/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/130313.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
L A T I N A M E R I C A
Wednesday, March 13, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 51
Headlines
A R G E N T I N A
CAPEX SA: S&P Affirms 'B-' CCR; Outlook Negative
* ARGENTINA: Moody's Takes Actions on Various Securitizations
B R A Z I L
VESPUCIO NORTE: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating; Outlook is Stable
* BRAZIL: Gets US$18 Million Loan to Help Prevent Corruption
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
AGROVENTURES LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
BGI EXTERNAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
BRIDGEND INVESTMENTS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
BTR INVESTMENT: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
CC ATHENA: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
FPCD ACQUISITION: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
HARAJUKU TOWN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
ISLAND COMMUNICATIONS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
KINGSFERRY INVESTMENTS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
LAGO OFFSHORE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
PIMCO GLOBAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
QUAESTA CAPITAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
SASCO NIM: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
TRITON 530: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
VINCI FIRENZE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
VINCI INTERNATIONAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
WELLS FARGO: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
WELLS FARGO 100: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
ZOOM ADVENTURES: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
H O N D U R A S
* HONDURAS: B2 Govt. Bond Rating Reflects Fiscal Deterioration
J A M A I C A
JAMAICA DIVERSIFIED: Moody's Downgrades DPR Ratings to Caa3
M E X I C O
PRESTACIONES FINMART: Fitch Assigns 'B' ST Issuer Default Ratings
P U E R T O R I C O
COMERCIAL LAS TRES: Case Summary & 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors
PLAZA RESORT: Suit vs. Perimetro Stays in Bankruptcy Court
R-G PREMIER: Ex-Execs Can't Duck FDIC's $417M Bank Collapse Suit
TECHOS CARIBE: Case Summary & 15 Unsecured Creditors
UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on Bonds
X X X X X X X X
* Moody's Issues 2013 Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean
* Prolonged Eurozone Recovery Poses Risk to LatAm, Fitch Says
- - - - -
=================
A R G E N T I N A
=================
CAPEX SA: S&P Affirms 'B-' CCR; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B-' global scale
corporate credit rating on CAPEX S.A. (CAPEX). The outlook
remains negative. The rating action was part of S&P's regular
review.
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services' rating on CAPEX reflects the
high political and regulatory risk it faces in Argentina and high
currency mismatch risk, with revenues denominated mainly in
Argentine pesos and debt in U.S. dollars. "However, CAPEX's
integrated business as a power producer, which has its own natural
gas production, and supplies part of its power plant fuel needs,
partly offsets these negatives," said Standard & Poor's credit
analyst Sergio Fuentes. CAPEX also benefits from its oil and
liquid processed natural gas operations that represent about 40%
of its EBITDA generation, and has a favorable debt maturity
profile.
* ARGENTINA: Moody's Takes Actions on Various Securitizations
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Latin America upgraded the national scale and global local
currency ratings of several debt securities and certificates of
securitizations issued in the Argentina.
The complete rating action, which includes upgrades of the
national scale ratings and global local currency ratings, is as
follows:
Issuer: Fideicomiso Financiero CCF Creditos Serie 1
VDF TFA, Affirmed Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012 Assigned
Aaa.ar (sf)
VDF TFA, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012 Assigned
Ba3 (sf)
CP, Upgraded to Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012 Assigned
A2.ar (sf)
CP, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 20, 2012 Assigned B3
(sf)
Issuer: Fideicomiso Financiero Supervielle Creditos 55
VDF TVB, Affirmed Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Dec 2, 2011 Assigned
Aaa.ar (sf)
VDF TVB, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)
VDF TVC, Affirmed Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded
to Aaa.ar (sf)
VDF TVC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)
CP, Upgraded to Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded
to A1.ar (sf)
CP, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded to
B2 (sf)
Issuer: Fideicomiso Financiero Supervielle Creditos 56
VDF TV Class B, Affirmed Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Jan 23, 2012
Assigned Aaa.ar (sf)
VDF TV Class B, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
VDF TFC Class C, Affirmed Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012
Upgraded to Aaa.ar (sf)
VDF TFC Class C, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)
CP, Upgraded to Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded
to Aa2.ar (sf)
CP, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)
Issuer: Fideicomiso Financiero Supervielle Creditos 63
VDF TVB, Affirmed Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2012 Assigned
Aaa.ar (sf)
VDF TVB, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2012 Assigned Ba3
(sf)
VDF TFA, Affirmed Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2012 Assigned
Aaa.ar (sf)
VDF TFA, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Aug 3, 2012 Assigned Ba3
(sf)
VDF TFC, Upgraded to Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012
Upgraded to Aa1.ar (sf)
VDF TFC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)
CP, Upgraded to Aa1.ar (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded
to Aa2.ar (sf)
CP, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)
Issuer: Fideicomiso Financiero Supervielle Creditos 64
VDF TFA, Affirmed Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012 Assigned
Aaa.ar (sf)
VDF TFA, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012 Assigned
Ba3 (sf)
VDF TVB, Affirmed Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012 Assigned
Aaa.ar (sf)
VDF TVB, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 14, 2012 Assigned
Ba3 (sf)
VDF TFC, Upgraded to Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012
Upgraded to Aa2.ar (sf)
VDF TFC, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)
CP, Affirmed Aa3.ar (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded to
Aa3.ar (sf)
CP, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded to B1
(sf)
Issuer: Fideicomiso Financiero Supervielle Creditos Banex 54
VDF TVB, Affirmed Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Nov 18, 2011 Assigned
Aaa.ar (sf)
VDF TVB, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 4, 2012 Downgraded
to Ba3 (sf)
VDF TVC, Affirmed Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded
to Aaa.ar (sf)
VDF TVC, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)
CP, Upgraded to Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded
to Aa2.ar (sf)
CP, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)
Issuer: Fideicomiso Financiero Supervielle Personales 5
CP, Upgraded to Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded
to Aa2.ar (sf)
CP, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 12, 2012 Upgraded to
B1 (sf)
VDF TVB, Affirmed Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Jan 17, 2012 Assigned
Aaa.ar (sf)
VDF TVB, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 17, 2012 Assigned
Ba3 (sf)
Issuer: Fideicomiso Financiero Supervielle Personales 6
VDF TFA, Affirmed Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2012 Assigned
Aaa.ar (sf)
VDF TFA, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2012 Assigned
Ba3 (sf)
VDF TVB, Affirmed Aaa.ar (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2012 Assigned
Aaa.ar (sf)
VDF TVB, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2012 Assigned
Ba3 (sf)
VDF TFC, Upgraded to Baa3.ar (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2012
Assigned Ca.ar (sf)
VDF TFC, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2012 Assigned
Ca (sf)
CP, Upgraded to B3.ar (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2012 Assigned
C.ar (sf)
CP, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Aug 17, 2012 Assigned C
(sf)
Ratings Rationale:
The upgrade reflects the sound performance of the securitized
pools and the increased credit enhancement levels due to turbo
sequential structures that capture the totality of the available
excess spread in the transactions to repay the rated debt.
