/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/140917.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Wednesday, September 17, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 184
Headlines
A N T I G U A & B A R B U D A
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA: Former Prime Minister Defends IMF Loan Deal
A R G E N T I N A
ARGENTINA: Congress Authorizes End-Run Debt Payments
ARGENTINA: Asks 2nd Circ. to Allow $8BB in Citibank Payments
ARGENTINA: Judge Punts on Enforcing Citi Subpoena
ARGENTINA: Most Debtholders Don't Want Change in Bond Jurisdiction
ARGENTINA: Macri's Presidential Bid Wins Support Amid Debt Stance
ARGENTINA: Currency Devaluation Seen Following Bond Default
B A H A M A S
ALLIANCE INVESTMENT: Enabled Battoo Fraud, US SEC Says
B E R M U D A
FRONTLINE LTD: Reports $78.95-Mil. Net Loss in June 30 Quarter
B R A Z I L
BANCO MIZUHO: Moody's Maintains Ba3 Baseline Credit Assessment
JALLES MACHADO: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Global Scale CCR; Outlook Stable
NII HOLDINGS: Aurelius Capital Issues Statement on Ch. 11 Filing
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
ERMITAGE ARIES: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Oct. 10
FOUNDER CHINA: Member to Receive Wind-Up Report on Sept. 17
FOUNDER CHINA MANCO: Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 17
HATTERAS CORE: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 25
HAV3 (III): Shareholder to Receive Wind-Up Report on Sept. 30
HAV3 (IV): Shareholder to Receive Wind-Up Report on Sept. 30
HAV3 LIMITED: Shareholder to Receive Wind-Up Report on Sept. 30
KONA (CAYMAN): Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
KONA FUND: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
KONA MASTER: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
SOUNDVIEW ELITE: Investment Advisor Wants Stay in Proceedings
C H I L E
INVERSIONES ALSACIA: Commences Solicitation of Votes Under Ch. 11
INVERSIONES ALSACIA: Solicitation Materials Now Available
P E R U
INKIA ENERGY: Fitch Corrects Sept. 11 Ratings Release
PACIFIC RUBIALES: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to $500MM Sr. Notes
PACIFIC RUBIALES: Fitch Expects to Rate USD500MM Debt Issuance BB+
PACIFIC RUBIALES: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on $750MM Sr. Notes
PESQUERA INCA: Parent Seeks to Amend Covenants on 2017 Notes
P U E R T O R I C O
PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Fitch Maintains Neg. Watch on CC Bond Rating
T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: May Be Affected by Venezuela Situation
T U R K S & C A I C O S I S L A N D S
ABATEMENT CORP: SEC Obtains Asset Freeze Amid Fla. Ponzi Scheme
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A N T I G U A & B A R B U D A
===============================
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA: Former Prime Minister Defends IMF Loan Deal
--------------------------------------------------------------
caribbean360.com reported that Antigua's former prime minister
Baldwin Spencer has defended the decision of his administration to
seek a multi-million dollar loan from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) saying his successor Gaston Browne "ought to have known
that you could not, based on the rule of the IMF restructure the
loan based on the ways he is suggesting."
The report recounted that Prime Minister Browne in August
criticized IMF saying that the 36-month Stand By Agreement (SBA)
with the IMF in 2010 for an original amount of US$121.9 million
failed to improve the economic situation and is partly to blame
for stagnating the country's economy. He said then that his
administration would not be seeking to enter into a new agreement
with the IMF and would be seeking a loan from Venezuela to repay
the Fund.
The report noted that the IMF had said that the aims of the
program were "largely achieved despite considerable challenges"
and that the fiscal deficit dropped from 18% of gross domestic
product (GDP) in 2009 to just over 1% last year.
According to the report, Spencer, whose government lost the June
12 general election, said he had hoped that Prime Minister Browne
"would have checked us out bat least before he made his
pronouncement."
The report added that Spencer acknowledged that his administration
may have defaulted on "one or possibly two" payments to the IMF
but insisted "it was not a situation where the repayment situation
was completely ignored by the UPP (United Progressive Party)
administration." He said one of the default payments would have
come just before the last general elections.
=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================
ARGENTINA: Congress Authorizes End-Run Debt Payments
----------------------------------------------------
Cara Salvatore at Law360.com reports that Argentina's legislature
passed a bill Sept. 11 authorizing controversial debt payments
that U.S. courts have repeatedly blocked because they sidestep
obligations to aggressive U.S. hedge funds.
The report said the bill to authorize locally based payments was
passed by the National Assembly, according to the Argentine
president's office and national news outlet Telam. Courts in the
U.S. have repeatedly thwarted Argentina's attempts to make select
payments, because the country wants to pay one group of creditors
who have accepted a haircut and ignore another group, so-called
vultures, waging an all-out fight for full repayment. The latter
group is led by hedge fund NML Capital Ltd.
According to Law360.com, the country's lower house passed the bill
134-99 on Sept. 11, clinching a full passage after approval by the
Senate the previous week. The bill aims to get money to the
country's favored creditors and get around U.S. District Judge
Thomas Griesa's many blockades, including one on a $539 million
payment that was already in transit through an intermediary bank.
Argentina's Cabinet Chief Jorge Capitanich, speaking at President
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner's state residence, the Casa Rosada,
said that the vote would "establish negotiation conditions that
allow a restructuring process for 100 percent of the bondholders
under conditions that are legal, equitable, reasonable and
sustainable," according to an English translation of his remarks,
notes Law360.com.
But Capitanich also had harsh words for legislators who opposed
the bill, the report relays.
"Those who voted in favor are defending the sovereignty of the
country," the report quoted Mr. Capitanich as saying. "Those who
voted against are in agreement with the views of the vulture
funds."
On Sept. 4, Argentina's Senate passed the bill with a 39-27 vote,
with two abstentions, Law360.com recalls. After that, passage was
expected in the lower Chamber of Deputies, where President
Fernandez's Front for Victory party holds a majority.
The bill's purpose is to allow the country to pay bondholders who
agreed to debt restructurings in 2005 and 2010 through local
channels, and to make payments to holdouts like NML, who want full
repayment, instead under the haircut terms agreed to by the so-
called exchange bondholders. The bill also leaves open the
possibility that the debt may be repaid under French jurisdiction.
The proposal would authorize Argentina's economic minister to take
steps to remove the Bank of New York Mellon Corp. as the bonds'
trustee, with bond payments being made through state-backed Banco
de la Nacion Argentina instead.
The vulture hedge funds include Elliott Management Corp.-
controlled NML Capital Ltd., as well as affiliates of Aurelius
Capital Management LP.
* * *
The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, on Aug. 1, 2014,
reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its debt late July 30
after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million
interest payment. Earlier that day, talks with a court-
appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the
country and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds
that the country had defaulted on in 2001. A U.S. judge had ruled
that the interest payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds
led by Elliott Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they
claimed. The country hasn't been able to access international
credit markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.
As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.
The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.
Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.
On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.
The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD). The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5. The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively. The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.
ARGENTINA: Asks 2nd Circ. to Allow $8BB in Citibank Payments
------------------------------------------------------------
Kurt Orzeck at Law360.com reports that Argentina asked the Second
Circuit on Sept. 5 to allow it to make interest payments to
Citibank NA on $8.4 billion in bonds issued in the country,
arguing a New York federal judge had erroneously lumped them with
$28 billion in debt covered by injunctions.
Argentina asked the appeals court to vacate a July 28 order in
which U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa said two batches of bonds,
one subject to a court ban on payments and one not, were
indistinguishable from each other, says the report.
Law360.com, citing court papers, said the latter batch is related
to compensation owed to Spain's Repsol SA for Argentina's
nationalization last year of its controlling stake in oil company
YPF SA.
Argentina claimed that those so-called "Argentine law bonds,"
which were issued exclusively in Argentina, are fundamentally
different from the $28 billion of republic-issued debt for which
the Bank of New York Mellon Corp. acts as trustee, Law360.com
relates.
"Enjoining payment on the Argentine law bonds thus fails to align
with the plain language of the injunctions," the brief said, the
report relays. "This interference promises only more injury to
third-party bondholders, financial institutions and the Republic
that is entirely unwarranted and unnecessary."
Citibank filed its own Second Circuit brief on Sept. 5, arguing
the injunctions were never intended to block payments by Citibank
Argentina in that country on Argentine law bonds held by the
bank's Argentinean customers, notes the report.
The report recalls that Argentina, whose Senate passed a bill
authorizing its government to bypass U.S. courts and pay its
bondholders through local channels, has tried to make payments to
certain bondholders. But they have been blocked in New York
federal court, where Judge Griesa said that payments cannot be
made piecemeal. The judge blocked $539 million worth of payments
that the country had already sent to a U.S. bank intermediary.
Citibank had asked Judge Griesa for permission to pay out on
certain bonds that it said were governed by Argentine law, not
U.S. law, reports Law360.com. In July, it said it had discovered
that the portion of the Argentine law bonds issued under 2005 and
2010 debt-exchange deals was indistinguishable from the
nonexchange portion. Therefore, any ban would necessarily apply to
both, it said -- and it is unable to apply payments selectively to
one or the other.
