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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Friday, August 12, 2022, Vol. 23, No. 155

                           Headlines



A Z E R B A I J A N

STATE OIL: Moody's Upgrades CFR to Ba1 & Alters Outlook to Stable


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO XIV: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on EUR14.8MM F-R Notes
GOLDENTREE LOAN 1: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR12MM F Notes to B3


I T A L Y

ARAGORN NPL 2018: DBRS Lowers Class A Notes Rating to CCC


S P A I N

IM BCC 2: DBRS Hikes Class B Notes Rating to BB(high)


U K R A I N E

UKRAINIAN RAILWAYS: S&P Cuts LT ICR to 'CCC-', Outlook Negative


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

GREENSILL CAPITAL: Ex-Employees Can Seek Damages Over Redundancy
T.WILSON & SONS: Owed More Than GBP1.3MM at Time of Administration
TOGETHER ENERGY: Warrington Puts Measures to Mitigate Exposure
TOWD POINT 2018-AUBURN: DBRS Hikes Class E Rating to BB(high)
WELCOME NURSERIES: Sells 26 Settings Via Pre-Pack Administration

XBITE: Owed Creditors Almost GBP6.4MM at Time of Administration


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in Cyberspace

                           - - - - -


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A Z E R B A I J A N
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STATE OIL: Moody's Upgrades CFR to Ba1 & Alters Outlook to Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of State Oil
Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) to Ba1 from Ba2,
including its corporate family rating and senior unsecured rating.
Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded SOCAR's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to ba3 from b1 and its probability of default
rating to Ba1-PD from Ba2-PD. The rating agency has also changed
the company's outlook to stable from positive.

The rating action follows the upgrade of the ratings of the
Government of Azerbaijan to Ba1 from Ba2 on August 5, 2022.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is in line with the sovereign rating action and
reflects SOCAR's strong credit linkages with the state as well as
its significant exposure to Azerbaijan's operating and
macroeconomic environment.

The upgrade of Azerbaijan's ratings reflects improved policy
effectiveness in recent years which translates into improved fiscal
management and increased capacity to absorb future shocks. Despite
the pandemic, fiscal metrics have remained strong and are improving
quicker than expected thanks to prudent fiscal management amid an
economic rebound and high hydrocarbon prices. Moody's expects the
government's anti-inflation measures and the Central Bank of the
Republic of Azerbaijan's (CBAR) proactive macroeconomic policy to
contain inflation risks exacerbated by the Russia/Ukraine crisis.
As a result, Moody's expects that operating and macroeconomic
environment for SOCAR will gradually improve, supporting its credit
profile.

Given that SOCAR is 100% state owned, Moody's applies its
Government-Related Issuers (GRI) methodology to determine the
company's CFR. SOCAR's Ba1 CFR incorporates (1) the company's BCA
of ba3, which measures its standalone credit strength, excluding
any extraordinary government support; (2) the Ba1 foreign currency
rating of the Government of Azerbaijan, with a stable outlook; (3)
the very high default dependence between the state and the company;
and (4) the high probability of the government providing support to
the company in the event of financial distress.

SOCAR's ba3 BCA and standalone credit quality is supported by (1)
the company's key role in the oil and gas sector of Azerbaijan and
its importance to the national economy; (2) SOCAR's sustainable
hydrocarbon production volumes; (3) Moody's expectation that
SOCAR's credit metrics will continue to strengthen in 2022 and 2023
on the back of a surge in oil and gas prices; (4) the company's
adequate liquidity, underpinned by substantial cash balances and
modest debt maturities in the next two to three years (excluding
short-term debt for its trading activities which the company rolls
over consistently); and (5) its close links with the Azerbaijan
government, which has accumulated substantial reserves and should
be in a position to provide financial support to the company if
needed.

However, SOCAR's BCA also takes into account (1) the company's
sizeable trading operations which reduce its consolidated margins,
inflate leverage through the use of short-term debt and limit
predictability of financial results because of the inherent
volatility of these activities; (2) governance factors including
SOCAR's complex organisational structure and lack of transparency
and disclosure with regard to foreign assets and transactions with
shares in various subsidiaries and affiliates and (3) moderate
refinancing risk at SOCAR's subsidiary Petkim Petrokimya Holding
A.S. (B2, Ratings Under Review).

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

In addition to governance factors mentioned above, SOCAR has highly
negative exposure to environmental factors related to carbon
transition risk and waste & pollution in particular as
decarbonisation efforts and transition towards cleaner energy
continues.

The company also has highly negative exposure to social factors,
mainly driven by demographic & societal pressures and the push for
responsible production, which are common for oil and gas
companies.

