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/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/140804.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Monday, August 4, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 152 Headlines A R G E N T I N A ARGENTINA: Default Sends Ripples Through Markets ARGENTINA: Is in Default, and Also Maybe in Denial ARGENTINA: No Deal Imminent on Debt Feud ARGENTINA: Fitch Downgrades Foreign Currency IDR to 'RD' FIDEICOMISO FINANCIERO: Moody's Rates ARS8.7MM Certs. 'C.ar' B A R B A D O S REDJET CARIBBEAN: Founder Dies at 58 B R A Z I L BANCO BTG PACTUAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' FC Rating on Sub. Notes C A Y M A N I S L A N D S DYNAMIC OPPORTUNITY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 19 HOLIDAY PARTNERS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 19 ICONS LTD: A.M. Best Lowers Rating on Class C Notes From 'bb' NCH CASUALTY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings PROVENA HEALTH: Commences Liquidation Proceedings RIVERSIDE GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 28 SUERTE LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 27 TAMWEEL RESIDENTIAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings TERAMO FUND: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 19 TL SHARE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings P U E R T O R I C O PUERTO RICO: S&P Affirms 'BB' GO Debt Rating; Outlook Neg. PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: S&P Lowers Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'CCC' PUERTO RICO: Lenders to Utility Extend Payment Deadline X X X X X X X X X * BOND PRICING: For the Week From July 28 to August 1, 2014 - - - - - ================= A R G E N T I N A ================= ARGENTINA: Default Sends Ripples Through Markets ------------------------------------------------ Dan Strumpf and Saabira Chaudhuri at The Wall Street Journal report that Argentina's failure to pay its debts sent ripples through financial markets Aug. 1 as its bonds fell for a second day and an industry group ruled investors can collect on insurance that protects against a default. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association ruled that sellers of the insurance, called credit-default swaps, must compensate buyers because the nation's failure to make an interest payment to bondholders by July 30 qualified as a credit event that triggers the contracts, according to The Wall Street Journal. Up to $1.04 billion stands to change hands as a result of the ruling, according to the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp, the report notes. The report recalls that Argentina defaulted on some of its debt late July 30 after expiration of a 30-day grace period on a $539 million interest payment. Earlier that day, talks with a court- appointed mediator ended without resolving a standoff between the country and a group of hedge funds seeking full payment on bonds that the country had defaulted on in 2001. A quick resolution appears unlikely, says The Journal. In a hearing Aug 1, U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa urged both sides to restart negotiations. However, a lawyer representing Argentina said the country had lost confidence in the mediator's ability to lead discussions. Neither side has announced a date for talks to resume, notes the report. The immediate impact on financial markets was largely limited to Argentina, though some traders in Europe and the U.S. said the default added to anxieties over other trouble spots, including financial problems at Banco Espirito Santo in Portugal, the report relays. Citigroup also said that it could lose up to $80 million if U.S. banking regulators at the Interagency Country Exposure Review Committee downgrade Argentina, potentially reducing revenue and raising funding costs, the report discloses. Dollar-denominated bonds due in 2033 were trading around 86 cents on the dollar Aug 1, down from about 90 cents on July 31 and 96 cents before the default, according to traders, notes The WSJ. Trading was thin, the traders said. Argentine stocks rebounded, with the Merval Index ending up 1.7%, the report relays. Still, the report notes that the losses for the bonds were mild, indicating many in the bond market expect Argentina to eventually resume payments. For investors, the main source of optimism remains the prospect of a bank-engineered deal to help Argentina pay off the debt it owes the holdout creditors and resume interest payments to other bondholders, the report discloses. Judge Griesa has ruled that Argentina must pay the holdout hedge funds, including Elliott Management Corp.'s NML Capital Ltd. and Aurelius Capital Management LP, when it pays investors who accepted discounted bonds in restructurings in 2005 and 2010, the report says. "I think everyone is thinking this is going to be a temporary default," The WSJ quoted Kathryn Rooney Vera, a senior macroeconomic strategist at Bulltick Capital Markets, as saying. "Usually, when a sovereign defaults, you have a total collapse in prices." The report notes that Argentine bonds held steady after the ISDA decision, which affects buyers and sellers of credit default swaps, including banks, insurance companies and such institutional investors as hedge funds and pension funds. ISDA said in a statement that it would hold an auction to determine the size of the payout, though it didn't say when, the report adds. Separately, some $682 million in contracts tied to a global emerging-market CDS index will need to be settled, according to J.P. Morgan Chase, notes the report. ISDA didn't immediately detail the reasoning backing up the panel's unanimous decision, but Argentina's bond documents say that the country can only be considered to have satisfied its obligations once bondholders get the money they are owed, the report relays. While Argentina had deposited money with an intermediary, that money had not reached holders, thanks to a U.S. court ruling, reports The WSJ. In the bond market, notes The Journal, investors are more concerned with the status of negotiations with the holdouts. On July 31, Economy Minister Axel Kicillof said the country "wouldn't oppose" a deal involving third parties, the report discloses. However, prices could continue to drift lower the longer talks drag on, the report quoted Siobhan Morden, head of Latin America strategy at Jefferies LLC, as saying. "Each day that time passes and there's no agreement, it shows that this is a long-term situation," Ms. Morden said, notes The WSJ. "If the market starts to believe there is no deal with the banks, we could hit south of [70 cents]" on the bonds, Ms. Morden added. ARGENTINA: Is in Default, and Also Maybe in Denial -------------------------------------------------- Alexandra Stevenson and Irene Caselli, writing for The New York Times' DealBook, report that Argentina may be in default, but one might not know it if they have not lived in Buenos Aires. Speaking to the nation in a televised news conference, Axel