The bonds are impossible to tell apart because Argentina gave the
nonexchange bonds in a batch with the same International
Securities Identification Number as the exchange bonds, according
to the bank, notes Law360.com.
Judge Griesa thus reluctantly approved a one-time payment, though
he also ordered the parties to untangle the two bond groups before
the issue came up again, the report relates.
Argentina argued that because $6.1 billion of the $8.4 billion in
bonds at issue were issued as part of local debt issuances in
Argentina, having nothing to do with the 2005 or 2010 exchange
offers or any other restructuring, they can't be considered
exchange bonds as contended by NML Capital Ltd., affiliates of
Aurelius Capital Management LP and other holdout investment firms
demanding full repayment under the same terms agreed to by the so-
called exchange bondholders, reports Law360.com.
The report relays that the other $2.3 billion of the bonds at
issue were issued in transactions separate from those involving
BNY Mellon and were only offered in Argentina to prior holders of
Argentine domestically issued debt, according to Argentina.
Citibank added that the holdout investment firms didn't provide
any evidence that the bonds at issue had been the subject of the
injunctions, whose reach the district court allegedly expanded
after expressing "confusion" over their nature, reports
Law360.com.
The plaintiffs are represented by Theodore B. Olson --
tolson@gibsondunn.com -- and Matthew D. McGill --
mmcgill@gibsondunn.com -- of Gibson Dunn; Robert A. Cohen --
tolsonrobert.cohen@dechert.com -- and Dennis H. Hranitzky --
dennis.hranitzky@dechert.com -- of Dechert LLP; Edward A. Friedman
-- efriedman@fklaw.com -- and Daniel B. Rapport --
drapport@fklaw.com -- of Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP;
Michael C. Spencer -- mspencer@milberg.com -- of Milberg LLP; and
Leonard F. Lesser -- llesser@simonlesser.com -- of Simon Lesser
PC.
Argentina is represented by Jonathan I. Blackman --
jblackman@cgsh.com -- Carmine D. Boccuzzi Jr. --
cboccuzzi@cgsh.com -- and Michael M. Brennan -- mbrennan@cgsh.com
-- of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP.
Citibank is represented by Karen Wagner --
karen.wagner@davispolk.com -- James L. Kerr --
james.kerr@davispolk.com -- Matthew B. Rowland --
matthew.rowland@davispolk.com -- and Lindsey T. Knapp --
lindsey.knapp@davispolk.com -- of Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP.
The lead case is Aurelius Capital Master Ltd. et al. v. Republic
of Argentina, case number 14-2689, in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.
* * *
The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, on Aug. 1, 2014,
reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its debt late July 30
after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million
interest payment. Earlier that day, talks with a court-
appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the
country and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds
that the country had defaulted on in 2001. A U.S. judge had ruled
that the interest payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds
led by Elliott Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they
claimed. The country hasn't been able to access international
credit markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.
As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.
The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.
Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.
On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.
The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD). The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5. The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively. The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.
ARGENTINA: Judge Punts on Enforcing Citi Subpoena
-------------------------------------------------
Max Stendahl at Law360.com reports that U.S. District Judge Thomas
Griesa said on Sept. 10 he wouldn't immediately order Citibank NA
to comply with a subpoena from a hedge fund seeking to verify the
bank's claim that Argentina is pressuring it to transfer interest
payments to bondholders in violation of a court order.
The report says Judge Griesa denied a motion by NML Capital Ltd.
to force Citibank to turn over documents related to the bank's
claim that Argentina has threatened it with "grave sanctions" if
it complies with a July 28 court order by not processing
Argentina's bond payments unless the country makes a corresponding
payment to NML.
The judge said he would wait for the Second Circuit to decide a
pending appeal by Citibank and Argentina challenging the July 28
order, reports Law360.com. A ruling is expected before a Sept. 30
payment deadline.
"I do not deny that there may be conduct, there may be warnings,
there may be information which could indicate that there might be
efforts by the Republic of Argentina to get Citibank to do what
might be in violation of this court's orders," the report quoted
Judge Griesa as saying during a hearing in Manhattan court.
But, he added, "This court should take no action at this time
while the appeal is pending before the court of appeals. It almost
goes without saying that what the court of appeals does will have
an effect on the issues we're discussing here, and therefore this
court reserves decision on the issues about discovery and the
issues about subpoenas," reports Law360.com.
The report recalls that plaintiffs -- hedge funds including NML
and Aurelius Capital Management LP -- bought Argentine sovereign
debt at a discount after the country defaulted on $100 billion in
bonds in 2001. The funds refused to swap them out in
restructurings in 2005 and 2010, instead suing in the U.S. for
full repayment.
Judge Griesa has said that Argentina can't pay bondholders that
agreed to debt restructurings unless it also makes a ratable
payment to the "holdout" hedge funds, notes Law360.com. The Second
Circuit upheld that finding, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined
to take up Argentina's appeal.
In its current Second Circuit appeal, notes Law360.com, Citibank
has argued that its Argentina branch should be allowed to make
payments in that country on so-called Argentine law bonds held by
customers of the branch. Otherwise, the bank says, it could be
kicked out of the country or found in violation of local criminal
laws.
But NML, in its Sept. 2 motion to enforce the subpoena, said it
needed to conduct discovery immediately to determine whether
Citibank's claims had merit, Law360.com relays.
"In effect, Citibank is seeking to have the Second Circuit rely on
the evidence of 'coercion' that it wants the Second Circuit to
see, while simultaneously refusing to allow NML or the courts to
see any information that may cast these contentions in a different
light," the hedge fund said in the motion, notes the report.
The hedge funds are represented by Gibson Dunn, Dechert LLP,
Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP, Milberg LLP and Simon Lesser
PC.
Argentina is represented by Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
and Bancroft PLLC.
Citibank is represented by Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP.
The case is NML Capital Ltd. v. the Republic of Argentina, case
number 1:08-cv-06978, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York.
* * *
The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, on Aug. 1, 2014,
reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its debt late July 30
after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million
interest payment. Earlier that day, talks with a court-
appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the
country and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds
that the country had defaulted on in 2001. A U.S. judge had ruled
that the interest payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds
led by Elliott Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they
claimed. The country hasn't been able to access international
credit markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.
As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.
The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.
Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.
On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.
The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD). The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5. The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively. The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.
ARGENTINA: Most Debtholders Don't Want Change in Bond Jurisdiction
------------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that majority of Argentina's debt investors do not
want to take up a government proposal to change the jurisdiction
governing their bonds, Economy Minister Axel Kicillof told members
of the country's Congress on Sept 9.
The South American country last month unveiled plans to make
payments on its foreign-held bonds locally and offer creditors the
possibility of bringing their debt under Argentine law to skirt a
U.S. court ruling that led to its latest default, the report
recalls.
"It is not the wish of a majority of bondholders, as far as I
know, to have a big change in the jurisdiction," Minister Kicillof
told a number of Congressional committees, notes Reuters.
Argentina defaulted in July after a U.S. court blocked an interest
payment to holders of its restructured debt governed by U.S. law,
ordering the government to settle first with a small group of U.S.
hedge funds who spurned previous bond swaps and demand full
payment.
The report says the frozen coupon payment is still held by U.S.
intermediary Bank of New York Mellon.
Minister Kicillof told lawmakers the Buenos Aires government was
open to suggestions from bondholders about where to make payments
if investors were unhappy with its proposal of Nacion
Fideicomisos, a unit of state-controlled Banco Nacion, Reuters
relates.
Lawyers say Argentina's proposed debt restructuring plan faces
massive legal and logistical hurdles that mean it may never get
off the ground, even if it is approved by lawmakers in Congress,
which is controlled by allies of President Cristina Fernandez,
adds the report.
* * *
The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, on Aug. 1, 2014,
reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its debt late July 30
after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million
interest payment. Earlier that day, talks with a court-
appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the
country and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds
that the country had defaulted on in 2001. A U.S. judge had ruled
that the interest payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds
led by Elliott Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they
claimed. The country hasn't been able to access international
credit markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.
As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.
The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.
Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.
On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.
The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD). The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5. The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively. The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.
ARGENTINA: Macri's Presidential Bid Wins Support Amid Debt Stance
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Camila Russo and Charlie Devereux, writing for Bloomberg News,
reported that for holders of Argentina's defaulted bonds who are
willing to wait 15 months for the chance to get paid, Mauricio
Macri's surge in presidential polls provides a measure of
consolation.
Macri, 55, is the mayor of Buenos Aires. Bloomberg said Macri has
seen his support among voters more than double to 23.2% since
April, the latest survey results showed. After languishing in
third place for much of the year, Macri has now vaulted to a
virtual tie with the two leading contenders.
The Bloomberg report said Macri has been the most outspoken about
the need for a resolution of the country's latest crisis.
Bloomberg said reaching a compromise would let Argentina, which
holds elections in October 2015, resume bond payments that are
currently being blocked. It would also remove the last vestige of
its record default in 2001 and help end Argentina's isolation from
international markets.
In 2001, Argentina defaulted on $95 billion of debt. It
renegotiated about 92% of its debt with creditors by issuing new
bonds worth 30 cents on the dollar, some holders including
billionaire Paul Singer rejected the terms, sued and were awarded
full payment in court.
