---

       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Friday, July 28, 2023, Vol. 24, No. 151

                           Headlines



A R M E N I A

ARDSHINBANK CJSC: S&P Alters Outlook to Pos., Affirms 'B+/B' ICRs


G E R M A N Y

SC GERMANY 2023-1: DBRS Gives Prov. BB(high) Rating to F Notes


H U N G A R Y

MBH INVESTMENT: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' ICRs, Outlook Positive


I R E L A N D

DILOSK RMBS 7: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating to Class E Notes
FASTNET SECURITIES 16: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on E Notes
FIDELITY GRAND 2023-1: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Cl. F Notes
LAST MILE: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
TORO EUROPEAN 4: Fitch Affirms 'B+sf' Rating on Class F-R Notes



I T A L Y

AUTOFLORENCE 1: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class E Notes
BCC NPLS 2019: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on Class B Notes


K A Z A K H S T A N

ONLINEKAZFINANCE: S&P Affirms 'B-' ICR, Outlook Stable


L U X E M B O U R G

PARTICLE INVESTMENT: S&P Upgrades LT ICR to 'B+', Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

EMBRAER NETHERLANDS: Fitch Rates New Sr. Unsec. Bonds 'BB+'
IGNITION TOPCO: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CCC' on Higher Refinancing Risk


R O M A N I A

DIGI COMMUNICATIONS: Moody's Downgrades CFR to B1, Outlook Stable


S P A I N

CAIXABANK PYMES 10: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on Series B Notes
RMBS SANTANDER: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on Class B Notes
SABADELL CONSUMO 2: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class F Notes


S W I T Z E R L A N D

[*] SWITZERLAND: Number of Company Insolvencies Up 22% in 1H 2023


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

HAYDON MECHANICAL: Files Notice to Appoint Administrators
LUDGATE FUNDING 2007: Fitch Puts 'B-sf' E Notes Rating on Watch Neg
MAPELEY STEPS: Put Into Liquidation After Sale-Leaseback Deal
WILKO: Hilco Agrees to Provide GBP5MM in Additional Funding


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Dangerous Dreamers

                           - - - - -


=============
A R M E N I A
=============

ARDSHINBANK CJSC: S&P Alters Outlook to Pos., Affirms 'B+/B' ICRs
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised the outlook on Ardshinbank CJSC to
positive from stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B+/B'
long- and short-term issuer credit ratings on the bank.

S&P said, "We believe Ardshinbank's risk profile has somewhat
improved over the past two years. We view positively the bank's
improvements in its credit underwriting--particularly more advanced
retail scoring models, which are comparable to regional peers."
Concentrations have also reduced slightly in light of expanding
lending to small businesses and retail customers. Ardshinbank's
foreign currency lending, while elevated compared with country
averages (44% compared with 36% for the sector as a whole) owing to
the focus on large corporates, is comparable with immediate peer
Ameriabank.

Improved capital adequacy offers buffer against riskier exposures
on Ardshinbank's balance sheet. Ardshinbank's exposure to bonds
issued by the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh republic (Artsakh)
declined to less than one-third of its total S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted capital by March 2023, from about 55% at the end
of 2021. This is owing to the bank's build-up of capital on the
back of extraordinary gains in 2022-2023.

S&P said, "We expect Ardshinbank to retain adequate capitalization
in the medium term. Specifically, we forecast its risk-adjusted
capital (RAC) ratio will slightly improve to about 8.7% in
2023-2024 from 7.8% as of year-end 2022. Our forecast factors in
10% credit growth in 2023 and 15% after. Ardshinbank has a rather
loose dividend policy with dividends effectively subject to the
board and shareholder's decision. With this in mind, we factor in
40% dividend payout in our projections."

After exemplary profit in 2022-2023, the bank's returns will
normalize. Our forecast assumes flows from Russia to Armenia will
reduce over 2023-2024, on the back of receding migration and the
weaker exchange rate of the Russian ruble. As a result, S&P expects
Ardshinbank's associated revenues to decline by more than 50% in
2023 and another 50% in 2024.

The positive outlook reflects its expectations that Ardshinbank
over the next 12-18 months will continue improving its risk profile
by resolving outstanding asset quality issues and maintaining at
least adequate capitalization.

S&P may revise the outlook back to stable if Ardshinbank's asset
quality deteriorates or if its capital buffers erode, perhaps owing
to a large, unexpected loss.

A positive rating action may follow if S&P considers Ardshinbank is
making further progress in improving its risk profile. This would
include reducing the share of problematic exposures to a level
commensurate with international peers, increasing provisions, and
fine-tuning its risk management procedures. An upgrade of Armenia
would be prerequisite for an upgrade of Ardshinbank. It would also
require capital at levels we consider adequate with a RAC ratio in
excess of 7%, and some clarity with respect to bonds issued by
bonds issued by the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh republic
(Artsakh).

ESG credit indicators: E-2, S-2, G-4




=============
G E R M A N Y
=============

SC GERMANY 2023-1: DBRS Gives Prov. BB(high) Rating to F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH assigned provisional ratings to the Class A,
Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E, and Class F Notes (together,
the Rated Notes) to be issued by SC Germany S.A., acting on behalf
and for the account of its Compartment Consumer 2023-1 (the Issuer)
as follows:

-- Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- Class C Notes at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D Notes at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F Notes at BB (high) (sf)

The rating on the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
scheduled interest and the ultimate repayment of principal by the
legal final maturity date. The ratings on the Class B Notes, the
Class C Notes, the Class D Notes, and the Class E Notes address the
ultimate payment of interest, the timely payment of interest when
most senior, and the ultimate repayment of principal by the legal
final maturity date. The rating on the Class F Notes addresses the
ultimate payment of interest and the ultimate repayment of
principal by the legal final maturity date.

DBRS Morningstar based its provisional ratings on information
provided by the Issuer and its agent as of the date of this press
release. The ratings will be finalized upon receipt of an execution
version of the governing transaction documents. To the extent that
the documents and information provided to DBRS Morningstar as of
this date differ from the executed version of the governing
transaction documents, DBRS Morningstar may assign different final
ratings to the Rated Notes.

The Rated Notes are backed by a portfolio of fixed-rate unsecured
amortizing personal loans granted without a specific purpose to
private individuals domiciled in Germany and serviced by Santander
Consumer Bank AG (SCB; the originator, seller, and servicer).

DBRS Morningstar based its ratings on a review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- The transaction's capital structure, including form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement;

-- Available credit enhancement in the form of subordination, a
liquidity reserve account, and excess spread.

-- Credit enhancement levels that are sufficient to support DBRS
Morningstar's projected cumulative net loss assumption under
various stressed cash flow assumptions for the Rated Notes;

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested;

-- SCB's capabilities with regard to originations, underwriting,
servicing, and its financial strength;

-- The transaction parties' financial strength with regard to
their respective roles;

-- The credit quality of the collateral and historical and
projected performance of the Seller's portfolio;

-- DBRS Morningstar's sovereign rating on the Federal Republic of
Germany, currently at AAA with a Stable trend; and

-- The expected consistency of the transaction's legal structure
with DBRS Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured
Finance Transactions' methodology and the presence of legal
opinions that are expected to address the true sale of the assets
to the Issuer.

TRANSACTION STRUCTURE

The transaction includes a 12-month scheduled revolving period,
during which the Issuer is able to purchase additional loan
receivables on each monthly payment date, as long as they satisfy
the eligibility criteria and the transaction concentration limits.

The transaction allocates payments according to separate interest
and principal priorities of payments and benefits from an
amortizing EUR 14.7 million cash reserve (corresponding to 1.5% of
the initial Rated Notes balance), subject to a floor of EUR 4.9
million (corresponding to 0.5% of the initial Rated Notes balance).
The liquidity reserve will be replenished in two different
positions in the interest waterfalls and can partially provide
credit enhancement to the transaction: the first part can cover
shortfalls in senior expenses, swap payments, and interest on the
Class A Notes and if not deferred, interest on the Class B through
Class F Notes, while the second part can be used to clear the
remaining shortfalls and any debit in the principal deficiency
ledgers (PDLs). The excess reserve amount could also cover items
below the reserve replenishment such as deferred interest on the
junior notes and Class F Notes principal.

The repayment of the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class
E Notes following the end of the revolving period will be on a pro
rata basis, unless a sequential redemption trigger is breached, in
which case the repayment will be in non-reversible sequential
order. The Class F Notes will begin amortizing during the revolving
period from the first payment date using available excess spread
pursuant to the interest priority of payments, with a target
amortization schedule of twenty equal instalments.

The Rated Notes pay floating interest rate indexed to one-month
Euribor, whereas the portfolio comprises fixed-rate loans. The
interest rate risk arising from the mismatch between the Rated
Notes and the portfolio is hedged through an interest rate swap
agreement with an eligible counterparty.

At inception, the weighted-average portfolio yield is expected to
be at least 7.3%, which is one of the revolving period portfolio
concentration limits.

COUNTERPARTIES

The Bank of New York Mellon, Frankfurt Branch (BNY Mellon) acts as
the account bank for the transaction. Based on DBRS Morningstar's
private rating on BNY Mellon, the downgrade provisions outlined in
the transaction documents, and other mitigating factors in the
transaction structure, DBRS Morningstar considers the risk arising
from the exposure to the account bank to be consistent with the
ratings assigned to the Rated Notes, as described in DBRS
Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

DZ BANK AG Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank (DZ Bank) acts as
the swap counterparty for the transaction. DBRS Morningstar has a
Long-Term Issuer Rating of AA (low) on DZ Bank, which is consistent
with DBRS Morningstar's criteria with respect to its role.

DBRS Morningstar's credit ratings on the Rated Notes address the
credit risk associated with the identified financial obligations in
accordance with the relevant transaction documents. The associated
financial obligations are listed at the end of this Press Release.

DBRS Morningstar's credit rating does not address non-payment risk
associated with contractual payment obligations contemplated in the
applicable transaction documents that are not financial
obligations.

DBRS Morningstar's long-term credit ratings provide opinions on
risk of default. DBRS Morningstar considers risk of default to be
the risk that an issuer will fail to satisfy the financial
obligations in accordance with the terms under which a long-term
obligation has been issued.

Notes: All figures are in Euros unless otherwise noted.




=============
H U N G A R Y
=============

MBH INVESTMENT: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' ICRs, Outlook Positive
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and short-term issuer
credit ratings on Hungary-based MBH Investment Bank. The outlook
remains positive.

MBHI is integral to MBH and depends on the wider group's future
creditworthiness. In early 2023, MBHI transferred its retail assets
and liabilities to MBH, with the two operating as a combined entity
since May 1, 2023. MBH's board of directors approves and monitors
MBHI's strategy, risk management, and resource allocation.

S&P said, "We acknowledge material improvements in the new group's
organizational setup and profitability (return on average equity of
10.9% as of first quarter 2023) and expect MBHI to further
contribute to the group's performance. We expect management to
tackle the overall group's structural profitability challenge and
align it more closely with peers by fully consolidating all the
group's members and establishing the new IT infrastructure. This
will eventually help to run the group more efficiently."

As part of MBH, MBHI is the second largest banking group in
Hungary, with a stable deposit franchise. MBH group has total
assets of Hungarian forint 10.45 trillion (about $31.5 billion) and
a market share of about 17% of loans. As such, it is the market
leader within both small and midsize enterprise and micro-corporate
business, as well as agricultural lending, building on an
established and loyal client base in the countryside. S&P views
MBH's customer deposit base as stable, based on its market position
and predecessor banks' strong franchises in Hungary, also
demonstrated by the robust and granular depositor base. Overall, it
sees funding and liquidity metrics as neutral to our ratings.

S&P said, "The positive outlook reflects our view that MBHI will
continue its transformation as part of the MBH group over the next
12 months, generate healthy organic revenue growth, and maintain
leading positions in its core businesses while sustainably
strengthening its capitalization and improving its asset quality.

"Our ratings on MBHI currently do not encompass expected additional
loss-absorbing capacity buildup. Although unlikely, we could also
take a positive rating action if the combined group were to build
up material additional loss-absorbing buffers while maintaining its
incremental stand-alone creditworthiness."

S&P expects MBHI to maintain its integral importance to the group.

S&P said, "We could upgrade MBHI if the MBH group continues to
successfully execute the merger, with the group becoming more
efficient and profitable as anticipated. A positive rating action
would hinge on MBH materially strengthening its capitalization and
improving asset quality.

"We could lower our ratings or revise the outlook on MBHI to stable
if MBH does not successfully execute its upcoming merger milestones
or does not realize its full synergy potential from the merger. We
could also downgrade MBHI if the merger impairs MBH's
creditworthiness, for example, if asset quality deteriorates or it
loses a significant market share."




=============
I R E L A N D
=============

DILOSK RMBS 7: DBRS Gives Prov. BB Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH assigned provisional credit ratings to the
residential mortgage-backed notes to be issued by Dilosk RMBS No. 7
DAC (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C notes at A (sf)
-- Class D notes at BBB (sf)
-- Class E notes at BB (sf)
-- Class F notes at B (low) (sf)
-- Class X1 notes at CCC (sf)

The credit rating on the Class A notes addresses the timely payment
of interest and the ultimate repayment of principal. The rating on
the Class B notes addresses the timely payment of interest once
they are the senior most class of notes outstanding and the
ultimate repayment of principal on or before the final maturity
date. The credit ratings on the Class C, Class D, Class E, Class F,
and Class X1 notes address the ultimate payment of interest and
principal.

DBRS Morningstar does not rate the Class X2 and Class Z notes also
expected to be issued in this transaction.

CREDIT RATING RATIONALE

The Issuer is a bankruptcy-remote special-purpose vehicle
incorporated in the Republic of Ireland. The Issuer will use the
proceeds of the notes to fund the purchase of prime and performing
Irish buy-to-let (BTL) mortgage loans secured over properties
located in Ireland. The majority of the mortgage loans included in
the portfolio were originated by Dilosk DAC (Dilosk; the
originator, seller, and servicer) in the past six years; however, a
small subset corresponds with more seasoned loans from a portfolio
which Dilosk acquired from the Governor and Company of the Bank of
Ireland acquired in 2014.

