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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                     L A T I N   A M E R I C A

            Friday, August 14, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 160


                            Headlines



B R A Z I L

AGENCIA DE FOMENTO: Moody's Cuts LT LC Issuer Rating to Ba1
BANCO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO: Moody's Cuts LT LC Issuer Rating to Ba1
BRAZIL: Moody's Cuts Government Bond Rating to 'Baa3'
BRAZIL: Trade Ties to China Add to Woes for Economy Under Siege
COMPANHIA DE SANEAMENTO: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' GS Issuer Rating

ITAU UNIBANCO: Moody's Cuts Global LC Issuer Rating to 'Ba1'
MGI-MINAS: Moody's Reviews Ba1(sf) Sr. Debt. Rating for Downgrade
MINAS GERAIS: Moody's Cuts Global Scale Rating to Ba1
OAS SA: Judge Sentences Executives in Corruption Scandal
STATE OF PARANA: Moody's Cuts Global Scale Rating to Ba1


C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S

ANTHRACITE BALANCED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 31
JORVI INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 24
LADNER INVESTMENTS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
ONE TREE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 24
PINEFIELD LIMITED: Members' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 24

QUANTITATIVE GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 24
ROUND TABLE INTEREST: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 22
S.P. HEDIN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
TCA INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 24
YORK BRAZIL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 23


C H I L E

CORPORACION NACIONAL: Contract Workers at Agree to End Strike


D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C

DOMINICAN REP: Truckers Demand Safety in Haiti Amid Walkouts


E C U A D O R

ECUADOR REPUBLIC: S&P Cuts LT Foreign Sov. Credit Rating to 'B'


J A M A I C A

JAMAICA: To Get $130-Million IDB Loan for Economic Growth Programs


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B R A Z I L
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AGENCIA DE FOMENTO: Moody's Cuts LT LC Issuer Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda has downgraded the long-term local
currency issuer rating of Agencia de Fomento do Parana S.A.
(Fomento Parana) to Ba1 from Baa3, and its short-term local
currency issuer rating to Not Prime from Prime-3. Moody's has also
downgraded the entity's long-term Brazilian national scale issuer
rating to Aa2.br, from Aa1.br, and affirmed the short-term
Brazilian national scale issuer rating of BR-1. The baseline
credit assessment (BCA) of ba2 assigned to Fomento Parana remained
unchanged. The outlook for the global scale issuer rating remained
negative.

This rating action follows the downgrade of the State of Parana's
long-term issuer rating. For more information, please refer to
Moody's August 12, 2015 press release, "Moody's America Latina
downgrades the ratings of the Brazilian states of Parana,
Maranhao, and the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro."

The primary reason for the downgrade of the rating assigned to the
state government is Moody's August 11, 2015 downgrade of Brazil's
government bond rating to Baa3 from Baa2, its senior unsecured
debt rating to Baa3 from Baa2, and the senior unsecured shelf
rating to (P)Baa3 from (P)Baa2. The rating agency also changed
Brazil's foreign currency country ceilings as part of this rating
action. The foreign currency bond ceiling went to Baa2 from Baa1,
while the foreign currency deposit ceiling went to Baa3 from Baa2.
(For more information on this downgrade, please refer to the press
release, "Moody's downgrades Brazil's bond rating to Baa3 from
Baa2, outlook changed to stable.")

The following ratings assigned to Fomento Parana were downgraded:

-- Long-term local currency issuer rating: to Ba1 from Baa3, with
negative outlook;

--- Short-term local currency issuer rating: to Not Prime from
Prime-3;

-- Long-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating: to Aa2.br
from Aa1.br.

The following rating assigned to Fomento Parana was affirmed:

-- Short-term Brazilian national scale issuer rating of BR-1.

RATING RATIONALE

The downgrade of Fomento Parana's local currency issuer rating to
Ba1 from Baa3 follows the downgrade of the State of Parana's
global local currency rating to Ba1 from Baa3. The entity's Ba1
rating is constrained by the rating of the regional government.
The negative outlook for Fomento Parana's rating is thus aligned
to the negative outlook on the regional government's rating.

The ba2 BCA reflects Fomento Parana's unsupported credit risk
profile, which is underpinned by a small regional franchise
providing medium to long-term financing to municipalities in
Parana, a strategic profile fully aligned to the state
government's development plans. The entity has solid financial
fundamentals supported by strong credit risk guidelines and low
track record of losses with non-performing loan ratio historically
below 0.5%, despite its relative concentrated loan book.

Agencia de Fomento do Parana S.A. is headquartered in Curitiba,
Brazil and had assets of BRL1.52 billion (USD572.7 million) and
equity of BRL1.393 billion (USD524 million) as of December 31,
2014.

The last rating action on Agencia de Fomento do Parana S.A. was on
September 22, 2014, when Moody's America Latina changed the rating
outlook to negative because of the negative outlook for the
ratings on the State of Parana.


BANCO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO: Moody's Cuts LT LC Issuer Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda has downgraded the long-term local
currency issuer ratings on Banco de Desenvolvimento de Minas
Gerais S.A. (BDMG) to Ba1 from Baa3, and its short-term local
currency issuer ratings to Not Prime from Prime-3, following the
downgrade of the issuer rating assigned to its regional
government, the State of Minas Gerais, to Ba1, from Baa3. The
outlook on the rating was changed to stable, from negative, in
line with the stable outlook of the rating of State of Minas
Gerais. At the same time, Moody's also affirmed BDMG's Brazilian
long-term national scale issuer rating at Aa1.br and short-term
national scale issuer rating at BR-1. The baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of ba1 assigned to BDMG remained unchanged.

The primary reason for the downgrade of the state government
ratings is Moody's August 11, 2015 downgrade of Brazil's
government bond rating to Baa3 from Baa2, its senior unsecured
debt rating to Baa3 from Baa2, and the senior unsecured shelf
rating to (P)Baa3 from (P)Baa2. The rating agency also changed
Brazil's foreign currency country ceilings as part of this rating
action. The foreign currency bond ceiling went to Baa2 from Baa1,
while the foreign currency deposit ceiling went to Baa3 from Baa2.
(For more information on this downgrade, please refer to the press
release, "Moody's downgrades Brazil's bond rating to Baa3 from
Baa2, outlook changed to stable.")

The following ratings assigned to Banco de Desenvolvimento de
Minas Gerais were downgraded:

Long-term local currency issuer rating: to Ba1 from Baa3, stable
outlook

Short-term local currency issuer rating: to Not Prime from Prime-3

The following ratings assigned to Banco de Desenvolvimento de
Minas Gerais were affirmed:

Brazilian long-term national scale issuer rating: Aa1.br

Brazilian short-term national scale issuer rating: BR-1

RATING RATIONALE

The downgrade of BDMG's local currency issuer rating to Ba1 from
Baa3 follows the downgrade of the State of Minas Gerais' global
local-currency rating to Ba1 from Baa3. The entity's Ba1 rating is
constrained by the rating on the regional government. The stable
outlook for BDMG's rating is thus aligned to the stable outlook
for the regional government's rating.

