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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Tuesday, May 24, 2022, Vol. 23, No. 97

                           Headlines



C R O A T I A

BRODOSPLIT: Commercial Court Commences Pre-Bankruptcy Procedure


F R A N C E

GINKGO AUTO 2022: DBRS Assigns B(high) Rating on Class F Notes


G E R M A N Y

TUI CRUISES: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Positive


I T A L Y

BANCA IFIS: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Stable


R U S S I A

MOSCOW INDUSTRIAL: Amendments to Bankruptcy Measures Okayed
SOVCOMFLOT: Sells Some of Kremlin-Owned Fleet to Repay Debts


S P A I N

AUTO ABS 2020-1: Fitch Hikes Class E Debt Rating to BB-sf
CAIBANK PYMES 8: DBRS Hikes Series B Notes Rating to B
NH HOTEL: Fitch Raises LongTerm IDR to 'B', Outlook Stable


U K R A I N E

[*] Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LongTerm IDRs on 4 Ukrainian Cities


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AMIGO LOANS: High Court Accepts Proposed New Business Scheme
LIBERTY STEEL: Court Overturns Decision to Liquidate Liege Unit
MONEYTHING: Administrator Looks at Costs of Operating Platform
NEWDAY FUNDING 2022-1: DBRS Gives Prov. B(high) Rating on F Notes
WHIRLI: Enters Administration, 10,500 Customers Affected


                           - - - - -


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C R O A T I A
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BRODOSPLIT: Commercial Court Commences Pre-Bankruptcy Procedure
---------------------------------------------------------------
Annie Tsoneva at SeeNews reports that a pre-bankruptcy procedure
has started for Croatian shipyard Brodosplit.

The pre-bankruptcy procedure started by a decision of the
Commercial Court in Split on May 20, the head of the company's
public relations department Josip Jurisic told SeeNews in an
e-mailed statement.

The procedure aims to identify the position of the debtor regarding
its creditors, prevent insolvency and maintain the company's
shipbuilding business, SeeNews states.

According to local media reports, Brodosplit's owner,
privately-owned DIV Group, last month also filed for a
pre-bankruptcy procedure with Zagreb Commercial Court due to an
outstanding debt of HRK41.7 million (US$5.9 million/EUR5.5
million), because DIV's bank account was blocked in mid-April after
the group provided financial support to Brodosplit, SeeNews notes.

Due to the sanctions imposed on some Russian banks over the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, Brodosplit's access to EUR60 million in
financing from VTB Europe, a Russian-owned bank based in Frankfurt,
for the construction of two ships, has been blocked, SeeNews
relates.

Brodosplit was unable to withdraw in full a loan from VTB Europe
and DIV had to provide Brodosplit with funding instead, SeeNews
discloses.  Thus, DIV invested EUR60 million of own funds in the
two vessels, instead of EUR30 million as planned, exhausting its
finances, state-run Croatian news agency HINA quoted DIV as saying
last month, SeeNews relays.




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F R A N C E
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GINKGO AUTO 2022: DBRS Assigns B(high) Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH assigned the following ratings to the notes
issued by Ginkgo Auto Loans 2022 (the Issuer):

-- Class A notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B notes at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C notes at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D notes at A (low) (sf)
-- Class E notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F notes at B (high) (sf)

DBRS Morningstar did not rate the Class G notes also issued in this
transaction.

The ratings of the Class A, Class B, and Class C notes address the
timely payment of scheduled interest and the ultimate repayment of
principal by the legal final maturity date. The ratings of the
Class D, Class E, and Class F notes address the ultimate payment of
scheduled interest while the class is subordinated and the timely
payment of scheduled interest as the senior most class outstanding,
and the ultimate repayment of principal by the legal final maturity
date.

The transaction is a securitization of fixed-rate, unsecured,
amortizing auto loans granted to individuals domiciled in France
for the purchase of new and used vehicles, and is serviced by CA
Consumer Finance.

While DBRS Morningstar has rated several consumer loan asset-backed
securities transactions in Europe where CA Consumer Finance is also
the originator or the parent of the originator(s), this is the
first transaction of auto-related loans rated by DBRS Morningstar.

DBRS Morningstar based its ratings on the following analytical
considerations:

-- The transaction's capital structure, including form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement levels sufficient to support the projected
expected net losses under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay investors according to the terms of the
notes.

-- CA Consumer Finance's financial strength and its capabilities
with respect to originations, underwriting, and servicing.

-- DBRS Morningstar's operational risk review of CA Consumer
Finance, which is deemed to be an acceptable servicer.

-- The transaction parties' financial strength regarding their
respective roles.

-- The credit quality, diversification of the collateral, and
historical and projected performance of CA Consumer Finance's
portfolio.

-- DBRS Morningstar's sovereign rating of the Republic of France,
currently at AA (high) with a Stable trend.

-- The consistency of the transaction's legal structure with DBRS
Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

TRANSACTION STRUCTURE

The transaction includes a 24-month scheduled revolving period.
During this period, the Issuer may purchase additional receivables,
provided that the eligibility criteria and concentration limits set
out in the transaction documents are satisfied. The revolving
period may end earlier than scheduled if certain events occur, such
as the breach of performance triggers or servicer termination.

There are separate waterfalls for interest and principal payments
that facilitate the distribution of the available distribution
amount. Following the scheduled revolving period, the transaction
enters into the normal redemption period with amortization amounts
based on the target subordination levels of each class of notes
until the breach of a sequential redemption trigger after which the
notes will be repaid sequentially.

The transaction includes Class A and Class B liquidity reserves
that are available to the Issuer during the revolving period and
the normal redemption period in restricted scenarios where the
interest and principal collections are not sufficient to cover the
shortfalls in senior expenses, swap payments, and interests on the
Class A notes (available from both the Class A and Class B
liquidity reserves) and the Class B notes (only available from the
Class B liquidity reserve). During the accelerated redemption
period, the amounts in both liquidity reserves are not available to
the Issuer and are instead returned directly to CA Consumer Finance
as the liquidity reserve provider.

As the rated notes carry floating-rate coupons based on one-month
Euribor whereas the collateral has a fixed interest rate, the
interest rate mismatch risk is largely mitigated by an interest
rate swap for the Class A notes and another interest rate swap for
the Class B through Class F notes provided by CA Consumer Finance.

