings Score Snapshot. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action. RATINGS LIST Ratings Lowered To From State of Rio de Janeiro Issuer Credit Rating Global Scale BB/Neg/-- BB+/Neg./-- Brazilian National Scale brAA-/Neg./-- brAA+/Neg./-- State of Sao Paulo Issuer Credit Rating Global Scale BB+/Neg./-- BBB-/Neg./-- Brazilian National Scale brAA+/Neg./-- brAAA/ Neg./-- State of Minas Gerais Issuer Credit Rating Global Scal BB+/Neg./-- BBB-/ Neg./-- Brazilian National Scale brAA/Neg./-- brAAA/ Neg./-- Santa Catarina (State of) Issuer Credit Rating Global Scale BB+/Neg./-- BBB-/Neg./-- Brazilian National Scale brAA+/Neg./-- brAAA/Neg. /-- City of Rio de Janeiro Issuer Credit Rating Global Scale BBB-/Neg./A-3 BBB/Neg./A-2 Brazilian National Scale brAAA/Neg./-- brAAA/Stable/-- SUZANO PAPEL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IDR, Outlook Positive ------------------------------------------------------ Fitch Ratings has affirmed Suzano Papel e Celulose S.A.'s foreign currency and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'BB'. At the same time, Fitch has upgraded its national scale long-term rating to 'AA-(bra)' from 'A+(bra)'. The Rating Outlook for the corporate ratings is revised to Positive from Stable. The upgrade of the company's national scale rating was due to the marked improvement in the company's free cash flow (FCF) due to the depreciation of the Brazilian real during 2015, which has reduced the company's cost structure. Stronger cash flow has accelerated the deleveraging of Suzano's balance sheet post the start-up of the Maranhao pulp mill at a pace more rapid than originally projected. The Positive Rating Outlook for both the international and national scale ratings reflects Fitch's expectation that the company's free cash will remain strong during 2016. By the end of next year, Fitch expects Suzano's net leverage to be around 2.5x. An upgrade could occur if the company's uses its FCF to reduce gross debt levels to around BRL13 billion if the exchange rates is in the range of BRL3.5 to BRL3.75. KEY RATING DRIVERS Strong Business Position and Liquidity Position Suzano's ratings continue to reflect the company's leading position in printing and writing paper and paperboard in Brazil, and its position as the fifth largest producer of market pulp in the world. The ratings also incorporate Suzano's strong liquidity and comfortable debt amortization schedule, and the expectation that net leverage will be reduced during 2015 to 2017. Leverage Will Continue to Decline Suzano's net debt-to-EBITDA ratio for the latest 12 months (LTM) was 3.6x as of June 30, 2015, per Fitch's calculation, and should fall to 2.5x or below by the end of 2016. Historically, Suzano has operated with a higher level than its Latin America peer group, with an average net leverage ratio of 3.6x between 2008 and 2011, and 5.0x between 2012 and 2014. F itch's base case considers that the company will maintain capex in the next two years around USD500 million to USD600 million per year as the company scales back investments. Net pulp prices are projected to improve from around USD625 per ton in 2016 to USD675 per ton in 2018. If prices were USD100 per ton higher in 2016, the company's net leverage ratio would decline to around to 2.0x. Positive Credit Trends Fitch projects Suzano will lower its net debt by BRL2 billion to BRL10 billion by the end of 2017. As of June 30, 2015, the company had BRL14.7 billion of total debt and BRL2.9 billion of cash. Fitch expects Suzano to generate about BRL5 billion of EBITDA and BRL3 billion of funds from operations (FFO) in 2016. During 2015, the company benefited from the weakening of the Brazilian real versus the U.S. dollar and strong sales volumes from its new pulp mill (Maranhao). Suzano generated BRL3.3 billion of EBITDA, BRL2.7 billion of FFO and BRL663 million of FCF in the LTM ended June 2015. This compares with BRL2.4 billion of EBITDA, BRL1.8 billion of FFO and negative FCF of BRL8 million during 2014. Stronger operating cash flow and lower investments will contribute toward the company's debt reduction strategy. Solid Business Position Suzano is the leading producer of printing and writing paper in Brazil, as well as paperboard, with 1.3 million tons of annual production capacity. The company's strong market shares in uncoated printing and writing paper and in paperboard allow it to be a price leader in Brazil. With 3.4 million tons of market pulp capacity, Suzano is the fifth largest producer of market pulp in the world. Like other producers of hardwood pulp in Brazil, Suzano enjoys a production cost structure that is among the lowest in the world. This enables Suzano to generate positive cash flows during troughs in the pulp and paper cycle, ensuring its long-term competitiveness. Significant Forestry Holdings A key credit consideration that further enhances Suzano's credit profile is its ownership of about 1 million hectares of land, where the company developed about 522,000 hectares of eucalyptus plantations. The forestry assets are valued at BRL3.9 billion. Importantly, the nearly ideal conditions for growing trees in the region make these plantations extremely efficient by global standards and give the company a sustainable advantage in terms of cost of fiber and transportation costs between forest and mills. KEY ASSUMPTIONS Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Suzano include: -- Net pulp prices between USD575 and USD625 per ton during 2015-2017. -- Pulp sales volume of 3.4 million tons per year. -- Pulp cash cost of USD200/ton. -- A Brazilian real weaker than 3.2 BRL/USD. RATING SENSITIVITIES Future developments that may individually or collectively lead to a positive rating action includes: -- Material reduction in gross debt to close to BRL13 billion. -- Reduction in net leverage to levels consistently below 3.0x through the cycle. -- Higher than expected cash generation during 2015 and 2016. -- Additional proactive steps by the company to materially bolster its capital structure in the absence of high operating cash flow. -- A positive outlook for