The ba1 unsupported credit risk profile remained unchanged and
reflects a relatively modest franchise, but one that is largely
restricted to a prosperous regional market, the State of Minas
Gerais, that represents roughly 10% of Brazil's GDP and about 20%
of Brazil's trade balance. BDMG's primary role has been to lend
directly to private sector companies and municipalities in the
state, primarily sourced from BNDES (Baa3 stable). BDMG's
consistent expansion of the bank's lending activities and client
base over the past two years has been supported by disciplined
risk guidelines, though non-performing loans ratio increased over
the past years, reaching 1% in 2014, still well below the system
average of 3%. Moody's expects BDMG's credit costs to increase
over the next quarters, affected by its high sector concentration
in the auto and cement industries, two important segments in the
state of Minas Gerais and which are highly vulnerable by the weak
economic environment. Capitalization is adequate to absorb
increasing risk environment in 2015 and 2016.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP

Positive rating influences are limited at this point following the
downgrade of the regional local government's ratings.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN

The main negative pressure on the rating comes from the
deterioration of BDMG's asset quality indicators resulting from
the weak economic environment and rising risks related to
companies' repayment capacity. Downward risks would also arise
from events that reduce BDMG's regional importance, perhaps from
intensified competition. These drivers would affect future
earnings generation and capital replenishment ability.

Banco de Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais S.A. is headquartered in
Belo Horizonte, Brazil, and had assets of BRL6.45 billion (USD2.43
billion) and equity of BRL1.73 billion (USD652 million) as of
December 31, 2014.


BRAZIL: Moody's Cuts Government Bond Rating to 'Baa3'
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has today downgraded Brazil's government
bond rating to Baa3 from Baa2. The rating agency also changed the
outlook on the rating to stable from negative

The drivers of the rating change are:

1. Weaker-than expected economic performance, the related upward
    trend in government expenditures and lack of political
    consensus on fiscal reforms will prevent the authorities from
    achieving primary surpluses high enough to arrest and reverse
    the rising debt trend this year and next, and challenge their
    ability to do so thereafter.

2. As a result, government debt burden and debt affordability
    will continue to deteriorate materially in 2015 and 2016
    relative to the rating agency's prior expectations, to levels
    materially worse than Brazil's Baa-rated peers. Moody's
    expects the rising debt burden to stabilize only towards the
    end of this administration.

In Moody's view, Brazil retains a number of credit strengths that
are reflected in its Baa3 rating: its ability to withstand
external financial shocks given ample international reserve
buffers; a government balance sheet with relatively limited
exposure to foreign currency debt and non-resident debt holdings
compared with its peers; and a large and diversified economy.

In addition to downgrading Brazil's government bond rating,
Moody's also downgraded its senior unsecured debt rating to Baa3
from Baa2, and the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Baa3 from
(P)Baa2. The rating agency also changed Brazil's foreign currency
country ceilings as part of this rating action. The foreign
currency bond ceiling went to Baa2 from Baa1, while the foreign
currency deposit ceiling went to Baa3 from Baa2. The local
currency country ceilings were not affected.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE DOWNGRADE TO Baa3

FIRST DRIVER - WEAK ECONOMIC GROWTH, INCREASED GOVERNMENT SPENDING
AND A LACK OF POLITICAL CONSENSUS WILL LIMIT THE AUTHORITIES'
ABILITY TO ARREST AND REVERSE DEFICIT AND DEBT TRENDS

It will be challenging for Brazil to achieve and sustain improving
fiscal trends. Last month the government revised its macroeconomic
projections. The numbers confirm that the authorities have been
unable to deliver primary surpluses large enough to prevent an
increase in debt ratios in 2015-16, and face significant
challenges in achieving the targets set in the medium-term fiscal
program. Moody's estimates that GDP growth of at least 2% and
primary surpluses of at least 2% of GDP will be required to
stabilize debt ratios. The rating agency does not expect Brazil to
meet these conditions this year or next.

Growth has been even weaker than Moody's expected a year ago, and
will remain so, in the agency's view. Fiscal and monetary policy
tightening, along with weak consumption and investment spending,
will negatively impact economic growth in 2015-16, with the
expectation of a recession in 2015, a stagnant economy next year,
and a gradual post-2016 recovery with GDP growth reporting annual
rates of about 2% in 2017-18.

Consumption has been hit by adverse labor market conditions with
declining employment and a reduction in real wages negatively
affecting household spending. Moody's expects these conditions to
extend into 2016 given the lag between when labor market
indicators respond and the economic cycle. At the same time, low
capacity utilization, low business confidence, and Petrobras-
related developments will negatively affect investment prospects
this year and next.

There is a lack of political consensus in Brazil over whether to
more aggressively address budgetary rigidities by pushing reforms
that tackle mandatory spending increases. This political stalemate
will make it difficult to arrest government spending trends and,
consequently, to reverse the rising debt trend during the second
part of this administration. The political arena has become
increasingly complicated. Record-low approval ratings for
President Rousseff have weakened her political standing and the
legal proceedings of the Lava Jato corruption investigation have
contributed to increased tension between Congress and the
Executive Branch, further undermining the government's efforts to
advance its economic agenda.

On the fiscal front, the reduction in discretionary spending has
not adequately compensated for the impact that weaker-than-
expected growth has had on government revenues. This trend will
continue, particularly in light of mandatory expenditures that
continue to increase in real terms.

During the year Congress approved several fiscal measures that
have been submitted by the government, but Moody's expects
significant opposition to a key upcoming vote on the reversal of
payroll tax reductions. A negative outcome that results in a
significantly watered-down version of the original proposal could
compromise next year's fiscal targets.

SECOND DRIVER -- DEBT METRICS TO DETERIORATE MATERIALLY RELATIVE
TO Baa-RATED PEERS

As a result, Moody's expects government debt ratios to continue to
increase over the course of this administration, remaining at
historically high levels both in absolute terms and relative to
Brazil's Baa peer group. Debt affordability will continue to
decline, in absolute terms and relative to peers.

Moody's estimates that debt-to-GDP will rise to 67% in 2016 and
continue to rise slowly thereafter, reaching close to 70% in 2018
-- in both cases significantly higher than the 53% level reached
in 2013. Thereafter, the rating agency expects debt levels to
remain around that elevated level. The interest burden will also
be materially higher, with interest payments exceeding 20% of
government revenues in 2015 and 2016 compared with 16% in 2013.
Moody's forecasts assume that economic growth and the primary
surplus both rise to 2% during the second part of this
administration. It would take higher growth or a more significant
fiscal correction than currently incorporated into Brazil's
revised official scenario to reverse the rising debt trajectory
before the end of this administration. Conversely, lower growth or
a lower surplus would imply that debt levels would continue to
rise beyond the end of this administration.

As a consequence, Brazil's fiscal profile will remain weaker than
that of other Baa-rated sovereigns, with debt-to-GDP and interest-
to-revenue ratios well above medians for Baa-rated peers. Brazil's
fiscal strength has been deteriorating relative to peers for some
years, and Moody's expects it to continue to do so for the rest of
this administration's term.

