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T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Tuesday, April 28, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 082
Headlines
A N T I G U A & B A R B U D A
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA INVESTMENT: Gov't Urged to Go After Principals
A R G E N T I N A
PROVINCE OF CHACO: Moody's Raises Issuer & Debt Ratings to Caa2
YPF SOCIEDAD: Moody's Assigns Caa1 Global Foreign Currency Rating
B R A Z I L
ENEVA SA: Some Creditors Pushing for Debt-for-Equity Deal
SCHAHIN II FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating to 'CC' & Puts on Watch Neg.
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
ARES ENHANCED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 20
CITADEL DERIVATIVES: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 20
CITADEL SECURITIES: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 11
LATAM CONSULTING: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 13
MARQUEE 2004-1: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 20
OTAGO INVESTMENTS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 12
TIGER GLOBAL VII: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 15
TIGER GLOBAL VIII: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 15
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Business Leaders Urge Resumption of Wage Talks
P U E R T O R I C O
FIRSTBANK PUERTO: S&P Keeps 'B+' Ratings on Watch Negative
GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CCC'; Outlook Negative
PUERTO RICO: S&P Lowers General Obligation Rating to 'CCC+'
PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: S&P Cuts Rating on Power Rev. Bonds to CCC-
T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Lack of US Currency Continues to Affect Firms
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Economy Maybe Shrunk, RBC Economist Says
V I R G I N I S L A N D S
BORETS INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Alters Outlook on B1 CFR to Stable
X X X X X X X X X
* Large Companies With Insolvent Balance Sheets
- - - - -
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A N T I G U A & B A R B U D A
===============================
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA INVESTMENT: Gov't Urged to Go After Principals
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Daily Observer reports that a former shareholder in the
financially troubled Antigua & Barbuda Investment Bank (ABIB) is
urging government to "go after" the property acquired through
loans from the bank, without the necessary securities.
Businessman and investor George Ryan said Prime Minister Gaston
Browne should consider the measure in plans to stabilize the bank,
according to The Daily Observer.
"Mr. Minister and government of Antigua, please go after the
people's assets . . . . take over those properties, hold them as
assets of the bank and dispose of them as soon as they can," Mr.
Ryan advised, the report notes.
Mr. Ryan joined the prime minister in strongly criticizing
shareholders, board members and managers for allowing the
perpetuation of poor financial decisions and self-enrichment
decisions, the report notes.
"Some of the shareholders have up to 20 or 30 pieces of heavy
equipment lying in their yard earning nothing. . . . they can't
pay back the bank the money," Mr. Ryan charged, the report relays.
In Parliament, Prime Minister Browne also blasted the heads of the
financial institution for specifically lending millions of dollars
in credit to Jolly Beach, an amount greater than the actual value
of the property, the report notes.
"Jolly Beach is theoretically valued at US$80 million, but in
reality, if you get EC$30 million for it you'd be very lucky,"
Prime Minister Browne charged, the report relays. "Now, the irony
about it is that, that group (ABIB) has extended over US$50
million in credit . . . . so you understand the situation there,"
Prime Minister Browne added.
The report notes that Mr. Ryan said when he spoke out about the
irresponsible transaction of the bank, including the acquisition
of Jolly Beach; he was sacked as a shareholder.
Amid all the criticisms levelled at the management of ABIB,
Opposition Leader Baldwin Spencer, speaking in Parliament, warned
that residents could lose confidence in local banks, worsening the
situation, the report adds.
About ABI
Antigua and Barbuda Investment Bank, the flagship of the ABI
Financial Group, has been in operation for just over 21 years,
having opened on March 1, 1990, when it acquired the collapsed
Fidelity Trust Bank.
* * *
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 15, 2011, Caribarena Antigua News reports that the Antigua
and Barbuda Minister of Finance, Economy, and Government
Administration Harold Lovell has revealed further details on the
bailout of the Antigua and Barbuda Investment Bank (ABIB) after
its near-collapse in July.
The government provided ABIB a $40 million bailout to prevent
panic that could have resulted in the bank's collapse, according
to Caribarena Antigua News. Mr. Lovell revealed that the money
used for the bailout initiative came from loans the government
acquired from the local banking sector. Mr. Lovell also clarified
that the money pumped into ABI Bank by the government was not
actually to pay off its own loan with the bank, contrary to
suggestions.
In early 2011, Eastern Caribbean Central Bank took over ABIB but
the money for the takeover came from the government, not the ECCB,
Caribarena Antigua News added.
=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================
PROVINCE OF CHACO: Moody's Raises Issuer & Debt Ratings to Caa2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo upgraded
the Province of Chaco's issuer and debt ratings to Caa2 from Caa3
in global scale local currency and to Ba3.ar from B3.ar in
Argentina's national scale, respectively. In the same rating
action, Moody's changed Chaco's outlook to negative from stable.
The upgrade of the Province of Chaco issuer ratings to Caa2 from
Caa3 mainly reflects the recording of continuous operating and
financing surpluses and declining debt levels. Chaco's gross
operating surplus averaged almost 11% in 2013 and 2014. The
province has relatively low debt levels equivalent to 27% of total
revenues as of December 31, 2014; down from almost 33% at the end
of the previous fiscal year.
The Province of Chaco, like other Caa2-rated provinces in
Argentina, has a relatively weak economic base and is highly
reliant on transfers from the government of Argentina (Caa1,
negative).
The debt ratings assigned to Chaco's Secured Bonds maturing in
2026 reflect the province's capacity and willingness to pay its
obligations. Moody's notes that these bonds have been performing
following their conversion to Argentinean pesos.
The negative outlook assigned reflects the country's weak and
volatile operating environment as well as the strong economic and
financial ties that exist between sub-sovereigns and the
sovereign.
Given the negative outlook on the issuer ratings, Moody's does not
expect upward pressures in the Province of Chaco's ratings in the
near to medium term. A downgrade in Argentina's bond ratings would
result in a downgrade of the ratings assigned. A sharp
deterioration in the province's metrics such as a rapid increase
in the debt to revenues ratio could exert downward pressure on the
ratings assigned.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.
YPF SOCIEDAD: Moody's Assigns Caa1 Global Foreign Currency Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Caa1 global foreign currency
rating to YPF Sociedad Anonima's (YPF)'s proposed US$1.5 billion
in global notes. The outlook on the ratings is negative.
Since YPF is majority owned by the Argentine government, YPF's
Caa1 rating reflects the application of Moody's joint default
rating methodology for government-related issuers (GRIs). YPF's
Caa1 rating combines its underlying Baseline Credit Assessment
(BCA) of b3; the Caa1 local currency rating and negative outlook
of the Argentine government; and the rating agency's view of
moderate support from and high dependence on the sovereign.
YPF's underlying BCA reflects the company's exposure to Argentine
economic instability, including an unpredictable government policy
framework, and exposure to foreign currency convertibility and
transfer risk. While YPF has maintained its strong financial track
record since coming under government control in April 2012, this
track record still remains limited. In addition, the BCA is
supported by the company's status as the largest industrial
corporation and energy company in Argentina and is also based on
the company's low leverage and high levels of retained cash flow
when compared with many of its peers. YPF benefits from
upstream/downstream integration and other business
diversification, and sizeable oil and gas reserves, including
large shale resources in the longer-term.
The government of Argentina's ability to provide support to YPF is
measured by its Caa1 local currency rating and negative outlook
but Moody's support assumptions are constrained by the low policy
transparency and predictability of the Argentine government.
Moody's consider the government's willingness to support YPF as
moderate, which is based on YPF's majority government ownership
and control, as well as the importance of YPF to the Argentine
economy, with a dominant market position in the energy sector.
While YPF is expected to account for only a small part of the
government's revenue base, the high default dependence reflects
the high correlation between YPF's credit profile and Argentine
economic trends. YPF derives the majority of its revenues
domestically; also, the company and the government also both share
common exposure foreign exchange rate risk.
YPF's negative rating outlook is based on the negative outlook on
the Argentine government. YPF and the government's ratings are
closely linked since YPF is a government-related issuer and also
due to the negative impact of the government's involvement in the
energy sector. The negative outlook on the sovereign rating is
tied to concerns about the government's haphazard policies, poor
transparency and the quality and reliability of its official data
reporting, as well as the sovereign's willingness to pay its debt
obligations.