pulp prices in the next couple of years could also bolster the probability of positive rating actions. Future developments that may individually or collectively lead to a negative rating action includes: -- Weaker liquidity position. -- Increase in net leverage ratio to levels above 4.5x, considering pulp prices at USD600 per ton. -- Sharp deterioration of market conditions with significant reduction of pulp prices. -- A debt financed acquisition. LIQUIDITY Suzano has historically maintained a strong cash position. As of June 30, 2015, the company had BRL2.9 billion of cash and marketable securities. Liquidity covered short-term debt obligations by a ratio of 1.8x. Suzano has manageable debt maturities of BRL2.3 billion up to the end of 2016 and BRL1.3 billion in 2017. During the first half of 2015, Suzano prepaid about BRL2.7 billion of debt with BNDES and continued to extend its debt maturity profile with the issuance of USD600 million syndicated loan and BRL675 million Export Credit Note. FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS Fitch has taken these rating actions: Suzano -- Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) affirmed at 'BB'; -- Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'BB'; -- Long-term national scale rating upgraded to 'AA-(bra)' from 'A+(bra)'. Suzano Trading Ltd. -- USD650 million senior notes, due Jan. 23, 2021 and guaranteed by Suzano, affirmed at 'BB'. The Rating Outlook for the corporate ratings is revised to Positive from Stable. ========================== C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ========================== ATR HOLDING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report ------------------------------------------------ The shareholders of ATR Holding received on Sept. 8, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Richard Fear c/o Ryan Charles Telephone: (345) 814 7364 Facsimile: (345) 945 3902 P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111 Cayman Islands CHEYNE CDO I: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Sept. 21 ---------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Cheyne CDO I General Partner Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by Sept. 21, 2015, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Aug. 6, 2015. The company's liquidator is: Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited c/o Jo-Anne Maher Telephone: (345) 814-9255 Facsimile: (345) 949-4647 94 Solaris Avenue Camana Bay P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108 Cayman Islands FARADAY ADVISORS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report ----------------------------------------------------- The shareholders of Faraday Advisors Ltd. received on Sept. 9, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Amicorp Cayman Fiduciary Ltd c/o Daniella Skotnicki Ogier, Attorneys 89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay Grand Cayman KY1-9007 Cayman Islands Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876 Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877 GROVE CREDIT: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report ------------------------------------------------- The shareholders of Grove Credit Investments received on Sept. 9, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Grove Services International Limited c/o Daniella Skotnicki 89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay Grand Cayman KY1-9007 Cayman Islands Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876 Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877 KINKOUCHO HOLDING: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report ------------------------------------------------------ The shareholders of Kinkoucho Holding received on Sept. 8, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Richard Fear c/o Ryan Charles Telephone: (345) 814 7364 Facsimile: (345) 945 3902 P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111 Cayman Islands NEXUS ENERGY: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report ------------------------------------------------- The shareholder of Nexus Energy Partners Fund Ltd received on Aug. 28, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Nexus Asset Management LLC c/o Jonathan Turnham Ogier, Attorneys 89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay Grand Cayman KY1-9007 Cayman Islands Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876 Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877 NEXUS ENERGY SPC: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report ----------------------------------------------------- The shareholder of Nexus Energy Partners SPC Ltd received on Aug. 28, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Nexus Asset Management LLC c/o Jonathan Turnham Ogier, Attorneys 89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay Grand Cayman KY1-9007 Cayman Islands Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876 Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877 OC 527 OFFSHORE: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report ---------------------------------------------------- The shareholder of OC 527 Offshore Fund, Ltd. received on Sept. 8, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Nicola Cowan DMS Corporate Services Ltd. 89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay Grand Cayman KY1-9007 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 946 7665 Facsimile: (345) 949 2877 SAIREF LTD: Commences Liquidation Proceedings --------------------------------------------- On April 7, 2015, the members of Sairef Ltd. resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by April 27, 2015, will be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Harry J. Thompson Telephone: (345) 946-4111 Facsimile: (345) 946-4222 P.O. Box 32315 Grand Cayman KY1-1209 Cayman Islands SUNRISE MARINE: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report --------------------------------------------------- The shareholders of Sunrise Marine Ltd. received on Sept. 14, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Ian Slack 