COUNTERPARTIES

CA Consumer Finance is the account bank and the interest rate swap
counterparty for the transaction. DBRS Morningstar has a private
rating on CA Consumer Finance and a Long-Term Issuer Rating of AA
(low) on its ultimate parent company, Crédit Agricole S.A. The
transaction documents contain downgrade provisions relating to the
account bank and swap counterparty consistent with DBRS
Morningstar's criteria.

DBRS Morningstar analyzed the transaction cash flow structure in
Intex DealMaker.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.




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G E R M A N Y
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TUI CRUISES: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Positive
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed TUI Cruises GmbH's (TUI Cruises)
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B-' with Positive Outlook
and senior unsecured notes due 2026 at 'CCC' with a Recovery Rating
of 'RR6'.

TUI Cruises' 'B-' rating is constrained by high leverage as
disruption to the cruise industry caused by pandemic-related
restrictions was exacerbated by the company's debt-funded
acquisition of Hapag Lloyd Cruises (HLC) in 2020. Fitch expects a
successful ramp-up of TUI Cruises' activity, resulting in an
improvement in its financial profile by 2023 and beyond, which is
reflected in the Positive Outlook.

Fitch expects almost full and sustained demand recovery by
end-2022, in the absence of any new Covid-19 related restrictions,
as most of them have been lifted following the removal of mask
mandate in Germany from April 30. As a result, management expects
strong resumption of demand in summer 2022 with 100% occupancies.
Meaningful delays to operational normalisation - including material
cost pressures and margin attrition - and to its deleveraging path
could lead to the Outlook being revised to Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Business Profile: The rating reflects TUI Cruises' strong
market position with around a 35% market share (40% when including
its faster operational ramp-up than peers'). Its concentrated
customer base enables the company to better adapt its product
offering to customer preferences, resulting in a high level of
repeat bookings representing 60%-70% of total customers. This
allows TUI Cruises to maintain its current market position while
growing the business through planned addition of new ships from
2024 onwards.

High Inherent Profitability: TUI Cruises' premium product offering
enabled it to generate an industry- leading EBITDA margin of close
to 40% in 2019. However, due to current high inflation, Fitch
conservatively assumes EBITDA margins at 30%-35% over the medium
term. The company also benefits from the marketing platform of TUI
AG (its 50% owner) as well as the technical expertise of Royal
Caribbean (the other 50% owner) for ship operations and new-build
activity. The company's fleet is among the youngest in the industry
with an average age of less than 10 years, resulting in lower
maintenance capex requirement and fuel consumption than peers'.

Well-Managed Covid-19 Impact: TUI Cruises, in line with the broader
cruise shipping industry, had suffered from pandemic-driven
restrictions during 2020 and for part of 2021. Cruise operations
were halted in 2Q20 and all its vessels were moved to a cool lay-up
status, resulting in minimum crew levels and maintenance costs. TUI
Cruises was able to reduce operating costs by 60% through minimised
labour costs, staff furloughs and layoffs. It was the first
mass-market cruise brand to return to service in July 2020 after
receiving approvals from the German and Greek port authorities
under the EU Healthy GateWays policy.

Improving Ship Occupancies: Ship occupancy levels at TUI Cruises
are expected to continue to ramp-up until summer 2022. It was able
to operate about 30% of its ships for most of 2H20, albeit at lower
occupancies. The ramp-up accelerated in May 2021 as planned with 11
(out of 12) ships back in operation by August 2021. However, due to
the onset of Omicron variant-related restrictions, particularly in
Germany, the ramp-up during 1Q22 was slower than expected.

Demand Recovery in 2022 Key: TUI Cruises' free cash flow (FCF,
including interest and capex but excluding debt amortisation and
new-build investment) turned positive since 2H21, and Fitch expects
it to improve through 2022. This is based on improved occupancy
levels, which are close to 70% currently, versus TUI Cruises'
EBITDA break-even at close to 30%. Fitch expects almost full and
sustained demand recovery by end-2022. Any significant delays may
lead us to lower Fitch's expectations for the recovery trajectory,
put some pressure on the company's available liquidity buffer, and
result in an Outlook revision to Stable.

Inflationary Pressures: TUI Cruises is facing inflationary
pressures from higher fuel costs (around 5% of total revenue),
higher prices of consumables as well as transportation costs.
Nevertheless, strong pent-up demand and its premium product
offering, particularly for the HLC brand, are enabling the company
to recover most of its cost inflation through increased ticket
prices. However, Fitch forecasts Fitch-calculated EBITDA margin in
2022 to remain at around 25%, significantly below the company's
long-term expectations of mid-30%. This also reflects lower than
normalised occupancy levels, particularly in 1Q22. Fitch forecasts
improvement in the EBITDA margin to above 30% from 2023.

Financial Profile to Improve: Given the continued ramp-up of
operations in 2022 and 2023, Fitch expects total debt/EBITDA to
improve to 5.9x in 2023 (from 10.2x in 2022), improving rating
headroom. TUI Cruises acquired HLC from TUI AG in 2020 for an
enterprise value of about EUR1.1 billion, including about EUR340
million of debt. This, along with the impact from severely reduced
operations in 2020, led to negative cash flow from operations of
EUR324 million. Half of this related to working-capital outflows
which, however, have been improving since March 2021. Fitch uses
unadjusted credit metrics for cruise operators as leases are not
treated as a core financing decision.

Longer-Term Leverage to Improve: Due to an increase in new-build
capex, as planned in 2024, Fitch forecasts total debt/EBITDA to
increase slightly at end-2024 to 6.1x. However, with further
increase in profits from new ships, Fitch forecasts leverage to
decline to below 5x by 2025. This is driven primarily by EBITDA
improvement while FCF generation will only see limited debt
reduction till end-2023. TUI Cruises' interest cover ratio is
forecast to remain strong for the rating from 2022 onwards at 3x,
before improving to above 5x to 2025.

Standalone Rating: TUI Cruises is rated on a standalone basis
despite its 50% ownership by TUI AG and Royal Caribbean each. Both
shareholders account TUI Cruises as a joint venture in their
accounts and there are no relevant contingent liabilities or cross
guarantees between the owners and TUI Cruises. TUI Cruises manages
its funding and liquidity independently. It has operational
related-party transactions with the owners, primarily in marketing
and technical activities, albeit on an arms-length basis.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

All major cruise operators such as Royal Caribbean, Carnival or NCL
Corporation (Norwegian) faced severe operating pressures and
liquidity tensions during 2020 and 2021. In the case of TUI
Cruises, revenue declined by a smaller extent than main operators
(75% versus 80%) and costs were more flexible with a higher
absorption capability. Capex was also significantly lower for TUI
Cruises.