RATIONALE FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF A Baa3 RATING

The assignment of a Baa3 rating reflects a balance of strengths
and weaknesses.

Brazil possesses a large, diverse economy, which is a credit
strength. Despite the deterioration in credit metrics that
underpins today's action, Brazil has low susceptibility to event
risk, a comparative advantage relative to sovereign peers with Baa
ratings. The government's balance sheet has very limited foreign
currency exposure and low non-resident domestic debt holdings.
Current account deficits are manageable, being largely financed by
foreign direct investment inflows, and international reserves
provide ample coverage of external debt payments. In all of these
areas, Brazil's standing is comparable to, or stronger than, that
of several Baa- and A-rated peers.

Set against those external strengths, the government's debt burden
is high relative to Baa peers and continues to rise. Growth is low
and debt affordability is declining. Institutional strength -- the
ability of Brazil's institutions to agree and deliver credit-
supportive policy objectives -- is under pressure. Political
dynamics are damaging: the lack of political consensus on fiscal
reforms has been exacerbated by the events surrounding the Lava
Jato investigation and Petrobras-related corruption scandals.
That, in turn, has contributed to the sustained loss of investor
confidence.

At present, Brazil's strengths sufficiently protect the
government's balance sheet from shocks during the period of
adjustment and recovery for its economic and fiscal profile to
continue to support an investment-grade rating. However, much will
rest on the capacity of Brazil's institutions to achieve fiscal
and monetary objectives, and its ability to restore investor
confidence and to stimulate growth.

RATIONALE FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF A STABLE OUTLOOK

The assignment of a stable outlook reflects Moody's view that
Brazil possesses the ability to achieve a turn-around in growth
and fiscal performance. The risks of political dysfunction leading
to further economic and fiscal deterioration and the likelihood of
a faster-than-expected economic and fiscal recovery are broadly
balanced. Even though Moody's expects the economic environment to
remain poor and political dynamics to remain relatively unstable
in 2015 and 2016, the rating agency does not currently expect so
severe a deterioration in debt metrics as to threaten Brazil's
investment-grade rating.

A macroeconomic environment characterized by economic contraction,
high inflation and elevated interest rates will continue to pose
challenges to the authorities this year and next. Because these
conditions reflect to a large extent cyclical factors, Moody's
expects that conditions will improve during the second part of
2016, alleviating the pressure on government accounts. While
political dynamics will likely remain complicated on account of
President Rousseff's record-low approval ratings, which will
continue to restrict the government's ability to advance its
economic agenda in Congress, Moody's does not expect that to
compromise fiscal sustainability over the medium term.

The stable outlook also reflects Moody's view that Brazil's
overall credit profile is more closely aligned with that of Baa3
peers than with representative Ba1-rated sovereigns.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO UP

The rating could go up, or the outlook be revised to positive,
should Moody's conclude that Brazil's economic and fiscal
prospects are likely to stabilize and ultimately improve faster or
with greater assurance than currently expected. Such an outcome
would likely be associated with fiscal reforms that reduce
structural budgetary rigidities derived from revenue earmarking
and mandatory growth in various spending categories.

WHAT COULD MAKE THE RATING GO DOWN

The rating could come under additional pressure if government debt
metrics were to deteriorate further and faster than Moody's
expects, and if the rating agency were to conclude that Brazil was
unlikely to achieve the growth and fiscal consolidation needed to
ensure fiscal sustainability over the medium term. In Moody's
view, Brazil needs to achieve GDP growth and primary surpluses of
at least 2% of GDP during the second part of this administration
to arrest the rise in debt and provide assurance of fiscal
sustainability beyond the span of this administration. A negative
outcome would likely be associated with a collective failure on
the part of Brazil's fiscal and monetary authorities to set out
and achieve clear, supportive policy objectives coupled with a
higher-than-expected level of political instability.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 16,096 (2014 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 0.2% (2014 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 6.4% (2014 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -6.7% (2014 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -4.5% (2014 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 26.8% (Actual)

Level of economic development: High level of economic resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On August 7, 2015, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Brazil, Government of.  The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, have materially decreased. The
issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile,
has materially decreased. Other views raised included: The
issuer's susceptibility to event risks has not materially changed.


BRAZIL: Trade Ties to China Add to Woes for Economy Under Siege
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ney Hayashi Cruz and Mario Sergio Lima at Bloomberg News report
that Brazil's dependence on China is worsening the outlook for
Latin America's largest economy.

The real led losses among major currencies, and the country's
Ibovespa stock gauge touched a five-month low Aug. 11 after
China's surprise devaluation fueled wagers that demand for
Brazil's iron ore, soybeans and chicken will falter as its top
trading partner seeks to bolster exports, according to Bloomberg
News.

The move highlighted how nervous Chinese policy makers are about
the deepest economic slowdown for the country since 1990,
Bloomberg News notes.

The growing unease about China couldn't come at a worse time for
Brazil, which saw its credit rating cut by Moody's Investors
Service amid the widest budget deficit in at least a decade and a
corruption scandal that has enveloped some of the country's
biggest businesses, Bloomberg News notes.  Any slump in Chinese
demand for commodities could hurt raw-materials producers that
make up a quarter of the Ibovespa, Bloomberg News relates.

"People start worrying that, if China is taking such a step, it
could be because the economic slowdown over there may be worse
than we think," Pablo Spyer, a director at Mirae Asset Financial
Group's Brazil unit, said from Sao Paulo, Bloomberg News relates.

Vale SA, which gets a third of revenue from China, joined the
selloff, extending this year's plunge to 24 percent, Bloomberg
News notes.  The MSCI Brazil/Materials Index sank to a one-week
low and is down 32 percent this year. The real's 24 percent
decline since December is the worst among 16 major currencies,
Bloomberg News discloses.

Brazil exported $41 billion worth of goods and services to China
last year, compared with $27 billion to the U.S., its second-
biggest market, Bloomberg News relays.

China's devaluation will fuel volatility in currency markets and
may lead to higher interest rates in Brazil as central-bank policy
makers seek to ward off inflation, according to Thais Zara, the
chief economist at Rosenberg Consultores Associados, a research
firm in Sao Paulo, Bloomberg News notes.  That would put an
additional drag on an economy already forecast to contract by the
most in 25 years, the report relates.

"If the international scenario keeps affecting the real, the
central bank may have to act," she added.


COMPANHIA DE SANEAMENTO: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' GS Issuer Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina Ltda. took the following rating actions on
its portfolio of toll-road concessionaires, water, gas and
electric companies as a result of the August 11, 2015 downgrade of
Brazil's government bond rating to Baa3 from Baa2. In addition to
downgrading Brazil's government bond rating, Moody's also
downgraded its senior unsecured debt rating to Baa3 from Baa2, and
the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Baa3 from (P)Baa2. The
rating agency also changed Brazil's foreign currency country
ceilings as part of this rating action. The foreign currency bond
ceiling went to Baa2 from Baa1, while the foreign currency deposit
ceiling went to Baa3 from Baa2. The local currency country
ceilings were not affected.