This is the seventh securitization from Dilosk, following Dilosk
RMBS No. 6 (STS) (Dilosk 6), which closed in April 2023. The
initial mortgage portfolio consists of EUR 210 million of
first-lien mortgage loans collateralized by BTL residential
properties in Ireland. The mortgages were mostly granted between
2017 and 2022, except for the portion corresponding with the
previously acquired portfolio.

The mortgage loans will be serviced by BCMGlobal ASI Limited
(BCMGlobal), trading as BCMGlobal, in its role as delegated
servicer. DBRS Morningstar reviewed both the originator and
servicer via an email update in February 2023. Underwriting
guidelines are in accordance with market practices observed in
Ireland and are subject to the Central Bank of Ireland's
macroprudential mortgage regulations, which specify restrictions on
certain lending criteria. CSC Capital Markets (Ireland) Limited
will act as the back-up servicer facilitator.

As of 31 March 2023, a large proportion of the loans in the
portfolio (55.8% in terms of outstanding balance) repays on an
interest-only basis. Only 0.7% of the loans in the mortgage
portfolio were in arrears at closing with a portion of 0.3% being
more than one month in arrears.

Liquidity in the transaction is provided by the non-amortizing
general reserve fund (GRF), which the Issuer can use to pay senior
costs and interest on the rated notes but also to clear principal
deficiency ledger (PDL) balances. Liquidity for the Class A notes
will be further supported by a liquidity reserve fund (LRF), fully
funded at closing and then amortizing in line with the referred
class of notes, which shall also feature a floor of 75% of its
initial balance at closing. The notes' terms and conditions allow
interest payments, other than on the Class A notes and on the Class
B notes when they are the most senior class of notes outstanding,
to be deferred if the available funds are insufficient.

Credit enhancement for the Class A notes is calculated at 10.85%
and is provided by the subordination of the Class B to Class F
notes and the general reserve fund. Credit enhancement for the
Class B notes is calculated at 7.85% and is provided by the
subordination of the Class C to Class F notes and the general
reserve fund. Credit enhancement for the Class C notes is
calculated at 4.35% and is provided by the subordination of the
Class D to Class F notes and the general reserve fund. Credit
enhancement for the Class D notes is calculated at 2.35% and is
provided by the subordination of the Class E to Class F notes and
the general reserve fund. Credit enhancement for the Class E notes
is calculated at 1.10% and is provided by the subordination of the
Class F notes and the general reserve fund. Credit enhancement for
the Class F notes is calculated at 0.35% and is provided by the
general reserve fund.

A key structural feature is the provisioning mechanism in the
transaction that is linked to the arrears status of a loan besides
the usual provisioning based on losses. The degree of provisioning
increases with the increase in number of months in arrears status
of a loan. This is positive for the transaction, as provisioning
based on the arrears status traps any excess spread much earlier
for a loan that may ultimately end up in foreclosure.

Payments are made directly by the borrowers via direct debit,
standing order, or cheque, unless otherwise agreed, into a
collection account held at the BNP Paribas, Dublin Branch. The
amounts in the collections account will be transferred to the
Issuer account at least twice every week. DBRS Morningstar's
private rating on BNP Paribas, Dublin branch in its role as Account
Bank is consistent with the threshold for the account bank as
outlined in DBRS Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European
Structured Finance Transactions" methodology, given the credit
ratings assigned to the notes.

DBRS Morningstar based its credit ratings on a review of the
following analytical considerations:

-- The transaction capital structure and form and sufficiency of
available credit enhancement.

-- The credit quality of the mortgage portfolio and the ability of
the servicer to perform collection and resolution activities. DBRS
Morningstar calculated probability of default (PD), loss given
default (LGD), and expected loss (EL) outputs on the mortgage
portfolio. DBRS Morningstar uses the PD, LGD, and ELs as inputs
into the cash flow tool. DBRS Morningstar analyzed the mortgage
portfolio in accordance with DBRS Morningstar's "European RMBS
Insight Methodology: Irish Addendum".

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class
E, Class F, and Class X1 notes according to the terms of the
transaction documents. DBRS Morningstar analyzed the transaction
structure using Intex DealMaker.

-- The sovereign rating of AA (low) with a Stable trend (as of the
date of this press release) on the Republic of Ireland.

-- The consistency of the legal structure with DBRS Morningstar's
"Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
methodology and the presence of legal opinions addressing the
assignment of the assets to the Issuer.

DBRS Morningstar's credit rating on Class A, Class B, Class C,
Class D, Class E, Class F, and Class X1 notes addresses the credit
risk associated with the identified financial obligations in
accordance with the relevant transaction documents. The associated
financial obligations are listed at the end of this Press Release.

DBRS Morningstar's credit rating does not address non-payment risk
associated with contractual payment obligations contemplated in the
applicable transaction document(s) that are not financial
obligations.

DBRS Morningstar's long-term credit ratings provide opinions on
risk of default. DBRS Morningstar considers risk of default to be
the risk that an issuer will fail to satisfy the financial
obligations in accordance with the terms under which a long-term
obligation has been issued.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


FASTNET SECURITIES 16: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH took the following credit rating actions on the
notes issued by Fastnet Securities 16 DAC (Fastnet 16) and Fastnet
Securities 17 DAC (Fastnet 17):

Fastnet 16:

-- Class A2 notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class A3 notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B notes confirmed at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C notes upgraded to A (high) (sf) from A (sf)
-- Class D notes upgraded to BBB (high) (sf) from BBB (sf)
-- Class E notes confirmed at BB (high) (sf)

The credit ratings on the Class A2 and Class A3 notes address the
timely payment of interest and the ultimate payment of principal on
or before the final maturity date in December 2058. The credit
rating on the Class B notes addresses the timely payment of
interest when most senior and the ultimate payment of principal on
or before the final maturity date. The credit ratings on the Class
C, Class D, and Class E notes address the ultimate payment of
interest and principal on or before the final maturity date.

Fastnet 17:

-- Class A1 notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class A2 notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class A3 notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B notes confirmed at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C notes confirmed at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D notes upgraded to A (high) (sf) from BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E notes upgraded to BBB (high) (sf) from BBB (low) (sf)

The credit ratings on the Class A1, Class A2, and Class A3 notes
address the timely payment of interest and the ultimate payment of
principal on or before the final maturity date in December 2058.
The credit ratings on the Class B and Class C notes address the
timely payment of interest when most senior and the ultimate
payment of principal on or before the final maturity date. The
credit ratings on the Class D and Class E notes address the
ultimate payment of interest and principal on or before the final
maturity date.

The credit rating actions follow an annual review of the
transactions and are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies, defaults, and
losses, as of the June 2023 payment date;

-- Portfolio default rate (PD), loss given default (LGD), and
expected loss assumptions on the remaining receivables; and

-- Current available credit enhancement to the notes to cover the
expected losses at their respective credit rating levels.

The transactions are static securitizations of Irish first-lien
residential mortgages originated and serviced by Permanent TSB plc
(PTSB), which closed in July 2021. Fastnet 16 had an initial
portfolio balance of EUR 3.95 billion of owner-occupied mortgages
while Fastnet 17 had an initial portfolio balance of EUR 1.03
billion of both owner-occupied and buy-to-let mortgages.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

Fastnet 16:

As of the June 2023 payment date, loans that were 30 to 60 days and
60 to 90 days delinquent represented 0.2% and 0.1% of the
outstanding principal balance, respectively, while loans more than
90 days delinquent represented 0.1%. There have not been any
repossessions or realized losses to date.

Fastnet 17:

As of the June 2023 payment date, loans that were 30 to 60 days and
60 to 90 days delinquent represented 1.4% and 0.7% of the
outstanding principal balance, respectively, while loans more than
90 days delinquent represented 1.8%. There have not been any
repossessions or realized losses to date.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS AND KEY DRIVERS

For Fastnet 16, DBRS Morningstar updated its base case PD and LGD
assumptions on the remaining receivables to 2.5% and 10.1%,
respectively. For Fastnet 17, DBRS Morningstar updated its base
case PD and LGD assumptions to 6.7% and 10.8%, respectively. The
higher loss assumptions at the base case level result from the
recent release of DBRS Morningstar's "European RMBS Insight: Irish
Addendum", which penalizes portfolios of loans originated before
2010.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

The subordination of the respective junior obligations and the
general reserve funds provide credit enhancement to the rated notes
in the respective transactions.

As of the June 2023 payment date, in Fastnet 16, credit enhancement
to the Class A notes increased to 21.7% from 14.1% at the time of
the previous annual review 12 months ago; credit enhancement to the
Class B notes increased to 16.3% from 10.4%; credit enhancement to
the Class C notes increased to 7.7% from 4.7%; credit enhancement
to the Class D notes increased to 4.5% from 2.6%; and credit
enhancement to the Class E notes increased to 2.7% from 1.4%.

In Fastnet 17, credit enhancement to the Class A notes increased to
39.3% from 22.2% at the time of the previous annual review 12
months ago; credit enhancement to the Class B notes increased to
30.4% from 17.0%; credit enhancement to the Class C notes increased
to 18.3% from 10.0%; credit enhancement to the Class D notes
increased to 14.3% from 7.7%; and credit enhancement to the Class E
notes increased to 11.2% from 5.9%.

The transactions benefit from a general reserve fund providing
credit support and a liquidity reserve fund providing liquidity
support, both funded at closing through a subordinated loan.
Together, the general reserve and liquidity reserve funds equal
1.0% of the initial total notes' balance in each transaction. As of
the June 2023 payment date, the general reserve fund for Fastnet 16
was at EUR 21.1 million and the liquidity reserve fund was at EUR
18.4 million while the general reserve fund for Fastnet 17 was at
EUR 7.1 million and the liquidity reserve fund was at EUR 3.3
million.

BNP Paribas Ireland - Dublin Branch (BNP Ireland) acts as the
account bank for the transactions. Based on DBRS Morningstar's
private rating on BNP Ireland, the downgrade provisions outlined in
the transaction documents, and other mitigating factors inherent in
the transaction structures, DBRS Morningstar considers the risk
arising from the exposure to the account bank to be consistent with
the credit ratings assigned to the notes in the transactions, as
described in DBRS Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European
Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

DBRS Morningstar's credit ratings on the respective Class A, Class
B, Class C, Class D, and Class E notes in the two transactions
address the credit risk associated with the identified financial
obligations in accordance with the relevant transaction documents.
The associated financial obligations are listed at the end of this
press release.

DBRS Morningstar's credit ratings on the respective Class A, Class
B, Class C, Class D, and Class E notes in the two transactions also
address the credit risk associated with the increased rate of
interest applicable to the respective Class A, Class B, Class C,
Class D, and Class E notes if the respective Class A, Class B,
Class C, Class D, and Class E notes are not redeemed on the
Optional Redemption Date as defined in and in accordance with the
applicable transaction documents.

DBRS Morningstar's long-term credit ratings provide opinions on
risk of default. DBRS Morningstar considers risk of default to be
the risk that an issuer will fail to satisfy the financial
obligations in accordance with the terms under which a long-term
obligation has been issued.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


FIDELITY GRAND 2023-1: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Cl. F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Fidelity Grand Harbour CLO 2023-1 DAC
final ratings.

ENTITY/DEBT    RATING    PRIOR
-----------             ------                  -----
Fidelity Grand Harbour
CLO 2023-1 DAC

A XS2632489709   LT   AAAsf  New Rating AAA(EXP)sf
B-1 XS2632489535  LT   AAsf   New Rating AA(EXP)sf
B-2 XS2632490038  LT   AAsf   New Rating AA(EXP)sf
C XS2632490202   LT   Asf    New Rating A(EXP)sf
D XS2632490111   LT   BBB-sf New Rating BBB-(EXP)sf
E XS2632490624   LT   BB-sf  New Rating BB-(EXP)sf
F XS2632490970   LT   B-sf   New Rating B-(EXP)sf
Subordinated Notes
XS2632490897   LT   NRsf New Rating NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fidelity Grand Harbour CLO 2023-1 DAC is a securitisation of mainly
senior secured obligations (at least 90%) with a component of
senior unsecured, mezzanine, second-lien loans and high-yield
bonds. Note proceeds are being used to purchase a portfolio with a
target par of EUR400 million. The portfolio is actively managed by
FIL Investments International (FIL). The collateralised loan
obligation (CLO) has a four-and-a-half-year reinvestment period and
a seven-and-a-half-year weighted average life (WAL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Above Average Portfolio Credit Quality (Positive): Fitch places the
average credit quality of obligors in the 'B' category. The Fitch
weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the identified portfolio
is 24.7.

High Recovery Expectations (Positive): At least 90% of the
portfolio comprises senior secured obligations. Fitch views the
recovery prospects for these assets as more favourable than for
second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine assets. The Fitch weighted
average recovery rate (WARR) of the identified portfolio is 61.5%.

Diversified Asset Portfolio (Positive): The transaction has a
concentration limit for the 10 largest obligors of 22.5%. The
transaction also includes various concentration limits, including
the maximum exposure to the three largest Fitch-defined industries
in the portfolio at 40%. These covenants ensure the asset portfolio
will not be exposed to excessive concentration.

Portfolio Management (Neutral): The transaction has a
four-and-a-half-year reinvestment period and includes reinvestment
criteria similar to those of other European transactions. Fitch's
analysis is based on a stressed-case portfolio with the aim of
testing the robustness of the transaction structure against its
covenants and portfolio guidelines. The transaction includes two
Fitch matrices, with both effective at closing.

Cash Flow Modelling (Positive): The WAL used for the Fitch-stressed
portfolio analysis was reduced by 12 months. This is to account for
the strict reinvestment conditions envisaged after the reinvestment
period. These conditions include passing the coverage test, the
Fitch 'CCC' maximum limit, Fitch WARF test, and a WAL covenant that
progressively steps down over time, both before and after the end
of the reinvestment period. The conditions would in the agency's
opinion reduce the effective risk horizon of the portfolio during
the stress period.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

A 25% increase of the mean default rate (RDR) across all ratings
and a 25% decrease of the recovery rate (RRR) across all ratings
would result in a downgrade for the class F notes.

Downgrades, which are based on the identified portfolio, may occur
if the loss expectation is larger than initially assumed, due to
unexpectedly high levels of defaults and portfolio deterioration.
Due to the better metrics of the identified portfolio than the
Fitch-stressed portfolio the rated notes display a rating cushion
to a downgrade of one notch for the class C notes, and two notches
for class B, D, E and F notes. The 'AAAsf' rated notes are at the
highest rating on Fitch's scale and cannot have a rating cushion.

Should the cushion between the identified portfolio and the
Fitch-stressed portfolio be eroded due to manager trading or
negative portfolio credit migration, a 25% increase of the mean RDR
across all ratings and a 25% decrease of the RRR all ratings of the
Fitch-stressed portfolio would lead to downgrades of no more than
one notch for the rated notes.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

A 25% reduction of the mean RDR across all ratings and a 25%
increase in the RRR across all ratings would result in an upgrade
of one notch for the class C notes, two notches for the class B, D,
E and F notes and no impact on the 'AAAsf' notes.

During the reinvestment period, upgrades based on the
Fitch-stressed portfolio, may occur on better-than-expected
portfolio credit quality and a shorter remaining WAL test, leading
to the ability of the notes to withstand larger-than-expected
losses for the remaining life of the transaction. After the end of
the reinvestment period, upgrades, except for the 'AAAsf' notes,
may occur in case of stable portfolio credit quality and
deleveraging, leading to higher credit enhancement and excess
spread available to cover losses in the remaining portfolio.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other nationally
recognised statistical rating organisations and/or European
securities and markets authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information or information on the risk-presenting entities.

Overall, and together with any assumptions, Fitch's assessment of
the information relied upon for the agency's rating analysis
according to its applicable rating methodologies indicates that it
is adequately reliable.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

A description of the transaction's representations, warranties and
enforcement mechanisms (RW&Es) that are disclosed in the offering
document and which relate to the underlying asset pool was not
prepared for this transaction. Offering Documents for this market
sector typically do not include RW&Es that are available to
investors and that relate to the asset pool underlying the trust.
Therefore, Fitch credit reports for this market sector will not
typically include descriptions of RW&Es. For further information,
please see Fitch's Special Report titled 'Representations,
Warranties and Enforcement Mechanisms in Global Structured Finance
Transactions'.

LAST MILE: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH confirmed its ratings on the following classes of
commercial mortgage-backed floating rate notes due August 2033
issued by Last Mile Logistics Pan Euro Finance DAC (the Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)
-- Class F at B (high) (sf)

All trends on all classes of notes remain Stable.

CREDIT RATING RATIONALE

The transaction is a securitization of a EUR 510.2 million senior
commercial real estate loan backed by a pan-European portfolio of
light-industrial and logistics assets managed collectively by
Mileway and owned by Blackstone Real Estate Partners (Blackstone or
the Sponsor). The senior loan is divided into two term
facilities—term A and term B—with term A advanced to non-Irish
borrowers and term B advanced only to Irish borrowers.
Additionally, there was a EUR 102.0 million mezzanine facility at
origination, contractually and structurally subordinated to the
securitized senior loan, which was repaid in April 2022 as per
Mileway's recapitalization.

The senior loan has a term of two years with three one-year
extension options. With initial maturity of the loan scheduled on
15 August 2023, DBRS Morningstar expects that the borrower will
exercise the first extension option and will extend the loan to
August 2024.

The senior loan is backed by 109 predominately light-industrial or
logistics assets across seven European countries (Germany, France,
the Netherlands, Finland, Spain, Denmark and Ireland). At
origination, the loan was backed by 113 properties with the
acquisition of the Choisy asset to be completed shortly after the
closing date. However, the property's completion was delayed beyond
the longstop date and allocated loan amount was used to prepay the
loan at the November 2021 interest payment day (IPD). Additionally,
three assets were sold in February 2023. As a result, the loan
balance decreased by EUR 9.2 million since origination to EUR 501.0
million, with all principal receipts applied pro-rata to the
notes.

Jones Lang LaSalle Limited conducted a revaluation of the portfolio
in September 2022 and appraised the aggregate market value of the
109 properties at EUR 804.6 million (excluding the 5.0% portfolio
premium), a 7.7% increase from the 2021 valuation on the
like-for-like basis. This translates into a loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio of 59.3% as of the May 2023 IPD, an improvement from 63.8%
LTV reported at last review.

The loan performed in line with the expectations over the past 12
months, with net rental income increasing to EUR 49.9 million in
May 2023 from EUR 46.5 million at the last review in spite of
property disposals helped by improvement in vacancy and increase in
average contracted rent per square meter. Consequently, debt yield
(DY) increased to 10.0% in May 2023 from 9.0% a year earlier.

Reflecting the changes in the portfolio's composition outlined
above, DBRS Morningstar updated its DBRS Morningstar net cash flow
(NCF) to EUR 35.6 million. With the capitalization rate remaining
unchanged from the initial rating, the resulting DBRS Morningstar
Value is EUR 547.7 million, representing a haircut of 32.0% to the
latest appraised value. This did not trigger any changes to the
ratings on all classes of notes, which DBRS Morningstar confirmed
with Stable trends. For DBRS Morningstar's underwriting assumptions
at issuance, please refer to the transaction's rating report.

DBRS Morningstar noted that the senior facility is denominated in
euros (EUR) whereas the Danish assets and income, which amount to
approximately 7.8% of the portfolio aggregated MV, are denominated
in Danish kroner (DKK). In the absence of a currency swap, the
borrower takes on the foreign-exchange risk between the two
currencies. However, the Danish central bank has pegged the DKK
exchange rate to EUR and historical data shows little fluctuation
in the DKK/EUR exchange rate. To reflect this, DBRS Morningstar
applied an exchange rate of DKK 7.6282 per EUR to the GRI generated
by the Danish assets, the highest exchange rate allowed by the
Danish central bank for all non-AAA (sf)-rated investment-grade
stress scenarios and a higher exchange rate of 12.1086 DKK per EUR
in the AAA (sf) stress scenario.

There are no financial covenants applicable prior to a permitted
change of control (COC), but cash trap covenants are applicable
both before and after a permitted COC. The cash trap covenants are
set at 73.67% LTV, while the DY covenant is set at 7.55% for the
first and second year and steps up to 7.93% on and from the third
year. After a permitted COC, the financial default covenants on the
LTV and the DY will be applicable. These covenants are set at 10%
above the LTV at the time of the permitted COC and the higher of
85% of the DY at the time of the permitted COC and 7.34%,
respectively. The loan will also start to amortize at 1% per year
after a permitted COC; however, DBRS Morningstar noted that, to be
qualified as a permitted COC, the LTV should not exceed 63.67% and
the new owner needs to be a qualifying transferee.

The transaction benefits from the liquidity reserve of EUR 11.8
million (EUR 12.0 million at origination), which is funded through
the over issuance of Class A notes and through the Issuer loan,
which funds the Issuer loan share of the reserve. The liquidity
reserve can be used to cover any potential interest shortfalls on
the Class A, Class B, and the relevant portion of the Issuer loan.
DBRS Morningstar estimated that the commitment amount is equivalent
to approximately 20 months of coverage based on the current
interest rate cap strike of 1.25% or approximately nine months of
coverage based on the 4% Euribor cap after loan maturity.

The Class E and Class F notes are subject to an available funds cap
where the shortfall is attributable to a reduction in the
interest-bearing balance of the senior loan that results from
prepayments or by a final recovery determination of the senior
loan.

The legal final maturity of the notes is in August 2033, seven
years after the fully extended loan maturity date.

DBRS Morningstar's credit ratings on Class A, Class B, Class C,
Class D, Class E, and Class F of the commercial mortgage-backed
floating rate notes issued by Last Mile Logistics Pan Euro Finance
DAC address the credit risk associated with the identified
financial obligations in accordance with the relevant transaction
documents. The associated financial obligations are listed at the
end of this Press Release.

DBRS Morningstar's credit rating does not address non-payment risk
associated with contractual payment obligations contemplated in the
applicable transaction documents that are not financial
obligations. For example, pro-rata default interest, Euribor excess
amount, and prepayment fees.

DBRS Morningstar's long-term credit ratings provide opinions on
risk of default. DBRS Morningstar considers risk of default to be
the risk that an issuer will fail to satisfy the financial
obligations in accordance with the terms under which a long-term
obligation has been issued.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


TORO EUROPEAN 4: Fitch Affirms 'B+sf' Rating on Class F-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Toro European CLO 4 DAC's class C-R
notes to 'AA-sf' from 'A+sf' and affirmed all others. The Outlook
for the class D-R notes has been revised to Positive from Stable
and for the class F-R notes to Negative from Stable.

ENTITY/DEBT    RATING    PRIOR
----------              ------                  -----
Toro European CLO 4 DAC

A-R XS1639912762 LT   AAAsf    Affirmed AAAsf
B-1-R 89109MAH7  LT   AAAsf    Affirmed AAAsf
B-2-R 89109MAM6  LT   AAAsf    Affirmed AAAsf
B-3-R 89109MAP9  LT   AAAsf    Affirmed AAAsf
C-R 89109MAS3  LT   AA-sf    Upgrade A+sf
D-R 89109MAV6  LT   BBB+sf   Affirmed  BBB+sf
E-R XS1639910808 LT   BB+sf    Affirmed BB+sf
F-R 89109MAZ7  LT   B+sf     Affirmed B+sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Toro European CLO 4 DAC is a cash flow collateralised loan
obligation (CLO). The underlying portfolio of assets mainly
consists of leveraged loans and is managed by Chenavari Credit
Partners LLP. The deal exited its reinvestment period on July
2021.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Deleveraging Drives Upgrade and Affirmation: Since Fitch's last
rating action in August 2022, the class A notes have been paid down
by approximately EUR87 million. The deleveraging has increased
credit enhancement (CE) for the senior class A-R and B-R notes by
14.5% and 9.4% respectively, and for the class C-R, D-R, E-R and
F-R notes by 6.6%, 4.4%, 1.6% and 0.5%, respectively. The EUR38
million of cash in the principal account, on a trade date basis, is
expected to be used to pay down the class A-R notes in the next
payment date, further increasing CE. The positive impact of the
deleveraging supports the upgrade of the class C-R notes and
affirmation on the others.

CE Protects Class A to E: The senior notes and class C-R, D-R and
E-R notes are unlikely to be affected by any near-term defaults due
to the sizeable build-up of CE from deleveraging, as reflected in
their Stable Outlooks. For the class C-R and D-R notes, the
Positive Outlook reflects the potential for upgrade as the
transaction seasons further and the portfolio performance continues
to be in line with Fitch's expectation.

Par Erosion, Refinancing Risk: Worsening par erosion as a result of
new defaults and the sale of defaulted assets since the last rating
action has offset the positive impact of deleveraging on the class
F-R notes. The transaction is now at 4.2% below par, compared with
1.7% below par in the last review. The Negative Outlook further
reflects the class F-R notes' vulnerability to near- and
medium-term refinancing risk due to their junior ranking.
Approximately 10.6% of the portfolio matures within the next 18
months, and 20% in 2025. About 2.8% of the portfolio comprises weak
credits of 'CCC+' or below, which mature in 2024.

Transaction Failing Reinvestment Criteria: The transaction is
failing the post-reinvestment period reinvestment criteria. For any
reinvestment to occur, the weighted average life test must be
satisfied, among others, immediately after the reinvestment, which
Fitch deems highly unlikely. Consequently, Fitch have analysed the
transaction based on the Outlook Negative portfolio for which Fitch
have downgraded by a notch entities on Negative Outlook and for
which the weighted average life (WAL) is floored at four years for
upgrades, and based on the current portfolio for downgrades.

'B'/'B-' Portfolio: Fitch assesses the average credit quality of
the obligors at 'B'/'B-'. The Fitch-calculated weighted average
rating factor (WARF) of the current portfolio was 24 and for the
Negative Outlook portfolio at 25.5.

High Recovery Expectations: Senior secured obligations comprise
97.1% of the portfolio. Fitch views the recovery prospects for
these assets as more favourable than for second-lien, unsecured and
mezzanine assets. The Fitch-calculated weighted average recovery
rate (WARR) of the current portfolio as reported by the trustee was
63.1%, but is based on an outdated Fitch criteria. Under the
current criteria, the WARR calculated by Fitch is 61.7%.

Increased Portfolio Concentrations: The top 10 obligor
concentration as calculated by the trustee is 24.5%, just under the
limit of 25%, and no obligor represents more than 2.7% of the
portfolio balance.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

An increase of the default rate (RDR) at all rating levels by 25%
of the mean RDR and a decrease of the recovery rate (RRR) by 25% at
all rating levels would result in downgrades of three notches for
the class E-R notes, to below 'B-sf' for the class F-R notes and
has no impact on the rest. Downgrades may occur if the build-up of
CE following amortisation does not compensate for a larger loss
expectation than initially assumed due to unexpectedly high levels
of defaults and portfolio deterioration.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

A reduction of the RDR at all rating levels by 25% of the mean RDR
and an increase in the RRR by 25% at all rating levels would result
in upgrades of up to three notches for the class C-R and the class
D-R notes, up to two notches for the class E-R notes and no more
than one notch for the class F-R notes. The class A-R and B-R notes
are already at the highest rating on Fitch's scale and cannot be
upgraded.

Further upgrades, except for 'AAAsf' notes, may occur if the
portfolio's quality remains stable and the notes start to amortise,
leading to higher CE across the structure.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset pool
and the transaction. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other nationally
recognised statistical rating organisations and/or European
securities and markets authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information or information on the risk-presenting entities.

Overall, and together with any assumptions, Fitch's assessment of
the information relied upon for the agency's rating analysis
according to its applicable rating methodologies indicates that it
is adequately reliable.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.



=========
I T A L Y
=========

AUTOFLORENCE 1: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH took the following credit rating actions on the
notes (collectively, the Notes) issued by AutoFlorence 1 S.r.l.
(the Issuer):

-- Class A Notes confirmed at AA (sf)
-- Class B Notes upgraded to A (high) (sf) from A (sf)
-- Class C Notes upgraded to A (low) (sf) from BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class D Notes confirmed at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E Notes confirmed at B (high) (sf)

The credit rating on the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment
of interest and the ultimate repayment of principal by the legal
final maturity date in December 2042. The credit ratings on the
Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E Notes address the ultimate
payment of interest and the ultimate repayment of principal by the
legal final maturity date in December 2042.

The credit rating actions follow an annual review of the
transaction and are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies, defaults, and
losses, as of the June 2023 payment date;

-- Probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and
expected loss assumptions on the remaining receivables; and

-- Current available credit enhancement to the Notes to cover the
expected losses at their respective credit rating levels.

The transaction is an Italian securitization of auto loan
receivables granted and serviced by Findomestic Banca S.p.A.
(Findomestic). The transaction closed in August 2019 and had an
initial 12-month revolving period, which ended on the August 2020
payment date. Since then, the rated notes as well as the unrated
Class F Notes have been amortizing on a pro rata basis. However,
certain events could cause this feature to stop, and the cash flows
would then be allocated on a sequential basis to amortize the
Notes.

Despite the pro rata amortization of the Notes, the deleveraging of
the portfolio, down to EUR 176.6 million from EUR 950.0 million at
closing in 2019, prompted the upgrades on the credit ratings of the
Class B and Class C Notes.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As of the June 2023 payment date, loans that were one to two months
delinquent represented 0.6% of the principal outstanding balance of
the portfolio, while loans that were two to three months and more
than three months delinquent represented 0.1% and 0.2%,
respectively. Gross cumulative defaults amounted to 1.7% of the
aggregate original portfolio balance, with cumulative recoveries of
17.2% to date.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS AND KEY DRIVERS

DBRS Morningstar conducted a loan-by-loan analysis on the remaining
pool of receivables and updated its base case PD to 3.5% and
maintained its base case LGD assumption at 80.0%.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

The subordination of the respective junior obligations provides
credit enhancement to the Class A through Class E Notes. As of the
June 2023 payment date, credit enhancements to the Class A, Class
B, Class C, Class D, and Class E Notes were 15.0%, 11.0%, 8.0%,
5.5%, and 3.5%, respectively, unchanged since the DBRS Morningstar
initial credit rating because of the inclusion of the 12-month
revolving period first and the subsequent pro rata amortization of
the notes.

The transaction benefits from a liquidity reserve, available until
the Class C Notes are fully repaid, to cover senior expenses, swap
payments, interest on the Class A Notes, and interest on the Class
B and Class C Notes if not subordinated. It is available only if
principal collections are not sufficient to cover the interest
deficiency. The liquidity reserve was funded at closing with EUR
8.7 million and its required balance is equal to 1% of the
aggregate balance of the Class A, Class B, and Class C Notes'
balance, subject to a EUR 3.1 million floor. The liquidity reserve
is currently at its floor of EUR 3.1 million.

BNP Paribas Succursale Italia (BNPP Italia) acts as the account
bank for the transaction. Based on DBRS Morningstar's private
rating on BNPP Italia, the downgrade provisions outlined in the
transaction documents, and other mitigating factors inherent in the
transaction structure, DBRS Morningstar considers the risk arising
from the exposure to the account bank to be consistent with the
credit ratings assigned to the Notes, as described in DBRS
Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

Findomestic acts as the swap counterparty for the transaction. DBRS
Morningstar's private rating of Findomestic is consistent with the
First Rating Threshold as described in DBRS Morningstar's
"Derivative Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
methodology.

DBRS Morningstar's credit rating on the Notes addresses the credit
risk associated with the identified financial obligations in
accordance with the relevant transaction documents. The associated
financial obligations are listed at the end of this Press Release.

DBRS Morningstar's credit rating does not address non-payment risk
associated with contractual payment obligations contemplated in the
applicable transaction document(s) that are not financial
obligations.

DBRS Morningstar's long-term credit ratings provide opinions on
risk of default. DBRS Morningstar considers risk of default to be
the risk that an issuer will fail to satisfy the financial
obligations in accordance with the terms under which a long-term
obligation has been issued.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


BCC NPLS 2019: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on Class B Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH took the following credit rating actions on the
notes issued by BCC NPLs 2019 S.r.l. (the Issuer):

-- Class A Notes downgraded to BBB (low) (sf) from BBB (sf) with a
Negative trend

-- Class B Notes confirmed at CCC (sf) with a Negative trend

The transaction represents the issuance of Class A, Class B, and
Class J Notes (collectively, the Notes) backed by a mixed pool of
Italian nonperforming secured and unsecured loans originated by 68
Italian banks (collectively, the Originators). The credit rating
assigned to the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate repayment of principal on or before the
final maturity date of the transaction, while the credit rating
assigned to the Class B Notes addresses the ultimate payment of
both interest and principal on or before the final maturity date.
DBRS Morningstar does not rate the Class J Notes also issued under
this transaction.

The gross book value (GBV) of the loan pool was approximately EUR
1.32 billion as of the 31 December 2018 selection date. The
securitized portfolio is composed of secured loans, representing
approximately 73.8% of the GBV, with unsecured loans representing
the remaining 26.2% of the GBV. Residential and industrial real
estate properties represent 44.2% and 16.2% of the pool by
first-lien real estate value, respectively.

The receivables are serviced by doValue S.p.A. (doValue or the
Special Servicer). doNext S.p.A. acts as the master servicer while
Banca Finanziaria Internazionale S.p.A. (formerly Securitization
Services S.p.A.) operates as the backup servicer.

CREDIT RATING RATIONALE
The credit rating actions follow a review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Transaction performance: An assessment of portfolio recoveries
as of December 31, 2022, focusing on: (1) a comparison between
actual collections and the Special Servicer's initial business plan
forecast; (2) the collection performance observed over recent
months; and (3) a comparison between the current performance and
DBRS Morningstar's expectations.

-- Updated business plan: The Special Servicer's updated business
plan as of December 2022, received in June 2023, and the comparison
with the initial collection expectations.

-- Portfolio characteristics: The loan pool composition as of
December 2022 and the evolution of its core features since
issuance.

-- Transaction liquidating structure: The order of priority
entails a fully sequential amortization of the Notes (i.e., the
Class B Notes will begin to amortize following the full repayment
of the Class A Notes and the Class J Notes will amortize following
the repayment of the Class B Notes). Additionally, interest
payments on the Class B Notes become subordinated to principal
payments on the Class A Notes if the net cumulative collection
ratio or the present value cumulative profitability ratio is lower
than 90%. These triggers were not breached on the January 2023
interest payment date (IPD), with the actual figures at 93.0% and
109.1%, respectively, according to the Special Servicer.

-- Liquidity support: The transaction benefits from an amortizing
cash reserve providing liquidity to the structure by covering
potential interest shortfall on the Class A Notes and senior fees.
The cash reserve target amount is equal to 3% of the Class A Notes'
principal outstanding balance and is currently fully funded.

-- Interest rate risk: The transaction is exposed to interest rate
risk in a rising interest rate environment due to an increasing
strike rate in the interest rate cap agreement that slows down the
redemption of the Class A Notes.

TRANSACTION AND PERFORMANCE

According to the latest investor report from January 2023, the
outstanding principal amounts of the Class A, Class B, and Class J
Notes were EUR 253.6 million, EUR 53.0 million, and EUR 13.2
million, respectively. As of the January 2023 payment date, the
balance of the Class A Notes has amortized by 28.6% since issuance
and the current aggregated transaction balance was EUR 319.8
million.

As of December 2022, the transaction was performing below the
Special Servicer's business plan expectations. The actual
cumulative gross collections equalled EUR 148.0 million at the end
of December, whereas the Special Servicer's initial business plan
estimated cumulative gross collections of EUR 153.6 million for the
same period. Therefore, as of December 2022, the transaction was
underperforming by EUR 5.6 million (-3.7%) compared with the
initial business plan expectations.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar estimated cumulative gross
collections for the same period of EUR 100.2 million at the BBB
(sf) stressed scenario and EUR 148.2 million at the CCC (sf)
stressed scenario. Therefore, as of December 2022, the transaction
was performing above DBRS Morningstar's initial stressed
expectations in the BBB (sf) scenario, but below the expectations
in the CCC (sf) scenario.

Pursuant to the requirements set out in the receivable servicing
agreement, in June 2023, the Special Servicer delivered an updated
portfolio business plan.

The updated portfolio business plan, combined with the actual
cumulative gross collections of EUR 148.0 million as of December
2022, results in a total of EUR 562.2 million, which is 13.1% lower
than the total gross disposition proceeds of EUR 646.8 million
estimated in the initial business plan.

Excluding actual collections, the Special Servicer's expected
future collections from January 2023 now amount to EUR 414.2
million. The updated DBRS Morningstar BBB (low) (sf) credit rating
stress assumes a haircut of 17.4% to the Servicer's updated
business plan, considering future expected collections from January
2023. In DBRS Morningstar's CCC (sf) scenario, the Servicer's
updated forecast was only adjusted in terms of the actual
collections to date and the timing of future expected collections.

The final maturity date of the transaction is in January 2044.

DBRS Morningstar's credit rating on the Class A and Class B Notes
addresses the credit risk associated with the identified financial
obligations in accordance with the relevant transaction documents.
The associated financial obligations are listed at the end of this
Press Release.

DBRS Morningstar's credit rating does not address non-payment risk
associated with contractual payment obligations contemplated in the
applicable transaction documents that are not financial
obligations.

DBRS Morningstar's long-term credit ratings provide opinions on
risk of default. DBRS Morningstar considers risk of default to be
the risk that an issuer will fail to satisfy the financial
obligations in accordance with the terms under which a long-term
obligation has been issued.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.




===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================

ONLINEKAZFINANCE: S&P Affirms 'B-' ICR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' long-term issuer credit rating
on microfinance organization OnlineKazFinance Microfinance
Organization JSC (OKF). The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term issuer credit
rating and its 'kzBB-' Kazakhstan national scale rating on the
company.

The transformation into a bank may be positive for OKF's
creditworthiness. OKF filed an application to convert into a bank
in mid-2023, expecting completion in the fourth quarter of 2023.
That conversion may support OKF's credit profile as the company
would be able to offer a wider range of services (specifically
settlement), may benefit from lower cost of funds, including
deposits, and will be subject to a more stringent regulation and
supervision.

S&P said, "We expect OKF will operate with moderate capital
buffers.We expect OKF's capital adequacy, measured by our
risk-adjusted capital (RAC), ratio will stay in the range of
5.5%-6.0% in the medium term, fueled by a planned capital increase.
We expected previously that OKF's adjusted capital adequacy will be
in the range of 7%-8%, with the change driven by a lower volume of
projected capital injections and relaxed equity-to-assets covenants
negotiated with Mintos. We consider recently issued preferred stock
will have minimal equity content under our criteria because,
according to the company's charter, any loss absorption (reduction
of dividends or conversion into common equity) requires that
two-thirds of preferred stock holders give their consent."

OKF's corporate structure will continue to evolve. Boris Batine and
Alexander Dunaev now own OKF through Solva Capital LLP, while Solva
Group only retains preferred stock. This change in the corporate
structure reflects OKF's efforts to achieve regulatory approval for
the conversion into a bank. S&P understands, however, that the
group does not rule out raising some capital through Solva Group by
using common and preferred stock.

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that the benefits
OKF may receive from the banking license will balance ongoing
execution risks related to its evolving business model and risk
appetite over the next 12-18 months.

"We may lower the ratings if OKF's asset quality rapidly
deteriorates, creating risks for creditors. We may also take a
negative rating action if we see OKF's funding shift toward
short-term maturities, with the entity increasingly reliant on its
rollover.

"We may raise the ratings over the next 12-18 months if we perceive
that OKF's progress toward becoming a fully licensed bank is
complemented with the successful expansion of its digital offering
of settlement products. Prerequisites for a positive rating action
will be at least moderate capitalization and consistent asset
quality, along with a diversified and stable funding profile closer
to that of conventional banks."

ESG credit indicators: E-2, S-2, G-3




===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================

PARTICLE INVESTMENT: S&P Upgrades LT ICR to 'B+', Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term issuer credit rating on
Particle Investment S.a.r.l. (WebPros), the leading web hosting
automation software provider, and the issue rating on its
first-lien senior secured facilities to 'B+' from 'B'. The recovery
rating remains unchanged at '3', reflecting its estimate of an
about 65% recovery (rounded estimate) in the event of a default.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the company will
maintain its high EBITDA margin and deliver consistent growth,
helping it maintain leverage at well below 5x S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA.

The upgrade is supported by WebPros' solid track record of debt
repayments, which improved its credit metrics. WebPros prepaid $82
million of debt in 2022, and an additional $38 million in the first
half 2023, leading adjusted debt to decline to $533 million in
first-half 2023 from $653 million in 2021. S&P said, "We calculate
adjusted debt to EBITDA declined to about 4.2x at the end of
first-quarter 2023 from 4.5x in 2022 and 5.7x in 2021. We expect
the company will continue with its repayments in the second half of
2023 and--coupled with our estimation of 7% annual revenue
growth--this may lead to leverage below 4.0x in 2023. Our base case
does not assume any acquisition or shareholder distributions. While
we see dividends as unlikely in the short term, the rating is
constrained by the company's financial sponsor ownership and lack
of commitment to maintaining credit metrics at a level supporting a
higher rating."

S&P said, "We forecast continued organic growth and strong margins,
mainly supported by price increases. We estimate WebPros will
expand its topline by up to 7% in 2023, supported by continued
price increases, while the number of licenses sold will likely
remain flat. We expect license volume movement to be largely driven
by an infrastructure optimization program at one of WebPros'
largest customers (migration from solo licenses into editions with
more than one account, leading to a decrease in the number of
licenses while the number of accounts stays the same). Thus, our
forecast revenue growth will mainly be driven by price indexation
and supported by customer loyalty and favorable market trends. As
price growth is exceeding expected inflation, we anticipate
profitability will remain strong with adjusted EBITDA margins of
58%-59%--compared with an average of 25%-30% for software peers."

Above-average profitability coupled with low capex needs support
material cash flow generation. WebPros' low cost of good sales
(COGS) and low sales and marketing expenses underpin its strong
profitability. COGS mainly relates to third-party extensions and
commissions to online store partners, as well as expenses for
customer support services. As such, margins remain strong, despite
additional labor costs incurred in 2022 related to the relocation
of Russian employees and exceptional payments to former and
executive management. Moreover, WebPros benefits from a
capital-light nature and minimal working capital requirements,
which give it solid free operating cash flow conversion (FOCF) to
revenue of nearly 30%. S&P forecasts FOCF (after lease payments) of
$64 million in 2023, which can further support WebPros' liquidity,
providing a buffer for small bolt-on acquisitions or debt
repayment.

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that the
company will maintain strong profitability and deliver consistent
growth while keeping leverage well below 5x S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA and FOCF to debt at about 10%. We
also expect WebPros will prioritize debt repayments over dividend
distribution and do not anticipate large mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) in the next 12-18 months.

"We could lower the rating if WebPros' revenue and EBITDA growth
are materially below our base case--leading to adjusted debt to
EBITDA higher than 5x for a sustained period--with FOCF to debt
weakening materially below 10%. This could happen if the company
faces a decline in license volumes or is unable to increase prices
as expected. We could also lower the rating if there are material
shareholder structure changes leading to a more aggressive
financial policy.

"We could raise the rating over the next 12-18 months if adjusted
leverage declined and remained sustainably below 4.0x while FOCF to
debt exceeded 10%. This would need to be coupled with a prudent
financial policy aimed at maintaining these metrics or material
headroom for the metrics to be maintained."

ESG credit indicators: E-2, S-2, G-3




=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================

EMBRAER NETHERLANDS: Fitch Rates New Sr. Unsec. Bonds 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BB+' rating to Embraer Netherlands
Finance B.V. proposed 2030 benchmark sized senior unsecured bonds.
Embraer Netherlands Finance is a wholly owned subsidiary of Embraer
S.A. (Embraer). The issuance will be unconditionally and
irrevocably guaranteed by Embraer. Net proceeds will be used for a
tender offer for the 2028, 2025 and 2027 notes, and any remainder
for general corporate purposes. Fitch currently rates Embraer's
Long-Term (LT) Foreign Currency and Local Currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) 'BB+' and Long-Term National Scale Rating
'AAA(bra)'. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Embraer's ratings reflect its competitive positions in the
commercial and business jet markets; large backlog (USD17.4
billion) covering several years of sales; and some product
portfolio diversification that further includes defense programs
and solid operations of its services and support segment. Embraer's
robust liquidity profile (mostly held outside Brazil) and its large
export revenues combined with some offshore operating cash flow
further support its ratings. The company's ability to maintain
positive FCF generation, to reduce gross leverage, while
maintaining net leverage consistently below 2.5x during the next
years and navigate the development of Eve Holding Inc. (EVE) is key
to potential positive rating actions in the medium term.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Ongoing Backlog and Deliveries Recover: Fitch expects commercial
aircraft deliveries for 2023 to be around 20% below 2019 levels and
10% for 2024 (around 70 and 80 aircraft, respectively). For
business jet deliveries, the rebound has been faster with an
increase of 15% in 2023 and of 24% in 2024 (around 125 and 135
aircraft, respectively). During 2022, deliveries reached 57 for
commercial aviation and 102 for executive jets. Embraer and the
global aerospace & defense industry as a whole, has been suffered
from materials shortages and supply chain constraints, which
affected deliveries targets. Fitch expects this scenario to be
improving throughout 2023 with manufacturings reporting lower lead
times for parts and higher engine availability, which is likely to
support the ongoing rebound in deliveries later in the year and
2024.

Embraer's firm order backlog (commercial aviation) stood at 281
aircraft at the end of 1Q23, down from 291 in 4Q22 and 315 in 1Q22.
In terms of financial backlog, it has already surpassed
pre-pandemic levels, with USD17.4 billion at the end of 1Q23,
amount higher than 2019 (USD16.8 billion), and improvement from
USD14.4 billion at the end of 2020. In Fitch's view, Embraer's
backlog supports production for the next several years but suffers
from concentration and quality. Embraer remains working to boost
the orders of its E2 aircraft, while fierce competition could be
pressuring to higher price discounts.

Strong Market Position: Embraer's strong market position for
commercial jets with fewer than 150 seats and within the global
executive jets are key factors supporting the expected recovery in
the company's backlog in the medium term. Albeit increasing
competition that could pressure prices, midsize commercial jets
producers are expected to continue to have opportunities with
mainline or low-cost carriers that are looking to rightsize their
fleet to adjust capacity. The weaker financial or business position
of few competitors, or in some cases a change in strategy, are
allowing growth opportunities for Embraer that are helping the
company to see deliveries rebound in 2023/2024. Embraer's high
exposure to the U.S. regional/domestic market, which have seen a
stronger recover in some markets, are also facing some
infrastructure constrains. The performance of those markets is also
a key rating consideration and should help to drive commercial
aviation deliveries.

EBIT Margin Recovering: Embraer's operating performance is expected
to improve as deliveries rebound. During 2023 and 2024, Fitch
projects that Embraer's EBIT margins will recover to around 6.5%,
with the likely increase in backlog. During pre-pandemic period,
the company was facing pressures as it navigated several new
development programs. The lower deliveries in commercial aviation
and less favorable mix have affected the company's fixed cost
dilution during the 2020-2022 period.

Short-Term Working Capital Pressure: After a strong FCF generation
during 2022 (around USD500 million), working capital consumption
ahead of deliveries volume ramp-up, ongoing capex programs and
developments at EVE will pressure Embraer's FCF in the next 2-3
years. The strong FCF during 2022 represented an improvement from
the USD1 billion of FCF burn in 2020 and positive FCF of USD239
million in 2021. For 2023 and 2024, FCF is expected to be negative
at USD188 million and USD208 million, after capex of USD396 million
and USD555 million (including EVE), respectively. For 2023-2024,
Fitch's rating case does not currently assume dividend
distributions.

Net Leverage Trending Down: Fitch forecasts Embraer's net
debt/EBITDA to reach 1.9x in 2023, down from 2,4x in 2022 and 4.3x
in 2021. This compares with 20.7x in 2020, 4.1x in 2019 and average
of 1.0x during the 2015-2017 period. On gross leverage, Embraer's
leverage remains high for the rating, around 5.6x-4.6x over the
next two years. The company's ability to maintain positive FCF
generation, to reduce gross leverage, while maintaining net
leverage consistently below 2.5x during the next years and navigate
the development of EVE is key to potential positive rating actions
in the medium term.

Modest Brazilian Risk: Approximately 90% of Embraer's revenue is
generated from exports or from business operations based abroad.
Nonetheless, Brazil's economic and political environment is a
concern as the majority of Embraer's operating asset base is
locally domiciled, and the government represents a large portion of
the defense segment backlog. Brazil is listed as a related party in
Embraer's SEC filings as a result of the Brazilian government's
"golden share" and a direct shareholder stake (approximately 5% of
Embraer) via a company controlled by the government. Embraer's
recent contract renegotiations with the Federal Government was an
item to watch, but Fitch does not expect any major impact to cash
flow.

Rating Above Country Ceiling: Fitch does not consider Brazil's
country ceiling a rating constraint for Embraer currently, given
the company's large cash holding outside of Brazil, as well as its
heavy focus on exports, stand-by credit facility and growing
business outside of Brazil. Based on these factors, under Fitch's
criteria, Embraer could be rated up to three notches higher than
the Brazilian country ceiling.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Embraer is one the market leaders for commercial jets with fewer
than 150 seats. Its aircraft are known for their engineering,
commonality across models and interior design. The company had 281
firm jet orders in backlog as of March 31, 2023. Embraer's total
backlog, including contracts from all segments, was USD17.4 billion
at March 31, 2023. Embraer's weaker competitive position compared
with major global peers, notably The Boeing Company (BBB-/Stable)
and Airbus SE (A-/Stable), based on scale and financial strength,
is partially offset by its good business position in the niche of
commercial jets with fewer than 150 seats, and its manageable
financial profile. Embraer's bulk of operations are in Brazil, but
its large exports flow, cash balances and operating cash flow
abroad are factors supporting its ratings above the country
ceiling, as per Fitch's criteria.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within the Rating Case for the Issuer

-- Embraer's commercial deliveries to be close to the company's
guidance of 70 in 2023 and 80 in 2024 (-21% and -10% versus 2019);

-- The business jet market deliveries to be around 125 in 2023 and
2024;

-- EBIT margin to moving around 7%;

-- Consolidated investment expenditures of around USD400 million
in 2023 and USD550 million in 2024;

-- Embraer to maintain its strong liquidity throughout the
forecast period and active liability management strategy to manage
refinancing risks.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An upgrade to investment-grade level would be dependent on a
return to net leverage below 2.5x on sustainable basis, in addition
to gross leverage around 4.5x and strong liquidity position with no
major refinancing risks in the medium term;

-- Strong rebound in deliveries to 2019 levels earlier than
expected leading to EBIT margins above 7%;

-- Steady positive FCF generation.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Higher than expected capex levels, including additional cash
outflows related to EVE;

-- Substantial order cancellations in the E1 and E2 programs and
business jet segment, or significant delays and cost increases on
the new programs;

-- Net leverage remaining consistently above 3.5x from end of 2023
on;

-- Substantial declines in liquidity without commensurate debt
reductions;

-- Multiple-notch downgrade of Brazil's sovereign rating, along
with a similar reduction in the country ceiling.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Strong Liquidity: Embraer's financial flexibility is solid and it
is a key factor supporting the ratings. The company had USD3.2
billion of debt as of March 31, 2023, with cross-border unsecured
bonds representing around 79% of this amount. Total cash and
investments at the end of the period were USD1.9 billion, excluding
EVE (USD 294 million), and is sufficient to support debt
amortization up to at least mid 2027. The company's liquidity is
further enhanced by a revolving credit facility of USD650 million.

Fitch expects Embraer to remain disciplined with its liquidity
position, maintaining its proactive approach in liability
management to avoid exposure to refinancing risks. At March 31,
2023, approximately 98% of the company's cash, equivalents and
financial investments were in U.S. dollars and a major part being
held abroad.

ISSUER PROFILE

Embraer is the market leader for commercial jets with fewer than
150 seats. Its aircraft are known for their engineering,
commonality across models, and interior design. The company
delivered 57 commercial jets in 2022, an increase from 44 in 2020,
but down from 89 in 2019, 90 in 2018, and 101 in 2017.

DATE OF RELEVANT COMMITTEE

January 19, 2023

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

IGNITION TOPCO: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CCC' on Higher Refinancing Risk
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on IGM Resins parent
company, Ignition Topco, and its debt to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'; the
recovery rating on the debt remains at '3', reflecting its
expectation of weighted average recovery of 55% (rounded
estimate).

S&P said, "The outlook is stable because, despite our view that
IGM's capital structure is unsustainable, we regard liquidity
sufficient to support operations for the next 12 months and
consider that the current shareholders have expressed their
willingness to support the company if needed."

IGM Resins, which manufactures and supplies ultraviolet (UV) and
light-emitting diode (LED) curable materials, continued to
significantly underperform its budget and our base-case scenario
during the first five months of 2023.

S&P said, "We anticipate that IGM Resins' FOCF will be negative in
2023, with leverage well above 10x, due to the continued weak
economic environment and high exceptional costs. For the first five
months of 2023, IGM Resins reported significantly lower sales and
EBITDA compared with its budget and last year's results. The
underperformance stemmed mainly from low market demand, combined
with continued competitive pressure from China in core
photoinitiators, and significant cost impact from underutilized
manufacturing sites in Mortara and the Charlotte plant, with the
Anqing plant still ramping up. We anticipate lower revenue of about
EUR240 million-EUR250 million in 2023 and EUR270 million-EUR290
million in 2024. Our forecast factors in low market demand caused
by destocking and China's lagging economy in the first half of
2023. We expect this situation to eventually reverse, given end
customers' low inventory levels, which should give rise to moderate
restocking activity amid still subdued demand later in 2023 and
into 2024."

The new turnaround plan should support the business and margins in
2024. The company has also announced a new turnaround plan, aimed
at optimizing sites, winding down the Charlotte plant, reducing
overall costs, and improving the product mix as well as the
marketing approach. S&P anticipates that these actions will
contribute to the overall strengthening of IGM Resins' business and
margins, most notably in 2024 when exceptional expenses (including
turnaround costs) will no longer depress its adjusted EBITDA
metric. That said, these initiatives will weigh on cash flow in
2023, emphasizing the need for working capital inflows to support
management's plan to reduce drawings under the revolving credit
facility (RCF).

S&P said, "The rating action also factors in our view of an
increasing likelihood of a covenant breach. We expect the company
will not manage to meet the conditions of its financial covenant
when the testing period resumes in 2023, unless operating
performance shows a significant improvement leading to higher cash
flow generation, or the shareholders are willing to provide a cash
injection to bridge an operating shortfall and repay at least 40%
of the RCF. We note that, with turnaround-related costs weighing on
operating cash flow and notwithstanding its benefits supporting
EBITDA already this year, to address near-term liquidity pressure,
the company will be mostly relying on its RCF, and expected
positive inflow from working capital. We understand the RCF was
fully drawn as of June 30, 2023. We believe IGM Resins' liquidity
situation has worsened since the beginning of the year, when the
company was able to rely on availability under its RCF, about EUR25
million of cash on the balance sheet, and prospects for positive
cash funds from operations (FFO). If operating cash shortfalls
erode IGM's liquidity sources, there may be insufficient to sustain
its operations over the next 12 months.

"We believe the risk of a debt restructuring that we could view as
distressed has increased. In late 2023, IGM Resins will need to
explore options to refinance its debt, given that its RCF and term
loan mature in December 2024 and July 2025, respectively. We
believe the company's ability to refinance will depend on the
successful delivery of the turnaround and ability to restore its
EBITDA to levels that are more than sufficient to support
normalized capital expenditure (capex) and higher interest costs.

"We understand the private equity sponsor is not currently
considering an exchange offer and will focus on the new strategy
and turnaround plan. That said, we note that Term Loan B is
currently trading significantly below par, which in our view
increases the likelihood of the company engaging in a transaction
that we would regard as distressed, such as a debt restructuring.
Although we expect EBITDA to improve in 2024, we note that higher
interest costs on refinancing in 2024 are likely to further depress
cash flows, given currently high interest rates.

"The stable outlook reflects that, although we view IGM's capital
structure as unsustainable, we believe liquidity will be sufficient
to support operations for the next 12 months and also consider that
the current shareholders appear willing to support the company if
needed.

"We could lower our rating if the anticipated recovery in EBITDA in
the second half of 2023 did not materialize, for example, if volume
growth remains weak and operating costs stay high for an extended
period. In such a scenario, we forecast that the company would not
manage to cover its liquidity needs without support from its
shareholders and may have difficulty in refinancing its debt,
thereby increasing the risk of debt restructuring.

"We could raise the rating if operating performance recovers
sustainably, leading to EBITDA higher than EUR55 million, alongside
positive FOCF. A positive rating action would depend on IGM Resins
improving its liquidity position, including the refinancing of
upcoming debt maturities, and maintaining adequate covenant
headroom."

ESG credit indicators: E-2, S-2, G-3Related Criteria




=============
R O M A N I A
=============

DIGI COMMUNICATIONS: Moody's Downgrades CFR to B1, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B1 from Ba3 the
corporate family rating and to B1-PD from Ba3-PD the probability of
default rating of Digi Communications N.V. (Digi or the company),
the parent company for RCS & RDS S.A. (RCS&RDS). At the same time,
Moody's has downgraded to B1 from Ba3 the rating on the EUR850
million backed fixed rate senior secured notes (split into two
tranches, EUR450 million due 2025 and EUR400 million due 2028)
issued by RCS&RDS. The outlook remains stable.

"The downgrade to B1 from Ba3 reflects Moody's expectation that
Digi's credit metrics will weaken over the coming 12-18 months,
mainly driven by higher capex associated with its growth strategy"
says Pilar Anduiza, a Moody's Analyst and lead analyst for Digi.

"While the company will operate at higher leverage levels which is
reflecting of a more aggressive financial policy, the stable
outlook takes into account the expected positive earnings growth,
and management's track record of strong operating performance and
successful execution of challenger strategy in Spain" added Ms
Anduiza.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects Moody's expectation that the company's
Moody's adjusted leverage will increase above 3.5x over the next
12-18 months because of the higher capex requirements associated
with the roll-out of its own fiber network in Spain and greenfield
operations in Portugal and Belgium, which will be cash-consuming in
the initial years of operations.

Moody's projects the company's capex to increase to around EUR550
million-EUR600 million compared to its initial expectation of
around EUR450 million-EUR500 million per annum over the next 2
years. Moody's expects Moody's adjusted FCF to be negative in the
range of EUR300 million-EUR150 million over the next two years as
capital spending peaks before reducing from 2025 onwards. Moody's
also expects Digi's Moody's adjusted interest cover as measured by
EBIT/interest to weaken towards 2.0x as a result of a higher debt
burden and higher interest rates.

More positively, Moody's notes management's proven track record in
growing revenue and EBITDA as well as the company's successful
expansion as a challenger in Spain. However, the planned expansion
in Portugal and Belgium still carries significant execution risks.

Digi continued to report strong operating performance in 2022 and
into 2023. In the first quarter of 2023, revenue increased by 11.7%
while company adjusted EBITDA grew at 7%. Moody's forecasts revenue
growth to remain solid at high single digit over the next two years
while EBITDA will likely grow at a slower rate reflecting strong
growth in low-margin revenue in Spain and the negative contribution
from new markets. Moody's expects EBITDA margin to improve from
2025 onwards as the Spanish operations will benefit from investment
efforts into the company's own fiber network.

Governance considerations were a factor in Moody's rating decision.
Moody's expects that the company will operate a higher level of
leverage with negative FCF for a longer period than previously
anticipated due to the funding requirements resulting from Digi's
greenfield operations in Portugal and Belgium and the roll-out of
its own fiber infrastructure in Spain. Moody's also notes that
refinancing risk is rising as the company will need to address the
refinancing of its EUR450 million bond maturing in February 2025.
As a result, Moody's revised Digi's governance issuer profile score
to G-4 from G-3, and the credit impact score to CIS-4 from CIS-3.

The B1 CFR continues to reflect the company's track record of solid
operating performance; strong market position in Romania as a
result of its superior network quality; success as a challenger in
the Spanish market, resulting in accelerating revenue growth; and
the growth opportunities stemming from its planned expansion into
the Portuguese and Belgium markets.

The rating also reflects the expected increase in Moody's adjusted
leverage above 3.5x, negative FCF because of high capital spending;
its geographical concentration, mainly in Romania; the high
execution risks related to its expansion in Portugal and Belgium;
the foreign-exchange risk associated with the company's exposure to
the Romanian leu; and its exposure to M&A event risk because there
is potential for further consolidation in the Romanian market.

LIQUIDITY

Moody's considers that Digi's current liquidity is adequate. Cash
and cash equivalents of around EUR236 million, together with the
recently signed EUR250 million committed term facilities and EUR100
million fully undrawn revolving credit facility, will cover its
basic liquidity needs and growth capex over the next 12-18 months.
However, Moody's anticipates that the company will generated
negative Moody's adjusted FCF of EUR300 million-EUR150 million each
year.

The company's SFA 2020 is restricted by two maintenance financial
covenants: less than 3.5x net debt/EBITDA (tested quarterly) and
EBITDA/net total interest of more than 4.25x.

Nevertheless Moody's notes that refinancing risk is rising given
the maturity of its EUR450 million bond in February 2025. Moody's
assumes that the company will proactively address its 2025
maturities in the near term.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Digi's PDR of B1-PD is in line with the B1 CFR, reflecting the
expected recovery rate of 50%, which Moody's typically assume for a
bank and bond capital structure.

RCS&RDS is the borrower of the EUR850 million worth of backed
senior secured notes. The B1 rated backed senior secured notes and
the unrated senior credit facilities are guaranteed on a senior
secured basis by RCS&RDS. They have been ranked highest in priority
of claims to reflect their first-ranking security interests over
substantially all present and future movable assets of RCS&RDS on a
pari passu basis.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

Despite the expected negative FCF, the stable outlook reflects
Moody's expectation that Digi will maintain a strong operating
performance with strong revenue and additional EBITDA improvement.
The stable outlook also reflects Moody's assumption that Digi will
address the refinancing of its upcoming maturities in the near
term.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Upward pressure on the rating could develop if Digi (1) reports
solid operating performance such that its Moody's-adjusted
debt/EBITDA decline well below 3.25x; and (2) generates positive
FCF (after capital spending and dividends) on a sustained basis.
Upward pressure will also require a stronger track record of
governance, including compliance and reporting considerations and a
proactive liquidity management.

Conversely, downward rating pressure could emerge if (1) Digi's
operating performance weakens such that its Moody's-adjusted
debt/EBITDA rises towards 4.25x and the company's; (2) FCF
generation remains materially negative for a prolonged period of
time; (3) liquidity weakens.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Downgrades:

Issuer: Digi Communications N.V.

Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to B1-PD from Ba3-PD

LT Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to B1 from Ba3

Issuer: RCS & RDS S.A.

BACKED Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to B1
from Ba3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Digi Communications N.V.

Outlook, Remains Stable

Issuer: RCS & RDS S.A.

Outlook, Remains Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Pay TV
published in October 2021.

COMPANY PROFILE

Digi Communications N.V. is the parent company of RCS & RDS S.A., a
leading pay-TV and communications services provider in Romania. The
company is listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange. In 2022, the
company reported revenue of around EUR1.5 billion and adjusted
EBITDA of EUR505 million. Digi is ultimately controlled by Romanian
entrepreneur Zoltan Teszari, president of the board and founder of
the company.



=========
S P A I N
=========

CAIXABANK PYMES 10: DBRS Confirms CCC Rating on Series B Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH took the following rating actions on the notes
issued by three CaixaBank PYMES transactions:

CaixaBank PYMES 10, FT (CB10)
-- Series A Notes upgraded to AAA (sf) from AA (high) (sf)
-- Series B Notes confirmed at CCC (sf)

CaixaBank PYMES 11, FT (CB11)

-- Series A Notes confirmed at AA (high) (sf)
-- Series B Notes upgraded to BB (low) (sf) from B (sf)

CaixaBank PYMES 12, FT (CB12)

-- Series A Notes confirmed at AA (high) (sf)
-- Series B Notes upgraded to BB (high) (sf) from BB (low) (sf)

The credit ratings on the Series A Notes in each transaction
address the timely payment of interest and the ultimate payment of
principal on or before the legal final maturity date for each
transaction (October 2051 for CB10, April 2052 for CB11, and
September 2062 for CB12).

The credit ratings on the Series B Notes in each transaction
address the ultimate payment of interest and the ultimate payment
of principal on or before the legal final maturity date for each
transaction.

The credit rating actions follow an annual review of the
transactions and are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The portfolio performance, in terms of level of delinquencies
and defaults, as of the latest payment date for each transaction
(April for CB10 and CB11 and June for CB12);

-- The one-year base-case probability of default (PD) and default
and recovery rates on the outstanding receivables; and

-- The current available credit enhancement to the rated notes to
cover the expected losses assumed in line with their respective
credit rating levels.

CB10, CB11, and CB12 are securitizations of secured and unsecured
loans, and drawdowns of secured and unsecured lines of credit for
CB10 and CB11, originated and serviced by CaixaBank, S.A.
(CaixaBank) to corporates, small and medium-size enterprises, and
self-employed individuals based in Spain. The transactions closed
in November 2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

CB10

As of the April 2023 payment date, loans more than three months
delinquent represented 4.0% of the portfolio balance, up from 3.1%
at the last annual review. Gross cumulative defaults amounted to
1.7% of the original collateral balance, up from 1.6%.

CB11

As of the April 2023 payment date, loans more than three months
delinquent represented 2.2% of the portfolio balance, up from 1.7%
at the last annual review. Gross cumulative defaults increased to
1.4% of the original collateral balance, up from 1.1%.

CB12

As of the June 2023 payment date, loans more than three months
delinquent represented 2.0% of the portfolio balance, up from 1.3%
at the last annual review. Gross cumulative defaults increased to
0.7% of the original collateral balance, up from 0.3%. Receivables
are classified as defaulted after 12 months of arrears per the
three transactions’ documentation.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS AND KEY DRIVERS

DBRS Morningstar conducted a loan-by-loan analysis on the remaining
pool of each transaction.

For CB10, DBRS Morningstar updated the portfolio's one-year
base-case PD assumption to 2.5% and the weighted-average recovery
rate to 44.6% at the AAA (sf) credit rating level and to 56.2% at
the CCC (sf) credit rating level.

For CB11, DBRS Morningstar updated the portfolio's one-year
base-case PD assumption to 1.8% and the weighted-average recovery
rate to 31.7% at the AA (high) (sf) credit rating level and to
42.3% at the BB (low) (sf) credit rating level.

For CB12, DBRS Morningstar updated the portfolio's one-year
base-case PD assumption to 1.4%, and the weighted-average recovery
rate to 22.9% at the AA (high) (sf) credit rating level and to
31.0% at the BB (high) (sf) credit rating level.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

Credit enhancement in the three transactions is provided by the
subordination of the Series B Notes and the reserve fund. The
reserve fund is available to cover missed interest and principal
payments on the Series A Notes and Series B Notes once the Series A
Notes have been paid in full. The reserve funds amortize in line
with their target amortization amounts (4.0%, 4.7%, and 5.0% of the
outstanding balance of the notes for CB10, CB11, and CB12,
respectively) and are currently slightly above their target levels
at EUR 32.4 million for CB10, EUR 44.8 million for CB11, and EUR
59.9 million for CB12.

CB10

As of the April 2023 payment date, the credit enhancement to the
Series A Notes was 77.7%, up from 59.2% at the last annual review;
the credit enhancement to the Series B Notes was 4.5%, up from
4.4%.

CB11

As of the April 2023 payment date, the credit enhancement to the
Series A Notes was 42.6%, up from 33.4% at the last annual review;
the credit enhancement to the Series B Notes was 5.2%, up from
5.1%.

CB12

As of the June 2023 payment date, the credit enhancement to the
Series A Notes was 38.1%, up from 27.8% at the last annual review;
the credit enhancement to the Series B Notes was 5.5%, up from
5.4%.

CaixaBank acts as the account bank for the three transactions.
Based on the account bank reference rating of A (high) on CaixaBank
(one notch below its DBRS Morningstar Long Term Critical
Obligations Rating of AA (low)), the downgrade provisions outlined
in the transaction documents, and other mitigating factors inherent
in the transactions' structures, DBRS Morningstar considers the
risk arising from the exposure to the account bank to be consistent
with the credit ratings assigned to the rated notes, as described
in DBRS Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured
Finance Transactions" methodology.

DBRS Morningstar's credit ratings on the notes address the credit
risk associated with the identified financial obligations in
accordance with the relevant transaction documents. The associated
financial obligations are listed at the end of this press release.

DBRS Morningstar's credit ratings do not address nonpayment risk
associated with contractual payment obligations contemplated in the
applicable transaction documents that are not financial
obligations.

DBRS Morningstar's long-term credit ratings provide opinions on
risk of default. DBRS Morningstar considers risk of default to be
the risk that an issuer will fail to satisfy the financial
obligations in accordance with the terms under which a long-term
obligation has been issued.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


RMBS SANTANDER: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on Class B Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH confirmed its credit ratings on the bonds issued
by FT RMBS Santander 6 (Santander 6) and FT RMBS Santander 7
(Santander 7) as follows:

Santander 6

-- Class A notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B notes at BB (high) (sf)

Santander 7

-- Class A Notes at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class B Notes at BB (high) (sf)

The credit ratings on the Class A notes in both transactions
address the timely payment of interest and the ultimate repayment
of principal by the respective legal final maturity date in
December 2059 (Santander 6) and December 2063 (Santander 7). The
credit ratings on the Class B notes in both transactions address
the ultimate payment of interest and principal by the respective
legal final maturity dates.

The confirmations of credit ratings follow an annual review of the
transactions and are based on the following analytical
considerations:

-- Portfolio performances, in terms of delinquencies, defaults,
and losses as of the respective payment dates (May 2023 for both
transactions);

-- Updated portfolio default rates (PD), loss given default (LGD),
and expected loss assumptions on the remaining pools of
receivables; and

-- Current available credit enhancement to the rated notes in both
transactions to cover the expected losses at their respective
credit rating levels.

The transactions are securitizations of Spanish first-lien
residential mortgage loans originated by Banco Santander SA
(Santander), Banco Popular Español, S.A., and Banco Espanol de
Credito, S.A. The mortgage loans are secured over residential
properties located in Spain. Santander acts as the servicer of the
portfolios of both transactions.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

Santander 6

As of the May 2023 payment date, loans two to three month in
arrears represented 0.3% of the outstanding portfolio balance, up
from 0.2% in May 2022. Loans more than 90 days in arrears
represented 0.7%, up from 0.5% in the same period, while the
cumulative default ratio increased to 2.4%.

Santander 7

As of the May 2023 payment date, loans two to three month in
arrears represented 0.2% of the outstanding portfolio balance, up
from 0.1% in May 2022. Loans more than 90 days in arrears
represented 0.6%, up from 0.2% in the same period, while the
cumulative default ratio was at 1.0%.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS AND KEY DRIVERS

DBRS Morningstar conducted a loan-by-loan analysis of the remaining
pools of receivables in both transactions and updated its base case
PD and LGD assumptions to 5.5% and 34.1%, respectively, for
Santander 6, and to 3.2% and 31.3%, respectively, for Santander 7.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

In both transactions, the credit enhancement to the Class A notes
is provided through the subordination of the Class B notes and the
reserve fund. The credit enhancement to the Class B notes is
provided through the reserve fund.

As of the May 2023 payment date, the credit enhancements to the
Class A and Class B notes in Santander 6 were 27.0% and 6.1%,
respectively, up from 23.7% and 5.4%, respectively, in May 2022. As
of the May 2023 payment date, the credit enhancements to the Class
A and Class B notes in Santander 7 were 17.2% and 5.2%,
respectively, up from 15.4% and 4.6%, respectively, in May 2022.

The transactions benefit from reserve funds with the target level
of EUR 225 million (Santander 6) and EUR 265 million (Santander 7),
which are available to cover senior expenses as well as interest
and principal payments on the rated notes until they are paid in
full. The reserve funds in both transactions were funded at closing
via a subordinated loan and will start amortizing three years after
closing, up to a floor of EUR 112.5 million. The reserve funds will
not amortize if certain performance triggers are breached, if they
were used on any payment date and are under their target level, or
until they reach 10% of the outstanding balance of the Class A and
Class B notes in each transaction.

As of the May 2023 payment date, the reserve funds were at EUR
208.9 million for Santander 6 and EUR 228.0 million for Santander
7. Both reserve funds were below their respective target levels as
they were used to meet the respective Class A notes target
amortization amounts according to the transaction documents.

Santander acts as the account bank for both transactions. Based on
Santander's reference rating of A (high), which is one notch below
DBRS Morningstar's Long Term Critical Obligations Rating of AA
(low), the downgrade provisions outlined in the transaction
documents, and other mitigating factors inherent in the transaction
structures, DBRS Morningstar considers the risk arising from the
exposure to the account bank to be consistent with the credit
ratings assigned to the notes in both transactions, as described in
DBRS Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

The rating on the Class B notes issued by FT RMBS Santander 7 at BB
(high) (sf) materially deviates from the higher rating implied by
the quantitative model. DBRS Morningstar considers a material
deviation to be a rating differential of three or more notches
between the assigned rating and the rating implied by a
quantitative model that is a substantial component of a rating
methodology. In this case, the rating action takes into account the
current level of interest shortfall on the Class B notes, where
interest payments have been deferred since the November 2022
payment date. DBRS Morningstar notes that such deferrals are
permissible until the maturity date and considers such interest
deferrals to be temporary in nature. DBRS Morningstar will continue
to monitor the situation and may take positive rating actions once
cumulative interest shortfalls reduce.

DBRS Morningstar's credit ratings on the Class A and Class B notes
in both transactions address the credit risk associated with the
identified financial obligations in accordance with the relevant
transaction documents. The associated financial obligations are
listed at the end of this Press Release.

DBRS Morningstar's credit ratings do not address non-payment risk
associated with contractual payment obligations contemplated in the
applicable transaction documents that are not financial
obligations.

DBRS Morningstar's long-term credit ratings provide opinions on
risk of default. DBRS Morningstar considers risk of default to be
the risk that an issuer will fail to satisfy the financial
obligations in accordance with the terms under which a long-term
obligation has been issued.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


SABADELL CONSUMO 2: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH confirmed the ratings on the notes issued by
Sabadell Consumo 2 FT (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F Notes at B (high) (sf)

The rating on the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
legal final maturity date in December 2034. The rating on the Class
B Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest but the timely
payment of interest when most senior, and the ultimate payment of
principal before the legal final maturity date. The ratings on the
Class C, Class D, Class E, and Class F Notes address the ultimate
payment of interest and principal on or before the legal final
maturity date.

The confirmations follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies, defaults, and
losses, as of the June 2023 payment date;

-- Probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and
expected loss assumptions on the remaining receivables; and

-- Current available credit enhancement to the notes to cover the
expected losses at their respective rating levels.

The transaction is a static securitization of Spanish consumer loan
receivables originated and serviced by Banco de Sabadell, S.A.,
which closed in July 2022 with an original portfolio balance of EUR
750.0 million.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As of the June 2023 payment date, loans that were 30 to 60 days
delinquent and 60 to 90 days delinquent represented 0.4% and 0.3%
of the outstanding portfolio balance, respectively, while loans
more than 90 days delinquent amounted to 0.5%. Gross cumulative
defaults amounted to 0.7% of the initial portfolio balance.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS AND KEY DRIVERS

DBRS Morningstar conducted a loan-by-loan analysis of the remaining
pool of receivables and maintained its base case PD and LGD
assumptions at 6.6% and 80.0%, respectively.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

The subordination of the respective junior obligations provides
credit enhancement to the rated notes. As of the June 2023 payment
date, credit enhancement to the Class A Notes was 33.2%, credit
enhancement to the Class B Notes was 21.9%, credit enhancement to
the Class C Notes was 15.2%, credit enhancement to the Class D
Notes was 10.9%, credit enhancement to the Class E Notes was 8.8%,
and credit enhancement to the Class F Notes was 7.2%. The credit
enhancement levels have remained unchanged since the DBRS
Morningstar initial rating because of the pro rata amortization of
the rated notes.

The transaction benefits from an amortizing cash reserve, funded at
closing to EUR 8.8 million using proceeds from the issuance of
Class H Notes, available to cover senior expenses, swap payments,
interest payments on the Class A Notes, and, unless deferred,
interest payments on the remaining outstanding notes. The reserve
has a target balance equal to 1.17% of the outstanding Class A
through Class G Notes balance, subject to a floor of EUR 3.2
million. As of the June 2023 payment date, the reserve was at its
target balance of EUR 6.4 million.

Societe Generale, S.A., Sucursal en Espana (SocGen Spain) acts as
the account bank for the transaction. Based on DBRS Morningstar's
private rating on SocGen Spain, the downgrade provisions outlined
in the transaction documents, and other mitigating factors inherent
in the transaction structure, DBRS Morningstar considers the risk
arising from the exposure to the account bank to be consistent with
the ratings assigned to the rated notes, as described in DBRS
Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

J.P. Morgan SE acts as the swap counterparty for the transaction.
DBRS Morningstar's private rating on J.P. Morgan SE is consistent
with the First Rating Threshold as described in DBRS Morningstar's
"Derivative Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
methodology.

DBRS Morningstar's credit ratings on the Class A to Class F Notes
address the credit risk associated with the identified financial
obligations in accordance with the relevant transaction documents.
The associated financial obligations are listed at the end of this
Press Release.

DBRS Morningstar's credit ratings do not address nonpayment risk
associated with contractual payment obligations contemplated in the
applicable transaction documents that are not financial
obligations.

DBRS Morningstar's long-term credit ratings provide opinions on
risk of default. DBRS Morningstar considers risk of default to be
the risk that an issuer will fail to satisfy the financial
obligations in accordance with the terms under which a long-term
obligation has been issued.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.




=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================

[*] SWITZERLAND: Number of Company Insolvencies Up 22% in 1H 2023
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Swissinfo.ch reports that the number of company insolvencies in
Switzerland rose 22% in the first six months of the year compared
to the same period in 2021.

Some 581 construction firms went bankrupt between January and the
end of June, out of 2,822 companies in all sectors, according to
research group Dunn & Bradstreet, Swissinfo.ch discloses.

The financial and service sector industries saw one of the largest
percentage rises in bankruptcies with a 31% increase in businesses
going bust, Swissinfo.ch states.  Some 30% more hotels and
restaurants also went out of business, Swissinfo.ch relates.

"Bankruptcies increased significantly in all major sectors,"
Swissinfo.ch quotes Dunn & Bradstreet as saying on July 26,
highlighting a large number of service industry failures.

Amid uncertain economic conditions and a rise in interest rates,
which makes it more expensive to get bank loans, the rate of
start-ups declined compared to last year, Swissinfo.ch notes.




===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

HAYDON MECHANICAL: Files Notice to Appoint Administrators
---------------------------------------------------------
Business Sale reports that London-based Haydon Mechanical &
Electrical has filed a notice of intention to appoint
administrators.

The company entered a Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) with its
creditors last year as a result of cashflow problems in the wake of
the COVID-19 pandemic, Business Sale recounts.

The CVA, which the company entered in August 2022, was designed to
distribute GBP7.2 million to the firm’s creditors at a rate of
GBP200,000 per month, with repayment starting from November 2022
and seeing suppliers receive at least 80p to the GBP1 in return for
their debts, Business Sale discloses.

At the time, the firm had a loan agreement in place with former
parent company Mears, which had sold Haydon to its management team
in 2013 for GBP1 million, Business Sale notes.  Mears had agreed to
postpone all loan repayments for a period of at least 18 months as
the company worked through the CVA, Business Sale states.

In Haydon's most recent accounts at Companies House, covering the
period from July 1 2020 to December 31 2021, the company noted
that, due to the nature of its business, "there can be considerable
unpredictable variation in the timing of cash inflows" a situation
that had been "compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the ensuing
lockdowns and government restrictions which resulted in a slowdown
in the industry, delays on contracts, cost increases and the
erosion of contract margins", Business Sale relates.

According to Business Sale, the company said that these issues had
led to it entering the CVA, but added that projected cash flow
information up to November 2025 indicated that the company would
return to profitability during 2022 "and will continue to be
profitable for the duration of the period considered."

Despite this optimism, the firm is now poised to fall into
administration, Business Sale relays.  In its accounts to the end
of 2021, its fixed assets were valued at GBP93,848 and current
assets at close to GBP16.5 million, while its net liabilities
amounted to GBP1.4 million, Business Sale discloses.


LUDGATE FUNDING 2007: Fitch Puts 'B-sf' E Notes Rating on Watch Neg
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed nine tranches of the Ludgate Funding plc
Series on Rating Watch Negative (RWN) and affirmed 13 tranches.

ENTITY/DEBT    RATING    PRIOR  
----------              ------                  ----
Ludgate Funding Plc's Series 2008-W1

Class A1
XS0353588386  LT   AAAsf    Affirmed AAAsf

Class A2b
XS0353589608  LT   AAAsf    Affirmed AAAsf

Class Bb
XS0353591505  LT   AA+sf    Affirmed AA+sf

Class Cb
XS0353594434  LT   AA-sf    Affirmed AA-sf

Class D XS0353595597 LT   Asf      Affirmed Asf

Class E XS0353600348 LT BBB+sf   Rating Watch On  BBB+sf


Ludgate Funding Plc Series
2006 FF1

Class A2a
XS0274267862  LT   AAAsf  Rating Watch On   AAAsf

Class A2b
XS0274271203  LT   AAAsf  Rating Watch On   AAAsf

Class Ba
XS0274268241  LT   AA+sf  Rating Watch On   AA+sf

Class Bb
XS0274271898  LT   AA+sf  Rating Watch On   AA+sf

Class C XS0274272359 LT   AA-sf  Rating Watch On   AA-sf

Class D XS0274272862 LT   BBB+sf Rating Watch On   BBB+sf

Class E XS0274269645 LT   BBsf   Rating Watch On   BBsf


Ludgate Funding Plc Series
2007 FF1

Class A2a
XS0304503534  LT   AAAsf    Affirmed AAAsf

Class A2b
XS0304504003  LT   AAAsf    Affirmed AAAsf

Class Ma
XS0304504698  LT  AA+sf     Affirmed AA+sf

Class Mb
XS0304505232  LT  AA+sf     Affirmed AA+sf

Class Bb
XS0304508681  LT  A+sf      Affirmed A+sf

Class Cb
XS0304509739  LT  BBB+sf    Affirmed BBB+sf

Class Da
XS0304510158  LT  BB+sf     Affirmed BB+sf

Class Db
XS0304512105  LT  BB+sf     Affirmed BB+sf

Class E XS0304515546 LT B-sf Rating Watch On  B-sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Ludgate Funding Plc Series 2006 FF1 (LF 2006), Ludgate Funding Plc
Series 2007 FF1 (LF 2007) and Ludgate Funding Plc's Series 2008-W1
(LF 2008) are secured by loans originated by Wave (formerly Freedom
Funding Limited) and purchased by Merrill Lynch International Bank
Limited. The loans are buy-to-let (BTL) and non-conforming
owner-occupied (OO) and secured against properties located in
England and Wales.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

RWN Reflects Libor Transition: Fitch has placed all tranches of LF
2006 and the class E notes of LF 2007 and LF 2008 on RWN due to the
transactions featuring notes linked to sterling Libor that have not
yet transitioned to an alternative reference rate. In November
2022, the Financial Conduct Authority announced that three-month
sterling Libor would cease to be published at the end of March
2024. If notes linked to sterling Libor have not transitioned by
this time, the existing fall back provisions mean that the note
coupons may become fixed.

Fitch has tested a scenario assuming a Libor rate at cessation in
line with market-implied forward rates, scheduled principal
redemptions at the contractual rate and unscheduled principal
redemptions at the rate observed in the last year. Where this
scenario suggests a downgrade, Fitch have placed the relevant
tranche on RWN. The Negative Outlooks on the remaining tranches
remain reflect ongoing uncertainty in the period to cessation and
in potential costs that may be incurred by the issuer.

Libor Expectations Constrain Ratings: All notes' ratings are below
the model-implied ratings (MIR). This reflects the risk from the
potential interest rate exposure associated with LIBOR
discontinuation and has led to the affirmation of notes not on
RWN.

Asset Performance Weakening: LF 2007 and LF 2008 had one-month plus
arrears of 4.95% and 9.72%, respectively, as at March 24, 2023. LF
2006's one-month plus arrears were 4.51% as at May 23, 2023.
Three-month plus arrears in LF 2006, LF 2007 and LF 2008 were
1.73%, 1.7% and 4.11%, respectively, at the same dates. Arrear
levels in LF 2008, have increased significantly since the last
review. Nonetheless, arrears in the transactions compare favourably
with the non-conforming index.

IO Concentration Risk: The LF 2006 pool exhibits interest-only (IO)
maturity concentration as 66.5% of the BTL sub-pool is expected to
mature over 2029-2031. The WAFF levels were driven by Fitch's IO
concentration Foreclosure frequencies (FFs) for this transaction.

Credit Enhancement: All notes benefit from the availability of
non-amortising reserves. Unless a performance trigger is breached,
pro-rata amortisation will continue until the notes fall below 10%
of their initial balance.

The affirmations reflect the increase in credit enhancement (CE)
for LF 2007 and LF 2008, which has been driven by the gradual
amortisation of the notes and the non-amortising reserve funds. The
class E notes currently have CE of 1.4% (1.1% as at last review)
and 5.4% (5.2% as at last review), in LF 2007 and LF 2008,
respectively. However, CE in LF 2006 has declined moderately to
1.3% from 1.7% at the last review, due to drawings on the reserve
funds (RF).

RFs Below Target: LF 2008's RF was below the required amount as of
the January 2023 interest payment date (IPD). This represents a
breach of the amortisation trigger, with amortisation switching to
sequential on the April IPD. The RF has subsequently been topped up
to the target level, with the transaction reverting to pro-rata
amortisation on the July IPD.

LF 2006's RF was below the target level based on the investor
report for the June 2023 IPD. However, amortisation did not switch
to sequential contrary to Fitch's expectations. Fitch tested
scenarios where amortisation would stay pro rata despite
performance trigger breaches (except the 10% of initial balance
trigger) and this had no impact on the notes' ratings.

Excessive Counterparty Exposure: The RF provide more than 50% CE
for LF 2008's class E notes. Consequently, Fitch believes these
notes are potentially exposed to excessive counterparty risk as the
loss of CE resulted in an MIR downgrade of more than 10 notches. It
is unlikely that these notes could achieve a rating above the
transaction account bank's, (Barclays Bank plc) long-term deposit
rating. The transaction account bank's long-term deposit rating of
'A+' is above the notes' rating of 'BBB+sf', so this counterparty
exposure does not constrain the ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative
Rating Action/Downgrade

The transactions' performance may be affected by adverse changes in
market conditions and economic environment. Weakening economic
performance is strongly correlated to increasing levels of
delinquencies and defaults that could reduce CE available to the
notes.

Additionally, unanticipated declines in recoveries could result in
lower net proceeds, which may make certain notes susceptible to
negative rating action depending on the extent of the decline in
recoveries. Fitch conducts sensitivity analyses by stressing both a
transaction's base-case FF and recovery rate (RR) assumptions, and
examining the rating implications on all classes of issued notes.
For example, a 15% weighted average (WA) FF increase and 15% WARR
decrease would result in a downgrade of no more than four notches
for the class E notes in all three transactions.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive
Rating Action/Upgrade

The ratings of all notes are currently constrained due to Libor
discontinuation risks. If the notes transition to an alternative
reference rate, the notes could be upgraded by several notches. In
addition, and subject to a transition to an alternative reference
rate, stable to improved asset performance driven by stable
delinquencies and defaults would lead to increasing CE and
potential further upgrades. Fitch tested an additional rating
sensitivity scenario by applying a decrease in the WAFF of 15% and
an increase in the WARR of 15%, implying upgrades of no more than
eight notches for the class E notes in all three transactions.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pool[s] ahead of the transactions' initial
closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions over the
years is consistent with the agency's expectations given the
operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that the
asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating analysis
was adequately reliable.

Overall, and together with any assumptions, Fitch's assessment of
the information relied upon for the agency's rating analysis
according to its applicable rating methodologies indicates that it
is adequately reliable.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Ludgate 06, 07 and 08 each has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for
customer welfare - fair messaging, privacy & data security due to a
material concentration of interest-only loans, which has a negative
impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the ratings in
conjunction with other factors.

Ludgate 06, 07 and 08 each has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for
human rights, community relations, access & affordability due to
mortgage pools with limited affordability checks and self-certified
income, which has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is
relevant to the ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

MAPELEY STEPS: Put Into Liquidation After Sale-Leaseback Deal
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Royal Gazette reports that Mapeley Steps Holdings is being
wound up by liquidators.

In 2001, HM Revenue and Customs transferred hundreds of properties
it owned and the management of them to a private company, with the
assets themselves owned by a Bermuda subsidiary, The Royal Gazette
recounts.

In total, 591 buildings with 1.3 million square metres of floor
space were sold, The Royal Gazette discloses.

The sale-leaseback deal was designed to save the taxpayer money, by
lowering the running costs for HMRC, but it also meant that the
government would be denied some tax revenue on the properties as a
result of their ownership being in Bermuda, The Royal Gazette
notes.

While an inquiry found that the cost savings outweighed the tax
revenue loss -- and the company noted that rental income would
actually be taxed -- it was determined that the optics were bad,
The Royal Gazette states.

The ownership of Mapeley -- a hedge fund and a George Soros-linked
entity -- was often mentioned in press reports at the time.

The company that signed the deal with the British Government was
Mapeley Holdings, and Bermudian-registered Mapeley Steps Ltd was
the owner of the assets, The Royal Gazette relates.

In the years that followed, the drama continued.  Mapeley was taken
public in 2005 and then private again in 2009 as the stock price
fell, losing more than 90% of its value from the peak, The Royal
Gazette recounts.

The company had piled on debt, and the property market hit a
cyclical downturn, The Royal Gazette states.

The company's website, www.mapeley.com, no longer provides
information about the company, instead pointing to j2.com, a
marketing company.

Earlier this year, a number of Mapeley companies were put into
voluntary liquidation in the UK, and FTI Consulting took charge as
liquidators, The Royal Gazette relates.

In an advertisement published on July 24, FTI announced the
voluntary winding up of Mapeley Steps Holdings and Mapeley Steps,
both Bermuda companies, according to The Royal Gazette.

Creditors must contact FTI with claims by Aug. 21, The Royal
Gazette discloses.


WILKO: Hilco Agrees to Provide GBP5MM in Additional Funding
-----------------------------------------------------------
Mohamed Dabo at Retail Insight Network reports that Hilco, the
specialist retail investor that owns Homebase, has agreed to
provide approximately GBP5 million (US$6.4 million) in additional
funding to Wilko, the general merchandise chain, as it faces an
intensifying cash squeeze.

This new debt comes in addition to a GBP40 million loan Wilko
secured from Hilco earlier this year, Retail Insight Network
notes.

The move highlights Hilco's commitment to supporting the
family-controlled retailer as it strives to find a long-term
solution to its financing challenges, Retail Insight Network
states.

Last week, Sky News revealed that the Wilkinson family, who founded
Wilko in 1930, is considering a change of ownership for the first
time due to the imminent risk of running out of cash within weeks,
Retail Insight Network recounts.

Wilko currently employs around 12,000 people and operates from 400
stores, making it one of the largest privately owned retailers in
the UK.

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the company advising Wilko, has
already started talks with prospective financial investors to raise
new equity for the business, Retail Insight Network discloses.

This funding is intended to support the company through a complex
restructuring process and help stabilise its operations, according
to Retail Insight Network.

The company has been grappling with inflationary pressures and
supply chain challenges, Retail Insight Network relays.  As a
result, has been working on finalising a company voluntary
arrangement (CVA) that would result in substantial rent cuts for
hundreds of stores, according to Retail Insight Network.

However, the chances of launching a CVA have diminished
significantly as Wilko desperately seeks new funding, Retail
Insight Network states.  Without securing the necessary financial
backing, the company is at risk of falling into administration by
the end of August, Retail Insight Network notes.

Wilko CEO Mark Jackson responded to reports about additional cash
lending, stating that such suggestions were incorrect, Retail
Insight Network relays.

He reiterated that the company is actively exploring a
re-capitalisation, which is still ongoing, as previously confirmed
in statements to Sky News, Retail Insight Network notes.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Dangerous Dreamers
-----------------------------------
Dangerous Dreamers: The Financial Innovators from Charles Merrill
to Michael Milken

Author: Robert Sobel
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 271 pages
List Price: $34.95

Order your own personal copy at
http://www.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/dangerous_dreamers.html  

"For the rest of his life, Milken will be accused of crimes for
which he was not charged and to which he did not plead guilty."
Milken is -- as anyone familiar with junk bonds and the scandals
surrounding them in the 1980s knows -- Michael Milken of the Drexel
Burnham banking and investment firm. In this book, noted business
writer Robert Sobel analyzes the Milken criminal case and the many
other phenomena of the period that lay the basis for the modern-day
financial industry. However, the author's perspective is broader
than the sensationalistic excesses and purported crimes of Milken
and his like. Sobel is interested in the individuals and businesses
that introduced and developed financial concepts, vehicles, and
transactions that increased the wealth of millions of average
persons.

Sobel's examination of the byplay between financial chicanery and
economic revitalization extends back to the Gilded Age of the
latter 1800s and early 1900s. This was a time when Jim Fisk, Jay
Gould, and others were making fortunes through skulduggery and
manipulation of the financial markets, while Cornelius Vanderbilt
and others were building the "world's finest railroad system."

Later, in the "Junk Decade of the 1980s," as Ivan Boesky and others
were reaping fortunes from "dubious" transactions, financial firms
such as Forstmann Little and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts "played major
positive roles in the largest restructuring of American industry
since the turn of the century."

While Sobel does not try to defend the excesses and illegalities of
individuals and companies, he basically sees the Milkens of the
world as "vehicles through which the phenomena of junk finance and
leveraged buyouts played themselves out." This was the
"Conglomerate Era." Mergers and acquisitions were at the center of
financial and economic activity, and CEOs at major corporations
were in competition to grow their corporations. Milken, Boesky, and
others provided the means for this end. However, it is important to
note that they did not originate the mergers and acquisition
phenomenon.

At first, Milken et al. were much appreciated by major corporations
and the financial industry. However, when mergers and acquisition
excesses began to bear sour fruit, Milken and his company Drexel
Burnham took the brunt of public indignation. The government's
search for villains then began.

Sobel examines the ripple effects of financial innovators who
became financial pariahs. Milken's journey, for example, cannot be
unraveled from that of a company such as Beatrice. Starting in
1960, the food company Beatrice started making large-scale
acquisitions. CEO Williams Karnes, who "ran a tight, lean ship,
with a small office staff," was succeeded by corporate heads who
brought in corporate jets and limousines, greatly increased staff,
and moved into regal office space. James Dutt of Beatrice is
singled out as symptomatic of the heedless mindset that crept into
corporate America in the 1980s.

Sobol's tale of the complexities and ambivalence of this
transitional period is bolstered by memorable portraits of key
players and companies. In so doing, he demonstrates once more why
he has long been recognized as one of the country's most important
business writers.

                         About the Author

Robert Sobel was born in 1931 and died in 1999. He was a prolific
historian of American business life, writing or editing more than
50 books and hundreds of articles and corporate profiles. He was a
professor of business at Hofstra University for 43 years and held a
Ph.D. from New York University. Besides producing books, articles,
book reviews, scripts for television and audiotapes, he was a
weekly columnist for Newsday from 1972 to 1988. At the time of his
death he was a contributing editor to Barron's Magazine.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2023.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                * * * End of Transmission * * *