/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/140801.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Friday, August 1, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 151
Headlines
A R G E N T I N A
ARGENTINA: Default Clock Runs Out as Debt Talks Collapse
ARGENTINA: S&P Lowers Sovereign Credit Rating to 'SD'
B R A Z I L
GOL LINHAS: 2Q14 Load Factor Reached 76%; Prask Grew 27% y/y
JBS S.A.: Moody's Says Tyson Foods Deal No Impact on Ba3 Rating
* BRAZIL: Espirito Santo to Bolster Tourism with $48MM IDB Loan
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
ASHTON PERFORMANCE: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Aug. 29
ASHTON SELECT: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Aug. 29
BPI CAYMAN: Moody's Affirms (P)Ba3 Sr. Bond/Debenture Rating
BUTTERFIELD HOLDINGS: Members' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 20
CQS ABS: Members' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 18
CQS ABS MASTER: Members' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 18
DOLPHIN LEASING: Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Aug. 6
EXPENSIVE INVESTMENTS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 15
LEHMAN BROTHERS CAYMAN: Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Aug. 13
PENGUIN LEASING: Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Aug. 6
VRE INVESTMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 6
WINDSONG HOLDINGS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 4
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
XSTRATA PLC: Obtains ISO 14001 Certification
H A I T I
* HAITI: IDB OKs $14 Million Loan for Agricultural Health Services
M E X I C O
MBIA MEXICO: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating; Outlook Stable
P U E R T O R I C O
PUERTO RICO INFRASTRUCTURE: S&P Lowers Rev. Bond Rating to 'BB-'
- - - - -
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A R G E N T I N A
=================
ARGENTINA: Default Clock Runs Out as Debt Talks Collapse
--------------------------------------------------------
Katia Porzecanski, Camila Russo and Daniel Cancel at Bloomberg
News report that with Standard & Poor's saying Argentina is in
default and last-minute plans to remedy the situation falling
through, investor focus is turning to whether holders of $29
billion of bonds will demand immediate repayment.
The nation missed a deadline on July 30, to pay $539 million in
interest after two full days of negotiations in New York failed to
produce an accord with creditors from its last default in 2001,
according to Bloomberg News. A U.S. judge ruled that the payment
couldn't be made unless those investors, a group of hedge funds
led by Elliott Management Corp., got the $1.5 billion they
claimed, notes the report.
Bloomberg News discloses that as Economy Minister Axel Kicillof
returns to Buenos Aires with no set plans for further discussions
with the hedge funds he described as "vultures," other creditors
must decide whether to invoke a clause that entitles them to
demand their money back. While an 11th-hour attempt by a group of
Argentine banks to avert a crisis by purchasing the securities
from Elliott fell through, bondholders probably will give the
parties more time to reach a settlement, according to Bank of
America Corp, Bloomberg News notes.
"It's in their best interest to delay acceleration and not
introduce more difficulties," Jane Brauer, a strategist at Bank of
America, told Bloomberg News by phone from New York. "The best
thing for Argentina to do is to continue seeking a solution," Mr.
Brauer said.
Previous Swaps
According to Bloomberg News, Argentina has about $29 billion of
bonds sold in international markets and denominated in foreign
currencies with so-called cross-default provisions. Under their
terms, Argentina would have to pay back the entire balance -- plus
unpaid interest -- if at least 25 percent of holders demand that
their money be returned. The potential liabilities are equal to
the country's foreign reserves, which are already hovering close
to an eight-year low, Bloomberg News discloses.
S&P's declaration came after the expiration of a 30-day grace
period on the original June 30 payment deadline. If Argentina is
able to figure out a way to make its debt payments, the ratings
could be revised "depending on our assessment at that time of
Argentina's residual litigation risk, its access to international
debt markets and its overall credit profile," S&P said, Bloomberg
News relays.
"If there is a hint of a potential deal, bondholders will not be
incentivized to accelerate," Patrick Esteruelas, senior analyst at
Emso Partners Ltd., a money-management firm specializing in
emerging markets, said in an e-mail to Bloomberg News.
Bond Rally
The price of Argentina's $4.3 billion of bonds due in December
2033 soared July 30 by 11.8 percent to 95.57 cents on the dollar,
the highest level since 2010. The bonds were quoted at 95.89
cents July 31, according to prices on Bloomberg at 11:08 a.m. in
London.