26 New Street, St. Helier Jersey JE2 3RA Telephone: + 44 (0) 1534 814814 Facsimile: + 44 (0) 1534 814815 TREMBLANT SELECT: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report ----------------------------------------------------- The shareholder of Tremblant Select Ltd received on Sept. 8, 2015, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Tremblant Select Capital LP c/o Daniella Skotnicki 89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay Grand Cayman KY1-9007 Cayman Islands Telephone: +1 (345) 949 9876 Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877 ======= P E R U ======= CONTINENTAL TRUSTEES LTD: S&P Lowers Rating on Notes to 'BB' ------------------------------------------------------------ Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various rating actions on 20 Peruvian structured finance transactions. Fifteen of the transactions are diversified payment rights (DPRs) securitizations backed by U.S. dollar-denominated Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) MT100 or MT200 series payment order messages, which are a product of the respective Peruvian bank's international financial operations. Four transactions are from BBVA Banco Continental: three are synthetic asset-backed securities (ABS) transactions that depend on S&P's rating on BBVA Banco Continental, and one is a residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transaction. The rating actions follow several downgrades and affirmations taken on Sept. 8, 2015, on Peruvian banks after Peru's Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) was revised. In S&P's view, domestic banks now face tougher operating conditions, which S&P believes weakened their financial profiles, notably their asset quality and capital and earnings. These combined effects have led to the downgrade of five banks. Standard & Poor's affirmed its ratings on three banks, reflecting their group or sovereign support, which offsets the impact of the higher economic and industry risks in Peru. The ratings and SPUR on the 15 series backed by DPRs were unaffected by the Sept. 8, 2015, lowering of S&P's global scale issuer credit ratings on their respective originator banks; however, one rating was lowered given that the originator's stand- alone credit profile was lowered further than its peers. The ratings and SPUR on these transactions reflect each bank's ability to generate the specific flow of receivables that are being securitized, the transactions' supportive structural features, and our view of the transactions' sovereign interference risk. The three ABS synthetic transactions have structures that mirror the credit risk of the underlying collateral's credit quality in the form of a participation interest in a senior loan (Continental Senior Trustees and Continental Senior Trustees II) and a subordinate loan (Continental Trustee Ltd.) issued by BBVA Banco Continental S.A. ('BBB/Stable/A-2'), which was downgraded. The RMBS notes it issued are backed by a pool of U.S. dollar- denominated fixed-rate mortgages on residential properties in Peru. Based on its good underlying pool performance and the available credit enhancement, and considering that the downgrade on BBVA Banco Continental did not affect the assessment as bank account provider, S&P affirmed its rating on the transaction. S&P will continue to monitor the ratings on these structured finance transactions and revise the ratings as necessary to reflect any changes in the transactions' underlying credit quality. RATINGS AFFIRMED CCR Inc. MT-100 Payment Rights Master Trust (Underlying collateral: future DPR receivables) Series Rating 2006-A A 2006-A (SPUR) A 2010-B A 2010-C A 2012-A A 2012-B A 2012-C A Continental DPR Finance Co. (Underlying collateral: future DPR receivables) Series Rating 2008-A A 2010-A A 2012-A A 2012-B A 2012-C A 2012-D A SBP DPR Finance Co. (Underlying collateral: future DPR receivables) Series Rating 2010-A A 2010-B A 2012-A A BBVA Banco Continental RMBS (Peru) (Underlying collateral: fixed-rate mortgages) Class Rating Sr. Notes BBB (sf) RATINGS LOWERED IBK DPR Securitizadora (Underlying collateral: future DPR receivables) Series Rating To From 2009-A A- A Continental Trustees Ltd. (Underlying collateral: synthetic) Class Rating To From Notes BB BB+ Continental Senior Trustees (Cayman) Ltd. (Underlying collateral: synthetic) Series Rating To From 2010 BBB BBB+ Continental Senior Trustees (Cayman) II Ltd. (Underlying collateral: synthetic) Series Rating To From 2011 BBB BBB+ CORPORACION LINDLEY: S&P Puts 'BB+' CCR on CreditWatch Positive --------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BB+' long-term corporate credit and issue-level ratings, on Peru-based Corporacion Lindley S.A.'s on CreditWatch with positive implications, following the announcement that Arca Continental S.A.B. de C.V. reached an agreement to acquire 53.16% of Corporacion Lindley's capital. The CreditWatch listing follows the announcement that Arca Continental S.A.B. de C.V. (mxAAA/Stable/--) reached an agreement to acquire 53.16% of voting shares in Corporacion Lindley S.A., from various members of the Lindley family that form its control group. Assuming the acquisition is completed, S&P could raise its ratings on Lindley depending on its assessment of the potential support from its new parent company. S&P does not expect substantial operating changes to Lindley following this acquisition but S&P believes it could benefit from both the potential synergies and Arca Continental's expertise in other countries of Latin America in the bottling industry. Additionally, S&P don't expect changes in the company's business or financial risk profiles. S&P expects the transaction to close during the fourth quarter of 2015, subject to the antitrust authority and Arca's shareholders general assembly approvals. S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch once the transaction is completed and it reviews Lindley's importance to and its expected integration within the new controlling group. Therefore, S&P could raise its long-term ratings on Lindley by at least one notch following the