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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Tuesday, July 26, 2022, Vol. 23, No. 142

                           Headlines



A Z E R B A I J A N

AZERBAIJAN: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' SCRs, Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

BLACK DIAMOND 2015-1: Moody's Ups EUR9.5MM F Notes Rating to Ba3
BNPP IP 2015-1: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on EUR9MM Class F Notes


I T A L Y

TELECOM ITALIA: Moody's Cuts CFR to B1, Outlook Remains Negative


K A Z A K H S T A N

BANK CENTERCREDIT: S&P Upgrades ICR to 'B+', Outlook Stable
TRANSTELECOM CO: S&P Raises National Scale Rating to 'kzBB+'


N E T H E R L A N D S

E-MAC NL 2007-I: Fitch Ups Class D Notes Rating to 'BB-'
E-MAC PROGRAM II: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class D Notes


P O R T U G A L

CAIXA ECONOMICA: Fitch Ups Sr. Preferred LT Debt Rating From 'CCC'


S P A I N

ENFRAGEN FINANCE: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' CFR, Outlook Stable


U K R A I N E

UKRAINE: Fitch Lowers LongTerm Foreign Currency IDR to 'C'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CARILLION: KPMG Partner Fined GBP250,000 for Misleading Regulator
CARING CHOICES: Opts for Liquidation, Set to Close Next Month
FIRECLAD AND HARRISON: Goes Into Administration
FUSION: Hill Buys Assets in Pre-Pack Administration Deal
O'KEEFE GROUP: Subcontractors, Suppliers in the Dark re Payments

UROPA SECURITIES 2007-1B: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on B2a Notes
XBITE: Bought Out of Administration, 87 Jobs Saved

                           - - - - -


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A Z E R B A I J A N
===================

AZERBAIJAN: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' SCRs, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
On July 22, 2022, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Azerbaijan. The outlook is stable.

Outlook

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that favorable
hydrocarbon prices and rising gas exports will support Azerbaijan's
fiscal and balance-of-payments positions over 2022-2023. It is also
based on the assumption that there is no return to open military
confrontation with Armenia, while the negative repercussions of the
Russia-Ukraine war remain limited for Azerbaijan.

Downside scenario

S&P could lower the ratings if Azerbaijan's fiscal balances prove
weaker than it currently expects over the medium term. This could
happen, for example, because ageing oil fields result in oil
production declining faster than expected. Reduced hydrocarbon
revenue could also weigh on Azerbaijan's broader economic
prospects, with real per capita GDP growth falling further below
that of peers at a similar level of economic development. In
addition, ratings pressure could build if the military
confrontation with Armenia sharply escalates again, but this is not
our baseline scenario.

Upside scenario

Conversely, S&P could consider an upgrade if higher external
surpluses are sustained for longer than expected, resulting in
sizable external asset accumulation. Ratings upside could also
build if the government implements reforms addressing some of
Azerbaijan's structural impediments, including constraints to
monetary policy effectiveness stemming from elevated resident
deposit dollarization and a still-weak domestic banking system.

Rationale

S&P said, "Of the sovereigns we rate in the 'BB' category, we
consider Azerbaijan's fiscal and external stock positions among the
strongest. The government has accumulated substantial liquid
assets, mainly within sovereign wealth fund State Oil Fund of the
Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ). We forecast that the government
will have access to liquid assets of close to 60% of GDP through
2025 and that general government debt will remain at about 20% of
GDP. In addition to strong stock positions, currently favorable oil
prices also support Azerbaijan's fiscal and balance-of-payments
performance."

S&P's ratings on Azerbaijan remain constrained by weak
institutional effectiveness, the country's narrow and concentrated
economic base, and limited monetary policy flexibility.

Institutional and economic profile: Stronger near-term outlook but
the economy is facing a long-term structural decline in oil
production

-- S&P forecasts Azerbaijan's economy will expand 3.5% in 2022
following a strong 5.6% recovery in 2021.

-- However, medium-term growth prospects are weaker--averaging
1.3% annually over 2023-2025--amid declining oil production due to
ageing fields that will likely be only partially offset by rising
gas exports.

-- Azerbaijan's institutional environment remains relatively weak
and political power is centralized in the presidential
administration.

Azerbaijan's economy is significantly dependent on the hydrocarbon
sector, which is currently benefiting from favorable global oil
prices. Oil and gas constitute almost 90% of exports and amount to
about 50% of GDP. S&P said, "We now project that favorable terms of
trade will persist for Azerbaijan over the rest of 2022 and in
2023. We expect that the Brent oil price will average $102 per
barrel (/bbl) in 2022, $85/bbl in 2023, and $55/bbl in 2024-2025.
In parallel, the OPEC+ group of countries (of which Azerbaijan is a
member) has continued to taper back oil production quotas, in line
with the agreement reached in July 2021."

In S&P's view, the present environment will benefit Azerbaijan's
economic, fiscal, and balance-of-payments performance. However, the
longer-term outlook appears less favorable. Azerbaijan is one of
the oldest oil producers in the world having started industrial oil
production in the 19th century. Existing oilfields are ageing and
experiencing continued production declines. Between 2010 and 2021,
for instance, oil production dropped by 30% to an estimated 0.74
million barrels per day (mbpd) from over 1 mbpd.

Oil production continued to decline over the first four months of
2022, dropping 4.5% in year-on-year terms and averaging close to
0.72 mbpd. S&P said, "We understand that this has been spurred by
natural reductions in output as oil fields age but also some
technical and possibly temporary factors. As a result, Azerbaijan's
production has been below its OPEC+ quotas for the past few months.
We forecast the country's oil production will remain at 0.72 mbpd
on average in 2022 and about that level over 2023-2025."

In contrast to oil, the outlook is stronger for Azerbaijan's gas
sector. Production at the new Shah Deniz II (SDII) gas field
commenced in 2018 and the two related pipelines, the
Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans Adriatic
Pipeline (TAP), carrying gas to Turkey and Europe respectively,
became operational in 2019-2020. Consequently, between 2017 and
2021, Azerbaijan's gas production rose by 80% and is set to
increase another 13% through 2025, according to official plans.

Nevertheless, even considering this recent production ramp-up, S&P
expects gas exports will play a relatively modest role in
Azerbaijan's economy, accounting for about 20% of hydrocarbon
exports compared with close to 80% for oil over the medium term.

Azerbaijan's non-oil sector has exhibited strong growth so far in
2022, up 9.6% year-on-year through June. The favorable trend has
been fairly broad-based in terms of sub-sectors with transportation
(34% growth), IT (14%), and industrial production (11.5%) all
exhibiting strong dynamics. S&P said, "That said, we expect
momentum to slow through the rest of this year, partly due to base
effects but also as elevated inflation is likely to drag on
consumption growth momentum. Beyond 2022, we also do not expect
high growth rates in the non-oil sector to be sustained, given only
limited progress in economic diversification and structural reforms
in recent years."

Although it presents several uncertainties, beyond the oil price
channel, the Russia-Ukraine conflict's effects on Azerbaijan's
economy appear contained so far. Russia is Azerbaijan's largest
trade partner on the import side, accounting for 20% of total goods
imports, out of which wheat is the largest single item. Before the
war, Ukraine contributed 4.5% of imports. Even though the conflict
has contributed to higher inflation, including for food, there do
not currently appear to be broader implications for Azerbaijan,
such as widespread supply chain disruptions or unavailability of
some goods. There is some anecdotal evidence of Russian citizens
relocating to Azerbaijan or moving their funds, but the
macroeconomic effect of this is insubstantial so far.

S&P said, "Overall, we project economic growth of 3.5% for 2022
following a 5.6% rebound in 2021, which mostly reflects increasing
gas production, the recovering non-oil sector, and a slight decline
in oil production. We expect growth will average just over 1% over
2023-2025 as new gas capacity only partially compensates for the
gradual oil sector decline.

"In our opinion, Azerbaijan's institutions remain relatively weak.
They are characterized by highly centralized decision-making and
lack transparency, which can make policy responses difficult to
predict. Political power remains concentrated with the president
and his administration, and there are limited checks and balances.
In our view, structural reforms and economic diversification
efforts have yielded only limited results in recent years.

"We also consider that Azerbaijan continues to suffer from material
gaps in reported data. For instance, there is no real national
income accounts data available broken down by expenditure. Although
sovereign wealth fund SOFAZ provides a detailed and timely
disclosure of its asset composition, there is no international
investment position data available for the economy overall."

Following a six-week-long war in Nagorno-Karabakh that broke out in
September 2020, Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed to a Russia-brokered
ceasefire that took effect on Nov. 10, 2020. Our baseline
expectation is that the ceasefire will broadly hold, supported by
Russia's peacekeeping operations. That said, several ceasefire
violations and skirmishes have taken place at the border in recent
months.

Flexibility and performance profile: Sizable assets accumulated
within SOFAZ are a key support to the sovereign ratings

-- S&P projects Azerbaijan will post 6% of GDP general government
and 24% of GDP current account surpluses in 2022--a significant
upward revision compared to our previous forecasts.

-- In S&P's view, Azerbaijan will retain an average general
government net asset position of around 40% of GDP through 2025.

-- Monetary policy effectiveness remains limited, constrained by
the central bank's limited operational independence, elevated
dollarization, and underdeveloped local currency capital markets.

S&P said, "Based on our 2022 Brent oil price forecast of $102/bbl
and projected oil production of an average of 0.72 mbpd (a 2.5%
year-on-year decline as oil fields age), we expect a current
account surplus of almost 24% of GDP in 2022, following a 15% of
GDP surplus in 2021. We also estimate that Azerbaijan will run the
highest current account surplus in over a decade this year."

The launch of the SDII gas project in 2018 and its further
expansion over the next three-to-four years should also support
Azerbaijan's external performance. However, this is moderated by
our projections of stagnating oil production over the medium term,
while imports rebound as domestic consumption recovers and the
authorities deliver on planned reconstruction activities in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Combined with S&P's assumption that oil prices
will decline to $55/bbl in 2024, Azerbaijan's current account
surpluses will turn into deficits toward the end of the four-year
forecast horizon.

Nevertheless, Azerbaijan's strong external stock position will
remain a core rating strength, reinforced by the large amount of
foreign assets accumulated at SOFAZ. S&P said, "We estimate that
external liquid assets will surpass external debt through 2025.
Although Azerbaijan remains vulnerable to potential terms-of-trade
volatility, we consider that its large net external asset position
will serve as a buffer that could mitigate the potential adverse
effects of economic cycles on domestic economic development."

Azerbaijan's fiscal asset position remains strong, mirroring its
external position and supporting the sovereign rating. Despite the
budgeted 2021 deficit, Azerbaijan posted a full-year general
government surplus of 6.6% of GDP. In 2021, the general government
balance improved as terms of trade proved more favorable than in
2020, while expenditure was under-executed--a frequent occurrence
in Azerbaijan.