"The price action suggests the market thought the deal with
Argentine banks was possible, or that there would be an 11th-hour
breakthrough with holdouts," Kevin Daly, who helps oversee $13
billion of emerging-market debt at Aberdeen Asset Management Plc
in London, said by e-mail to Bloomberg News. "This looks like it
could now drag out until 2015. The risk is that it gets pushed
out further, or you get an acceleration demand by an exchange
bondholder that adds a new wrinkle to the holdout quandary," Mr.
Daly said.
Argentina's bonds in the U.S. are likely to erase July 30's gains,
according to Morten Groth, who helps manage about $1.5 billion in
debt at Jyske Bank A/S in Silkeborg, Denmark, Bloomberg News
reports.
"While the market is optimistic that a solution will be found in
the next few days, execution risk is higher than that during the
pre-default situation," Emiliano Surballe, a fixed-income analyst
at Bank Julius Baer in Zurich, said in e-mailed comments to
Bloomberg News. "Now, Argentina might not only have to negotiate
with holdouts, it might have to reach an agreement with the
holders of sovereign debt" that have just been defaulted on, Mr.
Surballe added.
Real Suffering
Mr. Kicillof told reporters that the holdouts rebuffed all offers
and wouldn't endorse a stay of the court ruling that would have
allowed more time for talks, Bloomberg News notes.
Elliott's NML unit said in an e-mailed statement to Bloomberg News
that Argentina refused to seriously consider a court-appointed
mediator's "numerous creative solutions" for resolving the
dispute. NML said it found many of those options acceptable.
Daniel Pollack, the mediator, wrote in his own e-mailed statement
that "real people" are likely to suffer because of Argentina's
default, notes Bloomberg News.
"The full consequences of default are not predictable, but they
certainly are not positive," Mr. Pollack wrote, Bloomberg News
relays.
The economy, already headed for its first annual contraction since
2002 amid 40 percent inflation, will suffer in a default scenario
as Argentines scrambling for dollars cause the peso to weaken and
activity to slump, according to Hernan Yellati, the head of
research at Banctrust & Co, notes Bloomberg News.
Default Swaps
Bloomberg News discloses that the country hasn't been able to
access international credit markets since its $95 billion default
13 years ago. Credit-default swaps to protect against losses from
an Argentine default over the next three months had become the
most expensive in the world on July 30, according to data compiled
by CMA, reports Bloomberg News. The five-year contracts were
quoted at a cost of $3.1 million plus $500,000 a year to insure
$10 million of debt, CMA reported at 11 p.m. in London July 30.
Bloomberg News discloses that about $1 billion of Argentine
sovereign debt is covered by the contracts, compared with $10
billion of Russian government obligations and $16 billion of
Brazilian debt. The International Swaps & Derivatives Association
is responsible for determining if a credit event has taken place
to trigger payment to the holders, Bloomberg News notes. That
decision would be taken by the association's Determinations
Committee, a group of 15 dealers and investors, only after a
ruling has been requested by a trader, Bloomberg News says.
RUFO Clause
Mr. Kicillof told reporters that the judge in the case was unfair
and criticized ratings companies, saying it didn't make sense that
the country was declared in default since it posted money to make
the interest payment, notes the report.
"Argentina paid, Argentina has money, and we're going to keep
making our future debt payments because we want to," Bloomberg
News quoted Mr. Kicillof as saying.
Bloomberg News discloses that Mr. Kicillof said Argentina couldn't
pay the $1.5 billion verdict to the hedge funds because doing so
would require the country to similarly sweeten terms for investors
who went along with the country's debt restructurings in 2005 and
2010 and got 30 cents on the dollar. That stipulation, known as
the RUFO clause, could trigger claims of more than $120 billion,
the country has said, Bloomberg News notes.
The government will probably wait until the RUFO clause expires
before striking a deal with the hedge funds at the beginning of
next year, according to Bulltick Capital Markets, Bloomberg News
relays.
"In the worst-case scenario, this probably will be fixed in the
next six months," Bloomberg News quoted Alberto Bernal, head of
research at Bulltick, as saying. "Argentines need the money, they
need to come back to the market, and the holdouts want to get
paid."
Bank Proposal
Sebastian Palla, head of investment banking at Banco Macro SA in
Buenos Aires, presented a proposal from members of the local
banking association Adeba to buy the holdouts' defaulted bonds,
according to a bank official who asked not to be identified
because she isn't authorized to speak publicly about the plans,
reports Bloomberg News.