Bloomberg noted that U.S. Judge Thomas Griesa ordered trustee Bank
of New York Mellon Corp. to keep $539 million of interest payments
until Argentina complies with the ruling or settles. The default,
which pushed the economy deeper into recession, has also fueled
the worst peso rout since 2002 as Argentines hoard dollars.
According to Bloomberg, Argentina's Economy Minister Axel
Kicillof, who met with holdout creditors in New York in July, said
the "vulture funds" are seeking to profit off of extortion and
that it's "impossible" to comply with the ruling.
According to Bloomberg, Argentina on Aug. 19 said it plans to
skirt the court ruling and make bond payments via local banks. The
bill, which was approved by the lower house Sept. 11, also gives
investors the option to voluntarily exchange international bonds
into new debt issued under domestic law.
According to Bloomberg, the day after the government announced the
plan, Macri said at a news conference that his party's legislators
would vote against it. In a July 24 interview with Todo Noticias
TV channel, he said Argentina should "negotiate in court the best
possible conditions in favor of Argentina and solve the problem."
Bloomberg said bondholders who piled into Argentina's dollar-
denominated bonds, betting the nation would avert the default,
have suffered losses since the July 30 deadline passed without a
resolution. Argentina's benchmark dollar bonds due 2033 have
fallen 10.45 cents on the dollar since reaching a four-year high
of 95.57 cents on July 30, the report added.
* * *
The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, on Aug. 1, 2014,
reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its debt late July 30
after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million
interest payment. Earlier that day, talks with a court-
appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the
country and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds
that the country had defaulted on in 2001. A U.S. judge had ruled
that the interest payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds
led by Elliott Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they
claimed. The country hasn't been able to access international
credit markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.
As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.
The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.
Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.
On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.
The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD). The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5. The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively. The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.
ARGENTINA: Currency Devaluation Seen Following Bond Default
-----------------------------------------------------------
Camila Russo and Sebastian Boyd, writing for Bloomberg News,
reported that another devaluation of Argentina's peso has become
all but inevitable after the country's bond default in July.
According to Bloomberg, the gap between the currency's spot rate
and an unofficial rate used in offshore bond trading widened to a
record 5 pesos this month. That compares with almost 4 pesos just
before Argentina devalued by 14 percent in January in an attempt
to prop up its dwindling foreign reserves. Strategists surveyed by
Bloomberg expect the peso to weaken 10.3 percent by year-end to
9.37 per dollar, the most among 39 peers.
The report noted that Argentina's peso is already the worst-
performing major currency of 2014, plunging 22 percent amid a
shrinking economy and a debt default in July that accelerated the
flight of capital from the country. The government has accused
foreign investors of trying to engineer a devaluation on their
own, boosting speculation that Argentina is providing a tacit
admission that it's already preparing for the worst.
The report also noted that Argentina's Economy Minister Axel
Kicillof said in a speech to lawmakers on Sept. 9 that holdout
creditors are putting pressure on the peso with the help of local
businessmen and the media, and are "working to get a devaluation."
The government has strengthened capital controls to avoid just
that end result, the report added. In recent months, officials
have reduced the amount of foreign currency banks can hold to 20
percent of liquid assets from 30 percent, and authorities now
informally require lenders to seek authorization for dollar
purchases of $150,000 or more.
* * *
The Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America, on Aug. 1, 2014,
reported that Argentina defaulted on some of its debt late July 30
after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a US$539 million
interest payment. Earlier that day, talks with a court-
appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the
country and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds
that the country had defaulted on in 2001. A U.S. judge had ruled
that the interest payment couldn't be made unless the hedge funds
led by Elliott Management Corp., got the US$1.5 billion they
claimed. The country hasn't been able to access international
credit markets since its US$95 billion default 13 years ago.
As a result, reported the TCR-LA on Aug. 1, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-and short-term
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of
Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.
The TCR-LA, on Aug. 4, 2014, also reported that Fitch Ratings
downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC', and its Short-Term Foreign Currency
Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C'.
Meanwhile, Moody's Investors Service affirmed Argentina's Caa1
issuer rating, which also applies to domestic law bonds, confirmed
the (P)Caa2 rating for its foreign law bonds, and affirmed the Ca
rating on the original defaulted bonds. The long-term issuer
rating was placed on negative outlook, reported the TCR-LA on Aug.
5, 2014.
On Aug. 8, 2014, the TCR-LA reported that Moody's Latin America
Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo affirmed the deposit, debt,
issuer and corporate family ratings on Argentina's banks and
financial institutions, both on the global and national scales.
The outlook on these ratings has been changed to negative from
stable. At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the
banks' Caa2 foreign-currency deposit ratings and Not-
Prime short-term ratings. The banks' standalone E financial
strength ratings corresponding to caa1 baseline credit assessments
(BCA) have also been affirmed.
The TCR-LA, On Aug. 6, 2014, also reported that DBRS Inc. has
downgraded Argentina's long-term foreign currency issuer rating
from CC to Selective Default (SD). The short-term foreign
currency rating has been downgraded to Default (D), from R-5. The
long-term and short-term local currency issuer ratings have been
confirmed at B (low) and R-5, respectively. The trend on the
long-term local currency rating is Negative, and the trend on the
short-term local currency rating is Stable.
=============
B A H A M A S
=============
ALLIANCE INVESTMENT: Enabled Battoo Fraud, US SEC Says
------------------------------------------------------
The Securities and Exchange Commission has charged a Bahamas-based
brokerage firm and its president for enabling a fraud that was
halted when the SEC charged the hedge fund manager at the center
of the scheme.
The SEC, in a statement dated Aug. 9, alleges that Julian R. Brown
and his firm Alliance Investment Management Limited (AIM)
purported to be the "custodian" for assets under the management of
Nikolai Battoo. The SEC obtained a court-ordered freeze over
Battoo's assets after charging him in 2012 with defrauding
investors around the world by hiding major losses while falsely
boasting that their investments were performing remarkably during
the financial crisis.
According to the SEC's complaint filed in August against Brown and
AIM in federal court in Chicago, they misrepresented themselves to
investors as Battoo's custodian when, since at least 2009, their
firm did not have custody of most of the assets listed on investor
account statements. Brown and AIM allowed Battoo to create false
account statements on AIM letterhead that vastly overstated the
value of investors' assets by more than $150 million. Brown and
AIM then routinely provided the false account statements to
auditors and others acting on behalf of Battoo's investors.
The SEC further alleges that Brown and AIM permitted Battoo to
misappropriate at least $45 million of investor funds by
transferring money at Battoo's behest from investor accounts to
Battoo's direct control. Battoo used investor funds to pay AIM
and Brown more than $5 million in return for their critical
assistance.
"We allege that Brown and his firm enabled Battoo's scheme by
providing investors with false assurances about who was holding
their money and how much money they had in their accounts," said
Timothy Warren, associate director of the SEC's Chicago Regional
Office.
The SEC's complaint alleges that Brown and AIM violated Section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, and aided and
abetted Battoo's violations of the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws.
The SEC's investigation, which is continuing, has been conducted
by John D. Mitchell in the Chicago office, and assisted by Carlos
CostaRodrigues, Marianne Olson, and Alberto Arevalo in the
agency's Office of International Affairs. The litigation will be
led by Daniel J. Hayes. The SEC appreciates the assistance of the
Securities Commission of the Bahamas, British Virgin Islands
Financial Services Commission, and Guernsey Financial Services
Commission.
=============
B E R M U D A
=============
FRONTLINE LTD: Reports $78.95-Mil. Net Loss in June 30 Quarter
--------------------------------------------------------------
Frontline Ltd. filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission its quarterly report on Form 6-K, disclosing a net loss
of $78.95 million on $118.97 million of total operating revenues
for the three months ended June 30, 2014, compared with a net loss
of $120.93 million on $121.22 million of total operating revenues
for the same period in 2013.
The Company's balance sheet at June 30, 2014, showed $1.25 billion
in total assets, $1.31 billion in total liabilities and total
stockholders' deficit of $61.79 million.
A copy of the Form 6-K is available at:
http://is.gd/qzLBX0
About Frontline Ltd.
Frontline Ltd. is a Hamilton, Bermuda-based operator of very large
crude carriers.
Frontline said in November 2011 that it will need new funding in
the first half of 2012 to cover cash obligations. There are also
"significant uncertainties" about compliance with loan covenants
in the last quarter of 2011. The Company said it "will seek
discussions" with creditors with the aim of reaching agreement on
a "restructuring solution" by the end of this year.
The Company completed a restructuring of its business in December
2011. The restructuring included the sale of 15 wholly-owned
special purpose companies ("SPCs"), which together owned five VLCC
newbuilding contracts, six VLCCs, including one on time charter,
and four Suezmax tankers to Frontline 2012 Limited ("Frontline
2012"). The sale of these SPCs resulted in a loss of $307.0
million, which was recorded in 2011. In addition, the Company
obtained agreements with its major counterparts whereby the gross
charter payment commitment under existing chartering arrangements
on 32 vessels was reduced.
