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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Friday, August 18, 2023, Vol. 24, No. 166

                           Headlines



I R E L A N D

DILOSK 7: DBRS Finalizes CCC Rating on Class X1 Notes
DRYDEN 32 2014: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR12.5MM F-R Notes to Caa1


I T A L Y

ARAGORN NPL 2018: DBRS Confirms CC Rating on Class B Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALLMA CONSTRUCTION: Enters Administration, Ceases Trading
BUCKINGHAM GROUP: Files Notice to Appoint Administrators
FISHERPRINT: Goes Into Liquidation, Ceases Operations
INEOS QUATTRO: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' CFR, Alters Outlook to Neg.
NEW CINEWORLD: Moody's Assigns 'B3' CFR on Bankruptcy Emergence

RIPPING IMAGE: Enters Liquidation, Halts Operations
SIG PLC: S&P Affirms 'B+' Long-Term ICR, Alters Outlook to Stable
TARGET TRAVEL: Enters Liquidations, Owes Nearly GBP500,000
TIME GB: RoyaleLife Seeks to Appoint Administrators to Unit


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Bailout: An Insider's Account of Bank Failures

                           - - - - -


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DILOSK 7: DBRS Finalizes CCC Rating on Class X1 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH finalized its provisional credit ratings on the
residential mortgage-backed notes issued by Dilosk RMBS No. 7 DAC
(the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C notes at A (sf)
-- Class D notes at BBB (sf)
-- Class E notes at BB (sf)
-- Class F notes at B (low) (sf)
-- Class X1 notes at CCC (sf)

The credit rating on the Class A notes addresses the timely payment
of interest and the ultimate repayment of principal. The credit
rating on the Class B notes addresses the timely payment of
interest once they are the most senior class of notes outstanding
and the ultimate repayment of principal on or before the final
maturity date. The credit ratings on the Class C, Class D, Class E,
Class F, and Class X1 notes address the ultimate payment of
interest and principal.

DBRS Morningstar does not rate the Class X2 and Class Z notes also
issued in this transaction.

CREDIT RATING RATIONALE

The Issuer is a bankruptcy-remote special-purpose vehicle
incorporated in the Republic of Ireland. The Issuer will use the
proceeds of the notes to fund the purchase of prime and performing
Irish buy-to-let (BTL) mortgage loans secured over properties
located in Ireland. The majority of the mortgage loans included in
the portfolio were originated by Dilosk DAC (Dilosk; the
originator, seller, and servicer) in the past six years; however, a
small subset corresponds with more seasoned loans from a portfolio
that Dilosk acquired from the Governor and Company of the Bank of
Ireland in 2014.

This is the seventh securitization from Dilosk, following Dilosk
RMBS No. 6 (STS) DAC, which closed in April 2023. The initial
mortgage portfolio consists of EUR 202 million of first-lien
mortgage loans collateralized by BTL residential properties in
Ireland. The mortgages were mostly granted between 2017 and 2022,
except for the portion corresponding with the previously acquired
portfolio.

The mortgage loans will be serviced by BCMGlobal ASI Limited
(BCMGlobal), trading as BCMGlobal, in its role as delegated
servicer. DBRS Morningstar reviewed both the originator and
servicer via an email update in February 2023. Underwriting
guidelines are in accordance with market practices observed in
Ireland and are subject to the Central Bank of Ireland's
macroprudential mortgage regulations, which specify restrictions on
certain lending criteria. CSC Capital Markets (Ireland) Limited
will act as the backup servicer facilitator.

As of 30 June 2023, a large proportion of the loans in the
portfolio (55.6% in terms of outstanding balance) repays on an
interest-only basis. Only 0.6% of the loans in the mortgage
portfolio were in arrears at cut-off with a portion of 0.1% being
more than one month in arrears.

Liquidity in the transaction is provided by the non-amortizing
general reserve fund, which the Issuer can use to pay senior costs
and interest on the rated notes but also to clear principal
deficiency ledger balances. Liquidity for the Class A notes will be
further supported by a liquidity reserve fund, fully funded at
closing and then amortizing in line with the referred class of
notes, which shall also feature a floor of 75% of its initial
balance at closing. The notes' terms and conditions allow interest
payments, other than on the Class A notes and on the Class B notes
when they are the most senior class of notes outstanding, to be
deferred if the available funds are insufficient.

Credit enhancement for the Class A notes is calculated at 10.86%
and is provided by the subordination of the Class B to Class F
notes and the general reserve fund. Credit enhancement for the
Class B notes is calculated at 7.86% and is provided by the
subordination of the Class C to Class F notes and the general
reserve fund. Credit enhancement for the Class C notes is
calculated at 4.36% and is provided by the subordination of the
Class D to Class F notes and the general reserve fund. Credit
enhancement for the Class D notes is calculated at 2.36% and is
provided by the subordination of the Class E to Class F notes and
the general reserve fund. Credit enhancement for the Class E notes
is calculated at 1.11% and is provided by the subordination of the
Class F notes and the general reserve fund. Credit enhancement for
the Class F notes is calculated at 0.36% and is provided by the
general reserve fund.

A key structural feature is the provisioning mechanism in the
transaction that is linked to the arrears status of a loan besides
the usual provisioning based on losses. The degree of provisioning
increases with the increase in number-of-months-in-arrears status
of a loan. This is positive for the transaction, as provisioning
based on the arrears status traps any excess spread much earlier
for a loan that may ultimately end up in foreclosure.

Payments are made directly by the borrowers via direct debit,
standing order, or cheque, unless otherwise agreed, into a
collection account held at the BNP Paribas, Dublin Branch. The
amounts in the collections account will be transferred to the
Issuer account at least twice every week. DBRS Morningstar's
private rating on BNP Paribas, Dublin Branch in its role as Account
Bank is consistent with the threshold for the account bank as
outlined in DBRS Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European
Structured Finance Transactions" methodology, given the credit
ratings assigned to the notes.

DBRS Morningstar based its credit ratings on a review of the
following analytical considerations:

-- The transaction capital structure and form and sufficiency of
available credit enhancement.

-- The credit quality of the mortgage portfolio and the ability of
the servicer to perform collection and resolution activities. DBRS
Morningstar calculated probability of default (PD), loss given
default (LGD), and expected loss (EL) outputs on the mortgage
portfolio. DBRS Morningstar uses the PD, LGD, and ELs as inputs
into the cash flow tool. DBRS Morningstar analyzed the mortgage
portfolio in accordance with DBRS Morningstar's "European RMBS
Insight: Irish Addendum".

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class
E, Class F, and Class X1 notes according to the terms of the
transaction documents. DBRS Morningstar analyzed the transaction
structure using Intex DealMaker.

-- The sovereign rating of AA (low) with a Stable trend (as of the
date of this press release) on the Republic of Ireland.

-- The consistency of the legal structure with DBRS Morningstar's
"Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
methodology and the presence of legal opinions addressing the
assignment of the assets to the Issuer.

DBRS Morningstar's credit rating on the Class A, Class B, Class C,
Class D, Class E, Class F, and Class X1 notes addresses the credit
risk associated with the identified financial obligations in
accordance with the relevant transaction documents. The associated
financial obligations for each of the rated notes are the related
Interest Payment Amounts and the related Class Balances.

DBRS Morningstar's credit rating does not address non-payment risk
associated with contractual payment obligations contemplated in the
applicable transaction document(s) that are not financial
obligations.

DBRS Morningstar's long-term credit ratings provide opinions on
risk of default. DBRS Morningstar considers risk of default to be
the risk that an issuer will fail to satisfy the financial
obligations in accordance with the terms under which a long-term
obligation has been issued.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.



DRYDEN 32 2014: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR12.5MM F-R Notes to Caa1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on the
following notes issued by Dryden 32 Euro CLO 2014 Designated
Activity Company:

EUR12,500,000 Class F-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2022
Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

EUR230,945,000 (Current outstanding amount EUR214,534,000) Class
A-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031, Affirmed Aaa
(sf); previously on Nov 1, 2022 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR12,155,000 (Current outstanding amount EUR11,291,300) Class
A-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2031, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on Nov 1, 2022 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR16,950,000 Class B-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2022 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf)

EUR24,050,000 Class B-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2031, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2022 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf)

EUR12,275,000 Class C-1-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes due 2031, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2022
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR12,225,000 Class C-2-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes due 2031, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2022
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR17,500,000 Class D-1-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes due 2031, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2022
Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

EUR5,000,000 Class D-2-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes due 2031, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2022
Affirmed Baa2 (sf)

EUR30,500,000 Class E-R Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 1, 2022
Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Dryden 32 Euro CLO 2014 Designated Activity Company, issued in July
2014, refinanced in February 2017 and reset in August 2018 is a
collateralised loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is
managed by PGIM Limited. The transaction's reinvestment period
ended in November 2022.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrade on the Class F notes is primarily a result of
the deterioration in over-collateralisation ratios since the last
rating action in November 2022.

The affirmations on the ratings on the Class A-1-R, Class A-2-R,
Class B-1-R, Class B-2-R, Class C-1-R, Class C-2-R, Class D-1-R,
Class D-2-R and Class E-R Notes are primarily a result of the
expected losses on the notes remaining consistent with their
current ratings after taking into account the CLO's latest
portfolio, its relevant structural features and its actual
over-collateralization (OC) levels.

The over-collateralisation ratios of the rated notes have
deteriorated since the rating action in November 2022. According to
the trustee report dated September 2022 [1] the Class A/B, Class C,
Class D, Class E and Class F OC ratios are reported at 140.86%, %,
129.68%, 120.87%, 110.67% and 106.97% compared to June 2023 [2]
levels of 140.71%, 128.88%, 119.64%, 109.04% and 105.22%,
respectively.

In light of reinvestment restrictions during the amortisation
period, and therefore the limited ability to effect significant
changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's analysed the deal
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics would maintain an adequate buffer relative to
certain covenant requirements. In particular, Moody's assumed that
the deal will benefit from a shorter amortisation profile than it
had assumed at the last rating action in November 2022.

Key model inputs:

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.

In its base case, Moody's used the following assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: EUR372.9m

Defaulted Securities: EUR10.7m

Diversity Score: 56

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2948

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 4.05 years

Weighted Average Spread (WAS) (before accounting for Euribor
floors): 4.06%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.67%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 41.04%

Par haircut in OC tests and interest diversion test:  none

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future
defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the
collateral pool. In each case, historical and market performance
and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analysing.

Moody's notes that the July 2023 [3] trustee report was published
at the time it was completing its analysis of the June 2023 data.
Key portfolio metrics such as WARF, diversity score, weighted
average spread and life, and OC ratios exhibit little or no change
between these dates.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Counterparty Exposure:

The rating action took into consideration the notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as account bank and swap provider,
using the methodology "Moody's Approach to Assessing Counterparty
Risks in Structured Finance" published in June 2022. Moody's
concluded the ratings of the notes are not constrained by these
risks.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

-- Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.
Fast amortisation would usually benefit the ratings of the notes
beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

-- Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's
over-collateralisation levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty.  Recoveries
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



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ARAGORN NPL 2018: DBRS Confirms CC Rating on Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH confirmed its credit ratings on the notes issued
by Aragorn NPL 2018 S.r.l. (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A notes at CCC (sf)
-- Class B notes at CC (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also kept the Negative trend unchanged on the
Class A notes and the Class B notes no longer carries a trend.

The transaction represents the issuance of Class A, Class B, and
Class J notes (collectively, the Notes) backed by a mixed pool of
Italian nonperforming secured and unsecured loans originated by
Credito Valtellinese S.p.A. and Credito Siciliano S.p.A.
(collectively, the originators). The credit rating assigned to the
Class A notes addresses the timely payment of interest and the
ultimate repayment of principal while the credit rating assigned to
the Class B notes addresses the ultimate payment of both interest
and principal. DBRS Morningstar does not rate the Class J notes.

The gross book value (GBV) of the loan pool was approximately EUR
1.671 billion as of the 31 December 2017 cut-off date. The
nonperforming loan portfolio consists of secured commercial and
residential borrowers (82.0% of total GBV) and unsecured borrowers
(18.0% of total GBV), mostly Italian small and medium-size
enterprises (90.2% of the total GBV). Of the GBV, 68% comprised 364
borrowers (of the 4,161 total), each with a GBV of more than EUR 1
million. The top 50 borrowers made up 26.8% of the pool GBV at the
cut-off date.

The receivables are serviced by Special Gardant S.p.A. and Cerved
Credit Management S.p.A. (Cerved) (together, the Special
Servicers). Master Gardant S.p.A. acts as the master servicer while
Cerved operates as the backup servicer.

CREDIT RATING RATIONALE

The credit rating actions follow a review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Transaction performance: An assessment of portfolio recoveries
as of December 31, 2022, focusing on: (1) a comparison between
actual collections and the Special Servicers' initial business plan
forecast; (2) the collection performance observed over recent
months; and (3) a comparison between the current performance and
DBRS Morningstar's expectations.

-- Updated business plans: The Special Servicers' updated business
plan as of December 2022, and the comparison with the initial
collection expectations.

-- Portfolio characteristics: Loan pool composition as of June
2023 and the evolution of its core features since issuance.

-- Transaction liquidating structure: The order of priority
entails a fully sequential amortization of the Notes (i.e., the
Class B notes will begin to amortize following the full repayment
of the Class A notes and the Class J notes will amortize following
the repayment of the Class B notes). Additionally, interest
payments on the Class B notes become subordinated to principal
payments on the Class A notes if the cumulative collection ratio
(CCR) or the present value cumulative profitability ratio (NPV CPR)
is lower than 90%. The reported CCR of 66.5% as at December 31,
2022 is below the trigger while the reported NPV CPR is 103.6%. The
updated collections as per the Special Servicers' updated business
plan are not sufficient to pay down the outstanding balance of the
Class A notes alone or the aggregate outstanding balance of the
Class A and Class B notes.

-- Liquidity support: The transaction benefits from an amortizing
cash reserve providing liquidity to the structure, covering
potential interest shortfall on the Class A notes and senior fees.
The cash reserve target amount is equal to 5% of the Class A notes'
principal outstanding balance and is currently fully funded.

TRANSACTION AND PERFORMANCE

According to the latest investor report from January 2023, the
outstanding principal amounts of the Class A, Class B, and Class J
notes were EUR 328.1 million, EUR 66.8 million, and EUR 10.0
million, respectively. As of the January 2023 interest payment
date, the balance of the Class A notes had amortized by
approximately 35.6% since issuance and the current aggregated
transaction balance was EUR 405.0 million.

As of June 2023, the transaction was underperforming the special
servicers' initial business plan expectations. The actual
cumulative gross collections equaled EUR 291.8 million whereas the
special servicers' initial business plan estimated cumulative gross
collections of EUR 504.2 million for the same period. Therefore, as
of June 2023, the transaction was underperforming by EUR 212.4
million (-42.1%) compared with the initial business plan
expectations.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar estimated cumulative gross
collections for the same period of EUR 334.0 million at the BBB
(sf) stressed scenario and EUR 430.6 million at the CCC (sf)
stressed scenario. Therefore, as of June 2023, the transaction was
performing below DBRS Morningstar's initial BBB (sf) stressed
expectations.

Pursuant to the requirements set out in the receivable servicing
agreement, the special servicers provided DBRS Morningstar with a
revised portfolio business plan combined with the actual cumulative
collections as of December 2022. The updated portfolio business
plan, combined with the actual cumulative gross collections of EUR
261.5 million as of December 2022, resulted in a total of EUR 567.4
million, which is 26.6% lower than the total gross disposition
proceeds of EUR 773.0 million estimated in the initial business
plan. Excluding actual collections, the special servicers' expected
future collections from January 2023 account for EUR 306.0 million.
The updated DBRS Morningstar BBB (sf) rating stress assumes a
haircut of 14.3% to the special servicers' updated business plan,
considering future expected collections from January 2023. In DBRS
Morningstar's CCC (sf) scenario, the special servicers' updated
forecast was only adjusted in terms of the actual collections to
date and the timing of future expected collections.

The updated collections as per the special servicers' updated
business plan are not sufficient to pay down the outstanding
balance of the Class A notes alone or the total of the Class A and
Class B notes, but considering the transaction structure, a payment
default on the bond would likely only occur in a few years from
now.

The final maturity date of the transaction is in July 2038.

DBRS Morningstar's credit ratings on the Class A and Class B notes
address the credit risk associated with the identified financial
obligations in accordance with the relevant transaction documents.

DBRS Morningstar's credit rating does not address non-payment risk
associated with contractual payment obligations contemplated in the
applicable transaction document(s) that are not financial
obligations.

DBRS Morningstar's long-term credit ratings provide opinions on
risk of default. DBRS Morningstar considers risk of default to be
the risk that an issuer will fail to satisfy the financial
obligations in accordance with the terms under which a long-term
obligation has been issued.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.





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ALLMA CONSTRUCTION: Enters Administration, Ceases Trading
---------------------------------------------------------
Ben Waddell at Barrhead News reports that a Barrhead-based
construction company has "gone into administration", it is
believed.

According to Barrhead News, it is understood that Allma
Construction, which is based on Muriel Street in the town, has
closed its doors.

The civil engineering company has been a part of the town's
business sector since 1991, The National notes.



BUCKINGHAM GROUP: Files Notice to Appoint Administrators
--------------------------------------------------------
Business Sale reports that construction giant Buckingham Group
Contracting has filed a notice of intention to appoint
administrators.

The group, which is known for its work on football stadia, reported
turnover of GBP665.3 million in 2021, but fell to a pre-tax loss of
GBP10.7 million.

According to Business Sale, this loss was attributed to the group
taking a financial hit on a major stadium contract -- reported to
be work on the Riverside stand of Fulham FC's Craven Cottage
stadium.  The company became the largest employee-owned contractor
in the UK when it transferred to an Employee Ownership Trust in
2021.

The company had also been employed on the GBP80 million addition of
a new tier to a stand at Liverpool FC's Anfield stadium, Business
Sale notes.  This project, initially due to complete in time for
the start of the new Premier League season this month, has been
delayed, with only the existing upper tier set to be open.

Buckingham Group was founded in 1987 and primarily works in stadium
and rail work, more recently expanding into work on warehouse and
logistics building.  The company's administration notice follows a
shake-up of its board, with Group Managing Director Ian McSeveney
resigning due to health issues two weeks ago and being replaced by
deputy Group MD Simon Walkley, Business Sale states.

In the company's 2021 accounts, its fixed assets were valued at
GBP2 million and current assets at GBP215.5 million, Business Sale
discloses.  At the time, the firm owed creditors over GBP190
million, leaving it with net current assets of GBP24.6 million,
Business Sale relates.


FISHERPRINT: Goes Into Liquidation, Ceases Operations
-----------------------------------------------------
Richard Stuart-Turner at Printweek reports that a public notice on
The Gazette has confirmed that Fisherprint is in liquidation, weeks
after local news reports said the business had ceased trading.

According to Printweek, Peterborough Telegraph quoted Fisherprint
chief executive Miles Fisher last month as saying that the business
-- based in the city -- had been put into a "company voluntary
administration".

At the time, the printer's website was still live but stated that
orders were no longer being taken by the business but that TLC
Signs and Banners was "business as usual", Printweek relates.

Signage specialist TLC, based on the same site, was acquired in
late 2016 by the group, the same year Fisherprint invested in a
five-colour Heidelberg Speedmaster CX 102 press, Printweek
recounts.

It has subsequently been confirmed on The Gazette that Fisherprint
Ltd is now in liquidation, with Kirren Keegan and Tommaso Waqar
Ahmadof Bailey Ahmad Business Recovery appointed on Aug. 2,
Printweek discloses.

The Peterborough Telegraph article last month had reported that 31
staff were made redundant after Fisherprint ceased trading,
Printweek notes.

According to Printweek, it quoted chief executive Miles Fisher as
having said that the factors resulting in the closure of the
business were "many and varied", with Covid initially responsible
for "a serious reduction in turnover that has never really fully
recovered" alongside increasing materials and consumables costs
over the last 12 months "that has kept the market depressed".

Further business rates rises of 30% and soaring energy costs
further contributed, with Fisher reporting a "massive spike in
electricity charges" when the company's fixed rate utilities charge
ended last November, taking its monthly bill from around GBP6,500 a
month to GBP40,000 in December alone, Printweek relays.

During this time, Mr. Fisher, as cited by Printweek, said the
directors took out personal loans of "hundreds of thousands of
pounds, believing the business could trade through the turmoil".

But he said it "became obvious" the business was unsustainable, due
to the spiralling costs, and a decision was made to sell its
freehold property and relocate to "smaller but adequate premises".

However, while an exchange of contracts was arranged, multiple
deadlines for the exchange passed and "we have had to make the
desperately difficult decision to cease trading as of July 14,
2023", according to Printweek.


INEOS QUATTRO: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' CFR, Alters Outlook to Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed INEOS Quattro Holdings Ltd's
(INEOS Quattro) Ba3 corporate family rating, its Ba3-PD probability
of default rating, along with Ba3 ratings of its backed senior
secured bank credit facilities issued by INEOS Quattro Holdings UK
Ltd and INEOS US Petrochem LLC, backed Ba3 senior secured notes
issued by INEOS Quattro Finance 2 Plc, Ba3 senior secured notes and
the Ba3 senior secured bank credit facility issued by INEOS
Styrolution Group GmbH, and the Ba3 senior secured bank credit
facility issued by Ineos Styrolution US Holding LLC. The B2 rating
of the backed senior unsecured notes issued by INEOS Quattro
Finance 1 Plc is also affirmed. The rating outlook has been revised
to negative from stable for all entities.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects INEOS Quattro's weak performance in the
first half of 2023 as well as the expectation of delayed recovery.
Previously, Moody's expected INEOS Quattro's revenues and EBITDA to
return to mid-cycle levels in the second half of 2023; however,
this is now not anticipated until 2024.  As a result, INEOS
Quattro's credit profile will be pressured for a longer period of
time than previously anticipated.  INEOS Quattro's leverage rose
sharply to 5.3x for the twelve months ending June 2023 from 2.6x in
2022 as the chemical industry shifted from the cyclical peak in the
second quarter of 2022 closer to the cyclical trough a year later.
Moody's now expects INEOS Quattro's leverage to be at approximately
at 6.3x for 2023 before reducing in 2024 to below 4.5x in line with
the rating guidance.

The weakness in INEOS Quattro's performance is driven by reduced
demand for durables down from above-peak levels during the
pandemic, although somewhat offset by stronger demand from the
automotive sector which is benefitting from improvements in access
to semiconductors and filling the backlog of orders.  This backlog
is expected to support demand at least through the end of 2023.  In
addition, broad inflationary pressures are crimping demand across
INEOS Quattro's end markets and Chinese economy is recovering
slower than forecast earlier in the year.  Also, as expected, new
styrene capacity was added in China pressuring the styrene
margins.

Counterbalancing these challenges, INEOS continues to benefit from
good liquidity including no maturities ahead of January 2026 and
over EUR2 billion of cash at June 2023, along with two undrawn
securitisation facilities totaling EUR840 million and maturing in
June 2024.

The Ba3 corporate family rating of INEOS Quattro Holdings Ltd
(formerly INEOS Styrolution) reflects the company's large size and
scope, with leading market positions globally in a variety of
chemical products; its diverse product lines and end-markets; as
well as successful integration following the merger with INOVYN and
acquisition of BP aromatics and acetyls assets exceeding initial
synergy expectations.

These positives are counterbalanced by the cyclical nature of the
commodity chemical industry which is currently experiencing a
period of material market weakness owing to reducing demand across
many end markets; a history of significant risk appetite across the
broader INEOS Group; and the limited available disclosure regarding
the larger INEOS Group outside of the rated entities.

LIQUIDITY

INEOS' liquidity is good with over EUR2 billion of cash at June 30,
2023 and undrawn working capital facilities of EUR840 million. The
company's nearest debt maturity is in January 2026. INEOS has
recently been successful in refinancing its upcoming maturities in
the capital markets.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The senior secured debt of INEOS Quattro (issued through
subsidiaries) is rated Ba3, at the same level as its CFR of Ba3,
and the senior unsecured debt (also issued through subsidiaries) is
rated B2. Given the relative size of the two classes of debt, the
support provided by the unsecured debt is not sufficient to justify
any notching between the secured debt and the CFR.

The senior secured instruments rank pari passu and benefit from
guarantees from subsidiaries that constitute at least 85% of group
EBITDA. The collateral includes substantially all assets of the
company, including cash, bank accounts, inventories and property,
plant & equipment (PP&E), but excludes receivables that are pledged
to asset securitisation programmes.

RATING OUTLOOK

Negative rating outlook reflects Moody's expectation that INEOS
Quattro's earnings will continue to be pressured by reduced demand
globally through the second half of 2023 and into 2024, thereby
delaying the company's return to a credit profile commensurate with
the current rating.  The agency also expects no additional dividend
payments in the near term; any further dividends paid before market
conditions have improved resulting in a recovery of the company's
EBITDA generation would further pressure the rating.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Although unlikely in the near term, positive rating pressure would
occur if Moody's-adjusted leverage measured as debt/EBITDA is
reduced to well below 4.0x on a sustained basis while generating
positive free cash flow (FCF) and maintaining good liquidity at all
times.

Conversely, negative rating pressure could occur if leverage is
sustained above 4.5x for over 12 months. Any significant
deterioration in liquidity or further dividend payments could also
cause negative rating pressure.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Chemicals
published in June 2022.

COMPANY PROFILE

INEOS Quattro Holdings Ltd is an indirect wholly owned subsidiary
of INEOS Limited and was renamed in December 2020. It was formerly
called INEOS Styrolution Holdings Limited and now combines the
businesses of INEOS Styrolution (36% of revenue and 16% of EBITDA
in the first half of 2023) and INOVYN (30% of revenue and 72% of
EBITDA), together with the Aromatics (27% of revenue and 3% of
EBITDA) and Acetyls petrochemical assets (7% of revenue and 8% of
EBITDA) acquired from BP p.l.c. (A2 positive). INEOS Quattro is a
globally diversified chemical company with leading market positions
in a wide range of chemicals with broad market applications such as
polystyrene, vinyls and caustic soda, paraxylene, purified
terephthalic acid (PTA), acetic acid and acetate derivatives. INEOS
Quattro generated revenue of EUR6.6 billion and EBITDA of EUR0.6
billion in the first half of 2023.

NEW CINEWORLD: Moody's Assigns 'B3' CFR on Bankruptcy Emergence
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B3 corporate family rating
and a B3-PD probability of default rating to NEW CINEWORLD MIDCO
LIMITED (Cineworld or the company) following its emergence from
Chapter 11. At the same time, Moody's assigned a Ba3 to the
super-priority $250 million backed senior secured first-lien
revolving credit facility (RCF) and a B3 rating to the $1.62
billion backed senior secured first lien term loan. Both facilities
have been issued by Crown Finance US, Inc. (the RCF is co-issued
with Crown UK Holdco Limited), a US corporation, wholly owned by
Crown UK Holdco Limited, which is in turn wholly owned by
Cineworld. The RCF is due 4 years and the term loan is due 5 years
from the date of emergence from Chapter 11. The outlook on all the
ratings is stable.

The rating action reflects:

-- The completion of the restructuring of the company's debt
obligations following the emergence from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings which resulted in a substantial reduction in financial
debt and an improvement in the company's liquidity position

-- The execution risk associated with the implementation of the
post-restructuring business plan which is predicated on a recovery
of the market

-- Still high leverage on a Moody's adjusted basis and an adequate
liquidity position

RATINGS RATIONALE

The B3 CFR assigned to Cineworld reflects the court-confirmed plan
of reorganisation which achieved a net reduction of $4.53 billion
in financial debt, an $800 million rights issue, the elimination of
certain contingent liabilities, including pending litigation and an
extension to the debt maturity profile.

The rating action also reflects the risks around the recovery
trajectory of the company's operating and financial performance
with attendance levels still to recover to pre-pandemic levels. The
business is currently experiencing a gradual ramp-up in release
schedules but Moody's does not expect the box office to fully
return to pre-pandemic levels until 2025. Cineworld, like many
cinema operators, is a distributor with high fixed costs associated
with long-tenured leases. Energy and staff costs have been
exacerbated by inflation. Capital spending is needed to install and
maintain the technology associated with providing an immersive
cinematic experience. The company is crucially dependent on the
uninterrupted ramp-up in the number of blockbusters provided by the
film studios for cinematic release to support projected attendance
levels across 2023 and 2024. The screen actors guild announced in
mid-July its member will strike. The strike has the potential to
disrupt release schedules and production of new films across 2023
and 2024, however, the extent of the disruption at this stage,
remains unclear.  

Positively, Moody's acknowledges the successful releases across
2023 thus far, including Super Mario, Barbie, and Oppenheimer which
have outperformed expectations. These are examples of film releases
that have attracted attendance levels equal to and in some cases
better than pre-pandemic levels. Momentum has continued to build
and provides a strong sentiment around consumer demand for the
cinematic experience.

However, whilst Moody's anticipates cinematic release will continue
to remain a commercially attractive component of film distribution
for big-budget productions, the rapid pace of digitalisation and
structural changes in the film industry accelerated during the
pandemic. The demand for streaming services provides an additional
revenue source for production studios and Moody's expects at-home
film viewing across streaming services will continue to compete
with the demand for a cinematic experience.

Moody's adjusted leverage of 5.1x for 2023 remains high and the
risks of a stretched capital structure increase the probability of
default. The absolute cost of financial debt, material lease
rentals, deferred rental expenses, and the carry-over of a
non-recurring payment relating to rental agreement cure costs
inhibits the generation of free cash flow for 2023 requiring
Cineworld to rely on sources of liquidity.

LIQUIDITY

The company's liquidity position remains adequate and comprises a
company-reported cash position of $223 million upon emergence from
Chapter 11 and a $250 million RCF with no financial covenants and a
maturity date of four years to July 2027. Moody's expects the cash
balance will be reduced to around $105 million by year-end 2023 and
a drawdown under the RCF of £150 million by year-end 2023 in
Moody's base case to meet non-recurring restructuring expenses and
lease rental deferral. Moody's acknowledges the company's ability
to repay the drawings under the RCF will be dependent on attendance
levels continuing to improve over 2024 to maintain an adequate
liquidity position.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Ba3 rating on the $250 million super priority RCF reflects its
seniority in the capital structure. The B3 rating on the first lien
exit term loan facility is at the same level as the corporate
family rating (CFR) reflecting that, following the restructuring,
the first lien exit facility is the majority of Cineworld's
corporate family's total financial debt. The company's total
financial debt at emergence from Chapter 11 will comprise the $1.62
million first-lien exit term loan facility, drawings under the RCF
and minor unsecured facilities provided to the operating
companies.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation of a continued
gradual recovery in cinema attendance levels leading to substantial
growth in earnings and free cash flow over 2023 and 2024, leading
to an improvement in credit metrics.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Upward pressure on the rating may arise if (1) there is a continued
recovery in revenues and profitability to at least pre-pandemic
levels, with Moody's-adjusted leverage below 4.5x, (2)
Moody's-adjusted FCF to debt increases to positive low to
mid-single digit percentages and (3) management adheres to
conservative financial policies which include the absence of
debt-funded acquisitions.

Downward pressure on the rating could occur if (1) cinema
attendance levels do not return to pre-pandemic levels (2) there is
a deterioration in liquidity, or (3) an inability to strengthen the
financial metrics in 2024 which negatively impacts the company's
ability to sustain the new capital structure.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS

Social and Governance factors were taken into consideration within
the rating assessment outcome. Social risk reflects the structural
changes in societal and demographic trends. The rapid pace of
change toward digitalization and structural changes experienced by
the cinema industry in the wake of the pandemic poses risks to the
execution of the company's business plan. The pandemic-related
cinema closures accelerated a shift in demand towards watching more
films at home. The cinema operators will need to maintain ticket
prices at levels that make the cinema an attractive form of
out-of-home entertainment whilst maintaining strict cost control
and disciplined capital allocation policies.

Governance risk reflects management's financial strategy and risk
management which incorporates a tolerance for high leverage.
Management did not materially rationalise the number of cinema
sites subject to long-tenured leases, some of which Moody's expects
are currently underperforming. Whilst this more aggressive strategy
will enable the company to defend its market share and capture the
ramp-up in cinematic releases, it does expose the company to high
operating and financial risk.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Assignments:

Issuer: NEW CINEWORLD MIDCO LIMITED

Probability of Default Rating, Assigned B3-PD

LT Corporate Family Rating, Assigned B3

Issuer: Crown Finance US, Inc.

BACKED Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned B3

BACKED Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned Ba3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: NEW CINEWORLD MIDCO LIMITED

Outlook, Assigned Stable

Issuer: Crown Finance US, Inc.

Outlook, Assigned Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Services published in November 2021.

COMPANY PROFILE

Cineworld plc was listed on the London Stock Exchange between May
2007 and July 2023. The company grew through expansion and
acquisition to become the second-largest cinema group in the world.
Cineworld operates around 8,600 screens across 700 theatres in 10
countries including the US, the UK, Ireland, Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Israel.

The company was delisted on July 28, 2023, as part of the emergence
from bankruptcy and is now controlled by its lenders.

RIPPING IMAGE: Enters Liquidation, Halts Operations
---------------------------------------------------
Richard Stuart-Turner at Printweek reports that a Middlesex-based
printer whose business was severely hit by the pandemic has ceased
trading.

Ripping Image, based in Feltham, closed its doors on June 2, with
Julie Anne Palmer and Andrew Hook of Begbies Traynor (Central)
subsequently appointed as liquidators on July 19, Printweek
relates.  Six jobs were lost as a result of the closure, Printweek
discloses.

The business specialised in short to medium-run event marketing
material.

It was formed in 1993 and subsequently moved to larger premises,
where it invested in upgraded printing machinery, improving its
capacity for larger runs.  It continued to trade successfully until
lockdown restrictions were imposed in March 2020, Printweek notes.

Prior to the pandemic, the company's monthly turnover stood at
around GBP90,000, but this fell to less than GBP25,000 in the early
stages of lockdown, Printweek relays.

Despite help from the furlough scheme, a government-backed Bounce
Back Loan, and a customer base which liquidators said had remained
loyal, Ripping Image emerged from the pandemic in reduced form, and
work then continued to fall due to the slowdown in the economy,
Printweek relates.

Liquidators, as cited by Printweek, said a determined effort was
made to return to profitability following the pandemic, but a
combination of Brexit and the Ukraine war that saw the cost of raw
materials, energy, and transport rise dramatically hit the
company's profit margins and orders continued to decline in the
final quarter of 2022.

Its statement of affairs, filed on Companies House earlier this
month, revealed that its estimated total deficiency was GBP441,468,
according to Printweek.


SIG PLC: S&P Affirms 'B+' Long-Term ICR, Alters Outlook to Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on specialist building
materials distributor SIG PLC to stable from positive and affirmed
its 'B+' long-term issuer credit rating on the company.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that SIG will sustain
adjusted debt to EBITDA of 4x-5x in the next two years, supported
by broadly resilient revenue and EBITDA generation.

S&P said, "The rating action reflects our revised forecast of SIG's
adjusted leverage. We now expect adjusted debt to EBITDA will
increase to about 4.4x-4.6x in 2023 from 4.1x in 2022, before
moderating to 4.1x-4.2x in 2024. We base these ratios on our
adjusted EBITDA forecast of GBP141 million-GBP145 million in 2023
and GBP152 million-GBP155 million in 2024, versus GBP157 million
attained in 2022. Our lower EBITDA estimate for 2023 reflects
ongoing soft demand in SIG's key end markets of repair,
maintenance, and improvement (RMI; about 50% of sales) and the
new-build industry (also about 50%) amid a challenging
macroeconomic environment, as well as inflationary pressure on
operating costs. We note a range of self-help measures initiated by
management to alleviate market headwinds and margin compression,
notably a focus on higher-margin and private label products, price
over volume strategy, operating agility, and cost savings--while
ensuring that the business is well positioned to respond to market
recovery." Supporting the credit profile is SIG's limited capital
expenditure (capex) intensity due to the asset-light nature of the
business and typically countercyclical working capital movements,
typically with a release in a downturn.

SIG delivered broadly resilient results in the first half of 2023,
but the outlook remains challenging. Revenue growth was broadly
flat, supported by higher prices, contribution from acquisitions,
and favorable foreign exchange rates, which helped offset
like-for-like volume loss. That said, operating cost inflation led
to weaker like-for-like profit margins in all businesses except
U.K. interiors, notwithstanding further cost discipline and focus
on operational agility. S&P anticipates that benefits from these
measures will support margins in the second half of 2023 and into
2024 as inflationary pressures recede and position SIG well to
attain its medium-term target of 5% operating margins, thereby
narrowing the profitability gap with peers over time.

S&P said, "We believe that SIG will want to pursue bolt-on
acquisitions over time. Bolt-on acquisitions are the primary method
for distributors to deliver above-market revenue growth, and
consolidation opportunities are plentiful given the fragmented
nature of the industry. As such, we believe the company may want to
play a consolidating role in the future, although we note a high
bar set by SIG for the potential targets from the business
complementarity standpoint. In addition, SIG's clear capital
allocation priorities are set clearly and stipulate deleveraging as
a priority. We understand that this will be achieved through a
focus primarily on organic growth, and that acquisitions will be
financed prudently. SIG's financial policy is conservative, with
targeted leverage as defined by management of 2.5x on post
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS)-16 basis.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that SIG will sustain
adjusted debt to EBITDA of 4x-5x in the next two years, supported
by broadly resilient revenue and EBITDA generation. We also
anticipate that the company will generate positive free operating
cash flow (FOCF) in the coming years and maintain adequate
liquidity and headroom under its financial covenants."

Upside scenario

Upside to the rating could develop over time, notably if SIG
established a track record of profitable growth and positive FOCF
under normalized business conditions. A track record of
conservative financial policy, particularly balancing the growth
strategy with targeted leverage of 2.5x, as defined by management
and on a post IFRS-16 basis, would further support a higher rating.
S&P could raise the rating if:

-- SIG sustains adjusted EBITDA margins of 5%-6%;

-- Adjusted debt to EBITDA reduces consistently to below 4x; and

-- The company posts positive FOCF of at least GBP50 million per
year.

Downside scenario

S&P could lower the rating if:

-- S&P sees adjusted debt to EBITDA deteriorate above 5x without
swift recovery prospects. This could be a result of headwinds to
SIG's profitability, for example due to higher-than-anticipated
cost inflation and a delay in the pass-through to customers,
leading to negative FOCF;

-- The company departs from its currently prudent financial
policy. This could be illustrated by SIG resuming dividends at a
higher level than S&P currently anticipates, or pursuing sizable
debt-financed acquisitions; or

-- Liquidity or covenant pressure arise.

S&P said, "ESG factors have an overall neutral influence on our
credit rating analysis for SIG. SIG is a specialist building
products and solutions distributor, so we view its business as
significantly less affected by greenhouse gas emissions risks
because it is not as energy intensive as that of cement companies
or other building materials producers. We anticipate that SIG's
growth prospects will benefit from the increasing drive for
sustainability in the building materials industry, which, among
others, calls for better insulation, solar panels, and roofing
systems to preserve and generate green energy." The company states
that its products meet about 85% of insulation end-use demand in
the markets where it operates. SIG seeks to minimize the
environmental impact of its own operations by reducing energy,
fuel, and water consumption and minimizing waste.


TARGET TRAVEL: Enters Liquidations, Owes Nearly GBP500,000
----------------------------------------------------------
Paul Halford at Route One reports that the company behind Target
Travel, which had its O-Licence revoked three years ago, has gone
into liquidation with debts of nearly GBP500,000.

Dealtop (Plymouth) Ltd, which traded under the name Target Travel,
was penalised by the Traffic Commissioner (TC) in February 2020,
along with its Managing Director, Robert Risk, Route One relates.
Following the revocation of the O-Licence, both the company and MD
were banned from holding or obtaining an O-Licence for two years,
Route One notes.

According to Route One, documents filed at Companies House on Aug.
9 show Mr. Risk had a GBP250,000 stake in the company, which had
assets of only GBP29,300.  Among the other biggest creditors was
HMRC, which was owed more than GBP120,000, while NatWest Bank was
due more than GBP31,000 and Miller Commercial was owed more than
GBP25,000, Route One states.

In 2018, the firm lost its 40-vehicle O-Licence due to untaxed
vehicles, Route One recounts.

After it regained a 23-vehicle licence, a series of issues led to a
further penalty in January 2020, Route One relays.  Problems
included that vehicles used on local bus services were found not to
comply with PSVAR, Route One notes.

Money which had been used to show financial standing to support a
successful application to increase the O-Licence from 17 to 23 had
been used to buy eight vehicles including putting a large deposit
on a football team coach, according to Route One.  This behaviour
led TC Kevin Rooney to conclude that he could not trust the company
to be compliant, Route One relates.


TIME GB: RoyaleLife Seeks to Appoint Administrators to Unit
-----------------------------------------------------------
Lucca de Paoli at Bloomberg News reports that RoyaleLife told a
judge on Aug. 16 that it is seeking to appoint administrators to
one of its key subsidiaries, as the UK bungalow owner grapples with
around GBP1.5 billion (US$1.9 billion) of debt.

According to Bloomberg News, a lawyer acting for Time GB Group
Limited told London's high court that it will apply for an
administration order and has approached insolvency practitioners
from FRP Advisory.

Time GB Group is facing a winding-up petition that was filed by a
company called Yarwell Mill Country Park Limited in May, Bloomberg
News relays, citing public filings.  

The debt Yarwell Mill is seeking to recover relates to transactions
between RoyaleLife's owner Robert Bull and a businessman that has
been linked by Irish law enforcement to a criminal organization,
Bloomberg News states.

The winding-up petition is just one of a host of sustained creditor
pressures the company is facing, Bloomberg News notes.  A number of
its creditors have already placed the units they hold security over
into administration.  The bungalow provider is made up of more than
200 legal entities, with many of them having charges registered
against them by lenders.

Time GB Group has outstanding charges from units of US real estate
investment trust Sun Communities Inc. and Intermediate Capital
Group Plc, while other lenders to RoyaleLife include Avenue
Capital, Roundshield Partners LLP and Octopus Investments Ltd.,
Bloomberg News states.

The winding-up petition by Yarwell Mill was subject to court action
by RoyaleLife earlier this year, with lawyers for the group asking
a judge to strike out the application, Bloomberg News says.
According to Bloomberg News, in a witness statement, Mr. Bull
argued that the presentation of a petition could cost RoyaleLife
customers and lead to other creditors applying pressure on the
firm.  The judge dismissed the attempt to have the petition struck
out, noting that Time GB Group appeared to be "hopelessly
insolvent".




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Bailout: An Insider's Account of Bank Failures
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bailout: An Insider's Account of Bank Failures and Rescues

Author: Irvine H. Sprague
Publisher: Beard Books
Soft cover: 321 pages
List Price: $34.95
Order your personal copy at
https://ecommerce.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/bailout.html

No one is more qualified to write a work on this subject of bank
bailouts.  Holding the positions of chairman or director of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) during the 1970s and
1980s, one of Sprague's most important tasks was to close down
banks that were failing before they could cause wider damage.  The
decades of the 1970s and '80s were times of high interest rates for
both depositors and borrowers.  Rates for depositors at many banks
approached 10%, with rates for loans higher than that.  The fierce
competition in the banking industry to offer the highest rates to
attract and keep depositors caused severe financial stress to an
unusually high number of banks. Having to pay out so much in
interest to stay competitive without taking in much greater
deposits was straining the cash and other assets of many banks. The
unprecedented high interest rates also had the effect of reducing
the number of loans banks were giving out. There were not so many
borrowers willing to take on loans with the high interest rates.
With the disruptions in their interrelated deposits and loans, many
banks began to engage in unprecedented and unfamiliar financial
activities, including investing in risky business ventures.  As
well as having harmful effects on local economies, the widely
reported troubles of a number of well-known and well-respected
banks were having a harmful effect on the public's confidence in
the entire banking industry.

Sprague along with other government and private-sector leaders in
the banking and financial field realized the problems with banks of
all sizes in all parts of the country had to be dealt with
decisively.  Action had to be taken to restore public confidence,
as well as prevent widespread and long-lasting damage to the U.S.
economy.  Sprague's task was one of damage control largely on the
blind.  The banking industry, the financial community, and the
government and the public had never faced such a large number of
bank failures at one time. The Home Loan Bank Board for the
savings-and-loans associations had allowed these institutions to
treat goodwill as an asset in an effort to shore up their
deteriorating financial situations with disastrous results for
their depositors and U. S. taxpayers.  Such a desperate stratagem
only made the problems with the savings-and-loans worse.  The banks
covered by the FDIC headed by Sprague were different from these
institutions. But the problems with their basic business of
deposits and loans were more or less the same. And the cause of the
problem was precisely the same: the high interest rates.

Faced with so many bank failures, Sprague and the government
officials, Congresspersons, and leaders he worked with realized
they could not deal effectively with every bank failure. So one of
their first tasks was to devise criteria for which failures they
would deal with.  Their criteria formed what came to be known as
the "essentiality doctrine." This was crucial for guidance in
dealing with the banking crisis, as well as for explanation and
justification to the public for the government agency's decisions
and actions. Sprague's tale is mainly a "chronicle [of] the
evolution of the essentiality doctrine, which derives from the
statutory authority for bank bailouts."  The doctrine was first
used in the bailout of the small Unity Bank of Boston and refined
in the bailouts of the Bank of the Commonwealth and First
Pennsylvania Bank.  It then came into use for the multi-billion
dollar bailout of the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust
Company in the early 1980s.  Continental's failure came about
almost overnight by the "lightening-fast removal of large deposits
from around the world by electronic transfer."  This was another of
the unprecedented causes for the bank failures Sprague had to deal
with in the new, high-interest, world of banking in the '70s and
'80s.  The main part of the book is how the essentiality doctrine
was applied in the case of each of these four banks, with the
especially high-stakes bailout of Continental having a section of
its own.

Although stability and reliability have returned to the banking
industry with the return of modest and low interest rates in
following decades, Sprague's recounting of the momentous activities
for damage control of bank failures for whatever reasons still
holds lessons for today.  For bank failures inevitably occur in any
economic conditions; and in dealing with these promptly and
effectively in the ways pioneered by Sprague, the unfavorable
economic effects will be contained, and public confidence in the
banking system maintained.

As chairman or director of the FDIC for more than 11 years, Irvine
H. Sprague (1921-2004) handled 374 bank failures.  He was a special
assistant to President Johnson, and has worked on economic issues
with other high government officials.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2023.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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