TUI Cruises exhibits a weaker market position than industry
leaders, by way of fleet capacity and EBITDAR. However, TUI Cruises
benefits from recognised brand awareness and diversification into
the luxury segment, where competition is less intense.
Pre-pandemic, TUI Cruises operated with higher margins (pro-forma
for HLC acquisition in 2019: 36%) than those of Royal Caribbean or
Carnival, as a result of a younger and more efficient fleet.
Margins are also stronger than that of asset-heavy operators such
as NH Hotel Group SA (B-/Negative) or Whitbread PLC (BBB-/Stable).

TUI Cruises is well-positioned to continue its resumption of
operations, after its pioneering test-bubble cruises, on the back
of the removal of pandemic-related restrictions as well as pent-up
leisure demand, supporting the Positive Outlook.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Fitch's Rating Case for the Issuer

-- Reviewed prices to 2025 based on realised bookings, with
conservative starting prices post-pandemic and considering
management strategy of not increasing prices going forward

-- Cruise itineraries in line with management's plan but with
occupancy in 2022 down 10bp and in 2023 down 5bp

-- Cost at 26%-27% of sales in 2022-2025

-- Selling, general & administration expenses at around 8% of
sales in 2022, declining to 6.6% by 2025

-- Restricted cash of EUR40 million

-- Aggregate capex of EUR1.9 billion between 2022 and 2025, with a
peak of EUR1.4 billion in 2024 (new ship build)

Cash sweep as applicable based on lenders' definition

Recovery Assumptions

--The recovery analysis assumes that TUI Cruises would be
    reorganised as a going-concern (GC) in bankruptcy rather than
    liquidated. Ships can be sold for scrap but this typically
    does not occur until the tail end of its useful life (30-40
    years) and at a steep discount to initial construction cost.
    This is due to the inherent cash flow-generating ability of
    ships, even older ones, which can be moved to cheaper/less
    favourable locations as they age;

-- A 10% administrative claim;

-- The GC EBITDA estimate of EUR530 million, pro-forma for the
    HCL acquisition, reflects Fitch's view of a stressed but
    sustainable, post-reorganisation EBITDA upon which Fitch bases

    the enterprise valuation (EV);

-- An EV multiple of 6.0x EBITDA is applied to GC EBITDA to
    calculate a post-reorganisation EV;

-- The company's revolving credit facility (RCF), term loan I and

    KfW loan all fully drawn upon default;

-- The allocation of value in the liability waterfall results in
    recoveries corresponding to 'RR6' for the senior unsecured
    notes with the waterfall generated recovery computation at 0%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-− Visibility on the post-Covid-19 demand recovery, with
     occupancy ramp-up and cost control leading to an EBITDA
    margin above 30%;

-− Successful resumption of operations leading to FCF generation

    sustaining its liquidity buffer;

-− Total debt/EBITDA sustainably below 6.5x;

-− Improvement in recovery assumptions due to EBITDA growth or
    reduction in prior-ranking debt could lead to an upgrade of
    the senior unsecured bond rating.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to a
revision of Outlook to Stable:

−- Delays in demand recovery given a weaker economic
environment,
    leading to delays to the deleveraging path and total
    debt/EBITDA remaining above 6.5x beyond 2022.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to
downgrade:

-− Total debt/EBITDA consistently above 7.5x;

-− Additional external liquidity requirement in the next 12 to
18
    months, potentially due to delays in the planned ramp-up of
    operations;

-− Deeper and longer operating economic disruption than
currently
    modelled, including occupancy, pricing and operating margins
    remaining below normalised levels to 2023.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.



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I T A L Y
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BANCA IFIS: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banca IFIS S.p.A.'s (IFIS) Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+' with a Stable Outlook and its
Viability Rating (VR) at 'bb+'.

Fitch has withdrawn IFIS's Support Rating of '5' and Support Rating
Floor of 'No Floor' as they are no longer relevant to the agency's
coverage following the publication of its updated Bank Rating
Criteria on 12 November 2021. In line with the updated criteria,
Fitch has assigned IFIS a Government Support Rating (GSR) of 'no
support' (ns).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IFIS's Long-Term-IDR is driven by its VR. Its 'B' Short-Term IDR is
the only option mapping to its 'BB+' Long-Term IDR.

Specialised Bank: The ratings of IFIS reflect its specialised
business model with established market shares as a non-performing
loan (NPL) investor and adequate contribution of its long-standing
SME factoring activities. This allows adequate earnings generation
through the cycle and relative to similarly-sized traditional
commercial banks in Italy. IFIS's domestic business model also
features a moderate franchise in domestic leasing.

The ratings also reflect sound capitalisation, a higher impaired
loan ratio than domestic averages, and stable funding and
liquidity.

Capitalisation a Rating Strength: IFIS's common equity Tier 1
(CET1) ratio of about 15.4% at end-2021 is sound and has ample
buffers over its Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP)
requirement of 8.12%. While capitalisation remains at risk from
IFIS's large exposure to Italian sovereign debt, which accounted
for about 140% of CET1 capital at end-2021, capital encumbrance by
unreserved impaired loans (excluding purchased or originated
credit-impaired loans, (POCIs)) has gradually decreased to a modest
14% of CET1 capital.

Improved Asset Quality: The bank's impaired loan ratio (excluding
POCIs) has materially improved over the past four years to below
7%, but still lagged the industry average of 5% at end-2021. The
improvement mainly mirrors the bank's overall moderate risk profile
that is reliant on the short-term factoring business and the
above-average recovery rate of the leasing business. Fitch deems
the quality of the NPL business adequate, given its consistent
profitability underpinned by robust underwriting and collection
performance.

Achievable Asset-Quality Targets: Fitch views the bank's organic
impaired loan target of 5.7% (excluding POCIs) by 2024 as
realistic. Small impaired loan disposals will continue and will
compensate for asset- quality pressures from the indirect effects
of the Russian/Ukraine conflict (such as rising energy prices,
higher inflation, weaker domestic GDP growth). A more stringent
interpretation by the banking regulator of the new definition of
default, currently under review, may lead to a reclassification of
invoices issued by Italy's National Health System and Public
Administration to past due from performing. This may weaken the
asset-quality ratios during the collection period of the invoices,
with marginal profitability and modest CET1 impact. However,
Fitch's current overall view on asset quality would remain intact
given the technical nature of the change.