In order to establish the updated rating levels, Moody's ran cash
flow models using lognormal distributions for defaults and
prepayments. Moody's used the current pool balance and the current
balance of the debt securities and certificates. Moody's analysis
did not consider any loans that were more than 30 days past due.
The ratings of the Certificates address only the repayment of
principal before legal final.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan ABS Transactions published in
October 2012.
Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable with
the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs
for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country.
NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the
relevant country, as in ".mx" for Mexico.
===========
B R A Z I L
===========
VESPUCIO NORTE: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating; Outlook is Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook on Sociedad
Consecionaria Vespucio Norte Express S.A. to Stable from Negative.
The rating was affirmed at Ba1. The issuer has approximately 358
billion of CLP outstanding, or approximately US $740 million (at
current exchange rates).
Ratings Rationale:
The affirmation of Vespucio Norte's rating and the change to a
stable outlook acknowledges the stabilization of traffic and
revenues over the last two years. The road has shown signs of
recuperation after a period of extreme stress brought on by the
global financial crisis and the February 2010 earthquake, which
compounded the already existing lower than expected ramp up
traffic and revenue at the time.
Post-earthquake, the project's assets have been fully operational
for almost two years and the number of vehicles on the road is
showing growth that is more in line with that of other tolled
facilities in the Santiago metropolitan area. Total traffic in
2011 increased 19% over that of the previous year and in 2012 the
growth was approximately 9% relative to 2011. Despite the fact
that the traffic and revenue are notably below that originally
anticipated when the project debt was originally issued, the
current trend in traffic and revenue should be able to provide
adequate debt service coverage for the current rating level.
The issuer was able to manage the low debt service coverage over
the last three years with cash on hand, without the need to use
the debt service reserve fund. Debt service coverage for 2011 was
1.01x, and 1.10x for 2012. Going forward, traffic and revenue
growth that is somewhat above that of the region's GDP is
important given the increasing debt service structure.
Liquidity in the project remains strong and is the main reason
that the rating was maintained at the Ba1 during its very
difficult period which included several years of DSCR under 1.0x.
In addition to the DSRA, the project has a contingent equity
letter of credit that provides additional support. This LOC can be
released if debt service coverage on a 2 year historic and 2 year
look-forward basis reaches 1.3 times. At this rate, per Moody's
estimates, the earliest the contingent equity could be released
would be -- best case -- between 2017 and 2018.
Despite its stabilizing trends, fundamentally the project
continues to be weaker than its counterparts in the Santiago area
which have had consistent growth and metrics that are notably
stronger.
The rating could be upgraded if over time the project produces
debt service coverage that is consistently above 1.3x. The rating
could suffer downward pressure if the traffic gains achieved in
recent years are reversed and the related revenues yield declining
debt service coverage that is lower than the already somewhat weak
1.1x. While not expected given the constraints of the financing
structure, a loss of liquidity of the project while it experiences
debt service coverage below 1.3x could also lead to downward
rating action.
The ownership of the concessionaire changed at the end of 2012
with the purchase by Brookfield Infrastructure Group (Brookfield)
of 46.5% of the shares in Autopista Vespucio Norte from ACS
Servicios y Concesiones (ACS). The transaction also included
Brookfield's acquisition of the 8.1% ownership stake in AVN of
COFIDES. After purchasing M.M Warburg & Co.'s 16.2% ownership and
Hochtief's 29.4% stake in AVN in October 2012, Brookfield became
its sole shareholder.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Operational Toll
Roads published in December 2006.
* BRAZIL: Gets US$18 Million Loan to Help Prevent Corruption
------------------------------------------------------------
The Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) of Brazil will receive
a loan for US$18 million from the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) to consolidate its institutional capacity and strengthen
mechanisms to prevent and combat corruption in the country's
public administration.
The initiative will strengthen the operational capacity of the
CGU, which is charged with carrying out strategic measures to
improve the integrity and management of public resources. The
program will promote interactions between the CGU and federal
public administrators and increase transparency and civil society
oversight in the management of public resources, as well
strengthen support activities and internal controls at the state
and municipal levels.