antitrust authority and Arca's shareholder general assembly approvals. If for some reason the transaction is not completed, S&P would affirm the ratings with a stable outlook. ==================== P U E R T O R I C O ==================== BTB CORP: Had Until Sept. 14 to File Ch. 11 Plan, Disclosures ------------------------------------------------------------- The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico, according to minutes of hearing held on Aug. 5, 2015, directed BTB Corporation to file the Chapter 11 Plan and explanatory Disclosure Statement by Sept. 14, 2015. The hearing on approval of the Disclosure Statement is scheduled for Oct. 28, 2015, at 9:00 a.m. About BTB Corporation BTB Corporation sought Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 15-03681) in Old San Juan, Puerto Rico, on May 17, 2015. Samuel Lizardi signed the petition as interim president. The Debtor disclosed total assets of $16.5 million and total liabilities of $13.2 million. BTB said it sought bankruptcy protection as it is unable to meet obligations as they mature, and creditors are threatening suit and have threatened to undertake steps to obtain possession of its assets. The Debtor tapped Alexis Fuentes Hernandez, Esq., at Fuentes Law Offices, LLC, as its counsel. HORNED DORSET: Bennazar Garcia Okayed to Handle State Court Suits ----------------------------------------------------------------- The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico authorized Horned Dorset Primavera Inc. to employ Bennazar, Garcia & Milian Law Firm as special counsel. The Debtor stated that as of the Petition Date, several complaints were pending in a state court in which the Debtor asserted affirmative defenses against the plaintiff's claims. The litigation in the cases were being handled as of the date of the petition by counsel Antonio Juan Bennazar, Esq., partner in Bennazar Garcia. The Debtor has determined that the prosecution of the valid claims would benefit the estate and decided to retain Mr. Bennazar to appear on its behalf and continue the litigation before the State Court Aguada Branch. The representation entails: (a) preparation of the necessary motions, answer, order, reports, memoranda of law or any other legal document related to the prosecution of the claim for damages before the State Court; and (b) appear before the State Court at any and all hearings, or any other court in which the Debtor asserts a claim interest or defense directly or indirectly related to the issues pending before the State Court. The firm has represented the Debtor for the past 30 years, thus is knowledgeable of all matters concerning the sale of the property to Inmobiliaria T & M Inc., the granting of the Right of Usufruct over said property. The hourly rates of the firm's personnel are: Partners $250 Associate Lawyers $125 Paralegals $50 The firm will also charge actual and necessary expenses incurred in the prosecution of the matters. To the best of the Debtor's knowledge, the firm is a "disinterested person" as that term is defined in Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code. About The Horned Dorset Primavera The Horned Dorset Primavera Inc. operates the Horned Dorset Primavera, a small luxury hotel located in northwestern Puerto Rico, two miles from the town of Rincon. The hotel -- http://www.horneddorset.net/-- is set among rolling hills at the edge of the beautiful Caribbean Sea and is known for reserved European service executed in an atmosphere unique in Puerto Rico and the award-winning Restaurant Aaron. The hotel is a member of Relais & Chateaux. The Horned Dorset Primavera Inc. commenced a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 15-03837) in Old San Juan, Puerto Rico on May 22, 2015. According to the docket, the Debtor's Chapter 11 plan is due Nov. 18, 2015. The Debtor has tapped Isabel M. Fullana, Esq., at Garcia Arregui & Fullana PSC, as counsel. PUERTO RICO: Fitch Expects to Cut Rating to 'C' on Restructuring ---------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch says the Puerto Rico Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan (FEGP) released Sept. 9 is another indication that the commonwealth plans to broadly restructure its debt, and all of its credits are at risk of restructuring. The government's direction and interactions with debtholders are highly dynamic, limiting the predictability of outcomes. The rating for all of the commonwealth debt rated by Fitch is 'CC', Rating Watch Negative, which indicates Fitch's view that default of some kind appears probable. As the commonwealth's restructuring plans become clearer, Fitch expects to downgrade to 'C' on a security-specific basis at the point that default pursuant to Fitch's rating definitions appears to be inevitable. Fitch's public finance ratings do not address the loss given default of the rated liability. The FEGP is the product of a working group that Puerto Rico's governor created this summer after he declared that the commonwealth's debt is unpayable in aggregate, without distinguishing among its numerous securities. The FEGP recommends that the commonwealth's advisors begin work on a voluntary exchange offer to its various creditors. Reducing the commonwealth's debt burden is one of the stated key objectives of the FEGP. The working group has drafted legislation that would require the commonwealth to submit a consolidated five- year FEGP by the end of the second quarter of fiscal 2016 to a new control board that would be created by the same legislation. Beyond debt restructuring, a significant number of the working group's proposals rely on action by the federal government. In Fitch's view, political challenges to action at the federal level and in the commonwealth's Legislature are likely and the outcome is uncertain. Following is the list of commonwealth credits rated by Fitch, all at 'CC' Rating Watch Negative: -- Commonwealth of Puerto Rico GO and GO-guaranteed bonds; -- Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA) senior and subordinate lien sales tax revenue bonds; -- Employees Retirement System