/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCRLA_Public/090305.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R L A T I N A M E R I C A Thursday, March 5, 2009, Vol. 9, No. 45 Headlines A N T I G U A & B A R B U D A STANFORD FINANCIAL: CFO James Davis Declines to Testify STANFORD INT'L BANK: Stanford Estate Only Worth Millions A R G E N T I N A GAM S SA: Trustee Verifying Proofs of Claim Until April 6 NORPAPEL SAIC: Trustee Verifying Proofs of Claim Until April 1 TREBOL COMPANY: Trustee Verifying Proofs of Claim Until April 27 * S&P Says Argentina Keeps Rein on Provinces; Faces Rough Year B R A Z I L BANCO BRADESCO: UBS AG Raises Company to “Buy” on Earnings BNDES: Halts Financing for Independencia on Bankruptcy Filing BRACOL HOLDING: Moody's Reviews 'B3' Ratings for Possible Cuts INDEPENDENCIA SA: Voluntary Chapter 15 Case Summary C A Y M A N I S L A N D S AECF FUND: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 1 BURI LTD: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report CIL SPENCER: Members Receive Wind-Up Report DVA CAPITAL: Commences Wind-Up Proceedings FLAMING SPIRIT: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report GLUON FUND: Members Receive Wind-Up Report INDIGO INVESTMENTS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report INTERNATIONAL PAPER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up INTREPID CAPITAL: Commences Wind-Up Proceedings MARATHON INVESTMENT: Members Receive Wind-Up Report MLBT & ASSOCIATES: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report Today OCTAVE ENTERTAINMENT ET AL: Commences Wind-Up Proceedings ORANGERIE FUNDING: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up ORIENT GLOBAL: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report POLAR BLUE: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report Q APPRECIATION ET AL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 1 Q-BLK ARS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 1 ROCKBAY CAPITAL: To Hold Final Meeting on March 27 SENTOSA HOLDINGS: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report Today VEGA INSTITUTIONAL: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report C O L O M B I A BANCOLOMBIA: Discloses Public Offer of Subordinated Ordinary Notes ECOPETROL: To Offer US$8.1 Bln Bonds to Finance Investments ECOPETROL: To Buy Back Glencore's 51% Refinery Stake for US$549MM PETROECUADOR: Unit Inks Ops. & Safety Improvement Deal With FMS D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C * DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: EUI Sees 1% Decline in Economy This Year E C U A D O R PERENCO: Ecuador to Freeze Income Over EUR350 Mln Late Taxes G U Y A N A CL FIN'L: Clico Guyana Has No Investment in Bahamas, PM Says J A M A I C A AIR JAMAICA: Bilateral Air Services Deal With Brazil on Hold CABLE & WIRLESS: LIME Sues Digicel for Discriminatory Pricing RJR: To Carry Out Restructuring Exercise on Economic Downturn P A N A M A CHIQUITA BRANDS: Elects Kerrii Anderson to Board of Directors M E X I C O COPAMEX SA: Fitch Downgrades Issuer Default Rating to 'B+' VITRO SAB: S&P Withdraws 'D' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O CL FINANCIAL: CLICO Insurance Agents Told Not to Sell New Policies X X X X X X X X * Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars - - - - - =============================== A N T I G U A & B A R B U D A =============================== STANFORD FINANCIAL: CFO James Davis Declines to Testify ------------------------------------------------------- Laurel Brubaker Calkins and Laurence Viele Davidson report that James M. Davis, the second-highest ranking executive at the Stanford Financial Group of companies, has declined to provide testimony or accounting in connection with a lawsuit filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The SEC has filed a complaint against Stanford Financial, its founder R. Allen Stanford, Mr. Davis and Chief Investment Officer Laura Pendergest-Holt, in federal court for the sale of $8 billion in fraudulent certificates of deposit at Antigua-based Stanford International Bank. Mr. Davis, the director and chief financial officer of Stanford financial Group and Stanford International Bank, declined to cooperate in the suit, citing his privilege of against self- incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Mr. Davis and Stanford have not been criminally charged for any wrongdoing. About SIBL Domiciled in Antigua, Stanford International Bank Limited -- http://www.stanfordinternationalbank.com/-- is a member of Stanford Private Wealth Management, a global financial services network with US$51 billion in deposits and assets under management or advisement. Stanford Private Wealth Management serves more than 70,000 clients in 140 countries. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), on Feb. 17, charged Robert Allen Stanford and three of his companies for orchestrating a fraudulent, multi-billion dollar investment scheme centering on an US$8 billion Certificate of Deposit program. The SEC also charged SIBL chief financial officer James Davis as well as Laura Pendergest- Holt, chief investment officer of Stanford Financial Group (SFG), in the enforcement action. STANFORD INT'L BANK: Stanford Estate Only Worth Millions -------------------------------------------------------- Court Appointed Stanford receiver, Ralph Janvey, told U.S. District Judge David Godbey in a Dallas court that Robert Allen Stanford's financial empire might only amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, not billions, CaribbeanWorldNews reports. The report relates Mr. Janvey said there is a liquidity problem in the company, and “the estate's final assets might only be a 'fraction' of what was originally anticipated.” “Based on our preliminary investigation, the liquidity situation and overall financial condition of the Stanford entities can only be described as dire,” Mr. Janvey told Judge Godbey in a Dallas court, as cited by the news agency. “Evidence is also mounting that the assets of the Estate will be only a fraction of the amount needed to satisfy the anticipated claims against the Estate.” Mr. Janvey, the report notes, told Judge Godbey that he will file a plan by March 16 for releasing accounts that contain less than US$100,000, with some exceptions. According to the report, Judge Godbey earlier ruled the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission could maintain the freeze over Mr. Stanford's assets and set a March 12 hearing to decide on the SEC’s request to make the temporary injunction permanent. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, on Feb. 17, charged Mr. Stanford and three of his companies for orchestrating a fraudulent, multi-billion dollar investment scheme centering on an US$8 billion Certificate of Deposit program. Mr. Stanford's companies include Stanford International Bank, Stanford Group Company (SGC), and investment adviser Stanford Capital Management. About SIBL Domiciled in Antigua, Stanford International Bank Limited -- http://www.stanfordinternationalbank.com/-- is a member of Stanford Private Wealth Management, a global financial services network with US$51 billion in deposits and assets under management or advisement. Stanford Private Wealth Management serves more than 70,000 clients in 140 countries. ================= A R G E N T I N A ================= GAM S SA: Trustee Verifying Proofs of Claim Until April 6 --------------------------------------------------------- The court-appointed trustee for Gam s S.A.'s bankruptcy proceedings will be verifying creditors' proofs of claim until April 6, 2009. The trustee will present the validated claims in court as individual reports on August 9, 2009. The National Commercial Court of First Instance in Buenos Aires will determine if the verified claims are admissible, taking into account the trustee's opinion, and the objections and challenges that will be raised by the company and its creditors. Inadmissible claims may be subject to appeal in a separate proceeding known as an appeal for reversal. A general report that contains an audit of the company's accounting and banking records will be submitted in court on September 13, 2009. NORPAPEL SAIC: Trustee Verifying Proofs of Claim Until April 1 -------------------------------------------------------------- The court-appointed trustee for Norpapel S.A.I.C.'s reorganization proceedings will be verifying creditors' proofs of claim until April 1, 2009. The trustee will present the validated claims in court as individual reports on May 19, 2009. The National Commercial Court of First Instance in Buenos Aires will determine if the verified claims are admissible, taking into account the trustee's opinion, and the objections and challenges that will be raised by the company and its creditors. Inadmissible claims may be subject to appeal in a separate proceeding known as an appeal for reversal. A general report that contains an audit of the company's accounting and banking records will be submitted in court on July 1, 2009. Creditors will vote to ratify the completed settlement plan during the assembly on December 1, 2009. TREBOL COMPANY: Trustee Verifying Proofs of Claim Until April 27 ---------------------------------------------------------------- The court-appointed trustee for Trebol Company S.A.'s bankruptcy proceedings will be verifying creditors' proofs of claim until April 27, 2009. The trustee will present the validated claims in court as individual reports on June 10, 2009. The National Commercial Court of First Instance in Buenos Aires will determine if the verified claims are admissible, taking into account the trustee's opinion, and the objections and challenges that will be raised by the company and its creditors. Inadmissible claims may be subject to appeal in a separate proceeding known as an appeal for reversal. A general report that contains an audit of the company's accounting and banking records will be submitted in court on August 6, 2009. * S&P Says Argentina Keeps Rein on Provinces; Faces Rough Year -------------------------------------------------------------- Since the 2001-2002 financial crisis that gripped Argentina, the country's provinces have been subject to greater accountability to, and control by, the national government amid a remarkable recovery. By all measures, the fiscal position of the provinces seems less precarious than it was in the period running up to the country's 2001 crisis. However, with a worsening national economy and a global slowdown, the challenges for Argentina's provinces are different, but some of the same fears have returned. After the provinces showed a consolidated deficit in both 2007 and 2008, concerns are growing over their fiscal health. Standard & Poor's Ratings Services believes that, in the current national and global downturn, the provinces' finances will weaken more rapidly than the national government's. Moreover, with the provinces' fiscal dependence on the central government now stronger than it was before the last crisis, we're keeping a watchful eye on whether the provinces' issues could affect the Argentine government's own political, fiscal, and financial well- being. Conversely, S&P wonder about the provinces' own options should the sovereign's creditworthiness keep deteriorating. S&P rate the Argentine provinces based on S&P's methodology for rating international local and regional governments. Accordingly, the higher dependence of the provinces on the central government's financing and revenues affects the ratings of the provinces S&P rate. This links the ratings on the provinces to that on the sovereign. Several developments, in S&P's view, lie at the heart of concerns about the provinces' finances, having to do with deficits, tax monies, and debt financing. First, consolidated provincial finances have run in the negative the past two years, compared with the central government's reaping of surpluses. The central government has also benefited from new taxes instituted after the fiscal crisis, and these revenues don't have to be distributed to the provinces. On the cost side, the provinces have had to deal with inflationary pressures on salaries. Lastly, the provinces have lost some of their autonomy in debt financing, relative to the central government. Decentralized Finances Sped The Run To Ruin In 2001 To understand the Argentine provinces' situation, it's key to examine developments of the late 1990s and the country's ensuing fiscal crisis. In 1998, Argentina's economy entered into a recession that lasted almost four years, culminating in 2001 with the worst economic and social crisis the country has ever suffered. The Argentine provinces contributed to the recurring fiscal deficits in the public sector that led up to that crisis. Between 1996 and 1999, the provinces' finances deteriorated, and they worsened still further in 1999. Provincial spending grew faster than revenues, creating a large structural imbalance. Decentralization of the country's finances hastened the crisis. The national government transferred spending responsibilities to the provinces. Although revenues were also transferred, they were not enough to compensate for expenditure growth. Interest expenses rose, and social spending increased, causing the provinces' overall expenditures to grow significantly in the 1990s. At the same time, the central government reduced its "coparticipation" transfers to the provinces–-the system of revenue sharing that Argentina has had for decades--to finance a national social security system and treasury. Furthermore, as part of the Second Fiscal Pact, the government's 1994 agreement with the provinces to provide incentives for economic development, most provinces lowered their tax rates and granted various exemptions to taxpayers. Amid the slower economy from 1998 on, the provinces received even smaller coparticipation transfers from the government, and collected smaller revenues from their own sources, than the amounts they had budgeted for. Politically, by the end of the 1990s, the central government lacked the power to reverse the deterioration in provincial finances. Most provincial governors belonged to the political party in opposition to the president's and therefore were less willing to cooperate with the government or pay the political price of adjusting their fiscal plans. Also, the composition of the national congress differed from the central government coalition, further splintering the central government's power. The call for stronger fiscal austerity was muted. Politicians expected a rapid upturn, as had happened after the 1995 "Tequila Crisis," which began in Mexico and spread to Argentina. Fiscal austerity measures also could be postponed because the provinces had access to financing, mostly from commercial banks. The larger entities--including the Province of Buenos Aires, the City of Buenos Aires, the Province of Mendoza, and others--could even access the international capital markets. As the provinces' financial situation worsened, they started to pay correspondingly higher interest rates, which through the years became a more significant portion of provincial operating expenditures. The resulting deficits reflected, to a great extent, the seriousness of the fiscal problems in the provinces (see chart 1). All 24 provinces ended 2001 with fiscal deficits, 18 of them with deficits of more than 10% of total revenues. Half were indebted for more than 100% of their total annual revenues. By the end of 2001, Argentina's central government and consolidated provincial fiscal deficits had reached $8.72 billion (3.3% of GDP) and $6.37 billion (2.4%), respectively. The central government defaulted on its sovereign debt at that time, and the provinces defaulted between 2001 and 2005. An Opportunity Missed, Provincial Deficits Return After A Run Of Surpluses Since 2003, a combination of brisk economic growth and high, inflation-driven taxable incomes has propelled a financial recovery in both the central government and the provinces. Both reported significant surpluses during the recovery. While the central government still enjoys a surplus, the provinces' fiscal condition has diverged from the national one in the past two years. In 2008, while the central government's estimated bottom line was a surplus of 1.3% of GDP, the provinces' consolidated finances were negative for a second consecutive year, with a deficit of 0.3% of GDP (see chart 2). As another signal of deterioration, the provinces estimated a primary deficit (deficit before interest payments) for the first time since 2003--a total of Argentine pesos 140 million. The central government surpluses of the past few years have provided it with the fiscal and financial flexibility it lacked a decade ago when compared with the provinces. Recently, though, the government's increasing intervention in the economy, higher inflation, weaker fiscal results, inability to access international capital markets, and difficulties in tapping even the local markets have chipped away at its creditworthiness. This caused us to lower both the short- and long-term sovereign ratings on the Republic of Argentina (B-/Stable/C) late last year The government shares less, leaving the provinces to cope Before the 2001 crisis, the coparticipation law reduced the government's capacity to benefit from changes in the tax structure, because it had to share part of any new tax or increase in existing taxes with the provinces. Although the coparticipation law was not modified, in the context of the 2002 crisis, the national government implemented new taxes, the proceeds of which do not have to be distributed to the provinces. These include the export taxes and the financial transactions tax. These two taxes, the most profitable, have been crucial to the national government's robust fiscal results in the past few years, representing an estimated 19% of total government revenues and about 5.4% of GDP in 2008. The government makes coparticipation transfers on none of the export taxes and only a minor part of the FTT. Current transfers, meant to compensate for the extraordinary revenues not included in coparticipation, have also fallen. The central government has more discretion over them. Current transfers represented almost 7% of Argentina's primary expenditures in 2003, but they fell to 3% in 2008. Consequently, although its 2008 revenues were 35% higher than in 2007, the central government's current transfers to the provinces grew by only 13%--a particularly low rate when inflation was running at about 25%. This situation reflects the unpredictability and instability of the Argentine intergovernmental system, which, according to S&P's methodology. The new national taxes provided the central government with more revenues and fiscal autonomy than it had a decade ago, while they reduced those of the provinces. With no financing available when credit is tight, provinces now have to depend on their own revenue generation, and this could eventually work well only for the larger provinces. For example, the Province and City of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Córdoba, and Mendoza depend to a great extent upon self-generated tax revenues. The Province and City of Buenos Aires' own-source revenues represented 59% and 87%, respectively, of their 2008 operating revenues. The worsening situation for the provinces is pushing them to implement tax reforms in order to increase their revenues and avoid depending even more on help from the central government. In 2008, most of the provinces that implemented reforms increased their tax rates and eliminated some exemptions. The Provinces of Buenos Aires and Córdoba implemented tax reforms, and the Province of Neuquén, among others, may seek similar reforms. The City of Buenos Aires was the first to raise taxes, at the end of 2007, and S&P expects that it will do it again in 2009. In sum, because of the procyclical fiscal behavior of both the central government and the provinces at the peak of the cycle, they are now forced to be procyclical again in the downward part of the cycle, probably exacerbating the effects of the current economic slowdown. S&P believes this economic slowdown will fully burden the provinces' finances. Also adding to the significant hurdles they will face in 2009 is the temptation to spend in advance of this year's legislative elections. Inflation Pushes Up Provincial Salary Demands High inflation has helped revenues but has also put significant pressure on salaries, and this factor hits the provinces much harder than the sovereign. Given the inflation, the provinces have had to increase their spending, with salaries making up a high proportion--about 50%--of total provincial expenditures. Spending on personnel is less than 12% of the central government's expenditures, so the impact of salary increases on it is substantially lower. Even though provincial finances are beginning to falter, the situation is still less critical than it was in 2001 and 2002 (see chart 3). In 2007, the latest year for which official data are available for all the provinces, more than half the provinces ended with fiscal surpluses, and only seven out of 24 (the total including the City of Buenos Aires) were indebted by more than 100% of their total annual revenues. Though official data are not in yet, S&P expects the situation to have deteriorated markedly in 2008. To finance deficits, provinces now borrow from the government As their fiscal health deteriorates, more provinces will run deficits, and it's uncertain how they will finance them. Before the crisis, they relied on debt. Now, given that the capital markets are practically closed, this seems less likely. Besides, the Fiscal Responsibility Law, passed in 2004, requires all participating provinces to obtain the central government's authorization before issuing any type of debt. Before the 2001 crisis, the central government did not have or did not enforce this type of control. Therefore, the provinces had less incentive to balance their books because they could borrow from commercial banks or, in the case of the larger ones, resort to the international capital markets. Sometimes this law has added political motivation to the central government at the time of providing the approval. Provincial financing now ultimately depends on the central government providing it or approving it. Private sources of financing are, in any case, drying up. Argentine commercial banks have already reached their maximum allowed exposure to the public sector. The government, with the support of the congress, ended the capitalization system and replaced it with a pay-as-you-go system in December 2008, eliminating the system that had created the largest institutional investor in Argentina, the private pension funds. The National Social Security Administration, a public institution, now controls the funds that the AFJPs accumulated and could be a new source of financing for the provinces. However, no one knows how much political independence the ANSES is going to have. And the current international financial crisis and negative perception of Argentina rule out accessing the international capital markets, as the provinces were able to do in 2006 and 2007. Provincial debt has changed significantly since the 2001 crisis. A decade ago, the provinces' debt consisted mostly of commercial bank loans (34%) and private bonds (37%), and only a small proportion came from the national government (15%) (see chart 3). As the 2001 crisis unfolded, the central government assumed the provincial debt held by commercial banks, and the provinces became more indebted to it. This agreement had significant implications, especially in diluting provincial power. By accepting the debt swaps, with their more favorable conditions such as lower interest rates and longer maturities, and by returning to the central government for additional financing of their budgets since 2002, the provinces forfeited some financial autonomy to the central government. The agreements gave the government discretion in determining the terms of debt repayment from each province. As of December 2007, the federal government held almost 70% of the total provincial debt, bondholders 19%, and multilateral organizations 11% (see charts 4 and 5). By increasing its holdings of provincial debt, the government has enhanced its power to negotiate and control the provinces. As compensation, the provinces have lessened the market debt obligations they must honor. The Central Government Takes Charge, But Political Issues Threaten Stability Finally, a political consideration differentiates the situation from that leading up to the 2001 crisis. Although the party that controls the national government has had a majority in both chambers of the congress since 2003, back in 2001 the government did not have enough support to pass laws and amendments that might have headed off the crisis. In the late 1990s, only a few provinces were governed by the national government's political allies (Alianza). Since the election of former president Nestor Kirchner (in office from 2003 to 2007), the central government has consolidated its political power, depending less on its relationship with the provincial governors. Most governors also share the same political party, the Peronist party, with the central government. However, since farmers protested export taxes in the first half of 2008, the central government's popularity has fallen considerably, along with the support of some governors. Therefore, the political factor, which had not been a problem for Nestor Kirchner's administration, potentially limits the current administration of his wife, Cristina Kirchner. S&P believes this could well be a risk especially in 2009, a legislative election year. More Centralization Contains Provincial Risk But Limits Regional Development With one hand, the federal government has offered the provinces greater aid because of its more solid fiscal position since the crisis. With the other hand, however, it has taken away the some of the provinces' autonomy. Financing from the AFJPs is not an option for the provinces anymore. At the same time that their revenues have shrunk relative to the nation's, the amount of debt the provinces owe to the federal government has grown considerably. And, because of the Fiscal Responsibility Law, they now need the government's approval to issue any type of debt. Also, the provinces' higher dependence on the national government leads us to question what path they would follow if Argentina's creditworthiness continues to deteriorate. With the provinces' loss of fiscal and financial autonomy, Argentina is no longer the federalist country that it used to be, or pretended to be. It's becoming more centralized--more like Mexico and less like Brazil. It's not clear yet if this centralization will be positive or negative. Very centralized countries, such as Chile, have been able to work well fiscally, but the system is probably less effective in encouraging regional development. What seems certain is that provincial debt won't be a serious problem for the national government anymore. But the absence of a consistent regional development policy that incorporates all the provinces and addresses possible alternatives for their financing is still a major unresolved issue in Argentina. =========== B R A Z I L =========== BANCO BRADESCO: UBS AG Raises Company to “Buy” on Earnings ---------------------------------------------------------- Banco Bradesco S.A. was raised to “buy” from “neutral” at UBS AG, Telma Marotto of Bloomberg News reports. “Bradesco should trade at a premium to global peers due to the better quality of its equity and resilient earnings,” analyst Juan Partida wrote in a report obtained by Bloomberg News. “Bradesco boasts well diversified earnings,” including more than 30% of profit coming from its insurance arm”. According to the report, Mr. Partida said the bank’s net interest margin will be slightly affected by falling interest rates in the country. Headquartered in Sao Paulo, Brazil, Banco Bradesco S.A. (NYSE: BBD) -- http://www.bradesco.com.br/-- prides itself on serving low-and medium-income individuals in Brazil since the 1960s. Bradesco is Brazil's largest private bank, with more than 3,000 banking branches, and also a leader in insurance and private pension management. Bradesco has branches throughout Brazil as well as one in New York, and Japan. Bradesco offers Internet banking, insurance, pension plans, annuities, credit card services (including football-club affinity cards for the soccer- mad population), and Internet access for customers. The bank also provides personal and commercial loans, along with leasing services. * * * According to Bloomberg data, Banco Bradesco S.A. continues to carry Moody's "Ba2" long-term foreign bank deposits and "B-" bank financial strength rating with a stable outlook. BNDES: Halts Financing for Independencia on Bankruptcy Filing ------------------------------------------------------------- Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social SA (BNDES) suspended part of a financing package for Independencia Alimentos Ltda, following the meatpacker's bankruptcy filling, Rogerio Jelmaye of Dow Jones Newswires reports. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on March 4, 2009, Bloomberg News said Independencia has filed a Chapter 15 petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in Manhattan citing falling beef exports, volatility in currencies and debt of US$1.2 billion. The company simultaneously commenced a restructuring process under Brazilian insolvency law, according to Reuters. BNDES, DJ Newswires recounts, announced last year that it has injected a capital of BRL450 million (US$184 million) in Independencia in exchange for up to one third of the company's capital. Of that total, the government institution has so far deposited BRL250 million, the bank added. About BNDES Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social SA is Brazil's national development bank. It provides financing for projects within Brazil and plays a major role in the privatization programs undertaken by the federal government. * * * As of February 19, 2009, Banco Nacional continues to carry a Ba2 foreign long-term bank deposit rating from Moody's Investors Service. The rating was assigned in August 2007. BRACOL HOLDING: Moody's Reviews 'B3' Ratings for Possible Cuts -------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's placed the Ba3 ratings of Bracol Holding Ltda. (formerly Bertin Ltda.), 77.17% owner of unrated Bertin S.A., on review for possible downgrade. Given the recent accelerated deterioration in the business environment for Brazilian beef processors, Bracol's rating could be downgraded by more than one notch at the conclusion of the review. S.A. Fábrica de Produtos Alimentícios Vigor's B2 rating, however, remain under review for possible upgrade. "The rating action was primarily due to heightened challenges that Bracol will face in terms of: a) the company's operating performance in light of a significantly weaker outlook for Brazilian beef and leather exports; b) the company's exposure to increasingly expensive short term trade finance credit; and, c) high working capitals needs and margin compression in its domestic beef segment", explained Moody's VP Senior Analyst, Soummo Mukherjee. "The above-mentioned factors are likely to cause Bracol to violate Moody's triggers for downward pressure on its ratings on a 2009 full-year basis, which include FFO / Net Debt sustained below 20% (26% as of LTM 9/30/2008), EBITA / Interest below 1.5x (1.1x as of LTM 9/30/2008) or Total Adjusted Debt / EBITDA above 6.0x (6.9x as of 9/30/2008)," added Mukherjee. Brazilian fresh beef and leather export volumes and prices have dropped substantially since September 2008 and domestic prices have dropped in January and February of 2009, while cattle prices have declined to a less extent, resulting in margin compression for Brazilian beef processors. According to the Brazilian Foreign Commerce Secretariat, Brazilian fresh beef export dropped 45% in volumes and 68% in US$ prices from September 2008 to January 2009, while cattle prices in Brazil only dropped by about 10% in the same period. Meanwhile, lower exports resulted in increased redirection of beef produced in Brazil to the domestic market, and are likely to have pressured domestic beef retail prices in January and February of 2009. Moody's review will focus on Bracol's business plan and liquidity profile for the next two years. The review will also analyze the company's business profile and compare its principal credit metrics and overall level of corporate governance, including its financial disclosure, with other similarly rated peers. Ratings placed under review for possible downgrade: -- Bracol Holding Ltda.'s Corporate Family Rating: Ba3 -- US$ 350 million 10.25% senior unsecured guaranteed notes due 2016: Ba3 Moody's last rating action on Bracol was on December 17th, 2008, when Moody's affirmed Bracol's Ba3 ratings, but changed the outlook to negative. Bracol, headquartered in São Paulo, Brazil, is one of the largest beef processing and leather exporting companies in Latin America. In addition, the company owns and operates other facilities to produce raw materials for cleaning products, personal protective equipment, dog toys, cans and packaging materials using by- products of its slaughterhouses. As of February 10th, 2009, Bertin, Bracol's subsidiary, also owns directly and indirectly 99.4% of Vigor's total shares, a company focused in the dairy segment. INDEPENDENCIA SA: Voluntary Chapter 15 Case Summary --------------------------------------------------- Chapter 15 Debtor: Independencia S.A. Avenida Luiz A. Fayrdin S/3 Cajamar Sao Palo, Brazil Chapter 15 Case No.: 09-10903 Type of Business: The Debtor engages in real property investment. See: http://www.independencia-sa.cl/ Chapter 15 Petition Date: March 27, 2009 Court: Southern District of New York (Manhattan) Chapter 15 Debtor's Counsel: Paul R. DeFilippo, Esq. pdefilippo@wmd-law.com Wollmuth Maher & Deutsch LLP 500 Fifth Avenue, 12th Floor New York, NY 10110 Tel: (212) 382-3300 Fax: (212) 382-0050 Estimated Assets: unstated Estimated Debts: unstated The petition was signed by Tobias Bremer, chief financial officer. ========================== C A Y M A N I S L A N D S ========================== AECF FUND: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 1 --------------------------------------------------- The creditors of AECF Fund, Ltd. are required to file their proofs of debt by April 1, 2009, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Dec. 30, 2008. The Liquidator can be reached at: Jane Fleming Queensgate Bank & Trust Company Ltd PO Box 30464, Harbour Place Grand Cayman KY1-1202 Tel: 345 945-2187 Fax: 345 945-2197 BURI LTD: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report --------------------------------------------- On January 23, 2009, the shareholders of Buri Ltd. received the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Walkers SPV Limited Walker House, 87 Mary Street George Town, Grand Cayman KY1-9002 Cayman Islands CIL SPENCER: Members Receive Wind-Up Report ------------------------------------------- On February 3, 2009, the members of CIL Spencer Limited received the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Condor Nominees Limited P. O. Box 487 Grand Cayman KY1-1106 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 949- 7128 Facsimile: (345) 949-7657 DVA CAPITAL: Commences Wind-Up Proceedings ------------------------------------------ On December 16, 2008, a written resolution was passed by the sole shareholder of DVA Capital SPC that voluntarily wind up the company's operatiosn. Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by February 5, 2009, will be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: DMS Corporate Services Ltd. c/o Bernadette Bailey-Lewis dms Corporate Services Ltd. dms House, 2nd Floor P.O. Box 1344, Grand Cayman KY1-1108 Telephone: (345) 946 7665 Facsimile: (345) 946 7666 FLAMING SPIRIT: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report --------------------------------------------------- On January 31, 2009, the shareholder of Flaming Spirit Ltd received the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidators are: Connan Hill Bronwynne R. Arch P. O. Box 1109 Grand Cayman KY1-1102 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 949-7755 Facsimile: (345) 949-7634 GLUON FUND: Members Receive Wind-Up Report ------------------------------------------ On January 23, 2009, the members of Gluon Fund International, Ltd received the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: DMS Corporate Services Ltd c/o Bernadette Bailey-Lewis dms Corporate Services Ltd. dms House, 2nd Floor P.O. Box 1344, Grand Cayman KY1-1108 Telephone: (345) 946 7665 Facsimile: (345) 946 7666 INDIGO INVESTMENTS: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report ------------------------------------------------------- On February 9, 2009, the shareholders of Indigo Investments & Finance Limited received the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Peter D. Anderson P. O. Box 897, One Capital Place George Town, Grand Cayman KY1-1103 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 949-7576 Facsimile: (345) 949-8295 INTERNATIONAL PAPER: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up --------------------------------------------------- On December 24, 2008, the sole shareholder of International Paper Distribution Group Limited resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by February 19, 2009, will be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Ho, Man Kit Unit 511, 5/F., Tower 1 Silvercord, 30 Canton Road Tsimshatsui, Kowloon Hong Kong Tel: (852) 2851 6752 Fax: (852) 2537 5218 INTREPID CAPITAL: Commences Wind-Up Proceedings ----------------------------------------------- On December 31, 2008, a written resolution was passed by the sole shareholder of Intrepid Capital Multi-Sector Fund (Offshore), Ltd. that voluntarily wind up the company's operatiosn. Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by February 19, 2009, will be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Reid Services Limited Clifton House, 75 Fort Street PO Box 1350, Grand Cayman KY1-1108 Cayman Islands MARATHON INVESTMENT: Members Receive Wind-Up Report --------------------------------------------------- On January 23, 2009, the members of Marathon Investment Managers, Ltd received the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: DMS Corporate Services Ltd c/o Bernadette Bailey-Lewis dms Corporate Services Ltd. dms House, 2nd Floor P.O. Box 1344, Grand Cayman KY1-1108 Telephone: (345) 946 7665 Facsimile: (345) 946 7666 MLBT & ASSOCIATES: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report Today ----------------------------------------------------------- The shareholder of MLBT & Associates Ltd. will receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up report and property disposal today, March 5, 2009. The company's liquidator is: Lion International Corporate Services Limited c/o Shakira Gourzong P.O. Box 484, Grand Cayman KY1-1106 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 949-7755 Facsimile: (345) 949-7634 OCTAVE ENTERTAINMENT ET AL: Commences Wind-Up Proceedings --------------------------------------------------------- On December 29, 2008, the shareholders resolved to voluntarily wind up the operations of: -- Octave Entertainment, Ltd; and -- Octave Entertainment Fund, Ltd. The company's liquidator is: Stuart Sybersma c/o Emiliano Brito, Deloitte P.O. Box 1787 GT, Grand Cayman Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 949-7500 Facsimile: (345) 949-8258 ORANGERIE FUNDING: Placed Under Voluntary Wind-Up ------------------------------------------------- On December 30, 2008, the shareholders of Orangerie Funding Corporation resolved to voluntarily wind up the company's operations. Only creditors who were able to file their proofs of debt by February 19, 2009, will be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company's liquidator is: Ellen J. Christian Piccadilly Cayman Limited c/o BNP Paribas Bank & Trust Cayman Limited PO Box 10632, 3rd Floor Royal Bank House Shedden Road, George Town Grand Cayman KY1-1006, Cayman Islands Telephone: 345 945-9208 Fax: 345 945-9210 ORIENT GLOBAL: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report -------------------------------------------------- On January 5, 2009, the shareholders of Orient Global Group Limited received the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Peter D. Anderson P.O. Box 897, George Town Grand Cayman KY1-1103, Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 949-7576 Facsimile: (345) 949-8295 POLAR BLUE: Shareholder Receives Wind-Up Report ----------------------------------------------- On March 5, 2009, the shareholder of Polar Blue Limited received the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Lion International Corporate Services Limited c/o Darcia Tatum P.O. Box 484, Grand Cayman KY1-1106 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 949-7755 Facsimile: (345) 949-7634 Q APPRECIATION ET AL: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 1 -------------------------------------------------------------- Jane Fleming fixed April 1, 2009, as the last day to file proofs of debt for the creditors of: -- Q Appreciation Fund A, Ltd.; and -- G Appreciation Fund B, Ltd. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on December 30, 2008. The Liquidator can be reached at: Jane Fleming Queensgate Bank & Trust Company Ltd PO Box 30464, Harbour Place Grand Cayman KY1-1202 Tel: 345 945-2187 Fax: 345 945-2197 Q-BLK ARS: Creditors' Proofs of Debt Due on April 1 --------------------------------------------------- The creditors of Q-BLK ARS III, Ltd. are required to file their proofs of debt by April 1, 2009, to be included in the company's dividend distribution. The company commenced liquidation proceedings on Dec. 30, 2008. The Liquidator can be reached at: Jane Fleming Queensgate Bank & Trust Company Ltd PO Box 30464, Harbour Place Grand Cayman KY1-1202 Tel: 345 945-2187 Fax: 345 945-2197 ROCKBAY CAPITAL: To Hold Final Meeting on March 27 -------------------------------------------------- Rockbay Capital Offshore Fund Ltd. will hold the final meeting on March 27, 2009, at 11:00 p.m., to receive the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Russell Smith c/o John D’Cunha PO Box 2499, Grand Cayman KY1-1104 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 946 0820 Facsimile: (345) 946 0864 SENTOSA HOLDINGS: Shareholder to Hear Wind-Up Report Today ---------------------------------------------------------- The shareholder of Sentosa Holdings Ltd. will hear today, March 5, 2009, the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Lion International Corporate Services Limited c/o Darcia Tatum P.O. Box 484, Grand Cayman KY1-1106 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 949-7755 Facsimile: (345) 949-7634 VEGA INSTITUTIONAL: Shareholders Receive Wind-Up Report ------------------------------------------------------- On January 5, 2009, the shareholders of Vega Institutional Advisors Limited received the liquidator's report on the company's wind-up proceedings and property disposal. The company's liquidator is: Peter A. Anderson P. O. Box 897, One Capital Place George Town, Grand Cayman KY1-1103 Cayman Islands Telephone: (345) 949-7576 Facsimile: (345) 949-8295 =============== C O L O M B I A =============== BANCOLOMBIA: Discloses Public Offer of Subordinated Ordinary Notes ------------------------------------------------------------------ Bancolombia S.A. disclosed the local public offering of tranche 1 of Bonos Ordinarios Subordinados. This offering of Subordinated Ordinary Notes is the first offering of multiple and successive issuances of Subordinated Ordinary Notes up to an aggregate principal amount of one trillion Colombian pesos (Ps $1,000,000,000,000). Three hundred thousand (300,000) Subordinated Ordinary Notes were offered in the First Subordinated Ordinary Notes Offering for an aggregate principal amount of three hundred billion pesos ($ 300,000,000,000). Bancolombia may increase the offering principal amount of Subordinated Ordinary Notes by one hundred billion pesos ($100,000,000,000), for a total amount of up to four hundred billion pesos ($400,000,000,000). The First Subordinated Ordinary Notes Offering has been rated AA + by Duff & Phelps de Colombia S.A. The First Subordinated Ordinary Notes Offering was announced on page 7A of the March 3, 2009 edition of the Colombian newspaper "La Republica." About Bancolombia S.A. Bancolombia S.A. is Colombia's largest full-service financial institution, formed by a merger of three leading Colombian financial institutions. Bancolombia's market capitalization is over US$5.5 billion, with US$13.8 billion asset base and US$1.4 billion in shareholders' equity as of Sept. 30, 2006. Bancolombia is the only Colombian company with an ADR level III program in the New York Stock Exchange. * * * As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on June 23, 2008, Moody's Investors Service upgraded Bancolombia SA's Foreign currency deposits rating to Ba2, stable from Ba3 and Foreign currency subordinated debt rating to Baa3, stable from Ba1. ECOPETROL: To Offer US$8.1 Bln Bonds to Finance Investments ----------------------------------------------------------- Ecopetrol S.A. said it propose an issue of up to US$8.1 billion in nonconvertible bonds to help finance investments through 2011, Patrick Markey of Reuters reports. The report relates shareholders still has to consider the plan at a March 26 meeting. Ecopetrol, the report notes, said it would invest US$6.2 billion this year and could seek debt to help finance its investments depending on market conditions. Ecopetrol S.A. -- http://www.ecopetrol.com.co.-- is the largest company in Colombia as measured by revenue, profit, assets and shareholders' equity. The company is Colombia's only vertically integrated crude oil and natural gas company with operations in Colombia and overseas. Ecopetrol is one of the 40 largest petroleum companies in the world and one of the four principal petroleum companies in Latin America. It is majority owned by the Republic of Colombia and its shares trade on the Bolsa de Valores de Colombia S.A. (BVC) under the symbol ECOPETROL. The company divides its operations into four business segments that include exploration and production; transportation; refining; and marketing of crude oil, natural gas and refined-products. * * * As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on November 12, 2008, Fitch Ratings affirmed Ecopetrol S.A.'s foreign and local currency issuer default ratings at 'BB+' and 'BBB-', respectively. The Rating Outlook is Stable. ECOPETROL: To Buy Back Glencore's 51% Refinery Stake for US$549MM ----------------------------------------------------------------- Ecopetrol SA agreed to buy back commodity company Glencore International AG's 51% stake in a joint venture refinery for US$549 million, Inti Landauro of Dow Jones Newswires reports. According to the report, both companies will carry out the asset sale within 90 days, and the price may change after a process of due diligence to be held by Ecopetrol. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Feb. 18, 2009, Glencore plans to sell back its 51% stake in a refinery upgrade project in Colombia to Ecopetrol, due to its inability to obtain funds for the project expansion. Javier Mozzo of Reuters recalled that Glencore was struggling to get hold of credit to fund its share in the investment to boost output at the refinery in Cartagena. The companies, Reuters noted, planned to increase output to 140,000 barrels per day (bpd) from 75,000 bpd. However, due to the global credit crisis Glencore was unable to obtain the needed financing, Dow Jones Newswires related. Ecopetrol, as cited by DJ Newswires, said it might operate the refinery alone or it may seek new partners to replace Glencore. About Ecopetrol S.A. Ecopetrol S.A. -- http://www.ecopetrol.com.co.-- is the largest company in Colombia as measured by revenue, profit, assets and shareholders' equity. The company is Colombia's only vertically integrated crude oil and natural gas company with operations in Colombia and overseas. Ecopetrol is one of the 40 largest petroleum companies in the world and one of the four principal petroleum companies in Latin America. It is majority owned by the Republic of Colombia and its shares trade on the Bolsa de Valores de Colombia S.A. (BVC) under the symbol ECOPETROL. The company divides its operations into four business segments that include exploration and production; transportation; refining; and marketing of crude oil, natural gas and refined-products. * * * As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on November 12, 2008, Fitch Ratings affirmed Ecopetrol S.A.'s foreign and local currency issuer default ratings at 'BB+' and 'BBB-', respectively. The Rating Outlook is Stable. PETROECUADOR: Unit Inks Ops. & Safety Improvement Deal With FMS --------------------------------------------------------------- Petroproduccion, a subsidiary of Petroecuador, has selected Fleet Management Solutions (“FMS”) GPS and all-satellite tracking to improve the company's operations and safety. FMS Fleet Central will enable Petroproduccion to optimize use of its fleet resources and ensure the integrity of equipment and site maintenance. In addition, fuel efficiency, worker safety and improved vendor payment planning were reasons to deploy the FMS all-satellite system in rolling assets. "FMS was the only entity operating in our region that could deliver all the features we needed to implement our efficiency and security programs," said Roland Mariach, Sr. Engineer for Infrastructure and Networking. "We expect to see payback on our investment in less than one year. Local support in Ecuador demonstrates FMS commitment and is critical to our success." About Fleet Management Fleet Management Solutions, an INC 500 Company and recognized leader in GPS fleet tracking and All-Satellite Mobile Resource Management Solutions, is noted for its global success operating in rugged and remote environments, focusing on the oil and gas, government, military, and logistics industries. About Petroproduccion The State Company for Oil Exploration in Ecuador, Petroproduccion, was established on September 26, 1989 with the objective of exploring and exploiting hydrocarbon reservoirs, sedimentary basins, and hydrocarbon fields assigned to PetroEcuador and transporting oil and gas to the main storage facilities. About Petroecuador Headquartered in Quito, Ecuador, Petroecuador -- http://www.petroecuador.com.ec-- is an international oil company owned by the Ecuador government. It produces crude petroleum and natural gas. * * * In previous years, Petroecuador, according to published reports, was faced with cash-problems. The state-oil firm has no funds for maintenance, has no funds to repair pumps in diesel, gasoline and natural gas refineries, and has no capacity to pay suppliers and vendors. The government refused to give the much- needed cash alleging inefficiency and non-transparency in Petroecuador's dealings. In 2008, a new management team was appointed to turn around the company's operations. ================================== D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C ================================== * DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: EUI Sees 1% Decline in Economy This Year -------------------------------------------------------------- The Economist Intelligence Unit (“EIU”) predicts the Dominican economy will decline 1% in 2009, as the external conditions continue deteriorating and the growing impact from the U.S. economic recession and the global financial crisis, Dominican Today reports. According to the report, Stephen Keppel, Economist Intelligence Unit Assistant publisher, said with a 2.5% contraction in the United States Gross Domestic Product, Dominican Republic’s exports will fall and there’ll be negative impacts on tourism, remittances and foreign investment. “Investment in the country in 2009 will be higher than in other countries of the region due to the pre-established agreements in the tourism and mining sectors; however, they’ll be affected by the financial difficulties, lack of international liquidity and an increase in the aversion to risk,” the news agency quoted Mr. Keppel as saying. ============= E C U A D O R ============= PERENCO: Ecuador to Freeze Income Over EUR350 Mln Late Taxes ------------------------------------------------------------ Ecuador will freeze the income of 720,000 barrels of oil produced by Perenco after the French oil company failed to settle EUR350 million in late taxes, Alonso Soto at Reuters reports citing Petrecuador chief Luis Jaramillo. Perenco, Reuters relates, failed to repay its debt due on Monday. Reuters notes under Ecuadorean law, the state could temporarily seize assets or freeze accounts of a company to force payment. Xinhua recalls Derlis Palacios, Ecuador's oil minister, said Monday that he met with Perenco executives but "unfortunately we did not reach concrete agreements and the company did not give a proposal to pay its multimillion debt." In an earlier report, Reuters disclosed Mr. Palacios said Perenco could opt for a settlement similar to Repsol under which the Spanish oil company agreed to pay more than US$500 million in late taxes for five years. However, the oil minister said one of Perenco's partners opposed any agreement. Perenco –- http://www.perenco.com/–- is an exploration and production company dedicated to developing oil and natural gas potential. =========== G U Y A N A =========== CL FIN'L: Clico Guyana Has No Investment in Bahamas, PM Says ------------------------------------------------------------ Bahamas Prime Minister Hubert Ingraham told Guyana's President, Bharrat Jagdeo, that there seems to be no record that the Guyana government has invested 53% of CLICO Life and General Insurance Company South America Limited (CLICO Guyana) assets in Clico (Bahamas) Limited, Oscar Ramjeet of Caribbean Net News reports. According to the report, Mr. Ingraham did acknowledge that Guyana's claim does, however, this represent a very serious potential impairment for the Guyana operations given that it has place its operation into judicial management. A local newspaper, Kaieteur News, reported that the audited accounts of CLICO in both Guyana and the Bahamas indicate that there was an investment from CLICO (Guyana), Caribbean Net News notes. As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on March 4, 2009, Trinidad and Tobago Newsday said the Guyana government has placed CLICO Guyana's operations under judicial management prior to winding up of the company. The government's move, the report related, follows the liquidation of Clico (Bahamas), which has a 51% stake in CLICO Guyana. According to CaribWorldNews, the Bahamian Supreme Court granted a request from the islands government to liquidate Clico Bahamas for the protection of company shareholders. Craig Gomez of Baker Tilley Gomez was appointed as the liquidator of the company, according to the same report. President Jagdeo, as cited by Caribbean Net News, said it is the duty of the Bahamas regulators to find the money. "If they fail to do so then there would have been a massive fraud and people would face the courts," President Jagdeo said as quoted by the report. About CLICO Bahamas CLICO Bahamas Limited (formerly British Fidelity Assurance Limited), a subsidiary of CLICO (Holdings) Barbados Limited and a subsidiary of the CL Financial group, operated in the Bahamas for many years prior to 1992 as British Fidelity Assurance Limited under different owners. The company has active operations in the Bahamas, Belize and the Turks & Caicos Islands. About CL Financial According to Wikipedia, CL Financial Limited is the largest privately held conglomerate in Trinidad and Tobago and one of the largest privately held corporations in the entire Caribbean. Founded as an insurance company, Colonial Life Insurance Company (CLICO) by Cyril Duprey, it was expanded into a diversified company by his nephew, Lawrence Duprey. CL Financial is now one of the largest local conglomerates in the region, encompassing over 65 companies in 32 countries worldwide with total assets standing at roughly US$100 billion. * * * As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Feb. 20, 2009, the Trinidad and Tobago Express said Central Bank Governor Ewart Williams disclosed that an examination of insurance company CLICO, dissolved finance house CLICO Investment Bank and other CL Financial companies, showed a deficit between $6 billion and $8 billion. Tobago President George Maxwell Richards, The Express related, signed bailout bills for CL Financial, giving the government the authority to control the company's unit, Colonial Life Insurance Company, and giving the central bank extensive powers to treat with CL Financial's collapse and the consequent systemic crisis. According to the Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, the government used $1 billion of taxpayers money to help protect depositors and policyholders. T&T Newsday related Governor Williams pleaded with policy holders not to withdraw money from Clico, amid the unit's increasing $10 billion debt. ============= J A M A I C A ============= AIR JAMAICA: Bilateral Air Services Deal With Brazil on Hold ------------------------------------------------------------ The implementation of the bilateral air services agreement between Jamaica and Brazil has been put on hold, as the planned divestment of Air Jamaica Limited is still pending, Caribbean360. com reports. The deal, the report recalls, was signed by Transport and Works Minister, Michael Henry, and then Brazilian Ambassador to Jamaica, Cezar Augusto De Souza Lima, in December 2007, seeking to: * facilitate scheduled commercial passenger and cargo flights between the South American country and Jamaica; * facilitate code sharing among the designated stakeholder airlines, and a chance for the exploration of Jamaica as an alternative gateway for connecting flights between North and South America; and * encourage the promotion of fair play among all interests, while discouraging discrimination and abuse of dominant positions. According to the report, Communications Consultant Communications Consultant with the Ministry of Transport and Works, Reginald Allen, said no actions has taken place since the signing, which paves way for further discussions between local carriers and their Brazilian counterparts. Caribbean360. com notes Air Jamaica's Senior Director for Government and Community Affairs, William Rodgers, said Air Jamaica is yet to engage on the matter, however, it still has to go through the divestment process. "We are going through that divestment process, which, I am sure, once we know where we are going, then discussions could be explored for the for the future expansion of the airline. So the door is open (for talks)," the report quoted Mr. Rodgers as saying. Mr. Rodgers, the report says, added that there still needed to undertake route and economic surveys to assess the viability of the service, in order to effect implementation of the provisions. About Air Jamaica Headquartered in Kingston, Jamaica, Air Jamaica Limited -- http://www.airjamaica.com/-- was founded in 1969. It flies passengers and cargo to almost 30 destinations in the Caribbean, Europe, and North America. Air Jamaica offers vacation packages through Air Jamaica Vacations. The company closed its intra- island services unit, Air Jamaica Express, in October 2005. The Jamaican government owned 25% of the company after it went private in 1994. However, in late 2004, the government assumed full ownership of the airline after an investor group turned over its 75% stake. The Jamaican government does not plan to own Air Jamaica permanently. * * * As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Nov. 6, 2008, Moody's Investors Service placed the debt ratings of Air Jamaica Limited, B1 senior unsecured notes guaranteed by the Government of Jamaica, on review for possible downgrade. The review coincides with Moody's action placing the ratings of the Government of Jamaica under review for downgrade on November 4, 2008. CABLE & WIRLESS: LIME Sues Digicel for Discriminatory Pricing ------------------------------------------------------------- Lime (formerly Cable & Wireless Jamaica), a unit of Cable & Wireless plc, has filed a formal complaint to the Fair Trading Commission (FTC) againts Dicigel's "anticompetitive, discriminatory and predatory conduct," Jamaica Observer reports. The company, the report relates, was peeved by Dicigel's implementation of a 21% increase on LIME's landline customers. The report recalls on January 1, 2009, Dicigel started charging LIME's landline customers $8.50 per minute to call a Digicel mobile phone during peak traffic hours, while maintaining a low rate of $4 per minute for its own landline (fixed wireless) customers. According to the report, in a letter addressed to FTC Executive Director David Miller, LIME said: "[it] firmly believes that the rate increase during Peak hours which has the highest traffic volumes is not mere coincidence, but is a deliberate strategy by Digicel to target LIME's high value corporate fixed voice customers in particular, and encourage them to churn off the LIME fixed network and onto Digicel's fixed wireless service." The report relates LIME argued that Digicel is using discriminatory pricing to make it uneconomical for consumers to use any other service provider to make calls to Digicel phones. LIME charges that Digicel, with an extensive customer base of 1.9 million mobile subscribers, if left unchecked, can use anti- competitive tactics to drive its competitors out of business "thereby creating a virtual monopoly", the report says. Jamaica Observer notes LIME asked the FTC to conduct further investigations and take such actions in order to prevent Digicel from continuing its current course of conduct. About LIME Lime (formerly Cable & Wireless Jamaica) -- http://home.cwjamaica.com/ -- is a provider of national and international fixed line services. The company is owned 82% by Cable & Wireless plc. Cable & Wireless Jamaica also owns Jamaica Digiport International Limited, a company which provides high speed data and other telecommunications services exclusively to freezone and offshore companies. About Cable & Wireless Headquartered in London, England, Cable & Wireless plc -- http://www.cw.com/-- is an international telecommunications company. The Company offers mobile, broadband and domestic and international fixed line services to homes, small and medium-sized enterprises, corporate customers and governments. It operates in 39 countries through four major operations in the Caribbean, Panama, Macau and Monaco & Islands. It operates through two businesses: International and Europe, Asia & US. Its International business operates full service telecommunications companies through four major operations in the Caribbean, Panama, Macau and Monaco and Islands. Its Europe, Asia & US provides enterprise and carrier solutions to the largest users of telecom services across the United Kingdom, continental Europe, Asia and the United States. Its subsidiaries include Cable & Wireless UK, Cable & Wireless Jamaica Ltd, Cable & Wireless Panama, SA, Cable & Wireless (Barbados) Ltd and Monaco Telecom SAM. * * * According to Bloomberg data, Cable & Wireless plc continues to carry Moody's "Ba3" long-term corporate family rating, "B1" senior unsecured debt rating and "Ba3" probability of default rating with a stable outlook. The company continues to Standard & Poor's "BB-" long-term foreign and local issuer credit ratings and "B" short-term foreign and local issuer credit ratings. RJR: To Carry Out Restructuring Exercise on Economic Downturn ------------------------------------------------------------- RJR Communications Group instructed its management to carry out a restructuring exercise following the examination of the group's performance in its regular board meeting, Tyrone Reid of Jamaica Gleaner reports, citing Gary Allen, the group's managing director. Mr. Allen, the report relates, said the company found out that the measures taken since October to contain cost were not sucessful. According to the report, Mr. Allen said the board had "authorised management to carry out a restructuring exercise to address the deepening financial problems and the negative impact it has been having on the group with a view to ensuring that the company remains profitable." The Board, Radio Jamaica relates, said the restructuring exercise is to meaningfully reduce expenses and stimulate recovery Group- wide. The RJR's employees have already been briefed about the impending plan of the company. The Gleaner notes Mr. Allen said the restructuring exercise was still being fashioned, emphasising that no final decisions had been taken. Mr. Allen, Radio Jamaica adds, said that there will be an extensive consultative process among the various stakeholders over the next few days. =========== P A N A M A =========== CHIQUITA BRANDS: Elects Kerrii Anderson to Board of Directors ------------------------------------------------------------- Chiquita Brands International Inc.'s board of directors has elected Kerrii B. Anderson, 51, effective April 1, 2009. The size of the board will increase from eight to nine members. Ms. Anderson, who brings significant management experience in finance, accounting and executive leadership, will also serve as a member of the company's audit committee. "We are proud to welcome Kerrii to Chiquita's board," said Fernando Aguirre, chairman and chief executive officer. "Her leadership and extensive skills in executing a strategic business transformation will enhance an already strong group of independent board members whose vision and expertise continue to advance Chiquita's sustainable growth strategy." "Chiquita is an exciting company with two powerful, trusted brands," said Ms. Anderson. "I look forward to bringing my experience to Chiquita's board and working with the management team to build shareholder value." In addition to Mr. Aguirre and Ms. Anderson, the board currently includes: * Howard W. Barker Jr., former partner of KPMG LLP; * William H. Camp, former executive of the Archer Daniels Midland Company; * Robert W. Fisher, a private investor with more than 35 years senior management experience at various banana companies; * Clare M. Hasler, executive director of the Robert Mondavi Institute for Wine and Food Science at the University of California at Davis; * Durk I. Jager, former chairman, president and chief executive officer at the Procter & Gamble Co.; * Jaime Serra, senior partner of Serra Associates International, a consulting firm in law and economics, and Mexico's former secretary of finance and secretary of trade and industry; and * Steven P. Stanbrook, president, developing markets platform at S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. About Chiquita Brands Headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio, Chiquita Brands International Inc. (NYSE: CQB) -- http://www.chiquita.com/-- is a marketer and distributor of high-quality fresh and value-added food products. The company markets its products under the Chiquita(R) and Fresh Express(R) premium brands and other related trademarks. Chiquita employs approximately 25,000 people operating in more than 70 countries worldwide, including Panama. * * * As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America on November 6, 2008, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its senior unsecured debt ratings on Cincinnati, Ohio-based Chiquita Brands International Inc. to 'B-' (same as the corporate credit rating) from 'CCC+' and the recovery rating to '4' from '5' indicating the expectation of average (30% to 50%) recovery in the event of payment default. The upgrades are principally the result of about US$91 million of redemptions the company has made since June 2008. At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B-' corporate credit rating and 'B+' senior secured ratings. The outlook is stable. As of Sept. 30, 2008, Chiquita had about US$805 million in debts. =========== M E X I C O =========== COPAMEX SA: Fitch Downgrades Issuer Default Rating to 'B+' ---------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has downgraded Copamex, S.A. de C.V.'s senior unsecured foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings to 'B+' from 'BB-' and the senior unsecured national scale rating to 'BBB(mex)' from 'A-(mex)', including these peso-denominated medium-term notes or Certificados Bursatiles: Copamex 06, 07, 07-2 and 08. Fitch has also downgraded the rating of Copamex's peso-denominated medium-term notes (05-2) to 'BBB+(mex)' from 'A(mex)', which include a 15% cash collateral, and downgraded a MXP250 million short-term local CB program to 'F3(mex)' from 'F2(mex)'. The Outlook on all ratings is Stable. The rating action reflects the deterioration of Copamex's main financial indicators, which are not in accordance to Fitch's expectations of a gradual strengthening. Although diverse strategies have been implemented by management, which allowed Copamex to obtain savings in operating expenses, they have not been enough to maintain the financial indicators in the levels according to the rating category. On Dec. 31, 2008, Copamex reported a ratio of on-balance-sheet debt net of collaterals to EBITDA of 3.2 times (x), which is an increase from the 2.9x registered a year ago. The downgrade also incorporates higher refinancing risk considering the current credit restraint prevailing in the market, having 45% of total debt maturing in the short-term. As a result of the upcoming debt maturities, which Copamex faces in the next nine months, Fitch will continue monitoring the different financing alternatives given the current market situation. Copamex is a manufacturer of industrial papers, including printing and writing, kraft paper for packaging and specialty papers. The company also manufactures baby diapers. In 2008, sales and EBITDA reached MXP5,847 million and MXP428 million, respectively. VITRO SAB: S&P Withdraws 'D' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating -------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'D' long-term corporate credit rating on Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. at the company's request. At the time of withdrawal, the 'D' rating reflected the company's failure to make its coupon payments due Feb. 2, 2009, on its 8.625% senior notes due 2012 and on its 9.125% senior notes due 2017 as a result of the continued weakness in the issuer's liquidity. "Margin calls stemming from Vitro's derivative instrument positions represented an additional drain on its liquidity. The ratings also reflected a financial risk profile under pressure as a result of the weakness in the economies of Mexico, the U.S., and Spain--Vitro's principal markets," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Marcela Duenas. =============================== T R I N I D A D & T O B A G O =============================== CL FINANCIAL: CLICO Insurance Agents Told Not to Sell New Policies ------------------------------------------------------------------ Colonial Life Insurance Company (CLICO)'s insurance agents, around 700 in Trinidad and a dozens in the Bahamas, have been told not to sell any new policies until a new business model has been determined and rates have been revised, Oscar Ramjeet of Caribbean Net News reports. "We are not allowed to see new clients. We can only service old clients. We can't write new business or do any overseas stuff," the news agency quoted an agent, who works with a Port of Spain agency, as saying. According to the report, the agent said CLICO has discontinued marketing its annuities in foreign currencies - the US dollar, the euro, the Canadian dollar and the United Kingdom pound sterling - which were being sold to Trinidadians living abroad. The agent, the report relates, added: “They will only allow us to go forward with local currency products. We can't sell until we verify the new rates.” About CL Financial According to Wikipedia, CL Financial Limited is the largest privately held conglomerate in Trinidad and Tobago and one of the largest privately held corporations in the entire Caribbean. Founded as an insurance company, Colonial Life Insurance Company (CLICO) by Cyril Duprey, it was expanded into a diversified company by his nephew, Lawrence Duprey. CL Financial is now one of the largest local conglomerates in the region, encompassing over 65 companies in 32 countries worldwide with total assets standing at roughly US$100 billion. * * * As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Latin America on Feb. 20, 2009, the Trinidad and Tobago Express said Central Bank Governor Ewart Williams disclosed that an examination of insurance company CLICO, dissolved finance house CLICO Investment Bank and other CL Financial companies, showed a deficit between $6 billion and $8 billion. Tobago President George Maxwell Richards, The Express related, signed bailout bills for CL Financial, giving the government the authority to control the company's unit, Colonial Life Insurance Company, and giving the central bank extensive powers to treat with CL Financial's collapse and the consequent systemic crisis. According to the Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, the government used $1 billion of taxpayers money to help protect depositors and policyholders. T&T Newsday related Governor Williams pleaded with policy holders not to withdraw money from Clico, amid the unit's increasing $10 billion debt. =============== X X X X X X X X =============== * Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars --------------------------------------------- Mar. 13, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Bankruptcy Battleground West Beverly Wilshire, Beverly Hills, California Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ Mar. 14-16, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Conrad Duberstein Moot Court Competition St. John's University School of Law, New York City Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ Apr. 1-4, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE 27th Annual Spring Meeting Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center, National Harbor, Md. Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ Apr. 16-19, 2009 COMMERICAL LAW LEAGUE OF AMERICA 2009 Chicago/Spring Meeting Westin Hotel on Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill. Contact: (312) 781-2000; http://www.clla.org/ Apr. 17-18, 2009 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEES NABT Spring Seminar The Peabody, Orlando, Florida Contact: http://www.nabt.com/ Apr. 20, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Consumer Bankruptcy Conference John Adams Courthouse, Boston, Massachusetts Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ Apr. 27-28, 2009 TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION Corporate Governance Meetings Intercontinental Hotel, Chicago, Illinois Contact: www.turnaround.org Apr. 28-30, 2009 TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION TMA Spring Conference Intercontinental Hotel, Chicago, Illinois Contact: www.turnaround.org May 1, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Nuts and Bolts for Young Practitioners Alexander Hamilton Custom House, New York City Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ May 4, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE New York City Bankruptcy Conference New York Marriott Marquis, New York City Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ May 7-8, 2009 RENASSANCE AMERICAN MANAGEMENT, INC. 6th Annual Conference on Distressted Investing - Europe The Le Meridien Piccadilly Hotel, London, U.K. Contact: 1-903-595-3800 or http://www.renaissanceamerican.com/ May 7-10, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE 27th Annual Spring Meeting Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center National Harbor, Maryland Contact: http://www.abiworld.org/ May 12-15, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Litigation Skills Symposium Tulane University, New Orleans, La. Contact: http://www.abiworld.org/ May 14-16, 2009 ALI-ABA Chapter 11 Business Reorganizations Langham Hotel, Boston, Massachusetts Contact: http://www.ali-aba.org June 11-14, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Central States Bankruptcy Workshop Grand Traverse Resort and Spa Traverse City, Michigan Contact: http://www.abiworld.org/ June 21-24, 2009 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RESTRUCTURING, INSOLVENCY & BANKRUPTCY PROFESSIONALS 8th International World Congress TBA Contact: http://www.insol.org/ July 16-19, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Northeast Bankruptcy Conference Mt. Washington Inn Bretton Woods, New Hampshire Contact: http://www.abiworld.org/ July 29-Aug. 1, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Southeast Bankruptcy Conference The Westin Hilton Head Island Resort & Spa, Hilton Head Island, S.C. Contact: http://www.abiworld.org/ Aug. 6-8, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Mid-Atlantic Bankruptcy Conference Hotel Hershey, Hershey, Pa. Contact: http://www.abiworld.org/ Sept. 10-11, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Complex Financial Restructuring Program Hyatt Regency Lake Tahoe, Incline Village, Nevada Contact: http://www.abiworld.org/ Sept. 10-12, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE 17th Annual Southwest Bankruptcy Conference Hyatt Regency Lake Tahoe, Incline Village, Nevada Contact: http://www.abiworld.org/ Oct. 2, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE ABI/GULC "Views from the Bench" Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C. Contact: http://www.abiworld.org/ Oct. 5-9, 2009 TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION TMA Annual Convention Marriott Desert Ridge, Phoenix, Arizona Contact: 312-578-6900; http://www.turnaround.org/ Oct. 20, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE NCBJ/ABI Educational Program Paris Las Vegas, Las Vegas, Nev. Contact: http://www.abiworld.org/ Dec. 3-5, 2009 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE 21st Annual Winter Leadership Conference La Quinta Resort & Spa, La Quinta, California Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ Apr. 29-May 2, 2010 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Annual Spring Meeting Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center, Maryland Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ June 17-20, 2010 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Central States Bankruptcy Workshop Grand Traverse Resort and Spa, Traverse City, Michigan Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ July 7-10, 2010 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Northeast Bankruptcy Conference Ocean Edge Resort, Brewster, Massachusetts Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ July 14-17, 2010 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Southeast Bankruptcy Conference The Ritz-Carlton Amelia Island, Amelia, Fla. Contact: http://www.abiworld.org/ Aug. 5-7, 2010 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Mid-Atlantic Bankruptcy Workshop Hyatt Regency Chesapeake Bay, Cambridge, Maryland Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ Oct. 4-8, 2010 TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION TMA Annual Convention JW Marriott Grande Lakes, Orlando, Florida Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/ Dec. 2-4, 2010 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE 22nd Annual Winter Leadership Conference Camelback Inn, Scottsdale, Arizona Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ Mar. 31-Apr. 3, 2011 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Annual Spring Meeting Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center, Maryland Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ June 9-12, 2011 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Central States Bankruptcy Workshop Grand Traverse Resort and Spa Traverse City, Michigan Contact: http://www.abiworld.org/ Dec. 1-3, 2011 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE 23rd Annual Winter Leadership Conference La Quinta Resort & Spa, La Quinta, California Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ *********** Monday's edition of the TCR-LA delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR-LA editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR-LA constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR-LA editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Tuesday's edition of the TCR-LA features a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets obtained by our editors based on the latest balance sheets publicly available a day prior to publication. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each Thursday's edition of the TCR-LA. Submissions about insolvency- related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com *********** S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter - Latin America is a daily newsletter co-published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA. Marie Therese V. Profetana, Marites O. Claro, Joy A. Agravente, Pius Xerxes V. Tovilla, Rousel Elaine C. Tumanda, Valerie C. Udtuhan, Frauline S. Abangan, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2008. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2746. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Latin America subscription rate is US$625 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300. * * * End of Transmission * * *