Activities to strengthen the operational capacity of the CGU will
include the promotion of good management practices in staff
management and intensive use of new technologies. Models for
auditing and inspection processes will be revamped and the
Observatory for Public Spending will be implemented.
Interactions between the CGU and federal public administrators
will be strengthened by providing a risk management model and a
website containing recommendations, management support services,
and best practices information. Further actions are planned to
encourage civil society oversight in the use of public resources
by providing training and teaching materials.
According to IDB project team leader Pedro Farias, "the operation
will support the consolidation of a management and oversight model
that emphasizes prevention of irregularities and social oversight
through greater interaction among the CGU, public administrators,
and citizens."
The program will extend these activities to subnational
governmental entities through transparency websites at the state
and municipal levels along with training to improve internal
control units and support for the implementation of local versions
of public spending observatories.
The IDB financing has a term of 15.25 years, a grace period of
five years, and an interest rate based on LIBOR.
==========================
C A Y M A N I S L A N D S
==========================
AGROVENTURES LIMITED: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 19, 2012, the sole member of Agroventures Limited passed a
resolution that voluntarily winds up the company's operations.
The company's liquidator is:
Gavin Lowe
Turners Management Ltd.
Strathvale House
90 North Church Street
PO Box 2636 Grand Cayman KY1-1102
Cayman Islands
Telephone: +1 (345) 814 0712
BGI EXTERNAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
On Dec. 19, 2012, the sole shareholder of The BGI External Alpha
Fund I Limited resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's
business.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 30, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust Corporate Services (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 914 3115
BRIDGEND INVESTMENTS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 17, 2012, the sole shareholder of Bridgend Investments
Limited resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 28, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Robin Lee Mcmahon
c/o Mr. Barry MacManus
Telephone +1 (345) 814 8997
E-mail barry.macmanus@ky.ey.com
Ernst & Young Ltd
62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
PO Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
Cayman Islands
BTR INVESTMENT: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
----------------------------------------------
On Dec. 20, 2012, the sole shareholder of BTR Investment
Management Limited passed a resolution that voluntarily winds up
the company's operations.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 21, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Ogier
c/o Shameer Jasani
Telephone: (345) 815 1802
Facsimile: (345) 949 9877
89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9007
Cayman Islands
CC ATHENA: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report
----------------------------------------------
On Jan. 25, 2013, the shareholders of CC Athena OS Fund Ltd.
received the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up
proceedings and property disposal.
The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Dec. 20, 2012.
The company's liquidator is:
Stuarts Walker Hersant
Telephone: (345) 949 3344
Facsimile: (345) 949 2888
P.O. Box 2510 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
Cayman Islands
FPCD ACQUISITION: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 20, 2012, the sole member of FPCD Acquisition Company
passed a resolution that voluntarily winds up the company's
operations.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 23, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Gene Dacosta
c/o Noel Webb
Telephone: (345) 814 7394
Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
Cayman Islands
HARAJUKU TOWN: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 19, 2012, the sole shareholder of Harajuku Town Cayman
resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 30, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Cayman Islands
c/o Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 914 3115
ISLAND COMMUNICATIONS: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 19, 2012, the sole member of Island Communications Ltd.
passed a resolution that voluntarily winds up the company's
operations.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 23, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Gene Dacosta
c/o Noel Webb
Telephone: (345) 814 7394
Facsimile: (345) 945 3902
P.O. Box 2681 Grand Cayman KY1-1111
Cayman Islands
KINGSFERRY INVESTMENTS: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 17, 2012, the sole shareholder of Kingsferry Investments
Limited resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 28, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Robin Lee Mcmahon
c/o Mr. Barry MacManus
Telephone +1 (345) 814 8997
e-mail barry.macmanus@ky.ey.com
Ernst & Young Ltd
62 Forum Lane, Camana Bay
PO Box 510 Grand Cayman KY1-1106
Cayman Islands
LAGO OFFSHORE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
---------------------------------------------
On Dec. 20, 2012, the sole shareholder of Lago Offshore Fund Ltd
passed a resolution that voluntarily winds up the company's
operations.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 21, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Ogier
c/o Kate O'Neill
Telephone: (345) 815 1822
Facsimile: (345) 949 9877
89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9007
Cayman Islands
PIMCO GLOBAL: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------
On Dec. 11, 2012, the sole shareholder of Pimco Global Credit
Opportunity Offshore Fund II, Ltd. resolved to voluntarily
liquidate the company's business.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 30, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust Corporate Services (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 914 3115
QUAESTA CAPITAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
On Dec. 19, 2012, the sole shareholder of Quaesta Capital Foreign
Exchange Multi-Manager Program (FX-MMP) Fund SPC passed a
resolution that voluntarily winds up the company's operations.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 20, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust Corporate Services (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 914 3115
SASCO NIM: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------
On Dec. 19, 2012, the sole shareholder of Sasco Nim Company 2005-
WF3 resolved to voluntarily liquidate the company's business.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 30, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust SPV (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Cayman Islands
c/o Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 914 3115
STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-------------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 20, 2012, the sole shareholder of Strategic Opportunities
Management Ltd. passed a resolution that voluntarily winds up the