RATINGS RATIONALE

These actions reflect Moody's view that the recent sovereign and
sub-sovereign downgrades, along with deteriorating economic
perspectives and ongoing fiscal challenges in Brazil, will
negatively affect the credit quality of the following companies:

Toll-Road Concessionaires

Concessionaria do Sistema Anhanguera-Bandeirantes S.A. (AutoBAn):

Issuer rating downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1 on the global scale;
national scale rating affirmed at Aaa.br

Rating on BRL500million in Brazilian debentures due in 2018
downgraded to Baa2 from Baa1 on the global scale; national scale
rating affirmed at Aaa.br

Rating on BRL450 million in Brazilian debentures downgraded to
Baa2 from Baa1 on the global scale; national scale rating affirmed
at Aaa.br

Outlook changed to negative from stable for all ratings

Concessionaria de Rodovias do Oeste de Sao Paulo -- VIAOESTE S.A.

Issuer rating downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2 on the global scale;
national scale rating affirmed at Aaa.br;

Rating on BRL 440million in Brazilian debentures downgraded to
Baa3 from Baa2 on the global scale; national scale rating affirmed
at Aaa.br

Rating on BRL750million in Brazilian debentures due in 2017
downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2 on the global scale; national scale
rating affirmed at Aaa.br

Outlook changed to negative from stable for all ratings

Concessionaria Rodovia Presidente Dutra S.A.

Issuer rating affirmed at Baa3 on the global scale; national scale
rating affirmed at Aa1.br

Rating on BRL300 million in senior Brazilian debentures due in
2015 affirmed at Baa3 on the global scale; national scale rating
affirmed at Aa1.br

Rating on BRL200 million in subordinate bonds due in 2015 affirmed
at Ba1 on the global scale; national scale rating affirmed at
Aa2.br

Outlook changed to negative from stable for all ratings

Autovias S.A.

Issuer rating affirmed at Baa3 on the global scale; national scale
rating affirmed at Aa1.br

Rating on BRL120 million in Brazilian debentures due in 2017
affirmed at Baa3 on the global scale; national scale rating
affirmed at Aa1.br

Rating on BRL300 million in Brazilian debentures due in 2017
affirmed at Baa3 on the global scale; national scale rating
affirmed at Aa1.br

Outlook changed to negative from stable for all ratings

Concessionaria de Rodovias do Interior Paulista S.A.

Issuer rating affirmed at Baa3 on the global scale; national scale
rating affirmed at Aa1.br

Rating on BRL600 million in Brazilian debentures due in 2018
affirmed at Baa3 on the global scale; national scale rating
affirmed at Aa1.br;

Rating on BRL375 million in Brazilian debentures affirmed at Baa3
on the global scale; national scale rating affirmed at Aa1.br;

Outlook changed to negative from stable for all ratings

Concessionaria de Rodovias do Interior do Oeste S.A. (SPVias)

Issuer rating affirmed at Baa3 on the global scale; national scale
rating affirmed at Aa1.br;

Rating on BRL190 million in Brazilian debentures affirmed at Baa3
on the global scale; national scale rating affirmed at Aa1.br;

Outlook changed to negative from stable for all ratings

Regulated Electric Networks

Empresa Amazonense de Transmissao de Energia S.A. (EATE):

Issuer rating downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2 on the global scale;
national scale rating affirmed at Aaa.br

Rating on BRL295 million in Brazilian debentures due in 2016
downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2 on the global scale; national scale
rating affirmed at Aaa.br

Rating on BRL150 million in floating rate Brazilian debentures due
in 2017 downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2 on the global scale; national
scale rating affirmed at Aaa.br

Rating on BRL159 million in Brazilian debentures due in 2020
downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2 on the global scale; national scale
rating affirmed at Aaa.br

Outlook remains stable for all ratings

Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities

Companhia de Gas de Sao Paulo -- COMGAS

Issuer rating affirmed at Baa3 on the global scale; national scale
rating affirmed at Aa1.br

Rating on BRL400 million in Brazilian debentures affirmed at Baa3
on the global scale; national scale rating affirmed at Aa1.br

Outlook changed to negative from stable for all ratings

Global Regulated Water Utilities

Companhia de Saneamento do Parana -- SANEPAR

Issuer rating affirmed at Ba1 on the global scale; national scale
rating affirmed at Aa2.br

Rating on BRL300 million in Brazilian debentures affirmed at Ba1
on the global scale; national scale rating affirmed at Aa2.br

Rating on BRL300 million in debentures affirmed at Ba1 on the
global scale; national scale rating affirmed at Aa2.br

Outlook changed to negative from stable for all ratings

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Further deterioration in the sovereign's credit quality could
exert downward pressure on these infrastructure sectors. A
downgrade would be triggered if Moody's perceives a deterioration
in the level of supportiveness, consistency and predictability of
regulatory frameworks of the country and/or states under which
these companies operate. A further political interference in the
normal course of business of these companies could also be
considered a trigger for a downgrade.

The ratings of these companies could be upgraded or the outlook
stabilized if the sovereign's credit quality improves
significantly along with the resumption of an investment-led
economic recovery. Moody's would consider an upgrade or
stabilization of the outlook if the agency perceived an
improvement in the national and state regulatory frameworks.


ITAU UNIBANCO: Moody's Cuts Global LC Issuer Rating to 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of several
Brazilian banks following the downgrade of Brazil's government
bond rating to Baa3 from Baa2. In addition to downgrading Brazil's
bond rating, Moody's also downgraded its senior unsecured debt
rating to Baa3 from Baa2, and the senior unsecured shelf rating to
(P)Baa3 from (P)Baa2. The rating agency also changed Brazil's
foreign currency country ceilings as part of this rating action.
The foreign currency bond ceiling went to Baa2 from Baa1, while
the foreign currency deposit ceiling went to Baa3 from Baa2. The
rating agency also changed the government's rating outlook to
stable from negative.

Moody's downgraded the long-term global local currency deposit and
issuer ratings of nine financial institutions, and downgraded five
banks' standalone baseline credit assessments (BCAs) to baa3 from
baa2. Moody's also downgraded six senior and junior subordinated
debt ratings.

Moody's also downgraded the long-term global foreign currency
deposit and/or senior debt ratings of 20 financial institutions,
including the foreign branches, because of the change in Brazil's
foreign currency bond ceiling to Baa2 from Baa1, and its foreign
currency deposit ceiling to Baa3 from Baa2. Also, Brazil's local
currency deposit ceiling of A1 remained unchanged.

The outlook on all the affected global scale ratings was changed
to stable from negative, in line with the outlook of the
sovereign, except for HSBC Bank Brasil's ratings, which remain on
review for downgrade following HSBC Holdings' announcement that
its Brazilian operations will be acquired by Banco Bradesco.

Moody's also downgraded the counterparty risk (CR) assessments
assigned to ten banks, including their respective foreign
branches, by one notch, and downgraded the Brazilian national
scale issuer rating assigned to Itau Unibanco Holding S.A. to
Aa1.br from Aaa.br, in line with the downgrade of its global local
currency issuer rating to Ba1 from Baa3, which captures one notch
of structural subordination from its operating bank subsidiary
Itau Unibanco S.A., the ratings of which were also downgraded by
one notch, to Baa3 from Baa2.