Core Business Lines Sustain Revenue: Operating profit recovered to
nearly 1.6% of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) in 2021 (from 0.4% in
2020), due to core revenue growth that more than compensated the
lower contribution from purchase price allocation (PPA) on former
Interbanca's loans (which has almost ceased), and lower loan
impairment charges (LICs) in the lending business.

Conservative Provisioning Approach: LICs (excluding recoveries on
POCIs) decreased 15% yoy in 2021 as the bank frontloaded provisions
related to pandemic risks in the previous year. LICs remained high
at 89bp of average gross loans despite lower NPL inflows as the
bank maintained a prudent provisioning policy in light of risks
posed by the withdrawal of government-support measures in 2Q22.

Fitch expects the bank to maintain high coverage ratios ahead of
asset-quality deterioration resulting from the Russian/Ukraine
conflict. Over time, Fitch expects LICs/average gross loans to
gradually decrease to below 60bp by 2024, which is in line with the
bank's target.

Stable Funding and Liquidity: Funding and liquidity are underpinned
by stable customer deposits. Funding diversification is
commensurate with the bank's profile, with less established access
to wholesale markets than larger banks' and less certain funding
access during periods of market stress. The bank's utilisation of
central-bank facilities is more opportunistic to support its net
interest income than for actual liquidity needs.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- The ratings could be downgraded if IFIS increases its risk
    appetite, for example, due to a loosening of underwriting
    standards to pursue business growth, leading to a material
    deterioration in its asset quality and causing operating
    profitability to weaken and significant capital erosion.

In particular, the ratings could be downgraded if the organic
impaired loans ratio (excluding POCIs) structurally increases above
10%, operating profitability falls below 0.8% of RWA and the CET1
ratio falls below 14% without prospects of a reversal in the short
term.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Given its specialised business profile, rating upside is
    currently limited. However, positive rating action would
    require a significantly broader and stronger franchise.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: KEY RATING DRIVERS

The long-term deposit rating is one notch above IFIS's Long-Term
IDR, reflecting depositor preference in Italy and the protection
offered to deposits by a sizeable buffer of subordinated and senior
debt above 10% of RWAs. At end-2021, IFIS's senior-and-subordinated
debt buffer amounted to about 11% of RWAs and Fitch expects it to
grow in the coming years.

The short-term deposit rating of 'F3' is in line with the rating
correspondence table for banks with a 'BBB-' long-term deposit
rating.

Tier 2 debt is rated two notches below the VR for loss severity to
reflect poor recovery prospects. No notching is applied for
incremental non-performance risk because write-down of the notes
will only occur once the point of non-viability is reached and
there is no coupon flexibility before non-viability.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- The long-term deposit rating would be downgraded if the Long-
    Term IDR is downgraded. It is also sensitive to a reduction in

    the buffers of senior and junior debt, if the bank fails to
    comply with its MREL.

-- The subordinated debt's rating is primarily sensitive to a
    downgrade of the VR, from which it is notched. The rating is
    also sensitive to an adverse change in the notes' notching,
    which could arise if Fitch changes its assessment of their
    non-performance relative to the risk captured in the VR.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- The long-term deposit rating would be upgraded if the Long-
    Term IDR is upgraded;

-- The subordinated debt's rating is primarily sensitive to an
    upgrade of the VR, from which it is notched.

VR ADJUSTMENTS

The asset quality score of 'bb' is above the 'b & below' category
implied score due to the following adjustment reason: loan
classification policies.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

Rating Actions

Banca IFIS S.p.A.    LT IDR          BB+      Affirmed   BB+
                     ST IDR          B        Affirmed   B
                     Viability       bb+      Affirmed   bb+
                     Support         WD       Withdrawn  5
                     Support Floor   WD       Withdrawn  NF
                     Gov't. Support  ns       New Rating

subordinated        LT              BB-      Affirmed   BB-
long-term deposits  LT              BBB-     Affirmed   BBB-
Senior preferred    LT              BB+      Affirmed   BB+
short-term deposits ST              F3       Affirmed   F3




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R U S S I A
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MOSCOW INDUSTRIAL: Amendments to Bankruptcy Measures Okayed
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia approved amendments to the Plan for the Bank of
Russia's Participation in Bankruptcy Prevention Measures for JSC
Moscow Industrial bank (Reg. No. 912, hereinafter, the Bank).

According to these amendments, the Bank of Russia is to finance the
recapitalisation of the Bank.  The amount of the financing was
estimated at RUR34.9 billion so that the fair value of the Bank's
assets matches the amount of its liabilities.

Further operations with the Bank's troubled and non-core assets
will be recognised on its balance sheet. Thus, the said assets will
not be transferred to the group of NB TRUST.

Furthermore, under the Bank's financial resolution strategy, the
Bank of Russia is to contribute 100% of the Bank's shares at a
value of one ruble per share to SC DIA to be subsequently
transferred to the Russian Treasury pursuant to Federal Law No.
326-FZ ‘On Amending Articles 16 and 19 of the Federal Law "On the
Insurance of Deposits with Russian Banks".  The Bank is supposed to
join Promsvyazbank PJSC no later than in May 2023 provided the
Government of the Russian Federation makes a decision on the
contribution of the JSC Moscow Industrial bank's shares to the
authorised capital of Promsvyazbank PJSC.

To prepare the Bank for the transfer to the Russian Treasury,
representatives of the Bank of Russia and FBSC AMC Ltd. left the
board of directors of JSC Moscow Industrial bank in December 2021.

JSC Moscow Industrial bank will continue to operate as normal and
fulfil all its obligations to clients.  The Bank of Russia's
earlier decision to guarantee the continuity of JSC Moscow
Industrial bank remains in effect.


SOVCOMFLOT: Sells Some of Kremlin-Owned Fleet to Repay Debts
------------------------------------------------------------
Harry Dempsey, Neil Hume and Oliver Telling at The Financial Times
report that Russia's biggest shipping group Sovcomflot and its
western lenders have sold some of its Kremlin-owned fleet as part
of plans to repay debts and eventually return to international
markets once sanctions are lifted.

Sales of at least 20 vessels have been completed, according to
people familiar with the matter, although the company insisted it
had only sold 12 ships, or 10% of its fleet, the FT relates.