===========
B R A Z I L
===========
BANCO MIZUHO: Moody's Maintains Ba3 Baseline Credit Assessment
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative, from stable,
the outlook on Banco Mizuho do Brasil S.A.'s (Mizuho Brazil) long-
term foreign currency deposit rating of Baa2. At the same time,
Moody's affirmed all ratings of Mizuho Brazil and maintained its
baseline credit assessment (BCA) at ba3. The outlook on the bank
financial strength rating of D-, the long-term global local
currency deposit rating of Baa2 and the long-term Brazilian
national scale deposit ratings of Aaa.br remained stable.
This rating action follows the change in outlook to negative, from
stable, on Brazil's government bond ratings. Please refer to the
press release "Moody's changes outlook of Brazil's rating to
negative from stable; affirms Baa2 government bond rating" dated 9
September 2014.
The following rating was affirmed, with outlook changed to
negative from stable:
Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating of Baa2
The following ratings were affirmed:
Bank financial strength rating: D-, stable outlook, equivalent to
a baseline credit assessment of ba3
Long-term global local-currency deposit rating: Baa2, stable
outlook
Short-term global local-currency deposit rating: Prime-3
Short-term foreign-currency deposit rating: Prime-3
Long-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating: Aaa.br, stable
outlook
Short-term Brazilian national scale deposit rating: BR-1
Ratings Rationale
The ratings affirmation and the outlook change to negative, from
stable, on Mizuho Brazil's long-term foreign currency deposit
rating follows the change in outlook on Brazil's Baa2 sovereign
rating. The bank's rating is at the same level of the sovereign
rating and, therefore, a change in outlook on the Baa2 government
bond rating also affects the outlook on Mizuho Brazil's foreign
currency deposit rating.
The main drivers of the outlook change on the sovereign rating
include a) a sustained reduction in Brazil's economic growth,
which shows little sign of a return to potential in the near term;
b) a marked deterioration in investor sentiment which has
negatively impacted fixed capital formation in Brazil; and c) the
fiscal challenges these economic headwinds pose, impeding the
reversal of the upward trend in government debt indicators. At the
same time, the country's continued resilience to external
financial shocks given its international reserve buffers; the
government balance sheet's limited vulnerability to sudden changes
in global risk appetite compared with its peers; and the
underlying credit benefits derived from Brazil's large and
diversified economy continue to support Brazil's government bond
rating at its current Baa2 level.
Methodology Used
The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in July 2014.
Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in "za" for South Africa. For further
information on Moody's approach to national scale credit ratings,
please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology published in
June 2014 entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale Ratings to
Global Scale Ratings".
Last Rating Action
The last rating action on Mizuho Brazil was on 26 February 2014
when Moody's assigned a D- BFSR to the bank. At the same date,
Moody's also assigned to Mizuho Brazil long- and short-term global
local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Baa2 and Prime-3,
respectively, as well as long- and short-term national scale
ratings of Aaa.br and BR-1, respectively. The outlook on all
ratings is stable.
Banco Mizuho do Brasil S.A. is headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil.
As of 30 June 2014, Mizuho Brazil had total assets of BRL1.71
billion ($775 million) and shareholders' equity of BRL502 million
($228 million).
JALLES MACHADO: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Global Scale CCR; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB-' global scale
and 'brA' national scale corporate credit ratings on Jalles
Machado S.A. (Jalles). The outlook is stable. The company
doesn't have any rated debt.
The ratings reflect S&P's expectation that Jalles will increase
its operating cash flow generation as a result of its premium
portfolio of products, combined with full processing capacity at
its mills due to adequate investments in cane fields in the past
few years and favorable weather conditions in the region where it
operates. In S&P's view, these factors will enable Jalles to
generate positive free operating cash flow (FOCF) in fiscal 2015
(which started on April 1, 2014) and afterwards, improving its
capital structure through debt reduction, along with debt
refinancing at better terms and conditions.
"We assess Jalles' business risk profile as "fair." The company's
EBITDA margins have consistently been above peers'--above 60%--
thanks to the production of higher value-added products such as
organic sugar, branded crystal sugar, and anhydrous ethanol. We
believe that its above-average operating efficiency reflects the
full ownership of sugarcane plantations, less competition to
obtain additional acreage as more than 50% of the company's
sugarcane plantations are the shareholders' assets, its capacity
to generate excess energy from its cogeneration boilers, and its
irrigation capacity that mitigates the volatile weather effects on
the harvest productivity. We believe that these factors mitigate
the company's limited scale of only 4.3 million tons of crushing
capacity and its operation in the state of Goias, where shipping
costs are higher than in other sugarcane producing states and soil
and weather are usually less favorable than in the state of Sao
Paulo. Although the company is exposed to volatile weather
conditions and global sugar demand and prices, we believe that its
recent investments in the plantations, increased irrigation
capacity, and the much higher prices for organic sugar mitigate
these risks," S&P said.
Jalles' ultimate shareholder is Planagri S.A. (not rated). Jalles
accounts for more than 87% of the group's revenues and debt, and
we incorporate Planagri's debt in S&P's analysis of Jalles. The
shareholders of Planagri are the majority owners and the most
senior executives of the group, with a long-term track record in
the sugarcane business.
S&P views Jalles' financial risk profile as "significant." The
drought of 2009 reduced the harvest and liquidity crunch prevented
the company from sufficiently investing in the cane fields at that
time. The company has improved its operating and free operating
cash flow generation; its shortfall in FOCF narrowed to R$3.9
million in 2014 and should be positive afterwards.
NII HOLDINGS: Aurelius Capital Issues Statement on Ch. 11 Filing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Aurelius Capital Management, LP on Sept. 15 issued a statement
regarding the commencement of Chapter 11 proceedings by NII
Holdings, Inc. and certain of its U.S. and Luxembourg
subsidiaries. The statement said:
"An Aurelius-managed entity is the largest holder of bonds due
2016 and 2019 issued by NII Capital Corp. and the second largest
holder across all five series of NII bonds."
"An Aurelius-managed entity is the largest holder of bonds due
2016 and 2019 issued by NII Capital Corp. and the second largest
holder across all five series of NII bonds.
"Aurelius welcomes NII's Chapter 11 case as a means to restore the
Company to financial health and empower management to complete the
Company's operational turnaround. Over the last several months we
have worked tirelessly with management toward that objective, and
we remain dedicated to it.
"We have taken the lead among bondholders in supporting a plan
that would allow the Company to emerge from Chapter 11 swiftly, by
deferring until after emergence the resolution (through litigation
or settlement) of many inter-creditor disputes. Aurelius was
ready last week to enter into a binding agreement to support a
plan (the "Reserve Plan") that would have:
Converted all $4.35 billion of NII bonds into 100% of the
reorganized company's equity (before taking into account the
rights offering mentioned below and any management incentive
plan).
Allocated that equity among the bondholders in accordance with the
absolute-priority rule.
Raised fresh equity through a rights offering. Aurelius offered to
backstop $125 million of that rights offering.
Deferred all inter-creditor disputes until after NII emerges from
Chapter 11. A portion of the new equity would be placed in
reserve and released as each dispute is resolved, whether through
litigation or settlement. (Any settlements reached before
emergence would be taken into account in the initial distribution
of shares at emergence.)
"The Reserve Plan would be the best of all worlds because it
would:
Restore NII to financial health within a matter of months.
Enable bondholders a full and fair opportunity to resolve any
inter-creditor disputes in an orderly way.
Honor the absolute priority rule as among bondholders.
"A bondholder group primarily holding bonds of NII's Luxembourg
subsidiary has opposed the Reserve Plan. Their opposition tells us
that they (i) lack the courage of their convictions and (ii) hope
to extract more by holding the Company hostage in Chapter 11 than
they would if the inter-creditor disputes were resolved in a fair
and orderly manner afterward.
"Aurelius wants to see NII flourish for the benefit of all
bondholders. As to inter-creditor issues, we are content to trust
the merits. We urge other bondholders to do likewise.
NOTE: Aurelius Capital Management, LP does not make any
representation or undertake any duty. Nothing herein should be
considered investment advice or a recommendation to buy or sell
any securities."
About NII Holdings
NII Holdings is a publicly held company based in Reston, Va., that
provides differentiated mobile communication services for
businesses and consumers in Latin America. NII Holdings, operating
under the Nextel brand in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, offers
fully integrated wireless communications tools with digital
cellular voice services, data services, wireless Internet access
and Nextel Direct Connect(R) and International Direct ConnectSM, a
digital two-way radio.
The Company's balance sheet at June 30, 2014, showed
$7.44 billion in total assets, $8.02 billion in total liabilities
and a stockholders' deficit of $583.55 million.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America on
August 21, 2014, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it
lowered the corporate credit rating on NII Holdings Inc. to 'D'
from 'CC'. Moody's Investors Service also cut its corporate
family rating to Caa2 from Caa1. The downgrade followed NII's
failure to pay interest due Aug. 15, 2014, on debt issued by
subsidiaries NII Capital Corp. and NII International Telecoms
S.C.A. The missed interest payment on the debt follows the
company's deteriorating operating performance, weak liquidity, and
breach of its financial maintenance covenants for the bank loans
in Brazil and vendor facilities in Brazil and in Mexico.