of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (ERS) pension funding bonds; -- Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA) senior lien revenue bonds; -- Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) power revenue bonds. UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO: S&P Lowers Longterm Rating to 'CC' ------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term rating and underlying rating (SPUR) to 'CC' from 'CCC-' on the University of Puerto Rico (UPR) existing university system revenue bonds. Some of these bonds were issued by the Puerto Rico Industrial, Tourist, Educational, Medical, and Environmental Control Facilities Authority. In addition, S&P withdrew the stand-alone credit profile (SACP) on the university. S&P no longer considers UPR a government-related entity given the inability of the commonwealth to provide extraordinary support. The downgrade reflects the downgrade of the general obligation rating on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to CC/Negative. The rating on the university has moved in tandem with the commonwealth rating given the university's significant dependence on the commonwealth (about 68% of 2014 revenues). Although appropriations are not pledged to the bonds, they make up the largest portion of revenues available for operations. Any delay or reduction in appropriations could have a serious effect on the university's operations. The university system's revenue bonds are obligations of the University of Puerto Rico, secured primarily by a first lien on tuition and fees and certain other specifically pledged revenues. S&P views this as an unlimited student fee equivalent pledge. The negative outlook mirrors that on the general obligation bonds of Puerto Rico in that S&P could lower the rating on the university if the rating on Puerto Rico falls or if the state appropriation payment to the university is delayed or reduced such that operating liquidity is pressured. Given the negative outlook on Puerto Rico, S&P do not believe a positive rating action on the university is possible during the one-year outlook period. ================= X X X X X X X X X ================= * Large Companies With Insolvent Balance Sheets ----------------------------------------------- Total Total Shareholders Assets Equity Company Ticker (US$MM) (US$MM) ------- ------ --------- ------------ AGRENCO LTD AGRE 285996574 -543142756 AGRENCO LTD-BDR AGEN33 285996574 -543142756 AGRENCO LTD-BDR AGEN11 285996574 -543142756 ARTHUR LAN-DVD C ARLA11 11642255 -17154460 ARTHUR LAN-DVD P ARLA12 11642255 -17154460 ARTHUR LANGE ARLA3 11642255 -17154460 ARTHUR LANGE SA ALICON 11642255 -17154460 ARTHUR LANGE-PRF ARLA4 11642255 -17154460 ARTHUR LANGE-PRF ALICPN 11642255 -17154460 ARTHUR LANG-RC C ARLA9 11642255 -17154460 ARTHUR LANG-RC P ARLA10 11642255 -17154460 ARTHUR LANG-RT C ARLA1 11642255 -17154460 ARTHUR LANG-RT P ARLA2 11642255 -17154460 BALADARE BLDR3 159449535 -52990724 BATTISTELLA BTTL3 59711286 -33374425 BATTISTELLA-PREF BTTL4 59711286 -33374425 BATTISTELLA-RECE BTTL9 59711286 -33374425 BATTISTELLA-RECP BTTL10 59711286 -33374425 BATTISTELLA-RI P BTTL2 59711286 -33374425 BATTISTELLA-RIGH BTTL1 59711286 -33374425 BI CIA SECURITIZ BICS 38231827 -584102 BOMBRIL BMBBF 256955171 -24963790 BOMBRIL FPXE4 19416014 -489914853 BOMBRIL BOBR3 256955171 -24963790 BOMBRIL - RTS BOBR11 256955171 -24963790 BOMBRIL CIRIO SA BOBRON 256955171 -24963790 BOMBRIL CIRIO-PF BOBRPN 256955171 -24963790 BOMBRIL HOLDING FPXE3 19416014 -489914853 BOMBRIL SA-ADR BMBPY 256955171 -24963790 BOMBRIL SA-ADR BMBBY 256955171 -24963790 BOMBRIL-PREF BOBR4 256955171 -24963790 BOMBRIL-RGTS PRE BOBR2 256955171 -24963790 BOMBRIL-RIGHTS BOBR1 256955171 -24963790 BOTUCATU TEXTIL STRP3 27663605 -7174512 BOTUCATU-PREF STRP4 27663605 -7174512 BUETTNER BUET3 82872146 -36299304 BUETTNER SA BUETON 82872146 -36299304 BUETTNER SA-PRF BUETPN 82872146 -36299304 BUETTNER SA-RT P BUET2 82872146 -36299304 BUETTNER SA-RTS BUET1 82872146 -36299304 BUETTNER-PREF BUET4 82872146 -36299304 CAF BRASILIA CAFE3 160933830 -149277092 CAF BRASILIA-PRF CAFE4 160933830 -149277092 CAFE BRASILIA SA CSBRON 160933830 -149277092 CAFE BRASILIA-PR CSBRPN 160933830 -149277092 CEEE-D CEED3 1060724542 -3299108 CEEE-D CEED3B 1060724542 -3299108 CEEE-D-PREF CEED4 1060724542 -3299108 CEEE-D-PREF CEED4B 1060724542 -3299108 CELGPAR GPAR3 206352324 -953477771 CELGPAR-RTS GPAR11 206352324 -953477771 CIA PETROLIFERA MRLM3 377592596 -3014215 CIA PETROLIFERA MRLM3B 377592596 -3014215 CIA PETROLIFERA 1CPMON 377592596 -3014215 CIA PETROLIF-PRF MRLM4 377592596 -3014215 CIA PETROLIF-PRF MRLM4B 377592596 -3014215 CIA PETROLIF-PRF 1CPMPN 377592596 -3014215 CIMOB PARTIC SA GAFP3 44047412 -45669964 CIMOB PARTIC SA GAFON 44047412 -45669964 CIMOB PART-PREF GAFP4 44047412 -45669964 CIMOB PART-PREF GAFPN 44047412 -45669964 COBRASMA CBMA3 52538544 -1986594292 COBRASMA SA COBRON 52538544 -1986594292 COBRASMA SA-PREF COBRPN 52538544 -1986594292 COBRASMA-PREF CBMA4 52538544 -1986594292 D H B DHBI3 94806424 -188014922 D H B-PREF DHBI4 94806424 -188014922 DHB IND E COM DHBON 94806424 -188014922 DHB IND E COM-PR DHBPN 94806424 -188014922 DOC IMBITUBA IMBI3 103926124 -44366335 DOC IMBITUBA-RT 8218594Q 103926124 -44366335 DOC IMBITUBA-RT 9866923Q 103926124 -44366335 DOC IMBITUBA-RT IMBI1 103926124 -44366335 DOC IMBITUBA-RTC 8174503Q 103926124 -44366335 DOC IMBITUBA-RTP 8174507Q 103926124 -44366335 DOC IMBITUB-PREF IMBI4 103926124 -44366335 DOCA INVESTIMENT DOCA3 187044412 -204249587 DOCA INVEST-PREF DOCA4 187044412 -204249587 DOCAS IMBITUBA IMBION 103926124 -44366335 DOCAS IMBITUB-PR IMBIPN 103926124 -44366335 DOCAS SA DOCAON 187044412 -204249587 DOCAS SA-PREF DOCAPN 187044412 -204249587 DOCAS SA-RTS PRF DOCA2 187044412 -204249587 EBX BRASIL SA CTMN3 2341831724 -578077527 EDELAP-B ELAP 228302327 -21022097 EDELAP-B ELAPC 228302327 -21022097 EDELAP-B ELAPD 228302327 -21022097 ELEC ARG SA-PREF EASA6 1019816241 -75790649 ELEC ARGENT-ADR EASA 1019816241 -75790649 ELEC DE ARGE-ADR 1262Q 1019816241 -75790649 ELECTRICIDAD ARG 3447811Z 1019816241 -75790649 EMPRESA DISTRI-A 0122195D 228302327 -21022097 