According to the FT, the sale of 12 vessels, Sovcomflot said, had
reduced total outstanding debt by US$1.3 billion in a loan
restructuring to avoid defaulting and triggering bad loans on the
banks' balance sheets.

A default would have damaged the company's reputation with
creditors and oil majors, including Shell and Total, that charter
its vessels, say industry figures, the FT notes.

The asset sale comes as energy executives warn Russia's oil and
tanker industry will increasingly resemble those of Iran and
Venezuela, which rely on a "dark fleet" of vessels operating
outside international markets, the FT relays.

Annual accounts showed that Russia's national tanker company had
US$2.4 billion of net debt at the end of last year, but it is
unknown how much of this is owed to international creditors and
whether it could use its US$644 million of cash to repay loans from
the banks, according to the FT.

Sovcomflot was founded in 1988 and has become Russia's largest
shipping company with a fleet of 122 vessels at the end of last
year, slightly less than half of which carry crude oil.

Russia's government owns 82.8% of the company, the FT discloses.
The remaining shares were listed on the Moscow Exchange in October
2020.  Its stock has tumbled 60% since then because of sanctions,
the FT states.

ING was the main bank involved in the sales, but other western
lenders have been trying to reduce their exposure to Sovcomflot,
too, including Citibank, Societe Generale, KfW and Crédit
Agricole, according to the FT.

Sovcomflot sold many of the ships directly to buyers, but in the
case of ING, the Dutch group took ownership of the company's
vessels, allowing buyers to transact directly with the lender
instead of the Russian tanker company, the FT states.




=========
S P A I N
=========

AUTO ABS 2020-1: Fitch Hikes Class E Debt Rating to BB-sf
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken multiple rating actions on two Auto ABS
Spanish Loans ABS transactions, including upgrading three tranches
of Auto ABS Spanish Loans 2020-1, FT (Auto ABS 2020) and affirming
the rest. The Outlooks on all tranches is Stable. A full list of
rating actions is available below.

   DEBT                   RATING                   PRIOR
   ----                   ------                   -----
Auto ABS Spanish Loans 2018-1, FT

Class A ES0305370001     LT AA+sf     Affirmed     AA+sf

Auto ABS Spanish Loans 2020-1, FT

Class A ES0305506000     LT AA+sf     Upgrade      AA-sf
Class B ES0305506018     LT Asf       Affirmed     Asf
Class C ES0305506026     LT BBBsf     Affirmed     BBBsf
Class D ES0305506034     LT BB+sf     Upgrade      BBsf
Class E ES0305506042     LT BB-sf     Upgrade      Bsf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The transactions are collateralised by auto loans originated by PSA
Financial Services Spain, E.F.C. S.A. (PSA). PSA is the Spanish
captive financial entity of the French car maker Peugeot, now part
of Stellantis N.V. (BBB-/Positive/F3). PSA is a 50/50 joint venture
of Banque PSA Finance S.A. and Santander Consumer Finance, S.A.
(SCF, A-/Stable/F2).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Broadly Stable Asset Performance Expectations: Fitch has lowered
its base-case default rates for both transactions and for all
sub-products to a weighted average (WA) of 2.2% (Auto ABS 2018) and
3.2% (Auto ABS 2020). This recalibration reflects their robust
performance since closing in 2018 and 2020, and Fitch's neutral
asset performance outlook on the Spanish car loan sector. While
downside performance risk has increased due to the recent increase
in inflation that may put pressure on household financing,
especially for weaker borrowers, Fitch views the transactions
sufficiently protected by credit enhancement to withstand the most
immediate consequences, as reflected in today's rating actions.

Asset Assumptions Reflect Current Portfolio: Fitch's analysis of
Auto ABS 2020 reflects the current portfolio composition rather
than the assumed stressed composition, following the end of
revolving period in December 2021, leading to a recalibration of
its default rating multiple to 5.9x at 'AA+sf' from 4.8x. Auto ABS
2018 has been amortising since 2020, and Fitch has increased the
default rating multiple for the 'AA+sf' highest achievable rating
to 6.2x from 4.2x, reflecting the lower default rate base case on
the portfolio.

Residual Value Risk for Auto ABS 2020: Of the portfolio balance,
around 27% is linked to balloon loans granted to individuals for
the purchase of new cars, on which borrowers have the option to
deliver the vehicle to discharge the final balloon instalment (ie
residual value (RV)). Fitch has revised its RV analysis assumptions
to reflect updated data received from the originator. In
particular, car sale proceeds were increased to 95% (from 85%) of
the final balloon instalments in Fitch's base case. All other RV
assumptions are unchanged.

Account Bank Eligibility Limits Ratings: Ratings for all the
classes of rated notes are capped at 'AA+sf' due to the SPV account
bank's and hedge provider's minimum eligibility ratings that are
contractually defined at 'A-' or 'F1'. Such ratings are
insufficient to support a 'AAAsf' rating according to Fitch's
Structured Finance and Covered Bonds Counterparty Rating Criteria.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Long-term asset performance deterioration such as increased
delinquencies or reduced portfolio yield, which could be driven by
adverse changes in portfolio characteristics, macroeconomic
conditions, business practices or the legislative landscape. Higher
inflation, larger unemployment and lower economic growth than
Fitch's current forecast as disclosed in the "Global Economic
Outlook - March 2022" could affect the borrowers' ability to pay
its car loan financing.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

For notes rated at 'AA+sf', documented counterparty provisions of
'A' (from A-) or 'F1' minimum eligibility ratings that are
compatible with the 'AAAsf' rating under Fitch's Counterparty
Rating Criteria may result in upgrades.

Increasing credit enhancement ratios as the transactions deleverage
to fully compensate the credit losses and cash flow stresses
commensurate with higher rating scenarios may lead to upgrades.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third- party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Prior to the transactions' closing, Fitch reviewed the results of a
third-party assessment conducted on the asset portfolio information
and concluded that there were no findings that affected the rating
analysis.

Prior to the transactions' closing, Fitch conducted a review of a
small targeted sample of the originator's origination files and
found the information contained in the reviewed files to be
adequately consistent with the originator's policies and practices
and the other information provided to the agency about the asset
portfolio.

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates that it is adequately reliable.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


CAIBANK PYMES 8: DBRS Hikes Series B Notes Rating to B
------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings GmbH took the following rating actions on the notes
issued by CaixaBank PYMES 8, FT (the Issuer):

-- Series A Notes confirmed at AA (sf)
-- Series B Notes upgraded to B (sf) from CCC (low) (sf)

The rating on the Series A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
legal final maturity date in January 2054. The rating on the Series
B Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest and the ultimate
payment of principal on or before the legal final maturity date.

The rating actions follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- The portfolio performance, in terms of level of delinquencies
and defaults, as of the January 2022 payment date;

-- The one-year base case probability of default (PD) and default
and recovery rates on the outstanding receivables;

-- The current available credit enhancement to the rated notes to
cover the expected losses at their respective rating levels; and

-- The current economic environment and an assessment of
sustainable performance, as a result of the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) pandemic.

The transaction is a cash flow securitization collateralized by a
portfolio of bank loans originated and serviced by CaixaBank, S.A.
(CaixaBank) to self-employed individuals and small and medium-size
enterprises (SMEs) based in Spain. The transaction closed in
November 2016.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

The portfolio is performing within DBRS Morningstar's expectations.
As of 31 December 2021, the 90+-day delinquency ratio was 2.3%, up
from 2.1% in March 2021 at the time of the last annual review on
this transaction. The cumulative default ratio was 1.5% in December
2021, slightly up from 1.4% in March 2021.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS AND KEY DRIVERS

DBRS Morningstar conducted a loan-by-loan analysis of the remaining
pool of receivables and updated its default rate and recovery
assumptions on the outstanding portfolio to 34.2% and 36.2%,
respectively, at the AA (sf) rating level, and to 14.5% and 42.9%,
respectively, at the B (sf) rating level. DBRS Morningstar updated
its base case PD to 1.8%, including coronavirus-related adjustments
and based on the updated portfolio composition.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

The credit enhancements available to the rated notes have continued
to increase as the transaction deleverages. As of the January 2022
payment date, the credit enhancements available to the Series A
Notes and Series B Notes were 76.5% and 14.9%, respectively (up
from 61.5% and 12.0%, respectively, as of the April 2021 payment
date at the time of the last rating action on this transaction).
Credit enhancement is provided by subordination of the Series B
Notes and a reserve fund. The reserve fund is available to cover
senior expenses as well as missed interest and principal payments
on the Series A Notes and also on the Series B Notes once the
Series A Notes have paid in full.

CaixaBank acts as the account bank for the transaction. Based on
the account bank reference rating of A (high) on CaixaBank (one
notch below its DBRS Morningstar Long Term Critical Obligations
Rating of AA (low)), the downgrade provisions outlined in the
transaction documents, and other mitigating factors inherent in the
transaction structure, DBRS Morningstar considers the risk arising
from the exposure to the account bank to be consistent with the
rating assigned to the Series A Notes, as described in DBRS
Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

DBRS Morningstar analyzed the transaction structure in its
proprietary Excel-based cash flow engine.

The Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the resulting isolation
measures have caused an immediate economic contraction, leading in
some cases to increases in unemployment rates and income reductions
for many borrowers. DBRS Morningstar anticipates that delinquencies
may continue to increase in the coming months for many SME
transactions. The ratings are based on additional analysis to
expected performance as a result of the global efforts to contain
the spread of the coronavirus.

For this transaction, DBRS Morningstar increased the expected
default rate on receivables granted to obligors operating in
certain industries based on their perceived exposure to the adverse
disruptions of the coronavirus. As per DBRS Morningstar’s
assessment, 22.4% of the outstanding portfolio balance represented
industries classified in the high-risk economic sectors. This led
the underlying one-year PDs to be multiplied by 1.5 times. DBRS
Morningstar also conducted an additional sensitivity analysis to
determine that the transaction benefits from sufficient liquidity
support to withstand high levels of payment holidays in the
portfolio. As of 31 December 2021, EUR 42,418.9 was reported as
currently benefitting from coronavirus-related moratoriums.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


NH HOTEL: Fitch Raises LongTerm IDR to 'B', Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded NH Hotel Group S.A.'s (NHH) Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B' from 'B-'. Its senior secured
rating has been upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+', while the Recovery
Rating remains at 'RR2'. The Outlook on the IDR is Stable. Fitch
also removed the ratings of NHH from Under Criteria Observation
(UCO).

The upgrade reflects Fitch's revised approach to Fitch's
Parent-Subsidiary Linkage (PSL) Criteria application that now
considers the consolidated credit profile plus one notch as the
rating cap. This is largely due to Fitch's assessment of porous
legal ring-fencing of NHH's debt despite open access and control.
NHH's Standalone Credit Profile (SCP) remains unchanged at 'b'.

The rating reflects NHH's continuing business recovery, which
however is expected to be slightly slower than the EMEA lodging
industry for 2022 and 2023, due to its urban profile. Fitch
forecasts total adjusted net debt will stabilise below 6.0x
operating EBITDAR by 2024.

The Stable Outlook reflects the expected improvement and higher
predictability of global travel as it gradually recovers from the
pandemic, as well as improved liquidity, supported by debt
refinancing and asset disposals in 2021.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Revised Parent-Subsidiary Linkage: Using Fitch's updated PSL
Criteria, Fitch constrains NHH's IDR at one notch above the
consolidated profile of Minor International (MINT), the major
shareholder of NHH. Fitch views legal ring-fencing as porous, based
on retained terms in new financing documentation that limit access
of its controlling shareholder to NHH's cash flows. This, together
with full control by and the ability of MINT to potentially change
the board underlining Fitch's open access and control assessment,
results in NHH's 'B' rating.

Gradual Revenue Recovery: Fitch forecasts that 2022 will see a
strong recovery primarily in the leisure segment, and a slower
rebound in the urban segment as B2B revenue will take longer to
normalise. European hotels will continue to primarily rely on
intra-European travel, with visitors from China taking longer to
return. Fitch expects NHH's revenue per available room (RevPAR) to
recover in 2022 to only 70% of 2019 levels, reaching 90% in 2023
and 94% in 2024. Average daily rates (ADRs) should on average
exceed pre-pandemic levels in 2022, while occupancies will still be
5pp-10pp below 2019 levels in 2024-2025.

Asset Sale-Leaseback Completed: Sale and leaseback of a hotel in
Barcelona was completed in 2021 for EUR125 million. This, together
with proceeds from a subordinated loan that was later capitalised,
strengthened NHH's liquidity in 2021. Further, a shift towards a
more asset-light business model should provide NHH with higher
capex flexibility, while retaining some high-quality owned assets
provides an additional source of financial flexibility.