==========================
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
==========================
ERMITAGE ARIES: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Oct. 10
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Ermitage Aries will hear on Oct. 10, 2014, at
10:30 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 943-3100
FOUNDER CHINA: Member to Receive Wind-Up Report on Sept. 17
-----------------------------------------------------------
The member of Founder China Partners Genpar, Limited will receive
on Sept. 17, 2014, at 9:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Ting Zhou
1206 North Tower, Kerry Center
1 Guanghua Road, Chaoyang District
Beijing 100020
China
FOUNDER CHINA MANCO: Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 17
--------------------------------------------------------------
The member of Founder China Partners Manco, Limited will hear on
Sept. 17, 2014, at 9:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the
company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Ting Zhou
1206 North Tower, Kerry Center
1 Guanghua Road, Chaoyang District
Beijing 100020
China
HATTERAS CORE: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Sept. 25
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Hatteras Core Alternatives Offshore Fund, Ltd.
will hear on Sept. 25, 2014, at 11:00 a.m., the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Ogier
c/o Jonathan Turnham
Telephone: +1 (345) 815 1839
Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 9877
HAV3 (III): Shareholder to Receive Wind-Up Report on Sept. 30
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of HAV3 (III) Limited will receive on Sept. 30,
2014, at 10:45 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 943-3100
HAV3 (IV): Shareholder to Receive Wind-Up Report on Sept. 30
------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of HAV3 (IV) Limited will receive on Sept. 30,
2014, at 11:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's
wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 943-3100
HAV3 LIMITED: Shareholder to Receive Wind-Up Report on Sept. 30
---------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of HAV3 Limited will receive on Sept. 30, 2014, at
11:15 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 943-3100
KONA (CAYMAN): Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
--------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Kona (Cayman) Limited received on Sept. 16,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Julian Gover
Kona Partners LLP
2 Charles Street, Mayfair
London, W1J 5DB
England
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7183 6450
KONA FUND: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Kona Fund Limited received on Sept. 16, 2014,
the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Julian Gover
Kona Partners LLP
2 Charles Street, Mayfair
London, W1J 5DB
England
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7183 6450
KONA MASTER: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report
------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Kona Master Fund Limited received on Sept. 16,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Julian Gover
Kona Partners LLP
2 Charles Street, Mayfair
London, W1J 5DB
England
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7183 6450
SOUNDVIEW ELITE: Investment Advisor Wants Stay in Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Gerti Muho asks the Bankruptcy Court to temporarily stay
proceedings in relation to the Chapter 11 case of Soundview Elite,
Ltd., et al. He said fraud had been committed on the Court,
specifically the parties that have filed for bankruptcy had done
fraudulently for the sole purpose of stealing assets that
Mr. Muho, in his role as investment advisor for his investors,
solely controls. He said a temporary stay of all proceedings in
the Court would be beneficial and practical and may prevent
unnecessary efforts by the parties and the Court.
About Soundview Elite
Six mutual funds originally created by Citco Group of Cos.,
including Soundview Elite Ltd., filed petitions for Chapter 11
protection on Sept. 24, 2013, in Manhattan to avoid undergoing
bankruptcy liquidation in the Cayman Islands, where they are
incorporated.
The funds are Soundview Elite (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 13-13098)
Soundview Premium, Ltd. (Case No. 13-13099); Soundview Star Ltd.
(Case No. 13-13101); Elite Designated (Case No. 13-13102); Premium
Designated (Case No. 13-13103); and Star Designated (Case No.
13-13104). The petitions were signed by Floyd Saunders as
corporate secretary. By order dated Oct. 16, 2013, the Court
directed that the Debtors' bankruptcy cases be procedurally
consolidated and jointly administered.
SoundView Elite Ltd. and two similarly named funds were the target
of a winding-up petitions in the Cayman Islands filed in August by
Citco, which had sold its interest in the funds' manager years
before. An investor, who was removed from the funds' board in
June, filed a different winding-up petition in August, aimed at
three funds created later to hold illiquid assets.
Soundview Elite estimated assets and debts of at least $10
million. The funds said in a court filing their total cash assets
of about $20 million are held in the U.S., where the funds are
managed. Court papers list the funds' total assets as $52.8
million, against debt totaling $28 million.
Judge Robert E. Gerber presides over the U.S. cases.
Warren J. Martin, Jr., Esq., Mark J. Politan, Esq., Terri Jane
Freedman, Esq., and Rachel A. Segall, Esq., at Porzio, Bromberg &
Newman, PC, serve as the Debtors' counsel. CohnReznick LLP serves
as financial advisor.
Peter Anderson and Matthew Wright, as Joint Official Liquidators
of the Debtors, are represented in the U.S. proceedings by John A.
Pintarelli, Esq., James J. Beha, II, Esq., William H. Hildbold,
Esq., at Morrison & Foerster LLP.
The U.S. Trustee solicited for the formation of an official
committee of unsecured creditors, but to date one has not been
formed.
=========
C H I L E
=========
INVERSIONES ALSACIA: Commences Solicitation of Votes Under Ch. 11
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Inversiones Alsacia S.A., together with Express de Santiago Uno
S.A. and their subsidiaries and affiliates, on Sept. 15 disclosed
that it has commenced solicitation of votes for a prepackaged plan
of reorganization to be filed under chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code. The solicitation is being carried out
pursuant to a disclosure statement dated September 15, 2014.
Under the terms and conditions of the Plan, qualified holders of
the Company's 8.0% senior secured notes due 2018 will receive (i)
new notes issued by the Company with a principal amount equal to
the aggregate of (a) the principal amount of the Existing Notes
that they hold plus (b) accrued and unpaid interest thereon at a
rate of 8.0% per annum through and including September 30, 2014
and (ii) a cash payment, to be made on the issue date of the New
Notes, in an amount equal to the interest accruing on the
aggregate of the Old Note Amount and the Capitalized Interest
Amount from and including October 1, 2014 through and excluding
the Issue Date at a rate of 8.0% per annum. The New Notes will
have an initial maturity of December 31, 2018, which may be
extended in the event that the Company successfully obtains
extensions of its concessions through at least April 22, 2021.
The New Notes will bear interest at a rate of 8.0% per annum,
which is the same as the interest rate applicable to the Existing
Notes, and will have semi-annual mandatory amortizations as set
forth in the Plan, as well as mandatory redemptions in the event
that the Company generates excess cash. Further detail on the
terms and conditions of the New Notes is contained in the
description of the New Notes included as an exhibit to the Plan.
Confirmation of the Plan remains subject, among other things, to
the successful solicitation of consents and confirmation by the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York.
The terms of the Plan were previously agreed in a Restructuring
and Plan Support Agreement, dated as of August 31, 2014 entered
into by the Company with an informal group of holders that,
collectively, holds more than 60.0% of the principal amount of the
Existing Notes. The Informal Group has agreed to vote in favor of
the Plan, subject to the terms and conditions of the RPSA.
A Company spokesman commented, "The Company expects to continue to
provide uninterrupted bus services to the citizens of Santiago and
will continue to meet its obligations to its vendors and
employees, who will not be negatively impacted in any way by the
restructuring of the Existing Notes. In addition, the
restructuring of the Existing Notes will better position the
company to invest in new low emission buses that will enable it to
provide improved service to the Chilean public."
As previously announced, the Company has not experienced and does
not expect to experience any disruptions in its operations during
its reorganization process. Specifically, the Company expects to
continue to:
* operate its full schedule of services to the citizens of
Santiago;
* provide its employees with wages, healthcare coverage, vacation
days, and similar benefits without interruption; and
* pay suppliers for goods and services received throughout the
reorganization process.
No other creditors or suppliers have been, or should be, affected
by the restructuring of the Existing Notes that is to be
implemented in accordance with the Plan. The Company remains
current on all of its other obligations as of the date of this
announcement.
In addition, the Company on Sept. 15 disclosed that it and the
Informal Group have agreed to amend the RPSA to replace the
exhibits to the RPSA -- specifically, Exhibit A (Plan), Exhibit B
(Cash Collateral Order) and Exhibit C (Description of New Notes)
-- with modified exhibits.
Copies of the Disclosure Statement, including: (i) the Plan, (ii)
the RPSA, (iii) financial projections, (iv) the description of
New Notes and (v) the Company's historical financial statements,
and the RPSA amendment are available on the Company's website --
www.alsacia.cl or www.expsl.cl -- under the heading
"Inversionistas - Comunicados y Noticias" for both Inversiones
Alsacia S.A. and Express de Santiago Uno S.A.
About Inversiones Alsacia
Inversiones Alsacia S.A., together with its affiliate, Express de
Santiago Uno S.A., are collectively the largest operator in the
Transantiago Transportation System, transporting approximately
800,000 passengers every day, throughout 35 communities in
Santiago, Chile, which accounts for more than 30% of the
passengers in Transantiago.
Alsacia and Express belong to an international holding company
with interests in public passenger transportation, environmental
solutions, outsourcing services and real estate development in
Chile, Colombia, Panama, Peru and the United States of America.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Aug
22, 2014, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the senior secured
rating of Inversiones Alsacia S.A. to Caa3 from Caa2. The rating
was also placed under review for downgrade. The rating downgrade
reflected Alsacia's default on the required interest and principal
payment due on August 18 to an informal group of holders that,
collectively, holds more than 60% of the principal amount of the
Company's 8% senior secured notes due 2018. Moody's added that the
ratings downgrade also reflected the Company's plan to commence a
restructuring process on the outstanding senior secured notes.