company's operations.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 21, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Ogier
c/o Michael Lubin
Telephone: (345) 815 1793
Facsimile: (345) 949 9877
89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9007
Cayman Islands
TRITON 530: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
------------------------------------------
On Dec. 20, 2012, the sole member of Triton 530 Ltd. passed a
resolution that voluntarily winds up the company's operations.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 22, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Gene Dacosta
c/o Maree Martin
P.O. Box 2681 Cayman Islands
VINCI FIRENZE: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
---------------------------------------------
On Dec. 20, 2012, the sole shareholder of Vinci Firenze
International Fund II passed a resolution that voluntarily winds
up the company's operations.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 21, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Ogier
c/o Michael Lubin
Telephone: (345) 815 1793
Facsimile: (345) 949-9877
89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9007
Cayman Islands
VINCI INTERNATIONAL: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
---------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 20, 2012, the sole shareholder of Vinci International Fund
II passed a resolution that voluntarily winds up the company's
operations.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 21, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Ogier
c/o Michael Lubin
Telephone: (345) 815 1793
Facsimile: (345) 949 9877
89 Nexus Way, Camana Bay
Grand Cayman KY1-9007
Cayman Islands
WELLS FARGO: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
----------------------------------------------
On Dec. 19, 2012, the sole shareholder of Wells Fargo Multi-
Strategy 100 Tei Fund A, LDC resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 30, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust Corporate Services (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 914 3115
WELLS FARGO 100: Commences Liquidation Proceedings
--------------------------------------------------
On Dec. 19, 2012, the sole shareholder of Wells Fargo Multi-
Strategy 100 Tei Fund I, LDC resolved to voluntarily liquidate the
company's business.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 30, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Intertrust Corporate Services (Cayman) Limited
190 Elgin Avenue, George Town
Grand Cayman KY1-9005
Cayman Islands
c/o Jennifer Chailler
Telephone: (345) 914 3115
ZOOM ADVENTURES: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up
-----------------------------------------------
On Dec. 18, 2012, the shareholders of Zoom Adventures LLC passed a
resolution that voluntarily winds up the company's operations.
Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by
Jan. 22, 2013, will be included in the company's dividend
distribution.
The company's liquidator is:
Bruce Makowsky
Campbells Corporate Services Limited
Willow House, Floor 4
Cricket Square
P.O. Box 268 Grand Cayman KY1-1104
Telephone: +1 (345) 949 6258
Facsimile: +1 345 945 2877
===============
H O N D U R A S
===============
* HONDURAS: B2 Govt. Bond Rating Reflects Fiscal Deterioration
--------------------------------------------------------------
In its annual report on Honduras, Moody's Investors Service says
the country's B2 government bond rating with a negative outlook
reflects a deterioration in the government's fiscal metrics, as
well as the country's external position. Moody's affirmed
Honduras' B2 bond rating on February 26 and changed the outlook to
negative from stable.
The deterioration in fiscal metrics relates to weak tax
collection, limited fiscal flexibility, weak expenditure control,
and rising debt ratios. Meanwhile, the rating agency report finds
that Honduras' balance of payments pressure stems from a widening
current account deficit, which is only partially covered by
foreign direct investment. Last year, the nearly 10% of GDP
current account deficit was partially covered by international
reserves, resulting in a decline in the overall reserves level.
As strengths, the country can point to stable GDP growth rates,
strong workers' remittance inflows, and stable FDI.
Moody's assesses Honduras' economic strength as low, reflecting
the small size and limited diversification of the agriculture- and
maquila-dependent economy, while GDP (PPP) per capita is low at
just above $4,000. Remittances (16% of GDP) remain strong and real
GDP growth has remained stable since the domestic political
upheaval and global financial crisis in 2009.
The country's institutional strength is low, according to Moody's,
because of weak governance and concerns about the rule of law, as
reflected in high crime rates. These institutional weaknesses are
partly mitigated by the fact that Honduras has maintained a close
and ongoing relationship with the IMF, but the country's
arrangement with the IMF expired in March 2012. Renewal discussion
are likely to begin soon, but Moody's does not expect a new IMF
arrangement to be signed in 2013, given that it will be difficult
to commit to significant fiscal consolidation in an election year.
Government financial strength is low, says Moody's, despite debt
forgiveness by bilateral and multilateral creditors from 2005-07.
After this debt forgiveness, government debt fell from 60% of GDP
to 17%, but it has since risen to 35% of GDP, and Moody's expects
it to continue on an upward trajectory. Also, the government has a
small revenue base, limited fiscal flexibility, and weak
expenditure oversight. The government's liquidity challenges have
also led it to borrow from the central bank and run up arrears
with service providers; however, the government has remained
current on all debt payments. Relatively large current account
deficits expose Honduras to a high degree of economic event risk.
In the event of a shock to the country's external accounts, says
Moody's, the central bank's crawling peg regime could put pressure
on the already low level of international reserves.
Finally, Moody's assessment of political event risk captures the
moderate possibility of a coup similar to the one that took place
in 2009, when then President Manuel Zelaya was removed from office
after trying to change the constitution in order to run for
another term.
=============
J A M A I C A
=============
JAMAICA DIVERSIFIED: Moody's Downgrades DPR Ratings to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service concluded the review of Jamaica
Diversified Payment Rights Company, Series 2006-1 and 2007-1. The
transactions are originated by National Commercial Bank Jamaica
Limited. The ratings are on review for possible downgrade since
February 20, 2013. The complete rating action is as follows:
Issuer: Jamaica Diversified Payment Rights Company, Series 2006-1
Ser. 2006-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 20, 2013
Downgraded to B3 and Placed under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Jamaica Diversified Payment Rights Company, Series 2007-1
Ser. 2007-1, Downgraded to Caa3; previously on Feb 20, 2013
Downgraded to B3 and Placed under Review for Possible Downgrade
Ratings Rationale:
The rating action is the result of the downgrade of government
bond ratings of the Government of Jamaica (Jamaica) with credit -
negative consequences to NCB as holder of Jamaican government
securities.
On March 6, 2013 Moody's downgraded the Government of Jamaica's
government debt rating to Caa3 from B3 due to the government debt
exchange affecting US$9.1 billion in domestic debt, equivalent to
54% of total government debt outstanding at year-end 2102, that
Moody's considers a distressed exchange. The debt exchange
resulted in net present value losses for investors in excess of
10% and is the second distressed debt exchange in three years.
As in most future flow transactions, the ratings of Jamaica
Diversified Payment Rights Series 2006-1 and 2007-1 are linked to
the operational and financial strength of the originator of the
future receivables, in this case, NCB. As a result, a change in
Moody's opinion about the creditworthiness of the Jamaican
government, together with its potential impact on NCB, results in
a change of the rating of NCB's future flow transactions.
Moody's notes that both future flow transactions are currently
performing according to expectations. Both Series 2006-1 and 2007-
1 issued by Jamaica Diversified Payment Rights Company exhibit
strong monthly and quarterly debt service coverage levels.
Quarterly debt service coverage levels have remained above 60
times since 2Q2011 and well above transaction triggers.
The Jamaica Diversified Payment Rights Company, Series 2006-1, and
Series 2007-1 notes are backed by existing and future U.S. dollar
cash flows generated by the electronic remittance business of NCB.
NCB is the originator of and the servicer in both transactions.
The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Diversified Payment Rights Securitisations"
published in March 2009. Other methodologies and factors that may
have been considered can also be found in the Credit Policy &
Methodologies directory.
===========
M E X I C O
===========
PRESTACIONES FINMART: Fitch Assigns 'B' ST Issuer Default Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned foreign and local currency long-term
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'B+' and short-term IDRs of 'B'
to Mexico's Prestaciones Finmart, S.A.P.I. de C.V., SOFOM, E.N.R.
National scale ratings of 'BBB+(mex)' and 'F2(mex)' were also
assigned. The long-term Rating Outlook is Stable. Fitch also
expects to rate an upcoming issue of medium-term Reg S bonds
'B+/RR4'.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
All of Finmart's ratings are driven by its core profile. Thus, the
ratings reflect its favorable business model, granting personal
loans to stable public sector employees with direct debit to their
payrolls. However, the ratings also factor in the relatively high
operational, political, and reputational risks associated with
this sector, as well the exposure to fierce competition and the
potential for rapidly changing market dynamics.
Finmart's ratings also consider its gradually growing franchise
and overall competitive position, sound operating and risk
management practices, and improving performance and capital
adequacy metrics, although these have been somewhat volatile in
recent years. More important, Finmart's ratings are constrained by
its relatively expensive, concentrated funding base, which is
faced with burdensome terms and conditions.
The expected rating on the proposed notes reflects Fitch's opinion
that, upon completion of such issue, FinMart would have enough
available earning assets to ensure an average recovery for
bondholders in the case of liquidation. This underpins the
Recovery Rating of 'RR4' and the alignment of the notes' rating
with Finmart's IDR.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Finmart's ratings could be eventually upgraded if the flexibility
of funding is materially improved, with more diversified sources,
an increasing portion of more stable financing alternatives, and a
material shift in the funding mix, with the majority of this
coming from unsecured lending. Also, sustained profitability and
capital adequacy metrics might be positive ratings factors.
In turn, Finmart's ratings could be affected if the company is not
able to sustain the performance, capital, and asset quality
metrics recorded at end-2012. The ratings could be negatively
affected by operating return on assets (ROA) below 2%, a capital-
to-assets ratio lower than 20%, and/or impairment and charge-off
ratios above 7% and 4%, respectively.
The rating of the proposed notes will likely remain aligned with
Finmart's IDRs. However, it could be downgraded to a level below
the IDR if Finmart does not improve the availability of unpledged
earnings assets materially after completion of the issuance.
CREDIT PROFILE
Finmart, established in 2003, grants personal loans secured by
payroll withholdings to unionized public sector employees in
Mexico. These employees, federal, state, and municipal
governments, often have limited access to financing products,
given their relatively lower income and limited credit track
record. However, public sector unionized jobs are usually stable
and have low turnover ratios. Finmart offers medium-term loans
that are repaid in fixed installments.
In early 2012, EzCorp Inc. (NASDAQ: EZPW), a consumer finance
company based in Austin, Texas, acquired 60% of Finmart through a
capital infusion of USD12 million which, coupled with new capital
contributed by original shareholders, increased Finmart's capital
base by USD20 million. These resources enabled Finmart to expand
its loan growth capacity, implement a strategy to improve its
funding structure, and clean up its loan portfolio. As a result,
capital metrics and franchise improved materially, although
profitability and asset quality were somewhat affected, but these
have been gradually improving since 2012.
For many years, Finmart's funding mix has been relatively
expensive and concentrated, with burdensome terms and conditions.
Tenors, interest rates, and required collateral have been
improving steadily and materially, which has boosted recurring
earnings and improved the entity's financial flexibility.
Nonetheless, funding remains concentrated in wholesale sources,
while the company remains challenged to further improve the
conditions of its credit facilities while reducing its reliance on
collateralized funding.