Higher Leases Affect Deleveraging: Fitch expects NHH's focus on
asset-light network growth and the sale-leaseback transaction to
increase the amount of lease payments EUR385 million-EUR390 million
in 2022 -2023 from around EUR354 million in 2019, despite higher
flexibility on lease contracts. This will materially affect
lease-adjusted leverage metrics. At the same time, recovery of both
RevPAR and profitability should support deleveraging to 6.0x
adjusted net debt/EBITDAR basis by end-2023.

Actions Protecting Cost Base: NHH has demonstrated one of the
highest absorption rates among peers during the pandemic and
continued to deploy efficient measures to further reduce staff and
lease costs. Fitch forecasts that part of its cost-optimisation
measures will support profitability post-pandemic, and lift EBITDAR
margin to 36%-37% over 2022-2025, from 20% at end-2021. This is
broadly in line with pre-pandemic levels, and strong for the
rating.

Free Cash Flow to Improve: Fitch expects NHH to generate low
single-digit free cash flow (FCF) margins from 2022, primarily due
to recovered profitability and moderate capex intensity. Fitch
assumes that forecast excess available cash would be used for
deleveraging. Fitch's forecast considers moderate capex intensity
in mid-single digits and dividends below EUR30 million in 2024,
with no cash distributions to MINT in 2022 and 2023.
Higher-than-anticipated capex or dividends resulting in more
permanent neutral-to-negative FCF, and leverage remaining above
6.0x beyond 2023 would be evidence of a weaker credit profile.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

NHH is one of the 10 largest European hotel chains. It is
significantly smaller than global peers such as Accor SA
(BB+/Stable) or Meliá Hotels International by breadth of
activities and number of rooms. NHH focuses on urban cities and
business travellers, while Accor and Meliá are more diversified
across leisure and business customers. NHH is comparable with
Radisson Hospitality AB in urban positioning, although Radisson is
present in a greater number of cities.

NHH had an EBITDA margin of more than 17% in pre-pandemic 2019,
which is above that of close competitor Radisson but still far from
that of asset-light operators such as Accor or Marriott
International, Inc. NHH has been more severely affected by the
pandemic, due to an asset-heavy structure and the urban
positioning, similarly to Alpha Group (CCC).

NHH's pre-pandemic FFO lease-adjusted net leverage of 5.0x
(adjusted for variable leases) at end-2019 was higher than peers'
due to its large exposure to leases. NHH remains an asset-heavy
hotel group, although its use of management contracts was around
13% of its hotel portfolio as of end-December 2021. Despite the
financial flexibility of NHH allowing some asset-rotation
strategies as demonstrated in 2021 and easing the cost base in a
disruptive environment such as the pandemic (proven by its adequate
absorption rate), it will remain highly leveraged versus
asset-heavy peers such as Whitbread PLC (BBB-/Stable).

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Fitch's Rating Case for the Issuer

-- Progressive revenue recovery but still 30% behind 2019 levels
    in 2022, driven by impaired RevPAR across all regions;

-- Positive EBITDA in 2022 as a result of limited occupancy.
    EBITDA margin to recover towards 15% by end-2025;

-- Around EUR350 million of aggregate capex for 2022-2025 to
    cover maintenance capex, additional repositioning within the
    portfolio, development of the current signed pipeline and some

    additional limited expansion;

-- EUR20 million of disposals in 2022;

-- Dividend distribution in line with legal restrictions and
    historical policy from 2024.

Recovery Assumptions:

NHH's 'RR2' Recovery Rating reflects the collateral available to
the EUR400 million secured notes and a EUR242 million revolving
credit facility (RCF), which rank equally with each other.
Collateral includes Dutch hotels as properties managed by NH group
operators, a share pledge on a Dutch hotel, share pledges on
Belgian companies owning hotels managed by NH group operator
companies and finally a share pledge on NH Italy as a single legal
entity operating and owning the whole Italian group. This includes
both assets and operating contracts. The described collateral had a
market value of EUR1,319 million at end-May 2021 as evaluated by a
third-party appraiser.

The expected distribution of recovery proceeds results in potential
full recovery for senior secured creditors, including for senior
secured bonds even after a conservative haircut of 45% to the
collateral valuation.

However, the Recovery Rating is constrained by Fitch's
country-specific treatment of Recovery Ratings for Spain, which
effectively caps the uplift from the IDR at two notches at
'BB-'/'RR2'. The waterfall generated recovery computation (WGRC)
output percentage based on current metrics and assumptions remains
capped at 90%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Stronger consolidated profile of MINT or transition to
    insulated legal ring-fencing leading to revision of PSL
    assessment that implies a potential widening in notching from
    the consolidated profile;

-- Total adjusted net debt/operating EBITDAR below 5.5x on a
    sustained basis and/or FFO lease-adjusted net leverage below
    5.5x;

-- EBITDAR/(gross interest + rent) sustainably above 1.5x;

-- Continued improvement in the operating profile via EBIT margin

    and RevPAR uplift;

-- Sustained positive FCF.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Total adjusted net debt/operating EBITDAR above 6.0x and/or
    FFO lease-adjusted net leverage above 6.0x, for example due to

    protracted market recovery, or shareholder's initiatives such
    as increased dividend payments;

-- EBITDAR/(gross interest +rent) below 1.3x;

-- Weakening trading performance leading to EBIT margin
    (excluding capital gains) trending toward 5% in 2022 and
    thereafter;

-- Negative FCF;

-- Deterioration in the consolidated profile of MINT while
    maintaining Fitch's view of open access and control and porous

    legal ring-fencing. Further negative action may result from a
    reassessment of legal ring-fencing to open.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Satisfactory Liquidity, Lower Refinancing Risk: NHH's EUR242
million undrawn RCF, EUR25 million of available bilateral credit
lines and strong EUR209 million (as defined by Fitch) available
cash balance as of December 2021 provide a healthy liquidity
buffer. Liquidity was supported by shareholder contributions and
asset disposals in 2021, which Fitch expects to be further enhanced
by positive FCF throughout Fitch's forecast period to 2025. NHH's
ownership of unencumbered assets provides additional financial
flexibility in case of need.

ISSUER PROFILE

NHH operates as an urban hotel with a diversified portfolio in the
upscale segment. The hotel portfolio comprises 353 hotels with
55,000 rooms in 30 countries in 2021, including leased/owned hotels
(representing roughly 86% of all rooms) and managed hotels.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.