The TCRLA also reported on Aug 22, that Fitch Ratings downgraded
to 'D' from 'CC' the rating of Inversiones Alsacia's US$464
million senior secured bonds due in 2018. Fitch said the rating
downgrade reflects Alsacia's lack of payment of the debt service
obligations due Aug. 18, 2014, which constitutes an Event of
Default upon the notes' indenture, with no cure period or
possibility for a waiver.
INVERSIONES ALSACIA: Solicitation Materials Now Available
---------------------------------------------------------
Inversiones Alsacia S.A., together with Express de Santiago Uno
S.A. and their subsidiaries and affiliates, on Sept. 15 disclosed
that copies of the disclosure statement for their prepackaged plan
of reorganization to be filed under chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code dated September 15, 2014, including: (i)
the Plan, (ii) RPSA, (iii) financial projections, (iv) the
description of New Notes and (v) the Company's historical
financial statements, and the RPSA amendment are now also
available at https://cases.primeclerk.com/alsacia.
About Inversiones Alsacia
Inversiones Alsacia S.A., together with its affiliate, Express de
Santiago Uno S.A., are collectively the largest operator in the
Transantiago Transportation System, transporting approximately
800,000 passengers every day, throughout 35 communities in
Santiago, Chile, which accounts for more than 30% of the
passengers in Transantiago.
Alsacia and Express belong to an international holding company
with interests in public passenger transportation, environmental
solutions, outsourcing services and real estate development in
Chile, Colombia, Panama, Peru and the United States of America.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Aug
22, 2014, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the senior secured
rating of Inversiones Alsacia S.A. to Caa3 from Caa2. The rating
was also placed under review for downgrade. The rating downgrade
reflected Alsacia's default on the required interest and principal
payment due on August 18 to an informal group of holders that,
collectively, holds more than 60% of the principal amount of the
Company's 8% senior secured notes due 2018. Moody's added that the
ratings downgrade also reflected the Company's plan to commence a
restructuring process on the outstanding senior secured notes.
The TCRLA also reported on Aug 22, that Fitch Ratings downgraded
to 'D' from 'CC' the rating of Inversiones Alsacia's US$464
million senior secured bonds due in 2018. Fitch said the rating
downgrade reflects Alsacia's lack of payment of the debt service
obligations due Aug. 18, 2014, which constitutes an Event of
Default upon the notes' indenture, with no cure period or
possibility for a waiver.
=======
P E R U
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INKIA ENERGY: Fitch Corrects Sept. 11 Ratings Release
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings corrected its release originally published on Sept.
11, 2014. It clarifies information regarding Inkia's short-term
debt.
The corrected release is as follows:
Fitch Ratings expects Inkia Energy Limited's (Inkia; long-term IDR
'BB'/Outlook Negative) proposed amendments to the Indenture
governing its notes to be a neutral-to-negative credit event.
Fitch will monitor the outcome of the solicitation and resulting
changes in Inkia's credit profile.
New Parent to Have Weaker Credit Profile:
Israel Corp (IC) plans to spin off its international operations
and other assets into a new holding company, Kenon, which will be
the ultimate parent of Inkia. Kenon will likely have a credit
profile weaker than that of IC since Israel Chemicals Ltd. ICL,
the largest contributor to IC's consolidated net income, will
remain under IC.
Inkia's ratings incorporate the credit quality and historical
parent support reflected on subordinated loans and payment of no
upstream dividends. Fitch revised the Rating Outlook to Negative
after Inkia repaid USD168 million subordinated intercompany loans
to Israel Corp in May 2014. Fitch considers that changes in
Inkia's dividend policy following the change of parent or other
upstream transfers may trigger a negative rating action.
Lower Investable Base due to Acter's Indebtedness:
The company expects to apply USD125 million from the proceeds from
the sale of its equity interest in EDEGEL S.A.A. (EDEGEL) to repay
a short-term senior intercompany loan from IC Power. This loan
was granted in August 2014 and was used to repay short-term debt
taken by Acter, the investment vehicle that held Inkia's
participation in EDEGEL, in December 2013. This short-term debt
reduced the investable base from the sale of EDEGEL, at the time
the debt was incurred, in approximately USD125 million or USD70
million, net of taxes. Fitch expects the company to use the
remaining proceeds from this divestiture to acquire cash-
contributing assets similar to EDEGEL or to reduce third party
debt.
Rating Sensitivity:
A negative rating action could be triggered by a combination of:
investments in projects with higher risk profiles than that of
EDEGEL; deterioration of credit metrics as result of new
investments, dividend payments while leverage is high; failure to
decrease consolidated leverage below 4.0x after Cerro del Aguila
and Samay I commence operations; concentration of assets in
countries with high political and economic risk.
Although a positive rating action is not expected in the near
future, any combination of the following factors could be
considered: the Peruvian operation's cash flow contribution
increasing beyond current expectations and/or leverage declines
materially.
PACIFIC RUBIALES: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to $500MM Sr. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB+' rating to
Pacific Rubiales Energy Corp.'s (Pacific: BB+/Stable/--) proposed
$500 million senior unsecured notes due 2025. The notes will
benefit from the unconditional and irrevocable guarantee by the
company's main subsidiaries, which represent about 85% of the
Pacific's total assets. S&P expects the company to use the
proceeds for refinancing activities and capital expenditures
program.
The rating on the notes is based on S&P's corporate credit rating
on Pacific. The 'BB+' corporate credit rating on Pacific is
derived from S&P's anchor of 'bb+', based on the company's "fair"
business risk profile given its geographic concentration because
it generates 100% of its EBITDA in Colombia; smaller scale in
terms of proved reserves with about 290 million barrels (MMbbl) as
of 2013 compared with its investment-grade peers with more than
1,500 MMbbl; and 50% of its revenues coming from the Rubiales and
Piriri blocks, whose concessions expire in 2016. However, S&P
believes that the combined production from the new heavy-oil
fields, CPE-6 and Rio Ariari, and Pacific's active exploration
program will help the company to replace its production from the
Rubiales field in the next two to three years. The rating also
reflects the company's "intermediate" financial risk profile based
on its debt leverage of less than 1.5x and its strong cash
generation despite its aggressive capital expenditures plans of
about $2.5 billion during the next two years.
RATINGS LIST
Pacific Rubiales Energy Corp.
Corporate credit rating BB+/Stable/--
Rating Assigned
Pacific Rubiales Energy Corp.
Sr. unsec. notes due 2025 BB+
PACIFIC RUBIALES: Fitch Expects to Rate USD500MM Debt Issuance BB+
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings expects to rate Pacific Rubiales Energy Corp's
(Pacific Rubiales) proposed senior unsecured debt issuance of up
to USD500 million 'BB+'. The notes are expected to mature in
Jan. 2025. Pacific Rubiales expects to use all the proceeds to
refinance shorter term debt maturities.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Pacific Rubiales' ratings are supported by the company's
leadership position as the largest independent oil and gas player
in Colombia and its strong management with recognized expertise in
heavy oil exploration and production. The ratings also reflect
the company's strong liquidity and adequate leverage. The company
faces developing risks associated with increasing production from
existing fields in order to offset decrease in production expected
for 2016, when the production agreement for its main producing
field expires. Pacific Rubiales' credit quality is tempered by
the company's relatively small scale, production concentration and
relatively small reserve profile. The company also benefits
somewhat from its partnerships with Ecopetrol ('BBB' IDR by
Fitch), Colombia's national oil and gas company, which supports
Pacific Rubiales' investments and shares production.
SOLID FINANCIAL PROFILE
The company's ratings reflect its adequate financial profile
characterized by low leverage and strong interest and debt service
coverage. As of the last 12 months (LTM) ended June 30, 2014, the
company reported leverage ratios, as measured by total net debt to
EBITDA and total debt-to-total proved reserves of 1.4 times (x)
and USD9.7 per barrels of oil equivalent (boe), respectively. As
of June 30, 2014, debt of approximately USD4.3 billion was
primarily composed mostly of senior unsecured notes due between
2019 and 2023 and to a lesser extent of short-term bank financing.
As of the LTM ended June 30, 2014, Pacific Rubiales reported an
EBITDA, as measured by operating income plus depreciation and
stock-based compensation, of USD2.7 billion.
PIRIRI-RUBIALES CONCESSION EXPIRES IN 2016
Although Pacific Rubiales production and reserves profile has
significantly improved in recent years, the expiration of the
Piriri-Rubiales production agreement in 2016 is expected to have a
significant impact on the company's financial results. As a
result of the expiration of the Piriri-Rubiales production
agreement in 2016, Fitch expects Pacific Rubiales' production
level for 2017 to be in line with that of 2012 or below current
production. This field currently represents 43% of total net
production, down from 75% in 2010. The company is expected to be
able to replace Piriri-Rubiales production by 2017 given the
company's recent diversification efforts and high reserve
replacement ratios, coupled with its proven track record of
increasing production. The rating does not incorporate the
possibility of extending production from this field past its
expiration date. As of December 2013, this field represented
approximately 15% of the company's total proved reserves of 455
million boe; excluding Piriri-Rubiales resources, debt-to reserves
(1P) would increase to approximately USD11.1 per boe.