YPF's ratings could be downgraded if it is unable to maintain
sufficient liquidity and access to foreign currency in order to
meet its debt service obligations. The ratings could also be
downgraded if the government of Argentina's Caa1 rating were to be
downgraded.
There is limited upside for YPF's ratings over the near-term
though continued growth in oil production while maintaining strong
margins and low leverage could result in positive pressure on the
BCA. Over the longer term, an improvement in Argentina's Caa1
rating and continued demonstration of a strong financial track
record could result in a ratings upgrade.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Global
Integrated Oil & Gas Industry published in April 2014. Other
methodologies used include the Government-Related Issuers
methodology published in October 2014.
YPF is an Argentine based integrated energy company with
operations concentrated in the exploration, development and
production of crude oil, natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas,
and downstream operations engaged in refining, chemicals
production, retail marketing, transportation and distribution of
oil and petroleum products. The company is 51% owned by the
Argentine government and had revenues of USD 17.6 billion and
total assets of USD 26 billion in 2014.
===========
B R A Z I L
===========
ENEVA SA: Some Creditors Pushing for Debt-for-Equity Deal
---------------------------------------------------------
Rogerio Jelmayer at The Wall Street Journal reports that some
major creditors of Brazilian power company Eneva SA are pushing
for a $791-million debt-for-equity swap in the troubled company
once owned by failed tycoon Eike Batista, with the aim of bringing
the firm out of bankruptcy protection, according to people
familiar with the proposal.
The debt-for-equity deal, valued at about BRL2.4 billion, is part
of a BRL3 billion capital plan to be discussed at a creditors
assembly scheduled for April 30. Large creditors, mainly banks,
are already eyeing an eventual sale of their stakes in the firm,
the people said, according to The Wall Street Journal.
If the plan is approved, Brazilian bank BTG Pactual will likely
emerge as the utility's main shareholder, with a 40% stake, the
report notes. Two other lenders, Itau BBA and Citibank, will also
become relevant shareholders, the report relates.
Germany's E. ON. SE, which currently holds a 43% interest in the
company, will see its stake diluted to around 10% to 20%, while
Mr. Batista's interest will drop to around 5% of the restructured
company from around 20% currently, one of the people said, the
report relays.
The report relays that a spokeswoman for E.ON confirmed that
E.ON's stake in Eneva would shrink if the proposed recovery plan
is approved, but couldn't provide exact figures.
Formerly known as MPX Energia SA, the company was founded in 2001
by Mr. Batista and is another casualty of his crumbled industrial
empire, the report notes. The Brazilian businessman sold a
majority stake in the utility to E. ON SE in 2013, but maintained
co-control of Eneva, a power generation and trading company, with
businesses in natural gas exploration and production, the report
relays.
Eneva filed for bankruptcy protection last December for its
holding company Eneva S.A, and Eneva Participacoes units, after
the firm's lenders refused to renew an accord to refinance its
debt, the report recalls. Seven thermal electricity plants
operated by Eneva weren't included in the BRL2.4 billion petition,
the report says.
Eneva's total debt, including project finance to some power
plants, is around BRL5 billion, according to the company's 2014
financial results, the report notes.
The company owes around:
-- BRL1 billion to BTG Pactual;
-- BRL707 million to Banco Itau BBA, the investment arm of Itau
Unibanco; and
-- BRL387.9 million to Citibank.
The report says that while the creditors will likely soon become
shareholders in Eneva SA, some are already making plans to put
their stakes up for sale, according to a person familiar with the
talks who didn't unveil a potential price for the sale nor the
potential buyers.
They "just want to save the company from bankruptcy," the person
said, the report notes.
Eneva SA is the fourth company founded by Mr. Batista to seek
bankruptcy protection, including his flagship oil firm, Oleo e Gas
Participacoes, whose failure sunk his other holdings, the report
notes.
Once Brazil's richest man, Mr. Batista has been charged with
insider trading and other financial crimes related to the
meltdown. His criminal trial in a Rio de Janeiro court was halted
in March after the judge in charge of the case was accused of
alleged wrongdoing, the report discloses. A new judge has been
appointed, but it could take months for proceedings to resume, the
report says.
Mr. Batista has previously denied the accusations against him, the
report adds.
About Eneva SA
Eneva SA operates several thermal power plants in Brazil with a
total installed capacity of 2.9 GW. The company also has
interests in gas exploration fields in the country.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Dec. 12, 2014, Juan Pablo Spinetto at Bloomberg News reported that
Eneva Participacoes SA (Eneva SA), the Brazilian utility
controlled by EON SE (EOAN) and Eike Batista, filed for bankruptcy
protection, becoming the fourth venture founded by the former
billionaire to seek creditor protection in just more than a year.
Eneva, which Batista set up as MPX Energia SA in 2001, filed the
request to a court in the state of Rio de Janeiro, where the
company is based, it said in a statement obtained by Bloomberg
News. The petition, called a judicial recovery in Brazil, comes
after failure to renew a deal between the company and its lenders
to suspend debt payments, Eneva SA said, according to the report.
SCHAHIN II FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating to 'CC' & Puts on Watch Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Schahin
II Finance Company (SPV) Limited's (Schahin II's) notes to 'CC'
from 'B+' and placed the rating on CreditWatch with negative
implications.
The downgrade reflects S&P's view of an imminent default on
Schahin II's notes, in light of Black Oil Drilling LLC's
recuperacao judicial, similar to Chapter 11 proceedings.
On April 17, 2015, various Schahin group member companies
requested recuperacao judicial under Brazilian law in the Sao
Paulo Bankruptcy and Judicial Reorganization Court. The request
included Black Oil Drilling LLC, a limited liability company
organized under the laws of Delaware that is the owner of all of
the outstanding equity interests in Dleif Drilling LLC (not rated,
and the owner of the Sertao drillship).
The filing constitutes an event of default under the indenture of
the notes. The occurrence of such event of default is an operator
replacement event and a collateral disposition event under the
definition of the notes terms.
CREDITWATCH
The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's opinion that it could
further lower the rating in the next few days, in a scenario of
the notes' early amortization.
==========================
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
==========================
ARES ENHANCED: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 20
---------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Ares Enhanced Credit Opportunities Fund Ltd.
will hold their final meeting on May 20, 2015, at 10:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Marc Randall
Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
c/o PO Box 1093, Boundary Hall
Grand Cayman KY1-1102
Cayman Islands
CITADEL DERIVATIVES: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 20
---------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Citadel Derivatives Trading Ltd. will hold
their final meeting on May 20, 2015, at 10:30 a.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Marc Randall
c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
P.O. Box 1093, Boundary Hall
Grand Cayman KY1-1102
Cayman Islands
CITADEL SECURITIES: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 11
--------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Citadel Securities International Holdings Ltd.
will hold their final meeting on May 11, 2015, at 10:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Mervin Solas
c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
P.O. Box 1093, Boundary Hall
Grand Cayman KY1-1102
Cayman Islands
LATAM CONSULTING: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 13
------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Latam Consulting Services Alpha Limited will
hold their final meeting on May 13, 2015, at 10:20 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Mervin Solas
c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
P.O. Box 1093, Boundary Hall
Grand Cayman KY1-1102
Cayman Islands
MARQUEE 2004-1: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 20
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Marquee 2004-1 Ltd. will hold their final
meeting on May 20, 2015, at 1:10 p.m., to receive the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
c/o PO Box 1093, Boundary Hall
Grand Cayman KY1-1102
Cayman Islands
OTAGO INVESTMENTS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 12
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Otago Investments No. 1 Limited will hold
their final meeting on May 12, 2015, at 9:00 p.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Mervin Solas
c/o Maples Liquidation Services (Cayman) Limited
P.O. Box 1093, Boundary Hall
Grand Cayman KY1-1102
Cayman Islands
TIGER GLOBAL VII: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 15
------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Tiger Global PIP V China Holdings VII, Ltd.
will hold their final meeting on May 15, 2015, at 10:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Gregory Seidell
c/o Campbells, Willow House, Floor 4
Cricket Square
Grand Cayman KY1-1103
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 2648
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8613
TIGER GLOBAL VIII: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for May 15
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Tiger Global PIP V China Holdings VIII, Ltd.
will hold their final meeting on May 15, 2015, at 10:00 a.m., to
receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Gregory Seidell
c/o Campbells, Willow House, Floor 4
Cricket Square
Grand Cayman KY1-1103
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 2648
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 8613
===================================
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
===================================
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Business Leaders Urge Resumption of Wage Talks
------------------------------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that National Young Business Leaders
Association (ANJE) President Biviana Riveiro on Thursday, April
23, said she's confident they'll find a way for management and
labor to resume the talks for a wage increase, one day after union
leaders warned of a general strike.