Finally, the global local currency deposit ratings and the BCAs of
four foreign-owned banks remained unchanged. Moody's also affirmed
the Aaa.br Brazilian national scale deposit ratings of eight banks
whose global local currency deposit ratings were downgraded to
Baa3 from Baa2.

For all of the issuers cited in this press release, the ratings
and assessments not included in this action remain the same. The
Ba3(hyb) rating assigned to the $2.5billion preferred stock non-
cumulative notes issued by Banco do Brasil Cayman Branch in 2014,
as well as the Ba3(hyb) rating assigned to the subordinated notes
issued by Caixa Economica Federal in 2014 also remained unchanged.
These ratings are notched off Banco do Brasil and Caixa's
respective BCAs, which remained unchanged at baa3 and ba2.

The following banks and financial institutions are covered in this
press release:

-- Itau Unibanco S.A.

-- Itau Unibanco Holding S.A.

-- Banco Bradesco S.A.

-- Banco do Brasil S.A.

-- Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econ“mico e Social -- BNDES

-- Caixa Economica Federal

-- Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A.

-- Banco Safra S.A.

-- HSBC Bank Brasil -- Banco Multiplo S.A.

-- BM&FBovespa S.A.

-- Banco Citibank S.A.

-- ING Bank N.V. -- Sao Paulo

-- Banco Alfa de Investimento S.A.

-- Banco Mizuho do Brasil S.A.


MGI-MINAS: Moody's Reviews Ba1(sf) Sr. Debt. Rating for Downgrade
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina has placed the Ba1 (sf) global rating and
Aa2.br (sf) national scale rating of the third issuance of senior
debentures backed by re-performing ICMS taxes issued by MGI- Minas
Gerais Participacoes (MGI) on review for downgrade.

The senior debentures are backed by the right to receive 60% of
collections resulting from monthly payments of renegotiated ICMS
taxes (Imposto sobre Operacoes Relativas a Circulacao de
Mercadorias e Prestacao Servicos de Transporte Interestadual e
Intermunicipal e de Comunicacao) originally owed to the State of
Minas Gerais.

MGI is a public limited company almost wholly owned (99.8%) by the
State of Minas Gerais (Ba1).

The rating action is driven by: (1) the downgrade of the rating of
the State of Minas Gerais to Ba1 from Baa3; and (2) a review of
the potential credit impact of the refinanced receivables.

Issuer: MGI - Minas Gerais Participacoes S.A. third issuance of
debentures backed by re-performing ICMS taxes

-- Senior Debenture, Ba1 (sf) and Aa2.br (sf) ratings placed on
review for downgrade; previously on Apr 29, 2014 confirmed at Ba1
(sf) and Aa2.br (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating of the State of Minas Gerais was downgraded to Ba1 from
Baa3 as a result of the ongoing deterioration of Brazil's economy
and of the federal government's fiscal position that have a direct
impact on the operating environment of the State, as it relates to
the downgrade of the Government of Brazil's government bond rating
to Baa3 from Baa2, its senior unsecured debt rating to Baa3 from
Baa2, and the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Baa3 from
(P)Baa2. The rating agency also changed Brazil's foreign currency
country ceilings as part of this rating action. The foreign
currency bond ceiling went to Baa2 from Baa1, while the foreign
currency deposit ceiling went to Baa3 from Baa2. The local
currency country ceilings were not affected.

Although MGI is the sole obligor under the debentures and
investors have no recourse to the State of Minas Gerais under the
transaction, MGI and the State of Minas Gerais are closely related
given the extent of the state's ownership of MGI and the portion
of the transaction's subordinated debt it holds.

Through May 2015 an amount equivalent to 28.6% of the original
pool balance related to receivables that became delinquent after
the transaction closed has been refinanced. Moody's notes that
under the transaction documents, refinanced receivables must be
indemnified by the State of Minas Gerais. In contrast, MGI and the
State of Minas Gerais have argued that such refinancings have no
impact on noteholders, as the refinanced receivable started to
perform again, generating cash flows. This argument is supported
by the transaction's strong performance in recent months.
Nonetheless, Moody's is requesting additional information on the
refinanced receivables to determine the potential impact of such
receivables on the future cash flows of the transaction.

Since the extraordinary amortization of the debentures in February
2014, the transaction has performed within expectations, with an
average debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) of 2.18x from February
2014 to June 2015, above the minimum requirement of 1.8x. The
asset coverage ratio as of June 2015 was 321%, higher than the
200% trigger level. The asset coverage ratio has stood between
310% and 364% since February 2014, in part supporting the issuer's
contention that the refinanced receivables started to perform
again with no impact on noteholders. However, Moody's notes that
the asset coverage ratio incorporates receivables that are less
than 90 days past due, including refinanced receivables, despite
their delinquent history and uncertain credit quality.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's updated cash flow projections indicate that collections
will be sufficient to repay the debt principal and interest by the
transaction's maturity in August 2017, as the DSCR will remain
above 1.5x through that time. However, the 1.8x DSCR trigger is
expected to be breached, and in the event that this occurs, at
current collection levels and applying the cash available in the
cash collateral account, the transaction is expected to be repaid
in five months.

Stress Scenarios:

In its analysis Moody's reduced the expected cash flows by 6% to
reflect potential pressures in collections due to refinanced
receivables.

Conclusion of the review:

During the review period, Moody's will evaluate the potential
impact of the refinanced receivables on the transaction's cash
flows, which could lead to a trigger breach and, if so, require
support from the State of Minas Gerais.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING :

Factors that would lead to a downgrade include a deterioration of
the collateral performance; a determination that the refinanced
receivables are negatively affecting the credit quality and cash
flows from the pool; and a further downgrade of the rating of the
State of Minas Gerais.


MINAS GERAIS: Moody's Cuts Global Scale Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of the Brazilian
States of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais. Moody's also downgraded the
ratings of the Municipality of Belo Horizonte, as follows:

State of Sao Paulo. Rating downgraded to Baa3 (Global Scale, Local
and Foreign Currency) from Baa2.

State of Minas Gerais. Rating downgraded to Ba1 (Global Scale,
Local and Foreign Currency) from Baa3.

Municipality of Belo Horizonte. Rating downgraded to Ba1 (Global
Scale, Local and Foreign Currency) from Baa3.

The outlook for all ratings is stable.

The action follows Moody's August 11, 2015 rating action in which
it downgraded Brazil's government bond rating to Baa3 from Baa2.
In addition to downgrading Brazil's government bond rating,
Moody's also downgraded its senior unsecured debt rating to Baa3
from Baa2, and the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Baa3 from
(P)Baa2. The rating agency also changed Brazil's foreign currency
country ceilings as part of this rating action. The foreign
currency bond ceiling went to Baa2 from Baa1, while the foreign
currency deposit ceiling went to Baa3 from Baa2.

RATINGS RATIONALE

In Moody's view, the ongoing deterioration of Brazil's economy and
of the federal government's fiscal position have a direct impact
on the operating environment of Brazilian states and
municipalities. In addition, the fiscal position of Brazilian
states and municipalities has weakened as a result of lower tax
revenues and increased expenditure rigidities. Moody's expects
that the challenging macroeconomic environment will continue to
exert pressure on the credit quality of Brazilian states and
municipalities in the near future.

Moody's also notes that the assigned ratings are supported by a
strong institutional framework and the close oversight of Brazil's
federal government on states and municipalities in the country.
The agency continues to view Brazil's institutional framework as a
credit positive for states and municipalities relative to
international peers.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

An upgrade of Brazil's sovereign bond rating could exert upward
pressure on the assigned ratings. A sustained improvement in key
financial metrics could lead to an upgrade of these issuers.
Conversely, a downgrade of the sovereign bond rating, and/or a
deterioration in the key financial metrics of each of these states
and municipality could exert downward pressure on the assigned
ratings.


OAS SA: Judge Sentences Executives in Corruption Scandal
--------------------------------------------------------
Luciana Magalhaes, writing for Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review,
reported that a Brazilian judge sentenced five construction-
company executives to as many as 16 years in prison on Aug. 5 for
their participation in a massive bribery scandal that has rocked
Brazil for more than a year.

According to the report, builder OAS's president, Jose Aldemario
Pinheiro Filho, was sentenced to 16 years and four months in
prison, and four other of the company's executives received equal
or shorter sentences, for their involvement in a corruption scheme
that stole billions of dollars from state-controlled oil company
Petroleo Brasileiro SA, or Petrobras.

                            About OAS S.A.

The OAS Group is among the largest and most experienced
infrastructure companies in Brazil, focusing on heavy engineering
and equity investments in infrastructure projects located in and
outside Brazil and abroad for both public and private clients.
The OAS Group provides services in 22 countries in Latin America,
the Caribbean and Africa.

Based in Sao Paulo, Brazil, OAS S.A. is the holding company at the
apex of the OAS Group.  Its share capital is divided between CMP
Participacoes Ltda. (owned by Mr. Cesar de Araujo Mata Pires),
which has a 90% stake, and LP Participacoes e Engenharia Ltd.
(owned by Mr. Jose Adelmario Pinheiro Filho, which has a 10%
stake.

Amid an investigation into alleged corruption and money
laundering, and missed interest payments, OAS S.A. and its
affiliates Construtora OAS S.A., OAS Investments GmbH, and OAS
Finance Limited on March 31, 2015, commenced judicial
reorganization proceedings before the First Specialized Bankruptcy
Court of Sao Paulo pursuant to Federal Law No. 11.101 of February
9, 2005 of the laws of the Federative Republic of Brazil.

On April 15, 2015, OAS S.A., et al., filed Chapter 15 bankruptcy
petitions (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 15-10937) in Manhattan,
in the United States to seek U.S. recognition of the Brazilian
proceedings.  Renato Fermiano Tavares, as foreign representative,
signed the petitions.  The cases are assigned to Judge Stuart M.
Bernstein. White & Case, LLP, serves as counsel in the U.S. cases.

OAS S.A. listed at least US$1 billion in assets and liabilities.


STATE OF PARANA: Moody's Cuts Global Scale Rating to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's America Latina changed the ratings of the Brazilian states
of Parana and Maranhao. Moody's also downgraded the ratings of the
Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, as follows:

State of Parana. Rating downgraded to Ba1 (Global Scale, Local and
Foreign Currency) from Baa3, and to Aa2.br (National Scale, Local
and Foreign Currency) from Aa1.br, with a negative outlook

State of Maranhao. Rating downgraded to Ba2 (Global Scale, Local
and Foreign Currency) from Ba1, and to Aa3.br (National Scale,
Local Currency) from Aa2.br with a stable outlook, and

Rio de Janeiro, City of. Rating downgraded to Baa3 (Global Scale,
Local and Foreign Currency) from Baa2, and affirmed to Aaa.br
(National Scale, Local Currency) with a stable outlook

The action follows Moody's August 11, 2015 rating action in which
it downgraded Brazil's government bond rating to Baa3 from Baa2.
In addition to downgrading Brazil's government bond rating,
Moody's also downgraded its senior unsecured debt rating to Baa3
from Baa2, and the senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)Baa3 from
(P)Baa2. The rating agency also changed Brazil's foreign currency
country ceilings as part of this rating action. The foreign
currency bond ceiling went to Baa2 from Baa1, while the foreign
currency deposit ceiling went to Baa3 from Baa2.

RATINGS RATIONALE

In Moody's view, the ongoing deterioration of Brazil's economy and
of the sovereign's fiscal position have a direct impact on the
operating environment of Brazilian states and municipalities. In
addition, the fiscal position of Brazilian states and
municipalities has weakened in 2014, resulting from lower tax
revenues and increased expenditure rigidities. Moody's expects
that the challenging macroeconomic environment will continue to
exert pressure on the credit quality of Brazilian states and
municipalities in the near future.

Moody's also notes that the assigned ratings are supported by a
strong institutional framework and by the close oversight of
Brazil's federal government on states and municipalities in the
country. The agency continues to view Brazil's institutional
framework as a credit positive for states and municipalities
relative to international peers.

Moody's maintains the ratings of the state of Parana with a
negative outlook to reflect the faster deterioration in the
state's operating balance during 2014 compared to peers, as
indicated by figures published by the National Treasury System
evidencing a deficit of around 6% of operating revenues, compared
to a 10% surplus in 2013. The negative outlook also reflects
diminished confidence in the state's reporting given the material
discrepancy in the level of personnel expenses reported in the
state's public accounts in 2014 compared with those reported by
the federal government.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

A sustained improvement in key financial metrics and/or an upgrade
of Brazil's government bond rating could lead to upward pressures.
Conversely, a downgrade of the government bond rating, and/or a
deterioration in the key financial metrics of each of these states
and municipality could exert downward pressure on their ratings.

Moody's also notes that a continued failure by the State of Parana
to clearly disclose its financial condition could lead the agency
to consider withdrawing the ratings for lack of information.


==========================
C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S
==========================


ANTHRACITE BALANCED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 31
----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Anthracite Balanced Company (JR-49) Limited are
required to file their proofs of debt by Aug. 31, 2015, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 17, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Simon Conway
          c/o Andrew Nembhard
          Telephone: (345) 914 8779
          Facsimile: (345) 945 4237
          P.O. Box 258 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands


JORVI INVESTMENTS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 24
--------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Jorvi Investments Ltd. are required to file their
proofs of debt by Aug. 24, 2015, to be included in the company's
dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 17, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


LADNER INVESTMENTS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
--------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary meeting held on July 17, 2015, the
shareholders of Ladner Investments Limited resolved to voluntarily
wind up the company's operations.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          Campbells Directors Limited
          Willow House, Floor 4
          Cricket Square
          P.O. Box 884 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
          Cayman Islands
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 2648
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8613


ONE TREE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 24
-----------------------------------------------
The creditors of One Tree Natural Resources Fund III are required
to file their proofs of debt by Aug. 24, 2015, to be included in
the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on July 22, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Ogier
          c/o Xing Yan
          Telephone: (852) 3976 6966
          One Midtown, 45th Floor
          11 Hoi Shing Road, Tsuen Wan
          Hong Kong


PINEFIELD LIMITED: Members' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 24
---------------------------------------------------------
The members of Pinefield Limited will hold their final meeting on
Aug. 24, 2015, to receive the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.

The company's liquidator is:

         Buchanan Limited
         P.O. Box 1170
         Offices of Cititrust (Jersey) Limited
         38 Esplanade, St. Helier
         Jersey
         George Town, Grand Cayman
         Cayman Islands KY1-1102


QUANTITATIVE GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 24
----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Quantitative Global 1X Fund Master Ltd are
required to file their proofs of debt by Aug. 24, 2015, to be
included in the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 21, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited
          c/o Jo-Anne Maher
          Telephone: (345) 814-9255
          Facsimile: (345) 949-4647
          94 Solaris Avenue Camana Bay
          P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
          Cayman Islands


ROUND TABLE INTEREST: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 22
-----------------------------------------------------------
The creditors of Round Table Interest Rate Fund, Ltd. are required
to file their proofs of debt by Aug. 22, 2015, to be included in
the company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 13, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Highwater Limited
          c/o Nicole Gagliano
          Telephone: (345) 943 2295
          Facsimile: (345) 943 2294
          Grand Pavilion Commercial Centre, 1st Floor
          802 West Bay Road
          P.O. Box 31855, Grand Cayman, KY1-1207
          Cayman Islands


S.P. HEDIN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------
On July 21, 2015, the shareholder of S.P. Hedin resolved to
voluntarily liquidate the company's business.

Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included
in the company's dividend distribution.

The company's liquidator is:

          UBS Nominees Ltd.
          c/o Stephen Nelson
          Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4544
          Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8460
          Zephyr House
          122 Mary Street George Town
          P.O. Box 709 Grand Cayman KY1-1107
          Cayman Islands


TCA INVESTMENT: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 24
-----------------------------------------------------
The creditors of TCA Investment Fund Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by Aug. 24, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced wind-up proceedings on July 17, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Richard Fear
          c/o Ryan Charles
          Telephone: (345) 814 7364
          Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
          P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
          Cayman Islands


YORK BRAZIL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 23
--------------------------------------------------
The creditors of York Brazil Fund Limited are required to file
their proofs of debt by Aug. 23, 2015, to be included in the
company's dividend distribution.

The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 16, 2015.

The company's liquidator is:

          Nicholas Quin
          c/o Laura McGeever for and behalf of
          CDL Company Ltd.
          P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
          Cayman Islands


=========
C H I L E
=========


CORPORACION NACIONAL: Contract Workers at Agree to End Strike
-------------------------------------------------------------
EFE News reports that contract workers at Corporacion Nacional del
Cobre -- Codelco -- reached agreement with the copper giant and
contract companies to suspend their 23-day strike, a job action
that caused tens of millions of dollars in losses.

The agreement they reached with the two affected Codelco
divisions, El Salvador and Ministro Hales, and the Agema
association of contract companies states that the parties will
renegotiate the framework agreement governing the contract
workers' labor conditions, according to EFE News.

For their part, the contract companies pledged not to dismiss or
take other retaliatory measures against workers who took part in
the strike, the report notes.

The agreement "is good news for the company, but especially for
the residents of El Salvador, for our workers and for all of
Chile, since the willingness to talk prevailed," Codelco's vice
president of productivity and costs, Jose Robles, said in a press
release, the report relates.

The contract workers began their job action on July 21, blocking
roads leading to mines, setting vehicles ablaze and clashing with
police, the report says.

One worker, Nelson Quichillao, was shot and killed by police in
one incident that occurred on July 24 near the El Salvador mine,
located in the northern Chilean region of Atacama, the report
notes.

Codelco, the world's largest copper producer, estimates that the
strike cost the company nearly $20 million and caused its copper
output to fall by almost 8,000 tons, the report adds.


===================================
D O M I N I C A N   R E P U B L I C
===================================


DOMINICAN REP: Truckers Demand Safety in Haiti Amid Walkouts
------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that the ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Andres Navarro, and Interior and Police, Jose Ramon Fadul met with
Blas Peralta, head of the country's biggest truckers union
(Fenatrado), and other government officials to seek a solution to
the more than one week walkout by drivers and risks they face when
hauling freight to Haiti.

In the meeting at the Foreign Ministry, Navarro said the various
agencies which operate along the border assess the risk to
Dominican truckers together with the Haitian government, to adopt
the measures needed to resume freight service, according to
Dominican Today.

The report notes that Mr. Peralta said the current conflict over
freight transport to Haiti has led them to temporarily halt
service due to lack of guarantees of safety.  Mr. Peralta said the
Dominican government guarantees safety for Fenatrado truckers at
the border, but the risk is from the constant threats once they
cross into Haiti, where drivers are attacked and their merchandise
stolen by groups operating in that country, notes the report.

Likewise Mr. Navarro said the lack of safety to haul freight to
Haiti affects businesses and transporters in both countries, and
urged the Haitian government to guarantee security for drivers and
their rigs, the report adds.


=============
E C U A D O R
=============


ECUADOR REPUBLIC: S&P Cuts LT Foreign Sov. Credit Rating to 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term foreign
and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Ecuador to 'B' from 'B+'.  The outlook is stable.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed the 'B' short-term foreign and local currency
sovereign credit ratings.  In addition, S&P lowered its transfer
and convertibility (T&C) assessment for Ecuador to 'B' from 'B+'.

RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects that tensions between Ecuador's government
and society have risen following the fall of global oil prices,
limiting the government's ability to implement fiscal measures.
Oil and oil derivatives represent nearly 15% of economic output,
50% of exports, and 25% of fiscal revenues.  Lower revenues from
oil have led the government to attempt to raise other revenues in
order to sustain expenses and aggregate demand.  They have also
prompted the government to cut more than $1 billion in planned
capital expenditure.  Both efforts have met with social protests
and have subsequently partly been modified.  S&P now expects the
general government fiscal deficit to reach 5%-6% of GDP in 2015.
In line with S&P's forecast on oil, it expects the 2016 fiscal
deficit to fall near 3% of GDP before rising again in the run-up
to the 2017 presidential elections.  S&P expects social and
political tensions to remain elevated through the election.

Official credit, from China and multilateral lending institutions,
and international and domestic bonds will fund the government's
2015 financing requirements, estimated at $10.5 billion, or 10% of
GDP, in 2015 (including its $650 million global bond due in
December).  At the end of June 2015, the government already raised
$6.3 billion.  The government borrowing requirement is expected to
be lower in 2016, around $6 billion, including $2.6 billion in
amortizations, down from the $5 billion amortization payments in
2015.

S&P expects net general government debt to increase to 31% of GDP
by the end of 2015 and to increase to about 38% of GDP by the end
of 2017.

On the external side in 2015, S&P expects oil exports to drop
about 40% while oil imports decline 18% on lower oil global
prices, resulting in a smaller oil trade surplus.  Even though S&P
expects the non-oil trade deficit to moderate given lower non-oil
imports on economic growth deceleration and import restrictions,
we still expect the country's current account deficit to widen to
2% of GDP in 2015 from 0.6% of GDP in 2014.  Thereafter, S&P
expects lower current account deficits as oil prices slightly
increase.  S&P anticipates that external debt will largely finance
these deficits.  The government already issued $1.5 billion in
global bonds in 2015.  After these issuances and other external
loans, reserves increased to $4.8 billion as of July 31, 2015,
from $3.9 billion as of December 2014, or 143% of short-term
public external debt by remaining maturity.

S&P expects that Ecuador will continue to use the U.S. dollar as
its currency, constraining the country's monetary flexibility and
the central bank's ability to act as a lender of last resort.
Consumer price inflation was 3.9%, on average, over the past five
years.  Inflation reached 3.6% in 2014 and is expected to increase
4.3%. Higher inflation than the U.S. indicates a steady loss of
competitiveness.  Ecuador's real effective exchange rate increased
4.6% during the first five months of 2015, mainly as a result of
nominal appreciation against its non-dollar trading partners, and
22% since 2008.

S&P projects that Ecuador's narrow net external debt will increase
to about 80% of current account receipts (CARs), on average, in
2015-2018.  During the same period, S&P expects that gross
external financing needs will remain just over 110% of CARs and
usable reserves.  About 60% of the public sector's debt is
external, almost all in dollars.  Official creditors hold 42% of
the public-sector debt.  External commercial debt is about 17% of
total debt, or $5.4 billion.

S&P expects the completion of major hydroelectric energy projects
in 2016 to reduce government spending on subsidies and reduce
energy imports, helping to stabilize the recent rise in both the
fiscal and external current account deficits.  However, a
prolonged period of low oil prices could result in persistently
large fiscal and current account deficits, absent further
adjustments in spending and other policies.  Under such a
scenario, S&P expects that the government would postpone some
capital projects, control current spending, and take other steps
to contain fiscal slippage and rise in its debt burden.  S&P
expects that the government will keep the U.S. dollar as the legal
tender and avoid steps that could undermine public confidence in
foreign exchange policy.  Thus, S&P do not see the Monetary and
Financial Code, passed in 2014, as a harbinger of dedollarization.

S&P estimates that the country's per capita GDP growth may
decelerate to 2% annually in the next three years, compared with
3.3% during 2010-2014 on the weaker terms of trade.

The ratings on Ecuador also take into account its centralized
political leadership. Political power is consolidated within the
executive branch, reducing checks and balances and transparency.
However, the government has pursued increasingly pragmatic
economic policies in recent years, which improved the country's
infrastructure, restored ties with official lenders, and regained
access to capital markets.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook is premised on S&P's assumption that Ecuador's
fiscal and external metrics will not deteriorate more than S&P
currently forecasts.  S&P expects the government will pursue
pragmatic economic policies to contain the impact of low oil
prices on fiscal revenues and the balance of payments.  After many
years of good GDP growth and a high level of public-sector
investment, the government has the fiscal capacity to reduce or
delay its investment plans to contain the recent increase in its
debt burden.  The resulting negative impact of fiscal austerity on
GDP growth could be compensated for, over the medium term, by
steps that encourage more private and foreign investment.

If these assumptions do not hold, S&P could lower the rating.  S&P
could also lower the ratings if there are signs of a weakening
commitment to dollarization, or if the political environment
worsens, leading to potential capital flight or lower prospects
for economic growth.

Conversely, S&P could raise the ratings if the government's fiscal
profile and the country's external liquidity improve beyond S&P's
forecasts.  Over the medium term, the combination of reduced fuel
imports, higher oil exports, and greater inflows of foreign direct
investment could improve the country's external profile.  That,
along with steps to reduce the fiscal deficit and reverse the
recent increase in the sovereign's debt burden, could lead to an
upgrade.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that external risk had deteriorated and that
debt risk had deteriorated.  All other key rating factors were
unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

RATINGS LIST

Downgraded; Ratings Affirmed
                                          To                 From
Ecuador (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating                  B/Stable/B
B+/Stable/B

Downgraded
                                          To                 From
Ecuador (Republic of)
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment     B                  B+
Senior Unsecured                         B                  B+


=============
J A M A I C A
=============


JAMAICA: To Get $130-Million IDB Loan for Economic Growth Programs
------------------------------------------------------------------
Jamaica will strengthen its structural program for economic growth
with a $130 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) that was approved by the IDB's Executive Board on August 5,
2015.

This is the second operation of a policy-based loan series,
providing budget support for the government's fiscal policy
reform.  The first operation was approved in February 2014.

The Jamaican government has been improving its public finances in
recent years in order to set the stage for stronger economic
growth.  Under its economic reform program, Jamaica approved key
tax reforms that aim at broadening the tax base while correcting a
distortionary tax system.

Among other measures, the program targets strengthening of
Jamaica's pension system, and most specifically, efforts to ensure
that the pension fund is financially sustainable.  This includes
reforming the National Insurance Scheme (NIS).  In addition, a
fiscal rule has been established.  These reforms will contribute
to maintaining and enhancing Jamaica's sound fiscal program.

Jamaica's Minister of Finance, the Honorable Peter Phillips,
stated: "The IDB has been a consistent partner in this program of
economic reform on which we have embarked and we have made
considerable progress because of the support received by the IDB.
We don't always agree on everything, but when we don't, we can
discuss and emerge with an even stronger bond of collaboration and
are better off for having these discussions. This approval, on the
eve of Jamaica's celebration of the 53rd anniversary of
Independence, is appropriately timed as we strive to ensure the
unfurling of all the opportunities that Independence represents.
Our sincere thanks to the IDB for a partnership that is helping us
to deliver on the legitimate expectations of the people in Jamaica
for a better life."

According to Alexandre Meira da Rosa, Vice President for Countries
at the IDB, "This agreement had the full support of everyone on
the IDB Board.  This is a credit and tribute to the efforts of
Jamaica to carry out the reforms necessary to achieve economic and
social growth.  We believe that Jamaica is about to turn the
corner and harvest the results of its efforts. This agreement is
the fulfillment of a commitment that IDB President Moreno and I
made to Minister Phillips last year, to walk hand-in-hand with
Jamaica on the reform journey.  We celebrate the fulfillment of
that promise and reaffirm the full commitment of the IDB to
Jamaica."

The IDB loan has a 20-year maturity, a 5.5-year grace period and
an interest rate based on LIBOR which is currently about 1.2
percent.

                         *     *     *

As reported in Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on July 29,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' issue
rating on Jamaica's up to US$2 billion in bonds issued in two
tranches.  The first tranche is for up to US$1,350 million due in
2028.  The second tranche is for up to US$650 million due in 2045.
The government will use the proceeds to purchase debt that Jamaica
owes to Venezuela as well as to finance the government's 2015/2016
budget.


                            ***********


Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable.   Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices
for actual trades are probably different.  Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication.  At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com


                            ***********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2746.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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