Those talks also ended without an agreement because the banks were
unable to devise a solution for a wider group of holdout
creditors, according to the official. Ambito Financiero, a Buenos
Aires-based daily, said discussions with officials from other
Argentine banks and private companies would continue in New York
in a bid to reach a deal, Bloomberg News reports.
Mr. Kicillof, who estimated total holdout claims at $15 billion to
$20 billion, said it wouldn't surprise him if such a private
solution arose since many investors have an interest in resolving
the battle, Bloomberg News notes.
Step Backward
In the past year, Argentina has taken steps to restore its
standing with international creditors, recalls Bloomberg News.
Those include paying $5 billion in government bonds to the Spanish
oil company Repsol SA to compensate it for the seizure of a local
unit, as well as reaching an agreement with the Paris Club of
creditors to settle $9.7 billion of debt. The country also
changed its methodology for calculating inflation statistics after
being faulted by the International Monetary Fund for flawed
reporting, Bloomberg News relays.
Missing the debt payments represent a step backward in those
efforts, according to Marco Santamaria, a New York-based money
manager at AllianceBernstein, which oversees $25 billion of
emerging-market debt, says Bloomberg News. Argentina hasn't
issued global bonds since the default in 2001.
"A lot of the goodwill and positive signals that had come out of
Buenos Aires are going to be diluted," Mr. Santamaria said, the
report adds.
ARGENTINA: S&P Lowers Sovereign Credit Rating to 'SD'
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its unsolicited long-
and short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Republic of Argentina to selective default ('SD') from 'CCC-/C'.
At the same time, S&P removed the 'CCC-/C' foreign currency
ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative
implications on July 1, 2014.
S&P affirmed its unsolicited 'CCC+/C' long- and short-term local
currency sovereign credit ratings and 'raBB+' national scale
rating on Argentina. The outlook on these ratings on Argentina
remains negative. The transfer and convertibility (T&C)
assessment remains 'CCC-'.
RATIONALE
On June 30, 2014, Argentina failed to make a US$539 million
interest payment on its Discount Bonds maturing in Dec. 2033.
Under the terms of the Discount Bonds, Argentina had a 30-day
grace period following the June 30 scheduled interest payment date
to make payment.
Standard & Poor's defines "default" to include instances where
either scheduled debt service is not paid on the due date or an
offer of new replacement debt contains terms that are less
favorable than those of the debt being replaced. S&P's
interpretation of an issuer meeting its financial commitments "as
they come due" is that investors are paid in full and on time,
failing which S&P lowers the rating on the relevant rated issue(s)
to 'D' and it downgrade the issuer to 'SD'.
"Our affirmation of the 'CCC+/C' local currency ratings reflects
our view that the potential disruptions to interest payments on
Argentina's external debt are not likely to further erode its
ability to service its debt issued in its local currency and under
its local law. We also maintain our 'CCC-' T&C assessment for
Argentina because we believe that assessment still reflects the
risks of Argentina's restrictive exchange control laws and
policies," S&P said.
The foreign currency sovereign credit ratings will remain at 'SD'
until Argentina cures its payment default on the Discount Bonds.
If and when Argentina cures the payment default on the Discount
Bonds, S&P will reassess the sovereign's general credit standing,
most likely raising the foreign currency rating to the triple 'C'
or low 'B' categories.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by
the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and
was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Downgraded; CreditWatch Action
To From
Argentina (Republic of) (Unsolicited Ratings)
Sovereign Credit Rating
Foreign Currency SD/SD CCC-/Watch Neg/C
Ratings Affirmed
Argentina (Republic of) (Unsolicited Ratings)
Sovereign Credit Rating
Local Currency CCC+/Negative/C
Argentina National Scale raBB+/Negative/--
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment CCC-
===========
B R A Z I L
===========
GOL LINHAS: 2Q14 Load Factor Reached 76%; Prask Grew 27% y/y
------------------------------------------------------------
GOL Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A. disclosed its preliminary
traffic figures for June 2014. Comparisons refer to June 2013, 2nd
Quarter 2013 and 6 Months-Ended 2013.
National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC) figures for other months.
During the 2014 FIFA World Cup, held in Brazil, GOL operated
28,000 commercial flights, transported 3.4 million passengers and
achieved its highest ever load factor, which averaged 81.2%
between June 12 and July 14. Customer satisfaction, measured by
an SMS survey, also reached the record level of 8.16 on a scale of
1 to 10, thanks to the total dedication of our Team of Eagles.