"We are confident that this disruption, perhaps abruptly,
dialogue, will find a way to resume the dialogue," Ms. Riveiro
said one day after union leaders walked out of the talks at the
Labor Ministry, on claims employers failed to make a proposal on
labor's demand for a 30% increase to the minimum wage.
Meanwhile Dialogue Coordinator Monsignor Agripino Nunez said he
expects the parties to exercise good judgment and reach an
agreement, the report notes. "I hope they have the good sense to
look for a way to compromise and reach an agreement. Management
should go a little further and hopefully reasonable way could be
found between government and business leaders," the report quoted
Mr. Nunez as saying.
Both Ms. Riveiro and Mr. Nunez agree that the talks must resume
and come to some agreement, the report notes.
April 22's National Wage Committee meeting, where a wage increase
was to be discussed, ended abruptly when union leaders Rafael
Abreu and Jacobo Ramos walked out, the report adds.
======================
P U E R T O R I C O
======================
FIRSTBANK PUERTO: S&P Keeps 'B+' Ratings on Watch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that its ratings on four
Puerto Rico-based regional banks will remain on CreditWatch with
negative implications, following the downgrade of Puerto Rico's
general obligation (GO) debt to 'CCC+' from 'B' and the lowering
of our long-term issuer credit rating on the Government
Development Bank of Puerto Rico (GDB) to 'CCC' from 'B-'. S&P
placed the four regional banks on CreditWatch with negative
implications on Feb. 13, 2015.
"In our view, the Commonwealth's market access prospects have
further weakened, and its ability to meet its financial
commitments increasingly depends upon favorable business,
financial, and economic developments, which we do not anticipate.
In resolving our CreditWatch listings, we will review the
persistently weak local economy and the downgrades of Puerto
Rico's GO debt and GDB, and how these developments could affect
our credit assessments of these four banks. We expect to resolve
our CreditWatch placements on these four banks within 90 days,"
S&P said.
RATINGS LIST
Remains on CreditWatch Negative
To From
FirstBank Puerto Rico
Issuer Credit Rating B+/Watch Neg/-- B+/Watch Neg/--
OFG Bancorp
Issuer Credit Rating B+/Watch Neg/-- B+/Watch Neg/--
Popular Inc.
Issuer Credit Rating B+/Watch Neg/C B+/Watch Neg/C
Santander BanCorp.
Issuer Credit Rating BBB/Watch Neg/A-2 BBB/Watch Neg/A-2
GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CCC'; Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its long-term
issuer credit rating on the Government Development Bank for Puerto
Rico (GDB) to 'CCC' from 'B-'. In addition, S&P affirmed its 'C'
short-term issuer credit rating on GDB. S&P also lowered its
liquidity assessment on GDB to "very weak" from "weak," as S&P's
bank criteria describe these terms. The rating outlook is
negative.
The downgrade to 'CCC' reflects S&P's view that GDB is vulnerable
and at risk of default, as defined under S&P's criteria, over the
next 12 months. In S&P's view, GDB depends on favorable business,
financial, and economic developments -- which S&P does not
anticipate -- to meet its financial commitments. S&P believes GDB
may not be able to meet its debt maturities over the next year --
and could exhaust remaining liquidity within the next three months
-- unless it or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is able to issue
new debt. S&P believes that the current fiscal situation of the
Commonwealth and certain public corporations, including
uncertainty about the implementation of its proposed value-added
tax reform, will continue to weigh on the Commonwealth's ability
to access the debt markets at reasonable rates.
"The rating outlook is negative and reflects our view that the
risk of default, as defined under our criteria, over the next 12
months has increased significantly," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Sunsierre Newsome.
If GDB is unable to raise sufficient funding to meet debt
maturities or other needs of the Commonwealth over the next 12
months, S&P could again lower its ratings on GDB. S&P could also
lower its ratings on GDB if it downgrades the Commonwealth's
general obligation debt further. Alternatively, S&P could revise
the outlook to positive if GDB is successful in accessing the
capital markets to raise capital sufficient to meet near-term
liquidity needs. However, an upgrade would be contingent upon GDB
raising sufficient capital to meet longer-term liquidity needs as
well as a significant improvement in the economic conditions in
Puerto Rico.
PUERTO RICO: S&P Lowers General Obligation Rating to 'CCC+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has lowered its general
obligation (GO) rating on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to
'CCC+' from 'B'. At the same time, Standard & Poor's has placed
the GO rating on CreditWatch with negative implications.
In addition, Standard & Poor's has lowered its ratings on:
-- Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corp.'s (COFINA) first-lien
sales tax bonds to 'CCC+' from 'B' and COFINA's second-lien
sales tax bonds to 'CCC+' from 'B';
-- Puerto Rico Municipal Finance Agency's, the Puerto Rico
Employees Retirement System's, and the commonwealth's
general fund-supported appropriation and moral obligation
bonds to 'CCC+' from 'B';
-- Puerto Rico Infrastructure Financing Authority's (rum tax)
and the Puerto Rico Convention Center District Authority's
(hotel tax) debt to 'CCC+' from 'B'; and
-- Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority's rated
debt (HTA) to 'CCC+' from 'B'.
These bonds have also been placed on CreditWatch with negative
implications.
S&P bases the downgrade of Puerto Rico's tax-supported debt on
S&P's view that the commonwealth's market access prospects have
further weakened and Puerto Rico's ability to meet its financial
commitments is increasingly tied to the business, financial, and
economic conditions on the island. Absent improvement in those
conditions, S&P believes debt and other financial commitments will
be unsustainable.
"Our placement of the ratings on CreditWatch negative reflects our
view that the commonwealth's current lack of consensus on key
elements of the fiscal 2016 budget could exacerbate liquidity and
fiscal pressure. We expect to resolve the CreditWatch within
three months when enactment of a budget will provide additional
information allowing us to evaluate overall liquidity. We believe
enactment of a credible balanced budget by the start of the new
fiscal year (July 1) could be an important element in Puerto Rico
regaining external market access. Should passage of a fiscal 2016
budget become significantly delayed, or the budget is enacted with
significant structural flaws, we could lower the rating to 'CCC'
or lower. Alternatively, if timely budget adoption translates
into stabilized liquidity, we could remove the ratings from
CreditWatch and affirm the 'CCC+' ratings," S&P said.
Recent developments highlight what S&P sees as liquidity risk for
the commonwealth from diminished external market access. The
board of the Puerto Rico Government Development Bank (GDB)
recently sent a letter to the Governor and state legislators
indicating increasingly remote prospects for selling a proposed
refinancing of a $2.2 billion Highway and Transportation Authority
loan from GDB with a larger $2.95 billion external bond issue
backed by petroleum taxes. The purpose of the refinancing would
be to improve GDB liquidity.
The GDB board cited liquidity problems that could occur as early
as the start of fiscal 2016 unless legislators enact a budget and
address tax reform. S&P believes the existence of such a letter
indicates liquidity stress.
In S&P's view, it is unclear how the GDB's efforts to attract a
nontraditional base of debt investors for the $2.95 billion
external bond issue are affecting the commonwealth's budget and
fiscal policy negotiations.
It is S&P's opinion that even if the proposed value-added tax
(VAT) were enacted by the legislature without delay, without
external financing, liquidity may still fall below thresholds
necessary to maintain operations and fund financial commitments.
Further underscoring liquidity pressure is legislation introduced
April 8 (P. de la C. 2406), which includes new restrictions on
depositors in order to preserve GDB liquidity.
Introduction of the executive budget proposal for fiscal 2016 has
been delayed as the legislature debates the administration's
proposal to implement a new 16% VAT, whose level may be reduced
after legislative deliberations. S&P believes that imposition of
a new VAT is subject to implementation risks, whose uncertainties
might affect future budget performance and the willingness of
investors to extend future credit, and which is incorporated into
S&P's CreditWatch designation.
S&P also believes budget pressures are exacerbated by current weak
economic trends and high debt levels, factors likely to persist in
the long term. Imposition of a large VAT may increase overall tax
revenue, but have negative short-term economic implications.