Fitch has assigned these ratings:
Prestaciones Finmart:
-- Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'B+';
-- Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs 'B';
-- Upcoming issue of MXN750 million 3-year Reg S bonds
'B+/RR4(EXP)';
-- National-scale long-term rating 'BBB+(mex)';
-- National-scale short-term rating 'F2(mex)'.
The Rating Outlook is Stable.
=====================
P U E R T O R I C O
=====================
COMERCIAL LAS TRES: Case Summary & 20 Largest Unsecured Creditors
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Debtor: Comercial Las Tres RRR Inc.
aka Comercial Las 3 RRR Inc.
P.O. Box 1210
Coamo, PR 00769
Bankruptcy Case No.: 13-01740
Chapter 11 Petition Date: March 6, 2013
Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court
District of Puerto Rico (Ponce)
Debtor's Counsel: Modesto Bigas Mendez, Esq.
BIGAS & BIGAS
P.O. Box 7462
Ponce, PR 00732
Tel: (787) 844-1444
Fax: (787) 842-4090
E-mail: modestobigas@yahoo.com
Estimated Assets: $500,001 to $1,000,000
Estimated Debts: $1,000,001 to $10,000,000
A copy of the Company's list of its 20 largest unsecured creditors
filed with the petition is available for free at:
http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb13-01740.pdf
The petition was signed by Rafael Reyes Rodriguez, president.
PLAZA RESORT: Suit vs. Perimetro Stays in Bankruptcy Court
----------------------------------------------------------
District Judge Francisco A. Besosa denied a motion to withdraw
reference of the adversary proceeding captioned SCOTIABANK DE
PUERTO RICO, Plaintiff, v. PERIMETRO PROPERTIES, INC., Defendant,
Civil No. 12-1457 (FAB) (D.P.R.).
Scotiabank holds a first mortgage on the property of The Plaza
Resort at Palmas, Inc., which filed for bankruptcy protection on
Nov. 20, 2011, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Puerto Rico. At that time, the Debtor listed all of the timeshare
owners as secured creditors under Schedule D. R-G Premier Bank of
Puerto Rico filed a proof of secured claim, which was subsequently
transferred to plaintiff Scotiabank.
The Debtor's principals own Perimetro. Scotiabank filed its
adversary complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that Perimetro
"is not a secured creditor and may not benefit from the
subordination clause in [Mortgage] Deed No. 9." The
"subordination clause" indicated that Scotiabank would be required
to honor the timeshare holders' personal and contractual rights to
enjoy the facilities, "provided that they acquired their timeshare
rights in the ordinary course" of business.
Perimetro subsequently asked the District Court to withdraw
reference of the adversary complaint from the bankruptcy court.
On review, Judge Besosa held that the issue in controversy is a
"core" bankruptcy issue. Determination "of the validity, extent,
or priority of liens" is specifically one of the issues Congress
listed a "core" bankruptcy issue, the District Court cites. The
district judge also holds that the core bankruptcy issue does not
carry a right to trial by jury.
Lastly, Judge Besosa said "uniformity in bankruptcy administration
weighs in favor of denying the withdrawal of the reference because
the bankruptcy court is much more familiar with the process of
determining lienholder priority."
The matter is referred back to the Bankruptcy Court for further
proceedings, Judge Besosa said.
A copy of the District Court's March 5, 2013 Opinion and Order is
available for free at http://is.gd/YwY9XMfrom Leagle.com.
R-G PREMIER: Ex-Execs Can't Duck FDIC's $417M Bank Collapse Suit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Hornbeck of BankruptcyLaw360 reported that a federal judge
refused to dismiss the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.'s $417
million lawsuit against 19 former directors and officers of Puerto
Rico's R-G Premier Bank, who allegedly helped precipitate one of
the largest bank failures in the island's history.
The report related that U.S. District Judge Carmen Consuelo Cerezo
refused to dismiss the case in a series of brief orders, despite
the defendants' insistence that the FDIC's allegations were too
vague or that the regulator had waited too long to accuse the
directors and officers of negligently overseeing the bank.
About R-G Premier
R-G Premier Bank of Puerto Rico in Hato Rey, P.R., was closed on
April 30, 2010, by the Office of the Commissioner of Financial
Institutions of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which appointed
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver. To
protect the depositors, the FDIC entered into a purchase and
assumption agreement with Scotiabank de Puerto Rico of San Juan,
P.R., to assume all of the deposits of R-G Premier Bank of Puerto
Rico.
TECHOS CARIBE: Case Summary & 15 Unsecured Creditors
----------------------------------------------------
Debtor: Techos Caribe, Inc.
P.O. Box 69001
Suite 380
Hatillo, PR 00659
Bankruptcy Case No.: 13-01758
Chapter 11 Petition Date: March 7, 2013
Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
District of Puerto Rico (Old San Juan)
Debtor's Counsel: Alexis Fuentes Hernandez, Esq.
FUENTES LAW OFFICES
P.O. Box 9022726
San Juan, PR 00902-2726
Tel: (787) 722-5216
Fax: (787) 722-5206
E-mail: alex@fuentes-law.com
Scheduled Assets: $720,000
Scheduled Liabilities: $2,151,566
A list of the Company's 15 largest unsecured creditors, filed
together with the petition, is available for free at
http://bankrupt.com/misc/prb13-01758.pdf
The petition was signed by Luis E. Rodriguez Colon, president.
UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the long-term ratings of
University of Puerto Rico -- specifically, the Ba1 rating on the
Pledged Revenue Bonds and the Ba2 rating on the 2000 Series A
bonds supported by university lease payments. The ratings are
removed from review for downgrade and the outlook has been revised
to negative.