S&P said, "We now forecast a 6% of GDP general government surplus
for 2022, an upward revision from our previous projection of 3% of
GDP, almost entirely reflecting more favorable oil price dynamics.
The 2022 budget was revised in July with the oil price now assumed
at $85/bbl (versus $50/bbl previously) and an increase in capital
expenditure (capex), allowed by better revenue outturns. Based on
the latest budget revision, overall government spending is set to
rise over 20% in nominal terms versus the actual outturn in 2021,
as social expenditure and public sector wages are increasing in
addition to capex. Nevertheless, we note that Azerbaijan tends to
underspend, so the actual full-year outcome will likely prove more
modest.

"We expect the net general government asset position will remain
about 40% of GDP through 2025. In calculating net general
government debt, we consider our estimate of SOFAZ's external
liquid assets. We exclude exposures equivalent to about 20% of 2021
GDP that we consider harder to liquidate quickly if needed, such as
the fund's domestic investments and certain equity exposures
abroad. Azerbaijan is far more transparent than many of its peers
(such as those in the Gulf Cooperation Council) with regards to the
composition of the assets and size of the sovereign wealth fund.
For example, SOFAZ publishes detailed audited annual reports with
granular information on the categories of investments held by the
fund.

"The government owns a majority stake in the International Bank of
Azerbaijan (IBA) and in 2017 restructured the bank and directly
assumed some of its debt. The government has also transferred IBA's
nonperforming loans, at a book value of about Azerbaijani manat
(AZN) 10 billion, to AqrarKredit, a state-owned nonbanking credit
organization funded by the Central Bank of Azerbaijan, with a
sovereign guarantee. We include AqrarKredit's sovereign guaranteed
loans of AZN9.5 billion in general government debt.

"We assume Azerbaijan will retain the manat's de facto peg to the
U.S. dollar at AZN1.7 to $1, supported by the authorities' regular
interventions in the foreign currency market. Nevertheless, in our
view, should hydrocarbon prices drop sharply and remain low for a
prolonged period, the authorities could consider allowing the
exchange rate to adjust. This would help avoid a substantial loss
of foreign currency buffers similar to that experienced by the
central bank in 2015."

Like most other emerging and advanced economies, Azerbaijan's
inflation has continued to exceed our previous forecasts,
surpassing levels exhibited over 2016-2017, when prices rose
significantly following the 2015 manat devaluation. Current upward
price pressures are driven by the effects of post-pandemic
reopening, food price inflation, and global trends given that
Azerbaijan imports a wide range of goods from abroad and is
significantly affected by foreign inflation developments. S&P now
forecasts inflation will average 13% in 2022 before gradually
slowing to 5% through 2025.

S&P considers Azerbaijan's banking system to be stable with overdue
loans continuing on a downward trend and reaching 3.6% in May 2022,
although the large shadow economy makes it difficult to assess true
underlying asset quality. The financial sector remains small with
total assets of under 50% of GDP, which limits possible contingent
liability risks for the government. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan's
banking system is characterized by several persisting structural
vulnerabilities, including the still high levels of dollarization,
weak governance and transparency in an international context, and
relaxed lending and underwriting standards.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List

  RATINGS AFFIRMED

  AZERBAIJAN

   Sovereign Credit Rating                BB+/Stable/B

   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   BB+




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I R E L A N D
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BLACK DIAMOND 2015-1: Moody's Ups EUR9.5MM F Notes Rating to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Black Diamond CLO 2015-1 Designated Activity
Company ("Black Diamond CLO 2015-1"):

EUR24,800,000 Refinancing Class D Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes due 2029, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
Jan 21, 2022 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR23,600,000 Refinancing Class E Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes due 2029, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
Jan 21, 2022 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

EUR9,500,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2029, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2022 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

EUR176,300,000 (Current outstanding amount EUR15,092,055)
Refinancing Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2022 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

USD67,200,000 (Current outstanding amount USD5,793,843)
Refinancing Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2022 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR24,300,000 Refinancing Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2029, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2022
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR30,000,000 Refinancing Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate
Notes due 2029, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 21, 2022
Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR22,900,000 Refinancing Class C Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes due 2029, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan
21, 2022 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Black Diamond CLO 2015-1, issued in September 2015 and refinanced
in January 2018, is a multi-currency collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield senior secured
European and US loans. The portfolio is managed by Black Diamond
CLO 2015-1 Adviser, L.L.C. (the "Manager"). The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in October 2019.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades on the Class D, E and F Notes are primarily a
result of the significant deleveraging of the senior notes
following amortisation of the underlying portfolio since the last
rating action in January 2022.

The Class A Notes have paid down by approximately EUR29 million
(12% of Class A original balance) since the last rating action in
January 2022 and EUR223 million (91% of Class A original balance)
since closing. As a result of the deleveraging,
over-collateralisation (OC) has increased across the capital
structure. According to the trustee report dated June 6, 2022 [1]
the Class A/B, Class C, Class D, Class E and Class F OC ratios are
reported at 226.2%, 177.1%, 143.4%, 121.4% and 114.4% compared to
the last rating action in January 2022, the Class A/B, Class C,
Class D, Class E and Class F OC ratios reported as of December 20,
2021 [2] were 182.6%, 154.6%, 132.5%, 116.6% and 111.3%
respectively. Moody's notes that the June 6, 2022 principal
payments are not reflected in the reported OC ratios.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.

In its base case, Moody's used the following assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: EUR183.5 million

Defaulted Securities: None

Diversity Score: 39

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3266

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 3.1 years

Weighted Average Spread (WAS) (before accounting for Euribor
floors): 3.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.0%

Par haircut in OC tests and interest diversion test: 1.45%

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future
defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the
collateral pool. In each case, historical and market performance
and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analysing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Counterparty Exposure:

The rating action took into consideration the notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as account bank, using the
methodology "Moody's Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in
Structured Finance" published in June 2022. Moody's concluded the
ratings of the notes are not constrained by these risks.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the note,
in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the general
economy. In particular, the length and severity of the economic and
credit shock precipitated by the global coronavirus pandemic will
have a significant impact on the performance of the securities. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted either positively or
negatively by (1) the manager's investment strategy and behaviour
and (2) divergence in the legal interpretation of CDO documentation
by different transactional parties because of embedded
ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.
Fast amortisation would usually benefit the ratings of the notes
beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

Foreign currency exposure: The deal has significant exposures to
non-EUR denominated assets. Volatility in foreign exchange rates
will have a direct impact on interest and principal proceeds
available to the transaction, which can affect the expected loss of
rated tranches.

BNPP IP 2015-1: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on EUR9MM Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by BNPP IP Euro CLO 2015-1 DAC:

EUR13,500,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2018 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

EUR12,632,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2030,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2018 Definitive Rating
Assigned Aa2 (sf)

EUR24,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

EUR16,800,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

EUR185,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2018 Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR18,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2018
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

EUR9,000,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
2030, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Apr 16, 2018 Definitive
Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

BNPP IP Euro CLO 2015-1 DAC, issued in April 2015 and refinanced in
April 2017 and April 2018, is a collateralised loan obligation
(CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield senior secured
European loans. The portfolio is managed by BNP PARIBAS ASSET
MANAGEMENT France SAS. The transaction's reinvestment period ended
on July 15, 2022.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades on the Class B-1, Class B-2, Class C and Class
D Notes are primarily a result of the benefit of the transaction
having reached the end of the reinvestment period on July 15,
2022.

In light of reinvestment restrictions during the amortisation
period, and therefore the limited ability to effect significant
changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's analysed the deal
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics would maintain an adequate buffer relative to
certain covenant requirements.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.

In its base case, Moody's used the following assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: EUR298.9m

Defaulted Securities: EUR1.1m

Diversity Score: 51

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2940

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 4.56 years

Weighted Average Spread (WAS) (before accounting for Euribor
floors): 3.70%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.16%

Par haircut in OC tests: None

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future
defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the
collateral pool. In each case, historical and market performance
and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analysing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Counterparty Exposure:

The rating action took into consideration the notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as account bank, using the
methodology "Moody's Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in
Structured Finance" published in June 2022. Moody's concluded the
ratings of the notes are not constrained by these risks.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The collateral manager's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.
Fast amortisation would usually benefit the ratings of the notes
beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's
over-collateralisation levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's analysed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price or the
recovery rate to account for potential volatility in market prices.
Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive
impact on the notes' ratings.



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I T A L Y
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TELECOM ITALIA: Moody's Cuts CFR to B1, Outlook Remains Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B1 from Ba3 the
corporate family rating and to B1-PD from Ba3-PD the probability of
default rating of Telecom Italia S.p.A. ("Telecom Italia" or "the
company"). Concurrently, Moody's has downgraded to B1/(P)B1 from
Ba3/(P)Ba3 the ratings of all senior unsecured debt instruments
issued (or guaranteed) by Telecom Italia and its rated
subsidiaries. The outlook for the entities remains negative.

"The downgrade of Telecom Italia's ratings reflects Moody's
expectation that its leverage will remain high and its free cash
flow will remain negative over the next 2 to 3 years, due to the
highly competitive market conditions in Italy and the high
investment needs, combined with  the expected macroeconomic
slowdown," says Ernesto Bisagno, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior
Credit Officer and lead analyst for Telecom Italia.

"The company was already weakly positioned in the previous rating
category. However, the macroeconomic environment has deteriorated
since we downgraded the rating to Ba3 in March, reducing the
visibility on Telecom Italia's operating performance and its
expected deleveraging path," adds Mr Bisagno.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrade reflects Moody's expectation that Telecom
Italia's credit metrics will remain weak well beyond 2022, with
high leverage, weak interest coverage ratios and negative free cash
flow generation, despite potential for earnings stabilization in
2023.

The company's Moody's adjusted net debt to EBITDA ratio will peak
in 2022 at around 5.4x, and decline towards 4.5x by 2024, exceeding
the 4.25x maximum leverage tolerance for the previous Ba3 rating.
In addition, Moody's expects the company's EBITDA –
Capex/Interest coverage ratio to start from a weak level of 1.0x in
2022 and only recover towards 1.5x by 2024.

In Moody's view, visibility into Telecom Italia's operating
performance has reduced because of the weakened macroeconomic
environment, with increased pressure on consumer spending due to
record inflation, and increasing funding costs owing to rising
interest rates and more difficult capital markets access.

On July 7, 2022, Telecom Italia hosted its Capital Market Day and
provided additional details around its network separation plan [1].
The  company has made good progress with the initial phase of the
delayering process, by more clearly identifying the perimeter for
each entity, and the potential capital structure of the network
company (netco) and service company (servco). No updates were
provided on the potential merger between the netco and Open Fiber
S.p.A. Under the MoU signed in May 2022, Telecom Italia and Open
Fiber S.p.A. aim to sign a binding agreement by the end of
October.