The Domestic Load Factor in 2nd Quarter 2014 and 6 Months-Ended
2014 came to 76.0% and 76.4%, respectively, both period records.
The new Load Factor level, together with the continuing upturn in
yield, which increased by close to 15% in 2nd quarter 2014, fueled
PRASK, which climbed by approximately 27% in year-over-year,
underlining the Company's new level of execution.
Domestic Supply had 6.0% cut in 2nd Quarter 2014 and 2.2% cut in 6
Months-Ended 2014, reflecting the Company's flexibility in
adapting its domestic capacity and in line with its guidance of a
reduction between 3% and 1%.
Domestic Demand increased by 3.5% in the quarter and 9.0% in the
first six months. It is worth noting that June's numbers reflect
only part of the traffic related to the World Cup, which began on
the 12th.
The number of Passengers on-board reached a record of 19 million
in the first six months of the year, 10% more than in 6 Months-
Ended 2013. In June, GOL carried 2.8 million passengers in the
domestic market, stable in relation to the same month last year,
thanks to the Company's focus on adapting its route network during
the World Cup, which offset the decline in corporate demand in the
period.
International Demand in 2nd Quarter 14 grew by 30.2%, fueled by
the 12.1p.p. increase in the international load factor. The
Company remains focused on increasing its international market
presence, launching new routes in the quarter between Sao Paulo
(Brazil) and Santiago (Chile), and Campinas (Brazil) and Miami
(USA).
GOL Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A. is a low-cost and low-fare
airline in Latin America, offers around 970 daily flights to 65
destinations in 10 countries in South America, Caribbean and the
United States under the GOL and VARIG brands, using a young,
modern fleet of Boeing.
* * *
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
March 21, 2014, Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of Gol
Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A.'s Foreign and local currency long-
term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B-'.
JBS S.A.: Moody's Says Tyson Foods Deal No Impact on Ba3 Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service commented that the proposed acquisition
of Tyson Foods, Inc.'s (Baa3/ RuR -- Down) poultry businesses in
Mexico and Brazil by JBS S.A. (Ba3/Negative) and Pilgrim's Pride
Corporation ("PPC", B1/Stable) for USD 575 million is credit
neutral for JBS, as it will not result in gross leverage increase
or liquidity deterioration. Moody's view the acquisition as in
line with JBS's strategy to increase its footprint in the global
processed food business. The transaction is subjected to
regulatory approvals in both jurisdictions.
* BRAZIL: Espirito Santo to Bolster Tourism with $48MM IDB Loan
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Inter-American Development Bank has approved a $48 million
loan for tourism along Brazil's coastal state of Espirito Santo
with a special emphasis on culinary tourism. The Tourism
Department of the State of Espirito Santo (SETUR) will use these
funds to conduct market studies about visitor preferences and
expectations, bolster the state's formal economy, increase year-
round tourism and improve the state's capacity to protect the
environment in tourism destinations.
The loan aims to help Espirito Santo compete with its neighbors.
In 2011, the state contributed just 4.3 percent to the gross
domestic product (GDP) of Brazil's Southeast, a four-state region
that earned 55.4 percent of the country's overall GDP. Other
Southeastern states see tourism throughout the year, but in
Espirito Santo a three-month peak account for more than 50 percent
of its current tourism arrivals.
This loan is part of an $80 million program, which also includes
$32 million in local funding. Half of the program's funds will be
used to broaden options for tourist consumption, especially in the
area of culinary tourism.
Brazilian travelers typically give high priority to dining on
local cuisine, so capturing both leisure and business customers
would help to improve linkages between the providers of culinary
tourism services and the local suppliers of raw materials. As
such, this part of the program will fund tourism value chain
studies to improve food growing and fisheries in the low season
and offer grants to entrepreneurs living below the poverty line.
The loan also earmarks $8.14 million for promoting and monitoring
the impact of tourism campaigns, and $2.44 million improving the
state tourism statistical system and broadening the reach of
SETUR.
To accommodate for the projected increase in visitors, the
remaining $21.16 million will fund investment in infrastructure
and basic services, such as the expansion of a wastewater
treatment system and socio-environmental services along the
state's coastline.