On December 14, 2012 Moody's downgraded the ratings of the
University of Puerto Rico and kept the ratings under review for
possible downgrade. The rating actions followed the downgrade on
December 13, 2012 of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the
Government Development Bank (GDB) to Baa3 with a negative outlook
for both from Baa1 with a negative outlook. The ratings for
University of Puerto Rico remained on review for possible
downgrade to assess the university's FY 2012 results and
projections for 2013, focusing on financial support from the
commonwealth and GDB, enrollment, hospital operations and
alternative sources of liquidity in the event the GDB were to face
issues of market access due to the downgrade of its long-term debt
rating.
Rating Rationale
The Ba1 rating for University of Puerto Rico reflects the high
reliance on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Baa3, negative), with
commonwealth funding accounting for an estimated 71% of FY 2012
university operating revenues and few other revenue sources,
coupled with the support of the Governmental Development Bank
(GDB) of the Commonwealth for liquidity and financial management
support. Other challenges are the university's very weak balance
sheet with extremely thin liquidity supported only by a liquidity
facility provided by GDB, its relationship with Servicios Medicos
Universitarios, which has a history of producing weak but
improving operating performance and thin liquidity from its high
Medicaid patient load. Offsetting strengths are its standing as
the sole provider of public higher education in the commonwealth
and large enrollment base, as well as good debt service coverage.
The negative outlook reflects the negative outlook of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the university's dependence on
state appropriations. Also included is the possible impact on
pledged revenues and debt service coverage if proposed legislation
is enacted resulting in substantially increased government funding
while seeing a reduction in student-based revenues, a primary
source of revenues for debt service. Given the possible resistance
to new increases of tuition and fee increases as seen by the
student strikes when the stabilization fee was implemented, it is
uncertain as to the sources and amount of future revenues outside
of commonwealth funding. Also driving the negative outlook are
vulnerability of a downturn in hospital operations from reduced
government funding and still improving governance practices as
evidenced by suspension by National Science Foundation for grant
funding for two research centers of the university.
Challenges
- Extremely high reliance on operating appropriations from the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (rated Baa3, negative) at 68.0% of FY
2011 operating revenue, compared to a median of 27.5% in FY 2011
for public universities.
- Dependence on the GDB for liquidity. In FY 2011, of the
university's $106 million of unrestricted monthly liquidity, $93.7
million reflected a draw on the GDB revolving liquidity facility.
- Potential decline in non-commonwealth revenues if proposed
legislation is enacted, resulting in a net increase in total
university revenues, but a reduction of revenues pledged to
bondholders.
- Ownership and operation of Servicios Medicos Universitarios
(SMU), the university's academic medical center that has an
accumulated deficit of $20.4 million at June 30, 2012, better than
$58.2 million the previous year due to improved operations.
- Overall decline in enrollment from the recent peak of 58,133
full-time equivalent (FTE) students in fall 2009 to 54,681 FTE in
fall 2012 following student protests in 2010 that disrupted
operations at 10 of the university's 11 units for up to 62 days
Strengths
- Critical role in Puerto Rico as the commonwealth's public
university system and a major research driver. For fall 2012, the
system of 11 campuses reported enrollment of over 57,000 FTEs
students and applications for fall 2013 are up from the prior
year. Research grant awards were generally stable at $135 million
for FY 2012.
- Strong support from the commonwealth and GDB, with annual
appropriations legislatively mandated as a percentage of general
fund revenues and continued GDB support in UPR's implementation of
its fiscal stabilization plan and SMU's revenue and expense
initiatives.
- Improved operations and cash flow generation particularly from
expense management and non-government funding to replace reduced
commonwealth appropriations. The university generated a 9.5%
operating cash flow margin compared to 4.4% in FY 2010 and expects
at least similar performance for FY 2012 based on preliminary
reports. Debt service coverage also rose to 2.2 times debt service
coverage for FY 2011, as calculated by Moody's, from 1.3 times for
FY 2010 and negative coverage in FY 2009.
- Improved hospital operations, with SMU generating operating cash
flow margins of 10.0% and 10.7% for FY 2011 and FY 2012,
respectively, following a negative 1.5% for FY 2009 (and weaker
results prior to FY 2009).
Outlook
The negative outlook reflects the negative outlook of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the university's dependence on
state appropriations. Also included is the possible impact on
pledged revenues and debt service coverage if proposed legislation
is enacted resulting in substantially increased government funding
while seeing a reduction in student-based revenues, a primary
source of revenues for debt service. Given the possible resistance
to new increases of tuition and fee increases as seen by the
student strikes when the stabilization fee was implemented, it is
uncertain as to the sources and amount of future revenues outside
of commonwealth funding. Also driving the negative outlook are
vulnerability of a downturn in hospital operations from reduced
government funding and still improving governance practices as
evidenced by suspension by National Science Foundation for grant
funding for two research centers of the university.
What Could Make The Rating Go Up (Revised To Stable Outlook)
Any revision in the outlook to stable or upgrade of the rating of
University of Puerto Rico could be driven by a revision in the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's outlook to stable from negative or
an upgrade in its GO rating; substantial improvement in the
financial profile of the university as reflected in growth and
diversification in revenues other than commonwealth
appropriations; significant increase in the university's own
unrestricted liquidity without reliance on borrowings; sustained
improvement in operating performance, including of the hospital,
resulting in positive unrestricted net assets.
What Could Make The Rating Go Down
A downgrade of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's GO Rating;
additional debt without improvement in the balance sheet resources
and liquidity; deterioration in or failure to improve operating
performance or balance sheet of University of Puerto Rico or SMU.
Principal Rating Methodology
The principal methodology used in this rating was U.S. Not-for-
Profit Private and Public Higher Education published in August
2011.
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
* Moody's Issues 2013 Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The credit outlook for Latin American and Caribbean sovereigns for
2013 is generally stable, says Moody's Investors Service in a new
report. However, prospects for the region's strongest and weakest
sovereigns will continue to diverge.
Economic growth will improve slightly throughout most of the
region with annual rates close to historical trends, even in
countries that will experience a modest deceleration, according to
Moody's annual outlook report for the region, "Latin America and
the Caribbean 2013 Sovereign Outlook: The Strong Get Stronger and
the Weak Get Weaker."
With the international economic environment not expected to
improve significantly in 2013, regional growth will be mostly
driven by rising domestic demand and increasing intraregional
trade, according to the rating agency. Any upside for the region
will depend upon external conditions exceeding those reflected in
Moody's central global scenario, which envisions stable growth in
the U.S. and China, and a mild recovery in the euro area.
In most cases, a benign inflation outlook for the region will
provide monetary authorities the flexibility to adopt a more
accommodative monetary stance if and when required. Though
government balances are projected to remain stable for the third
year in a row, the region's fiscal position will not be as strong
as before the global financial crisis, with limited exceptions.
Government debt ratios will not change significantly in most
cases, but the debt burdens faced by certain countries,
particularly in the Caribbean, are projected to continue
increasing, says the Moody's report.
In general terms, the external risks the region faces are receding
relative to previous years. Also, many countries in the region
have stronger buffers against adverse external shocks since the
onset of the global economic crisis.
Ample global liquidity coupled with a significant narrowing of
borrowing spreads has allowed countries that previously had
virtually no market access to make forays into the global bond
market, a development Moody's expects to continue in 2013. Capital
inflows that have been attracted to the region by high domestic
yields and the expectation of favorable growth prospects are
placing upward pressure on several Latin American currencies.
Despite efforts by authorities to limit this, continued real
appreciation has reduced export competitiveness limiting the
region's ability to diversify away from commodities, one of the
conditions that is necessary to further strengthen sovereign
credit profiles.
Although external debt has accumulated steadily, the level of
external indebtedness, both public and private, remains moderate.
In Moody's opinion, risks associated with a sudden stop in capital
inflows are manageable as several countries in the region benefit
from flexible exchange rates, adequate foreign exchange reserves,
and modest current account deficits that are funded with foreign
direct investment in many cases.
The rating agency concludes that strong growth in recent years has
helped mask the fact that fundamental challenges stand in the way
of further improvement in sovereign creditworthiness across the
region, including: weak institutions, low levels of investment,
and narrow government revenue bases, among others. In Central
America, Moody's finds that improved sovereign credit quality
hinges on governments tackling security issues and increasing tax
revenues, while credit prospects in the Caribbean are likely to be
driven by governments' ability to prop up growth and arrest
ongoing deterioration in sovereign balance sheets.
After several years of steadily strengthening credit quality, the
region is likely nearing the end of the current upgrade cycle.
Since the problems that must be addressed to support further
improvements in creditworthiness are more challenging, Moody's
expects the pace of rating upgrades will slow significantly,
particularly in the Baa category.
* Prolonged Eurozone Recovery Poses Risk to LatAm, Fitch Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
A prolonged Eurozone recovery and the effect of China's growth and
its commodity demands are the highest risks in terms of urgency
and potential impact on Latin America, according to the inaugural
edition of Fitch Ratings' LatAm Risk Radar.
The latest addition to Fitch's Risk Radar series, LatAm Risk
Radar, like the Risk Radar already published for the developed
world, is intended to portray the relative urgency and impact of
the principal macroeconomic rating drivers on Fitch's broad
portfolio of Latin American ratings.
'Risk has heightened recently as slowing regional growth
highlights the region's linkage to global conditions, despite a
strong domestic demand component of GDP in the leading economies,'
said Peter Shaw, Regional Credit Officer for Latin America.
'Brazil, Chile and Peru are most affected through trade with
Europe and China. Mexico is more linked to the U.S.'
Continued strong credit growth and growing levels of household
debt expose Latin American banks to asset quality pressures. This
could translate over time to pressure on domestic demand, which
has been fueled in part by growing access to credit for
individuals in much of the region.
While overall exposure to foreign funding remains relatively low,
some concentration of maturities in 2013 and 2014 presents
refinancing risks in the private sector. This is partially offset
by the high level of U.S. dollar reserves held by Latin American
governments.
Supporting the steady rise in ratings across much of the region
over recent years has been the solid outlook for sustained growth
in Latin America over the near and medium term of the middle class
and rising incomes - important in demand driven economies.
Despite a near-term slowdown, global demand for commodities will
also benefit the region's principal economies over time.
For more information, a special report titled 'LatAm Risk Radar -
January 2013' is available on the Fitch Ratings web site at
www.fitchratings.com.
***********
Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative
prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.
Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside
sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those
sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday
Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.
Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices
for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to
share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy
or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the
issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the
latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to
publication. At first glance, this list may look like the
definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR-LA. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
***********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America is a daily newsletter
co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C.,
USA, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravante, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Valerie U. Pascual, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Frauline S.
Abangan, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter A. Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *