/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/230817.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Thursday, August 17, 2023, Vol. 24, No. 165

                           Headlines



I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO XVI: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on EUR13.5MM F-R Notes
BRIDGEPOINT CLO V: Fitch Assigns 'B-(EXP)sf' Rating to Cl. F Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

DIEBOLD NIXDORF: Davis Polk Served as Secured Creditors' Adviser


S E R B I A

NOVI SAD CITY: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Issuer Rating, Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BROSS BAGELS: Goes Into Liquidation, Owes GBP1.2 Million
EMPIRE CINEMAS: CBRE to Sell Portfolio of Eight Outlets
GREENSILL CAPITAL: Accused of Charging Excessive NHS Financing Fee
HAM BAKER: Secures New Premises Following Acquisition
ROYALELIFE: 29 Companies Collapse Into Administration


                           - - - - -


=============
I R E L A N D
=============

AVOCA CLO XVI: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on EUR13.5MM F-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Avoca CLO XVI Designated Activity Company:

EUR16,900,000 Class C-1R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2031, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2022 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

EUR15,000,000 Class C-2R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2031, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2022 Upgraded
to A1 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

EUR265,500,000 Class A-1R (current outstanding amount
EUR252,850,541.82) Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2022 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR13,500,000 Class A-2R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2022 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

EUR20,000,000 Class B-1R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2031,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2022 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

EUR9,000,000 Class B-2R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2022 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

EUR16,300,000 Class B-3R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2022 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

EUR20,400,000 Class D-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2031, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2022 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

EUR29,500,000 Class E-R Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2022 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

EUR13,500,000 Class F-R Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Nov 10, 2022 Affirmed B2
(sf)

Avoca CLO XVI Designated Activity Company, issued in June 2016 and
refinanced in August 2018, is a collateralised loan obligation
(CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield senior secured
European loans. The portfolio is managed by KKR Credit Advisors
(Ireland) Unlimited Company. The transaction's reinvestment period
ended in October 2022.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades on the Class C-1R and C-2R notes are primarily
a result a shorter weighted average life of the portfolio which
reduces the time the rated notes are exposed to the credit risk of
the underlying portfolio.

The affirmations on the ratings on the Class A-1R, A-2R, B-1R,
B-2R, B-3R, D-R, E-R and F-R Notes are primarily a result of the
expected losses on the notes remaining consistent with their
current rating levels, after taking into account the CLO's latest
portfolio, its relevant structural features and its actual
over-collateralisation ratios.

Moody's also notes that the Class A-1R notes have amortised by
approx. EUR12.6m (4.76%) since closing.

In light of reinvestment restrictions during the amortisation
period, and therefore the limited ability to effect significant
changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's analysed the deal
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics would maintain an adequate buffer relative to
certain covenant requirements. In particular, Moody's assumed that
the deal will benefit from a shorter amortisation profile than it
had assumed at the last rating action in November 2022.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.

In its base case, Moody's used the following assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: EUR433.85m

Defaulted Securities: EUR5.0m

Diversity Score: 65

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2829

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 3.69 years

Weighted Average Spread (WAS) (before accounting for Euribor
floors): 3.59%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.58%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.0%

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future
defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the
collateral pool. In each case, historical and market performance
and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analysing.

Moody's notes that the July 2023 trustee report was published at
the time it was completing its analysis of the June 2023 data. Key
portfolio metrics such as WARF, diversity score, weighted average
spread and life, and OC ratios exhibit little or no change between
these dates.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Counterparty Exposure:

The rating action took into consideration the notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as account bank and swap providers,
using the methodology "Moody's Approach to Assessing Counterparty
Risks in Structured Finance" published in June 2022. Moody's
concluded the ratings of the notes are not constrained by these
risks.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The collateral manager's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

-- Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.
Fast amortisation would usually benefit the ratings of the notes
beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

-- Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's
over-collateralisation levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's analysed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price or the
recovery rate to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive
impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

BRIDGEPOINT CLO V: Fitch Assigns 'B-(EXP)sf' Rating to Cl. F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Bridgepoint CLO V DAC expected ratings.

The assignment of final ratings is contingent on the receipt of
final documents conforming to information already reviewed.

ENTITY/DEBT   RATING   
----------      ------
BridgePoint CLO V DAC

A  LT  AAA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
B-1  LT AA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
B-2  LT AA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
C  LT A(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
D  LT BBB-(EXP)sf          Expected Rating
E  LT BB-(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
F  LT B-(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
Subordinated LT NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Bridgepoint CLO V DAC is a securitisation of mainly senior secured
loans (at least 90%) with a component of senior unsecured,
mezzanine, and second-lien loans. The note proceeds will be used to
fund an identified portfolio with a target par of EUR400 million.
The portfolio is managed by Bridgepoint Credit Management Limited.
The CLO envisages a 4.5-year reinvestment period and a 7.5-year
weighted average life (WAL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Average Portfolio Credit Quality (Neutral): Fitch assesses the
average credit quality of obligors to be in the 'B'/'B-' category.
The Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the identified
portfolio is 25.76.

Strong Recovery Expectation (Positive): At least 90% of the
portfolio will comprise senior secured obligations. Fitch views the
recovery prospects for these assets as more favourable than for
second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine assets. The Fitch weighted
average recovery rate of the identified portfolio is 60.82.

Diversified Portfolio (Positive): The maximum exposure to the 10
largest obligors and fixed-rate assets for assigning the expected
ratings is limited to 21.0% and 12.5%, respectively. The
transaction also includes various concentration limits, including
the maximum exposure to the three largest Fitch-defined industries
in the portfolio at 40%. These covenants ensure the asset portfolio
will not be exposed to excessive concentration.

Portfolio Management (Neutral): The transaction has a 4.5-year
reinvestment period and includes reinvestment criteria similar to
those of other European transactions. Fitch's analysis is based on
a stressed-case portfolio with the aim of testing the robustness of
the transaction structure against its covenants and portfolio
guidelines.

Cash-flow Modelling (Neutral): The WAL used for the transaction
stress portfolio is 12 months less than the WAL covenant to account
for strict reinvestment conditions after the reinvestment period,
including the overcollateralisation tests, Fitch WARF test and
Fitch 'CCC' limit passing together with a linearly decreasing WAL
covenant. In Fitch's opinion, these conditions reduce the effective
risk horizon of the portfolio during the stress period.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

A 25% increase of the mean default rate (RDR) across all ratings
and a 25% decrease of the recovery rate (RRR) across all ratings of
the identified portfolio would result in downgrades of up to two
notches for the class B to E notes and to below 'B-sf' for the
class F notes.

Based on the identified portfolio, downgrades may occur if the loss
expectation is larger than initially assumed, due to unexpectedly
high levels of defaults and portfolio deterioration. Due to the
better metrics and shorter life of the identified portfolio than
the Fitch-stressed portfolio, the class D, E and F notes display a
rating cushion of two notches and the class B and C notes one
notch.

Should the cushion between the identified portfolio and the
Fitch-stressed portfolio be eroded due to manager trading or
negative portfolio credit migration, a 25% increase of the mean RDR
across all ratings and a 25% decrease of the RRR across all ratings
of the Fitch-stressed portfolio would lead to downgrades of up to
four notches for the class A to D notes and to below 'B-sf' for the
class E and F notes.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

A 25% reduction of the mean RDR across all ratings and a 25%
increase in the RRR across all ratings of the Fitch-stressed
portfolio would lead to upgrades of up to three notches for the
notes, except for the 'AAAsf' rated notes.

During the reinvestment period, based on the Fitch-stressed
portfolio, upgrades may occur on better than expected portfolio
credit quality and a shorter remaining WAL test, meaning the notes
are able to withstand larger than expected losses for the
transaction's remaining life. After the end of the reinvestment
period, upgrades may occur in case of stable portfolio credit
quality and deleveraging, leading to higher credit enhancement and
excess spread available to cover losses in the remaining
portfolio.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

BridgePoint CLO V DAC

The majority of the underlying assets or risk presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European
Securities and Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information or information on the risk presenting entities.

Overall, and together with any assumptions, Fitch's assessment of
the information relied upon for the agency's rating analysis
according to its applicable rating methodologies indicates that it
is adequately reliable.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool was not
prepared for this transaction. Offering Documents for this market
sector typically do not include RW&Es that are available to
investors and that relate to the asset pool underlying the trust.
Therefore, Fitch credit reports for this market sector will not
typically include descriptions of RW&Es.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================

DIEBOLD NIXDORF: Davis Polk Served as Secured Creditors' Adviser
----------------------------------------------------------------
Davis Polk advised an ad hoc group of secured creditors in
connection with the chapter 11 restructuring of Diebold Nixdorf,
Incorporated (together with its subsidiaries, "Diebold") and the
related proceedings under the Dutch Act on Confirmation of
Extrajudicial Plans (Wet homologatie onderhands akkoord or "WHOA").


On June 1, 2023, Diebold filed voluntary chapter 11 petitions in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
Texas. Additionally, on June 1, 2023, certain Diebold entities
commenced a Dutch scheme proceeding under the WHOA.

On July 13, the U.S. bankruptcy court confirmed the chapter 11 plan
of reorganization for Diebold. On August 2, 2023, a Dutch court
entered an order sanctioning the WHOA plan under the Dutch scheme
proceeding. On August 7, 2023, the U.S. bankruptcy court entered an
order pursuant to chapter 15 of the bankruptcy code recognizing the
order sanctioning the WHOA plan.

The restructuring deleveraged Diebold's balance sheet by
approximately $1.3 billion and provided for approximately $1.25
billion in exit term loan financing. Substantially all the equity
of the reorganized Diebold was distributed to Diebold's prepetition
creditors.

Diebold is a global leader in financial and retail technology, with
presence in over 100 countries. In addition to producing hardware,
such as ATMs, Diebold provides maintenance services for its
hardware and produces banking and retail software.

The Davis Polk restructuring team included partners Damian S.
Schaible and Adam L. Shpeen and associates Dylan A. Consla, Amber
Leary, Mariya Dekhtyar and Linyang Wu. The finance team included
partner Christian Fischer, counsel Jason Palios and associates
Alexander K.B. Shimamura, Bryan Mendiola and Audrey Youn. Counsel
Robert (Bodie) Stewart provided capital markets advice. Partner
James P. Dougherty provided corporate advice. Counsel Matthew
Yeowart provided antitrust and regulatory advice. Partner Lucy W.
Farr provided tax advice. Members of the Davis Polk team are based
in the New York and London offices.

Davis Polk refers to Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, a New York limited
liability partnership, and its associated entities.

                    About Diebold Nixdorf

Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated automates, digitizes and transforms
the way people bank and shop.  As a partner to the majority of the
world's top 100 financial institutions and top 25 global retailers,
its integrated solutions connect digital and physical channels
conveniently, securely and efficiently for millions of consumers
each day.

Diebold Nixdorf and several affiliated entities sought protection
under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on June 1, 2023.  The
cases are jointly administered under the case of Diebold Holding
Company, Inc., Bankr. S.D. Texas Lead Case No. 23-90602.  In the
petition signed by Jonathan B. Leiken, president, Diebold Holding
disclosed $3.09 billion in assets and $2.57 billion in
liabilities.

Diebold Nixdorf Dutch Holding B.V. commenced voluntary
reorganization proceedings pursuant to the Wet Homologatie
Onderhands Akkoord under Netherlands law in the District Court of
Amsterdam.  Diebold Netherlands sought recognition of the Dutch
Proceeding under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Judge David R. Jones oversees the Chapter 11 cases.

The Chapter 11 Debtors tapped Jones Day and Jackson Walker LLP as
legal counsels; Ducera Partners LLC as investment banker; FTI
Consulting, Inc. as financial advisor; and Kroll Restructuring
Administration, LLC as claims and noticing agent.




===========
S E R B I A
===========

NOVI SAD CITY: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Issuer Rating, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned Ba2 local and foreign
currency long-term issuer ratings to the City of Novi Sad.
Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a ba2 Baseline Credit Assessment
(BCA). The outlook is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Ba2 long term issuer ratings and ba2 BCA reflect the city's
strong operating performance, low debt levels and strong liquidity
position. The ratings also recognize Novi Sad's continued good
governance and budgetary management practices. The city's high
investment requirements and moderate budget flexibility are also
incorporated in the ratings.

Novi Sad is the second largest city in Serbia and the capital of
the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina with more than 368,000
inhabitants. The city is the second most important economic and
business center in the country (after the capital city), which
translates into a strong and diversified economic base and supports
operating revenue.

Novi Sad demonstrated a very strong operating performance over 2017
to 2022 with gross operating balance (GOB) averaging almost 22% of
operating revenue. This operating performance was attributable to
the strong generation of personal income tax, representing more
than 50% of the city's total revenue. Moody's expects Novi Sad to
continue to record strong GOB margins above 10% over 2023-24,
supported by the city's prudent budgetary management.

Novi Sad displays a low debt level and affordable debt service,
which is expected to continue over 2023-24. Net direct and indirect
debt (NDID) to operating revenue was below 20% over 2017 to 2022,
while debt service remained below 4% of operating revenue over the
same period. Moody's expects the city's debt levels and debt
service to remain low, with NDID to operating revenue projected at
12.7% and debt service to operating revenue below 1.5% in 2024.
This is supported by the city's strong liquidity position, which
fully covers the outstanding debt. The city's debt structure is
simple, consisting of long term debts to finance capital projects.

Novi Sad's ratings also take into account the city's high
investment requirements, which resulted in a modest cash financing
deficit in 2022 of 2.1% of total revenue. The city faces high
investment needs to upgrade infrastructure and accommodate a
growing population. According to Moody's projections, the city's
investment requirements will put additional pressure on the city's
budget in 2023, resulting in a cash financing deficit of 5.5% of
total revenue in 2023. The planned capital projects will be funded
by own liquidity and drawing from already contracted loans.

The ratings are also constrained by the institutional framework
under which Serbian local governments operate. The framework
exhibits frequent changes, which results in low financial
flexibility and stability, constraining policy effectiveness at the
city level. Moody's assess a moderate likelihood of extraordinary
support from the Government of Serbia (Ba2 stable).

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook mirrors the stable outlook on the sovereign. It
also reflects the city's very strong operating margin, low debt
levels and Moody's view that Novi Sad's strong governance will help
to maintain its strong operating performance.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS

Novi Sad's ESG Credit Impact Score is moderately negative (CIS-3),
reflecting high exposure to environmental risk, moderate exposure
to social risks and strong governance practices.

Novi Sad has highly negative exposure to the environmental risks
(E-4). The highest risk stems from physical climate risks related
to climate change, particularly exposure to heat waves and
flooding. Additional risks are linked to water management and
natural capital due to the presence of an oil refinery and thermal
power plant in the region as well as insufficient sewage network
quality. The investments needed for carbon transition and
environmental protection will put pressure on the city budget over
the medium term.

The city's exposure to social risks is moderately negative (S-3)
except for demographics and housing. The city has favorable net
immigration due to its status as second-largest city in Serbia and
its stronger economic performance compared to other Serbian cities.
The pressure stemming from the immigration results in the need to
invest in infrastructure and public services. Infrastructure in
Serbia remains underdeveloped compared to EU countries. The
unemployment rate in Novi Sad is lower than the both national and
provincial average.

Governance risk is assessed as neutral-low (G-2). The city
demonstrates sound governance, including prudent budgetary and
financial management with a track record of strict cost controls.
Moody's also recognizes a very high level of transparency and
disclosure, well above the national requirements. The institutional
framework, however, is still developing with frequent changes.

The specific economic indicators, as required by EU regulation, are
not available for this entity. The following national economic
indicators are relevant to the sovereign rating, which was used as
an input to this credit rating action.

Sovereign Issuer: Serbia, Government of

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 23,920 (2022) (also known as Per
Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 2.3% (2022) (also known as GDP Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 15.1% (2022)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -3.2% (2022) (also known as Fiscal
Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -7% (2022) (also known as External
Balance)

External debt/GDP: 70.3% (2022)

Economic resiliency: baa3

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or loans)
has been recorded since 1983

SUMMARY OF MINUTES FROM RATING COMMITTEE

On July 25, 2023, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of City of Novi Sad. The main points raised during the
discussion were: The issuer's institutions and governance strength,
the issuer's fiscal or financial strength including issuer's debt
profile; the systemic risk in which issuer operates; economic
fundamentals, including its economic strength.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Given the limited fiscal autonomy and market insulation of the
city, an upgrade of Novi Sad's rating would require an upgrade of
the sovereign rating, along with a continuation of solid budgetary
performance, low debt levels and strong liquidity.

Downgrade pressure on the rating could be driven by one or
combination of following: sovereign rating downgrade given the
close financial, institutional and operational linkages between the
central and local governments; weakening of the support provided by
the central government; or significant financial deterioration
driven by reduced operating margins, an unexpected and sharp
increase in debt levels and/or materially lower liquidity.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2018.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology
used in this credit rating action, if applicable.

This rating action concerns a new rating for an issuer not
previously publicly rated by us at the time that the EU sovereign
release calendar was published, and is therefore being released on
a date not listed in that publication.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

BROSS BAGELS: Goes Into Liquidation, Owes GBP1.2 Million
--------------------------------------------------------
Kris Gourlay at Edinburgh Live reports that Edinburgh sandwich
business Bross Bagels has fallen into liquidation, with debts of
GBP1.2 million being owed.

A petition was lodged at Edinburgh Sheriff Court on Aug. 3 on
behalf of owner Ms. Bross and her partner Marc Millar, shareholders
of Bross Bagels Limited, for the business "to be wound up by the
court and that an interim liquidator be appointed," Edinburgh Live
relates.

The news comes exclusively from the Edinburgh Reporter and
Edinburgh Guardian after they discovered the company are in debt of
up to GBP1.2 million with the majority owed to Inland Revenue,
Edinburgh Live states.

An investigation established that in July, a "warning of winding up
action" for GBP574,132 letter was sent to Bross Bagels by HM
Revenue and Customs, Edinburgh Live discloses.

"I've had no alternative but to place Bross Bagels Ltd into
liquidation. As stated previously all the jobs have been
safeguarded and we are bagel business as usual," Edinburgh Live
quotes Larah Bross as saying.

The next day, on July 14, Ms. Bross -- also known as Mama Bross --
registered a new business at Companies House in which she is the
sole shareholder and trading at Hot Mama Bagels Ltd.

According to Edinburgh Live, a letter from HMRC said: "If the
company doesn't pay in full or contact us about a payment plan by
August 3, 2023, we may apply for a winding-up order against the
company for this debt."

The letter continues to say that if the company is wound up then it
could lose all its assets, having its bank account frozen and may
have to pay legal and other costs, Edinburgh Live notes.


EMPIRE CINEMAS: CBRE to Sell Portfolio of Eight Outlets
-------------------------------------------------------
Brian Donnelly at Herald Scotland reports that a ten-screen
Scottish cinema that was owned by a company that collapsed into
administration has been brought to market for sale.

The Empire Clydebank was one of eight profitable outlets that
survived the initial administration of the Empire Cinemas estate,
with six sites south of the Border closing at the time of the July
announcement bringing the loss of 150 jobs, Herald Scotland
discloses.

Real estate advisor CBRE has been appointed to sell a portfolio of
eight cinemas, Herald Scotland states.

According to Herald Scotland, the agent said there has been
"significant interest from a wide pool of prospective" as it moved
to further interest in the cinemas on the open market.

The estate comprises two luxury boutique Tivoli cinemas, five
multiplex cinemas and one classic standalone cinema.

As well as the cinema in Clydebank, which has 2,500 seats, there
are sites in Bath, Cheltenham, Birmingham, High Wycombe, Ipswich,
Sutton and Sutton Coldfield.

They are available to purchase as either a single portfolio,
individual sites, or a combination, Herald Scotland notes.

In addition to the cinemas, the fully operational head office in
Leicester Square will be offered as part of the sale, which is on a
peppercorn rent for the next three years, according to Herald
Scotland.

The estate is being sold on behalf of administrators BDO, Herald
Scotland relays.


GREENSILL CAPITAL: Accused of Charging Excessive NHS Financing Fee
------------------------------------------------------------------
Ian Smith, Robert Smith and Nic Fildes at The Financial Times
report that Greensill Capital charged an "unreasonable and
excessive" fee for arranging financing for NHS building projects
and deliberately avoided disclosing this fact, according to the
collapsed company's main insurer.

Australian insurance agency Bond & Credit Co arranged US$10 billion
of coverage for Greensill, which specialised in supply chain
finance and collapsed into administration in 2021 after its
insurance expired, the FT discloses.

BCC, which is owned by Japanese group Tokio Marine, has targeted
the "commercially unsupportable" fee in its latest filing in
Australian court proceedings that bring together a series of
insurance claims by Greensill investors who lost billions of
dollars, the FT states.

Greensill's insurers, which include BCC's former parent Insurance
Australia Group, Tokio Marine and Zurich are refusing to pay out on
the company's credit cover, the FT notes.

BCC has argued that Greensill "fraudulently misrepresented"
material matters and its insurance is therefore void, the FT
relates.

In a recent filing, seen by the FT, BCC argues Greensill was
responsible for "misrepresentations and non-disclosures" in
relation to financing for Catfoss, a company engaged in building
projects at NHS hospitals in Derby, Dorset and Essex.

According to BCC, Catfoss paid Greensill a GBP10.4 million
structuring fee for the financing, which was "in excess of any fee
that would be negotiated by parties in a bona fide arms' length
relationship", the FT discloses.

BCC also said the "disproportionate" fee had been paid out of a
lending facility that only amounted to GBP15.3 million, the FT
relays.

It also alleges Lex Greensill, founder and CEO of the business,
presented the facility as short-term supply-chain financing, while
in reality it was working capital financing with terms of "up to
two years", according to the FT.

In one case, Greensill was "continuing to advance funds 
. . . and seeking insurance for those advances, even though
the relevant NHS Foundation Trust project had been completed in
January 2019," the filing states, the FT discloses.

The material was included in an annexe that BCC is using in
multiple Greensill legal proceedings, including a case brought by
investment firm White Oak, which is suing insurers in London and
Australia over losses on loans arranged by Greensill, the FT
states.

Greensill's involvement in a number of financing schemes linked to
the NHS fuelled the political furore surrounding its collapse in
2021, the FT notes.  Former UK prime minister David Cameron was an
adviser to the business.


HAM BAKER: Secures New Premises Following Acquisition
-----------------------------------------------------
Anna Cooper at TheBusinessDesk.com reports that Ham Baker has
secured new premises in Newcastle-under-Lyme, which will house the
full operations of the engineering business.

According to TheBusinessDesk.com, after being acquired out of
administration last year by Galliford Try, the firm is set to move
into a more than 10,000 sq ft factory and rebrand as Ham Baker
Engineering.

Founded in 1893, the rebranded business will now operate alongside
Galliford Try's Lintott, as part of the recently-created water
technologies business stream.

Fifty jobs were saved after the sale of two businesses within the
Ham Baker Group after it collapsed into administration in November,
TheBusinessDesk.com discloses.

Jimmy Saunders and Matthew Ingram, both of Kroll, completed the
sale of the business and assets of Industrial Values to Duvalco, a
trade purchaser on Nov. 15, TheBusinessDesk.com relates.

And on Nov. 17, Messrs. Saunders and Ingram sold Ham Baker's asset
inspection, maintenance and screens and distributor operations to
Galliford Try, with the team of around 40 workers continuing to
operate from the business's now previous premises in Stoke,
TheBusinessDesk.com recounts.

The fresh location will encompass asset inspection, maintenance,
refurbishment, and installation expertise as well as the
manufacture and assembly of spares, screens and distributor
operations, TheBusinessDesk.com notes.


ROYALELIFE: 29 Companies Collapse Into Administration
-----------------------------------------------------
Alex Turner at TheBusinessDesk.com reports that 29 RoyaleLife
holiday parks, developments and property companies have collapsed
into administration at the peak of the summer holiday season.

The court action comes weeks after their parent company, Royale
Parks, and a small number of resorts, including Billing Aquadrome
and Cogenhoe Mill in Northamptonshire, also appointed
administrators, TheBusinessDesk.com notes.

According to TheBusinessDesk.com, 15 of the affected sites are in
the South West, and there are also developments in the North West,
East Midlands, South East and East Anglia that are no longer in the
company's control.

The RoyaleLife group is owned by billionaire Robert Bull, who was
ranked 88th in the Sunday Times Rich List this May with a net worth
of nearly GBP2 billion.

Last month, he claimed winding up orders were "based on false
claims and unfounded information" and said they were the subject of
legal action -- a claim restated by a company spokesperson,
TheBusinessDesk.com recounts.

However, in a High Court judgment by Judge Barber handed down on
July 28, she refused to strike out a winding-up petition filed
against a property company Mr. Bull wholly owned, Time GB Group,
TheBusinessDesk.com relays.

There is also a separate breach of contract action by Bull, Time GB
Group and related companies against Sines Parks Holdings, which
applied to put some of Bull's companies into administration,
TheBusinessDesk.com notes.

The actions by Sines Parks appears to have influenced lenders and
started a domino effect culminating in the administration
appointments, TheBusinessDesk.com states.

A spokesperson for RoyaleGroup, as cited by TheBusinessDesk.com,
said: "All sites are continuing to trade as normal as we work
towards a deal with our administrators, Grant Thornton and JCK Ltd.
At this current time, no staff or job cuts are expected."

They reiterated a previous statement acknowledging the group "had a
challenging time emerging from the pandemic" but insisted it is
still "business as usual", and said RoyaleLife continues to build
in 64 different residential bungalow communities with 40 more in
planning and development.

According to TheBusinessDesk.com, the affected sites are:

Cheshire:
Moore Lane, Warrington

Cornwall:
Budemeadows Country Park, Bude
Dolbeare Court, Saltash

Devon:
Oakleigh Court, Dolton
Regency Court, Newton Abbot
Regency Place, Newton Abbot

Dorset:
Christchurch Marina Park, Christchurch
Matchams Lane, Christchurch
Beacon Hill, Poole
Manor Farm Park, Poole
Matchams Leisure Park, Ringwood
Silver Mist, Ringwood
Dorset Heights, Wareham
Deers Court, Wimbourne
New Forest Court, Wimborne

Essex:
Dunton Park, Royal Dunton Court, nr Brentwood

Gloucestershire:
Montserrat Caravan Park, Stroud

Hampshire:
Frensham Country Park, Churt
Milford on Sea Park, Lymington
Wickham Court, North Boarhunt

Isle of Wight:
Fort Caravan Park, Sandown
IOW View, Sandown

Kent:
Reculver Court, Herne Bay
Waterways, Herne Bay

Norfolk:
Plum Tree Country Park, Thetford
Redhill Residential Park, Watton

Nottinghamshire:
Sherwood Court, Newark

Rutland:
Ranksborough Hall Estates, Oakham

The holding company for the group's Hampshire head office property,
North Boarhunt 1, has also fallen into administration,
TheBusinessDesk.com notes.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2023.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                * * * End of Transmission * * *