ADEQUATE OPERATING METRICS
The operating metrics for the company have been improving rapidly
and its growth strategy is considered somewhat aggressive. During
2013, the company reserve replacement ratio was 314% and its
current 2P reserve life index is approximately 13 years using
current production levels; 1P reserve life stood at approximately
8.3 years during 2013. During the past two years the company
increased gross and net production to approximately 320,078 boe/d
and 149,118 boe/d from approximately 235,796 boe/d and 92,611
boe/d as of June 2012, respectively.
As of December 2013, Pacific Rubiales' proved (1P) and proved and
probable (2P) reserves, net of royalties, amounted to
approximately 394 million and 619 million boe, respectively.
Pacific Rubiales has a significant number of exploration
prospects, which will require significant funds to develop. In
the short term, the company plans to devote its efforts to develop
the Quifa, Sabanero and CPE-6 blocks, which surround and are near
Piriri-Rubiales block.
CAPEX TO PRESSURE FREE CASH FLOW
Free cash flow (cash flow from operations less capital
expenditures and dividends) has been negative given the company's
growth strategy. Pacific Rubiales' significant capital
expenditures plans over the next few years could continue to
pressure free cash flow in the near term. Increasing production
at the Piriri-Rubiales and the surrounding Quifa block are
expected to account for the bulk of the company's capital
expenditure, which is expected to be approximately USD2.5 billion
per year. By the year 2017 and after the expiration of the
Piriri-Rubiales concession, leverage is expected to range be below
2x and to range between 1.0x to 1.5x.
STRONG LIQUIDITY POSITION
The company's current liquidity position is considered strong,
characterized by strong cash flow generation and manageable short-
term debt obligations. As of June 30, 2014, cash on hand amounted
to approximately USD427 million, while short-term debt was USD455
million. The company also has committed credit facilities
totaling USD1.0 billion and as of June 30, 2014, it had drawn down
approximately USD100 million.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
A rating downgrade would be triggered by any combination of the
following events: A sustained adjusted leverage above 2x, driven
by increase in debt for exploration combined with a low success
rate of discoveries; an increase in royalties that significantly
cripples the company's financial profile (no changes in royalties
are expected in the near future;) and/or a decline in production
and reserves. Pacific Rubiales ratings could also be pressured if
the company fails to increase production in order to replace the
significant contribution of the Piriri-Rubiales field by the time
the concession expires.
Although a positive rating action is unlikely in the medium term
given the current developing risks associated with the company,
factors that could result in a positive rating action include an
increased diversification of the production profile of the
company, consistent growth of both production and reserves,
positive free cash flow generation.
PACIFIC RUBIALES: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating on $750MM Sr. Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba2 rating to Pacific
Rubiales Energy Corp.'s (PRE) offering of up to $750 million
senior unsecured notes due 2025, equal to PRE's Corporate Family
Rating (CFR) and reflecting their pari passu status with the
company's other debt obligations. PRE will use the net proceeds
from the offering to repay borrowings under its bank credit
facilities and for general corporate purposes. The rating outlook
is stable.
Ratings Rationale
PRE'S Ba2 CFR reflects the company's improving production,
reserves and cash flow profile, and its progress on overcoming
infrastructure constraints to grow production. PRE's production
has continued to increase largely in line with expectations, with
an average production of 149,000 BOE/day in the second quarter of
2014, up 17% from the second quarter of 2013.
PRE continues to derive most of its growth from development of the
core Rubiales/Piriri and Quifa heavy oil fields. However, the
company is also diversifying through acquisitions to provide new
exploration and development opportunities not only in Colombia,
but also in Peru, Guatemala, Guyana, Brazil and Papua New Guinea.
The Ba2 CFR also incorporates the risks of PRE's relatively high
concentration of production and proved reserves in the Rubiales
and Quifa concessions, which should contribute roughly 60% of
production in 2014. Moody's expect this mix to decline relative to
the company's total production as it targets almost doubling net
production to the area of 200,000 BOE/day in 2016. With the
expiration of its Rubiales/Piriri concessions in July 2016, PRE
will need to make steady progress on the Quifa field and other
prospects such as CPE-6 and Sabanero in the Llanos Basin, on the
La Creciente gas field and related LNG project, and Block Z-1
offshore Peru.
While acquisitions and exploration outside Colombia could modestly
diversify operations over the next few years, these efforts will
also entail exploration and political risk as well as potential
leveraging impacts. Moody's expect PRE's spending and leverage
profile to continue to reflect investments in strategic
infrastructure projects such as the Bicentennial Pipeline and an
LNG export facility.
Moody's expects rising production and an outlook for reasonably
high crude oil prices to continue to support strong cash margins
generating EBITDA in the $3 billion - $3.2 billion range in 2014.
Moody's also expect shareholder distributions (dividends and share
repurchases) in the $500 million range and capex of $2.3 billion
to drive modestly positive free cash flow in the $200 million -
$400 million range. In addition, additional asset sales could
improve leverage metrics for PRE.
In monitoring PRE's progress and momentum for a higher rating,
Moody's will be looking for further production growth and asset
diversification, including potential new contracts on the
Rubiales/Piriri concessions. The ratings could be downgraded if
the company experiences an extended delay or the failure to
complete asset sales to support de-leveraging. Moody's also see
relatively little flexibility at the current rating level for
further leveraged acquisitions. An inability in the medium-term to
secure parallel contracts for the expiring Rubiales/Piriri
concessions or to establish substantial alternative production
sources would also be negative for the rating.
Pacific Rubiales Energy Corp. (PRE) is a Canadian-based
exploration and production (E&P) company where it is the second
largest producer, operating in partnershiwith production
operations primarily in Colombia,p with Ecopetrol S.A., the
national oil company. It also has other assets in Peru, Guatemala,
Brazil, Guyana, Belize and Papua New Guinea. The company is
predominantly a heavy oil producer in the Llanos Basin. For the
year ended June 30, 2014 the company generated revenues of $4.9
billion and cash from operations of $2.4 billion.
PESQUERA INCA: Parent Seeks to Amend Covenants on 2017 Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
David Yong and Christine Jenkins, writing for Bloomberg News,
reported that bondholders of Corporacion Pesquera Inca SAC
bondholders are calling upon its parent, Singapore-listed China
Fishery Group Ltd. (CFG), to redeem its bonds as it pushes ahead
to relax the notes' terms and conditions.
The report said China Fishery is trying for a third time to get
noteholders of Lima, Peru-based unit Copeinca to agree to a deal
whereby the business in Peru would guarantee as much as $1.2
billion of debt at the parent level. The new deadline is 5 p.m.
New York time on Sept. 18 after two earlier ones -- on July 30 and
Aug. 21 -- passed without bondholders granting the majority
approval required.
Bloomberg recounted that China Fishery is seeking to amend
covenants on Copeinca's $250 million of 9% notes due February 2017
so that the world's third-largest fishmeal producer and holder of
the biggest anchovy quota permit in Peru can guarantee parent-
level debt, including $650 million of credit lines, $300 million
of other bonds due July 2019 and future borrowings, according to a
July 17 consent solicitation document. China Fishery is offering
$10 for every $1,000 in face value of bonds held, or 1 cent on the
dollar as a consent fee.
"They're trying to give us less than what we already have and
nobody cuts off one's own nose," Patrik Kauffmann, a money manager
in Zurich at Aquila & Co., said by e-mail on Sept. 10, the
Bloomberg report said. His firm manages about $10.7 billion of
assets, including Copeinca notes. "They should call the bond. The
consent process is likely to be a futile exercise."
Bloomberg said a third failure to win over bondholders could renew
pressure on China Fishery's credit ratings. Standard & Poor's cut
China Fishery and Copeinca by one level to B, or five notches
below investment grade, in August, citing refinancing risks.
Moody's Investors Service said in July it will review its B2
rating if the consent process fails.
China Fishery is headquartered in Hong Kong. It spent more than
$782 million taking over Copeinca in 2013, according to Bloomberg.
Copeinca has $2.5 billion of assets as at the end of March 2014.
According to Bloomberg, S&P has indicated that China Fishery
funded the acquisition in part with loans that banks say must now
be guaranteed by Copeinca. China Fishery got a four-year $650
million credit facility in March from China Citic Bank
International Ltd., Rabobank International, DBS Bank Ltd.,
Standard Chartered Plc and HSBC Holdings Plc, according to a March
24 statement. The proceeds were meant to help redeem the Copeinca
notes, among other things. That buyback plan however was scrapped
in May in favor of the consent solicitation process.
=====================
P U E R T O R I C O
=====================
PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: Fitch Maintains Neg. Watch on CC Bond Rating
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings maintains the Rating Watch Negative on $8.7 billion
of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) power revenue
bonds. The bonds are rated 'CC'.
SECURITY
The power revenue bonds are secured by a senior lien on net
revenues of the electric system.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
RESTRUCTURING OR DEFAULT REMAINS PROBABLE: Maintenance of the
current Rating Watch Negative reflects Fitch's view that a
restructuring of PREPA's debt obligations remains probable despite
recent forbearance agreements between PREPA and certain of its
creditors (including bondholders). The agreements, signed on
Aug. 14 2014, provide only temporary relief related to the
scheduled maturity of PREPA's bank lines of credit, and minimal
comfort that long-term financial compliance is sustainable.
TIME FOR NEGOTIATION PROVIDED: Pursuant to the forbearance
agreements PREPA's principal creditors have agreed not to exercise
any rights or remedies under their respective agreements through
March 31, 2015, which allows for continued operations and time for
additional negotiations. The maturity dates on PREPA's existing
$696 million of bank loans have also been extended to March 31,
2015 (from Aug. 14, 2014).
TERMS POINT TO RESTRUCTURING: Although certain provisions of the
agreements appear designed to enhance PREPA's ability to meet
near-term operating expenses, other provisions including the
required submission of a restructuring plan by March 2, 2015,
retention of a chief restructuring officer and the contemplated
use of reserve funds for debt service payments support Fitch's
view that a financial restructuring remains probable.
CASH FLOW CONCERNS REMAIN: The terms of the forbearance agreements
allow for bondholders to be paid scheduled debt service, including
payments due Jan. 1, 2015. However, Fitch remains concerned that
PREPA's net cash receipts and existing funds on hand are
insufficient to meet longer term working capital, debt service and
other funding requirements.
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE REMAINS WEAK: For the 12 months ended June
30, 2014 PREPA reported unaudited earnings before interest and
depreciation of $781 million and a net loss of ($267 million).
The net loss was well above PREPA's budgeted loss of ($161
million). Poor performance for the fiscal year was further
characterized by declining energy sales (3.6% in fiscal 2014),
declining customers (1.5%), high concentrations of accounts
receivable (25% of revenue), high fuel costs (14.99 cents/kWh) and
an unwillingness to increase base electric rates.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING: Any restructuring that does not result in
full and timely payment of the power revenue bonds according to
the original terms promised, would likely result in a further
downgrade to 'C' upon agreement and 'D' upon execution.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF: Similarly, any request for relief through
restructuring by PREPA, or GDB upon the Governor's request, as
contemplated in the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt
Enforcement and Recovery Act (the Act) would result in a further
downgrade.
NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION TO CHALLENGES: Any negotiated resolution to
the financial challenges and liquidity demands facing PREPA that
does not impair bondholders would be evaluated for commercial
reasonableness and long-term sustainability, and could lead to
consideration of a Stable Outlook and/or higher rating.
CREDIT PROFILE
PREPA is one of the largest public power systems in the U.S., and
the sole provider of power to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, an
island of about 3.6 million people and about 1.49 million electric
customers.
DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY REASONABLE BUT UNCERTAIN
PREPA's concentration of power resources in oil generation exposes
the authority to volatile fuel costs and environmental mandates.
Fitch views the utility's efforts to diversify its energy mix
positively, as the continued reduction in oil generation
dependency should alleviate some of the pressure on future
financial margins, as well as meet required U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) mandates.
PREPA has pursued a reasonable strategy to reduce dependency on
costly oil-fired generation, completing the conversion of the
Costa Sur generating facility to dual-fuel and planning for
construction of the Aguirre LNG terminal and conversion of Aguirre
generating units. However, PREPA requires additional capital to
fully execute this capital plan and access to capital remains
questionable.
WATCH RESOLUTION TIED TO RESTRUCTURING PLAN
Fitch expects to resolve the current Rating Watch Negative
following review of PREPA's proposed restructuring plan. Fitch
downgraded the rating on PREPA's net revenue bonds to 'CC' from
'BB' on June 26, 2014 to reflect its view of a probable
restructuring following introduction of the Act. Pursuant to the
terms of the forbearance agreements, PREPA is now expected to
submit to bondholders an updated business plan by December 15,
2014, and a restructuring plan by March 2, 2015. PREPA recently
appointed a chief restructuring officer, consistent with terms of
the agreements.
===============================
T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O
===============================
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: May Be Affected by Venezuela Situation
-----------------------------------------------------------
Verne Burnett, writing for Trinidad and Tobago's NewsDay, reported
that Trinidad and Tobago's economy could be adversely affected by
the current economic situation in Venezuela, according to Finance
Minister Larry Howai while addressing a breakfast meeting
September 11 hosted by First Citizens Investment Services in the
Casablanca Ballroom, Fiesta Plaza, MovieTowne at Invaders Bay.
According to the report, Howai said while TT faces relative
stability in terms of its oil and gas prices, the situation in
Venezuela poses a "big risk" and is something "that we need to pay
some close attention to and we continue to monitor very, very
closely" apart from the impact on PetroCaribe.
NewsDay said that a special report, "PetroCaribe: More Noose than
Lifeline," released by Scotiabank in Canada on September 4,
indicated that analysts expect Venezuela might be forced to
terminate the PetroCaribe program in light of worsening economic
conditions in the country.
NewsDay also noted that the bank's group CEO, Larry Nath, in his
opening remarks, observed Trinidad and Tobago's fiscal space could
be tested by further developments in Venezuela which are
threatening the longevity of the PetroCaribe Programme. He said if
the program ended "the interconnectedness with our key regional
neighbours could see this fallout leading to our shores."
NewsDay also noted that First Citizens Investment Services general
manager Jason Julien said TT manufacturers export to Caribbean
countries who are energy importers. He said, "Venezuela provided
opportunities for PetroCaribe which essentially provided
subsidised energy but packaged as a loan." He added that, "It
means that our Caribbean neighbours are very dependent on that
relationship and the existence of that facility." Julien also
explained, "The challenge will be that as Venezuela goes through
its own geo-political and economic gyrations, if that facility
were to be withdrawn and they not be allowed to transition out of
it." Juien said this would "cause an immediate shock to the
systems of our Caribbean islands which would have a whole ripple
effect for us given the export markets and the amount of capital
we have invested in the other Caribbean islands."
========================================
T U R K S & C A I C O S I S L A N D S
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ABATEMENT CORP: SEC Obtains Asset Freeze Amid Fla. Ponzi Scheme
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The Securities and Exchange Commission on Sept. 16 said an
emergency asset freeze against a company located in Turks and
Caicos Islands in connection with its operation of a South
Florida-based Ponzi scheme.
The SEC's request for the emergency asset freeze against Abatement
Corp. Holding Company Limited was granted in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Florida last week. The SEC's
complaint alleged that Abatement Corp. and its now-deceased
principal Joseph Laurer -- who commonly used the name Dr. Josef V.
Laurer -- falsely promised investors safe, guaranteed returns
while engaging in an offering fraud and Ponzi scheme from November
2004 until Laurer's death on May 15, 2014.
The SEC's complaint also names Laurer's widow Brenda Davis and
another Laurer-controlled company International Balanced Fund as
relief defendants because they received investor funds.
"Unknowing investors were led to believe that Abatement Corp. and
Laurer were watching out for their financial best interests when,
in fact, they were callously stealing their hard-earned money,"
said Eric I. Bustillo, Director of the SEC's Miami Regional
Office.
The SEC's complaint alleges that Laurer, through Abatement Corp.,
raised more than $4.6 million from approximately 50 investors
residing primarily in South Florida. Laurer, who was a member of
the City of Homestead's General Employee Pension Board and
president of the South Dade chapter of AARP, convinced investors
to give him money through false claims that he would put their
money into Abatement Corp.'s purported bond fund that invested in
triple-A rated corporate and government bonds. Laurer also told
investors that the fund would pay a guaranteed fixed return, with
no risk to principal because of insurance from either or both the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation.
The SEC alleges that by at least 2007, Laurer was operating a
full-fledged Ponzi scheme and putting virtually no new investor
money into securities, instead using investor funds to pay returns
to investors, fund investor withdrawals, and pay personal
expenses. At the time of Laurer's death, approximately $900,000
remained in Abatement Corp.'s bank account in the Turks and Caicos
Islands, and another $82,000 remains in a domestic bank account
held by International Balanced Fund. The SEC further alleges that
Laurer used investor funds for the benefit of his wife, including
paying premiums with investor funds on a half million dollar life
insurance policy she received upon his death.
The court order issued on September 12 temporarily freezes the
assets of Abatement Corp. and International Balanced Fund and sets
a hearing for September 22. Davis agreed to a temporary freeze of
certain assets of hers until November 6, pending a determination
of the SEC's claim against Davis for disgorgement. If the SEC and
Davis have not resolved the claims against her or agreed to an
extension of the temporary asset freeze by October 22, then the
court will hold a hearing on the SEC's motion against Davis on
October 24.
The SEC's complaint charges Abatement Corp. with violating Section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. In addition to
seeking an asset freeze, the SEC also seeks an order directing
Abatement Corp. and the relief defendants to pay disgorgement with
prejudgment interest and provide a sworn accounting of all
proceeds received and an order directing repatriation of any funds
held at any offshore bank or other financial institution not
subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
The SEC's investigation was conducted by Terence M. Tennant and
Mark S. Dee under the supervision of Elisha L. Frank in the SEC's
Miami Regional Office. They were assisted by Anson Kwong, Debra
E. Williamson, George Franceschini, Nicholas A. Monaco and John C.
Mattimore of the Miami office's examination program. The SEC's
litigation is being led by Andrew Schiff. The SEC appreciates the
assistance of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority and the
Turks and Caicos Islands Financial Services Commission.
***********
Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices
for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication. At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
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Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com
***********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2014. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
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