/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/240105.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Friday, January 5, 2024, Vol. 25, No. 5

                           Headlines



N E T H E R L A N D S

WINTERSHALL DEA 2: Fitch Puts 'BB+' Sub. Bonds Rating on Watch Neg.


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

HARBOUR ENERGY: Fitch Puts 'BB' LongTerm IDR on Watch Positive
JOULES: HMRC Expected to Get Full Repayment After Asset Sale
M. IGOE: Owes Over GBP3.5 Million at Time of Administration
ONLY THE BRAVE: Significant Bad Debt Prompts Administration
PURE COPPER: Enters Administration, Assets to Be Put Up for Sale

WESTRIDGE CONSTRUCTION: Councils Rush to Replace Contractor


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Taking Charge

                           - - - - -


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================

WINTERSHALL DEA 2: Fitch Puts 'BB+' Sub. Bonds Rating on Watch Neg.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Wintershall Dea AG's Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) of 'BBB' and its instrument ratings on Rating
Watch Negative (RWN). This follows an announcement that
substantially all of Wintershall Dea's upstream assets will be
purchased by Harbour Energy PLC (Harbour; BB/Rating Watch
Positive), and that its senior unsecured and subordinated bonds
will effectively be assumed by Harbour.

Post-acquisition, Wintershall Dea's assets portfolio will be
substantially reduced and will be represented by upstream assets in
Russia (which have effectively been expropriated by Russia),
upstream assets in the UAE (which are in the development stage),
and some other assets. The RWN on the IDR reflects its expectation
that its business profile will become extremely weak as a result of
the sale.

The RWN on the senior unsecured bonds issued by Wintershall Dea
Finance B.V. and on subordinated bonds issued by Wintershall Dea
Finance 2 B.V. reflects its expectation that the consolidated
credit profile of Harbour will be weaker than that of Wintershall
Dea's standalone profile. Its base case forecasts suggest that
Harbour's credit profile would be commensurate with the 'BBB-'
level following the acquisition.

As the acquisition is expected to be completed in 4Q24, the
resolution of the RWP may take longer than the typical six months
for a Watch. The transaction is subject to Harbour shareholder
approval, regulatory approvals and some other conditions.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Substantially All Upstream Assets Sold: A substantial share of
Wintershall Dea's assets will be sold to Harbour. Assets excluded
from the transaction do not generate material cash flows and
include Wintershall Dea's operations in Russia (which Wintershall
Dea currently does not control), an upstream project in UAE (which
is in the development stage), midstream operations and some other
assets. Management announced that after the deal is finalised
Wintershall Dea's headquarters will be closed.

Bonds Assumed by Harbour: Wintershall Dea's outstanding senior
unsecured bonds issued by Wintershall Dea Finance B.V. for EUR3
billion, and subordinated hybrid bonds issued by Wintershall Dea
Finance 2 B.V. for EUR1.5 billion will be assumed by Harbour. The
change-of-control clause will not be triggered for senior unsecured
bonds as long as the bonds continue to be rated investment-grade.

Other Debt Covered by Cash: Wintershall Dea's other debt (which at
30 June 2023 comprised its cash-pooling arrangement with related
companies) in the amount of EUR722 million was covered by
Wintershall Dea's cash balance (EUR2.3 billion at 30 June 2023).

Harbour's Post-Transaction Profile: Fitch believes that
post-transaction Wintershall Dea's senior unsecured bonds will be
rated in line with Harbour's IDR, and hybrid bonds will be notched
down from Harbour's post-merger rating. Its base case forecasts
suggest that Harbour's credit profile would be commensurate with
the 'BBB-' level following the acquisition.

Post-acquisition, Harbour's combined production is expected to be
around 500,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day (kboe/d), broadly
in line with that of US-focused Diamondback Energy, Inc. and
Norway-focused Aker BP ASA (both rated BBB/Stable). Harbour's
reserve life, however, will be lower than peers'. While Harbour's
EBITDA net leverage should remain fairly conservative, its debt
capacity will also be affected by substantial tax payments (given
Harbour's presence in Norway and the UK, where sector taxes are
high).

For more details on Harbour's post-acquisition profile see 'Fitch
Places Harbour Energy on Rating Positive Watch on Wintershall
Acquisition' published 29 December 2023.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Post-transaction, Wintershall Dea's portfolio will be substantially
reduced, which is reflected in the RWN on its IDR. Wintershall
Dea's bonds will be transferred to Harbour, and its other debt
(represented by the cash-pooling facility) will be fully covered by
cash.

Fitch expects Wintershall Dea's senior unsecured bonds to be rated
in line with Harbour's post-transaction IDR, which Fitch believes
will commensurate with the 'BBB-' level.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

- Crude oil (Brent) price: USD80/bbl in 2024, USD70/bbl in 2025,
USD65/bbl in 2026 and USD60/bbl in 2027

- Natural gas (TTF) price: USD12/mcf in 2024, USD10/mcf in 2025,
USD8/mcf in 2026 and USD5/mcf in 2027

- Wintershall Dea's standalone production of around 330 kboe/d in
2024

- Wintershall Dea's standalone capex of around EUR 1.2 billion in
2024

- Substantially all of Wintershall Dea's producing upstream assets
sold to Harbour

- Wintershall Dea's senior unsecured bonds and subordinated hybrid
bonds are assumed by Harbour

- Wintershall Dea's other debt is paid from its cash balance

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors That Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade:

- As the rating is on RWN, Fitch does not expect a positive rating
action in the short term

Factors That Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade:

- Completion of the sale

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Wintershall Post-Transaction Liquidity: Wintershall Dea's cash
balance at 30 June 2023 amounted to EUR2.3 billion and is outside
of the transaction scope. Fitch assumes that this balance will be
available to repay Wintershall Dea's cash-pooling facility with
related companies, which at 30 June 2023 amounted to EUR722
million. Wintershall Dea's committed revolving credit facility in
the amount of EUR900 million is undrawn.

Senior Unsecured Bonds at IDR: Fitch assumes that Wintershall Dea's
existing senior unsecured bonds, together with Harbour's existing
senior unsecured bonds, and new bonds to be issued by Harbour
following the deal completion will rank equally among themselves
and will benefit from broadly the same guarantee package. Fitch
hence believes that they are likely to be rated in line with
Harbour's IDR.

Wintershall's Hybrid Bonds Notched Down: Fitch assumes Wintershall
Dea's subordinated bonds with call dates in 2026 and 2029 to be a
permanent feature of Harbour's post-acquisition capital structure,
as articulated by Harbour's management. The bonds will remain
deeply subordinated and are likely to be notched down from
Harbour's post-merger rating. Fitch also assumes that the bonds
will continue to qualify for 50% equity credit, reflecting the
hybrids' cumulative interest coupon, a feature that is more
debt-like in nature.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

   Entity/Debt              Rating                  Prior
   -----------              ------                  -----
Wintershall Dea
Finance 2 B.V.

   Subordinated       LT     BB+  Rating Watch On   BB+

Wintershall Dea AG    LT IDR BBB  Rating Watch On   BBB

Wintershall Dea
Finance B.V.

   senior unsecured   LT     BBB  Rating Watch On   BBB



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

HARBOUR ENERGY: Fitch Puts 'BB' LongTerm IDR on Watch Positive
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Harbour Energy PLC's (Harbour) Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB' on Rating Watch Positive (RWP).
This follows an announcement of Harbour's acquisition of
substantially all of Wintershall Dea AG's upstream assets.

The deal will transform Harbour's business profile by substantially
increasing its scale, geographical and asset diversification.
Harbour's reserve life will also improve though will remain weaker
than peers'. Its base case forecasts suggest that Harbour's credit
profile would be commensurate with the 'BBB-' level after
completion.

As the acquisition is expected to be completed in 4Q24, the
resolution of the RWP may take longer than the typical six months
for a Watch. The transaction is subject to Harbour shareholder and
regulatory approvals, and some other conditions.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Transformative Acquisition, Larger Scale: The acquisition of
Wintershall Dea's assets will dramatically increase Harbour's scale
and diversification. In 2024, the combined production is expected
to be around 500,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day (kboe/d,
around 60% of which will be natural gas), and management expects a
fairly stable production profile in the next four years. Production
will primarily be focused on Norway and the UK and, to a lesser
extent, Argentina, Germany and Africa. The combined production
would be broadly in line with that of US-focused Diamondback
Energy, Inc. and Norway-focused Aker BP ASA (both rated
'BBB'/Stable).

Reserve Life Weaker Than Peers': The combined entity's reserves
will also increase dramatically -management estimates 2022
pro-forma 2P reserves at 1.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent
(boe). However, the company's 2P reserve life of eight years (based
on pro-forma 2023 production) will still be weaker than peers' 11
years (Aker BP and Neptune Energy Group Midco Limited, (BB+/RWP)).
This is partially mitigated by Harbour's substantial pro-forma 2C
resource base (1.6 billion boe) and a number of near-term potential
development projects.

High Tax Reduces Debt Capacity: While Harbour's EBITDA net leverage
should remain fairly conservative with Fitch-projected EBITDA net
leverage remaining below 1.0x in 2024-2026, its debt capacity will
also be affected by substantial tax payments (given Harbour's
presence in Norway and the UK, where sector taxes are high).

Fitch assumes Harbour should be able to maintain funds from
operation (FFO) net leverage at around or below 2x through the
cycle, though temporary deviations are possible, such as during
periods of lower oil and natural gas prices and will require
corrective actions (eg. dividend and/or capex cuts). Fitch
forecasts Harbour's post-acquisition FFO net leverage rising to
2.2x in 2026 from around 1.5x in 2024-2025. Fitch assumes no
material hedging arrangements beyond 2025, and Harbour's leverage
profile could additionally benefit from its commitment to continue
hedging on a three-year rolling basis.

Average Production Costs, Decommissioning Obligations: The
acquisition will help Harbour reduce average production costs,
given Wintershall Dea's focus on natural gas. The combined entity's
operating costs should be around USD11/boe, which Fitch views as
average (e.g. UK-focused Ithaca Energy plc's (B/Stable) production
costs are around USD20/boe, while Aker BP's are around USD7/boe).

Harbour's decommissioning provisions relative to 2P reserves should
also fall to around USD4/boe, versus its standalone USD10/boe,
Ithaca's USD7.5/boe and Aker BP's USD2/boe. However, the projected
decommissioning pre-tax expense of around USD300 million a year
will continue to affect cash flows.

Positive M&A Record: Harbour has demonstrated a record of acquiring
assets and successfully integrating them, most recently through its
reverse merger with Premier Oil, which increased its production by
around 50% and made Harbour a listed company. Following
acquisitions, Harbour focus has been on debt reduction, and
pre-transaction net financial debt is minimal. Fitch expects
Harbour's financial policy to remain prudent.

Energy Transition Underway: Harbour's target is to become
carbon-neutral on the Scope 1 & 2 basis by 2035 through minimising
emissions and investments in carbon offsets. The acquisition of
Wintershall Dea's assets is helpful in this regard due to the
latter's focus on natural gas.

Fitch assumes that at least in the next three to five years the
impact of energy transition on oil and gas companies will be
limited. However, over the long term, industry participants, and in
particular pure upstream producers, may be subject to more vigorous
regulations, and their margins could be affected by carbon taxes
and other regulatory measures.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Post-acquisition, Harbour's scale will be comparable to that of
other investment-grade independent exploration and production
peers, including Aker BP and Diamondback Energy, Inc. (BBB/Stable).
Harbour's production (2024 consolidated production, including
acquired Wintershall Dea's assets: around 500 kboe/d) will compare
well with Aker BP's guided 2023 production of around 460 kboe/d and
Diamondback's of 447 kboe/d. Harbour's post-acquisition business
profile will be more geographically diversified than that of Aker
BP (focused on Norway) and Diamondback (focused on Permian basin in
the US).

However, Harbour's pro-forma reserve life will be weaker than
peers' (2P reserve life of eight years, compared with Aker BP's 2P
reserve life of 11 years and Diamondback's 1P reserve life of 12.5
years), predominantly in view of Harbour's depleted reserves in the
United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS). Also, while Harbour's
EBITDA net leverage should remain fairly conservative, its debt
capacity will also be affected by substantial tax payments. In
2026, Fitch projects Harbour's post-acquisition FFO net leverage at
2.2x, higher than that of Aker BP and Diamondback.

Harbour's pre-acquisition level of production (1H23: 196kboe/d) is
slightly higher than that of Neptune (140kboe/d) and Energean plc
(BB-/Stable, 145kboe/d). Its 2P reserve life of six years is low
relative to Neptune's 11 years, but is counterbalanced by
substantial 2C resources and low leverage, allowing for
acquisitions.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

- Crude oil (Brent) price: USD80/bbl in 2024, USD70/bbl in 2025,
USD65/bbl in 2026 and USD60/bbl in 2027

- Natural gas (TTF) price: USD12/mcf in 2024, USD10/mcf in 2025,
USD8/mcf in 2026 and USD5/mcf in 2027

- Consolidated production averaging around 480kboe/d in 2024-2027

- Acquisition cash consideration of USD2.15 billion for Wintershall
Dea assets

- Dividends of USD455 million in 2025, but cut by 50% in 2026-2027
based on Fitch's lower assumed oil and natural gas prices

- Capex of around USD1.55 billion a year (excluding exploration
expenses and decommissioning charges)

- Decommissioning charges of around USD300 million a year

- Cash tax of around USD2.5 billion a year (or around 50% of
pre-tax operating cash flows)

- Equity credit of 50% for Wintershall Dea's hybrid bonds

- Legacy senior unsecured bonds issued by Harbour and Wintershall
Dea and new bonds to be issued by Harbour, to benefit from a
similar guarantee package

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors That Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade:

- Successful completion of the Wintershall Dea acquisition

Factors That Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade:

- As the rating is on RWP, Fitch does not expect negative rating
action in the short term.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Adequate Liquidity: Harbour expects that the cash consideration of
USD2.15 billion will be funded through cash flows generated by the
target portfolio between 30 June 2023 and completion, and an
underwritten USD1.5 billion bridge facility. Based on its
forecasts, the combined post-acquisition cash balance of Harbour,
after drawing down of the bridge facility and payment of the cash
consideration, should be in excess of USD1 billion.

Also, Harbour has replaced its reserve-based loan (limit USD1.3
billion) with a five-year unsecured revolving credit facility
(limit of USD3 billion, including the letter of credit portion of
USD1.75 billion).

In 2025, Harbour's post-acquisition maturities will include the
USD1.5 billion bridge facility and a EUR1 billion bond ported from
Wintershall Dea. Fitch believes that Harbour has adequate time to
address the upcoming maturities in 2025 and beyond.

Senior Unsecured Bonds In Line With IDR: Fitch assumes that
Harbour's senior unsecured bonds (including Harbour's existing
senior unsecured bonds, Wintershall Dea's existing senior unsecured
bonds and new bonds to be issued by Harbour following the deal
completion) will rank equally among themselves and will benefit
from broadly the same guarantee package. Fitch hence believes that
they are likely to be rated in line with Harbour's IDR.

Wintershall's Hybrid Bonds Notched Down: Fitch assumes Wintershall
Dea's subordinated bonds with call dates in 2026 and 2029 to be a
permanent feature of Harbour's post-acquisition capital structure,
as articulated by Harbour's management. The bonds will remain
deeply subordinated and are likely to be notched down from
Harbour's post-merger rating. Fitch also assumes that the bonds
will continue to qualify for a 50% equity credit, reflecting the
hybrids' cumulative interest coupon, a feature that is more
debt-like in nature.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Harbour has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Waste & Hazardous
Materials Management; Ecological Impacts due to significant
decommissioning obligations, which has a negative impact on the
credit profile, and is relevant to the rating in conjunction with
other factors.

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless
otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not
inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the
relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision.

   Entity/Debt              Rating              Recovery   Prior
   -----------              ------              --------   -----
Harbour Energy PLC    LT IDR BB  Rating Watch On           BB

   senior unsecured   LT     BB  Rating Watch On   RR4     BB

JOULES: HMRC Expected to Get Full Repayment After Asset Sale
------------------------------------------------------------
Helen Cahill at The Times reports that the taxman is expected to be
repaid GBP5.9 million in overdue VAT after the collapse of Joules.

According to The Times, the fashion and lifestyle brand is seeking
to repay its creditors and the sale of its assets is said to be on
course to deliver a full repayment of tax due to HM Revenue &
Customs.

Joules called in administrators when it failed to secure a
refinancing in November 2022, putting about 1,600 jobs at risk, The
Times relates.  The company had hoped to raise equity and to cut
its rental bill using a company voluntary arrangement before
appointing Interpath to find a buyer for the business, The Times
notes.

Next agreed to buy about 100 of the fashion retailer's shops for
GBP34 million in a move that safeguarded more than 1,400 jobs, The
Times discloses.


M. IGOE: Owes Over GBP3.5 Million at Time of Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jodie Bradley at Development Finance reports that building and
civil engineering contractor M. Igoe Limited went into
administration after appointing administrators on November 7, 2023,
owing over GBP3.5 million to its supply chain and creditors.

M. Igoe had been in business since 1985 specialising in civils work
for major house builders across the Northwest.

The firm had 32 employees and used more than 90 subcontractors
working on 11 live contracts when it went under, Development
Finance discloses.

According to Development Finance, the company's overall
deficiency/surplus as regards members is nearly GBP7.1 million.


ONLY THE BRAVE: Significant Bad Debt Prompts Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Chapman at Prolific North reports that Only The Brave has
confirmed that it has gone into administration, because of a
"significant bad debt."

According to Prolific North, Nick Aldrich, the owner and Managing
Director of the Sheffield-based strategic brand and content agency
told Prolific North:

"We founded the Allotment Agency, now Only The Brave, back in 2009
on the back of the food and beverage industry.

"Unfortunately that same industry has been responsible for putting
us into administration due to a significant bad debt and the
increasing difficulty of getting paid in this industry for work
done and delivered.

"After 35 years I have decided enough is enough and have decided to
retire from the industry.

"Giles and myself wish to thank our talented and devoted team for
many years of fun and laughter together and wish everyone the best
of luck for the future."

The agency called in the administrators earlier on Jan. 4.  Meaning
the end of 14 years of "successful and profitable trading."

Mr. Aldrich said that the decision came despite a healthy looking
2024 order book, Prolific North relates.


PURE COPPER: Enters Administration, Assets to Be Put Up for Sale
----------------------------------------------------------------
Business Sale reports that a Leicestershire-based company that
processed unused and discarded copper materials for resale has
collapsed into administration.

Inquesta Corporate Recovery & Insolvency director Steven Wiseglass
has been appointed as the administrator of Pure Copper Recycling
Ltd and a sale process is set to be undertaken for the company's
assets, Business Sale relates.

Pure Copper Recycling, which was based in Gaddesby, was founded in
2018 and was a granulation specialist.

According to Business Sale, despite generating sales of GBP10.4
million in the period from December 1, 2022 to September 28 2023,
the company had reportedly run into a number of issues.  Trading
had previously been stopped while the company sought new premises,
but it has now ceased trading upon entering administration with all
employees made redundant, Business Sale discloses.

"We are now working with advisers to assess the value of the
company's assets and will then undertake a sale process with a view
to securing a return for creditors," Business Sale quotes
administrator Steven Wiseglass as saying.

Pure Copper Recycling's most recent accounts at Companies House
cover the year ending November 30, 2022.  At that time, the
company's fixed assets were valued at GBP1.3 million and current
assets at slightly under GBP600,000,
Business Sale states.

However, the company owed significant sums to creditors at the
time, with GBP1.2 million due within one year and just under
GBP958,000 falling due after one year, leaving it with net
liabilities of GBP240,052, Business Sale notes.


WESTRIDGE CONSTRUCTION: Councils Rush to Replace Contractor
-----------------------------------------------------------
Will Ing at Construction News reports that a London borough is
racing to replace recently collapsed Westridge Construction on the
redevelopment of a travellers' site, while a West Sussex council
has picked a substitute builder to finish a housing development.

Westridge Construction entered administration in September owing
872 trade creditors a total of GBP11.3 million, Construction News
relays, citing a statement of affairs document.  The contractor,
which was based in East Sussex, turned over GBP69 million in the
year to February 2023 and worked on projects worth up to GBP15
million.

The builder worked in a range of sectors across the South East of
England -- with live projects at its time of collapse including a
49-home development in Southwick, Shoreham and the redevelopment of
a community hall and pitches for travellers in Mitcham, south
London.

Now the local authorities behind the latter projects have mobilised
to replace Westridge Construction on their projects, Construction
News discloses.

Sutton Council has published a tender document for the demolition
of 15 pitches and a community hall and the construction of 23 new
pitches -- including 23 amenity blocks -- and a replacement
community hall at The Pastures site on Carshalton Road,
Construction News states.

Sutton said the "unforeseeability of the original contractor going
into administration has led to urgency around re-procuring the
contract" as the project is required to start onsite by April 2024
to obtain Greater London Authority funding, Construction News
notes.

According to Construction News, the London borough said it "wishes
to invite interested MMC contractors to tender for a design and
build contract for the site", adding that the winning bidder would
be expected to undertake detailed design work starting from RIBA
Stage 3.

Interested contractors have until Jan. 17 to submit tenders, with
the contract expected to last for 16 months, Construction News
states.  Sutton Council told Construction News it expects the
contract to be worth around GBP6 million.

Meanwhile, Adur Council has signed a deal with Sussex-based
Cheesmur to finish the residential scheme on Albion Street in
Southwick, Construction News relays.  Cheesmur took control of the
site just before Christmas and is expected to complete the new
homes "by summer 2024", according to the council, Construction News
recounts.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Taking Charge
------------------------------
Taking Charge: Management Guide to Troubled Companies and
Turnarounds

Author: John O. Whitney
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 283 Pages
List Price: $34.95
Order a copy today at:
http://beardbooks.com/beardbooks/taking_charge.html  

Review by Susan Pannell

Remember when Lee Iacocca was practically a national hero? He won
celebrity status by taking charge at a company so universally known
as troubled that humor columnists joked their kids grew up thinking
the corporate name was "Ayling Chrysler." Whatever else Iacocca may
have been, he was a leader, and leadership is crucial to a
successful turnaround, maintains the author.

Mediagenic names merit only passing references in Whitney's book,
however. The author's own considerable experience as a turnaround
pro has given him more than sufficient perspective and acumen to
guide managers through successful turnarounds without resorting to
name-dropping. While Whitney states that he "share[s] no personal
war stories" in this book, it was, nonetheless, written from inside
the "shoes, skin, and skull of a turnaround leader." That sense of
immediacy, of urgency and intensity, makes Taking Charge compelling
reading even for the executive who feels he or she has already
mastered the literature of turnarounds.

Whitney divides the work into two parts. Part I is succinctly
entitled "Survival," and sets out the rules for taking charge
within the crucial first 120 days. "The leader rarely succeeds who
is not clearly in charge by the end of his fourth month," Whitney
notes. Cash budgeting, the mainstay of a successful turnaround, is
given attention in almost every chapter. Woe to the inexperienced
manager who views accounts receivable management as "an arcane
activity 'handled over in accounting.'" Whitney sets out 50
questions concerning AR that the leader must deal with -- not
academic exercises, but requirements for survival.

Other internal sources for cash, including judiciously managed
accounts payable and inventory, asset restructuring, and expense
cuts, are discussed. External sources of cash, among them banks,
asset lenders, and venture capital funds; factoring receivables;
and the use of trust receipts and field warehousing, are handled in
detail. Although cash, cash, and more cash is the drumbeat of Part
I, Whitney does not slight other subjects requiring attention. Two
chapters, for example, help the turnaround manager assess how the
company got into the mess in the first place, and develop
strategies for getting out of it.

The critical subject of cash continues to resonate throughout Part
II, "Profit and Growth," although here the turnaround leader
consolidates his gains and looks ahead as the turnaround matures.
New financial, new organizational, and new marketing arrangements
are laid out in detail. Whitney also provides a checklist for the
leader to use in brainstorming strategic options for the future.

Whitney's underlying theme -- that a successful business requires
personal leadership as well as bricks and mortar, money and
machinery -- is summed up in a concluding chapter that analyzes the
qualities that make a leader. His advice is as relevant in this
1999 reprint edition as it was in 1987 when first published.

John O. Whitney had a long and distinguished career in academia and
industry. He served as the Lead Director of Church and Dwight Co.,
Inc. and on the Advisory Board of Newsbank Corp. He was Professor
of Management and Executive Director of the Deming Center for
Quality Management at Columbia Business School, which he joined in
1986.  He died in 2013.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2024.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                * * * End of Transmission * * *