"As a result of what we believe is increasingly constrained
capital market access, we have used an override factor within our
state rating methodology to limit our GO rating on Puerto Rico to
'CCC+'. We are now using our 'CCC' criteria, which provides
clarity for assigning ratings within the 'CCC' and 'CC'
categories. Under our 'CCC' criteria, the degree of financial
stress and the time frame for anticipated default are primary
factors in our assessment of issuers rated within the 'CCC' and
'CC' categories. Although we believe that passage of a
structurally balanced budget by July 1 may improve the odds of
accessing the private debt markets to improve liquidity, we
believe that substantial doubt exists as to whether an external
debt sale of sufficient size may be accomplished by the end of
fiscal 2015, or later in fiscal 2016, when we believe substantial
seasonal cash flow financing will be needed. At present, we
believe Puerto Rico has very limited or no external debt market
access in either the public or private external debt markets,
including investment from private high-risk investors who have
provided cash flow financing during the current fiscal year. Our
downgrade reflects our criteria override assessment of increased
capital market access risk, combined with near-term liquidity
pressures. We believe this could lead to a government shutdown
without access to external debt markets," S&P said.
"Although HTA, COFINA, rum, and hotel tax-secured debt appear to
have adequate pledged revenues on a strict legal coverage basis,
we are concerned that these revenue streams may not be adequately
separated from the commonwealth's credit quality in the event of
severe general fund credit or liquidity stress caused by the lack
of debt market access.
PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: S&P Cuts Rating on Power Rev. Bonds to CCC-
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has lowered its rating on
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's (PREPA) power revenue bonds
to 'CCC-' from 'CCC'. The rating remains on CreditWatch with
negative implications.
The downgrade reflects S&P's view of:
-- Repeated draws on the debt service reserve fund and
uncertainty regarding any future draws that could result in
its depletion;
-- A structural imbalance between revenues and expenses without
a pathway to meeting debt service obligations if and when
the debt service reserve is depleted;
-- S&P's concern about the authority's access to capital
markets; and
-- The uncertainty whether money on deposit with the Government
Development Bank (GDB) could be diverted from PREPA.
"As a result, we believe a default, distressed exchange, or
redemption appears to be inevitable within six months, absent
unexpected significantly favorable changes in the authority's
circumstances," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Jeffrey
Panger.
"On April 1, 2015, PREPA used $8.8 million from its debt service
reserve to help make a quarterly bond payment, the third such
draw. In July and October 2014, the authority withdrew $41.6
million and $8.8 million, respectively, from the reserve. In our
opinion, the draws suggest that despite falling oil prices, the
authority has a continuing structural imbalance between revenues
and expenses. We also believe Puerto Rico has very limited access
to either the public or private debt markets. PREPA's next
scheduled debt service payment totals $400 million and is due July
1. Legislation enacted in 2014 requires PREPA to deposit with the
GDB certain non-operating funds, including construction funds and
the debt service reserve, which currently has $236 million on
deposit. It is unclear whether the government could divert this
money," S&P said.
S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placement in the next three
months after it has evaluated PREPA's plans and the actions it
will take to resolve the imbalance between revenues, expenses, and
debt service. S&P will lower the rating if the authority
restructures the debt by extending maturity dates.
===============================
T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O
===============================
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Lack of US Currency Continues to Affect Firms
----------------------------------------------------------------
Curtis Rampersad at Trinidad Express reports that a number of
sectors of the business community in Trinidad and Tobago are
saying the unavailability of United States currency in the country
continues to affect their operations because less than half of
their demands for foreign exchange is being met on a monthly
basis.
These were some of the findings of a survey of members of the
Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Commerce conducted by the business
group for the first quarter of 2015, according to Trinidad
Express.
The report relates that the chamber's Trade and Business
Development Unit in an e-mail analysis earlier noted: "Whil[le]
over the past few years, the business community of Trinidad and
Tobago has been experiencing increased difficulty in accessing
adequate supplies of foreign currency, this impediment to business
operations has been exacerbated since the beginning of 2014.
"This environment has created major problems for local businesses
resulting inter alia in major delays in the completion of
contracts, loss of business and the development of adverse
relationships with foreign suppliers," the e-mail added.
The report notes that for the first quarter of 2015, respondents
from various sectors of the business community (which include
financial, shipping, manufacturing, construction, food and
hospitality, distribution, security and consulting) expressed that
the unavailability of foreign currency has greatly affected their
businesses making it difficult to operate, compete and expand, the
chamber said.
"Ninety per cent of respondents to our Forex Survey need US
currency to operate their business and 75 per cent indicated that
the required currency is also more difficult to obtain than
before. It is important to acknowledge that the foreign currency
problem in Trinidad and Tobago still needs to be adequately
addressed," the e-mail said.
The report discloses that 52% per cent of the respondents
indicated that they require more than US$250,000 monthly to
operate their business efficiently and meet other business
requirements. It is important to note that 54 per cent of
respondents indicated that less than half of this demand is being
satisfied monthly, the report relays.
Long waiting times for foreign currency are being experienced,
with 42% stating that they wait more than one month, the report
notes.
Most businesses in the survey (56%) also admitted that in the hope
of improving their chances of receiving the required currency,
they still split their requests amongst several banks. However,
this has not greatly improved their position, the chamber's unit
stated, according to the report.
In its latest injection earlier this month, the Central Bank sold
US$60 million to the financial system to ease demand from
customers, the report discloses.
Trade Minister Vasant Bharath told the Trinidad and Tobago
Manufacturers' Association's (TTMA) annual meeting at the Hilton
Trinidad, St Ann's there was US$5 billion sitting in customers'
bank accounts which was being "saved" and not put back into the
economy, the report adds.
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: Economy Maybe Shrunk, RBC Economist Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
Sean Douglas at Trinidad and Tobago Newsday reports that RBC
Economist Marla Dukharan calculated a weaker performance of the
Trinidad and Tobago economy in this fiscal year that the forecasts
of both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Standard and
Poor's (S&P), she told the "Second Annual Pre-Budget Forum."
The event at the University of the West Indies (UWI), St
Augustine, was held by the UWI Alumni Association, the
Professional Centre and UWI.
Ms. Dukharan said the S&P is predicting 2.0 percent growth, and
the IMF predicting 1.5 percent growth this year, according to
Trinidad and Tobago Newsday.
Noting that last year's growth was just 0.7 percent when the
global oil-price was US$90 per barrel (compared to a current
figure of about US$55), Ms. Dukharan predicted this year's growth
would be much less than the forecasts of the IMF and S&P, and
indeed could likely be zero or even negative growth (that is, a
shrinkage of the economy), the report notes.
The report relates that overall from 2009 to present, the Trinidad
& Tobago economy has slightly shrunk by a negative growth of 0.3
percent.
The report notes that Ms. Dukharan said that despite some
improvements in the supply of data by the Central Statistical
Office (CSO), S&P has bemoaned that there are still shortages in
the CSO's economic data.
The report discloses that Ms. Dukharan said some analysts think
the CSO data underestimates the country's economic growth,
especially in the non-energy sector. Ms. Dukharan singled out
some alternative indicators of economic performance, the report
notes. She said some 18,000 cars are imported annually, cement
sales are healthy and there is much more growth in other regions
outside of Port-of-Spain, the report relates.
Ms. Dukharan said the RBC is predicting a global rise in the Brent
crude oil-price from US$60 this year to US$70 next year to a long-
term value of US$90, the report relays.
The report notes that the corresponding price of WTI oil (near
which price TT oil is sold) to be roughly six dollars lower than
Brent in each case. Likewise, the price of natural gas on the US
market -- the Henry Hub price -- should go from US$2.90 per mmBTU
this year to US$3.45 next year to $4.50 in the long-term, she said
citing the RBC forecasts, the report discloses.
The TT energy sector provides 43 percent of TT's GDP and 35
percent of fiscal revenues (worth $20 billion), she said, and
further was the platform supporting the non-energy sector, the
report notes.
The report notes that Ms. Dukharan said while he intended fiscal
deficit to be 2.3 percent of GDP for this fiscal year, if State
expenditure and world oil/gas prices stay as they are, the deficit
will in fact now likely be 6.7 percent of GDP, or $11.7 billion.
By contrast, the deficit for fiscal 2009 was just $206 million,
she noted.
Contrasting a growing deficit (since 2009 to present) to the 0.3
percent economic shrinkage over that period, Ms. Dukharan declared
that (increased/excessive) governmental spending has not led to an
increase in economic growth, the report relays.
"My prediction is that the economy could contract this year, based
on lower revenues from the oil and gas sector," the report quoted
Ms. Dukharan as saying.
In the question session, UWI economics lecturer, Dr. Daren Conrad,
bemoaned that Trinidad & Tobago is still reliant on its energy
sector (for revenue) and has too many transfers and subsidies (for
expenditure). Efforts at economic diversification have been
stymied by complacency, he said, and persons need to be weaned off
of State subsidies, the report discloses. "The average household
gets $5,000 worth of subsidies, at a cost to the Government," said
Mr. Conrad. "18,000 cars are imported and we drive from here to
there because gasoline is cheap," the report quoted Mr. Conrad as
saying.
Admitting that other nations whose governments had tried to cut
their fuel subsidies had reacted by public rioting, he nonetheless
urged that such a reduction be introduced gradually, along with
encouraging a change in the citizenry's mind- set.
Suggesting that low-wages could lead workers to be frustrated and
be vulnerable to the lure of committing crime, Conrad urged that a
solution is to make a marginal increase in people's quality of
life such that their marginal benefit of going into crime will
decrease, especially if the State can increase the probability of
offenders being caught and punished.
===========================
V I R G I N I S L A N D S
===========================
BORETS INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Alters Outlook on B1 CFR to Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service changed to stable from positive the
outlook on the B1 corporate family rating and B1-PD probability of
default rating of Borets International Ltd, and on the B1 senior
unsecured rating of the notes issued by Borets Finance Limited, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Borets. At the same time, Moody's has
affirmed all ratings.
The rating action reflects increasing concerns over Borets'
exposure to foreign currency risks as a result of the sharp rouble
devaluation since 4Q 2014 and the continued volatility this year.
The currency mismatch between Borets' revenues, 70% of which are
in roubles, and its US dollar debt will likely result in a
deterioration of the company's leverage metrics, with adjusted
debt/EBITDA potentially exceeding 4.0x in 2015.
Moody's also cautions that the drop in oil prices, and the
challenging macroeconomic and political environment in Russia,
could affect the company's operating and financial results in
2015. In particular, Moody's sees risk that oil companies could
revise their investment programmes, further tightening pricing and
payment terms of contracts with suppliers.
At the same time, Borets' ratings continue to reflect its
consistent focus on positive free cash flow generation,
historically healthy cash balances, and moderate debt service
requirements until the maturity of the bond in 2018. These
positives to some extent mitigate the weaker-than-expected
leverage metrics.
Moody's also expects that Borets will be able to maintain an
adequate operating performance, supported by its (1) leading
position in the niche electric submersible pumps (ESP) market with
long-standing customer relationships; (2) favourable industry
fundamentals, supported by a globally increasing need for oil
recovery enhancement technologies; and (3) historically proven
resistance to oil price volatility, underpinned by its large
installed base and high portion of revenues derived from the
replacement and servicing of existing ESPs.
Given Borets' high level of vertical integration with all key
production facilities located in Russia, the rouble devaluation
should further reinforce its already competitive cost position.
The company should also be able to maintain profitability at
healthy levels, with its adjusted EBITDA margin remaining above
17% in 2015. This, together with the continuous development of its
international operations, should allow the company to resume
deleveraging in line with Moody's initial expectations of adjusted
debt/EBITDA at around 3.5x in 2016.
Moody's also notes that Borets has upheld its sound corporate
governance standards following the buyback of shares held by
Weatherford International Ltd. (Bermuda) (Baa3, negative) in
September 2013, and the subsequent acquisition by the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, Aaa stable) and
International Finance Corporation (IFC, Aaa stable) of 5% and 3%
stakes in the company respectively, with comfortable protection of
creditors and minority rights.
Borets' B1 rating remains constrained by (1) its small scale and
focus on a single product line (ESP); (2) limited (albeit
gradually increasing) geographic and customer diversification
relative to global peers; and (3) competition from larger-scale
global players in the higher-end segment and from Russian and
Chinese producers in the lower-end segment.
The stable outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that Borets will deliver on its operating targets, including
sustainable growth of its international business, while
maintaining robust cash flow generation and a strong liquidity
profile. These factors should compensate for a potential temporary
deterioration in leverage metrics in 2015 as a result of the sharp
rouble devaluation, bringing metrics back to within the guidance
by 2016. Moody's also expects that the company will continue to
adhere to its sound corporate governance standards.
Moody's would consider upgrading Borets' ratings if the company
continues to (1) adhere to sound corporate governance standards;
and (2) demonstrate robust operational performance, further
increasing the scale of its operations and geographical
diversification. In addition, to consider a rating upgrade,
Moody's would expect Borets to reduce its leverage (measured as
adjusted debt/EBITDA) comfortably below 3.5x on a gross basis or
3.0x on a net basis, while maintaining a solid liquidity profile
and positive free cash flow generation. The consideration of net
leverage reflects that cash is expected to accumulate over time in
view of the bullet debt structure and positive free cash-flow.
Downward rating pressure could emerge in case of (1) material
debt-financed acquisitions or capital investments; (2) aggressive
shareholder distributions; or (3) a material deterioration in
Borets' competitive position, with leverage, as measured by
adjusted debt/EBITDA, rising above 4.0x on a sustained basis.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Oilfield Services Industry Rating Methodology published in
December 2014. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default
for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada
and EMEA published in June 2009.
Borets International Limited is a leading vertically integrated
manufacturer of artificial lift products for the oil sector,
specialising in the design and manufacture of electric submersible
pumps (ESP) and related products and provision of related
services. In 2014, Borets generated $720 million in sales and $133
million of adjusted EBITDA and reported $695 million in assets.
=================
X X X X X X X X X
=================
* Large Companies With Insolvent Balance Sheets
-----------------------------------------------
Total
Total Shareholders
Assets Equity
Company Ticker (US$MM) (US$MM)
------- ------ --------- ------------
FABRICA TECID-RT FTRX1 BZ 66603695.4 -76419246.3
METROGAS SA-A 153255Z AR 331403741 -24462400.6
METROGAS SA-C 153263Z AR 331403741 -24462400.6
LA POLAR SA NUEVAPOL CI 571550458 -31565432.3
TECTOY-PF-RTS5/6 TOYB11 BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TEKA-ADR TEKAY US 313948165 -395261073
GOL-PREF GOLL4 BZ 3769323901 -125802483
GOL-ADR GOL US 3769323901 -125802483
GOL GOLL3 BZ 3769323901 -125802483
METROGAS-B MGSBF US 331403741 -24462400.6
BOMBRIL BMBBF US 323685704 -31241748
KARSTEN CTKCF US 174656858 -10482924.6
KARSTEN-PREF CTKPF US 174656858 -10482924.6
MANGELS INDL-PRF MGIRF US 176399866 -61689625.2
TEKA TKTQF US 313948165 -395261073
TEKA-PREF TKTPF US 313948165 -395261073
SNIAFA SA-B SDAGF US 11229696.2 -2670544.86
TEC TOY SA-PREF TOYDF US 27114628.6 -8215580.95
PUYEHUE RIGHT PUYEHUOS CI 17878064 -7344408.97
BATTISTELLA-RIGH BTTL1 BZ 120474772 -21271905.1
BATTISTELLA-RI P BTTL2 BZ 120474772 -21271905.1
BATTISTELLA-RECE BTTL9 BZ 120474772 -21271905.1
BATTISTELLA-RECP BTTL10 BZ 120474772 -21271905.1
AGRENCO LTD-BDR AGEN33 BZ 285996574 -543142756
GOL-ADR GOQ GR 3769323901 -125802483
PET MANG-RIGHTS 3678565Q BZ 140957879 -410925540
PET MANG-RIGHTS 3678569Q BZ 140957879 -410925540
PET MANG-RECEIPT 0229292Q BZ 140957879 -410925540
PET MANG-RECEIPT 0229296Q BZ 140957879 -410925540
MMX MINERACAO TRES3 BZ 1223308090 -312940530
INEPAR-RT ORD 3697782Q BZ 1191789041 -214360998
INEPAR-RT PREF 3697786Q BZ 1191789041 -214360998
INEPAR-RCT ORD 3697790Q BZ 1191789041 -214360998
INEPAR-RCT PREF 3697794Q BZ 1191789041 -214360998
RB CAPITAL RBCS3B BZ 13996658.5 -815.062365
MMX MINERACA-GDR MMXMY US 1223308090 -312940530
BOMBRIL HOLDING FPXE3 BZ 19416013.9 -489914853
BOMBRIL FPXE4 BZ 19416013.9 -489914853
SANESALTO SNST3 BZ 21339668.9 -6954061.77
BOMBRIL-RGTS PRE BOBR2 BZ 323685704 -31241748
BOMBRIL-RIGHTS BOBR1 BZ 323685704 -31241748
MMX MINERACA-GDR 0567931D CN 1223308090 -312940530
MMX MINERACA-GDR 3M11 GR 1223308090 -312940530
LAEP-BDR MILK33 BZ 222902269 -255311026
AGRENCO LTD AGRE LX 285996574 -543142756
LAEP INVESTMENTS LEAP LX 222902269 -255311026
INVERS ELEC BUEN IEBAA AR 239575758 -28902145.8
INVERS ELEC BUEN IEBAB AR 239575758 -28902145.8
OSX BRASIL SA OSXB3 BZ 2592199410 -291661108
MMX MINERACAO MMXCF US 1223308090 -312940530
CELGPAR GPAR3 BZ 233784351 -1156798479
RECRUSUL - RT 4529781Q BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RT 4529785Q BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RCT 4529789Q BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RCT 4529793Q BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL-BON RT RCSL11 BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL-BON RT RCSL12 BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
BALADARE BLDR3 BZ 159449535 -52990723.7
TEXTEIS RENAU-RT TXRX1 BZ 48951015.5 -73535330.8
TEXTEIS RENAU-RT TXRX2 BZ 48951015.5 -73535330.8
TEXTEIS RENA-RCT TXRX9 BZ 48951015.5 -73535330.8
TEXTEIS RENA-RCT TXRX10 BZ 48951015.5 -73535330.8
CIA PETROLIF-PRF MRLM4 BZ 377592596 -3014215.1
CIA PETROLIFERA MRLM3 BZ 377592596 -3014215.1
NEWTEL PARTICIPA NEWT3 BZ 10517157.2 -10542831.7
NOVA AMERICA SA NOVA3 BZ 21287488.9 -183535526
NOVA AMERICA-PRF NOVA4 BZ 21287488.9 -183535526
EBX BRASIL SA CTMN3 BZ 2592199410 -291661108
GOL-ADR GOLN MM 3769323901 -125802483
OSX BRASIL SA EBXB3 BZ 2592199410 -291661108
LA POLAR-RT LAPOLARO CI 571550458 -31565432.3
ELECTRICIDAD ARG 3447811Z AR 948261051 -148983927
TEC TOY-RT 7335610Q BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TEC TOY-RT 7335614Q BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TEC TOY-RCT 7335626Q BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TEC TOY-RCT 7335630Q BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
MMX MINERACAO-RT 4111484Q BZ 1223308090 -312940530
MMX MINERACA-RCT 4111488Q BZ 1223308090 -312940530
GOL-RT 0113333D BZ 3769323901 -125802483
GOL-RT 0113334D BZ 3769323901 -125802483
GOL-RCT 0113335D BZ 3769323901 -125802483
GOL-RCT 0113338D BZ 3769323901 -125802483
PET MANG-RT 4115360Q BZ 140957879 -410925540
PET MANG-RT 4115364Q BZ 140957879 -410925540
INEPAR-RT ORD INEP1 BZ 1191789041 -214360998
INEPAR-RT PREF INEP2 BZ 1191789041 -214360998
INEPAR-RCT ORD INEP9 BZ 1191789041 -214360998
INEPAR-RCT PREF INEP10 BZ 1191789041 -214360998
MINUPAR-RT 9314542Q BZ 76619687.5 -91780261.5
MINUPAR-RCT 9314634Q BZ 76619687.5 -91780261.5
MMX MINERACAO-RT 0626050D BZ 1223308090 -312940530
MMX MINERACA-RCT 0626051D BZ 1223308090 -312940530
PET MANG-RT 0229249Q BZ 140957879 -410925540
PET MANG-RT 0229268Q BZ 140957879 -410925540
RECRUSUL - RT 0163579D BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RT 0163580D BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RCT 0163582D BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RCT 0163583D BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
PORTX OPERA-GDR PXTPY US 976769385 -9407990.18
PORTX OPERACOES PRTX3 BZ 976769385 -9407990.18
OSX BRASIL S-GDR OSXRY US 2592199410 -291661108
TEC TOY-RT 1254570D BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TEC TOY-RT 1254571D BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TEC TOY-RCT 1254572D BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TEC TOY-RCT 1254573D BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
MMX MINERACAO MMXM11 BZ 1223308090 -312940530
MINUPAR-RT 0599562D BZ 76619687.5 -91780261.5
MINUPAR-RCT 0599564D BZ 76619687.5 -91780261.5
PET MANG-RT RPMG2 BZ 140957879 -410925540
PET MANG-RT 0848424D BZ 140957879 -410925540
PET MANG-RECEIPT RPMG9 BZ 140957879 -410925540
PET MANG-RECEIPT RPMG10 BZ 140957879 -410925540
GOL-RT GOLL1 BZ 3769323901 -125802483
GOL-RT 1003237D BZ 3769323901 -125802483
GOL-RCT GOLL9 BZ 3769323901 -125802483
GOL-RCT 1003238D BZ 3769323901 -125802483
LAEP INVESTMEN-B 0122427D LX 222902269 -255311026
LAEP INVES-BDR B 0163599D BZ 222902269 -255311026
RECRUSUL - RT 0614673D BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RT 0614674D BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RCT 0614675D BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RCT 0614676D BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
TEKA-RTS TEKA1 BZ 313948165 -395261073
TEKA-RTS TEKA2 BZ 313948165 -395261073
TEKA-RCT TEKA9 BZ 313948165 -395261073
TEKA-RCT TEKA10 BZ 313948165 -395261073
MINUPAR-RTS MNPR1 BZ 76619687.5 -91780261.5
MINUPAR-RCT MNPR9 BZ 76619687.5 -91780261.5
LA POLAR-RT LAPOLAOS CI 571550458 -31565432.3
RECRUSUL SA-RTS RCSL1 BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL SA-RTS RCSL2 BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL SA-RCT RCSL9 BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL - RCT RCSL10 BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
OSX BRASIL - RTS 0701756D BZ 2592199410 -291661108
OSX BRASIL - RTS 0701757D BZ 2592199410 -291661108
LA POLAR SA LAPOLAR CI 571550458 -31565432.3
MMX MINERACA-RTS MMXM1 BZ 1223308090 -312940530
MMX MINERACA-RCT MMXM9 BZ 1223308090 -312940530
OSX BRASIL - RTS 0812903D BZ 2592199410 -291661108
OSX BRASIL - RTS 0812904D BZ 2592199410 -291661108
OSX BRASIL SA OSXRF US 2592199410 -291661108
OSX BRASIL - RTS OSXB1 BZ 2592199410 -291661108
OSX BRASIL - RTS OSXB9 BZ 2592199410 -291661108
NEWTEL PARTI-RTS 1051621D BZ 10517157.2 -10542831.7
PET MANG-RTS 1227980D BZ 140957879 -410925540
AGRENCO LTD-BDR AGEN11 BZ 285996574 -543142756
LAEP-BDR MILK11 BZ 222902269 -255311026
MMX MINERACA-GDR MMXMD US 1223308090 -312940530
MMX MINERACAO MMXXF US 1223308090 -312940530
GOL PREF - RTS GOLL2 BZ 3769323901 -125802483
GOL PREF - RCT GOLL10 BZ 3769323901 -125802483
BOMBRIL - RTS BOBR11 BZ 323685704 -31241748
KARSTEN SA - RTS CTKA1 BZ 174656858 -10482924.6
KARSTEN SA - RTS CTKA2 BZ 174656858 -10482924.6
KARSTEN SA - RCT CTKA9 BZ 174656858 -10482924.6
KARSTEN SA - RCT CTKA10 BZ 174656858 -10482924.6
NEWTEL PARTI-RCT NEWT9B BZ 10517157.2 -10542831.7
NEWTEL PARTI-RTS NEWT1B BZ 10517157.2 -10542831.7
CELGPAR-RTS GPAR11 BZ 233784351 -1156798479
LA POLAR-RTS BON LAPOLAOB CI 571550458 -31565432.3
PET MANGUINH-RTS RPMG1 BZ 140957879 -410925540
METROGAS-B METR AR 331403741 -24462400.6
METROGAS-B BLOCK METRB AR 331403741 -24462400.6
METROGAS-B METRC AR 331403741 -24462400.6
METROGAS-B METRD AR 331403741 -24462400.6
METROGAS SA MGAI US 331403741 -24462400.6
METROGAS-B MGSB GR 331403741 -24462400.6
METROGAS-ADR MGS US 331403741 -24462400.6
METROGAS-ADR MGSA GR 331403741 -24462400.6
ARTHUR LANGE ARLA3 BZ 11642254.9 -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANGE SA ALICON BZ 11642254.9 -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANGE-PRF ARLA4 BZ 11642254.9 -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANGE-PRF ALICPN BZ 11642254.9 -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANG-RT C ARLA1 BZ 11642254.9 -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANG-RT P ARLA2 BZ 11642254.9 -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANG-RC C ARLA9 BZ 11642254.9 -17154460.3
ARTHUR LANG-RC P ARLA10 BZ 11642254.9 -17154460.3
ARTHUR LAN-DVD C ARLA11 BZ 11642254.9 -17154460.3
ARTHUR LAN-DVD P ARLA12 BZ 11642254.9 -17154460.3
BOMBRIL BOBR3 BZ 323685704 -31241748
BOMBRIL CIRIO SA BOBRON BZ 323685704 -31241748
BOMBRIL-PREF BOBR4 BZ 323685704 -31241748
BOMBRIL CIRIO-PF BOBRPN BZ 323685704 -31241748
BOMBRIL SA-ADR BMBPY US 323685704 -31241748
BOMBRIL SA-ADR BMBBY US 323685704 -31241748
BUETTNER BUET3 BZ 82872146.2 -36299304.3
BUETTNER SA BUETON BZ 82872146.2 -36299304.3
BUETTNER-PREF BUET4 BZ 82872146.2 -36299304.3
BUETTNER SA-PRF BUETPN BZ 82872146.2 -36299304.3
BUETTNER SA-RTS BUET1 BZ 82872146.2 -36299304.3
BUETTNER SA-RT P BUET2 BZ 82872146.2 -36299304.3
CAF BRASILIA CAFE3 BZ 160933830 -149277092
CAFE BRASILIA SA CSBRON BZ 160933830 -149277092
CAF BRASILIA-PRF CAFE4 BZ 160933830 -149277092
CAFE BRASILIA-PR CSBRPN BZ 160933830 -149277092
IGUACU CAFE IGUA3 BZ 190073766 -74308212
IGUACU CAFE IGCSON BZ 190073766 -74308212
IGUACU CAFE IGUCF US 190073766 -74308212
IGUACU CAFE-PR A IGUA5 BZ 190073766 -74308212
IGUACU CAFE-PR A IGCSAN BZ 190073766 -74308212
IGUACU CAFE-PR A IGUAF US 190073766 -74308212
IGUACU CAFE-PR B IGUA6 BZ 190073766 -74308212
IGUACU CAFE-PR B IGCSBN BZ 190073766 -74308212
SCHLOSSER SCLO3 BZ 46981417.3 -55419754.7
SCHLOSSER SA SCHON BZ 46981417.3 -55419754.7
SCHLOSSER-PREF SCLO4 BZ 46981417.3 -55419754.7
SCHLOSSER SA-PRF SCHPN BZ 46981417.3 -55419754.7
KARSTEN SA CTKA3 BZ 174656858 -10482924.6
KARSTEN CTKON BZ 174656858 -10482924.6
KARSTEN-PREF CTKA4 BZ 174656858 -10482924.6
KARSTEN-PREF CTKPN BZ 174656858 -10482924.6
COBRASMA CBMA3 BZ 68585867.9 -2324358597
COBRASMA SA COBRON BZ 68585867.9 -2324358597
COBRASMA-PREF CBMA4 BZ 68585867.9 -2324358597
COBRASMA SA-PREF COBRPN BZ 68585867.9 -2324358597
D H B DHBI3 BZ 94806424.1 -188014922
DHB IND E COM DHBON BZ 94806424.1 -188014922
D H B-PREF DHBI4 BZ 94806424.1 -188014922
DHB IND E COM-PR DHBPN BZ 94806424.1 -188014922
DOCA INVESTIMENT DOCA3 BZ 187044412 -204249587
DOCAS SA DOCAON BZ 187044412 -204249587
DOCA INVEST-PREF DOCA4 BZ 187044412 -204249587
DOCAS SA-PREF DOCAPN BZ 187044412 -204249587
DOCAS SA-RTS PRF DOCA2 BZ 187044412 -204249587
FABRICA RENAUX FTRX3 BZ 66603695.4 -76419246.3
FABRICA RENAUX FRNXON BZ 66603695.4 -76419246.3
FABRICA RENAUX-P FTRX4 BZ 66603695.4 -76419246.3
FABRICA RENAUX-P FRNXPN BZ 66603695.4 -76419246.3
HAGA HAGA3 BZ 17930008.8 -31863962
FERRAGENS HAGA HAGAON BZ 17930008.8 -31863962
FER HAGA-PREF HAGA4 BZ 17930008.8 -31863962
FERRAGENS HAGA-P HAGAPN BZ 17930008.8 -31863962
CIMOB PARTIC SA GAFP3 BZ 44047412.2 -45669964.1
CIMOB PARTIC SA GAFON BZ 44047412.2 -45669964.1
CIMOB PART-PREF GAFP4 BZ 44047412.2 -45669964.1
CIMOB PART-PREF GAFPN BZ 44047412.2 -45669964.1
IGB ELETRONICA IGBR3 BZ 307112239 -59872446.9
GRADIENTE ELETR IGBON BZ 307112239 -59872446.9
GRADIENTE-PREF A IGBR5 BZ 307112239 -59872446.9
GRADIENTE EL-PRA IGBAN BZ 307112239 -59872446.9
GRADIENTE-PREF B IGBR6 BZ 307112239 -59872446.9
GRADIENTE EL-PRB IGBBN BZ 307112239 -59872446.9
GRADIENTE-PREF C IGBR7 BZ 307112239 -59872446.9
GRADIENTE EL-PRC IGBCN BZ 307112239 -59872446.9
HOTEIS OTHON SA HOOT3 BZ 207664352 -21612890.7
HOTEIS OTHON SA HOTHON BZ 207664352 -21612890.7
HOTEIS OTHON-PRF HOOT4 BZ 207664352 -21612890.7
HOTEIS OTHON-PRF HOTHPN BZ 207664352 -21612890.7
RENAUXVIEW SA TXRX3 BZ 48951015.5 -73535330.8
TEXTEIS RENAUX RENXON BZ 48951015.5 -73535330.8
RENAUXVIEW SA-PF TXRX4 BZ 48951015.5 -73535330.8
TEXTEIS RENAUX RENXPN BZ 48951015.5 -73535330.8
INEPAR INEP3 BZ 1191789041 -214360998
INEPAR SA INPRON BZ 1191789041 -214360998
INEPAR-PREF INEP4 BZ 1191789041 -214360998
INEPAR SA-PREF INPRPN BZ 1191789041 -214360998
INEPAR-COM DVD INEP11 BZ 1191789041 -214360998
INEPAR BONUS B INEP12 BZ 1191789041 -214360998
INEPAR-PRF DVD INEP13 BZ 1191789041 -214360998
PARMALAT LCSA3 BZ 388720096 -213641152
PARMALAT BRASIL LCSAON BZ 388720096 -213641152
PADMA INDUSTRIA LCSA4 BZ 388720096 -213641152
PARMALAT BRAS-PF LCSAPN BZ 388720096 -213641152
PARMALAT BR-RT C LCSA5 BZ 388720096 -213641152
PARMALAT BR-RT P LCSA6 BZ 388720096 -213641152
MANGELS INDL MGEL3 BZ 176399866 -61689625.2
MANGELS INDL SA MISAON BZ 176399866 -61689625.2
MANGELS INDL-PRF MGEL4 BZ 176399866 -61689625.2
MANGELS INDL-PRF MISAPN BZ 176399866 -61689625.2
ESTRELA SA ESTR3 BZ 101429217 -112373470
ESTRELA SA ESTRON BZ 101429217 -112373470
ESTRELA SA-PREF ESTR4 BZ 101429217 -112373470
ESTRELA SA-PREF ESTRPN BZ 101429217 -112373470
MET DUQUE DUQE3 BZ 75039127.4 -2847420.37
MET DUQUE MDUON BZ 75039127.4 -2847420.37
MET DUQUE-PREF DUQE4 BZ 75039127.4 -2847420.37
MET DUQUE-PREF MDUPN BZ 75039127.4 -2847420.37
WETZEL SA MWET3 BZ 85449973 -19170318.6
WETZEL SA MWELON BZ 85449973 -19170318.6
WETZEL SA-PREF MWET4 BZ 85449973 -19170318.6
WETZEL SA-PREF MWELPN BZ 85449973 -19170318.6
MINUPAR MNPR3 BZ 76619687.5 -91780261.5
MINUPAR SA MNPRON BZ 76619687.5 -91780261.5
MINUPAR-PREF MNPR4 BZ 76619687.5 -91780261.5
MINUPAR SA-PREF MNPRPN BZ 76619687.5 -91780261.5
NOVA AMERICA SA NOVA3B BZ 21287488.9 -183535526
NOVA AMERICA SA NOVAON BZ 21287488.9 -183535526
NOVA AMERICA-PRF NOVA4B BZ 21287488.9 -183535526
NOVA AMERICA-PRF NOVAPN BZ 21287488.9 -183535526
NOVA AMERICA-PRF 1NOVPN BZ 21287488.9 -183535526
NOVA AMERICA SA 1NOVON BZ 21287488.9 -183535526
RECRUSUL RCSL3 BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL SA RESLON BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL-PREF RCSL4 BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
RECRUSUL SA-PREF RESLPN BZ 25757600.8 -21626049.7
PETRO MANGUINHOS RPMG3 BZ 140957879 -410925540
PETRO MANGUINHOS MANGON BZ 140957879 -410925540
PET MANGUINH-PRF RPMG4 BZ 140957879 -410925540
PETRO MANGUIN-PF MANGPN BZ 140957879 -410925540
RIMET REEM3 BZ 103098359 -185417651
RIMET REEMON BZ 103098359 -185417651
RIMET-PREF REEM4 BZ 103098359 -185417651
RIMET-PREF REEMPN BZ 103098359 -185417651
SANSUY SNSY3 BZ 164647493 -171565662
SANSUY SA SNSYON BZ 164647493 -171565662
SANSUY-PREF A SNSY5 BZ 164647493 -171565662
SANSUY SA-PREF A SNSYAN BZ 164647493 -171565662
SANSUY-PREF B SNSY6 BZ 164647493 -171565662
SANSUY SA-PREF B SNSYBN BZ 164647493 -171565662
SNIAFA SA SNIA AR 11229696.2 -2670544.86
SNIAFA SA-B SNIA5 AR 11229696.2 -2670544.86
PILMAIQUEN PILMAIQ CI 169175281 -28425493.1
BOTUCATU TEXTIL STRP3 BZ 27663605.3 -7174512.12
STAROUP SA STARON BZ 27663605.3 -7174512.12
BOTUCATU-PREF STRP4 BZ 27663605.3 -7174512.12
STAROUP SA-PREF STARPN BZ 27663605.3 -7174512.12
TECTOY TOYB3 BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TECTOY SA TOYBON BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TECTOY-PREF TOYB4 BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TECTOY SA-PREF TOYBPN BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TEC TOY SA-PREF TOYB5 BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TEC TOY SA-PF B TOYB6 BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TECTOY TOYB13 BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TECTOY-RCPT PF B TOYB12 BZ 27114628.6 -8215580.95
TEKA TEKA3 BZ 313948165 -395261073
TEKA TEKAON BZ 313948165 -395261073
TEKA-PREF TEKA4 BZ 313948165 -395261073
TEKA-PREF TEKAPN BZ 313948165 -395261073
TEKA-ADR TKTPY US 313948165 -395261073
TEKA-ADR TKTQY US 313948165 -395261073
F GUIMARAES FGUI3 BZ 11016542.2 -151840378
FERREIRA GUIMARA FGUION BZ 11016542.2 -151840378
F GUIMARAES-PREF FGUI4 BZ 11016542.2 -151840378
FERREIRA GUIM-PR FGUIPN BZ 11016542.2 -151840378
VARIG SA VAGV3 BZ 966298048 -4695211008
VARIG SA VARGON BZ 966298048 -4695211008
VARIG SA-PREF VAGV4 BZ 966298048 -4695211008
VARIG SA-PREF VARGPN BZ 966298048 -4695211008
WIEST WISA3 BZ 34107195.1 -126993682
WIEST SA WISAON BZ 34107195.1 -126993682
WIEST-PREF WISA4 BZ 34107195.1 -126993682
WIEST SA-PREF WISAPN BZ 34107195.1 -126993682
ELEC ARG SA-PREF EASA6 AR 948261051 -148983927
ELEC ARGENT-ADR EASA LX 948261051 -148983927
ELEC DE ARGE-ADR 1262Q US 948261051 -148983927
LOJAS ARAPUA LOAR3 BZ 37959788.7 -3613691912
LOJAS ARAPUA LOARON BZ 37959788.7 -3613691912
LOJAS ARAPUA-PRF LOAR4 BZ 37959788.7 -3613691912
LOJAS ARAPUA-PRF LOARPN BZ 37959788.7 -3613691912
LOJAS ARAPUA-PRF 52353Z US 37959788.7 -3613691912
LOJAS ARAPUA-GDR 3429T US 37959788.7 -3613691912
LOJAS ARAPUA-GDR LJPSF US 37959788.7 -3613691912
BATTISTELLA BTTL3 BZ 120474772 -21271905.1
BATTISTELLA-PREF BTTL4 BZ 120474772 -21271905.1
HOPI HARI SA PQTM3 BZ 129077627 -2031408.69
HOPI HARI-PREF PQTM4 BZ 129077627 -2031408.69
PARQUE TEM-DV CM PQT5 BZ 129077627 -2031408.69
PARQUE TEM-DV PF PQT6 BZ 129077627 -2031408.69
PARQUE TEM-RT CM PQTM1 BZ 129077627 -2031408.69
PARQUE TEM-RT PF PQTM2 BZ 129077627 -2031408.69
PARQUE TEM-RCT C PQTM9 BZ 129077627 -2031408.69
PARQUE TEM-RCT P PQTM10 BZ 129077627 -2031408.69
INVERS ELEC BUEN IEBA AR 239575758 -28902145.8
NEWTEL PARTICIPA NEWT3B BZ 10517157.2 -10542831.7
NEWTEL PARTICIPA 1NEWON BZ 10517157.2 -10542831.7
MMX MINERACAO MMXM3 BZ 1223308090 -312940530
TRESSEM PART SA 1TSSON BZ 1223308090 -312940530
CIA PETROLIFERA MRLM3B BZ 377592596 -3014215.1
CIA PETROLIF-PRF MRLM4B BZ 377592596 -3014215.1
CIA PETROLIFERA 1CPMON BZ 377592596 -3014215.1
CIA PETROLIF-PRF 1CPMPN BZ 377592596 -3014215.1
PUYEHUE PUYEH CI 17878064 -7344408.97
IMPSAT FIBER NET IMPTQ US 535007008 -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER NET 330902Q GR 535007008 -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER NET XIMPT SM 535007008 -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER-CED IMPT AR 535007008 -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER-C/E IMPTC AR 535007008 -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER-$US IMPTD AR 535007008 -17164978
IMPSAT FIBER-BLK IMPTB AR 535007008 -17164978
VARIG PART EM TR VPTA3 BZ 49432119.3 -399290357
VARIG PART EM-PR VPTA4 BZ 49432119.3 -399290357
VARIG PART EM SE VPSC3 BZ 83017828 -495721697
VARIG PART EM-PR VPSC4 BZ 83017828 -495721697
***********
Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices
for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication. At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com
***********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2015. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.
* * * End of Transmission * * *