Overall, the credit impact of these exposures is non-material
because it is offset by the high probability of government support
in the event of financial distress and the group's resilient
balance sheet.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on SOCAR's rating is in line with the stable
outlook on Azerbaijan's sovereign rating and reflects Moody's view
that the company's specific credit factors, including its operating
and financial performance, market position and liquidity, will
remain commensurate with its rating on a sustainable basis.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Moody's could upgrade SOCAR's rating if it were to upgrade
Azerbaijan's sovereign rating, provided there was no significant
deterioration in the company's specific credit factors, including
its operating and financial performance, market position, credit
metrics and liquidity, and no weakening in the probability of
extraordinary state support in the event of financial distress.

Conversely, Moody's could downgrade SOCAR's rating if (i) it were
to downgrade Azerbaijan's sovereign rating, or (ii) there was
evidence that the government's capacity and willingness to provide
support to SOCAR were diminishing, or (iii) government actions
significantly impaired SOCAR's credit profile (including
unfavourable regulatory or tax changes, significant equity
withdrawals, or increased exposure to domestic and international
infrastructure projects of the state without funding support from
it), or (iv) SOCAR's retained cash flow (RCF)/net debt declined
below 20% and EBIT/interest expenses declined below 3.0x, both on a
Moody's-adjusted and sustained basis, or (v) if its liquidity
deteriorated significantly.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The methodologies used in these ratings were Integrated Oil and Gas
Methodology published in September 2019.

CORPORATE PROFILE

State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) is a 100%
state-owned, vertically integrated national oil and gas company
headquartered in Baku, Azerbaijan. The company has a monopoly
position in supplying oil and gas products to the domestic market
and is the state's official representative in all oil and gas
projects in Azerbaijan, including all international consortia.
SOCAR has an integrated offering including crude oil and petroleum
products, natural gas, refining products, oilfield services and
sales and distribution (including trading). Apart from Azerbaijan,
the company mainly operates in Switzerland, Turkey, the UAE and
Georgia. In 2021, SOCAR reported revenue of AZN77.5 billion ($45.6
billion).



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I R E L A N D
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AVOCA CLO XIV: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on EUR14.8MM F-R Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Avoca CLO XIV Designated Activity Company:

EUR16,300,000 Class B-1R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2031,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2021 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf)

EUR48,500,000 Class B-2R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2021 Upgraded to
Aa1 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

EUR274,400,000 Class A-1R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2021 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

EUR25,000,000 Class A-2R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2021 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

EUR18,000,000 Class C-1R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2031, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2021 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

EUR15,000,000 Class C-2R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2031, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2021 Upgraded to
A1 (sf)

EUR25,000,000 Class D-R Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2031, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2021 Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf)

EUR25,700,000 Class E-R Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2021 Affirmed Ba2
(sf)

EUR14,800,000 Class F-R Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Nov 12, 2021 Upgraded to B1
(sf)

Avoca CLO XIV Designated Activity Company, issued in June 2015 and
reset in November 2017, is a collateralised loan obligation (CLO)
backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield senior secured European
loans. The portfolio is managed by KKR Credit Advisors (Ireland)
Unlimited Company. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in
December 2021.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades on the Class B-1R and B-2R Notes are primarily
a result the transaction having reached the end of the reinvestment
period in December 2021.

The rating affirmations on the Class A-1R, A-2R, C-1R, C-2R, D-R,
E-R and F-R Notes reflect the expected losses of the notes
continuing to remain consistent with their current ratings after
taking into account the CLO's latest portfolio, its relevant
structural features and its actual over-collateralization levels.

In light of reinvestment restrictions during the amortisation
period, and therefore the limited ability to effect significant
changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's analysed the deal
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics would maintain an adequate buffer relative to
certain covenant requirements. In particular, Moody's assumed that
the deal will benefit from a shorter amortisation profile than it
had assumed at the last rating action in November 2021.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.

In its base case, Moody's used the following assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: EUR500,047,962

Diversity Score: 63

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2828

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 4.26 years

Weighted Average Spread (WAS) (before accounting for Euribor
floors): 3.49%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.31%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.67%

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future
defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the
collateral pool. In each case, historical and market performance
and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analysing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Counterparty Exposure:

The rating action took into consideration the notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as account bank, using the
methodology "Moody's Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in
Structured Finance" published in June 2022. Moody's concluded the
ratings of the notes are not constrained by these risks.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The collateral manager's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.
Fast amortisation would usually benefit the ratings of the notes
beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.