The loan is for a 24-year term, with a 114-month grace period and
an interest rate based on LIBOR.
==========================
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
==========================
ASHTON PERFORMANCE: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Aug. 29
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Ashton Performance SPV will hear on Aug. 29,
2014, at 9:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-
up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Kim Charaman/Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 943-3100
ASHTON SELECT: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report on Aug. 29
------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholder of Ashton Select SPV will hear on Aug. 29, 2014,
at 9:15 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Kim Charaman/Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 943-3100
BPI CAYMAN: Moody's Affirms (P)Ba3 Sr. Bond/Debenture Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the debt and deposit
ratings and maintained the corresponding outlooks of the following
Portuguese banks:
(i) Caixa Geral de Depositos, S.A. (CGD): long-and short-term
senior debt and deposit ratings affirmed at Ba3/Not-Prime with a
negative outlook
(ii) Banco Comercial Portugues, S.A. (BCP): affirmed at B1/Not-
Prime with a negative outlook
(iii) Banco BPI S.A. (BPI): affirmed at Ba3/ Not-Prime with a
negative outlook
(iv) Banco Santander Totta S.A. (BST): affirmed at Ba1/ Not-Prime
with a stable outlook
(v) Caixa Economica Montepio Geral (Montepio): affirmed at B2/
Not-Prime with a negative outlook
(vi) BANIF-Banco Internacional do Funchal, S.A. (Banif): affirmed
at Caa1/ Not-Prime with a negative outlook
The long-term debt and deposit ratings on Banco Espirito Santo,
S.A. (BES) remain on review for downgrade.
At the same time, Moody's has upgraded the government-guaranteed
debt ratings of BES to Ba1 from Ba2 and assigned a stable outlook.
These rating actions follow the upgrade of the government bond
ratings of Portugal to Ba1 with a stable outlook, implemented on
25 July 2014.
A list of all affected ratings is available at the end of this
press release.
Ratings Rationale
Rationale For Debt And Deposit Ratings
The rating action on Portuguese banks follows the recent upgrade
of the Portuguese sovereign bond ratings.
Moody's believes that the likelihood of support from the
government assigned to each bank remains materially unchanged,
underpinning the affirmation of the supported ratings of
Portuguese banks.
In addition, the negative outlooks on CGD, BCP, BPI, Montepio and
Banif's long-term debt and deposit ratings reflect the high
likelihood that current systemic support assumptions embedded in
ratings may be lowered in the context of the implementation of
"Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive" (BRDD).
The long-term debt and deposit ratings of BES remain on review for
downgrade due to the uncertainties on the full extent of the
financial liabilities that could emerge for BES from its holding
company ESFG and from other parts of the Espirito Santo Group. The
downward bias of the review reflects the downside risks to BES's
standalone credit strength should the bank be required to support
any of the Espirito Santo Group companies or become liable for any
of its obligations.
The stable outlook on BST's long-term debt and deposit ratings is
based on the stable outlook of its standalone rating. It reflects
Moody's view that the downside risks to the bank's credit profile
have substantially diminished. Throughout the economic recession
and banking system challenges of the last several years in
Portugal, BST has demonstrated a continuing ability to generate
capital internally despite a significant pick-up of its non-
performing loans (NPLs) and subdued business activities. The
stable outlook on BST's ratings is further underpinned by the
stable outlook on the ratings of its parent Banco Santander S.A.
(deposits Baa1 stable, BFSR C- stable/BCA baa1); and the stable
outlook of Portugal's Ba1 government rating.
Rationale For Government-Guaranteed Debt
Moody's rates Portuguese government-guaranteed debt at the
sovereign rating level. The rating on the government-backed debt
of BES has therefore been aligned with Portugal's Ba1 government
bond rating (stable outlook).
What Could Change The Ratings Up/Down
Any upward pressure on the banks' ratings is currently unlikely,
given their relatively weak intrinsic financial strength and
ongoing downward pressure stemming mostly from a weak
profitability and still high asset quality challenges. The current
uplift due to systemic support also incorporates the availability
of EUR6.4 billion in the government's recapitalisation facility
fund (prefunded by the Troika) to inject into the banks should
further support be needed.
Moody's could also downgrade Portuguese banks' senior debt and
deposit ratings as a result of the evolution of systemic support
prospects in Portugal and in the EU, in light of developments
associated with resolution mechanisms and burden sharing for
European banks. In addition, a lowering of the BCA and/or a
downgrade of Portugal's sovereign rating could prompt a downgrade
of the senior ratings.
