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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Thursday, June 23, 2022, Vol. 23, No. 119

                           Headlines



G E R M A N Y

FORTUNA CONSUMER 2022-1: DBRS Gives Prov. CCC Rating on X Notes
REVOCAR 2018: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class D Notes


L U X E M B O U R G

ALTISOURCE SARL: Moody's Cuts CFR & Alters Outlook to Stable


P O R T U G A L

NOVO BANCO: Moody's Upgrades Long Term Deposit Ratings to Ba3


S P A I N

AUTO ABS 2022-1: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class E Notes
BBVA CONSUMER 2020-1: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on D Notes
BBVA RMBS 5 FTA: DBRS Reviews BB(high) Rating on Ser. C RMBS Deals


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ARENA TELEVISION: Made Bankrupt After Order to Repay GBP100MM
AUTORESTORE LTD: Ex-Workers to Take Legal Action Over Job Losses
GENESIS MORTGAGE 2022-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class E Notes
MACMERRY: Enters Administration, 63 Jobs Affected
SHEPHERD COX: Sold to New Owners Following Administration

[*] UK: Property Company Insolvencies Soar in Past Few Months

                           - - - - -


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G E R M A N Y
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FORTUNA CONSUMER 2022-1: DBRS Gives Prov. CCC Rating on X Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH assigned provisional ratings to the notes to be
issued by Fortuna Consumer Loan ABS 2022-1 Designated Activity
Company (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes at BB (sf)
-- Class F Notes at B (high) (sf)
-- Class X Notes at CCC (sf)

DBRS Morningstar did not assign provisional ratings to the Class G
Notes and the Class R Notes also expected to be issued in this
transaction.

The provisional ratings are based on information provided to DBRS
Morningstar by the Issuer and its agents as of the date of this
press release. These ratings will be finalized upon a review of the
final version of the transaction documents and of the relevant
opinions. If the information therein were substantially different,
DBRS Morningstar may assign different final ratings to the notes.

The ratings of the Class A and Class B Notes address the timely
payment of scheduled interest and the ultimate repayment of
principal by the legal final maturity date. The ratings of the
Class C, Class D, Class E, and Class F Notes address the ultimate
repayment of interest (timely when most senior) and the ultimate
repayment of principal by the legal final maturity date. The rating
of the Class X Notes addresses the ultimate repayment of interest
and the ultimate repayment of principal by the legal final maturity
date.

The transaction is a securitization of fixed rate, unsecured,
amortizing consumer loans granted to individuals domiciled in
Germany and brokered through auxmoney GmbH (auxmoney) in
co-operation with Süd-West-Kreditbank Finanzierung GmbH (SWK) as
the nominal originator.

The ratings are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- The transaction's capital structure, including form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement;

-- Credit enhancement levels sufficient to support DBRS
Morningstar's projected cumulative net loss assumptions under
various stressed scenarios;

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms of the
notes;

-- DBRS Morningstar's operational risk review of SWK and
auxmoney's capabilities with regard to originations and
underwriting;

-- CreditConnect GmbH's capabilities with regard to servicing;

-- The transaction parties' financial strength regarding their
respective roles;

-- The credit quality, diversification of the collateral, and
historical and projected performance of auxmoney's portfolio;

-- DBRS Morningstar's sovereign rating of the Republic of Germany,
currently at AAA with a Stable trend; and

-- The expected consistency of the transaction's legal structure
with DBRS Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured
Finance Transactions" methodology.

TRANSACTION STRUCTURE

The transaction is static but features two more sales and transfers
post-closing, on 2022. There are separate waterfalls for interest
and principal payments that facilitate the distribution of the
available distribution amount. Post-closing, the notes (except the
Class X Notes) will enter into a pro rata redemption period with
amortization amounts based on the percentages (which are the
outstanding amount of each class of notes minus the related class
PDL divided by the aggregate amount) until the breach of a
sequential redemption trigger after which the notes will be repaid
sequentially.

The transaction includes an amortizing liquidity reserve funded
through the issuance proceeds of the notes at closing, which is
only available to the Issuer in restricted scenarios where the
interest and principal collections are not sufficient to cover the
shortfalls in senior expenses and interests on the Class A Notes
and, if not deferred, the interest payments on the Class B, Class
C, Class D, Class E, and Class F Notes.

The transaction also benefits from a PDL mechanism to capture
excess spread to cure principal deficiencies. Principal funds may
be used to cover certain interest shortfall. The transaction
structure also incorporates interest deferral triggers to defer
interest payments on the notes, conditional on the PDL debit amount
and seniority of the notes.

The interest rate risk is expected to be largely mitigated by an
interest rate cap.

COUNTERPARTIES

Elavon Financial Services DAC is the account bank for the
transaction. DBRS Morningstar has a private rating on Elavon
Financial Services DAC. The transaction documents contain downgrade
provisions relating to the account bank consistent with DBRS
Morningstar's criteria.

BNP Paribas SA is the cap counterparty for the transaction. DBRS
Morningstar has a Long-Term Issuer Rating of AA (low) on BNP
Paribas, which meets its criteria to act in such capacity. The
transaction documents also contain downgrade provisions consistent
with DBRS Morningstar's criteria.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


REVOCAR 2018: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH confirmed its AAA (sf) ratings on the Class A,
Class B, and Class C Notes as well as its BB (sf) rating on the
Class D Notes (collectively, the Rated Notes) issued by RevoCar
2018 UG (haftungsbeschränkt) (the Issuer).

The ratings address the timely payment of interest and the ultimate
payment of principal on or before the legal final maturity date in
April 2031.

The confirmations follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance, in terms of level of delinquencies and
defaults, as of the April 2022 payment date.

-- Probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and
expected loss assumptions on the remaining receivables.

-- Current available credit enhancement to the Rated Notes to
cover the expected losses at their respective rating levels.

The transaction is a securitization of German auto loan receivables
originated and serviced by Bank11 fur Privatkunden und Handel GmbH
(Bank11). The initial portfolio included loans granted to private
and corporate clients for the purchase of new and used vehicles.
Most of the receivables have equal monthly instalments; however,
12.7% of loans at closing included a final balloon payment. The
transaction closed on May 22, 2018.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As of the April 2022 payment date, loans that were one month and
two months in arrears represented 0.9% and 0.2% of the outstanding
portfolio balance, respectively, while loans that were three months
in arrears represented 0.04%. Gross cumulative defaults amounted to
0.8% of the initial collateral balance, with cumulative recoveries
of 50.3% to date.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS AND KEY DRIVERS

DBRS Morningstar conducted a loan-by-loan analysis of the remaining
pool of receivables, and maintained its base case PD at 1.3% and
updated its base case LGD to 60.8% following removal of the
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) adjustments.

DBRS Morningstar opted to elect mid-range core multiples. The
inclusion of incremental balloon stresses means the derived
adjusted multiple is above the higher range used at a AAA (sf)
level.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT AND RESERVES

The subordination of the respective junior obligations provides
credit enhancement to the Rated Notes. As of the April 2022 payment
date, credit enhancement to the Class A Notes increased to 72.5%
from 33.6% at the last annual review 12 months ago; credit
enhancement to the Class B Notes increased to 31.6% from 14.7%;
credit enhancement to the Class C Notes increased to 25.8% from
12.0%; and credit enhancement to the Class D Notes increased to
7.9% from 3.6%.

The transaction benefits from an amortizing liquidity reserve,
which will only become available to the Issuer upon a servicer
termination event, with a target balance equal to 0.7% of the
outstanding collateral balance. The reserve would be available to
cover senior fees and expenses, swap payments, and interest
payments on the Class A Notes. As of the April 2022 payment date,
the reserve was at its target of EUR 0.3 million.

The transaction additionally benefits from a commingling reserve
funded by Bank11 at closing to EUR 10.4 million. This reserve is
maintained at a balance equal to the scheduled collections amount
for the next collection period plus 0.5% of the outstanding
performing collateral balance. As of the April 2022 payment date,
the reserve was funded to EUR 3.0 million.

Borrowers in Germany have the right to set off claims against the
Issuer that they had at the time of the assignment of receivables
or at the time they become aware of the assignment from the Seller
to the Issuer. Set-off risk is mitigated by loan eligibility
criteria that stipulates borrowers cannot hold deposits with Bank11
and that Bank11 will fund a set-off risk reserve if certain events
occur. As of the April 2022 payment date, the set-off risk reserve
account was unfunded.

The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, Frankfurt Branch
(BNY-Frankfurt) acts as the account bank for the transaction. Based
on DBRS Morningstar's private rating on BNY-Frankfurt, the
downgrade provisions outlined in the transaction documents, and
structural mitigants, DBRS Morningstar consider the risk arising
from the exposure to BNY-Frankfurt to be consistent with the
ratings assigned to the Rated Notes, as described in DBRS
Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

UniCredit Bank AG acts as the swap counterparty for the
transaction. DBRS Morningstar's private rating on UniCredit Bank AG
is consistent with the First Rating Threshold as described in DBRS
Morningstar's "Derivative Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.




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L U X E M B O U R G
===================

ALTISOURCE SARL: Moody's Cuts CFR & Alters Outlook to Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Altisource S.a.r.l.'s
corporate family rating and its long-term senior secured bank
credit facility rating to Caa2 from Caa1. Altisource's outlook was
changed to stable from negative.

Downgrades:

Issuer: Altisource S.a.r.l.

Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1

Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Altisource S.a.r.l.

Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of Altisource's ratings reflects Moody's view that
there is elevated refinancing risk for the company as its
profitability will remain under pressure over the next year due to
challenging operating conditions.

The company has experienced a significant, sustained decline in
revenue from the decline in default-related services it offers,
stemming from moratoriums on foreclosures and evictions, and
temporary loss mitigation measures. Industry-wide mortgage default
referrals have decreased significantly from pre-coronavirus levels
due to governmental foreclosure moratoriums, forbearance programs
and temporary loss mitigation measures which temporarily prevented
servicers from pursuing foreclosure of delinquent loans, and
consequently Altisource from providing its default-related services
to mortgage firms. Foreclosure moratoriums expired on July 31,
2021, and the temporary loss mitigation measures expired on
December 31, 2021.

Altisource should have opportunities to grow its default-related
revenue as the overall market for default related services
stabilizes following the expiration of forbearance plans,
foreclosure moratoriums, and loss mitigation measures. Furthermore,
foreclosure activity restarted on pre-pandemic delinquent loans
beginning in September 2021 and initiations of foreclosure activity
on other delinquent loans began in January 2022. In fact, the
company's overall revenue grew in the first quarter of 2022, the
first quarter of sequential growth in 11 quarters. However, the
pace of this growth remains uncertain, particularly in light of the
expected significant decline in residential mortgage origination
volumes which will put pressure on the revenue the company
generates from services it provides to mortgage originators, which
the company hopes to offset through increased demand for certain
origination solutions offered by Altisource.        

Altisource's Caa2 CFR reflects the company's revenue concentration
in default management related services and its continued reliance
for a large portion of its revenues on the servicing portfolios of
PHH Mortgage Corporation (Caa1 stable). In May 2021, Altisource
extended and expanded the term of this relationship through August
2030 from August 2025, a credit positive mitigant to the risk of
losing this key revenue source.

With the company's senior secured debt of $247 million outstanding
maturing in April 2024, Altisource has a modest amount of time to
grow its revenue and improve its profitability, elevating refinance
risk for the company. However, Altisource's liquidity profile
benefits from approximately $80 million in cash and cash
equivalents as of March 31, 2022.

Altisource's stable outlook reflects Moody's view that challenging
operating conditions for the company's default related business are
beginning to abate, but will continue to pressure the company's
revenues and profitability and slow its diversification efforts
away from PHH Mortgage Corporation, over the next 12-18 months.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Altisource's ratings could be upgraded if the company refinances
its senior secured term loan, mitigating refinancing risk and
providing the company with the liquidity runway to grow its revenue
and improve profitability. The ratings also could be upgraded if
the company were to improve its profitability and leverage, such
that it achieves and sustains debt/EBITDA of 7x or less.

Altisource's ratings could be downgraded if Moody's determines that
there is an increased risk of a distressed exchange on its senior
secured term loan, if the company's profitability and leverage
meaningfully deteriorate, or if its liquidity materially weakens.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Finance
Companies Methodology published in November 2019.




===============
P O R T U G A L
===============

NOVO BANCO: Moody's Upgrades Long Term Deposit Ratings to Ba3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Novo Banco, S.A.'s and –
where applicable - its supported entities' long-term deposit
ratings to Ba3 from B2 and its senior unsecured debt ratings to B3
from Caa2. At the same time, the rating agency has upgraded (1) the
bank's Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) and Adjusted BCA to b2 from
caa1; (2) the dated subordinated debt ratings to B3 from Caa2; (3)
the long-term Counterparty Risk (CR) Assessment to Ba2(cr) from
B1(cr) and (4) the Counterparty Risk Ratings (CRR) to Ba2 from B1.
The outlook on the long-term deposit and senior unsecured debt
ratings remains positive.

Moreover, Moody's has affirmed the bank's short-term deposits,
commercial paper and CRR at Not Prime and its short-term CR
Assessment at Not-Prime(cr).

The rating action reflects Novo Banco's improved credit profile as
a result of the continued de-risking of its balance sheet and the
significant restructuring of its operations over recent years. In
upgrading the ratings, Moody's has also considered that, since last
year, Novo Banco publicly stated financial strategy aimed at
fostering its financial fundamentals has yielded positive results,
which contributes to dissipate concerns about the solidity of its
franchise.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR UPGRADING THE BCA

The upgrade of Novo Banco's BCA to b2 from caa1 reflects the bank's
success in delivering on its restructuring plan which was aimed at
maintaining the bank as going concern by 2021. This is reflected in
Novo Banco's significantly improved asset quality metrics and
enhanced profitability levels, with the bank reporting a profit for
five consecutive quarters since the beginning of 2021.

Despite a significant reduction achieved over recent years, Novo
Banco still holds a large stock of nonperforming assets (NPAs)
including not only loans but also a material amount of repossessed
real estate assets. The bank's NPA ratio declined to a Moody's
estimated 11.2% at end-December 2021 from 14.4% a year earlier, and
its nonperforming loans (NPL) ratio stood at a Moody's calculated
6.7%, down from 9.7% a year earlier, which is still above
Portuguese banking system average of 3.5% as of the same date.
Between 2017 and 2021, Novo Banco has significantly reduced its
stock of NPA principally by selling large portfolios which will
continue going forward. Nevertheless, Moody's expects a slowdown in
the pace of reduction of NPAs because of the gradual withdrawal of
public support measures that were put in place during the pandemic.
Moreover, inflationary pressures on both households' purchasing
power and corporate profits could also have a bearing upon the
bank's asset quality.

Novo Banco's loss absorption capacity remains weak when measured
against its still weak asset-risk profile. At end-December 2021,
Moody's preferred capital measure, tangible common equity
(TCE)/risk-weighted assets (RWAs), stood at 10.7% as of the end of
December 2021. The bank reported a phased-in Common Equity Tier 1
(CET1) ratio of 11.1% and a total capital ratio of 13.1% as of end
2021, well above its CET1 regulatory requirement of 8.7% for 2022
but still below the total capital ratio requirement of 13.5%. The
bank is implementing several measures to generate capital, which
together with the organic capital generation will allow it to
comply with this requirement by the end of the year.

Novo Banco's profitability has significantly improved as a result
of the restructuring of the bank's operations. The bank reported a
profit of EUR192 million in 2021, compared to a loss of EUR1,329
million a year earlier and equivalent to a net income to tangible
assets ratio of 0.4%. Looking to the future, Moody's expects the
bank's profitability to benefit from the economic recovery and
rising interest rates, although high inflation will put pressure on
operating costs and bottom-line profitability will continue to be
negatively affected by high cost of risk.

In upgrading the BCA, Moody's has also considered the bank's
publicly stated strategic plan and targets as well as the
confirmation of a continued and stable return to profitability,
which have helped dissipate some concerns about the viability of
the bank's franchise. These considerations have led to the
withdrawal of the one-notch negative adjustment for corporate
behaviour in Novo Banco's BCA.

RATIONALE FOR UPGRADING NOVO BANCO'S LONG-TERM DEPOSIT AND SENIOR
UNSECURED DEBT RATINGS

The upgrade of Novo Banco's long-term deposit ratings to Ba3 from
B2 and of its senior unsecured debt ratings to B3 from Caa2
reflects: (1) the upgrade of the bank's BCA and Adjusted BCA to b2
from caa1; (2) the result from the rating agency's Advanced Loss
Given Failure (LGF) analysis which continues to lead to two notches
of uplift for the deposit rating and one notch below the BCA for
the senior unsecured debt rating; and (3) Moody's assessment of a
low probability of government support for Novo Banco, which results
in no further rating uplift.

Moody's advanced LGF analysis continues to indicate a low
loss-given-failure for depositors and high loss-given-failure for
senior unsecured creditors, leading to two notches and one notch
below the b2 Adjusted BCA, respectively.

RATIONALE FOR THE POSITIVE OUTLOOK

The outlook on Novo Banco's long-term deposit and senior unsecured
debt ratings remains positive, reflecting Moody's view that the
bank's creditworthiness, and in particular its asset risk and
capital position might continue improving over the outlook horizon.
The positive outlook on the bank's senior unsecured debt ratings
also points to the positive pressure that could develop if the bank
were to issue subordinated instruments to comply with its minimum
requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL)
requirements.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Novo Banco's standalone BCA could be upgraded if the bank continued
to make progress in reducing its stock of problem assets and
improving its capital and profitability metrics.

An upgrade of Novo Banco's BCA could trigger an upgrade of the
bank's long-term deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings. The
issuance of sizeable volumes of bail-in-able debt instruments could
also exert upward pressure on Novo Banco's senior unsecured debt
ratings.

Novo Banco's standalone BCA could be downgraded if the bank's
capital position were to deteriorate or because of a weakening of
its asset risk, or profitability. A downgrade could also occur if
bank's liquidity were to deteriorate from its current position.

A downgrade of Novo Banco's BCA would likely strain the deposit and
debt ratings because they are linked with the bank's standalone
BCA. The bank's deposit ratings could also be affected by a
reduction in the volume of junior deposits.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A.

Upgrades:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, upgraded to Ba2 from B1

Long-term Bank Deposits, upgraded to Ba3 from B2, outlook remains
Positive

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to Ba2(cr) from
B1(cr)

Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to b2 from caa1

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, upgraded to b2 from caa1

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to B3 from Caa2,
outlook remains Positive

Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to B3 from Caa2

Affirmations:

Short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, affirmed NP

Short-term Bank Deposits, affirmed NP

Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed NP(cr)

Commercial Paper, affirmed NP

Outlook Action:

Outlook remains Positive

Issuer: NB Finance Ltd.

Upgrades:

Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to B3
from Caa2, outlook remains Positive

Outlook Action:

Outlook remains Positive

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., Luxembourg Branch

Upgrades:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, upgraded to Ba2 from B1

Long-term Bank Deposits, upgraded to Ba3 from B2, outlook remains
Positive

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, upgraded to Ba2(cr) from
B1(cr)

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to B3 from Caa2,
outlook remains Positive

Affirmations:

Short-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, affirmed NP

Short-term Bank Deposits, affirmed NP

Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed NP(cr)

Outlook Action:

Outlook remains Positive

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
Methodology published in July 2021.





=========
S P A I N
=========

AUTO ABS 2022-1: DBRS Gives Prov. B Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH assigned provisional ratings to the following
classes of notes to be issued by Auto ABS Spanish Loans 2022-1 FT
(the Issuer):

-- Class A Notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class B Notes at A (sf)
-- Class C Notes at BBB (sf)
-- Class D Notes at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class E Notes at B (sf)

DBRS Morningstar did not assign a provisional rating to the Class F
Notes also expected to be issued in this transaction.

The rating on the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate repayment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in February 2032. The ratings on the Class B Notes,
Class C Notes, Class D Notes, and Class E Notes (together with the
Class A Notes, the Rated Notes) address the ultimate payment of
interest and the ultimate repayment of principal by the legal final
maturity date.

DBRS Morningstar based its provisional ratings on information
provided by the Issuer and its agent as of the date of this press
release. The ratings will be finalized upon receipt of an execution
version of the governing transaction documents. To the extent that
the documents and information provided to DBRS Morningstar as of
this date differ from the executed version of the governing
transaction documents, DBRS Morningstar may assign different final
ratings to the Rated Notes.

This transaction represents the issuance of notes backed by a
portfolio of approximately EUR 700 million of fixed-rate
receivables related to amortizing and balloon auto loans granted by
PSA Financial Services Spain, E.F.C., S.A, (PSA or the Originator)
to private individuals residing in Spain for the acquisition of new
or used vehicles. The Originator also services the portfolio. The
Class F Notes funded the cash reserve.

DBRS Morningstar based its ratings on a review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- The transaction's capital structure, including form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement;

-- Relevant credit enhancement in the form of subordination,
excess spread, and the availability of the cash reserve;

-- Credit enhancement levels that are sufficient to support DBRS
Morningstar's projected cumulative net losses and residual value
(RV) losses under various stressed cash flow assumptions for the
Rated Notes;

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under which
they have invested;

-- PSA's financial strength and its capabilities with regard to
originations, underwriting, and servicing;

-- The transaction parties' financial strength with regard to
their respective roles;

-- DBRS Morningstar's operational risk review of PSA, which it
deemed to be an acceptable servicer;

-- The credit quality of the collateral and historical and
projected performance of the seller's portfolio; and

-- The expected consistency of the transaction's legal structure
with DBRS Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured
Finance Transactions" methodology and the presence of legal
opinions that are expected to address the true sale of the assets
to the Issuer.

TRANSACTION STRUCTURE

The transaction is subject to a revolving period of seven months,
during which time the seller may offer additional receivables and
their related RV purchase option receivables. The Issuer can
purchase these receivables so long as the eligibility criteria,
global portfolio limits, and other conditions set out in the
transaction documents are met. The revolving period may end earlier
than scheduled if certain events occur, such as the breach of
performance triggers, the Originator's insolvency, or the
servicer's replacement.

The transaction allocates payments on a combined interest and
principal priority of payments basis and benefits from an
amortizing EUR 5.9 million cash reserve funded through the
subscription proceeds of the Class F Notes. The cash reserve can be
used to cover senior costs, payments under the interest rate swap
agreement, and interest on the Rated Notes. The cash reserve will
be part of the Issuer's available funds.

The repayment of the Rated Notes will start after the end of the
revolving period on the first principal payment date in January
2023 on a pro rata basis unless certain events such as the breach
of performance triggers, the servicer's insolvency, or the
servicer's termination occur (Subordination Events). Under these
circumstances, the principal repayment of the Rated Notes will
become fully sequential, and the switch is not reversible. The
Class F Notes will be repaid with available funds up to their
target amortization amount.

Interest and principal payments on the notes will be made monthly
on the 28th of every month. The Rated Notes pay interest indexed to
one-month Euribor whereas the total portfolio pays a fixed-interest
rate. The interest rate risk arising from the mismatch between the
Issuer's liabilities and the portfolio is hedged through an
interest rate swap agreement provided by Banco Santander SA (Banco
Santander).

COUNTERPARTIES

The Issuer bank account is held at BNP Paribas Securities Services,
Spanish Branch (BNPSS). Based on DBRS Morningstar's private rating
on BNPSS, the downgrade provisions outlined in the transaction
documents, and structural mitigants inherent in the transaction
structure, DBRS Morningstar considers the risk arising from the
exposure to BNPSS to be consistent with the rating assigned to the
Class A Notes, as described in DBRS Morningstar's "Legal Criteria
for European Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

Banco Santander is the swap counterparty for the transaction. DBRS
Morningstar's public Long-Term Issuer Rating on Banco Santander is
at A (high) with a Stable trend. The hedging documents are expected
to contain downgrade provisions consistent with DBRS Morningstar's
criteria.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


BBVA CONSUMER 2020-1: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Rating on D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH confirmed the following ratings on the notes
issued by BBVA Consumer Auto 2020-1 FT (the Issuer):

-- Series A at AA (low) (sf)
-- Series B at A (high) (sf)
-- Series C at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Series D at BB (high) (sf)

The rating on the Series A notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate repayment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in January 2036. The ratings on the Series B, Series
C, and Series D notes address the ultimate payment of interest and
the ultimate repayment of principal by the legal final maturity
date.

The confirmations follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies and defaults,
as of the April 2022 payment date.

-- Probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and
expected loss assumptions on the remaining receivables.

-- Current available credit enhancement to the notes to cover the
expected losses at their respective rating levels.

The transaction is a securitization of Spanish unsecured vehicle
loans originated and serviced by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria,
S.A. (BBVA). The portfolio comprises loans to finance the purchase
of new and used vehicles. The transaction closed in June 2020 and
had an 18-month revolving period that ended on the January 2022
payment date.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As of the April 2022 payment date, loans that were 30 to 60 days
delinquent and 60 to 90 days delinquent represented 0.7% and 0.4%
of the portfolio balance, respectively. Loans more than 90 days
delinquent amounted to 0.3%. The cumulative doubtful loan ratio was
1.0% of the aggregate original portfolio, with cumulative principal
recoveries of 12.0% to date.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS AND KEY DRIVERS

DBRS Morningstar conducted a loan-by-loan analysis of the remaining
pool of receivables and maintained its base case PD at 5.1% and
updated its base case LGD assumptions to 57.2%.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

The subordination of the junior notes provides credit enhancement.
As of the April 2022 payment date, the Series A, Series B, Series
C, and Series D notes' credit enhancement remained at 14.0%, 11.5%,
8.5%, and 5.0%, respectively, because of the pro rata amortization
of the notes. If a sequential redemption event is triggered, the
principal repayment of the notes will become sequential and
nonreversible.

The transaction benefits from a cash reserve, currently at the
target level of EUR 5.5 million, equating to 0.50% of the
outstanding balance of the Series A, Series B, and Series C notes.
The cash reserve covers senior fees and provides liquidity support
to the Series A, Series B, and Series C notes.

BBVA acts as the account bank for the transaction. Based on the
account bank reference rating of A (high) on BBVA (which is one
notch below the DBRS Morningstar Long Term Critical Obligations
Rating (COR) of AA (low)), the downgrade provisions outlined in the
transaction documents, and other mitigating factors inherent in the
transaction structure, DBRS Morningstar considers the risk arising
from the exposure to the account bank to be consistent with the
rating assigned to the Series A notes, as described in DBRS
Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

BBVA acts as the swap counterparty for the transaction. DBRS
Morningstar's COR of AA (low) on BBVA is consistent with the first
rating threshold as described in DBRS Morningstar's "Derivative
Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
methodology.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


BBVA RMBS 5 FTA: DBRS Reviews BB(high) Rating on Ser. C RMBS Deals
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH placed the following ratings on five Spanish
residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) transactions Under
Review with Positive Implications:

BBVA RMBS 5 FTA

-- Series B rated BBB (high) (sf)
-- Series C rated BB (high) (sf)

The ratings on the Series B and C notes address the timely payment
of interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
legal final maturity date in March 2061.

FT RMBS Prado VI

-- Class B rated A (high) (sf)

The rating on the Class B notes addresses the ultimate payment of
interest and principal on or before the legal final maturity date
in March 2055.

FT RMBS Santander 6

-- Class A rated AA (low) (sf)
-- Class B rated CCC (high) (sf)

The rating on the Class A notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and principal by the legal final maturity date in December
2059. The rating on the Class B notes addresses the ultimate
payment of interest and principal by the legal final maturity
date.

FT RMBS Santander 7

-- Class A Notes rated AA (sf)
-- Class B Notes rated BB (sf)

The rating on the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and principal by the legal final maturity date in December
2063. The rating on the Class B Notes addresses the ultimate
payment of interest and principal by the legal final maturity.

IM BCC Cajamar 2 FT

-- Class B Notes rated B (low) (sf)

The rating on the Class B Notes addresses the ultimate payment of
interest and principal on or before the legal final maturity date
in December 2061.

DBRS Morningstar also rates the Class A notes in BBVA RMBS 5 FTA,
FT RMBS Prado VI, and IM BCC Cajamar 2 FT at AA (sf), AAA (sf), and
AAA (sf), respectively, but did not place these classes Under
Review with Positive Implications.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND CONSIDERATIONS

On April 26, 2022, DBRS Morningstar finalized its proposed update
to the "European RMBS Insight: Spanish Addendum" (the Updated
Spanish Addendum) and corresponding update to its European RMBS
Insight Model (the Model). The Updated Spanish Addendum supersedes
the prior version published on July 6, 2021.

The Updated Spanish Addendum presents the criteria for which
Spanish RMBS ratings, and, where relevant, Spanish covered bonds
ratings and Spanish nonperforming loan transactions are assigned
and/or monitored.

In the Updated Spanish Addendum, DBRS Morningstar updated its
Spanish loans scoring approach (LSA), which DBRS Morningstar
recalibrated using an updated modelling sample that includes
approximately 120,675 Spanish mortgages sourced from both internal
and external datasets. The resulting LSA consists of 22 model
parameters from 15 variables. Some of the variables employed in the
LSA are new or have substantially changed compared with the LSA in
the previous version of the methodology.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.




===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

ARENA TELEVISION: Made Bankrupt After Order to Repay GBP100MM
-------------------------------------------------------------
James Hurley at The Times reports that two directors of Arena
Television, the failed outside broadcast business at the centre of
the UK's "largest ever" asset-based lending fraud, were made
bankrupt after failing to respond to a High Court judgment ordering
repayment of GBP100 million.

Arena, which collapsed last November and is suspected of defrauding
lenders out of about GBP280 million, its owner, Richard Yeowart,
and co-director Robert Hopkinson, had initially been asked to repay
GBP250 million, The Times relays, citing the latest insolvency
filing.

When the directors, whose whereabouts are still thought to be
unknown, did not respond, insolvency practitioners from Kroll
pursued a default judgment via the High Court, The Times discloses.
According to The Times, an administrators' report shows this was
granted in the sum of GBP100 million, plus costs of GBP500,000.


AUTORESTORE LTD: Ex-Workers to Take Legal Action Over Job Losses
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alison Bagley at Northamptonshire Telegraph reports that ex-staff
of a Rushden-based scratch and dent car repairers are to take legal
action over the dent repairers' redundancy process claiming they
were not consulted over job losses ahead of company's collapse.

Those affected by the collapse of AutoRestore in Crown Way have
reached out to lawyers amidst allegations that they were not
properly consulted before they were made redundant earlier this
month, Northamptonshire Telegraph relates.

While the company website is still live, law firm Simpson Millar
says it has been contacted by a number of former employees who
claim they arrived at work one day only to be told their contracts
had been terminated and their jobs had been lost, Northamptonshire
Telegraph notes.

According to Companies House, the status of AutoRestore Limited is
now "In Administration", with reports suggesting that scores of
staff have been affected by the collapse of what had been one of
the UK's leading providers of mobile body repair services,
Northamptonshire Telegraph states.

The company made an operating loss of GBP899,000 in 2020 -- the
previous year they made an operating profit of GBP116,000 -- but
had been awarded GBP938,000 in 2020, as part of the government's
Job Retention Scheme "to limit the impact of Covid",
Northamptonshire Telegraph discloses.

Law firm Simpson Millar's specialist employment team has now begun
investigations into whether a Protective Award can be secured for
those affected, Northamptonshire Telegraph relays.

According to Northamptonshire Telegraph, Anita
North, an employment law expert at Simpson Millar, said:
"It is very upsetting to learn of the collapse of yet another
business. News that will no doubt have come as a real shock to its
many employees, who will no doubt be very concerned about their
immediate future and job prospects.

"We have since spoken to a number of people who have been directly
affected as a result of job losses at the company's headquarters,
and we are in the early stages of investigating whether more should
have done to consult with staff."

Simpson Millar has also urged anyone affected to get in touch if
they would like to be involved in the legal action, as ex-employees
have just three months less one day from when they were made
redundant to make a claim, Northamptonshire Telegraph relates.

According to Northamptonshire Telegraph, a spokesman for Turpin
Barker Armstrong Insolvency Services, brought in to look after the
day-to-day running of the company, said: "Martin Armstrong and
Andrew Bailey of Turpin Barker Armstrong have been appointed as
administrators to AutoRestore Limited, a motor vehicle maintenance
and repair business. Significant losses in recent years due to
challenging economic conditions mean that, despite undertaking a
marketing exercise, the business ceased trading on June 14 2022."


GENESIS MORTGAGE 2022-1: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized its provisional ratings on the
following classes of notes issued by Genesis Mortgage Funding
2022-1 plc (Genesis 22-1 or the Issuer):

-- Class A notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B notes at AA (sf)
-- Class C notes at A (sf)
-- Class D notes at BBB (sf)
-- Class E notes at BB (sf)
-- Class X notes at BB (low) (sf)

The final rating on the Class A notes addresses the timely payment
of interest and the ultimate repayment of principal on or before
the final maturity date in September 2059. The final ratings on the
Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E notes address the timely
payment of interest once most senior and the ultimate repayment of
principal on or before the final maturity date. The final rating on
the Class X notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest and
principal on or before the final maturity date.

DBRS Morningstar does not rate the Class F notes or the residual
certificates.

Genesis 22-1 is the second securitization of residential mortgages
originated by Bluestone Mortgage Limited (BML). The asset portfolio
comprises first-lien owner-occupied and buy-to-let (BTL) mortgages,
originated by BML and secured by properties in the United Kingdom.
BML is the mortgage portfolio servicer. In order to maintain
servicing continuity, CSC Capital Markets UK Limited will be
appointed as the backup servicer facilitator. BML is a specialist
UK lender that offers a full suite of mortgage products including
owner-occupied, BTL, and adverse credit history loans. BML only
started originating loans in 2016 and hence has limited performance
history.

The structure includes a pre-funding mechanism where BML has the
option to sell recently originated mortgage loans to the Issuer,
subject to certain conditions to prevent a material deterioration
in credit quality. The acquisition of these assets shall occur
before the first interest payment date (IPD), using the proceeds
standing to the credit of the pre-funding principal reserve. Any
funds that are not applied to purchase additional loans will flow
through the pre-enforcement principal priority of payments and pay
down the notes on a pro rata basis.

The Issuer issued six tranches of collateralized mortgage-backed
securities (the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E, and
Class F notes; the Principal Backed Notes) to finance the purchase
of the initial portfolio and fund the pre-funding reserves.
Additionally, Genesis 22-1 issued one class of noncollateralized
notes, the Class X notes. Part of the proceeds of the Class X notes
are used to fully fund the General Reserve Fund (GRF) and the
pre-funding revenue reserve ledger at closing. The aim of the
pre-funding revenue reserve is to mitigate the risk of negative
carry arising during the prefunding period and the risk arising
from potential changes in the swap payments as a consequence of any
adjustment to the swap fixed notional amount and new swap rate
agreed with the swap counterparty for the additional loans. In
addition, the GRF is sized at its target level directly as of the
closing date. Any funds remaining in the pre-funding principal
reserve and pre-funding revenue reserve on the first IPD will flow
through the pre-enforcement principal priority of payments and the
pre-enforcement revenue priority of payments respectively on the
first IPD.

The transaction is structured to initially provide 16.5% of credit
enhancement to the Class A notes. This includes subordination of
the Class B to Class F notes and the GRF from closing.

The GRF is available to cover shortfalls in senior fees, senior
swap payments, interest, and any PDL debits on the Class A to Class
E notes after the application of revenue. On the closing date and
prior to the redemption in full of the Class A to Class F notes,
the required amount will be equal to 1.5% of the Principal Backed
Notes as of closing. Any excess will be released as part of
available revenue funds through the revenue priority of payments.
The reserve target amount will become zero once the Class F notes
are redeemed in full and any excess will become part of the
available revenue funds.

The liquidity reserve fund (LRF) is available to cover shortfalls
of senior fees, senior swap payments, and interest on the Class A
notes after the application of revenue and the GRF. The LRF has a
balance of zero at closing and is funded through principal receipts
as a senior item in the waterfall to its amortizing target –1.5%
of the outstanding balance of the Class A notes until the LRF
reaches its target for the first time. Any time after that, the LRF
will be replenished from revenue. The excess amounts following
amortization of the Class A notes will form part of the available
principal.

Principal can be used to cure any shortfalls of senior fees or
unpaid interest payments on the most-senior class of the Class A to
Class F notes outstanding after using revenue funds and both
reserves. Any use will be recorded as a debit in the principal
deficiency ledger (PDL). The PDL comprises six subledgers that will
track the principal used to pay interest, as well as realized
losses, in a reverse sequential order that begins with the Class F
subledger.

On the interest payment date in June 2025, the coupon due on the
notes will step up and the notes may be optionally called. The
notes must be redeemed for an amount sufficient to fully repay
them, at par, plus pay any accrued interest.

As of  March 31, 2022, the closing portfolio consisted of 1,403
loans with an aggregate principal balance of GBP 241.1 million.
Approximately 95.6% of the loans by outstanding balance were
owner-occupied mortgages. As is common in the UK mortgage market
for owner-occupied loans, the loans were largely scheduled to pay
interest and principal on a monthly basis. The remaining 4.4% of
the loans by outstanding balance were BTL loans, out of which 3.8%
paid on an interest only basis with principal repayment
concentrated in the form of a bullet payment at the maturity date
of the mortgage.

The mortgages are high-yielding, with a weighted-average coupon of
4.89% and a weighted-average reversionary margin of 3.0% over the
Bluestone Variable Rate (BVR). The weighted-average seasoning of
the pool is relatively low at 11.8 months. The weighted-average
original loan-to-value (LTV) is 68.6%, with 25.7% of the loans
having an original LTV above 80%. The weighted-average indexed
current LTV of the portfolio as calculated by DBRS Morningstar is
68.9%, with 25.8% of the loans having an indexed current LTV above
80%.

Furthermore, 30.4% of the loans were granted to self-employed
borrowers and 7.2% of the loans were granted under the Help-to-Buy
scheme. Moreover, 23.7% of the mortgage portfolio by loan balance
have prior county court judgements (CCJ) relating to the primary
borrower and 3.0% of the borrowers having a bankruptcy or
individual voluntary arrangement recorded. As of the final cut-off
date, loans between one and three months in arrears represent 1.3%
of the outstanding principal balance of the portfolio; loans more
than three months in arrears were 1.4%.

The majority of loans in the portfolio (87.6%) will revert to
floating rate referenced to BVR after the initial fixed-rate period
in the next one to five years. The remaining 12.4% of the portfolio
is currently paying a floating rate linked to BVR. The interest on
the notes is calculated based on the daily-compounded Sterling
Overnight Index Average (Sonia), which gives rise to interest rate
risk. The basis risk exposure is partially mitigated through a
minimum BVR covenant, which will provide that the variable rate is
not set below Sonia (rolling daily compounded SONIA over the
previous calendar) plus 1.0%.

The Issuer is entering into a fixed-to-floating balanced guarantee
swap with NatWest Markets Limited S.A. (NatWest) to mitigate the
fixed interest rate risk from the mortgage loans and Sonia payable
on the notes. The Issuer will pay a swap rate equivalent to 1.05%
per annum and will receive the Sonia rate. The Issuer can enter
into further hedging agreements with the existing swap counterparty
and adjust the notional of the original swap agreement in order to
hedge the exposure to additional fixed-rate loans resulting from
additional loans during the pre-funding period. In addition, a new
swap fixed rate (applicable market rate) will be applicable for the
increased notional amount with no upfront swap premium payable. The
minimum WA post-swap margin of the total portfolio (including the
loans that are purchased during the pre-funding period is 3.75%.
Based on the DBRS Morningstar ratings of NatWest, which has a
long-term issuer rating of A (low) and a Long Term Critical
Obligations Rating of A (high), the downgrade provisions outlined
in the documents, and the transaction structural mitigants, DBRS
Morningstar considers the risk arising from the exposure to NatWest
to be consistent with the ratings assigned to the notes as
described in DBRS Morningstar's "Derivative Criteria for European
Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

Monthly mortgage receipts are deposited into the collections
account at NatWest and held in accordance with the collection
account declaration of trust. The funds credited to the collection
account are swept daily to the Issuer's account. The collection
account declaration of trust provides that interest in the
collection account is in favor of the Issuer over the Seller.
Commingling risk is considered mitigated by the collection account
declaration of trust and the regular sweep of funds. If the
collection account provider is downgraded below BBB (low), the
collection account bank will be replaced by an appropriately rated
bank within 60 calendar days.

Citibank N.A., London Branch (Citibank) is the account bank in the
transaction and will hold the Issuer's transaction account, the
GRF, the LRF, the prefunding reserves, and the swap collateral
account. The transaction documents stipulate in the event of a
breach of the DBRS Morningstar rating level of "A", the account
bank will be replaced by, or obtain a guarantee from, an
appropriately rated institution within 30 calendar days. Based on
the DBRS Morningstar private rating of Citibank, replacement
provisions, and investment criteria, DBRS Morningstar considers the
risk arising from the exposure to Citibank to be consistent with
the ratings assigned to the rated notes as described in DBRS
Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

DBRS Morningstar based its ratings on a review of the following
analytical considerations:

-- The transaction’s capital structure and form and sufficiency
of available credit enhancement.

-- The credit quality of the mortgage portfolio and the ability of
the servicer to perform collection and resolution activities. DBRS
Morningstar calculated the probability of default (PD), loss given
default (LGD), and expected loss outputs on the mortgage portfolio,
which are used as inputs into the cash flow tool. The mortgage
portfolio was analyzed in accordance with DBRS Morningstar's
"European RMBS Insight: UK Addendum".

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class
E, and Class X notes according to the terms of the transaction
documents.

-- The structural mitigants in place to avoid potential payment
disruptions caused by operational risk, such as a downgrade, and
replacement language in the transaction documents.

-- DBRS Morningstar's sovereign rating on the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland at AA (high) with a Stable trend
as of the date of this press release.

-- The consistency of the transaction's legal structure with DBRS
Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology and presence of legal opinions addressing
the assignment of the assets to the Issuer.

The transaction structure was analyzed using Intex DealMaker,
considering the default rates at which the rated notes did not
return all specified cash flows.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.


MACMERRY: Enters Administration, 63 Jobs Affected
-------------------------------------------------
Rosalind Erskine at The Scotsman reports that Dundee-based MacMerry
has gone into administration, with 63 staff across its venues being
made redundant.

MacMerry 300 was established in 2010, and owns bars across Dundee
and Glasgow, most notably Abandon Ship, which hit the news last
year due to accusations of "systemic mistreatment" from staff, The
Scotsman relates.

These included alleged pay and contract issues, including staff not
being paid sick or holiday pay; lack of communication over sick
and/or holiday pay; inconsistences with tax and not being paid full
wages for shifts at other venues, The Scotsman discloses.

The future of the business was uncertain, after HMRC applied to
have the company wound up, The Scotsman notes.

But now, Blair Nimmo and Geoff Jacobs from Interpath Advisory have
been appointed joint liquidators, The Scotsman discloses.

A statement from the liquidators said the business has been wound
up due to the financial pressures and subsequent losses caused by
the covid-19 pandemic, The Scotsman relays.

According to The Scotsman, speaking to The Courier, Mr. Nimmo,
chief executive of Interpath Advisory and joint liquidator, said:
"This is unfortunately a further example of a business within the
hospitality and leisure sector being unable to withstand ongoing
testing trading conditions, as the re-emergence from Covid-related
restrictions continue against a backdrop of accumulated debt."

When it comes to staff, Mr. Jacobs, as cited by The Scotsman, said
the focus would be to assist employees with redundancy claims,
saying they would be: "safeguarding any remaining company assets
and ascertaining from the director the circumstances under which
the recent transfer of assets occurred and carrying out appropriate
investigations".


SHEPHERD COX: Sold to New Owners Following Administration
---------------------------------------------------------
Mark Payne at Hartlepool Mail reports that Hartlepool's Grand Hotel
has been sold to new owners for around GBP100,000 almost two years
after closing its doors.

The former Best Western hotel, in Victoria Road, closed in 2020
with all staff made redundant after its then owner Shepherd Cox
Hotels (Hartlepool) went into administration, Hartlepool Mail
recounts.

According to Hartlepool Mail, an update in a liquidators progress
report filed with Companies House in May shows the hotel has been
sold to Otway Capital Limited in March for GBP95,727.27 excluding
VAT.

A number of jobs for the Grand Hotel are also currently being
advertised online including for positions of general manager and
bar staff, Hartlepool Mail discloses.

Simon Bonney and Carl Jackson, of Quantuma Advisory, were
previously appointed as joint administrators and later joint
liquidators to handle the administration process, Hartlepool Mail
relates.

Otway Capital is registered in Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk, and the
nature of its business is given on the Companies House website as
"hotels and similar accommodation".

The liquidators statement of receipt and payments also says that an
insurance claim totalling GBP138,000 was paid out following damage
suffered to the hotel after it closed, Hartlepool Mail notes.

According to Hartlepool Mail, it stated no dividend had been paid
to date to preferential creditors, who include employees, for wage
arrears and pension contributions, adding: "It is uncertain whether
there will be sufficient realisations to pay a dividend to
preferential creditors."


[*] UK: Property Company Insolvencies Soar in Past Few Months
-------------------------------------------------------------
George Hammond at The Financial Times reports that the number of UK
property companies falling into insolvency has soared in the past
few months, as investors who were weakened by the pandemic now face
being killed off by rising interest rates.

In the first three months of the year, 81 property investment
companies fell into insolvency, the FT relays, citing tax and
advisory firm Mazars.  That is the highest quarterly figure in more
than a decade and a sharp increase on the 46 companies which went
insolvent in the final three months of 2021, the FT notes.

According to the FT, among the most at-risk businesses are those
which took on loans to fund speculative development projects before
the pandemic struck and commercial landlords who lost out on income
when shops were closed during lockdowns.

Now they face an existential threat in the form of rising borrowing
costs, as the Bank of England moves to rein in soaring inflation by
raising interest rates -- the BoE's Monetary Policy Committee has
tightened policy in five back-to-back meetings, taking the
benchmark rate to 1.25%, the FT states.

Some businesses have only survived until now only because borrowers
have been protected by government coronavirus measures, according
to the FT.  But a moratorium on issuing winding up petitions came
to an end earlier this year, meaning lenders are no longer obliged
to show forbearance, the FT notes.

Having survived coronavirus, investors had hoped that they could
recover lost earnings and catch up on delayed projects against a
backdrop of economic recovery, the FT discloses.

But the invasion of Ukraine has tipped the global economy
ever-closer to recession, stoking a cost of living crisis which has
weighed on high street spending and raising the prospect of a
housing market slowdown in the UK, according to the FT.

Property developers are also grappling with rising labour and
material costs due to wage inflation, high energy prices and supply
chain disruption, the FT relates.

Separate research by accountancy firm Price Bailey shows a sharp
jump in the number of businesses in the construction sector which
have defaulted on government loans designed to prop up small
businesses during the pandemic, the FT discloses.

Businesses in the construction industry made 14,255 Coronavirus
Business Interruption Loan Scheme, or CBILS, claims, the FT
discloses.  The firm said so far, 354 businesses have defaulted,
representing 2.5% of the total, the FT notes.

The rate of default in the construction sector is far higher than
in other sectors, and is likely to herald more insolvencies to
come, the FT relays, citing Price Bailey.

"The full impact from the three big shocks of Brexit, Covid and
Ukraine is yet to come. The current increase in insolvencies
largely relates to businesses that were likely to fail before the
various supply side shocks experienced by the UK economy," the FT
quotes Matt Howard, head of insolvency and recovery at Price
Bailey, as saying.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
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Editors.

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