While no full guidance was provided, Moody's expects that free cash
flow for each entity would remain negative in 2023 and break even
towards 2025, mainly because of the high investment needs in
particular for the netco, combined with the restructuring costs and
potential for higher interest costs.

Following the delayering plan, the netco would have net debt of up
to EUR11 billion (as calculated by the company, before leases)
while the servco would have a net debt lower than EUR5 billion. The
proposed capital structure for the different entities will provide
potential for de-leveraging, with the debt reduction depending on
the final valuation of the netco. Only if the deleveraging target
is achieved, there might be potential one-off shareholder
distributions. However, the separation will be a complex and
potentially lengthy process at a time when the operating
environment is becoming more challenging, including  increased
volatility in  the capital markets.

Despite the potential for a network separation, Telecom Italia's
rating continues to consider the company's current perimeter and
configuration and factors in the evolution of the credit metrics
for the group as a whole. If the company proceeds with the
delayering strategy, Moody's would assess its implications on the
business model of each entity, as well as the future financial
profile including the deleveraging trajectory and potential to
generate free cash flow. This could ultimately lead to a different
rating outcome.

Telecom Italia's B1 rating primarily reflects (1) the company's
scale and position as the incumbent service provider in Italy, with
strong market shares in both fixed and mobile segments; and (2) the
international diversification in Brazil, a business that is
reporting steady earnings growth. The rating is constrained by (1)
the company's high leverage, weak interest coverage metrics and
negative free cash flow generation; (2) the high competitive
pressures in Italy; (3) the ongoing earnings decline; (4) the
uneven historical track record at achieving earnings guidance; and
(5) the increased complexity of the group's structure.

LIQUIDITY

Telecom Italia's liquidity is adequate; it decreased from the 2021
level due to the redemption of EUR3.3 billion of debt which matured
in the first part of 2022, partially offset by new financing
activity.  Moody's liquidity assessment takes into account cash
and cash equivalents of EUR4.9 billion, and EUR4 billion available
under its senior unsecured revolving credit facility agreements
with no financial covenants.

In Q3 2022, Telecom Italia expects to receive EUR1.5 billion
(including EUR200 million debt repayment) from the disposal of the
12.4% indirect stake in mobile telecoms tower business
Infrastrutture Wireless Italiane S.p.A. (INWIT).

In July 2022, the company raised EUR2 billion through a new 6-years
bank facility, guaranteed by the Italian export credit agency Sace
S.p.A., which helps to pre-fund near term maturities.

However, the company will likely generate negative FCF of around
EUR1.4 billion in 2022 before spectrum payments of EUR2 billion,
and has significant debt maturities of around EUR0.6 billion in
2022 and EUR3.2 billion in 2023. There is an important additional
refinancing in 2024, which the company will need to address and
that Moody's expects to become more onerous.

RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on the rating reflects Telecom Italia's
expected weak credit metrics over the next couple of years, with
negative free cash flow generation over 2022-23. The negative
outlook also reflects the execution risks in the turn-around
strategy and the reduced visibility on the company's operating
performance owing to the deteriorated macroeconomic environment.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Upward rating pressure in the next 12-18 months is unlikely given
the weak credit metrics. However, upward pressure could develop if
operating performance shows signs of significant improvement, such
that Telecom Italia's Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA declines below
4.25x and its Moody's adjusted EBITDA-Capex / interest expense
ratio improves above 2.0x, while the company demonstrates improving
free cash flow generation.

Further downward rating pressure could develop if Telecom Italia's
Moody's-adjusted net leverage ratio does not reduce to below 5.0x;
its Moody's adjusted EBITDA-Capex / interest expense ratio remains
below 1.5x, with sustained negative free cash flow generation; or
its liquidity deteriorates.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Downgrades:

Issuer: Telecom Italia S.p.A.

Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to B1-PD from Ba3-PD

LT Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to B1 from Ba3

Senior Unsecured MTN Program, Downgraded to (P)B1 from (P)Ba3

Senior Unsecured Bank Credit Facility, Downgraded to B1 from Ba3

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to B1 from
Ba3

Issuer: Telecom Italia Capital S.A.

BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to B1
from Ba3

Issuer: Telecom Italia Finance, S.A.

BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN Program, Downgraded to (P)B1 from
(P)Ba3

BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to B1
from Ba3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Telecom Italia S.p.A.

Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: Telecom Italia Capital S.A.

Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: Telecom Italia Finance, S.A.

Outlook, Remains Negative

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was
Telecommunications Service Providers published in January 2017.

COMPANY PROFILE

Telecom Italia is the leading integrated telecommunications
provider in Italy. The company provides a full range of services
and products, including telephony, data exchange, interactive
content, and information and communications technology solutions.
In addition, the group is one of the leading telecom companies in
the Brazilian mobile market, operating through its subsidiary, TIM
Brasil. Vivendi SE (Vivendi, Baa2 negative) and Cassa Depositi e
Prestiti S.p.A. (Baa3 stable) are the main shareholders of Telecom
Italia, with 23.8% and 9.8% shares, respectively. In 2021, Telecom
Italia reported EUR15.3 billion in revenue and EUR6.2 billion in
company-organic EBITDA.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================

BANK CENTERCREDIT: S&P Upgrades ICR to 'B+', Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term issuer credit rating on
Kazakhstani Bank CenterCredit JSC (BCC) to 'B+' from 'B'. The
outlook is stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B'
short-term rating on the bank.

Additionally, S&P raised its Kazakhstan national scale rating on
BCC to 'kzBBB' from 'kzBBB-'.

BCC's business position has gradually strengthened, supported by
improving profitability and better asset quality. The bank has been
sharpening its strategy in recent years and is focusing on
developing new business in high-margin segments, such as small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) and retail. Over the next few years, BCC
targets increasing SME loans to 20% of its total loan book (up from
17% as of June 1, 2022) and for the retail segment to account for
up to 65%-70% of total loans (58% as of June 1, 2022). S&P said,
"We expect a decline in corporate loans, in line with the bank's
plan to decrease further its single-name concentration to 20% of
total loans in 2022-2023 from 30% as of end-2021. We acknowledge
management's efforts to clean up its balance sheet from legacy
problem loans and increase its operating efficiency over the past
years. We consider that the bank's profitability has noticeably
improved over 2019-2021. For 2021, BCC posted net consolidated
profits 1.65x times higher than in 2020. Its return on average
common equity (ROAE) improved to about 15% in 2021 compared with
10% in 2020 and an average of about 4%-8% in 2015-2019. The
increase in profitability was driven by some growth in operating
revenue and lower provisioning needs, as BCC mostly finalized its
loan book cleanup after the asset-quality review and given its
focus on quality borrowers as part of its strategic shift to
stricter underwriting. We expect ROAE will exceed 15% over the next
several years after spiking above 50% in 2022, driven by positive
impacts from the Eco Center Bank acquisition."

The recent acquisition of Eco Center Bank should further support
the bank's market footprint and profitability.In May 2022, BCC
acquired Eco Center Bank (formerly SB Alfa-Bank Kazakhstan). S&P
said, "We believe that the overall effect from the deal is rather
positive for BCC's market position, capital and earnings, and asset
quality. As a result of the acquisition, BCC's market share in
terms of assets has increased to 7.3% as of June 1, 2022, from 6%
as of April 1, 2022, making it the fourth-largest Kazakhstani bank
(up from No. 7). We expect BCC will keep this position thanks to
expected loan growth of 10%-15% in 2023-2024, in line with the
system-average growth, after an extraordinary 40%-45% increase in
the loan book this year largely due to the acquisition. The
structure of the deal, with a significant discount to Eco Center
Bank's equity and one-off dividend income received from the bank,
will result in extraordinary ROAE of more than 50% in 2022.
However, overall profitability will benefit going forward too, due
to a larger loan portfolio and a material fee and commission income
business transferred from Eco Center Bank. We note that there are
currently integration risks related to the acquisition, that said,
we believe BCC will be able to manage them, since a material part
of Eco Center Bank's clients are already transferred to BCC and the
IT systems of both banks are mostly unified."

S&P siad, "BCC's capitalization has strengthened, and we expect the
bank will operate with a higher capital buffer. The bank's Tier-1
capital ratio has improved to 13.5% as of June 1, 2022, from about
11.6% as of May 1, 2022. We anticipate our RAC ratio will also
improve and remain at about 5.4%-5.6% in 2022-2023 compared with
4.4% in 2021, supported by one-off income received from the
acquisition, improved earnings metrics, and just moderate
dividends, which the bank can start paying out after finalizing its
participation in the post-asset quality revie (AQR) government
program. At the same time, we still consider the bank's capital
buffer as moderate in the international context and rather neutral
for the rating."

BCC has significantly advanced the cleanup of legacy problem loans
over the past three years. The stock of problem assets decreased,
with the share of Stage 3 and purchased or originated
credit-impaired loans at 9.8% of the loan portfolio as of June 1,
2022, declining from 20% at year-end 2020. S&P said, "We anticipate
credit costs in 2022 will remain elevated but not higher than the
system-wide average of about 2%, reflecting the challenging
operating conditions and potential negative spillover effect on
borrowers' creditworthiness. An inflationary spike, alongside the
disruption of trade and logistic chains stemming from the
Russia-Ukraine conflict, could weigh on borrowers' payment
discipline and create additional provisioning needs for banks in
the system. However, since economic fundamentals in the context of
Kazakhstan's external buffers remain supportive, we consider that
any deterioration in asset quality would likely be moderate and
temporary."

S&P said, "BCC's systemic importance strengthens its
creditworthiness, in our view.The long-term rating on BCC is one
notch higher than the stand-alone credit profile, reflecting our
view of the bank's moderate systemic importance in Kazakhstan, and
the Kazakh government as supportive toward its banking system. This
is driven by BCC being the fourth-largest domestic bank by retail
deposits, with about a 7% market share.

"The stable outlook on BCC reflects our expectation that within
next 12-18 months the bank will maintain its competitive standing
and capital buffers while sustaining stable asset-quality. We also
expect that BCC will manage well potential integration risks
stemming from the acquisition.

"We could consider a downgrade or revise the outlook to negative if
the bank experiences material deterioration in asset quality, or if
we believe that the bank's competitive position and profitability
are pressured, for example, by increased competition, unexpected
business integration expenses stemming from the acquisition, or
higher-than-expected provisioning needs associated with rapid
business expansion in unsecured consumer lending or SME loans.

"We could consider a positive rating action if we believe that
BCC's asset quality has sustainably strengthened, with the share of
nonperforming assets in its loan book not exceeding the
system-average level, and its S&P Global Ratings' RAC ratio
improving sustainably to above 7.0%. However, we believe it is
unlikely to happen over the next 12-18 months."

ESG credit indicators: E-2, S-2, G-4


TRANSTELECOM CO: S&P Raises National Scale Rating to 'kzBB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings corrected its national scale rating on
Kazakhstan-based issuer TransTeleCom Co. JSC by raising it to
'kzBB+' from 'kzBB'. In accordance with S&P's criteria, its
national scale rating on TransTeleCom is derived from its global
scale rating using the respective mapping table. Due to an error,
it had inadvertently used an outdated mapping table from the
criteria guidance that was already retired when we assigned the
initial national scale rating on July 15, 2019. No other ratings on
TransTeleCom were affected by the error.




=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================

E-MAC NL 2007-I: Fitch Ups Class D Notes Rating to 'BB-'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded E-MAC Program B.V. Compartment NL
2007-I's class C and D notes, as listed below. Fitch has affirmed
the other classes of the transaction as well as all tranches of
E-MAC NL 2004-II B.V., E-MAC NL 2005-I B.V. and E-MAC Program B.V.
- Compartment NL 2007-III. The Outlook is Stable.

   DEBT                 RATING                 PRIOR
   ----                 ------                 -----

E-MAC NL 2005-I B.V.

Class A XS0216513118   LT   A+sf   Affirmed    A+sf

Class B XS0216513548   LT   A+sf   Affirmed    A+sf

Class C XS0216513977   LT   A+sf   Affirmed    A+sf

Class D XS0216514199   LT   A+sf   Affirmed    A+sf

E-MAC Program B.V. Compartment NL 2007-I

Class A2 XS0292255758  LT   Asf     Affirmed   Asf

Class B XS0292256301   LT   BBB+sf  Affirmed   BBB+sf

Class C XS0292258695   LT   BB+sf   Upgrade    BB-sf

Class D XS0292260162   LT   BB-sf   Upgrade    CCCsf

Class E XS0292260675   LT   CCCsf   Affirmed   CCCsf

E-MAC Program B.V. - Compartment NL 2007-III

Class A2 XS0307677640  LT   A+sf    Affirmed   A+sf

Class B XS0307682210   LT   A-sf    Affirmed   A-sf

Class C XS0307682723   LT   BB+sf   Affirmed   BB+sf

Class D XS0307683291   LT   B+sf    Affirmed   B+sf

Class E XS0307683531   LT   CCCsf   Affirmed   CCCsf

E-MAC NL 2004-II B.V.

Class A XS0207208165   LT   A+sf    Affirmed   A+sf

Class B XS0207209569   LT   A+sf    Affirmed   A+sf

Class C XS0207210906   LT   A+sf    Affirmed   A+sf

Class D XS0207211037   LT   A+sf    Affirmed   A+sf

Class E XS0207264077   LT   CCCsf   Affirmed   CCCsf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The E-MAC transactions are seasoned true-sale securitisations of
Dutch residential mortgage loans originated by GMAC-RFC Nederland
B.V. The successor company, CMIS Nederland B.V. is the servicer.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Model Error Corrected: The transactions include swaps which provide
20bp of excess spread after senior costs and class A to D interest,
based on the notional of the loans that have reset between two
interest payment dates. In its modelling during previous reviews,
Fitch underestimated the post-swap margin for those loans having a
reset date outside of the month of an IPD. The correction of this
error was a factor in the upgrade of 2007-I's class D notes, in
addition to increased credit enhancement and lower loss
assumptions.

Lack of Replacement Language Determines 'A+sf' Cap: Fitch has
capped the 2004-II and 2005-I notes' ratings due to a lack of
replacement language for the collection account bank in these
transactions. As commingling losses in combination with pro rata
payments could lead to losses for all notes, Fitch has capped the
rating of these notes at the deposit rating of ABN Amro Bank N.V.
Counterparty risks are reduced for the other two transactions under
Fitch's Structured Finance and Covered Bonds Counterparty Rating
Criteria.

Pro Rata Structures Limit CE Build-Up: As of the April 2022 payment
date, all transactions were amortising pro rata, except 2005-I,
which switched to sequential amortisation three years ago. All
transactions have had periods of sequential amortisation, but
2004-II, 2007-I and 2007-III reverted to pro rata, reducing the
credit enhancement build-up for the senior notes in line with the
amortisation mechanism in the documentation. This feature has been
factored into the rating analysis to the extent that the relevant
pro-rata triggers are captured by Fitch's modelling.

There are no conditions that would result in an irreversible switch
to sequential note amortisation after amortisation has crossed a
certain threshold, which is deemed to be a non-standard structural
feature. Where appropriate, Fitch has assigned ratings that are
different to those derived by its cash flow model. This reflects
the fact that ratings could be lower if performance is better than
assumed in the respective rating scenarios and thereby principal
payments continue to be pro rata. Fitch also considered cash-flow
models with a purely sequential amortisation to take into account
worse-than-expected performance and prolonged periods of high
arrears.

Performance Adjustment Floored: Fitch has floored the performance
adjustment applied to 2007-III. This was done to mitigate the
influence of arrears movements on the performance adjustment as
calculated by ResiGlobal and reflects Fitch's expectations for the
future performance of the transaction's assets.

Excess Spread Notes at 'CCCsf': All outstanding excess spread notes
are rated 'CCCsf'. Principal redemption of these notes ranks
subordinate to the payment of subordinated swap payments and
extension margins on the collateralised notes in the revenue
waterfall. As the extension margin amounts have been accruing and
remain unpaid, the full principal redemption of the excess spread
notes from interest receipts is considered unlikely. Fitch's
ratings do not address the payment of extension margins.

The reserve funds in these transactions may increase following
asset performance deterioration. Funds collected will be released
once arrears fall again below the pre-defined three-months arrears
trigger, at which point the funds released will be used towards the
redemption of the excess spread notes. As the portfolios continue
to amortise, a small number of loans can lead to greater volatility
in arrears performance, leading to the possibility of continuous
replenishments and releases in the reserve funds, and subsequent
redemptions on the excess spread notes. Given this variability, the
credit risk of these notes is commensurate with the 'CCCsf' rating
definition leading to the affirmation of the excess spread notes.

Interest-Only Concentration: The interest-only (IO) concentrations
in these transactions range between 69% (2005-I) and 84% (2004-II)
of the outstanding portfolio and are high compared with other
Fitch-rated Dutch RMBS. Under the Criteria, a 50% weighted average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) is assumed for the peak concentration
at 'AAA' level (lower WAFF assumptions are applied at lower rating
stresses), and the 'B' WAFF to the remainder of the pool.

For 2004-II, the application of the IO concentration WAFF resulted
in model-implied ratings more than three notches below the rating
derived by applying a WAFF produced by the standard criteria
assumptions. Therefore Fitch considered the IO WAFF in its rating
analysis for this transaction. The standard Criteria WAFF was
considered by Fitch for the remaining three deals.

The KRDs listed in the applicable sector Criteria, but not
mentioned above, are not material to this rating action.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Adverse macroeconomic factors may affect asset performance. An
increase in foreclosures and losses beyond Fitch's stresses may
erode CE, leading to negative rating action.

Furthermore, a downgrade of the collection account bank could
result in an downgrade of 2004-II's and 2005-I's notes.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Due to the lack of a hard switch-back to sequential amortisation, a
slight and persistant increase in delinquencies and losses could be
beneficial to the senior notes, as this could switch the
transactions to sequential amortisation and lead to an increase in
CE for those notes if amortisation remains sequential until the
notes are repaid.

Furthermore, an upgrade of the collection account bank could result
in an upgrade of 2004-II's and 2005-I's notes.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

E-MAC NL 2004-II B.V., E-MAC NL 2005-I B.V., E-MAC Program B.V. -
Compartment NL 2007-III, E-MAC Program B.V. Compartment NL 2007-I

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third- party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pool[s] ahead of the transaction's [E-MAC NL
2004-II B.V., E-MAC NL 2005-I B.V., E-MAC Program B.V. -
Compartment NL 2007-III, E-MAC Program B.V. Compartment NL 2007-I]
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment, and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis under its applicable rating methodologies indicates
that it is adequately reliable.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

E-MAC PROGRAM II: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded E-MAC Program III B.V. Compartment NL
2008-I's class B, C and D notes, and E-MAC Program II B.V.
Compartment NL 2008-IV's class B, C and D notes. Fitch has affirmed
the other classes of the transactions as well as all tranches of
E-MAC Program II B.V. - Compartment NL 2007-IV B.V., as detailed
below.

   DEBT                  RATING                PRIOR
   ----                  ------                -----

E-MAC Program II B.V. Compartment NL 2008-IV

Class A XS0355816264   LT   AAsf    Affirmed   AAsf

Class B XS0355816421   LT   AA-sf   Upgrade    A+sf

Class C XS0355816694   LT   AA-sf   Upgrade    A+sf

Class D XS0355816934   LT   BBB+sf  Upgrade    B+sf

E-MAC Program II B.V. - Compartment NL 2007-IV

A XS0325178548         LT   A-sf    Affirmed   A-sf

B XS0325183464         LT   BBB-sf  Affirmed   BBB-sf

C XS0325183621         LT   B+sf    Affirmed   B+sf

D XS0325184355         LT   CCCsf   Affirmed   CCCsf

E-MAC Program III B.V. Compartment NL 2008-I

Class A2 XS0344800957  LT   AA+sf   Affirmed   AA+sf

Class B XS0344801765   LT   AA+sf   Upgrade    A+sf

Class C XS0344801922   LT   AAsf    Upgrade    A+sf

Class D XS0344802060   LT   A-sf    Upgrade    BBBsf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The E-MAC transactions are seasoned true-sale securitisations of
Dutch residential mortgage loans originated by GMAC-RFC Nederland
B.V. The successor company, CMIS Nederland B.V. is the servicer.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Model Error Corrected: The transactions all include a swap which
provides 20bp of excess spread after senior costs and class A to D
interest on the following interest payment date, based on the
notional of the loans that have reset between the two Interest
Payment Dates (IPD). In its modelling during previous reviews,
Fitch underestimated the post-swap margin for those loans having a
reset date outside of the month of an IPD. The correction of this
error was a factor in the upgrade of 2008-IV's class D notes, in
addition to increased credit enhancement and lower loss
assumptions.

Pro Rata Structures Limit CE Build-Up: As of the April 2022 payment
date, all transactions were amortising pro rata. Some transactions
paid sequentially during some periods, but recently reverted to pro
rata, reversing the credit enhancement (CE) built-up for the senior
notes in line with the amortisation mechanism in the documentation.
The pro rata mechanism has been factored into the rating analysis
to the extent that the relevant pro rata triggers are captured by
Fitch's modelling assumptions.

There are no conditions that would result in an irreversible switch
to sequential note amortisation after amortisation has crossed a
certain threshold, which is deemed to be a non-standard structural
feature. Where appropriate, Fitch has assigned ratings that are
different to those derived by its cash flow model. This reflects
the fact that ratings could be lower if performance is better than
assumed in the respective rating scenarios and thereby principal
payments continue to be pro rata.

Interest-only Concentration: The interest-only (IO) concentrations
in these transactions range between 82% (2007-IV) and 88% (2008-I)
of the outstanding portfolio and are high compared with other Dutch
RMBS. Under Fitch's Criteria, Fitch assumes a 50% weighted average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) for the peak concentration at the
'AAA' level (lower WAFF assumptions are applied at lower rating
stresses) and the 'B' WAFF to the remainder of the pool.

In contrast to previous reviews, the application of the IO
concentration WAFF did not result in model-implied ratings that
were more than three notches below the rating derived by applying a
WAFF produced by the standard Criteria assumptions. Therefore,
Fitch primarily considered the standard Criteria WAFF in its rating
analysis.

However, the transactions are sensitive to default timing due to
their highly concentrated maturity profile. Fitch therefore
considered various sensitivities, including more back-loaded
default timings, and incorporated the results into its ratings.

The KRDs listed in the applicable sector criteria, but not
mentioned above, are not material to this rating action.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Adverse macroeconomic factors may affect asset performance. An
increase in foreclosures and losses beyond Fitch's stresses may
erode CE, leading to negative rating action.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

Due to the lack of a hard switch-back to sequential amortisation, a
slight and persistent increase in delinquencies and losses could be
beneficial to the senior notes. This is because such as an increase
could switch the transactions to sequential amortisation and lead
to an increase in CE for those notes if amortisation remains
sequential until the notes are repaid.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

E-MAC Program II B.V. - Compartment NL 2007-IV, E-MAC Program II
B.V. Compartment NL 2008-IV, E-MAC Program III B.V. Compartment NL
2008-I

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third- party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pools ahead of the transaction's [E-MAC
Program II B.V. - Compartment NL 2007-IV, E-MAC Program II B.V.
Compartment NL 2008-IV, E-MAC Program III B.V. Compartment NL
2008-I] initial closing. The subsequent performance of the
transactions over the years has been consistent with the agency's
expectations given the operating environment, and Fitch is
therefore satisfied that the asset pool information relied upon for
its initial rating analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates it is adequately reliable.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============

CAIXA ECONOMICA: Fitch Ups Sr. Preferred LT Debt Rating From 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Caixa Economica Montepio Geral, Caixa
economica bancaria, S.A.'s (Banco Montepio) senior preferred
long-term debt rating to 'CCC+' from 'CCC'. The agency has also
affirmed Banco Montepio's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at
'B-' and its Viability Rating (VR) at 'b-'. The Outlook on the
Long-Term IDR remains Positive.

The upgrade of the bank's senior preferred debt rating to
'CCC+'/'RR5' reflects an improvement in the recovery prospects for
this debt class, resulting from Banco Montepio's gradual progress
in its balance sheet de-risking.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Banco Montepio's ratings reflect the bank's execution record and
asset quality, which are weaker than those of than peers, despite
gradual progress, resulting in structurally high levels of problem
assets and vulnerable capitalisation, given high capital
encumbrance from unreserved problem assets. The ratings also
reflect weak and potentially volatile profitability due to Banco
Montepio's moderate franchise and highly interest-rate sensitive
business model. Banco Montepio's VR is one notch below the 'b'
implied VR due to the bank's still vulnerable capitalisation and
leverage, which Fitch scores at 'b-' and which is the weakest
link.

The Positive Outlook on the Long-Term IDR indicates Fitch's
expectation of continued progress in the reduction in problem
assets since end-2019, combined with an improving operating
environment in Portugal, despite macroeconomic uncertainties as a
result of the war in Ukraine. As a result of these positive trends,
the ratings could be upgraded over the rating horizon.

High Stock of Problem Assets: Fitch estimates that Banco Montepio's
problem assets ratio was about 11.7% at end-March 2022, when
including net real estate foreclosed assets, which is higher than
that of most southern European banks. When excluding foreclosed
assets, Banco Montepio's non-performing exposure (NPE as per EBA
definition) ratio was about 7.8% at end-March 2022 and Fitch
expects it to fall to below 7% during 2022. Fitch expects moderate
new impaired loans formation from loans previously under
moratoriums as their performances to date have been resilient and
better than anticipated.

Weak but Improving Profitability: Banco Montepio's core
profitability is weak due to a lack of scale and limited business
diversification, as well as low operating efficiency. Lower loan
impairment charges (LICs), allowed for a small profit to be
reported in 2021, with an operating profit at 0.4% of risk-weighted
assets (RWAs). Results for 1Q22 confirmed Banco Montepio's
improving core profitability. The bank's management has delivered
to a large extent on its operating efficiency plan, supporting a
structural improvement in earnings generation which should also
benefit from rising interest rates.

Vulnerable Capitalisation: Capitalisation improved in 2021 and the
total capital ratio reached 15% at end-March 2022 (almost flat
year-to date). This creates a modest buffer above Banco Montepio's
overall capital requirement of about 14% in 2022, including
combined buffer requirements. Unreserved problem assets (including
net impaired loans, net foreclosed assets, investment properties
and holdings of restructuring funds) were about 100% the bank's
fully-loaded common equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital at end-March 2022.
This renders capital ratios vulnerable to asset quality shocks and
remains materially above domestic and other similarly rated
international peers.

Confidence-Sensitive Funding: Banco Montepio is mainly
deposit-funded and its liquid asset buffer is adequate in light of
low upcoming wholesale debt maturities. The bank's liquidity
profile remains sensitive to changes in creditor sentiment and to
the Portuguese operating environment, but has proved fairly stable
recently. Access to the wholesale markets is less established than
for peers but will be pivotal to the bank meeting its minimum
requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) as it is
required to within the next two-to-three years.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Banco Montepio's ratings have sufficient headroom at their level to
withstand an unexpected moderate setback to the recovery of the
Portuguese economy and weakening economic growth prospects, which
are improving relative to some peer countries. However, Fitch could
revise the Outlook on the Long-Term IDR back to Stable if a weaker
execution of its de-risking plan than anticipated leads to a
reversal in the improving asset quality trend and adds renewed
pressure to the bank's already weak capitalisation. For instance, a
significant breach of capital requirements for an extended period
of time would likely lead to a rating downgrade.

The ratings could also be under pressure if Banco Montepio returns
to being loss-making, despite improved asset quality, which would
reflect worse-than-expected structural business model weaknesses.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

The Positive Outlook on Banco Montepio's Long-Term IDR indicates
that an upgrade is likely in the medium term, notably if the bank
continues to improve its capitalisation. For example, this could be
achieved by further executing on its restructuring plan in line
with Fitch's expectations, improving organic capital generation.
Reduced capital encumbrance from net impaired loans and foreclosed
real-estate assets to 80%-90% of fully-loaded CET1, driven by a
sustained reduction in the problem assets ratio to close to 10%,
while maintaining at least modest buffers over regulatory capital
requirements are the most likely trigger for an upgrade. This is
because Fitch believes it would materially reduce Banco Montepio's
capital vulnerability to shocks to levels more in line with some
'b'-rated peers.

A longer record of improved profitability with an operating profit
consistently above 0.25% of RWAs would also be positive for the
bank's ratings.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: KEY RATING DRIVERS

DEPOSIT RATINGS

Banco Montepio's long-term deposit ratings of 'B' is one notch
above the Long-Term IDR, reflecting the lower vulnerability of
deposits to default than senior debt, given Fitch's expectation
that the bank would be resolved in a manner that protects
depositors if it fails, and also because of full depositor
preference in Portugal. Banco Montepio must comply with a MREL
requirement of 20.77% of RWAs excluding the 2.76% combined buffer
requirements for 2022. The uplift to deposit rating above the
Long-Term IDR reflects Fitch's expectation that Banco Montepio will
build up its MREL buffer over the next 12-18 months.

SENIOR PREFERRED AND SENIOR NON-PREFERRED DEBT

Fitch has upgraded the long-term senior preferred debt rating of
Banco Montepio to 'CCC+' from 'CCC' and is now one notch below the
bank's Long-Term IDR, reflecting Fitch's assessment that recovery
prospects would be below average (RR5), instead of poor (RR6) for
the bank's senior preferred creditors, in a default scenario. The
bank's good and gradual execution of de-risking plans is reducing
risks to its solvency, but capital encumbrance by net problem
assets remains high, while resolution debt buffer remains small.

The senior non-preferred debt programme ratings are notched down
twice from the bank's IDR at 'CCC' and have 'RR6' Recovery Ratings.
This is because of full depositor preference in Portugal and the
bank's very thin resolution debt buffer, currently consisting of
subordinated debt, relative to net problem assets, which remains
high relative to the bank's capital base. This means that losses
for senior non-preferred creditors would likely be very large in a
default scenario.

The short-term senior preferred debt rating of 'B' is in line with
Banco Montepio's Short-Term IDR because short-term bank issue
ratings incorporate only Fitch's assessment of the default risk on
the instrument and do not factor in recovery prospects.

SUBORDINATED DEBT

Banco Montepio's subordinated notes' 'CCC' long-term ratings are
notched down twice from the bank's VR, in line with Fitch's
baseline notching for subordinated Tier 2 debt. The notching
reflects the notes' poor recovery prospects (RR6 Recovery Rating)
if the bank becomes non-viable. Fitch does not apply additional
notching for incremental non-performance risk relative to the VR
since there is no coupon flexibility included in the notes' terms
and conditions.

No Government Support Factored in Fitch's Ratings: Banco Montepio's
Government Support Rating (GSR) of 'No Support' (ns) reflects
Fitch's view that although external extraordinary sovereign support
is possible it cannot be relied upon. Senior creditors can no
longer expect to receive full extraordinary support from the
government in the event that the bank becomes non-viable.

The EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Single
Resolution Mechanism for eurozone banks provide a framework for
resolving banks that requires senior creditors participating in
losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving
sovereign support.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES

Banco Montepio's deposit, senior preferred and senior non-preferred
are primarily sensitive to the IDRs and its subordinated debt
ratings are sensitive to the VR. The long-term deposit rating could
also be downgraded if Fitch no longer expects Banco Montepio to be
able to build up its MREL buffer over time with more junior
instruments.

The long-term senior preferred and senior non-preferred debt
ratings could also be upgraded by one notch if Fitch's assessment
of recoveries for senior preferred creditors improves to average
(RR4) from below average (RR5), and for senior non-preferred
creditors improves to below average (RR5) from poor (RR6). This
could be driven by further improvement in the bank's asset quality
and successful sales of impaired loans and other legacy assets,
translating into lower capital encumbrance by unreserved problem
assets.

The long-term senior preferred and senior non-preferred debt
ratings could also be upgraded if Banco Montepio successfully
builds and maintains a larger buffer of resolution debts in light
of its expected MREL requirement. This is because in a resolution,
losses could be spread over a larger debt layer resulting in
smaller losses and higher recoveries for the bank's senior
bondholders.

An upward revision of the GSR would be contingent on a positive
change in the sovereign's propensity to support the bank. In
Fitch's view, this is highly unlikely, although not impossible.

VR ADJUSTMENTS

Banco Montepio's VR is one notch below the 'b' implied VR, due to
the bank's still vulnerable Capitalisation and Leverage, which
Fitch scores at 'b-'.

The Business Profile score of 'b+' is below the 'bb' category
implied score, due to the following adjustment reason: business
model (negative).

The Capitalisation & Leverage score of 'b-' is below the 'bb'
category implied score, due to the following adjustment reasons:
reserve coverage and asset valuation (negative) and regulatory
capitalisation (negative).

The Funding & Liquidity score of 'bb-' is below the 'bbb' category
implied score, due to the following adjustment reason: non-deposit
funding (negative).

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Banco Montepio has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for governance
structure, reflecting negative implication on ratings from weaker
corporate governance than those of its domestic peers, although the
bank has been making progress.

Alleged disagreements between Banco Montepio's previous management
team and the bank's majority shareholder, MGAM, led to the
nomination and appointment of a new management team, within a new
governance framework in March 2018. The stabilisation of the bank's
management and board of directors took longer than expected and was
completed early 2020.

Fitch believes this protracted process had weighed on the bank's
strategic execution until end-2020. Banco Montepio's governance
structure is relevant to the bank's ratings in conjunction with
other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

   DEBT            RATING                 RECOVERY   PRIOR
   ----            ------                 --------   -----

Caixa             LT IDR   B-     Affirmed           B-
Economica
Montepio Geral,
Caixa economica bancaria, S.A.

                  ST IDR   B      Affirmed           B

   Viability               b-     Affirmed           b-

   Government              ns     Affirmed           ns
   Support
   subordinated    LT      CCC    Affirmed    RR6    CCC

   long-           LT      B      Affirmed           B
   term deposits

   Senior          LT      CCC+   Upgrade     RR5    CCC
   Preferred

   Senior          LT      CCC    Affirmed    RR6    CCC
   non-preferred

   Senior          ST      B      Affirmed           B
   Preferred

   short-term      ST      B      Affirmed           B
   deposits



=========
S P A I N
=========

ENFRAGEN FINANCE: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' CFR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba3 Senior Secured
rating assigned to the notes issued by EnfraGen Energia Sur, S.A.U.
Prime Energia Chile SpA and EnfraGen Spain S.A.U. (together the
"co-issuers" or "obligors"). At the same time, Moody's has
withdrawn Enfragen LLC's Ba3 corporate family rating and assigned a
Ba3 CFR to EnfraGen Finance Holdings LLC  (EnfraGen or the
"company"). The outlook is stable.

Assignments:

Issuer: EnfraGen Finance Holdings LLC

Corporate Family Rating, Assigned Ba3

Affirmations:

Issuer: EnfraGen Energia Sur, S.A.U.

Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba3

Withdrawals:

Issuer: EnfraGen LLC

Corporate Family Rating, Withdrawn , previously rated Ba3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: EnfraGen Energia Sur, S.A.U.

Outlook, Remains Stable

Issuer: EnfraGen Finance Holdings LLC

Outlook, Assigned Stable

Issuer: EnfraGen LLC

Outlook, Withdrawn, previously Stable

RATINGS RATIONALE

The assignment of the CFR considers that Enfragen Finance Holdings
LLC is the consolidating entity for Enfragen Energia Sur S.A.U;
Prime Energia Chile SpA and EnfraGen Spain S.A.U, the three
co-issuers or obligors under the senior secured notes, providing
adequate financial disclosures for the ratings monitoring.

The affirmation of the notes rating, at the same level of
EnfraGen's CFR, considers that despite the company's consolidated
performance below original expectations in 2021, the current
projections for the co-issuers in 2022-23 are in line with the
scenario evaluated when the notes rating was first assigned. The
weak performance in 2021 reflects the combination of the delay in
construction of the company's assets in Chile and the planned
acquisition of the Colombian thermal gas-fired Termovalle some
months later than expected. Additionally, in-merit generation in
Colombia's thermal gas-fired facility Termoflores was negatively
affected by La Nina conditions during 2021/22 because the favorable
hydrological conditions resulting in lower than anticipated cash
flows for the company. Those were partially compensated by dry
conditions in Chile that favored dispatch of power generation
across non-conventional renewables and thermal plants there.

The Ba3 continues to reflect the co-issuer's well diversified
operations in the power markets in three different jurisdictions in
Latin America where the company operates (Government of Colombia
Baa2 stable, Government of Chile A1 negative and Government of
Panama Baa2 stable). The regulatory frameworks in those countries
are developed, well-designed and with a track record of supportive
regulations that Moody's expect to remain largely in place over the
coming years. Importantly, most of the company's future revenues
will be derived from reliability and capacity charges designed to
provide security to the power markets in which it operates, that
are mainly dependent on highly variable energy sources (hydro and
solar). Furthermore, EnfraGen's planned expansion of the Chilean
operations will support the country's decarbonization plans through
the penetration of solar and the accelerated retirement of coal
facilities.

Nevertheless, the credit profile also incorporates the challenges
that evolving market dynamics could present over a longer time
horizon given EnfraGen's fuel concentration in gas and diesel (80%
of Ebitda). Further expansion in the renewable space while
positive, provides limited credit uplift given their expected low
share within the overall business mix.The ratings are also tempered
by an aggressive financing structure that entails very high
leverage, little amortization of the debt over the life of the
notes -via cash sweeps- and large distributions to shareholders
during the initial years of the transaction. Moody's anticipates
that the combined pro-forma cash interest coverage for the
co-issuers measured as CFO Pre-W/C + Interest / Interest will be
1.7x and 1.9 in 2022 and 2023 respectively while CFO Pre-W/C to
Debt will be 4.2% and 4.9% respectively. While cash sweeps and
mandatory amortization will result in a reduction of leverage (debt
to EBITDA around 5x in 2030), the total debt amortization is
expected to reach only 35% of initial debt by the year 10, exposing
noteholders to material refinancing risks.

Nevertheless, the ratings take into consideration the several
structural protections included in the financial documents that
provide enhancement to creditors, namely a six-month debt service
reserve account, a one-month O&M reserve account, limitations to
additional debt; limitations to business activity; restricted
payments test and several cash sweep mechanisms, starting in year
3, that seek to reduce debt by 35% by the bond's maturity date.

Rating Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's view that EnfraGen will
maintain sound operations across its portfolio and stable cash
flows mainly from regulated reliability and capacity charges.
Specifically, Moody's expect the co-issuers will be able to produce
combined pro-forma metrics of CFO (pre working capital) to debt in
the range of 3.5% to 4.5%, interest coverage above 1.5 times and
positive levels of retained cash flow (RCF) although at very low
levels during the first years of the transaction.

Moody's has decided to withdraw the rating because it believes it
has insufficient or otherwise inadequate information to support the
maintenance of the rating.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Given Moody's expectation of weak credit metrics, Moody's see
limited potential for an upgrade. However, if EnfraGen is able to
reduce debt faster than expected, leading to a ratio of
consolidated CFO to debt and RCF to debt higher than 8% and 5%
respectively Moody's could upgrade the ratings.

Moody's could downgrade the ratings if the operating performance of
the assets is below expectations or if an adverse market or
regulatory development were to weaken EnfraGen's cash flow
generation. Specifically, the obligors combined pro-forma interest
coverage below 1.3 times, CFO to debt below 3%, or negative
retained cash flow would lead to a downgrade of the notes rating.
Also, a sizeable and unanticipated debt-financed investment of
EnfraGen, could also create negative pressure on the CFR rating.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Unregulated
Utilities and Unregulated Power Companies published in May 2017.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============

UKRAINE: Fitch Lowers LongTerm Foreign Currency IDR to 'C'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Ukraine's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
(LTFC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'C' from 'CCC'. Fitch
typically does not assign Outlooks to sovereigns with a rating of
'CCC+' or below. Fitch has removed all of the ratings from Under
Criteria Observation (UCO).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade reflects the following key rating drivers and their
relative weights:

HIGH

Default-like Process Has Begun: On 20 July, the Ukrainian
government formally launched a consent solicitation to defer
external debt repayments for 24 months. Fitch views this as the
initiation of a distressed debt exchange (DDE) process, consistent
with ratings of 'C' for both the LTFC IDR and affected securities.
According to Fitch's Sovereign Criteria, a commercial debt
restructuring that entails a material reduction in terms, such as
the deferral of interest or principal, and is necessary to avoid a
traditional payment default constitutes a DDE. The LTFC IDR would
be downgraded to 'RD' (restricted default) and the affected
instruments to 'D' following the consent solicitation "effective
date" should it be accepted, which Fitch views as likely.

MEDIUM

Severe Stresses Necessitate Debt Restructuring: Even if not
accepted, Fitch considers that the risk of missed payments or
initiation of an alternative DDE process is high as the government
seeks to preserve liquidity in the face of acute military spending
pressure. More generally, Fitch expects a broader restructuring of
the government's commercial debt will be required, although the
timing remains uncertain. This reflects severe stresses to
Ukraine's macro-financial position, public finances and external
finances as a result of protracted war.

Local-Currency (LC) IDR 'CCC-': Following Fitch's recent
introduction of +/- modifiers in the 'CCC' category, Fitch has
downgraded Ukraine's Local-Currency IDR to 'CCC-', from 'CCC'. The
lower default risk than on FC debt partly reflects the government's
somewhat greater ability to service LC debt, and greater
disincentives to restructure, given that 40% of domestic LC debt is
held by banks (and 52% of the sector is state-owned) and a further
47% by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU). The share of domestic
government bonds held by non-residents has fallen to just 6%, and
Fitch does not expect strong international pressure for Ukraine to
bring domestic debt into a broader restructuring process.

Protracted Military Conflict: The war looks set to continue well
into next year, with the prospects of any negotiated political
settlement weak. The Ukrainian government, reflecting overwhelming
domestic public opinion, appears unlikely to cede any substantial
territory lost to Russia, and Fitch judges President Putin will
continue to pursue an objective of undermining the sovereign
independence of the Ukrainian state. At the same time, it is not
clear either side will have sufficient military superiority to
deliver on objectives, which could result in a long-drawn-out
conflict. The attritional nature of Russian military tactics, which
includes the widespread destruction of physical infrastructure, is
resulting in huge economic as well as human cost.

Massive Contraction, Gradual Recovery Expected: Fitch forecasts the
Ukrainian economy to contract 33% in 2022, with a shallow recovery
of 4% in 2023 constrained by ongoing war that limits seaport access
and prevents commencement of any large-scale reconstruction. There
has been some sequential pick-up in economic activity since the
early stages of the invasion, and the share of pre-war output from
territory in which there is currently conflict has fallen to an
estimated 12%. Net outward migration stands at 5.8 million people,
the damage to infrastructure alone is estimated at above USD100
billion (75% of GDP) in mid-June, and the government has projected
reconstruction needs over the next 10 years at USD750 billion.

Pressure on International Reserves: Foreign-exchange (FX) reserves
fell to USD22.8 billion at end-June from USD28.1 billion at
end-March, partly due to USD9.1 billion outflows relating to trade
credits and cash withdrawals of refugees abroad in the three months
to end-May. The current account remained in surplus, of USD3.6
billion in 5M22, as international grants and the positive impact of
capital controls on primary income offset deterioration in the
trade and services balances. Fitch forecasts a full-year current
account surplus of 2% of GDP, returning to a deficit of 1.6% in
2023, which together with ongoing financial account outflows will
put further downward pressure on FX reserves.

Record High Fiscal Deficit: The monthly fiscal deficit averaged
USD4 billion in 2Q22, driven by war-related expenditure, and Fitch
forecasts a full year general government deficit of 29.1% of GDP, a
record high for Ukraine. Given urgent spending pressures, Fitch
views the size of monthly expenditure as largely a function of
available finance. Fitch projects the deficit to remain large in
2023, at 22.4% of GDP due to the ongoing need to fund the war and
replace critical infrastructure.

Uncertain Financing Sources: Pledged multilateral and bilateral
budget aid support for 2022 totals near USD30 billion (USD14
billion of which has been disbursed) but there remains a need for
further financing by NBU (which accounted for just above 50% of
deficit financing in 1H22). Fitch assumes the rollover rate on
domestic debt will be just below 100% for the remainder of the
year, helped by ample banking-sector liquidity and capital controls
that encourage non-residents to roll over debt, but there is
sizeable risk to this. The ability to meet Ukraine's extremely
large financing need into 2023 largely depends on multilateral and
bilateral support, which is currently uncertain; and Fitch judges
that debt restructuring is a probable condition of continued
external support on such a scale.

Huge Rise in Public Debt: Fitch forecasts general government debt
to rise 48pp in 2022 to 92% of GDP, and to 103% at end-2023
(excluding government guarantees, of 8% of GDP on latest data). The
majority of bilateral and multilateral loans are highly
concessional, partly offset by the shorter tenor and expected rise
in yields on domestic debt following the NBU policy-rate increase
to 25%. There is a high degree of exchange rate risk, with 61% of
public debt FC-denominated, and uncertainty over the debt
trajectory generally. Additional contingent-liability risks have
also greatly increased.

High and Accelerating Inflation: Inflation quickened to 21.5% in
June, and Fitch forecasts rises to 30% at end-2022, due to weak
monetary policy transmission, further supply chain disruptions,
monetary financing, and ongoing high global commodity prices.
Inflation is projected to remain high in 2023, averaging 20%,
partly due to hryvnia depreciation.

Ukraine's ratings also reflect the following rating drivers:

Fundamental Rating Strengths and Weaknesses: The rating is
supported by strong multilateral and bilateral support, favourable
human development indicators, and prior to the invasion a credible
macro-policy framework. Set against these factors are heightened
geopolitical and security risk, low and falling external buffers,
very weak public finances, the huge economic and human cost of the
war, high inflation and macro-volatility, which also complicates
IMF-programme support.

Regulatory Forbearance Supports Banks: An extended period of
regulatory forbearance will help banks contain the near-term impact
of asset-quality deterioration, but ultimately a large government
recapitalisation of the sector is inevitable. Domestic confidence
in banks has held up well, supporting liquidity, with hryvnia
retail deposits rising 16% since the Russian invasion, although
those in FC fell by 7% and term deposits by 13%.

ESG - Governance: Ukraine has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of '5'
for both political stability and rights and for the rule of law,
institutional and regulatory quality and control of corruption.
These scores reflect the high weight that the World Bank Governance
Indicators (WBGI) have in Fitch's proprietary Sovereign Rating
Model (SRM). Ukraine has a low WBGI ranking at the 32nd percentile,
reflecting the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, weak institutional
capacity, uneven application of the rule of law and a high level of
corruption.

ESG - Creditor Rights: Ukraine has an ESG Relevance Score of '5'
for creditor rights as willingness to service and repay debt is
highly relevant to the rating and is a key rating driver for
Ukraine, given the announced consent solicitation.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- The LTFC IDR would be downgraded to 'RD' and the affected
    securities to 'D' following the consent solicitation
    "effective date" should it be accepted, or agreement to any
    alternative proposals that entail a material reduction of
    terms, or if there is failure to make a payment on a Eurobond
    in line with the original terms and within the applicable
    grace period;

-- The LTLC IDR would be downgraded to 'CC' if Fitch assesses
    that default of some kind on LC debt appears probable, or to
    'C' on announcing restructuring plans that materially reduce
    the terms of LC debt to avoid a traditional payment default.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Continued payment on Eurobonds in line with their original
    terms that Fitch views as sustainable, for example due to de-
    escalation of conflict with Russia that markedly reduces
    vulnerabilities to Ukraine's external finances, fiscal
    position and macro-financial stability, reducing the
    probability of commercial debt restructuring.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) AND QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)
Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Ukraine a score equivalent to a
rating of 'CCC+' on the LTFC IDR scale. However, in accordance with
its rating criteria, Fitch's sovereign rating committee has not
utilised the SRM and QO to explain the ratings in this instance.
Ratings of 'CCC+' and below are instead guided by Fitch's rating
definitions.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LTFC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the LTFC IDR, reflecting factors within Fitch's
criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected
in the SRM.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance
and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Ukraine has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for political stability
and rights as WBGI have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are
highly relevant to the rating and a key rating driver with a high
weight. The invasion by Russia and ongoing war severely compromises
political stability and the security outlook. As Ukraine has a
percentile below 50 for the respective governance indicator, this
has a negative impact on the credit profile.

Ukraine has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for rule of law,
institutional & regulatory quality and control of corruption as
WBGI have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and in the case of
Ukraine weaken the business environment, investment and reform
prospects; this is highly relevant to the rating and a key rating
driver with high weight. As Ukraine has a percentile rank below 50
for the respective governance indicators, this has a negative
impact on the credit profile.

Ukraine has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for creditor rights as
willingness to service and repay debt is highly relevant to the
rating and is a key rating driver with a high weight for Ukraine
given the announced consent solicitation which, together with the
fairly recent restructuring of public debt in 2015, has a negative
impact on the credit profile.

Ukraine has an ESG Relevance Score of '4[+]' for human rights and
political freedoms as the voice and accountability pillar of the
WBGI is relevant to the rating and a rating driver. As Ukraine has
a percentile rank above 50 for the respective governance indicator,
this has a positive impact on the credit profile.

Ukraine has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for international
relations and trade, reflecting the detrimental impact of the
conflict with Russia on international trade, which is relevant to
the rating and a rating driver with a negative impact on the credit
profile.

Except for the matters discussed above, the highest level of ESG
credit relevance, if present, is a score of 3. This means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity(ies), either due to their nature or to the way in which
they are being managed by the entity(ies).

   DEBT       RATING                             PRIOR
   ----       ------                             -----

Ukraine

            LT IDR            C      Downgrade   CCC

            ST IDR            C      Affirmed    C

            LC LT IDR         CCC-   Downgrade   CCC

            LC ST IDR         C      Affirmed    C

            Country Ceiling   B-     Affirmed    B-

   senior   LT                CCC-   Downgrade   CCC
   unsecured

   senior   LT                C      Downgrade   CCC
   unsecured



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

CARILLION: KPMG Partner Fined GBP250,000 for Misleading Regulator
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jasper Jolly at The Guardian reports that the KPMG partner who led
the audit of failed outsourcer Carillion has been banned from the
accounting profession for a decade for providing false and
misleading information to regulators.

According to The Guardian, Peter Meehan will also have to pay a
fine of GBP250,000 after a Financial Reporting Council (FRC)
tribunal found that he and other KPMG managers had misled the
regulator using forged documents.

Carillion collapsed in January 2018, resulting in 3,000 job losses
and rigorous scrutiny of the accounting profession amid accusations
that auditors had failed to spot deep financial problems, The
Guardian recounts.

However, the disqualifications related not to the audit itself, but
to information provided to regulators when they were carrying out
an investigation, The Guardian notes.  A tribunal in January heard
detailed evidence of the forged documents including meeting minutes
and retroactively edited spreadsheets, The Guardian recounts.

The FRC also banned three other managers on the Carillion audit
from membership of the profession, The Guardian discloses.
Alistair Wright and Adam Bennett will be banned for eight years and
will pay fines of GBP45,000 and GBP40,000 respectively, The
Guardian states.  Richard Kitchen will be banned for seven years
and fined GBP30,000, The Guardian says.  Mr. Meehan and the other
managers were found to have acted "dishonestly", The Guardian
relays.

KPMG, The Guardian says, had already admitted that misconduct had
occurred and that it had misled regulators at the start of the
tribunal, agreeing to pay a GBP14.4 million fine -- one of the
largest in audit history -- that was decided in May.  KPMG also
paid costs of GBP4 million for the tribunal, The Guardian notes.

All of the individuals on the Carillion audit strongly denied
misconduct, but the tribunal quickly descended into recriminations
as they sought to blame each other for the misleading information,
The Guardian discloses.


CARING CHOICES: Opts for Liquidation, Set to Close Next Month
-------------------------------------------------------------
Nicola Jordan at KentOnline reports that a day centre which has
become a lifeline for adults with profound learning disabilities is
set to close after falling into financial problems.

According to KentOnline, Caring Choices, a private company which
looks after 45 vulnerable people, is said to owe a substantial
amount of money after a change in the law over the payment of VAT.

Directors of the organisation, based in Manor Road, Chatham, are
reported as saying they now have no alternative but to go into
liquidation, KentOnline discloses.

If the matter is not resolved, it could close by the end of next
month throwing the future of its clients into doubt and relying on
their desperately hard-pushed families to look after their loved
ones, KentOnline states.



FIRECLAD AND HARRISON: Goes Into Administration
-----------------------------------------------
Daniel Gayne at Building reports that Fireclad and Harrison Jorge
sank after client on loss-making contract refused to increase
prices.

According to Building, administrators for the firm have said a
25-year-old dry-lining firm and its sister plastering company
collapsed due to crippling materials and labour costs.

Fireclad and Harrison Jorge (HJ) went into administration last
month owing dozens of creditors more than GBP4 million, having been
unable to cope when the client on its main loss-making contract
refused to increase prices, Building recounts.

According to a report by Interpath, one unsecured creditor, a
Sheffield-based insulation supplier, is owed more than GBP960,000
by Fireclad, Building notes.

In total, the company owed GBP3.3 million to the supply chain,
while HJ owed GBP925,640, Building discloses.

The report lists Fireclad's 72 employees as unsecured creditors,
owed nearly GBP651,000, and as preferential creditors, owed
GBP17,500, states.  HJ had no listed employees.

The two firms, both owned by holding company Adparo, had a combined
turnover of GBP32.1 million.

According to the administrators' report, directors at Fireclad,
which was incorporated in 1996, took the decision to cease trading
"when it became clear that the client on the company's main
loss-making contract was not prepared to increase prices", Building
relates.

"This meant the margin the company had previously been making was
quickly eroded, making the contracts untenable and the company
unable to meet debts," it added.

The report listed increased materials costs, resulting from the war
in Ukraine, as well as poor labour supply in the wake of Brexit and
coronavirus as major pressures on the firm, according to Building.

Secured creditors include Aldermore Bank, which is owed just over
GBP240,000, and Metrobank, which is owed more than GBP2.9 million
for a coronavirus loan, Building relays.  The former is expected to
recover this debt in full, Building notes.


FUSION: Hill Buys Assets in Pre-Pack Administration Deal
--------------------------------------------------------
Joey Gardiner at Housing Today reports that housebuilder Hill has
paid less than a million pounds to buy the assets of GBP11 million
turnover offsite manufacturer Fusion in a pre-pack administration
deal.

According to Housing Today, the deal will see the firm take on the
Northampton factory and staff of the light gauge steel frame
fabricator, which will now be called Fusion Steel Framing Limited,
in a deal which will enable it to supply up to 1,250 units a year.

Hill chief executive Andy Hill told Housing Today the purchase will
enable Hill to run a GBP30 million offsite manufacturing business
supplying both units for its own low-rise apartment blocks -- of up
to 6-7 stories -- as well as for other developers.

Hill made the acquisition after the company running the Fusion
factory, GBP11.3 million turnover Salvesen Insulated Frames Ltd,
got into financial difficulty in the wake of the covid crisis,
Housing Today discloses.  The firm said in its last published
accounts, to May 31 2020, that "the impact of coronavirus has been
very significant on the business", and that "all of our key market
areas have been affected", Housing Today relates.  It eventually
appointed a voluntary liquidator on May 10, according to Companies
House, with Hill buying the business afterwards following due
diligence and a competitive sale process, Housing Today recounts.

The Fusion system is a panelised system, which includes flooring
options, which is assembled on site.


O'KEEFE GROUP: Subcontractors, Suppliers in the Dark re Payments
----------------------------------------------------------------
Grant Prior at Construction Enquirer reports that subcontractors
and suppliers who supported O'Keefe Group through its recent cash
flow crisis fear their outstanding invoices will now go unpaid by
new owner Byrne Group.

According to the Enquirer, Byrne confirmed last week that it had
bought the properties and plant of O'Keefe Group and established
new companies O'Keefe Construction (Byrne Group) Limited and
O'Keefe Demolition (Byrne Group) Limited.

O'Keefe's supply chain has been left in the dark about how they
stand but the Enquirer can confirm O'Keefe Cosntruction (Greenwich)
went into administration the week before, the Enquirer relates.

The administrators were RSM Restructuring Advisory LLP who oversaw
O'Keefe's Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) last September which
was backed by 90% of creditors after the civils contractor suffered
a significant loss in the financial year to May 2021, the Enquirer
discloses.

Emails to subcontractors from O'Keefe staff seen by the Enquirer
talk of "rebuilding the supply chain" and point people towards RSM
for any questions over outstanding debts, the Enquirer notes.


UROPA SECURITIES 2007-1B: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on B2a Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative
its 'A (sf)', 'A (sf)', 'A (sf)', 'A (sf)', 'A (sf)', 'A (sf)', 'A-
(sf)', 'BB- (sf)', 'BB- (sf)' and 'B- (sf)' ratings on Uropa
Securities PLC Series 2007-1B's class A3a, A3b, A4a, A4b, M1a, M1b,
M2a, B1a, B1b, and B2a notes, respectively.

S&P said, "On Feb. 1, 2022, we placed on CreditWatch negative our
ratings on all outstanding classes of notes in this transaction
over LIBOR transition uncertainty. The relevant transaction parties
have since formally confirmed the applicable coupon rate on all the
interest determination dates for 2022 and approved changes to phase
out of LIBOR related exposures, effective from the first interest
determination date in 2023. These include the coupons on the issued
notes, the swap contracts, the liquidity facility costs
calculations, and the guaranteed investment contract (GIC) account.
We therefore removed our ratings from CreditWatch negative."

Uropa Securities 2007-1B is a static RMBS transaction that
securitizes a portfolio of first-lien U.K. nonconforming
residential mortgage loans assets originated by GMAC RFC,
Kensington Mortgage Co., and Money Partners.

The rating actions consider the transaction's recent performance as
well as the credit enhancement levels across the capital
structure.

The credit enhancement available for the notes has increased
partially because of periods of sequential amortization. The
nonamortizing reserve fund, which was drawn on the April 2022
interest payment date (IPD) to cover increased costs related to the
LIBOR transition, has also increased available credit enhancement
in this transaction. The fund was then replenished up to its
required amount on the July 2022 IPD.

Overall, the weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) has
remained relatively stable compared to recent historical levels. At
the same time, the weighted-average loss severity (WALS) at the
'AAA', 'AA', and 'A' categories has marginally improved, while it
slightly increased at the 'BBB', 'BB', and 'B' levels. This is
mainly due to the updated house-price index, over/under valuation,
and jumbo valuation limits assumptions in S&P's credit model--which
decreased our effective loan-to-value adjustment on the WAFF--and
its repossession market value decline assumptions and current
loan-to-value ratio on the WALS.

Considering the historical loss severity levels registered in
comparable U.K. non-conforming pools, the data suggest that the
portfolio's underlying properties may have only partially benefited
from the rising house prices, and S&P has therefore applied a
valuation haircut on the current valuations to reflect this.

Additionally, S&P observes a global deterioration in the credit
performance since its previous review, which it reflected in its
analysis.

Total arrears (14.5%) in the transaction have increased since S&P's
previous review (13.2%) and are currently above its U.K.
nonconforming index for pre-2014 originations.

The overall effect from S&P's credit analysis results is a general
decrease in the required credit coverage at all rating levels.

  Table 1

  Portfolio WAFF And WALS

  RATING LEVEL   WAFF (%)   WALS (%)   CREDIT    BASE FORECLOSURE
                                       COVERAGE  FREQUENCY
                                          (%)    COMPONENT FOR AN
                                                 ARCHETYPAL U.K.
                                                 MORTGAGE LOAN  
                                                 POOL (%)

   AAA           39.99      36.65      14.65     12.00

   AA            35.81      29.49      10.56      8.10

   A             33.55      18.73       6.28      6.10

   BBB           31.23      12.73       3.98      4.20

   BB            28.75       8.87       2.55      2.20

   B             28.19       5.97       1.68      1.75

  WAFF--Weighted-average foreclosure frequency.
  WALS--Weighted-average loss severity.

S&P said, "NatWest Markets PLC provides the currency swap and basis
risk swap contracts, which were not in line with our previous
counterparty criteria. Under our revised criteria, our collateral
assessment is weak, and considering the current resolution
counterparty rating (RCR) on NatWest Markets ('A'), the maximum
supported rating on the notes is 'A (sf)'.

"Following the application of our criteria, we have determined that
our assigned ratings on this transaction's classes of notes should
be the lower of (i) the rating as capped by our counterparty
criteria, or (ii) the rating that the class of notes can attain
under our global RMBS criteria.

"Our credit and cash flow results indicate that the available
credit enhancement for the class A3a, A3b, A4a, A4b, M1a, and M1b
notes could withstand our stresses at higher ratings than those
assigned. However, our ratings on all of these classes of notes are
capped at the 'A' RCR on NatWest Markets. We therefore affirmed our
'A (sf)' ratings on these classes of notes.

"The class M2a, B1a, and B1b notes could withstand our stresses at
higher ratings than those assigned. However, the ratings are
constrained by additional factors. First, we considered these
classes' relative position in the capital structure and their lower
credit enhancement compared with the senior notes. In addition, we
factored the sensitivity of these class of notes to deteriorating
credit conditions considering the most recent cost of living
crisis, especially given the nonconforming characteristics of the
borrowers in the portfolio. Additionally, we took into account the
transaction's tail-end risk, given that the pool factor is below
30%. We therefore affirmed our 'A- (sf)' rating on the class M2a
notes, and our 'BB- (sf)' ratings on the class B1a and B1b notes.

"In our view, the class B2a notes have sufficient credit
enhancement to pay timely interest and principal by maturity in a
steady-state scenario, in which the current level of arrears and
defaults shows little to no increase, and collateral performance
remains steady. We do not expect this class of notes to fail to pay
interest in the short term. This class of notes benefits from a
£4.25 million nonamortizing reserve fund plus available excess
spread. Taking into account the results of our credit and cash flow
analysis and the application of our criteria for assigning 'CCC'
ratings, we affirmed our 'B- (sf)' rating on the class B2a notes."


XBITE: Bought Out of Administration, 87 Jobs Saved
--------------------------------------------------
Ian Evans at TheBusinessDesk.com reports that online retailer Xbite
has been sold after it slipped into administration.

Chesterfield-based XB traded through websites including 365Games,
Roov, Maison and White, Pukkr and Shop4World, and like many online
businesses saw its turnover increase during the Covid-19 pandemic,
TheBusinessDesk.com relates.

According to TheBusinessDesk.com, the company employed 87 people
and turned over GBP51.7 million in FY21, but mounting cashflow
pressures and supply chain issues associated with importing from
China saw it run into trouble.

XB's directors explored options for additional investment,
including a potential sale of the business, but James Lumb and
Howard Smith from Interpath Advisory were appointed Joint
Administrators on July 15 after it became apparent that a solvent
sale was unachievable, TheBusinessDesk.com discloses.

The administrators have now completed the sale of the business and
certain assets to an unconnected purchaser, with all employees
keeping their jobs, TheBusinessDesk.com notes.

The company in administration has been renamed to XB Realisations
enabling the new company to take on the Xbite name,
TheBusinessDesk.com states.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2022.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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