List Of Affected Ratings
Upgrades:
Issuer: Banco Espirito Santo, S.A.
Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Ba1
from Ba2
Affirmations:
Issuer: Banco BPI Cayman Ltd
Backed Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed
(P)NP
Backed Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed
(P)Ba3
Backed Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP
Issuer: Banco BPI S.A.
Issuer Rating, Affirmed Ba3
Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)Ba3
Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba3
Senior Unsecured Deposit Rating, Affirmed Ba3
Issuer: Banco BPI S.A. (Cayman)
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)Ba3
Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba3
Issuer: Banco BPI S.A. (Madeira)
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)Ba3
Issuer: Banco BPI S.A. (Santa Maria)
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)Ba3
Issuer: Banco Comercial Portugues, S.A.
Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)B1
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP
Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1
Senior Unsecured Deposit Rating, Affirmed B1
Issuer: Banco Comercial Portugues, SA, Macao Br
Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)B1
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP
Senior Unsecured Deposit Rating, Affirmed B1
Issuer: Banco Comercial Portugues, SA, Madeira
Backed Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP
Issuer: Banco Santander Totta S.A.
Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)Ba1
Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP
Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba1
Senior Unsecured Deposit Rating, Affirmed Ba1
Issuer: Banco Santander Totta S.A., London
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)Ba1
Issuer: BANIF-Banco Internacional do Funchal, S.A.
Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP
Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Caa1
Senior Unsecured Deposit Rating, Affirmed Caa1
Issuer: BCP Finance Bank, Ltd.
Backed Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed
(P)B1
Backed Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed
(P)NP
Backed Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP
Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1
Issuer: BPI Capital Finance Ltd.
Backed Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed
(P)NP
Backed Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed
(P)Ba3
Issuer: Caixa Economica Montepio Geral
Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)B2
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP
Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B2
Senior Unsecured Deposit Rating, Affirmed B2
Issuer: Caixa Economica Montepio Geral, Cay. Is. Br.
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)B2
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP
Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B2
Issuer: Caixa Geral de Depositos Finance
Backed Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed
(P)NP
Backed Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed
(P)Ba3
Backed Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP
Issuer: Caixa Geral de Depositos, S.A.
Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)Ba3
Backed Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP
Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba3
Senior Unsecured Deposit Rating, Affirmed Ba3
Issuer: Caixa Geral de Depositos, S.A. (London)
Backed Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP
Issuer: Caixa Geral de Depositos, S.A. (Madeira)
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)Ba3
Backed Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP
Issuer: Caixa Geral de Depositos, S.A. (Paris)
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP
Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)Ba3
Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP
Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba3
Issuer: Caixa Geral de Depositos/New York
Senior Unsecured Deposit Rating, Affirmed Ba3
Issuer: CGD NORTH AMERICA FINANCE LLC
Backed Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP
Issuer: TOTTA (IRELAND) p.l.c.
Backed Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP
BUTTERFIELD HOLDINGS: Members' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 20
------------------------------------------------------------
The members of Butterfield Holdings (Cayman) Limited will hold
their final meeting on Aug. 20, 2014, at 1:00 p.m., to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Appleby (Cayman) Ltd.
c/o Sophie Benbow
Telephone: (345) 949 4900
P.O. Box 190 Clifton House, 75 Fort Street
Grand Cayman KY1-1104
Cayman Islands
CQS ABS: Members' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 18
-----------------------------------------------
The members of CQS ABS Alpha Feeder Fund Limited will hold their
final meeting on Aug. 18, 2014, to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
CDL Company Ltd.
P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
Cayman Islands
CQS ABS MASTER: Members' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 18
------------------------------------------------------
The members of CQS ABS Alpha Master Fund Limited will hold their
final meeting on Aug. 18, 2014, to receive the liquidator's report
on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
CDL Company Ltd.
P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KY1-1205
Cayman Islands
DOLPHIN LEASING: Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Aug. 6
--------------------------------------------------------
The member of Dolphin Leasing Limited will hear on Aug. 6, 2014,
at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Phang Thim Fatt
8 Shenton Way #18-01
Singapore 068811
EXPENSIVE INVESTMENTS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 15
------------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Expensive Investments Ltd will hold their
final meeting on Aug. 15, 2014, at 12:00 noon, to receive the
liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and
property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
MBT Trustees Ltd.