Kicillof, Argentina's economy minister, called it "atomic nonsense," to say that the country had entered into a default, according to The New York Times' DealBook. The report notes that the cabinet chief, Jorge Capitanich, said that the decision by the ratings agency Standard & Poor's to put Argentina in a so-called selective default was "an absurd lie" that undermined the country's attempt to restructure its debt after it defaulted on tens of billions of bonds in 2001. The report says that this was the country's political machine in overdrive after last ditch mediated talks to avert a default broke down in New York. Argentina has been battling a group of hedge funds -- so-called holdouts -- who sued the country for a full payment of $1.5 billion on bonds that Argentina defaulted on in 2001, the report discloses. The multiyear dispute reached a breaking point after Argentina missed a deadline on a scheduled interest payment to its regular bondholders, the report notes. Argentina's predicament has arisen from a ruling by a federal judge in the United States that it could not make its regular payments on bonds without also paying the hedge fund holdouts, reports Dealbook. On July 30, a court- appointed mediator issued a statement declaring Argentina to be "imminently" in default. But Argentines woke up on July 31 to headlines in some of the country's most popular newspapers indicating that some sort of private deal was in the works and that a default would be averted, the report discloses. Local reports described how Argentine and foreign banks had put forth varying proposals to buy the debt from the hedge funds, the report notes. Such confusion did not come as a surprise to many ordinary citizens, the report says. For a nation that went through a devastating default 13 years ago, the collective memory of what a real economic default feels like is still fresh, notes the report. "It's not comparable to 2001," said Gustavo, a 32-year old who is a wholesale trader with a small family business, the report relays. Mr. Gustavo did not want to give his surname because he described how he has traded pesos under the table for United States dollars. The report says that many Argentines who saw the value of the peso spiral quickly and their savings vanish after the last default have not been caught off guard this time. "These past years have taught us a strategy of how to save up money in a reliable way," the report quoted Mr. Gustavo as saying. The report relays that for most Argentines, the currency of choice is the dollar, but they have to go through the black market to obtain it. "It is difficult or almost impossible to keep those savings safe in Argentina, because money loses value very quickly here," Mr. Gustavo added. Reaction to Argentina's default in financial markets was also muted, in part because no one seems to know what would happen next, the report says. In Argentina, stocks and bonds responded more forcefully; the price on Argentina's benchmark foreign bonds slipped after rallying over, the report discloses. The report relays that the International Swaps and Derivatives Association will announce whether Argentina's missed payment could trigger credit-default swaps on Argentine foreign securities. While the mood in Argentina remains largely calm for now, this could change, warned Barbara Kotschwar, a research fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and an adjunct at Georgetown Center for Latin American Studies, the report notes. "I think that many people buy the argument that Argentina did not default, and buy into the hatred of the evil vultures," Ms. Kotschwar said, referring to the government's attempt to vilify the hedge fund holdouts, notes DealBook. "The story to watch, however, is what conclusion Argentines will draw in the medium term if their country's economy and their personal welfare is affected and their daily lives become more complicated," the report quoted Ms. Kotschwar as saying. ARGENTINA: No Deal Imminent on Debt Feud ---------------------------------------- Nicole Hong, Ken Parks and Matt Day, writing for The Wall Street Journal, reported that Argentina's default on $29 billion in debt brought a stock-market selloff and finger pointing by the Argentine government and creditors, but investors held out hope that a resolution to the crisis could be reached. According to the report, the main source of the optimism: efforts by banks in Argentina and the U.S., including J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., to strike a deal to help Argentina pay off the debt it owes a small group of hedge funds and resume interest payments to other bondholders. On July 31, Argentina's dollar-denominated bonds due in 2033, which were among the bonds in default, fell to near 90 cents on the dollar, from 96 cents late July 30, The Journal said. Argentina's benchmark Merval stock index fell 8.4%. In the black market, the peso fell to 12.65 per dollar from 12.30 on July 30, the report related. ARGENTINA: Fitch Downgrades Foreign Currency IDR to 'RD' -------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings downgrades Argentina's ratings as follows: -- Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'RD' from 'CC'; -- Short-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating to 'RD' from 'C' -- Local Currency IDR to 'CCC' from 'B-'; -- Discount Bonds issued under Foreign Law to 'D' from 'CC'; -- Performing Foreign Law Exchanged Securities (Pars and Global 17) to 'C' from 'CC'; -- Foreign Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law to 'C' from 'B-'; -- GDP linked securities to 'CC' from 'B-'; -- Local Currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law to 'CCC' from 'B-'; -- Foreign and Local Currency non-exchanged securities under Argentine Law to 'CCC' from 'B-'; -- Country Ceiling to 'CCC' from 'B-'. The ratings on the foreign currency exchanged bonds under Argentine Law have been simultaneously withdrawn due to the difficulty of monitoring the timely servicing of these bonds. The ratings on the GDP linked securities have also been withdrawn as these are no longer considered to be relevant to Fitch's coverage. Key Rating Drivers Argentina has not been able to cure the missed coupon payments on its discount bonds issued under foreign law after the expiration of the 30-day grace period on July 30. According to Fitch's criteria, this constitutes an event of default and Fitch has downgraded Argentina's Foreign Currency IDR to 'RD' and the affected securities to 'D'. The legal process related to the dispute between Argentina and certain holdout creditors that did not participate in the 2005 and 2010 exchange offers culminated with the denial of Argentina's cert petition to the U.S. Supreme Court. As such, the U.S. Lower Court ruling was upheld, which prohibited Argentina from making payments to exchanged bond holders unless payments were also made to the plaintiffs in the case. Argentina entered into the grace period related to its coupon payments on foreign law exchanged securities (the discount bonds) due on June 30. No agreement was achieved between the government of Argentina and the holdout creditors to avert a default upon the expiry of the grace period. Fitch's downgrade of the local currency IDR by one notch reflects the agency's view that the economy will suffer from higher uncertainty and financial volatility following the sovereign default, especially as the duration of default is unpredictable. The Argentine economy is already in recession and this is likely to worsen as the default event affects confidence and potentially further constrains foreign exchange flows to the country, leading to exchange rate volatility (official as well as parallel market rates). Potentially higher fiscal deficits and monetization of those deficits could further weaken Argentina's economy. Moreover, pressure on foreign reserves is likely to resume, especially next year as there are sizeable maturities falling due on some of these bonds (e.g. Boden 2015). Fitch's downgrade of the Country Ceiling reflects the view that capital controls could be tightened further in the context of the sovereign's limited foreign financing options, especially as the authorities attempt to prevent a faster decline in international reserves. This could potentially impair the private sector's ability to access foreign exchange to meet debt service. Fitch has downgraded the rating of performing exchanged bonds under foreign law to 'C' to reflect a very high level of default risk, particularly given the imminence of the next scheduled coupon payments. There is significant uncertainty pertaining to any possible negotiations between the government of Argentina and the plaintiffs in the case. A negotiated settlement could facilitate the resumption of timely debt service payments by Argentina on these securities but such an outcome is subject to significant uncertainty. The next coupon payments are due on 30 September (Par bonds) and 2 December (Global 17 bonds). Moreover, cross-default provisions allow for holders of exchanged bonds series currently not in default to declare the acceleration of bond payments. Rating Sensitivities The Foreign and Local Currency IDRs do not have Rating Outlooks. In the absence of bond payment acceleration, Fitch would move the rating of other Foreign Currency exchanged bonds under foreign law (Pars and Global 17) to 'D' if missed payments on their scheduled due dates are not remedied at the end of their respective grace periods. On the other hand, the resumption of timely debt service on defaulted bonds will likely lead to the upgrade of the foreign currency IDR. At such time, Fitch will review the ratings of Argentina and make an assessment based on the sovereign's capacity to service debt, its economic fundamentals, and the remaining litigation risks. FIDEICOMISO FINANCIERO: Moody's Rates ARS8.7MM Certs. 'C.ar' ------------------------------------------------------------ Moody's Latin America Agente de Calificacion de Riesgo rates Fideicomiso Financiero AMES IV, a transaction that will be issued by TMF (Argentina) S.A. - acting solely in its capacity as Issuer and Trustee. The securities for this transaction have not yet been placed in the market. The transaction is pending approval from the Comision Nacional de Valores, If any assumption or factor Moody's considers when assigning the ratings change before closing, the ratings may also change. Moody's has withdrawn the ratings of the transaction because the asset and liabilities' structure has changed before issuance. Moody's has assigned new ratings to this transaction as follows. - ARS 14,535,086 in Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities (VRDA) of "Fideicomiso Financiero AMES IV", rated Aaa.ar (sf) (Argentine National Scale) and B1 (sf) (Global Scale, Local Currency) - ARS 2,241,463 in Class B Floating Rate Debt Securities (VRDB) of "Fideicomiso Financiero AMES IV", rated C.ar (sf) (Argentine National Scale) and C (sf) (Global Scale, Local Currency) - ARS 8,723,601 in Certificates of "Fideicomiso Financiero AMES IV", rated C.ar (sf) (Argentine National Scale) and C (sf) (Global Scale, Local Currency). Ratings Rationale The rated securities are payable from the cash flow coming from the assets of the trust, which is an amortizing pool of approximately 1,883 eligible personal loans denominated in Argentine pesos, with a fixed interest rate, originated by the Asociaci¢n Mutual de la Economia Solidaria ("AMES"), in an aggregate amount of ARS 15,038,061.17. These personal loans are granted to employees of the City of Buenos Aires (rated Caa1/Baa1.ar) using a "C¢digo de Descuento". The "C¢digo de Descuento" is an identifier granted by a government-related entity (in this case the City of Buenos Aires) that allows to deduct a personal loan's installment directly from the borrowers' paycheck. The originator access an Internet-based system to verify the borrower's disposable income and originate the personal loan. The maximum DTI ratio established by the City of Buenos Aires is 50%. In this transaction, the City of Buenos will be instructed to send, on a monthly basis, the scheduled principal and interest on the securitized loans directly to the trust account. In turn, the trustee, based on the master servicer's reports will reconcile any amounts that might be owned to the originator. The automatic deduction of the loans's installments reduces significantly the probability of default of the loans, which is not dependant on the borrower's willingness to pay. In this type of loan the main causes of delinquency are: (i) termination of the work relationship between the borrower and the Government of the City of Buenos Aires, (ii) judicial embargos, that may limit the maximum disposable income tan can be deducted by the GCBA, (iii) increases in the Minimum Wage that increases the minimum disposable income that the employee must receive net of deductions, (iv) variable components of the wages that are not collected in a particular month and therefore decreases the disposable income (v) and unpaid work licenses. Also, the online validation system prevents fraud and to originate loans that do not have sufficient disposable income to pay the installments. Overall credit enhancement is comprised of 3.34% of subordination for the Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities. In addition the transaction has various reserve funds and excess spread. Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating: Factors that may lead to a downgrade of the ratings include an increase in delinquency levels beyond the level Moody's assumed when rating this transaction, or a disruption in the flow of payments from the City of Buenos Aires. Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include the building of credit enhancement over time due to the turbo sequential payment structure, when compared with the level of projected losses in the securitized pool. Loss and Cash Flow Analysis: Moody's considered the credit enhancement provided in this transaction through the initial subordination levels for each rated class, as well as the historical performance of AMES's portfolio. In addition, Moody's considered factors common to consumer loans securitizations such as delinquencies, prepayments and losses; as well as specific factors related to the Argentine market, such as the probability of an increase in losses if there are changes in the macroeconomic scenario in Argentina. These factors were incorporated in a cash flow model that takes into account all the relevant features of the transaction's assets and liabilities. Monte Carlo simulations were run, which determines the expected loss for the rated securities. In assigning the rating to this transaction, Moody's assumed a lognormal distribution for defaults on the main pool with a mean of 5% and a coefficient of variation of 70%. Also, Moody's assumed prepayments of 20%. These assumptions are derived from the historical performance to date of AMES' pools. The model results showed 0.40% expected loss for the Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities, 100.00% for the Class B Floating Rate Securities and 100.00% for the Certificates. Stress Scenarios: Moody's ran several stress scenarios, including increases in the default rate assumptions. If default rates were increased 6% from the base case scenario for the pool (i.e., mean of 11% and a coefficient of variation of 70%), the ratings of the Class A Floating Rate Debt Securities would likely be downgraded to B2 (sf). The ratings of the Class B Floating Rate debt securities and the Certificates would be unchanged. Moody's also applied a stress to the cash flows by assuming an interruption of the salary payments of the City of Buenos Aires for three consecutive months. The assigned ratings are consistent with this stress scenario. The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to Rating Consumer Loan ABS Transactions" published in May 2013. =============== B A R B A D O S =============== REDJET CARIBBEAN: Founder Dies at 58 ------------------------------------ Trinidad Express reports that Ian Burns, the founder of REDjet Caribbean Ltd., operating as REDjet (Airone Caribbean/Airone Ventures Limited), the airline that was the flag carrier of Barbados, has died. Mr. Burns died in his native Ireland. Mr. Burns, 58, died from a massive heart attack. The report notes that Barbadian businessman Ralph 'Bizzy' Williams said that Burns probably died of a broken heart due to the failure of the low cost carrier. Mr. Burns, the report recalls, founded Redjet in 2010 with one-way fares as low as US$9.99 across regional destinations. The airline started operating from Barbados to Trinidad in July 2011 and offered flights to nine destinations around the Caribbean. The report notes that though widely popular among Caribbean commuters, the airline never got the institutional support sought from regional governments, Mr. Williams said. It ran into financial problems and collapsed in 2012. "The man came to Barbados. He tried to set up a regional airline. He was frustrated non-stop by technocrats, here and in the other islands," contended Mr. Williams, an investor who said he lost millions in the venture, the report relays. "And I guess he died of a broken heart. His heart failed him, and having to go back to Ireland to face all the people who invested in his project would have been a tough time for him. He was not a guy who was trivial with people's money," the report quoted Mr. Williams as saying. REDjet Caribbean Ltd., operating as REDjet (Airone Caribbean/Airone Ventures Limited), was a startup low-cost carrier (LCC) based at the Grantley Adams International Airport in Christ Church, Barbados, near Bridgetown. The privately owned airline, incorporated in Barbados featured a fleet of McDonnell Douglas MD- 82 and MD-83 aircraft. =========== B R A Z I L =========== BANCO BTG PACTUAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' FC Rating on Sub. Notes ------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Banco BTG Pactual S.A. (BTG Pactual) and its related parties: BTG Investments LP (BTGI) Banco Panamericano S.A. (PAN), Brazilian Finance & Real Estate (BFRE), Brazilian Mortgages Cia Hipotecaria (BM) and Brazilian Securities Cia de Securitizacao (BS) and of its holding company BTG Pactual Holding S.A. (BTGH). The Rating Outlook remains Positive. Rating Action And Rationale The affirmation of BTG Pactual's ratings reflect Fitch's view that the acquisition in conjunction with the bank's capital plans will not have relevant impact on its leverage and its capitalization should remain within adequate levels. The proposed transaction, after its completion, will significantly expand BTG's income diversification and enhance its stability given the recurring nature of wealth management fees: the largest business engaged by BSI. In addition to that, Fitch observes that BSI may help to geographically diversify its assets and operations outside Brazil (around 35% of expected combined assets), which will bode for its growing franchise. In terms of the strengthening of BTG Pactual's franchise, the BSI acquisition should further expand the bank's distribution capabilities by almost doubling its Assets Under Management to roughly USD200 billion and strengthening mainly its Wealth Management business unit and to a lesser extent its Asset Management business. Cost synergies should be limited as BSI's structure and team should be maintained. In Fitch's opinion, the lower margin wealth management business would not enhance BTG Pactual's current above average profitability levels, but it will reduce its expected volatility. According to information provided by BTG Pactual's management, this transaction will not encumber its capital base with intangible assets as goodwill, while the bank remains committed to preserve an adequate cushion in their regulatory capital ratios to current minimums, and those even after the changes in place due the BIS III implementation in Brazil. The transaction valued in around USD 1,700 million, will be paid 20% via the issuance of new units (stapled shares of the bank and BTGI) and the rest with resources of the bank. Fitch understands that the bank manage several financing options (own resources, additional capital increases and the issuance of BIS III complaint securities) that will allow BTG to limit the possible impact of this transaction on its capital ratios. Even when integration risk of the intended acquisition exists, as it does in any other M&A transaction, a solid history of successful integration and management of M&A process in Brazil and abroad and the good financial profile of BSI suggests that these risks are manageable for BTG Pactual. Alternatively, a failure to complete the proposed acquisition or a large use of debt for its financing may result in negative implications for the bank credit profile and ratings. Measured on a consolidated basis, BTG Pactual's capital and leverage ratios are expected to slightly deteriorate following the acquisition even considering the plans to strengthen its capital base by accessing the market. In Fitch's view, BTG Pactual's gross leverage measured as tangible assets over equity should remain around 10x; a level similar to its March 2014 level. Also, the adjusted leverage ratio and net adjusted leverage ratio should also remain similar to their current levels and not increase more than 10x-12x; which are deemed as appropriate for its current rating and considering its business model. Regulatory capital ratios are ample and well above the minimum required, albeit, benefited by the low risk weight of its large portfolio of government securities. The bank aims to keep a buffer of 100/200 basis points (bps) compared to the required minimums during the phase in period of the BIS III rules in Brazil; a policy Fitch views reasonable. The Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) and National Scale Ratings of its related parties: BTGI PAN, BFRE, BM and BS are driven by the expected support from BTG. Under Fitch Rating criteria, these companies are considered 'strategically important' to the parent, and its ratings are notched once from BTG's IDR. BTGH is a pure holding company and its long- and short-term IDRs and National Scale Ratings are equalized to those of BTG thanks to its moderate leverage levels and favorable regulatory framework towards financial groups in Brazil. PAN's Viability Rating (VR) remains limited by its still weak operating performance, even though some improvements in asset quality have been observed. Counterbalancing these aspects, the bank enjoys a stable funding base, explained by committed funding and liquidity lines from its other controlling shareholder: Caixa Economica Federal (Caixa; foreign currency LT IDR of 'BBB'/Outlook Stable) and an improved business model, derived from the experience of the new management appointed by BTG since 2011. The unfavorable market scenario has not allowed the bank to grow as fast as it would expect and this has delayed some profitability improvements. Some cost controls measures taken recently as well as two capital injections confirmed by its two controlling shareholders and announced this year should benefit the bank's results in the coming periods. Rating Sensitivities/Key Rating Drivers - VRs and IDRs BTG Pactual's VR and IDRs may be upgraded if the bank is able to maintain its consolidated net adjusted leverage within an acceptable range (net adjusted leverage below 9.0x); maintain its operating ROAA around 2%, reflecting continued revenue growth and diversification into recurrent fee income. A failure to achieve this target may trigger the review of the Rating Outlook to Stable. The ratings may be negatively affected if the bank leverage and capitalization levels deteriorate more than 15% compared to its current levels and/or if its operating ROAA is reduced in a sustained manner below 1.5%. In addition, sudden deterioration of the operating environment, leverage, profitability or a troublesome performance of one or some of its subsidiaries may negatively affect BTG Pactual's ratings. A possible failure of the BSI transaction with effects on BTG Pactual franchise and/or funding may not only trigger a change on the Outlook to Stable but also a review of the ratings with possible negative implications. PAN's VR may be upgraded after a sustained improvement of its operational results (operating ROAA above 0.5%), that helps to maintain its Fitch Core Capital Ratio in levels superior to 7% and its funding profile remains aligned with the tenor and characteristics of its assets. A negative rating action may be triggered by a longer than expected breakeven point of its operations and a backdrop of capital ratios reducing to low levels. Rating Sensitivities/Key Rating Drivers - Support and Support Rating Floors Given its nature of merchant/investment bank and relative small deposit base; Fitch believes that there is a possibility of government support, but it cannot be relied upon; hence BTG Pactual Support Rating is a '5' and its Support Rating Floor remains in 'NF'. Rating Sensitivities/Key Rating Drivers - Subordinated Debt and Other Hybrids Securities Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by BTG Pactual are all notched down from the banks' VRs; as such these securities are notched twice from BTG Pactual's VR: one notch lower due to Loss Severity features and its subordinated status, and a one- notch deduction due to moderate risk of non-performance. The subordinated debt and hybrid capital ratings are primarily sensitive to any change in the VR of the bank. Rating Sensitivities/Key Rating Drivers - PAN, BFRE, BM and BS PAN, BFRE, BM and BS are 'strategically important subsidiaries' for BTG Pactual and hence, notched once from the parent IDR. Fitch believes that despite its current relative small size and incipient earnings generation compared to the parent revenue source; these entities are part of the business plan of BTG Pactual and the tools to implement their diversification plans in the medium term towards consumer banking, real estate financing and other capital market related activities. The IDRs and National Scale Ratings of BTG Pactual's subsidiaries may be affected if their strategic importance and ability to provide support from BTG Pactual changes; even though this scenario has a low probability of occurrence. Rating Sensitivities/Key Rating Drivers - BTGI BTGI's long-term IDR rating reflects its role as an integral BTG Pactual group and the implicit support BTGI receives from BTGH. According to Fitch's criteria, BTGI is deemed as a core part of BTG Pactual group. Despite its evident links with the group (franchise, common management, relevance of its revenue stream and completely aligned business model); BTGI is not a direct subsidiary of BTGH; hence, its rating its notched once from the rating of BTGH, the primary source of support to the entity. Changes to the rating of BTG Pactual or BTGH may lead to changes to BTGI's ratings. A material deterioration of BTGI's financial profile where sustained losses and/or a significant increase of its leverage may hinder the overall financial profile of BTG group, may trigger a rating downgrade. Rating Sensitivities/Key Rating Drivers - BTGH BTGH's long and short-term IDRs and National Scale Ratings are equalized to those of its sole operating subsidiary, Banco BTG Pactual S.A.'s (BTG Pactual, IDR 'BBB-'/Outlook Stable). BTGH is a pure holding company and directly controls 71.9% of BTG Pactual. The equalization of the ratings is based on the high correlation between the probability of default for BTGH and the bank. Both are incorporated in the same jurisdiction, being overseen by Brazilian authorities. Changes to the rating of BTG Pactual may lead to changes to BTGH's ratings. Also, an increase of its double leverage ratio above 120% or a deterioration of its debt service metrics may result in a downgrade of BTGH's ratings. Fitch has taken the following rating actions: BTG Pactual -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BBB-', Outlook Positive; -- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'F3'; -- Viability Rating affirmed at 