GOLDENTREE LOAN 1: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR12MM F Notes to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on the
following notes issued by GoldenTree Loan Management EUR CLO 1
Designated Activity Company:

EUR12,000,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2022
Affirmed B2 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

EUR162,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2022 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

EUR49,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2022 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

EUR30,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2030,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2022 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR26,000,000 Class B-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2022 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf)

EUR14,000,000 Class B-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2022 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf)

EUR14,000,000 Class C-1A Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2022
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

EUR11,500,000 Class C-1B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2022
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

EUR25,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Affirmed Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2022
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

EUR27,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Feb 9, 2022
Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

GoldenTree Loan Management EURCLO 1 Designated Activity Company,
issued in March 2018, is a collateralised loan obligation (CLO)
backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield senior secured European
and US loans. The portfolio is managed by GoldenTree Asset
Management LP. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in April
2022.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrade on the Class F Notes is primarily a result of
weaker key credit metrics, such as the weighted average rating
factor and the weighted average recovery rate as calculated by
Moody's, of the underlying pool since the last rating action in
February 2022. Additionally, rising interest rate environment has
negative impact on Class F Notes.

In light of reinvestment restrictions during the amortisation
period, and therefore the limited ability to effect significant
changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's analysed the deal
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics would maintain an adequate buffer relative to
certain covenant requirements.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.

In its base case, Moody's used the following assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: EUR390,722,492

Defaulted Securities: none

Diversity Score: 49

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2878

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 4.27 years

Weighted Average Spread (WAS) (before accounting for Euribor
floors): 3.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.37%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 44.85%

Par haircut in OC tests and interest diversion test: none

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future
defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the
collateral pool. In each case, historical and market performance
and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analysing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Counterparty Exposure:

The rating action took into consideration the notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as account bank, using the
methodology "Moody's Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in
Structured Finance" published in June 2022. Moody's concluded the
ratings of the notes are not constrained by these risks.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The collateral manager's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.
Fast amortisation would usually benefit the ratings of the notes
beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.



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I T A L Y
=========

ARAGORN NPL 2018: DBRS Lowers Class A Notes Rating to CCC
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH downgraded its rating on the Class A notes issued
by Aragorn NPL 2018 S.r.l. to CCC (sf) from CCC (high) (sf) with a
Negative trend as well as confirmed its rating on the Class B notes
at CC (sf) and changed the trend to Negative from Stable.

The transaction represents the issuance of Class A, Class B, and
Class J notes (collectively, the Notes) backed by a mixed pool of
Italian nonperforming secured and unsecured loans originated by
Credito Valtellinese S.p.A. and Credito Siciliano S.p.A.
(collectively, the Originators). The rating assigned to the Class A
notes addresses the timely payment of interest and the ultimate
repayment of principal while the rating assigned to the Class B
notes addresses the ultimate payment of both interest and
principal. DBRS Morningstar does not rate the Class J notes.

The gross book value (GBV) of the loan pool was approximately EUR
1.671 billion as of the 31 December 2017 cut-off date. The
nonperforming loan portfolio is composed of secured commercial and
residential borrowers (82.0% of total GBV) and unsecured borrowers
(18.0% of total GBV), mostly Italian small and medium-sized
enterprises (90.2% of total GBV). Of the GBV, 68% comprised 364
borrowers (of 4,161 total), each with a GBV of more than EUR 1
million. The top 50 borrowers made up 26.8% of the pool GBV at the
cut-off date.

The receivables are serviced by Special Gardant S.p.A. and Cerved
Credit Management S.p.A. (Cerved) (together, the Special
Servicers). Master Gardant S.p.A. acts as the master servicer while
Cerved operates as the backup servicer.

RATING RATIONALE

The rating downgrade follows an annual review of the transaction
and is based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Transaction performance: Assessment of portfolio recoveries as
of December 31, 2021, focusing on: (1) a comparison between actual
collections and the Special Servicers' initial business plan
forecast; (2) the collection performance observed over recent
months, including the period following the outbreak of the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19); and (3) a comparison between the
current performance and DBRS Morningstar's expectations.

-- Updated business plan: The Special Servicers' updated business
plan as of December 2021, which DBRS Morningstar received in July
2022, and the comparison with the initial collection expectations.

-- Portfolio characteristics: Loan pool composition as of June
2022 and the evolution of its core features since issuance.

-- Transaction liquidating structure: The order of priority
entails a fully sequential amortization of the Notes (i.e., the
Class B notes will begin to amortize following the full repayment
of the Class A notes and the Class J notes will amortize following
the repayment of the Class B notes). Additionally, interest
payments on the Class B notes become subordinated to principal
payments on the Class A notes if the cumulative collection ratio
(CCR) or the present value cumulative profitability ratio (NPV CPR)
is lower than 90%. In previous years, there was leakage to the
Class B notes interest, despite the poor performance, due to an
overstatement of ratios caused by a definition mismatch between the
servicing agreement and the terms & conditions of the notes. The
reported CCR of 63.35% as at June 30, 2022 is below the trigger and
this leakage has stopped. The reported NPV CPR is 105.61%. The
updated collections as per the Special Servicers' updated business
plan are not sufficient to pay down the outstanding balance of the
Class A notes alone or the aggregate outstanding balance of the
Class A and Class B notes.

-- Liquidity support: The transaction benefits from an amortizing
cash reserve providing liquidity to the structure, covering
potential interest shortfall on the Class A notes and senior fees.
The cash reserve target amount is equal to 5% of the Class A notes'
principal outstanding balance and is currently fully funded.

TRANSACTION AND PERFORMANCE

According to the latest investor report from January 2022, the
outstanding principal amounts of the Class A, Class B, and Class J
notes were EUR 374.9 million, EUR 66.8 million, and EUR 10.0
million, respectively. As of the January 2022 interest payment
date, the balance of the Class A notes had amortized by
approximately 26.4% since issuance and the current aggregated
transaction balance was EUR 451.7 million.

As of June 2022, the transaction was underperforming the Special
Servicers' initial business plan expectations. The actual
cumulative gross collections equalled EUR 223.1 million whereas the
Special Servicers' initial business plan estimated cumulative gross
collections of EUR 391.7 million for the same period. Therefore, as
of June 2022, the transaction was underperforming by EUR 168.5
million (-43.0%) compared with the initial business plan
expectations.

At issuance, DBRS Morningstar estimated cumulative gross
collections for the same period of EUR 255.8 million at the BBB
(sf) stressed scenario and EUR 334.9 million at the CCC (sf)
stressed scenario. Therefore, as of June 2022, the transaction was
performing below DBRS Morningstar's initial BBB (sf) stressed
expectations.

Pursuant to the requirements set out in the receivable servicing
agreement, in July 2022, the Special Servicers provided DBRS
Morningstar with a revised portfolio business plan combined with
the actual cumulative collections as of December 2021. The updated
portfolio business plan, combined with the actual cumulative gross
collections of EUR 194.9 million as of December 2021, resulted in a
total of EUR 593.6 million, which is 23.2% lower than the total
gross disposition proceeds of EUR 773.0 million estimated in the
initial business plan. Excluding actual collections, the Special
Servicers' expected future collections from January 2022 account
for EUR 398.7 million. The updated DBRS Morningstar BBB (sf) rating
stress assumes a haircut of 14.3% to the Special Servicers' updated
business plan, considering future expected collections from January
2022. In DBRS Morningstar's CCC (sf) scenario, the Special
Servicers' updated forecast was only adjusted in terms of the
actual collections to date and the timing of future expected
collections.

The updated collections as per the Special Servicers' updated
business plan are not sufficient to pay down the outstanding
balance of the Class A notes alone or the total of the Class A and
Class B notes. DBRS Morningstar downgraded the Class A notes by one
notch to CCC (sf), maintained the Negative trend on the Class A
notes and changed the trend to Negative from Stable on the Class B
notes as it continues to closely monitor the underperformance
observed thus far compared with the Special Servicers' initial
business plan as well as the development of the macroeconomic and
real estate scenarios within the current market environment.

The final maturity date of the transaction is in July 2038.

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the resulting isolation
measures had caused an economic contraction, leading in some cases
to increases in unemployment rates and income reductions for many
borrowers. For this transaction, DBRS Morningstar incorporated its
expectation of a moderate medium-term decline in commercial real
estate prices for certain property types.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.




=========
S P A I N
=========

IM BCC 2: DBRS Hikes Class B Notes Rating to BB(high)
-----------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH upgraded and confirmed its ratings on the Class A
and Class B Notes (together, the Rated Notes) issued by IM BCC
Cajamar 2 FT (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A Notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes upgraded to BB (high) (sf) from B (low) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar also removed the Class B Notes from Under Review
with Positive Implications (UR-Pos.), where they were placed on 4
May 2022 following a methodology update.

The rating on the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
final maturity date in December 2061. The rating on the Class B
Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest and principal on
or before the final maturity date.

The rating actions follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies, defaults, and
losses, as of the July 2022 payment date;

-- Portfolio default rate (PD), loss given default (LGD), and
expected loss assumptions on the remaining receivables; -- Updated
Spanish addendum to the "European RMBS Insight Methodology" and
model; and

-- The current available credit enhancement to the Rated Notes to
cover the expected losses assumed at their respective rating
levels.

The transaction is a securitization of residential mortgage loans
originated and serviced by Cajamar Caja Rural that closed in
December 2019. The Rated Notes are backed by a portfolio of
first-lien and second-lien mortgages, secured over properties
located in Spain.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As of the July 2022 payment date, loans that were one to two months
and two to three months delinquent represented 0.5% and 0.2% of the
portfolio balance, respectively, while loans more than three months
delinquent stood at 0.1%. Gross cumulative defaults represented
0.05%, of which 9.5% has been recovered so far.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS AND KEY DRIVERS

DBRS Morningstar conducted a loan-by-loan analysis of the remaining
pool of receivables and updated its base case PD and LGD
assumptions to 3.0% and 18.6%, respectively, from 7.6% and 26.1%,
respectively. The improved assumptions are mainly driven by the
updated Spanish addendum to the "European RMBS Insight Methodology"
and model, which prompted the rating actions.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

The subordination of the Class B Notes and the reserve fund provide
credit enhancement to the Rated Notes. As of the July 2022 payment
date, the credit enhancement to the Class A and Class B Notes stood
at 18.7% and 2.5%, respectively, up from 17.6% and 2.3%,
respectively, since the latest annual review of the transaction.

The transaction benefits from a nonamortizing reserve fund, sized
at 2% of the initial balance of the Rated Notes, currently at its
target of EUR 14.5 million. The reserve provides liquidity support
and credit support to the Class A Notes until the Class A Notes are
paid in full, after which time the reserve fund will provide
liquidity support to the Class B Notes.

Banco Santander SA (Banco Santander) acts as the account bank of
the transaction. Based on the account bank reference rating of A
(high) (one notch below the DBRS Morningstar Long Term Critical
Obligations Rating of AA (low) of Banco Santander), the downgrade
provisions outlined in the transaction documents, and other
mitigating factors inherent in the transaction structure, DBRS
Morningstar considers the risk arising from the exposure to the
account bank in the transaction to be consistent with the ratings
assigned to the Rated Notes, as described in DBRS Morningstar's
"Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
methodology.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.




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U K R A I N E
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UKRAINIAN RAILWAYS: S&P Cuts LT ICR to 'CCC-', Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term issuer credit rating on
Ukrainian Railways JSC (UR) to 'CCC-' from 'CCC'. S&P removed all
ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications, where it
placed them on June 1, 2022.

S&P views Ukraine's proposal to defer payments on all its foreign
debt obligations by 24 months as a sign of a material deterioration
in its financial capacity to continue providing ongoing support to
UR.

The negative outlook indicates the significant risk that UR could
default if additional financial support from the government is not
forthcoming or if S&P deems that the current adverse operating
environment will limit cash flow from operations such that UR is
unlikely to make payments in accordance with the existing maturity
schedule of its debt.

Deterioration in Ukraine's financial capacity to provide further
financial support may weaken UR's liquidity position and increase
the risk of default. S&P said, "Following the Ukrainian
government's decision to offer foreign debt restructuring to its
creditors, we believe further government financial support is
significantly less likely to be forthcoming as Ukraine may
prioritize its own general budget, defence, and reconstruction
needs. Taking this into account, and considering that UR has
depended on government support since the war start in February
2022, we believe UR's debt repayment capacity has weakened. Without
additional government intervention or significant cuts to operating
expenditure, we believe UR is likely to have to restructure its
payment schedule or default on its debt payments within the next
six months because existing liquidity will be depleted to maintain
operations. However, we acknowledge that UR's upcoming maturity
payments in 2022-2023 are low and that the next substantial payment
falls due in 2024."

Proposed foreign debt restructuring on the sovereign level
increases the risk of foreign debt restructuring of
government-related entities (GREs). S&P said, "We consider UR to be
a GRE because it is fully owned by the Ukrainian government, and
manages the national rail infrastructure, provides passenger
transport, and is the country's dominant freight provider. Given
that Ukraine's commercial debt service payments are at risk and the
government's economic and political stability is constantly
pressured by the war with Russia, we believe the risk of negative
government intervention has significantly increased. The government
can directly intervene into the GRE's operations and can threaten
UR's debt service payments if the government also decides to
enforce the GRE's debt restructuring, as occurred in 2015."

The impact of increased cargo tariffs and demining of seaports on
UR's liquidity position is uncertain. In July 2022, UR's cargo
tariffs increased by 70%, which is a substantial improvement.
However, this could hit its cargo volumes as not all clients would
be willing to pay such high tariffs. In the same month, Ukraine and
Russia agreed to demine three ports in the Odesa region to enable
Ukraine to export grain. S&P believes that both developments could
strengthen UR's ability to generate cash flows and partially reduce
its dependency on further financial support from the government,
but the timing remains uncertain.

The negative outlook reflects high uncertainties regarding the
Ukrainian government's financial capacity to provide further
support to UR, the lack of which significantly increases the risk
of UR defaulting. S&P continues to monitor the risk of further
damage to UR's assets resulting from the conflict.

Downside scenario

S&P said, "We could lower the ratings further if we deem UR is
unlikely to make payments in accordance with its maturity schedule
because the adverse operating environment has limited cash flow
from operations or the government makes debt restructuring
compulsory. We will also closely monitor the risk of severe damage
to UR's assets resulting from the conflict."

Upside scenario

S&P said, "We could revise the outlook on UR to stable if an
increase in the cargo tariffs or opening of the seaports boost the
company's cash flows and materially reduce its dependency on
government financial support, reducing the risk of default. We
could also revise the outlook to stable if Ukraine's security
environment improved and we had better visibility on its
medium-term macroeconomic outlook."




===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

GREENSILL CAPITAL: Ex-Employees Can Seek Damages Over Redundancy
----------------------------------------------------------------
Oliver Clay at InYourArea reports that nearly 300 former employees
at collapsed financial services giant Greensill Capital Management
(UK) Limited based in Daresbury can now seek millions of pounds in
damages.

The decision follows a long-fought battle led by the Employment Law
Team at Chester-based legal firm Aaron & Partners for the
claimants, who had all been dismissed with immediate effect on
March 12, 2021 -- the date the company collapsed, InYourArea
notes.

Aaron & Partners has welcomed the judgment made at Central London
Employment Tribunal on Thursday, July 28, InYourArea discloses.

According to InYourArea, a spokesman for the firm said Greensill
failed to collectively consult with staff on their redundancy.

The decision meant all 277 claimants were granted the maximum award
of 90 days' pay, meaning they could be awarded as much as GBP4.5
million in total from their former employer, InYourArea states.

The tribunal rejected Greensill's defence of special circumstances
entirely, finding that there was no "sudden disaster" which
prevented them from consulting with staff, InYourArea relays.

They failed to prove they had taken all practicable steps to
consult with staff, with the judge concluding that they had taken
no steps whatsoever, according to InYourArea.

Of the 277 former members of staff, 205 were employed at the firm's
base at Daresbury Park in Halton, Cheshire, with the rest in
London, InYourArea notes.

During the tribunal, Employment Judge Andrew Glennie agreed with
the claimant's submission that a failure to do anything must, at
best, be seen as serious naivety, or at worst, a deliberate
decision to do nothing, InYourArea discloses.

The tribunal found the proposed sale to Apollo, which collapsed on
March 10 2021, was merely a proposal and was not an offer to
purchase, InYourArea states.

They also found that the appointment of administrators Grant
Thornton on December 31, 2020, was an indication that Greensill
knew there was a risk of job losses and that the company had been
in financial difficulty for approximately a year before the
dismissals, according to InYourArea.

Neither Greensill nor the administrators produced any witnesses at
the final hearing to support the special circumstances defence, nor
did any representatives attend the hearing to make submissions or
to cross examine the witnesses on their behalf, InYourArea notes.

Greensill went into administration in 2021 as the company collapsed
in a storm of controversy, InYourArea recounts.


T.WILSON & SONS: Owed More Than GBP1.3MM at Time of Administration
------------------------------------------------------------------
Jon Robinson at BusinessLive reports that a family business owed
more than GBP1.3 million when it collapsed into administration, it
has been revealed.

Rainford-based T.Wilson & Sons (Farmers) Ltd appointed Rushtons
Insolvency in June after having been run by the Wilson family since
1977, BusinessLive relates.

Its transport division was sold to Preston-based Len Wright Salads,
a move that saved 42 jobs, but its farming arm had ceased to trade
at the end of April, with the loss of 35 roles.

Newly-filed documents with Companies House by Rushtons Insolvency
have revealed the company owed more than GBP1.3 million to its
creditors when it entered administration, BusinessLive discloses.

Unsecured creditors were owed GBP781,935 while secondary
preferential creditor HMRC was owed GBP551,685, BusinessLive
states.

According to BusinessLive, in a statement issued in June, Nicola
Baker of Rushtons Insolvency said: "The last few years have seen an
unprecedented squeeze on many farms and aspects of food producing
businesses, and, sadly, despite the strongly performing specialist
haulage business, it was simply not possible for the company to
keep trading as it was in the current economic climate.


TOGETHER ENERGY: Warrington Puts Measures to Mitigate Exposure
--------------------------------------------------------------
Aran Dhillon at Warrington Guardian reports that the Warrington
council says it has put measures in place to mitigate the 'maximum
potential exposure' following its failed investment into Together
Energy.

As recently reported, according to a council report, the "likely
maximum exposure" to the council is the potential loss of GBP18
million.

The energy company, which the council owned a 50% stake in,
announced it was to cease trading immediately back in January.

The report said, at the time of going into administration, the
council faced a potential liability of GBP66.17 million --
consisting of a GBP29.32 million Orsted guarantee, GBP18.85 million
of loans and GBP18 million of preference share capital.

It also stated that Together Energy Limited (TEL) was a "well
hedged" company.

"Following TEL liquidating its hedge position, it is forecast that
TEL will received a substantial net return after full repayment of
the Orsted liability over the period to October 2023," it added.

"The administrators have advised the council that based on current
information they anticipate that the council's loans (GBP18.850
million) will be repaid in full and there should be no call under
its guarantee to Orsted.

"However, the administrators cannot assess the potential level of
recovery, if any, against the equity investment.

"Therefore based on information available at this time, the likely
maximum exposure to WBC is the potential loss of the £18m equity
investment.

"This has been fully budgeted for in the council's budget, and
since the purchase was undertaken using the capital financing
regime any potential loss is already funded through the ongoing MRP
charges, and therefore, there will be no further impact on the
council taxpayer.

"The council set up a strategic risk reserve to mitigate any under
performance of the diversified investment portfolio and makes a
yearly contribution to the reserve.

"During 2021/22 the council contributed £4m to the strategic risk
reserve. As at March 31, 2022, the reserve stood at GBP32.782
million."


TOWD POINT 2018-AUBURN: DBRS Hikes Class E Rating to BB(high)
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited took the following rating actions on the notes
issued by Towd Point Mortgage Funding 2018-Auburn 12 Plc (the
Issuer):

-- Class A confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B upgraded to AA (high) (sf) from AA (sf)
-- Class C upgraded to AA (sf) from A (sf)
-- Class D upgraded to A (sf) from BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E upgraded to BB (high) (sf) from BB (sf)

The rating on the Class A notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
legal final maturity date in February 2045. The ratings on the
Class B and Class C notes address the ultimate payment of interest
and principal while junior and timely payment of interest while the
senior-most class outstanding. The ratings on the Class D and Class
E notes address the ultimate payment of interest and principal.

The rating actions follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies, defaults, and
losses;

-- Portfolio default rate (PD), loss given default (LGD), and
expected loss assumptions on the remaining receivables; and

-- Current available credit enhancement to the notes to cover the
expected losses at their respective rating levels.

The Issuer is a bankruptcy-remote special-purpose vehicle
incorporated in the UK. The Issuer used the notes to fund the
purchase of UK buy-to-let and owner-occupied residential mortgage
loans originated by Capital Home Loans Limited (CHL). CHL acts as
the servicer for the portfolio while Homeloan Management Limited
acts as the backup servicer.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As of May 2022, loans two to three months in arrears represented
0.4% of the outstanding portfolio balance and the 90+-day
delinquency ratio was 1.1%. As of May 2022, the cumulative default
ratio was 3.0% and the cumulative loss ratio was 0.2%.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS AND KEY DRIVERS

DBRS Morningstar conducted a loan-by-loan analysis of the remaining
pool of receivables and updated its base case PD and LGD
assumptions to 4.8% and 11.6%, respectively.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

As of the May 2022 payment date, the credit enhancement available
to the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E notes was
26.9%, 16.4%, 12.0%, 8.0%, and 4.2%, respectively, up from 23.1%,
14.1%, 10.3%, 6.9%, and 3.7% 12 months prior, respectively. Credit
enhancement in each case is provided by the subordination of junior
classes.

HSBC Bank plc acts as the account bank for the transaction. Based
on DBRS Morningstar's private rating on HSBC Bank plc, the
downgrade provisions outlined in the transaction documents, and
other mitigating factors inherent in the transaction structure,
DBRS Morningstar considers the risk arising from the exposure to
the account bank to be consistent with the rating assigned to the
Class A notes, as described in DBRS Morningstar's "Legal Criteria
for European Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.


WELCOME NURSERIES: Sells 26 Settings Via Pre-Pack Administration
----------------------------------------------------------------
Catherine Gaunt at Nursery World reports that Welcome Nurseries --
the fourth largest nursery group in the UK -- has gone through a
pre-packaged administration sale of 26 of its settings, leaving the
fate of the remaining nurseries and its staff unclear.

The group previously had at least 48 settings, largely in the North
of England and the Midlands, and employed 750 people, providing
more than 5,000 childcare places.

As Nursery World revealed on Aug. 9, six nurseries have recently
closed.

Nursery World understands that an 81-place nursery in Mansfield has
also now closed.

On Aug. 8, Asher Miller of Begbies Traynor, working with Paul Weber
of Leigh Adams, was appointed as joint-administrator to conduct the
pre-packaged administration of Welcome Nurseries, Nursery World
relates.

According to Nursery World, in a statement, Begbies Traynor said:
"Following a period of rapid expansion, Welcome Nurseries currently
operates 32 sites across the north of England. The extensive period
of disruption and uncertainty caused by the global pandemic left
the business unable to meet its ongoing operating costs and repay
the deferred consideration owed following the acquisitions
completed pre-pandemic.

"Together, the Joint Administrators were able to secure the sale of
26 of the sites, in a very short period of time, through a
pre-packaged administration sale to the Harp Group, newly set up by
the successful entrepreneur, Simon Fox. The acquisition, which has
the support of Linda Cuddy, the founder of Welcome Nurseries,
completed on 8 August 2022 and saved the jobs of over 300 dedicated
staff and ensured the seamless ongoing nursery care for around 450
children."

Nurseries in Alfreton, Enderby, Leicester, New Ollerton and
Wellingborough have all been rescued as part of the deal, according
to the Business Desk, but Harp Group did not buy the Crow Hill
Drive setting in Mansfield, Nursery World notes.

Nursery World understands that staff working for Welcome have been
informed that the company has gone into administration and await
further details about their employment, Nursery World discloses.


XBITE: Owed Creditors Almost GBP6.4MM at Time of Administration
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sam Metcalf at TheBusinessDesk.com reports that creditors at
Chesterfield-based online retailer Xbite were owed almost GBP6.4
million when the company was plunged into administration last
month, it has emerged.

Of this, documents seen by TheBusinessDesk.com show that unsecured
creditors are unlikely to see the GBP6 million owed to them when
the firm was sold out of administration in a deal worth just
GBP275,000.

Chesterfield-based XBite traded through websites including
365Games, Roov, Maison and White, Pukkr and Shop4World, and like
many online businesses saw its turnover increase during the
Covid-19 pandemic, TheBusinessDesk.com notes.

The company employed 87 people and turned over GBP51.7 million in
FY21, but mounting cashflow pressures and supply chain issues
associated with importing from China saw it run into trouble,
TheBusinessDesk.com relates.

XB's directors explored options for additional investment,
including a potential sale of the business, but James Lumb and
Howard Smith from Interpath Advisory were appointed joint
administrators on July 15 after, it became apparent that a solvent
sale was unachievable, TheBusinessDesk.com recounts.

The administrators have now completed the sale of the business and
certain assets to an unconnected purchaser, with all employees
keeping their jobs, TheBusinessDesk.com discloses.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in Cyberspace
-------------------------------------------------------------
Author: Warren E. Agin
Publisher: Bowne Publishing Co.
List price: $225.00
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher

Red Hat Inc. finds itself with a high of 151 5/8 and low of 20 over
the last 12 months! Microstrategy Inc. has roller-coasted from a
high of 333 to a low of 7 over the same period! Just when the IPO
boom is imploding and high-technology companies are running out of
cash, Warren Agin comes out with a guide to the legal issues of the
cyberage.

The word "cyberspace" did not appear in the Merriam-Webster
Dictionary until 1986, defined as "the on-line world of computer
networks." The word "Internet" showed up that year as well, as "an
electronic communications network that connects computer networks
and organizational computer facilities around the world."
Cyberspace has been leading a kaleidoscopic parade ever since, with
the legal profession striding smartly in rhythm. There is no
definition for the word "cyberassets" in the current
Merriam-Webster. Fortunately, Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in
Cyberspace tells us what cyberassets are and lays out in meticulous
detail how to address them, not only for troubled technology
companies, but for all companies with websites and domain names.
Cyberassets are primarily websites and domain names, but also
include technology contracts and licenses. There are four types of
assets embodied in a website: content, hardware, the Internet
connection, and software. The website's content is its fundamental
asset and may include databases, text, pictures, and video and
sound clips. The value of a website depends largely on the traffic
it generates.

A domain name provides the mechanism to reach the information
provided by a company on its website, or find the products or
services the company is selling over the Internet. Examples are
Amazon.com, bankrupt.com, and "swiggartagin.com." Determining the
value of a domain name is comparable to valuing trademark rights.
Domain names can come at a high price! Compaq Computer Corp. paid
Alta Vista Technology Inc. more than $3 million for "Altavista.com"
when it developed its AltaVista search engine.

The subject matter covered in this book falls into three groups:
the Internet's effect on the practice of bankruptcy law; the ways
substantive bankruptcy law handles the impact of cyberspace on
basic concepts and procedures; and issues related to cyberassets as
secured lending collateral.

The book includes point-by-point treatment of the effect of
cyberassets on venue and jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings;
electronic filing and access to official records and pleadings in
bankruptcy cases; using the Internet for communications and
noticing in bankruptcy cases; administration of bankruptcy estates
with cyberassets; selling bankruptcy estate assets over the
Internet; trading in bankruptcy claims over the Internet; and
technology contracts and licenses under the bankruptcy codes. The
chapters on secured lending detail technology escrow agreements for
cyberassets; obtaining and perfecting security interests for
cyberassets; enforcing rights against collateral for cyberassets;
and bankruptcy concerns for the secured lender with regard to
cyberassets.

The book concludes with chapters on Y2K and bankruptcy; revisions
in the Uniform Commercial Code in the electronic age; and a
compendium of bankruptcy and secured lending resources on the
Internet. The appendix consists of a comprehensive set of forms for
cyberspace-related bankruptcy issues and cyberasset lending
transactions. The forms include bankruptcy orders authorizing a
domain name sale; forms for electronic filing of documents;
bankruptcy motions related to domain names; and security agreements
for Web sites.

Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in Cyberspace is a well-written,
succinct, and comprehensive reference for lending against
cyberassets and treating cyberassets in bankruptcy cases.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2022.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                * * * End of Transmission * * *