Telephone: 949-9808
Facsimile: 949-9793/4
P.O. Box 30622 Grand Cayman KY1-1203
Cayman Islands
LEHMAN BROTHERS CAYMAN: Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Aug. 13
----------------------------------------------------------------
The member of Lehman Brothers Cayman Limited will hear on Aug. 13,
2014, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings
and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Carl Gosselin
Wilmington Trust (Cayman), Ltd.
P.O. Box 32322 Grand Cayman KY1-1209
Cayman Islands
Telephone: (345) 640-6712
PENGUIN LEASING: Member to Hear Wind-Up Report on Aug. 6
--------------------------------------------------------
The member of Penguin Leasing Limited will hear on Aug. 6, 2014,
at 10:00 a.m., the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Phang Thim Fatt
8 Shenton Way #18-01
Singapore 068811
VRE INVESTMENT: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 6
----------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of VRE Investment Limited will hold their final
meeting on Aug. 6, 2014, at 3:30 p.m., to receive the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Seiji Yamaoka
2-4-25, Shin-ishikawa, Aoba-ku
Yokohama City 225-0003, Kanagawa
Japan
WINDSONG HOLDINGS: Shareholders' Final Meeting Set for Aug. 4
-------------------------------------------------------------
The shareholders of Windsong Holdings, Inc. will hold their final
meeting on Aug. 4, 2014, at 8:00 a.m., to receive the liquidator's
report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal.
The company's liquidator is:
Appleby Trust (Cayman) Ltd
c/o Richard Gordon
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 4900
75 Fort Street
P.O. Box 1350 Grand Cayman KY1-1108
Cayman Islands
===================================
D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
===================================
XSTRATA PLC: Obtains ISO 14001 Certification
--------------------------------------------
Dominican Today reports that mining company Falconbridge
Dominicana (Falcondo) disclosed recertification of the ISO 14001
standard for environmental management, which "guarantee the proper
functioning of the environmental management plan at its mining
operation in Bonao and La Vega and its facilities at Haina Port,
San Cristobal."
Falcondo said it was the world's first ferronickel operation to
obtain ISO 14001 certification, in 1999, a year before the passing
of Environment law 64-00 and the Environment Ministry, according
to Dominican Today. This "shows the commitment we've always had
had with the environment, and by recovering the areas where it has
extracted minerals," the report notes.
In an emailed statement, the mining company said the ISO 14001
standard requires the company to create an environmental
management plan that includes environmental objectives and
targets, political and procedures to achieve these goals,
responsibilities, personnel training, documentation and a system
to control any changes and progress made, reports Dominican Today.
All those items checked under strict systems of internal and
external audits of all these processes, the report adds.
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on
Jan. 22, 2014, Dominican Today said that Chief Executive Officer
of Xstrata PLC's Falcondo reiterated that the company's presence
in the country depends on a long term mining, with cheap
electricity available, to produce and compete in world markets.
David Soares said they pin their hopes of extracting nickel at the
controversial site of Loma Miranda, between La Vega and Bonao
(central), for which they expect to get the mining permit,
according to Dominican Today. But environmental and civil society
groups could keep them from carrying out the project, after the
Chamber of Deputies agreed with the protesters and passed a bill
which declares Loma Miranda a protected area, arguing that much of
the Cibao region's (north) water depends on it, the report
related.
Xstrata PLC is the operator of Falconbridge Dominicana, C. por A.
("Falcondo") with an 85.26% ownership. Falcondo is a ferronickel
surface mining operation located in the Dominican Republic with
operations dating since 1971.
Headquartered in Zug, Switzerland, Xstrata PLC is a major producer
of coal, copper, nickel, primary vanadium and zinc and the largest
producer of ferrochrome
=========
H A I T I
=========
* HAITI: IDB OKs $14 Million Loan for Agricultural Health Services
------------------------------------------------------------------
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has approved a $14
million grant to help the Government of Haiti reduce plant and
livestock losses and increase exports by modernizing its
agricultural health services. The Government of Haiti is matching
the IDB's pledge with $2 million of its own funds.
The Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural
Development, through its Agricultural Health Unit, will invest in
infrastructures, equipment, modernization of procedures, and
capacity building, to improve key agricultural health services
such as epidemiologic vigilance, diagnostic capacities, risk
analysis, and pest and disease control, with a special effort to
decentralize field services all across the country and improve
interaction with producers and private sector professionals.