'bbb-'; -- Support Rating affirmed at '5'; -- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'No Floor'; -- Long-term National Rating affirmed at 'AA(bra)', Outlook Positive; -- Short-term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+(bra)'; -- Senior unsecured notes, due in March 2016, foreign currency rating affirmed at 'BBB-'; -- Senior unsecured notes, due in July 2016, foreign currency rating affirmed at 'BBB-'; -- Senior unsecured notes, due in September 2017, foreign currency rating affirmed at 'BBB-'; -- Senior unsecured notes due in January 2020, foreign currency rating affirmed at 'BBB-'; -- Senior unsecured notes due in January 2034, foreign currency rating affirmed at 'BBB-'; -- Subordinated notes due in September 2022, foreign currency rating affirmed at 'BB'. BTGI -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook Positive; -- Support Rating affirmed at '2'; -- Senior guaranteed notes affirmed at 'BBB-'. BTG Holding -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Positive; -- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'F3'; -- Support Rating affirmed at '5'; -- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'NF'; -- Long-term National Rating affirmed at 'AA(bra)'; Outlook Positive; -- Short-term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+(bra)'. PAN -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook Positive; -- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'B'; -- Viability Rating affirmed at 'b'; -- Support Rating affirmed at '3'; -- Long-term National Rating affirmed at 'AA-(bra)', Outlook Positive; -- Short-term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+(bra)'. BFRE -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook Positive; -- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'B'; -- Long-term National Rating affirmed at 'AA-(bra)', Outlook Positive; -- Short-term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+(bra)'. Brazilian Mortgages Cia. Hipotecaria (BM) -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook Positive; -- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'B'; -- Long-term National Rating affirmed at 'AA-(bra)', Outlook Positive; -- Short-term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+(bra)'. Brazilian Securities Cia. de Securitizacao (BS) -- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook Positive; -- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'B'; -- Long-term National Rating affirmed at 'AA-(bra)', Outlook Positive; -- Short-term National Rating affirmed at 'F1+(bra)'. ========================== C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ========================== DYNAMIC OPPORTUNITY: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 19 ---------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Dynamic Opportunity Fund, Ltd. are required to file their proofs of debt by Aug. 19, 2014, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced wind-up proceedings on July 8, 2014. The company's liquidator is: Ogier c/o Joanne Huckle Telephone: (345) 949 9876 Facsimile: (345) 949-9877 c/o Ogier 89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay Grand Cayman KY1-9007 Cayman Islands HOLIDAY PARTNERS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 19 ------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Holiday Partners Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by Aug. 19, 2014, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 4, 2014. The company's liquidator is: Appleby Trust (Cayman) Ltd c/o Richard Gordon Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4900 75 Fort Street P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108 Cayman Islands ICONS LTD: A.M. Best Lowers Rating on Class C Notes From 'bb' ------------------------------------------------------------- A.M. Best Co. has downgraded the debt ratings on five tranches and affirmed the debt rating on one additional tranche on a multi- tranche collateralized debt obligation (CDO) co-issued by two bankruptcy remote special purpose vehicles: ICONS, Ltd. (Cayman Islands) and ICONS CDO Corp. (Delaware) (collectively known as ICONS and issuers). The outlook for all ratings is stable. The principal balance of the rated notes is collateralized by a pool of trust preferred securities, surplus notes and secondary market securities (collectively, the capital securities), primarily issued by small- to medium-size insurance companies. The capital securities are pledged as security to the notes. Interest paid by the issuers of the capital securities are the primary source of funds to pay operating expenses of the issuers and interest on the notes. Repayment of the principal for the notes is primarily funded from the redemption of the capital securities. These rating actions primarily reflect: (1) the current issuer credit ratings (ICRs) of the remaining issuers of the capital securities and the number of terminated capital securities; (2) a stress of up to 250% on the assumed marginal default rates of insurers (derived from Best's Idealized Default Rates of Insurers); (3) the amount of capital securities considered to be in distress; (4) recoveries of 0% after defaults of the capital securities; and (5) qualitative factors such as the effect of interest rate spikes; subordination level associated with each rated tranche; the adjacency of very high investment grade ratings to very low non-investment grade ratings in the transaction's capital structure; and the possibility that additional redemptions of highly rated entities will leave lower-rated companies in the collateral pool. The debt ratings could be upgraded or downgraded and/or the outlook revised if there are material changes in the ICRs of the remaining insurance carriers, an increase in the number of defaulted capital securities or significant termination of the number of existing capital securities. The following debt ratings have been downgraded: ICONS, Ltd. and ICONS CDO Corp. -- to "a+" from "aa" on $40 million Class B Senior Notes Due 2034 -- to "b+" from "bb" on $8 million Class C-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2034 -- to "b+" from "bb" on $20 million Class C-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2034 -- to "b+" from "bb" on $6 million Class C-3 Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2034 -- to "ccc+" from "b+" on $20 million Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Notes Due 2034 The following debt rating has been affirmed: ICONS, Ltd. and ICONS CDO Corp. -- "aaa" on $172 million Class A Senior Notes Due 2034 NCH CASUALTY: Commences Liquidation Proceedings ----------------------------------------------- On July 9, 2014, the members of NCH Casualty Insurance SPC resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Russell Smith c/o Derek Larner Telephone: (345) 815 4555 e-mail: dlarner@bdo.ky BDO CRI (Cayman) Ltd. Floor 2-Building 3, Governors Square 23 Lime Tree Bay Ave P.O. Box 31229 Grand Cayman KY1 1205 Cayman Islands PROVENA HEALTH: Commences Liquidation Proceedings ------------------------------------------------- At an extraordinary meeting held on July 1, 2014, the members of Provena Health Assurance SPC resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. The company's liquidator is: Marsh Management Services Cayman Ltd. Governors Square, 23 Lime Tree Bay Avenue Building 4, Floor 2 P.O. Box 1051, KY1-1102, Grand Cayman Cayman Islands RIVERSIDE GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 28 ------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Riverside Global Value Fund are required to file their proofs of debt by Aug. 28, 2014, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 7, 2014. The company's liquidator is: Mourant Ozannes Cayman Liquidators Limited Mourant Ozannes Reference: NDL Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4123 Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 4647 Reference: Peter Goulden Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4123 Facsimile: +1 (345) 949 4647 94 Solaris Avenue Camana Bay P.O. Box 1348 Grand Cayman KY1-1108 Cayman Islands SUERTE LIMITED: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 27 ----------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Suerte Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by Aug. 27, 2014, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 28, 2014. The company's liquidator is: Edward Martin-Du Pan Wardour Management Services Limited Telephone: (345) 945-3301 Facsimile: (345) 945-3302 P O Box 10147 Grand Cayman KY1-1002 Cayman Islands TAMWEEL RESIDENTIAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings ------------------------------------------------------ At an extraordinary meeting held on July 4, 2014, the members of Tamweel Residential AbS CI (1) Ltd resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: David Dyer Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited P.O. Box 1984, Boundary Hall Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue Grand Cayman KY1-1104 Cayman Islands TERAMO FUND: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due Aug. 19 -------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Teramo Fund are required to file their proofs of debt by Aug. 19, 2014, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on July 10, 2014. The company's liquidator is: Appleby Trust (Cayman) Ltd c/o Richard Gordon Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4900 75 Fort Street, PO Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108 Cayman Islands TL SHARE: Commences Liquidation Proceedings ------------------------------------------- At an extraordinary meeting held on July 8, 2014, the members of TL Share Holding Corporation resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business. Creditors are required to file their proofs of debt to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: David Dyer Deutsche Bank (Cayman) Limited P.O. Box 1984, Boundary Hall Cricket Square, 171 Elgin Avenue Grand Cayman KY1-1104 Cayman Islands ===================== P U E R T O R I C O ===================== PUERTO RICO: S&P Affirms 'BB' GO Debt Rating; Outlook Neg. ---------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has affirmed its 'BB' general obligation (GO) and 'BB-' appropriation ratings on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico following an examination of Puerto Rico's enacted fiscal 2015 budget, updated quarterly disclosure, and current and projected liquidity position. The outlook is negative. "We believe that the combined cash position of the commonwealth and the Government Development Bank, which provides liquidity to the commonwealth and plans to assist Puerto Rico in its tax and revenue note cash flow financing, is currently adequate for the assigned speculative-grade rating based on our view of Puerto Rico's projections," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst David Hitchcock. The current speculative-grade ratings and negative outlook continue to reflect S&P's opinion of the commonwealth's ongoing fiscal pressures. "We are concerned about several of the risks outlined in the July quarterly disclosure report, which we believe continue to point to Puerto Rico's weakened ability and willingness to repay its debt obligations," Mr. Hitchcock added. "We have also affirmed our 'BBB' ratings on Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corp.'s (COFINA) first-lien sales tax-secured debt and our 'BBB-' ratings on COFINA's second-lien sales tax-secured debt based on what we view as strong legal protections on the security of pledged sales tax revenues, tempered by the potential in our view for a decreased willingness to pay either GO or COFINA debt given a choice between paying governmental functions and debt repayment if general fund liquidity worsened significantly. Our rating on rum tax and hotel tax debt is also affirmed and remains on a par with our GO rating, based on the our view of the potential diversion of revenue in favor of GO bondholders under the Puerto Rico Constitution, while our rating on the Highways and Transportation Authority is affirmed at 'B' due to our view of the authority being potentially subject to Puerto Rico's recent debt restructuring act for public corporations. The outlook on all of these ratings is negative," S&P said. "We had anticipated that the commonwealth would have been in a position to exhibit a stronger commitment to its GO debt obligations after having obtained $3.5 billion in financing -- an amount well above what it had previously indicated would be necessary to fund its operations for the current and next fiscal years. In addition, as we understood it, the recently enacted restructuring legislation was intended to erect a level of protection around the commonwealth's GO bonds. Instead, we believe there are risks relating to timely repayment of debt, which risks continue to be a significant focus of disclosure. The commonwealth indicates that, despite this disclosure, it is firmly committed to servicing its GO and other tax-supported obligations and has provided updated liquidity information to support this. We will continue to monitor budget and liquidity developments to assess future credit direction and expect a regular flow of timely information and disclosure from the commonwealth in order to assess this," S&P added. "The negative outlook reflects our view of Puerto Rico's weak economic trends, strained finances, a scheduled increase in debt service in fiscal 2016, continued deferred pension payments, and the potential difficulty in accessing the market for liquidity purposes if unanticipated budget shortfalls develop. In particular, lower-than-forecast revenue collections in fiscal 2015 could pose near-term problems over our one-year outlook horizon. If we believe additional liquidity pressure develops that could create a reduced willingness in the commonwealth to repay creditors in order to preserve other governmental functions, we could lower the ratings," S&P noted. PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC: S&P Lowers Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'CCC' ----------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has lowered its rating on Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's (PREPA) power revenue bonds two notches to 'CCC' from 'B-'. The rating remains on CreditWatch with negative implications, where S&P originally placed it June 18, 2014. PREPA has $8.3 billion of power revenue bonds outstanding. A pledge of the electric system's net revenues secures the bonds. The lower rating indicates that, in S&P's opinion, the authority's debt is vulnerable to nonpayment, and depends upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor to meet its commitment. In the event of adverse business, financial, or economic conditions, PREPA is not likely to have the capacity to meet its financial commitment on its obligations. "We believe that the absence of an overarching solution to liquidity issues and the structural imbalance among its revenues, operating expenses and debt service commitments suggests an increasing likelihood that the authority will not be able to satisfy debt service obligations on time and will avail itself of the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, signed into law June 28, 2014, and restructure all or portions of its debt," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Judith Waite. The law "allows public corporations, among other things, to adjust their debts in the interest of all creditors affected thereby; provides procedures for the orderly enforcement and, if necessary, the restructuring of debt in a manner consistent with the Commonwealth Constitution and the U.S. Constitution; and maximizes returns to all stakeholders by providing them going concern value based on each obligor's capacity to pay." PREPA's inability to successfully negotiate renewal of liquidity facilities needed to purchase oil has compounded its weakened financial position. The negotiating deadline for the revolving credit that matured in January was extended to July 31, and if the facility is not renewed, the authority will have to repay the $146 million outstanding, and probably relatively quickly. PREPA also has $525 million outstanding under a second revolving credit facility matures Aug. 14, 2014. If not renewed, the authority will have to repay the $525 million outstanding on that date. Normally, it repays the lines with revenue associated with fuel costs recovered from customers. However, PREPA does not have surplus liquidity to repay the amounts. Although not making credit facility payments is not a default under the revenue bond indenture, S&P believes the authority's inability to repay the amounts outstanding will increase the likelihood that it will restructure its debt. The CreditWatch placement reflects an ongoing structural imbalance among revenues, operating expenses and debt service commitments, compounded by liquidity pressures. S&P could lower the rating further if these mismatches remain unresolved and the likelihood of meeting debt service obligations erodes. S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placement within the next three months. PUERTO RICO: Lenders to Utility Extend Payment Deadline ------------------------------------------------------- Michael Corkery, writing for The New York Times' DealBook, reported that lenders to Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) are giving the beleaguered utility another two weeks before it has to make past-due payments on its lines of credit -- a roughly $250 million line from Citigroup and a $550 million line from a syndicate of banks. The agreement allows Prepa to delay until Aug. 14 certain payments that were due last month, the report related. According to the report, if Citigroup and the other lenders force Prepa to pay immediately, it could trigger the authority's restructuring and increase the likelihood of losses for the banks. ================= X X X X X X X X X ================= * BOND PRICING: For the Week From July 28 to August 1, 2014 ----------------------------------------------------------- Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price ------ ------ -------- -------- ----- BES Finance Ltd 2.9 EUR 211913000 PDVSA 6 11/15/2026 USD 4500000000 ESFG International Ltd 5.8 EUR 52950000 PDVSA 6 5/16/2024 USD 5000000000 PDVSA 5.4 4/12/2027 USD 3000000000 Mongolian Mining Corp 8.9 3/29/2017 USD 600000000 PDVSA 5.5 4/12/2037 USD 1500000000 Hindili Industry 8.6 11/4/2015 USD 380000000 BES Finance Ltd 4.5 EUR 95767000 Automotores Gildemeister SA 8.3 5/24/2021 USD 400000000 SMU SA 7.8 2/8/2020 USD 300000000 NQ Mobile Inc 4 10/15/2018 USD 172500000 Inversiones Alsacia SA 8 8/18/2018 USD 347300000 Venezuela Governement 7.7 4/21/2025 USD 1599817000 Glorious Property Holdings Ltd 13 3/4/2018 USD 400000000 Renhe Commercial 13 3/10/2016 USD 600000000 Bank Austria 1.9 EUR 97608000 China Precisoin 7.3 2/4/2018 HKD 1028000000 BCP Finance Co 2.4 EUR 99063406.25 Automotores Gildemeister SA 6.8 1/15/2023 USD 300000000 BA-CA Finance Cayman 2 Ltd 2 EUR 51481000 Argentina Bonar Bonds 26 9/10/2015 ARS 5424358000 Inversora de Electrica 6.5 9/26/2017 USD 130263886 BCP Finance Co 4.2 EUR 72112000 Mongolian Mining Corp 8.9 3/29/2017 USD 600000000 Argentina Government 4.3 12/31/2033 JPY 5840497000 PDVSA 6 5/16/2024 USD 5000000000 Argentina Boden Bonds 2 9/30/2014 ARS 930445250 PDVSA 6 11/15/2026 USD 4500000000 Greenfields Petroleum Corp 9 5/31/2017 CAD 23750000 Hindili Industry 8.6 11/4/2015 USD 380000000 Argentina Government 4.3 12/31/2033 JPY 2553017000 Argentina Bocon 2 1/3/2016 ARS 1608749924 Argentina Government 0.5 12/31/2038 JPY 21037843000 Automotores Gildemeister SA 8.3 5/24/2021 USD 400000000 Caixa Geral De Depositos Finance 1 EUR 44885000 SMU SA 7.8 USD 300000000 Renhe Commercial 13 3/10/2016 USD 600000000 Caixa Geral De Depositos Finance 2 EUR 65843000 Inversiones Alsacia SA 8 8/18/2018 USD 347300000 Automotores Gildemeister SA 6.8 1/15/2023 USD 300000000 BPI Capital Finance Ltd 2.9 EUR 15290000 Banif Finance Ltd 1.6 EUR 42234000 Banco BPI SA/Cayman Islands 4.2 11/14/2035 EUR 20000000 Empresas La Polar SA 3.8 10/10/2017 CLP 5000000 City of Buenos Aires Argentina 2 1/28/2020 USD 146771000 Aguas Andinas SA 4.2 12/1/2026 CLP 3289471.68 City of Buenos Aires Argentina 2 12/20/2019 USD 113229000 Venezuela Governement 7 3/31/2038 USD 1250003000 Empresa de Transporte 5.5 7/15/2027 CLP 3732799.8 Cia Cervecerias Unidas SA 4 12/1/2024 CLP 1050000 Almendral Telecomunicaciones SA 3.5 12/15/2014 CLP 644441.04 Cia Sud Americana de Vapores SA 6.4 10/1/2022 CLP 607142.76 Decimo Primer 4.5 10/25/2041 USD 37800000 Provincia del Chaco 4 12/4/2026 USD 10111047.85 Ruta de Bosque 6.3 3/15/2021 CLP 5062781.25 Talcan Chillan 2.8 12/15/2019 CLP 2978764.16 EMP Ferrocarriles Estado 6.5 1/1/2026 CLP 788572.14 *********** Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to publication. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com *********** S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2014. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200. * * * End of Transmission * * *