EMPRESA DISTRI-C 0122369D 228302327 -21022097 ESTRELA SA ESTR3 63482896 -99406808 ESTRELA SA ESTRON 63482896 -99406808 ESTRELA SA-PREF ESTR4 63482896 -99406808 ESTRELA SA-PREF ESTRPN 63482896 -99406808 F GUIMARAES FGUI3 11016542 -151840378 F GUIMARAES-PREF FGUI4 11016542 -151840378 FABRICA RENAUX FTRX3 66603695 -76419246 FABRICA RENAUX FRNXON 66603695 -76419246 FABRICA RENAUX-P FTRX4 66603695 -76419246 FABRICA RENAUX-P FRNXPN 66603695 -76419246 FABRICA TECID-RT FTRX1 66603695 -76419246 FER HAGA-PREF HAGA4 15936122 -26674218 FERRAGENS HAGA HAGAON 15936122 -26674218 FERRAGENS HAGA-P HAGAPN 15936122 -26674218 FERREIRA GUIMARA FGUION 11016542 -151840378 FERREIRA GUIM-PR FGUIPN 11016542 -151840378 FORJA TAURUS FJTA11 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS FJTA12 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS FORJF 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS FJTA3 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS-PRF FORZF 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS-PRF FJTA4 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS-RCT 1272182D 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS-RCT 1272184D 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS-RCT 1304888D 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS-RCT 1304790D 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS-RTS 1272180D 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS-RTS 1272181D 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS-RTS 1304881D 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS-RTS 1304791D 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS-RTS FJTA2 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS-RTS FJTA1 315868563 -18371045 FORJA TAURUS-RTS FJTA10 315868563 -18371045 FORJAS TAURUS SA TAUSON 315868563 -18371045 FORJAS TAURUS-PR TAUSPN 315868563 -18371045 GOL GOLL3 3173611977 -465114406 GOL PREF - RCT 1303123D 3173611977 -465114406 GOL PREF - RTS 1303121D 3173611977 -465114406 GOL PREF - RTS GOLL2 3173611977 -465114406 GOL-ADR GOL 3173611977 -465114406 GOL-ADR GOQ 3173611977 -465114406 GOL-ADR GOLN 3173611977 -465114406 GOL-PREF GOLL4 3173611977 -465114406 GOL-RCT 0113335D 3173611977 -465114406 GOL-RCT 0113338D 3173611977 -465114406 GOL-RCT GOLL9 3173611977 -465114406 GOL-RCT 1003238D 3173611977 -465114406 GOL-RT 0113333D 3173611977 -465114406 GOL-RT 0113334D 3173611977 -465114406 GOL-RT GOLL1 3173611977 -465114406 GOL-RT 1003237D 3173611977 -465114406 GRADIENTE ELETR IGBON 183430930 -135324913 GRADIENTE EL-PRA IGBAN 183430930 -135324913 GRADIENTE EL-PRB IGBBN 183430930 -135324913 GRADIENTE EL-PRC IGBCN 183430930 -135324913 GRADIENTE-PREF A IGBR5 183430930 -135324913 GRADIENTE-PREF B IGBR6 183430930 -135324913 GRADIENTE-PREF C IGBR7 183430930 -135324913 HAGA HAGA3 15936122 -26674218 HOPI HARI SA PQTM3 135437870 -15815342 HOPI HARI-PREF PQTM4 135437870 -15815342 HOTEIS OTHON SA HOOT3 179057269 -20332808 HOTEIS OTHON SA HOTHON 179057269 -20332808 HOTEIS OTHON-PRF HOOT4 179057269 -20332808 HOTEIS OTHON-PRF HOTHPN 179057269 -20332808 IGB ELETRONICA IGBR3 183430930 -135324913 IGUACU CAFE IGUA3 190073766 -74308212 IGUACU CAFE IGCSON 190073766 -74308212 IGUACU CAFE IGUCF 190073766 -74308212 IGUACU CAFE-PR A IGUA5 190073766 -74308212 IGUACU CAFE-PR A IGCSAN 190073766 -74308212 IGUACU CAFE-PR A IGUAF 190073766 -74308212 IGUACU CAFE-PR B IGUA6 190073766 -74308212 IGUACU CAFE-PR B IGCSBN 190073766 -74308212 IMPSAT FIBER NET IMPTQ 535007008 -17164978 IMPSAT FIBER NET 330902Q 535007008 -17164978 IMPSAT FIBER NET XIMPT 535007008 -17164978 IMPSAT FIBER-$US IMPTD 535007008 -17164978 IMPSAT FIBER-BLK IMPTB 535007008 -17164978 IMPSAT FIBER-C/E IMPTC 535007008 -17164978 IMPSAT FIBER-CED IMPT 535007008 -17164978 INEPAR INEP3 832445178 -356470593 INEPAR BONUS B INEP12 832445178 -356470593 INEPAR SA INPRON 832445178 -356470593 INEPAR SA-PREF INPRPN 832445178 -356470593 INEPAR-COM DVD INEP11 832445178 -356470593 INEPAR-PREF INEP4 832445178 -356470593 INEPAR-PRF DVD INEP13 832445178 -356470593 INEPAR-RCT ORD 3697790Q 832445178 -356470593 INEPAR-RCT ORD INEP9 832445178 -356470593 INEPAR-RCT PREF 3697794Q 832445178 -356470593 INEPAR-RCT PREF INEP10 832445178 -356470593 INEPAR-RT ORD 3697782Q 832445178 -356470593 INEPAR-RT ORD INEP1 832445178 -356470593 INEPAR-RT PREF 3697786Q 832445178 -356470593 INEPAR-RT PREF INEP2 832445178 -356470593 INPAR SA 0614469D 472874908 -9626316 INPAR SA 0614470D 472874908 -9626316 INPAR SA INPR3 472874908 -9626316 INPAR SA INPR1 472874908 -9626316 INPAR SA INPR9 472874908 -9626316 INPAR-S GDR REGS INASL 472874908 -9626316 INVERS ELEC BUEN IEBAA 213542509 -68439920 INVERS ELEC BUEN IEBAB 213542509 -68439920 INVERS ELEC BUEN IEBA 213542509 -68439920 KARSTEN CTKCF 91824644 -28389070 KARSTEN CTKON 91824644 -28389070 KARSTEN SA CTKA3 91824644 -28389070 KARSTEN SA - RCT CTKA9 91824644 -28389070 KARSTEN SA - RCT CTKA10 91824644 -28389070 KARSTEN SA - RTS CTKA1 91824644 -28389070 KARSTEN SA - RTS CTKA2 91824644 -28389070 KARSTEN-PREF CTKPF 91824644 -28389070 KARSTEN-PREF CTKA4 91824644 -28389070 KARSTEN-PREF CTKPN 91824644 -28389070 KOSMOS COMERCIO LOAR4 39089446 -2523382189 LAEP INVES-BDR B 0163599D 222902269 -255311026 LAEP INVESTMEN-B 0122427D 222902269 -255311026 LAEP INVESTMENTS LEAP 222902269 -255311026 LAEP-BDR MILK33 222902269 -255311026 LAEP-BDR MILK11 222902269 -255311026 LOJAS ARAPUA LOAR3 39089446 -2523382189 LOJAS ARAPUA LOARON 39089446 -2523382189 LOJAS ARAPUA-GDR 3429T 39089446 -2523382189 LOJAS ARAPUA-GDR LJPSF 39089446 -2523382189 LOJAS ARAPUA-PRF LOARPN 39089446 -2523382189 LOJAS ARAPUA-PRF 52353Z 39089446 -2523382189 LUPATECH SA LUPA3 301912839 -18027616 LUPATECH SA LUPTF 301912839 -18027616 LUPATECH SA LUPAF 301912839 -18027616 LUPATECH SA LUPTQ 301912839 -18027616 LUPATECH SA -RCT LUPA9 301912839 -18027616 LUPATECH SA-ADR LUPAY 301912839 -18027616 LUPATECH SA-ADR LUPAQ 301912839 -18027616 LUPATECH SA-ADR LUPAD 301912839 -18027616 LUPATECH SA-RT LUPA11 301912839 -18027616 LUPATECH SA-RTS 1041054D 301912839 -18027616 LUPATECH SA-RTS LUPA1 301912839 -18027616 MANGELS INDL MGEL3 134962177 -67749528 MANGELS INDL SA MISAON 134962177 -67749528 MANGELS INDL-PRF MGIRF 134962177 -67749528 MANGELS INDL-PRF MGEL4 134962177 -67749528 MANGELS INDL-PRF MISAPN 134962177 -67749528 MET DUQUE DUQE3 75039127 -2847420 MET DUQUE MDUON 75039127 -2847420 MET DUQUE-PREF DUQE4 75039127 -2847420 MET DUQUE-PREF MDUPN 75039127 -2847420 METROGAS SA MGAI 395437653 -33187927 METROGAS SA-A 153255Z 395437653 -33187927 METROGAS SA-C 153263Z 395437653 -33187927 METROGAS-ADR MGS 395437653 -33187927 METROGAS-ADR MGSA 395437653 -33187927 METROGAS-B MGSBF 395437653 -33187927 METROGAS-B METR 395437653 -33187927 METROGAS-B METRC 395437653 -33187927 METROGAS-B METRD 395437653 -33187927 METROGAS-B MGSB 395437653 -33187927 METROGAS-B BLOCK METRB 395437653 -33187927 MINUPAR MNPR3 70200522 -79362709 MINUPAR SA MNPRON 70200522 -79362709 MINUPAR SA-PREF MNPRPN 70200522 -79362709 MINUPAR-PREF MNPR4 70200522 -79362709 MINUPAR-RCT 9314634Q 70200522 -79362709 MINUPAR-RCT 0599564D 70200522 -79362709 MINUPAR-RCT MNPR9 70200522 -79362709 MINUPAR-RT 9314542Q 70200522 -79362709 MINUPAR-RT 0599562D 70200522 -79362709 MINUPAR-RTS MNPR1 70200522 -79362709 MMX MINERACA-GDR MMXMY 135425661 -367990919 MMX MINERACA-GDR 0567931D 135425661 -367990919 MMX MINERACA-GDR 3M11 135425661 -367990919 MMX MINERACA-GDR MMXMD 135425661 -367990919 MMX MINERACAO TRES3 135425661 -367990919 MMX MINERACAO MMXCF 135425661 -367990919 MMX MINERACAO MMXM11 135425661 -367990919 MMX MINERACAO MMXXF 135425661 -367990919 MMX MINERACAO MMXM3 135425661 -367990919 MMX MINERACAO-RT 4111484Q 135425661 -367990919 MMX MINERACAO-RT 0626050D 135425661 -367990919 MMX MINERACA-RCT 4111488Q 135425661 -367990919 MMX MINERACA-RCT 0626051D 135425661 -367990919 MMX MINERACA-RCT MMXM9 135425661 -367990919 MMX MINERACA-RTS MMXM1 135425661 -367990919 MORIXE HERM-5 VT MORI5 19006540 -928834 MORIXE HERMAN-BL MORIB 19006540 -928834 MORIXE HERMANOS MORI 19006540 -928834 MORIXE HERMANOS MORID 19006540 -928834 MORIXE HERMANOS MORIC 19006540 -928834 NOVA AMERICA SA NOVA3 21287489 -183535526 NOVA AMERICA SA NOVA3B 21287489 -183535526 NOVA AMERICA SA NOVAON 21287489 -183535526 NOVA AMERICA SA 1NOVON 21287489 -183535526 NOVA AMERICA-PRF NOVA4 21287489 -183535526 NOVA AMERICA-PRF NOVA4B 21287489 -183535526 NOVA AMERICA-PRF NOVAPN 21287489 -183535526 NOVA AMERICA-PRF 1NOVPN 21287489 -183535526 OL PREF - RCT GOLL10 3173611977 -465114406 OSX BRASIL - RTS 0701756D 2341831724 -578077527 OSX BRASIL - RTS 0701757D 2341831724 -578077527 OSX BRASIL - RTS 0812903D 2341831724 -578077527 OSX BRASIL - RTS 0812904D 2341831724 -578077527 OSX BRASIL - RTS OSXB1 2341831724 -578077527 OSX BRASIL - RTS OSXB9 2341831724 -578077527 OSX BRASIL SA OSXB3 2341831724 -578077527 OSX BRASIL SA EBXB3 2341831724 -578077527 OSX BRASIL SA OSXRF 2341831724 -578077527 OSX BRASIL S-GDR OSXRY 2341831724 -578077527 PADMA INDUSTRIA LCSA4 388720096 -213641152 PARMALAT LCSA3 388720096 -213641152 PARMALAT BRASIL LCSAON 388720096 -213641152 PARMALAT BRAS-PF LCSAPN 388720096 -213641152 PARMALAT BR-RT C LCSA5 388720096 -213641152 PARMALAT BR-RT P LCSA6 388720096 -213641152 PARQUE TEM-DV CM PQT5 135437870 -15815342 PARQUE TEM-DV PF PQT6 135437870 -15815342 PARQUE TEM-RCT C PQTM9 135437870 -15815342 PARQUE TEM-RCT P PQTM10 135437870 -15815342 PARQUE TEM-RT CM PQTM1 135437870 -15815342 PARQUE TEM-RT PF PQTM2 135437870 -15815342 PET MANG-RECEIPT 0229292Q 146857128 -409610413 PET MANG-RECEIPT 0229296Q 146857128 -409610413 PET MANG-RECEIPT RPMG9 146857128 -409610413 PET MANG-RECEIPT RPMG10 146857128 -409610413 PET MANG-RIGHTS 3678565Q 146857128 -409610413 PET MANG-RIGHTS 3678569Q 146857128 -409610413 PET MANG-RT 4115360Q 146857128 -409610413 PET MANG-RT 4115364Q 146857128 -409610413 PET MANG-RT 0229249Q 146857128 -409610413 PET MANG-RT 0229268Q 146857128 -409610413 PET MANG-RT RPMG2 146857128 -409610413 PET MANG-RT 0848424D 146857128 -409610413 PET MANG-RTS 1227980D 146857128 -409610413 PET MANGUINH-PRF RPMG4 146857128 -409610413 PET MANGUINH-RTS RPMG1 146857128 -409610413 PETRO MANGUINHOS RPMG3 146857128 -409610413 PETRO MANGUINHOS MANGON 146857128 -409610413 PETRO MANGUIN-PF MANGPN 146857128 -409610413 PILMAIQUEN PILMAIQ 165119822 -32646104 PORTX OPERACOES PRTX3 976769385 -9407990 PORTX OPERA-GDR PXTPY 976769385 -9407990 PUYEHUE PUYEH 17660617 -6652295 PUYEHUE RIGHT PUYEHUOS 17660617 -6652295 RB CAPITAL RBCS3B 13996658 -815 RECRUSUL RCSL3 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL - RCT 4529789Q 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL - RCT 4529793Q 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL - RCT 0163582D 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL - RCT 0163583D 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL - RCT 0614675D 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL - RCT 0614676D 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL - RCT RCSL10 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL - RT 4529781Q 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL - RT 4529785Q 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL - RT 0163579D 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL - RT 0163580D 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL - RT 0614673D 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL - RT 0614674D 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL SA RESLON 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL SA-PREF RESLPN 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL SA-RCT RCSL9 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL SA-RTS RCSL1 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL SA-RTS RCSL2 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL-BON RT RCSL11 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL-BON RT RCSL12 14029394 -32749735 RECRUSUL-PREF RCSL4 14029394 -32749735 RENAUXVIEW SA TXRX3 35618784 -79358528 RENAUXVIEW SA-PF TXRX4 35618784 -79358528 RIMET REEM3 103098359 -185417651 RIMET REEMON 103098359 -185417651 RIMET-PREF REEM4 103098359 -185417651 RIMET-PREF REEMPN 103098359 -185417651 RIOSULENSE SA RSUL3 59211114 -1322540 RIOSULENSE SA RSULON 59211114 -1322540 RIOSULENSE SA-PR RSUL4 59211114 -1322540 RIOSULENSE SA-PR RSULPN 59211114 -1322540 SANESALTO SNST3 16282468 -4707586 SANSUY SNSY3 142208953 -165790983 SANSUY SA SNSYON 142208953 -165790983 SANSUY SA-PREF A SNSYAN 142208953 -165790983 SANSUY SA-PREF B SNSYBN 142208953 -165790983 SANSUY-PREF A SNSY5 142208953 -165790983 SANSUY-PREF B SNSY6 142208953 -165790983 SCHLOSSER SCLO3 35479692 -46000438 SCHLOSSER SA SCHON 35479692 -46000438 SCHLOSSER SA-PRF SCHPN 35479692 -46000438 SCHLOSSER-PREF SCLO4 35479692 -46000438 SNIAFA SA SNIA 11229696 -2670545 SNIAFA SA-B SDAGF 11229696 -2670545 SNIAFA SA-B SNIA5 11229696 -2670545 STAROUP SA STARON 27663605 -7174512 STAROUP SA-PREF STARPN 27663605 -7174512 TEC TOY SA-PF B TOYB6 12406257 -2797000 TEC TOY SA-PREF TOYDF 12406257 -2797000 TEC TOY SA-PREF TOYB5 12406257 -2797000 TEC TOY-RCT 7335626Q 12406257 -2797000 TEC TOY-RCT 7335630Q 12406257 -2797000 TEC TOY-RCT 1254572D 12406257 -2797000 TEC TOY-RCT 1254573D 12406257 -2797000 TEC TOY-RT 7335610Q 12406257 -2797000 TEC TOY-RT 7335614Q 12406257 -2797000 TEC TOY-RT 1254570D 12406257 -2797000 TEC TOY-RT 1254571D 12406257 -2797000 TECTOY TOYB3 12406257 -2797000 TECTOY TOYB13 12406257 -2797000 TECTOY - RCT TOYB9 12406257 -2797000 TECTOY - RTS TOYB1 12406257 -2797000 TECTOY - RTS TOYB2 12406257 -2797000 TECTOY SA TOYBON 12406257 -2797000 TECTOY SA-PREF TOYBPN 12406257 -2797000 TECTOY-PF-RTS5/6 TOYB11 12406257 -2797000 TECTOY-PREF TOYB4 12406257 -2797000 TECTOY-RCPT PF B TOYB12 12406257 -2797000 TEKA TKTQF 271521130 -360176693 TEKA TEKA3 271521130 -360176693 TEKA TEKAON 271521130 -360176693 TEKA-ADR TEKAY 271521130 -360176693 TEKA-ADR TKTPY 271521130 -360176693 TEKA-ADR TKTQY 271521130 -360176693 TEKA-PREF TKTPF 271521130 -360176693 TEKA-PREF TEKA4 271521130 -360176693 TEKA-PREF TEKAPN 271521130 -360176693 TEKA-RCT TEKA9 271521130 -360176693 TEKA-RCT TEKA10 271521130 -360176693 TEKA-RTS TEKA1 271521130 -360176693 TEKA-RTS TEKA2 271521130 -360176693 TELEBRAS SA TELB3 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS SA TLBRON 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS SA TBASF 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS SA-PREF TELB4 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS SA-PREF TLBRPN 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS SA-RCT TELB9 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS SA-RT 0250949D 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS/W-I-ADR TBH-W 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-ADR TBAPY 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-ADR TBRAY 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-ADR TBH 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-ADR TBX 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-ADR RTB 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-ADR TBASY 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-BLOCK TELB30 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-CED C/E TEL4C 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-CEDE BL RCT4B 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-CEDE PF RCTB4 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-CEDE PF RCT4C 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-CEDE PF RCT4D 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-CEDE PF TELB4 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-CEDEA $ TEL4D 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-CM RCPT RCTB31 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-CM RCPT TELE31 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-CM RCPT TBRTF 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-CM RCPT RCTB32 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-CM RCPT RCTB30 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-COM RT 0250948D 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-COM RTS TELB1 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-PF BLCK TELB40 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-PF RCPT CBRZF 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-PF RCPT RCTB41 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-PF RCPT TELE41 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-PF RCPT RCTB42 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-PF RCPT RCTB40 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-PF RCPT TBAPF 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-PF RCPT TLBRUP 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-RCT RCTB33 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-RCT PRF TELB10 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-RECEIPT TLBRUO 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-RTS CMN RCTB1 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-RTS CMN TCLP1 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-RTS PRF RCTB2 628229764 -46558625 TELEBRAS-RTS PRF TLCP2 628229764 -46558625 TELECOMUNICA-ADR 81370Z 628229764 -46558625 TEXTEIS RENA-RCT TXRX9 35618784 -79358528 TEXTEIS RENA-RCT TXRX10 35618784 -79358528 TEXTEIS RENAU-RT TXRX1 35618784 -79358528 TEXTEIS RENAU-RT TXRX2 35618784 -79358528 TEXTEIS RENAUX RENXON 35618784 -79358528 TEXTEIS RENAUX RENXPN 35618784 -79358528 TRESSEM PART SA 1TSSON 135425661 -367990919 VARIG PART EM SE VPSC3 83017828 -495721697 VARIG PART EM TR VPTA3 49432119 -399290357 VARIG PART EM-PR VPTA4 49432119 -399290357 VARIG PART EM-PR VPSC4 83017828 -495721697 VARIG SA VAGV3 966298048 -4695211008 VARIG SA VARGON 966298048 -4695211008 VARIG SA-PREF VAGV4 966298048 -4695211008 VARIG SA-PREF VARGPN 966298048 -4695211008 VIVER INCORPORAD VIVR3 472874908 -9626316 VIVER INCORP-RCT VIVR9 472874908 -9626316 VIVER INCORP-RTS VIVR1 472874908 -9626316 VIVER INCORP-RTS VIVR11 472874908 -9626316 VIVER-S GDR 144A INAAL 472874908 -9626316 WETZEL SA MWET3 71188964 -21819177 WETZEL SA MWELON 71188964 -21819177 WETZEL SA-PREF MWET4 71188964 -21819177 WETZEL SA-PREF MWELPN 71188964 -21819177 WIEST WISA3 34107195 -126993682 WIEST SA WISAON 34107195 -126993682 WIEST SA-PREF WISAPN 34107195 -126993682 WIEST-PREF WISA4 34107195 -126993682 *********** S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2015. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-362-8552. * * * End of Transmission * * *