Until the 1990s, agriculture accounted for nearly half of Haiti's
GDP. While nearly half of Haitians still farm, the agricultural
sector's GDP contribution has dropped to 22.5 percent. Part of
this downturn is attributed to institutional weaknesses in
responding to vulnerability to pests and diseases.
Classic Swine Fever and Teschen diseases cause more than $1
million of annual losses in the pig supply chains, and Newcastle
disease costs more than $1.5 million in poultry losses. Pests such
as the "Crazy Ant" cause losses of $11 million per year to both
crops and livestock. Should exports of mangos be suspended due to
a fruit fly infestation, economic losses could reach $10 million a
year.
The disbursement period for this grant will be 60 months.
===========
M E X I C O
===========
MBIA MEXICO: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' global scale
counterparty credit and financial strength ratings on MBIA Mexico
S.A. de C.V. (MBIA Mexico). In addition, S&P affirmed its 'mxBB+'
national scale financial strength rating on the company. Outlook
on ratings remains stable.
The ratings on MBIA Mexico are based on its core status to its
parent, MBIA Insurance Corp (MBIA; B/Stable/--), according to
S&P's group rating methodology. The group status assessment is
based on the parent's support, which consists of a reinsurance
agreement calling for MBIA Mexico to cede 100% of its net
liability and other obligations to MBIA, and a net worth
maintenance agreement in which MBIA agrees to maintain MBIA
Mexico's capital equal to Mexican regulatory requirements or $10
million, whichever is greater. In 2013, the Mexican subsidiary
capitalized retained earnings and in 2014 a capitalization from
parent has been already approved, to ensure compliance with
regulatory requirements in line with the net worth maintenance
agreement. Also 100% of claims have been covered by reinsurer so
far,as stated in the reinsurance agreement.
S&P's financial strength rating on MBIA reflects its view of the
company's poor financial condition, small capital base relative to
the risk of its insured portfolio, and poor operating performance,
which S&P expects to continue. While the possibility of liquidity
stress exists, the experienced management team's liquidity and
risk mitigation strategy has helped to maintain solvency. The
baseline liquidity projections indicate MBIA has sufficient
liquidity to meet claim payments through 2015. The rating also
reflects the company's run-off status and S&P's belief that its
corporate profile is unlikely to change any time soon. MBIA
Mexico is also in run-off, has only two policies in portfolio,
which are due by 2036, and it's not commercializing any products
at this point.
The stable outlook on MBIA Mexico reflects the outlook on its
parent. Ratings benefit from the support agreements that MBIA
provides, thus ratings will move in tandem with those on the
parent.
"The stable outlook reflects our view that MBIA's capital and
liquidity is adequate to meet claim payments through 2015. Given
the risk of the remaining insured portfolio relative to MBIA's
capital base and limited opportunity to improve its capital
position, we expect capital to remain under stress. As the
company begins to realize net cash inflow relating to the 2005-
2007 vintage residential mortgage-backed securities due to excess
spread payments, we expect the strain on capital to somewhat
lessen. If MBIA's capital stabilizes as a result of lower
potential adverse loss development, we would view this as positive
to the rating. If the company losses increase and its liquidity
weakens, so that the time to a possible breach of minimum
regulatory levels shortens to less than two years, we could lower
the rating. We don't expect MBIA to make any interest payments on
its surplus notes in the near future," S&P said.
=====================
P U E R T O R I C O
=====================
PUERTO RICO INFRASTRUCTURE: S&P Lowers Rev. Bond Rating to 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has lowered its rating on
Puerto Rico Infrastructure Financing Authority's series 2011B and
2011C revenue bonds, issued for the port authority project, one
notch to 'BB-' from 'BB', and removed the rating from CreditWatch,
where it was placed with negative implications on July 1, 2014.
These bonds receive support in the form of a letter of credit
provided by Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico.
This action follows Standard & Poor's July 11, 2014, lowering of
its rating on Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico one
notch to 'BB-' from 'BB' and subsequent removal of the rating from
CreditWatch, where it was placed with negative implications on
June 27, 2014.
STANDARD & POOR's 17g-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a
description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.
There is no Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in
this credit rating report because, in S&P's view, there are no
representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms available
to investors.
***********
Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices
for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication. At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
Submissions about insolvency-related conferences are encouraged.
Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com
***********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, and Peter A.
Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2014. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *