/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/130401.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Monday, April 1, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 63 Headlines A N T I G U A & B A R B U D A * ANTIGUA & BARBUDA: Government to Pay Antigua Public Workers A R G E N T I N A EDENOR SA: Shareholders' Meeting Scheduled for April 25 * Argentina's Bid for 2nd Cir. En Banc Review in Bond Case Denied B R A Z I L VALID S.A.: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to BRL250MM of Debentures * BRAZIL: Fitch Sees Prolonged Economic Slowdown C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ALTAIR STARS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 25 BRAVO HOLDCO: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 25 CONNAUGHT OFFSHORE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 25 DRAGONTECH VENTURES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 HALBIS GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 HALBIS GLOBAL MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 HONICOS LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 MAGNETAR-GRF: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 MARUBENI POWER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 RAB EUROPE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up SOLA SPV: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 VAHINE LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 WELLS FARGO: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 25 P U E R T O R I C O CONSTRUCTORA DE HATO: Has Until April 26 to File Plan PUERTO RICO AQUEDUCT: S&P Lowers Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+' T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O PETROTRIN: Silent on US$2.5 Billion Shutdown, Senator Says TRINIDAD CEMENT: Incurs US$383 Million Loss in 2012 V E N E N Z U E L A PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' IDRs; Outlook Neg. * VENEZUELA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Issuer Default Rating X X X X X X X X * BOND PRICING: For the Week March 25 to March 29, 2013 - - - - - =============================== A N T I G U A & B A R B U D A =============================== * ANTIGUA & BARBUDA: Government to Pay Antigua Public Workers -------------------------------------------------------------- Jamaica Observer reports that public servants, including teachers, who have been staging industrial action over the non-payment of salaries, have been given an assurance that they will be paid early next month. A government statement said that the assurance has come from Accountant General, Cleopatra Gittens and that at a meeting between Finance Minister Harold Lovell and trade union representatives "it was revealed that all government employees will be paid by April 5", according to Jamaica Observer. The report notes that the statement said that at the meeting which was attended by representatives of Antigua and Barbuda Union of Teachers (A&BUT), Antigua and Barbuda Workers' Union, Guild of Antigua and Barbuda Air Traffic Controllers, Police Welfare Association, and the Nurses Association, "those present were reassured that where their membership incurs penalties at financial institutions due to the late payment of wages and salaries, the government will cover the costs". The statement said that Mr. Lovell has proposed monthly meetings with the stakeholders "to keep them abreast of the government's monthly cash flow," Jamaica Observer says. Earlier in March, the government apologized "for the tardiness in payments" to teachers who warned they would continue their industrial action over the non-payment of salaries, Jamaica Observer discloses. Jamaica Observer says that the government had said the actions by the teachers were also affecting the operations of the National School Meals Service. ================= A R G E N T I N A ================= EDENOR SA: Shareholders' Meeting Scheduled for April 25 ------------------------------------------------------- Empresa Distribuidora y Comercializadora Norte S.A. ("EDENOR"), will hold a general ordinary and extraordinary shareholders' meeting on April 25, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. at Avenida del Libertador 6363, First Floor, in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. Included as a specific item on the agenda for that Meeting is the consideration of a mandatory capital stock reduction pursuant to the terms of Section 206 of Law No. 19,550, which became applicable upon the issuance of the Financial Statements of EDENOR as of, and for the year ended, Dec. 31, 2012. A copy of the Notice is available for free at http://is.gd/KykMUH About EDENOR Based in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Edenor S.A. is the largest electricity distribution company in Argentina in terms of number of customers and electricity sold (both in GWh and Pesos). Through a concession, Edenor distributes electricity exclusively to the northwestern zone of the greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area and the northern part of the city of Buenos Aires, which has a population of approximately 7 million people and an area of 4,637 sq. km. In 2011, Edenor sold 20,077 GWh of energy and purchased 23,004 GWh of energy, with net sales of approximately Ps. 2.3 billion and net loss of Ps. 435.4 million. Price Waterhouse & Co. S.R.L., in Buenos Aires, said that the delay in obtaining tariff increases, the cost adjustments recognition ("MMC"), requested in the presentations made until now by the Company in accordance with the terms of the Adjustment Agreement ("Acta Acuerdo") and the continuous increase in operating expenses significantly affected the economic and financial position of the Company and raise substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern. The Company reported a net loss of ARS435.40 million on net sales of ARS3.565 billion for 2011, compared with a net loss of ARS49.05 million on ARS2.174 billion for 2010. The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2011, showed ARS5.744 billion in total assets, ARS4.373 billion in total liabilities, ARS56.87 million of minority interest, and stockholders equity of ARS1.314 billion. * * * As reported by the TCR on Sept. 12, 2012, Moody's Latin America has downgraded Edenor's corporate family and senior unsecured ratings to Caa1 from B3 and its national scale rating to Ba3.ar from Baa2.ar. The downgrade has been prompted by Edenor's continued poor operating performance in 2012 and the ongoing issue of frozen tariffs. The downgrade also reflects the liquidity constraints the company will face over coming quarters should the frozen tariff position of the company not change. * Argentina's Bid for 2nd Cir. En Banc Review in Bond Case Denied ----------------------------------------------------------------- Juan Carlos Rodriguez of BankruptcyLaw360 reported that the U.S. Second Circuit shot down Argentina's request for an en banc rehearing of a panel's finding that it owes $1.4 billion to bondholders after a 2001 default on its sovereign debt and should be barred from paying off other debt first. The report said Argentina had argued that the panel's Oct. 26 ruling, which ordered it to pay private equity firm NML Capital Ltd. and other investors who opted out of restructuring offers Argentina extended in 2005 and 2010, will make voluntary debt restructuring by sovereign nations. =========== B R A Z I L =========== VALID S.A.: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to BRL250MM of Debentures ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's America Latina assigned a Ba2 and Aa3.br ratings on the global scale and on the Brazilian National Scale Rating, respectively, to the BRL250 million senior unsecured debentures to be issued by Valid S.A. At the same time, Valid's corporate family rating and its senior unsecured rating remains unchanged at Ba2/Aa3.br. The outlook for all ratings is stable. Rating Assigned: - Proposed BRL 250 million senior unsecured debentures: Ba2 (global scale); Aa3.br (national scale). Ratings unchanged: - Corporate Family Rating: Ba2 (global scale). - BRL 100 million senior unsecured debentures: Ba2 (global scale); Aa3.br (national scale). - BRL 147 million senior unsecured debentures: Ba2 (global scale); Aa3.br (national scale). The outlook for all ratings is stable. Ratings Rationale: "Valid's Ba2/Aa3.br ratings reflect the company's market position as one of Brazil's major suppliers of plastic cards for payment transactions and ID systems, SIM cards, and printing services," said Moody's Vice-President and Senior Credit Officer Soummo Mukherjee." The rating is also supported by the company's long- term client relationships with financial institutions, state governments, and telecommunications companies; the growth of value-added products in its product portfolio; and its prudent financial management, which has contributed to stable margins, strong liquidity and relatively low gearing," added Mukherjee. On the other hand, the rating is constrained by Valid's relatively small size in comparison to global peers, the regional nature of its operations, its reliance on a small group of large clients in banking and telecom, the growth of competition, and the relatively low barriers to the entry of other entities in the plastic and SIM cards sector - although the ID system sector has high entry barriers. Risks associated with the development of new technologies and the company's acquisitiveness are additional constraining factors, although Valid continues its efforts to develop new technologies and has a history of successfully integrating its acquisitions. The company has recently acquired Chicago-based Vmark, a provider of financial plastic cards, gift cards, and printing services, which was operating under bankruptcy protection. Moody's sees the acquisition as positive as it can significantly increase Valid's market position in the US and increase its geographic diversification while increasing leverage only modestly. Valid has historically practiced prudent financial management, maintaining low leverage and good liquidity. Moody's expects leverage to be maintained below 1.5 times net debt to EBITDA despite the company's ongoing appetite for acquisitions and the potential for gradual increases in the dividend pay-out ratio, if no appealing acquisition opportunities occur. Proceeds from the proposed BRL250 million debentures will be used to pay down the 3rd debenture issuance occurred in December 2012, refinance the company's outstanding debt and strengthen Valid's liquidity position. The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Valid will maintain its market position and stable margins. Moody's also expects the company to continue to prudently manage capex and dividends, to exercise discipline with regard to acquisitions, and to maintain its healthy liquidity. The rating would experience upwards pressure if the company were to expand its scale and further diversify its geographic and client base while maintaining Free Cash Flow to Total Adjusted Debt above 16%, EBITDA less Capex to Interest Expenses above 4.0x, and healthy liquidity. The rating would experience downwards pressure if the company's market position were to deteriorate, causing revenue growth to stagnate and its debt metrics to weaken, with negative Free Cash Flow to Total Adjusted Debt for a prolonged period and EBITDA less Capex to Interest Expense declining to below 2.5x. Any sizable debt-financed acquisitions would also affect the rating negatively. The principal methodology used in rating Valid was the Global Business and Consumer Services Industry Methodology, published in October, 2010. Moody's National Scale Ratings (NSRs) are intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the relevant country, as in ".mx" for Mexico. Valid is a local supplier of solutions for Means of Payment, ID systems and Telecom Services in Brazil. Main clients are financial institutions, state and federal governments and telephony operators. Valid posted net revenues of BRL 937 million in 2012 (USD481 million) and EBITDA of BRL221 million (USD113 million). * BRAZIL: Fitch Sees Prolonged Economic Slowdown ------------------------------------------------ A continued and more prolonged economic slowdown combined with an expansionary fiscal stance could detract from fiscal consolidation and hinder government debt reduction in Brazil, according to a new Fitch Ratings report published on March 27. With General Government Debt/GDP and Interest Payments/Revenue remaining above the 'BBB' median, this could delay an improvement in Brazil's relative standing within its rating category. 'Brazil's economic underperformance over the last two years has been driven by both cyclical and structural factors,' said Shelly Shetty, Head of Fitch's Latin America Sovereign Group. The cyclical component of the slowdown responded to internal factors including tighter macroeconomic policies and currency appreciation in 2011, and external conditions including a sluggish global economy and falling commodity prices. 'On the other hand, structural factors such as a difficult business environment, a heavy tax burden, labor market inflexibility and infrastructure bottlenecks have led to a drop in Total Factor Productivity and investment growth, reducing Brazil's trend growth,' added Shetty. The lower economic growth, evidenced by real GDP growth of 0.9% in 2012, and loosening of fiscal policy have had a negative impact on government finances, bringing the reported primary surplus, including PAC-related capital spending, down to 2.4% in 2012, from 3.1% in 2011. However, Brazil's overall fiscal position has not been compromised, as interest payments went from 5.7% in 2011 to 4.9% in 2012. A sensitivity analysis conducted to assess the effect of lower primary surpluses and real GDP growth on general government debt highlights the need for healthy growth rates and fiscal caution. The analysis suggests that a primary surplus target below 2% of GDP, including the use of PAC deductions, combined with real GDP growth sustainably at 3% during 2013-16, would lead to an increase in the government's debt path. Thus, further structural reforms and improvements in growth dynamics would be positive rating drivers, while a weakening in macroeconomic stability and deterioration in fiscal credit metrics would be negative for Brazil's rating. Fitch's special report 'Brazil's Growth and Fiscal Challenges: Cyclical and Structural Factors Underlie Slowdown' is available at 'www.fitchratings.com'. ========================== C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ========================== ALTAIR STARS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 25 ---------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Altair Stars LP Holdings Ltd. are required to file their proofs of debt by April 25, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 4, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Intertrust Corporate Services (Cayman) Limited 190 Elgin Avenue, George Town Grand Cayman KYI1-9005 Cayman Islands Jennifer Chailler Telephone: (345) 914 3115 BRAVO HOLDCO: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 25 ---------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Bravo Holdco are required to file their proofs of debt by April 25, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced wind-up proceedings on Feb. 28, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Roy Kelvin One Market Street Steuart Tower, 23rd Floor San Francisco CA 94105 Telephone: +1 (415) 293 5000 CONNAUGHT OFFSHORE: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 25 ---------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Connaught Offshore Mezzanine Fund, Ltd are required to file their proofs of debt by April 25, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Feb. 28, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Connaught Real Estate Finance LLC Daniel Fowler 222 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 100 Chicago, IL 6060 Telephone: (312) 621 3300 DRAGONTECH VENTURES: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 ----------------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Dragontech Ventures Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by April 15, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on May 8, 2008. The company's liquidator is: Zhang Shenglan Maples and Calder, Attorneys-at-law The Center, 53rd Floor 99 Queen's Road Central Hong Kong HALBIS GLOBAL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 ----------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Halbis Global Opportunistic Alpha Fund, Ltd are required to file their proofs of debt by April 15, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Jan. 7, 2011. The company's liquidator is: Ogier Fiduciary Services (Cayman Limited) 89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay Grand Cayman KYI-9007 Cayman Islands c/o Jennifer Collins Telephone: +1 (345) 815 1446 Facsimile: (345) 945 6265 HALBIS GLOBAL MASTER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 ------------------------------------------------------------ The creditors of Halbis Global Opportunistic Alpha Master Fund, Ltd are required to file their proofs of debt by April 15, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Jan. 7, 2011. The company's liquidator is: Ogier Fiduciary Services (Cayman Limited) 89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay Grand Cayman KYI-9007 Cayman Islands c/o Jennifer Collins Telephone: +1 (345) 815 1446 Facsimile: (345) 945 6265 HONICOS LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 --------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Honicos Ltd. are required to file their proofs of debt by April 15, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 1, 2013. The company's liquidator is: CDL Company Ltd. P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KYI1-1205 Cayman Islands MAGNETAR-GRF: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 ---------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Magnetar-GRF Fund (Cayman), Ltd are required to file their proofs of debt by April 15, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 1, 2013. The company's liquidator is: CDL Company Ltd. P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KYI1-1205 Cayman Islands MARUBENI POWER: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 ------------------------------------------------------ The creditors of Marubeni Power (Cayman Islands) Finance Limited are required to file their proofs of debt by April 15, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced wind-up proceedings on March 1, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Ogier 89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay Grand Cayman KYI-9007 Cayman Islands c/o Rachel Smyth Telephone: (345) 815 1840 Facsimile: (345) 949-9877 RAB EUROPE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up ------------------------------------------ On March 1, 2013, the sole shareholder of RAB Europe Fund Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. The company's liquidator is: Avalon Management Limited Reference: GL Landmark Square, 1st Floor 64 Earth Close West Bay Beach PO Box 715, George Town Grand Cayman KYI-1107 Cayman Islands Telephone: +1 (345) 769 4422 Facsimile: +1 (345) 769 9351 SOLA SPV: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 ------------------------------------------------ The creditors of Sola SPV 1 are required to file their proofs of debt by April 15, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced wind-up proceedings on March 4, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Ogier 89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay Grand Cayman KYI-9007 Cayman Islands c/o Jo-Anne Maher Telephone: (345) 815-1762 Facsimile: (345) 949-9877 VAHINE LTD: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 15 -------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Vahine Ltd. are required to file their proofs of debt by April 15, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on March 1, 2013. The company's liquidator is: CDL Company Ltd. P.O. Box 31106 Grand Cayman KYI1-1205 Cayman Islands WELLS FARGO: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due April 25 --------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Wells Fargo Multi-Strategy 50 Offshore Hedge Fund, Ltd. are required to file their proofs of debt by April 25, 2013, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Feb. 26, 2013. The company's liquidator is: Intertrust Corporate Services (Cayman) Limited 190 Elgin Avenue, George Town Grand Cayman KYI1-9005 Cayman Islands Jennifer Chailler Telephone: (345) 914 3115 ===================== P U E R T O R I C O ===================== CONSTRUCTORA DE HATO: Has Until April 26 to File Plan ----------------------------------------------------- The Hon. Brian K. Tester of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico has extended, at the behest of Constructora De Hato, the deadline to file a plan of reorganization and disclosure statement until April 26, 2013. As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter on Feb. 26, 2013, the Debtor sought a 60-day extension of the deadline to file a plan and disclosure statement, saying that it is imperative that asset sales be conducted prior to the filing of a Chapter 11 plan as the proceeds of the sales will be funding the plan. The Debtor has received an offer from Aramis Rivera, president of Dey Drilling Equipment, for the purchase of the Debtor's 2011 Volvo. The Debtor also received an offer from Drey for the purchase of the Debtor's 1998 Tesmec Model 110 for $50,000. About Constructora De Hato San Juan, Puerto Rico-based Constructora De Hato owns parcels of land in Puerto Rico with an aggregate value of $1.82 million. It filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. D.P.R. Case No. 12-02876-11) in Old San Juan, Puerto Rico, on April 13, 2012. The petition was signed by Waldemar Carmona Gonzalez, president. The Debtor is represented by Charles Alfred Cuprill, Esq., at Charles A. Curpill, PSC Law Office, in San Juan. Luis R. Carrasquillo & Co., PSC, serves as financial consultant. In its schedules, as amended, the Debtor disclosed $10,701,724 in assets and $6,847,693 in liabilities. PUERTO RICO AQUEDUCT: S&P Lowers Rating on Revenue Bonds to 'BB+' ----------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered by one notch, to 'BB+', its rating on Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority's (PRASA) senior-lien revenue bonds. S&P also lowered by one notch, to 'BBB-' the rating on the authority's bonds guaranteed by the full faith and credit pledge of the commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The downgrades reflect Standard & Poor's lowering of its rating on the commonwealth's general obligation (GO) debt on March 13, 2013. S&P lowered that rating by one notch, based primarily on a larger- than-expected budgetary gap and the potential difficulty for the general government to achieve structural fiscal stability in the near term. "The negative outlook on PRASA's guaranteed bonds reflects the outlook on Puerto Rico's GO debt, indicating our view that we could lower the rating within our two-year outlook horizon," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Theodore Chapman. PRASA's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) is unchanged at 'bb+,' reflecting S&P's view of the authority's general creditworthiness solely on its own credit characteristics. The ratings on PRASA's senior-lien bonds had previously received a one-notch uplift from the authority's SACP of 'bb+', based on the application of S&P's criteria for government-related entities (GREs). S&P considers PRASA a GRE of the general government, given the history of support by the Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico (BBB- /Negative/A-3) in guaranteeing or, in some cases, at least supporting certain financing obligations of PRASA. In S&P's view, there is a high likelihood of extraordinary government support given what S&P deems an important role and very strong link to the general government, given PRASA's function as the drinking water and sanitary sewer provider of the commonwealth. =============================== T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O =============================== PETROTRIN: Silent on US$2.5 Billion Shutdown, Senator Says ---------------------------------------------------------- Julien Neaves at Trinidad Express reports that Trinidad and Tobago opposition Senator Terrence Deyalsingh has questioned why it has taken close to two years to get Petroleum Company of Trinidad and Tobago's fluid catalytic cracking unit back up and running, with a net loss to date of US$2.5 billion. Senator Deyalsingh was contributing to a Senate debate on a motion by Opposition Senator Fitzgerald Hinds, calling on the Government to reaffirm its commitment to democracy, according to Trinidad Express. Senator Deyalsingh, the report notes, said the project was determined "ready to go" by the People's Partnership administration in April 2011, with a projected contract time of four months. Senator Deyalsingh noted in June 2011, there was a promise of start-up in September 2011, and then in February 2012 that it would be completed in one month, the report discloses. Senator Deyalsingh, the report relays, also recalled in October 2012, in response to his queries during the national budget debate, both Energy Minister Kevin Ramnarine and Finance Minister Larry Howai gave a tentative date of November or December 2012. Senator Deyalsingh said it was close to two years after the original shutdown, the report notes. Senator Deyalsingh also asked Mr. Ramnarine and Petrotrin about the "silence" on the project and the cause for the delay, Senator Deyalsingh says. Mr. Ramnarine responded, saying they had some "serious challenges" in getting the cat cracker completed, Senator Deyalsingh relates. The report relays that Mr. Ramnarine noted the main challenge was that the original contractors had been dismissed. Senator Deyalsingh, the report discloses, said he heard other reasons, including: welding could not be done because of rain, accidents, industrial action, as well as the firing of the contractor. Senator Deyalsingh said Mr. Ramnarine needed to make "more than that statement" and described the Petrotrin board as "incompetent and inefficient" and one that had "mucked up the project," the report adds. Petroleum Company of Trinidad and Tobago is the major state-owned oil company in Trinidad and Tobago. The company was established in 1993 by the merger of Trintopec and Trintoc, two state-owned oil companies. Petrotrin's main holdings are extensive, mature onshore fields located across southern Trinidad. Large areas have been leased out to small private producers who are able to make a profit on wells that are unprofitable for Petrotrin, giving it higher labor costs. The company operates a refinery at Pointe-Pierre, just north of San Fernando in south Trinidad. Most crude petroleum produced in Trinidad is exported without being refined. The refinery depends on imported crude (mostly from Venezuela), which is either used domestically or exported. * * * As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on June 9, 2010, Trinidad Express related that four members of Petrotrin submitted their resignation letters. According to the report, Malcom Jones resigned as chairman of Petrotrin and from the State boards. The report related board members Lawford Dupres, who chaired the National Petroleum board, attorney Kerwin Garcia and Andrew McIntosh had also resigned. Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar, the report noted, said that Cabinet had ordered a forensic audit of Petrotrin as there were "grounds for suspicion of misconduct" at Petrotrin similar to what may have transpired at special-purpose State enterprise UDeCOTT. The report said that the company was experiencing serious financial difficulties resulting in high cost overruns of its refinery upgrade. The situation was exacerbated by a US$12 billion lawsuit by World GTL Inc. against Petrotrin, the report added. TRINIDAD CEMENT: Incurs US$383 Million Loss in 2012 --------------------------------------------------- RJR News reports that Trinidad Cement Limited, TCL, has released financial results which show it continues to rack up losses. Trinidad Cement Limited, TCL, suffered a US$383 million loss for 2012, according to RJR News. The report relates that the losses were at the same level in the previous year. RJR News notes that TCL said it remains challenged by the markets in Jamaica, Barbados and other selected export countries which are flat to declining. The Trinidad and Tobago market is experiencing resurgence in demand and TCL's cement and concrete operations stand to benefit from continued buoyancy this year, the report relates. RJR News notes that the Guyana and Suriname markets are also recording strong demand. The Group continues to pursue cost control and cost reduction initiatives as well as new markets, the report adds. About Trinidad Cement Trinidad Cement Limited is a cement company and is the parent company of Caribbean Cement Company Limited. * * * As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Oct. 5, 2011, RJR News reports that Trinidad Cement Limited has now reached an agreement with its debtors on the terms and conditions attached to the repayment of its debt. The agreement will convert most of the company's debt into an 8-year facility, to be paid, quarterly, from March 2013, according to RJR News. The report related that deal also includes certain performance criteria for repaying the debt and if those are not met, the company will be penalized. =================== V E N E N Z U E L A =================== PETROLEOS DE VENEZUELA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' IDRs; Outlook Neg. ------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has affirmed Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.'s local and foreign currency issuer default ratings (IDRs) at 'B+'. Fitch has also affirmed the rating of approximately USD22.5 billion of senior unsecured debt outstanding at 'B+/RR4'. The rating Outlook for all ratings is negative. Concurrently, Fitch has affirmed PDVSA's national long-term rating at 'AAA(ven)'. PDVSA's credit quality reflects the company's linkage to the government of Venezuela as a state-owned entity, combined with increased government control over business strategies and internal resources. This underscores the close link between the company's credit profile and that of the sovereign. PDVSA's ratings also consider the company's strong balance sheet, sizeable proven hydrocarbon reserves, and strategic interests in international downstream assets. LINKAGE TO SOVEREIGN PDVSA credit quality is inextricably linked to the Venezuelan government. It is a state-owned entity whose royalties and tax payments have historically represented more than 50% of the government's revenues, and it is of strategic importance to the economic and social policies of the country. In 2008, the government changed PDVSA's charter and mission statement to allow it to participate in industries that contribute to the country's social development, including health care, education, and agriculture. LIMITED TRANSPARENCY OF SOVEREIGN The Venezuelan government displays limited transparency in the administration and use of government-managed funds, and in fiscal operations, which poses challenges to accurately assess the stance of fiscal policy and the full financial strength of the sovereign. As a direct by-product of being a state-owned entity, PDVSA displays similar characteristics, which reinforces the linkage of the company's ratings to those of the sovereign. STAND-ALONE CREDIT PROFILE SOLID FOR RATING CATEGORY PDVSA continues to be an important player in the global energy sector. The company's competitive position is strong and supported by its reported sizeable proven hydrocarbon reserves, strategic interests in international downstream assets and private participation in upstream operations. The company also benefits from a strong balance sheet, which is in line with many of its competitors. These strong credit attributes are consistent with a higher rating category although sovereign related risks offset the strength of the financial profile and constrain the rating to that of the sovereign. LOW LEVERAGE EXPECTED TO MODERATELY RISE PDVSA reported an EBITDA (after royalties and social expenditure which include most oil bartering agreements) and FFO of approximately USD18.7 billion and USD30.9 billion, respectively, as of year-end 2011. Total financial debt as of Dec. 31, 2012 increased to USD40.0 billion from USD34.9 billion as of 2011. The company's estimated leverage level of approximately 2.0x is low for the rating category, which is limited by the credit quality of the Venezuelan government. Capital expenditures which have totaled approximately USD85.0 billion over the past five years are expected to increase significantly as the company intensifies its exploration and production efforts on the Orinoco Oil Belt. Under Fitch's base case, PDVSA's credit quality is expected to remain strong for the rating category despite an expected deterioration in the company's financial profile due to large capital expenditures of approximately USD236 billion through 2018 and increasing debt levels. Fitch expects capital expenditures to be lower than those projected by the company as they seem unrealistic compared with current levels. Under Fitch's stress case scenario, with declining production levels, same capital expenditure levels and increasing debt, PDVSA's underling credit quality could deteriorate to levels in line with the assigned rating category. LARGE HYDROCARBON RESERVES PDVSA's reported hydrocarbon reserves continue to increase with proved hydrocarbon reserves of 331 billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe) (approximately 89% oil and 11% natural gas) and proved developed hydrocarbon reserves of 20 billion boe as of December 2011, representing a 15-year proved developed reserve life. All reserves are property of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and not the company. Venezuela reported oil production of approximately 2.99 million barrels per day (bpd) and total production of approximately 3.86 boed during 2011. The company is yet to publish 2012 production numbers and financial statements. Reported crude production has declined by approximately 2% per annum on average over the last four years. Various independent reports have estimated production levels are lower than reported by the company, which adds to risk and is incorporated into the ratings. * VENEZUELA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Issuer Default Rating ------------------------------------------------------ Fitch Ratings has affirmed Venezuela's ratings as: -- Long-term foreign currency (FC) and local currency (LC) Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B+'; -- Short-term FC IDR at 'B'; -- Country Ceiling at 'B+' The Rating Outlook is Negative. KEY RATING DRIVERS The Negative Outlook reflects these factors: Policy choices related primarily to the exchange rate regime and the administration of the country's oil revenues have weighed on Venezuela's external and fiscal metrics as well as increased the sovereign's vulnerability to swings in international commodity prices. External liquidity and the sovereign's external net position have deteriorated in comparison to the 'B' median due to the transfer of oil exports' and bilateral loan proceeds to off-budget funds. Moreover, in recent years, the sovereign has issued FX-denominated debt in the domestic market in order to address strong demand for FX assets due to a weak exchange rate regime. In addition, political and policy uncertainty persists due to the magnitude of the current political transition in Venezuela. In the absence of President Hugo Chavez, the central figure in politics and policymaking over the past 14 years, the next government will face the challenges of consolidating its political position while at the same time rebalancing the Venezuelan economy. The rating affirmation reflects the following factors: Venezuela's ratings are currently underpinned by the sovereign's relative strong financing flexibility, favourable maturity profile, record of willingness to service debt and a favourable international oil price environment. A weak and volatile macroeconomic performance, a poor business environment, heightened commodity dependence, limited transparency in the administration and use of government-managed off-budget funds and relative weak institutional framework constitute key credit weaknesses. After 5.5% growth in 2012, the economy is likely to slow down markedly over the forecast period because of the comparatively lower fiscal stimulus, devaluation of the official exchange rate, continued high inflation, and bottlenecks in the provision of FX to the private sector. A markedly expansionary policy mix, domestic supply constraints and continued devaluation and high inflation expectations are likely to maintain inflation at high levels. Negative real interest rates have helped credit expand at a brisk pace, which could create a source of macroeconomic vulnerability. The central government deficit reportedly reached 4.9% of GDP in 2012. The February devaluation and still favourable oil prices could support a moderate fiscal consolidation to a deficit of 3% of GDP in 2013. After rising to 27.5% of GDP, central government debt could further increase to 29.6% in 2013, though still below 'B' rated peers. Nevertheless, the rapid growth of government debt in recent years has pushed the sovereign's interest burden to 11.4% of government revenues, above the 'B' median of 7.7%. The recent changes in Venezuela's FX system could reduce the need for the sovereign to issue FX debt for exchange rate policy purposes. Nevertheless, in the absence of tighter fiscal and monetary policies with efficiency improvements in the allocation of FX to the private sector, the new system is not likely to improve macroeconomic stability. Venezuela has generated continued current account surpluses since 1999, but these have failed to strengthen the sovereign's external balance sheet. In recent years, the authorities have channelled a significant portion of the country's oil-derived revenues to opaque off-budget funds such as the National Development Fund (FONDEN) in order to finance the government's policy priorities. The limited information regarding cash flows, quality of investments and outstanding balances increases the challenge to accurately assess the financial strength of the sovereign. Commodity dependence continues to deepen, as oil represented 96% of total exports and 42% of total central government revenues in 2012. In addition, 62% of international reserves were held in gold at the end of 2012. As a result, Venezuela's balance of payments, fiscal accounts and external liquidity cushions are vulnerable to a decline in international commodity prices Under current international oil prices, balance of payments and fiscal risks are manageable. Venezuela's amortization profile remains manageable at 1.7% and 1.2% of GDP in 2013 and 2014, respectively. In addition, government deposits at the end of 2012 equalled 7.8% of GDP. Further reducing roll-over risks, about 50% of domestic debt is held by public sector institutions. RATING SENSITIVITIES The Negative Outlook reflects the following risk factors that may, individually or collectively, result in a downgrade of the ratings by up to one notch: -- Further deterioration in the already weak policy environment that exacerbates the weakening of the sovereign's external and fiscal credit metrics vis-a-vis rating peers; -- Increased governability risks that undermine the potential for policy adjustments. The current Rating Outlook is Negative. Consequently, Fitch's sensitivity analysis does not currently anticipate developments with a material likelihood, individually or collectively, leading to a rating upgrade. However, future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead to a stabilisation of the Outlook include: -- Policy adjustments that lead to reduced macroeconomic distortions and external and fiscal vulnerabilities; -- Strengthening and greater transparency of fiscal and external accounts. KEY ASSUMPTIONS The ratings and Outlooks are sensitive to a number of assumptions. Fitch assumes that international oil prices will remain above USD100 (Brent) over the forecast period. A sustained decline in international oil prices would exacerbate pressures on Venezuela's balance of payments and fiscal accounts and be negative for the rating. Notwithstanding the significant political transition underway, Fitch judges the risk of social and political unrest leading to disruption in oil-derived revenues to have been materially reduced. =============== X X X X X X X X =============== * BOND PRICING: For the Week March 25 to March 29, 2013 ------------------------------------------------------- Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price ------ ------ -------- -------- ----- ARGENTINA --------- ARGENT-$DIS 8.28 12/31/2033 USD 57.5 ARGENT-$DIS 8.28 12/31/2033 USD 58 ARGENT-$DIS 8.28 12/31/2033 USD 58 ARGENT-$DIS 8.28 12/31/2033 USD 58.491 ARGENT-$DIS 8.28 12/31/2033 USD 60 ARGENT- PAR 1.18 12/31/2038 ARS 45.344 ARGENT- DIS 7.82 12/31/2033 EUR 45 ARGENT- DIS 7.82 12/31/2033 EUR 50 ARGENT- DIS 7.82 12/31/2033 EUR 50.5 ARGENT- DIS 4.33 12/31/2033 JPY 35.5 ARGENT- DIS 4.33 12/31/2033 JPY 36 ARGENT- PAR 0.45 12/31/2038 JPY 15 ARGENT-PAR&GDP 0.45 12/31/2038 JPY 8 ARGENTINA 9 11/29/2018 USD 74.875 ARGNT-BOCON PRE9 2 3/15/2014 ARS 152.5 BANCO MACRO SA 9.75 12/18/2036 USD 71.25 BANCO MACRO SA 9.75 12/18/2036 USD 71.03 BANCO MACRO SA 9.75 12/18/2036 USD 72.1 CAPEX SA 10 3/10/2018 USD 73.9 CAPEX SA 10 3/10/2018 USD 73.375 CIA LATINO AMER 9.5 12/15/2016 USD 66 EMP DISTRIB NORT 9.75 10/25/2022 USD 46 EMP DISTRIB NORT 10.5 10/9/2017 USD 95.001 EMP DISTRIB NORT 9.75 10/25/2022 USD 46.125 METROGAS SA 8.875 12/31/2018 USD 72.875 PROV BUENOS AIRE 9.625 4/18/2028 USD 61.664 PROV BUENOS AIRE 9.625 4/18/2028 USD 61.625 PROV BUENOS AIRE 9.375 9/14/2018 USD 67.25 PROV BUENOS AIRE 9.375 9/14/2018 USD 67.127 PROV BUENOS AIRE 10.875 1/26/2021 USD 70.263 PROV BUENOS AIRE 10.875 1/26/2021 USD 70.245 PROV DE FORMOSA 5 2/27/2022 USD 62.25 PROV DE MENDOZA 5.5 9/4/2018 USD 74.42 PROV DE MENDOZA 5.5 9/4/2018 USD 74.375 PROV DEL CHACO 4 12/4/2026 USD 27.25 PROV DEL CHACO 4 11/4/2023 USD 54.75 TRANSENER 9.75 8/15/2021 USD 46.69 TRANSENER 8.875 12/15/2016 USD 41 TRANSENER 9.75 8/15/2021 USD 42.75 CAYMAN ISLAND ------------- BANCO BPI (CI) 4.15 11/14/2035 EUR 71.75 BCP FINANCE CO 4.239 45.917 BCP FINANCE CO 5.543 45.7 BES FINANCE LTD 4.5 65 BES FINANCE LTD 5.58 69.167 CAM GLOBAL FIN 6.08 12/22/2030 EUR 71.25 CHINA FORESTRY 10.25 11/17/2015 USD 52 CHINA FORESTRY 10.25 11/17/2015 USD 52.5 CHINA SUNERGY 4.75 6/15/2013 USD 59.141 ERB HELLAS CAYMA 9 3/8/2019 EUR 16 ESFG INTERNATION 5.753 56.6 GOL FINANCE 8.75 77 JINKOSOLAR HOLD 4 5/15/2016 USD 66.899 LDK SOLAR CO LTD 10 2/28/2014 CNY 69.071 LUPATECH FINANCE 9.875 31 LUPATECH FINANCE 9.875 30.95 PUBMASTER FIN 6.962 6/30/2028 GBP 63.086 RENHE COMMERCIAL 11.75 5/18/2015 USD 74.5 RENHE COMMERCIAL 13 3/10/2016 USD 78.75 RENHE COMMERCIAL 13 3/10/2016 USD 72.75 RENHE COMMERCIAL 11.75 5/18/2015 USD 75.005 SUNTECH POWER 3 3/15/2013 USD 33 SUNTECH POWER 3 3/15/2013 USD 44.75 CHILE ----- ALMENDRAL TEL 3.5 12/15/2014 CLP 43.436 CHILE 3 1/1/2042 CLP 65.066 CHILE 3 1/1/2042 CLP 65.066 CHILE 3 1/1/2040 CLP 66.564 CHILE 3 1/1/2040 CLP 66.564 COLBUN SA 3.2 5/1/2013 CLP 25.26 TALCA CHILLAN 2.75 12/15/2019 CLP 65.673 PUERTO RICO ----------- PUERTO RICO CONS 6.2 5/1/2017 USD 58.5 PUERTO RICO CONS 6.5 4/1/2016 USD 69.48 VENEZUELA --------- PETROLEOS DE VEN 5.5 4/12/2037 USD 69.75 PETROLEOS DE VEN 5.375 4/12/2027 USD 69.35 *********** Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to publication. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each Thursday's edition of the TCR-LA. Submissions about insolvency- related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com *********** S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Frauline S. Abangan, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200. * * * End of Transmission * * *