=============
U K R A I N E
=============

[*] Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LongTerm IDRs on 4 Ukrainian Cities
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Ukrainian cities of Kryvyi Rih,
Mariupol, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia's Long-Term Foreign- and
Local-Currency IDRs at 'CCC'. Ratings at this level typically do
not carry Outlooks due to their high volatility.

The ratings are unchanged but their drivers have changed since
Fitch's last review. The ratings were formerly the result of
Standalone Credit Profiles (SCPs; at b or b+) equal or higher than
and capped by the sovereign rating at 'CCC'. Local governments
(LGs) remain institutionally strongly linked to the Ukrainian
sovereign, which is severely affected by the Russian-Ukrainian war.
However, this rating action reflects Fitch's revision of the
issuers' standalone situations, notably as the war is weighing on
their debt sustainability assessments, which in Fitch's opinion has
worsened and is no longer commensurate with 'a'-'aa' debt
sustainability (DS) scores.

The LGs' overall performance has been negatively affected by the
war-related large negative shock to the national economy and the
damage to critical infrastructure. The risk of insufficient
liquidity to service the LGs' adjusted debt is elevated. In
addition, there is uncertainty about the pace of a future economic
recovery, capital market access and the cost of debt after the war
ends.

Rating Actions

                            Rating               Prior
                            ------               -----
Zaporizhzhia City   LT IDR    CCC      Affirmed    CCC
                    ST IDR    C        Affirmed    C
                    LC LT IDR CCC      Affirmed    CCC

Kryvyi Rih City     LT IDR    CCC      Affirmed    CCC
                    ST IDR    C        Affirmed    C
                    LC LT IDR CCC      Affirmed    CCC
                    Natl LT   A+(ukr)  Affirmed    A+(ukr)

Mykolaiv, City of   LT IDR    CCC      Affirmed    CCC
                    LC LT IDR CCC      Affirmed    CCC

Mariupol City       LT IDR    CCC      Affirmed    CCC
                    ST IDR    C        Affirmed    C
                    LC LT IDR CCC      Affirmed    CCC
                    Natl LT   AA-(ukr) Affirmed    AA-(ukr)

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Risk Profile: 'Vulnerable'

Fitch has not changed the assessment of the LGs' risk profiles,
which remain 'Vulnerable' and is based on 'Weaker' attributes on
the six key risk factors. The 'Weaker' assessment of the risk
factors is the lowest possible under Fitch's International Local
and Regional Governments Rating Criteria and reflects the
interference and strong interdependence of the LGs on the Ukrainian
sovereign.

The assessment reflects Fitch's view of a very high risk relative
to international peers that the issuers' ability to cover debt
service with the operating balance may weaken unexpectedly over the
scenario horizon (2021-2025) notably due to lower revenue and
higher expenditure.

Ukraine government and its institutions (central government, tax
collection, social transfers, banking system) are still largely
intact. However, the damage of critical municipal and social
infrastructure - housing, schools and kindergartens, hospitals,
roads, municipal building and work establishments - and the
displacement of a large number of LGs' citizens to other places in
Ukraine or abroad, significantly restrict the LGs revenues, which
cannot be made up by transfers from the state budget.

Fitch assumes spending pressure will increase strongly with raising
inflation, broken supply chains driving prices for goods and
services high and large reconstruction efforts. Additionally,
government-related entities (GREs) performing municipal services
(transportation, heating, solid waste, water and sewage) are
largely not self-supporting, and will increasingly rely on
subsidies, capital injections and direct debt repayments made by
the cities, which will only add to their own difficulties.

In Fitch's view, issuers are facing increasing and material
refinancing risk for their debt as they are exposed to greater
uncertainty for market access, cost of debt and FX exchange rates.
This is despite the fact that the National Bank of Ukraine has
suggested implementing holidays on loan payments until martial law
ends (recently prolonged by 30 days until 25 May) and some LGs have
approached lenders to waive the debt service. Ukrainian cities' and
their GREs' funding comes from capital markets, local commercial
banks, and institutional lenders, is of short to medium term and
often in FX (US dollars or euros). Fitch focuses on Fitch-adjusted
debt, as it reclassifies contingent debt of not self-supporting
GREs.

DS: 'b' Category

While LGs' most recently available data may not have indicated
instant performance impairment, material changes in revenue and
expenditure profiles are likely to worsen in the short term as
economic activity suffers due to the war. As a result, Fitch
expects issuers to start to report negative operating balances and
increased budgetary deficits that need to be debt financed as
accumulated cash reserves will be depleted in the near term.
Despite some central government protection for Ukrainian borrowers
and the high willingness of local banks and IFIs to waive principal
and interest payments, the timely servicing of debt service will be
at risk in the near term. Consequently, Fitch viewd the debt ratios
as having deteriorated to a 'b' DS score.

Given these factors (the war weighing on both the qualitative risk
profile and the quantitative debt sustainability), Fitch has
revised the cities' SCPs down to 'ccc' from 'b' (Kryvyi Rih and
Zaporizhzhia) and from 'b+' (Mariupol and Mykolaiv). This indicates
that a default is a real possibility and that the issuers typically
have exposure to significant refinancing needs and high liquidity
risk accompanied by weak debt coverage metrics.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Ukrainian LGs' SCPs are assessed at 'ccc', reflecting a combination
of a 'Vulnerable' risk profile and debt sustainability metrics
assessed in the 'b' category under Fitch's rating case scenario.
Other factors beyond SCP (support, cap, floor) do not affect the
ratings, leading to the LG's IDRs being equal to their SCPs, at
'CCC'. The 'CCC' IDRs reflect a real possibility of default.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Qualitative and quantitative assumptions:

Risk Profile: Vulnerable

Revenue Robustness: Weaker

Revenue Adjustability Weaker

Expenditure Sustainability: Weaker

Expenditure Adjustability: Weaker

Liabilities and Liquidity Robustness: Weaker

Liabilities and Liquidity Flexibility: Weaker

Debt sustainability: 'b' category

Budget Loans or Ad-Hoc Support: n/a

Asymmetric Risk: n/a

Rating Cap or Rating Floor: n/a

Quantitative assumptions - issuer specific

Fitch's rating case scenario is a "through-the-cycle" scenario,
which incorporates a combination of revenue, cost and financial
risk stresses. It is based on the 2016-2020 figures and 2021-2025
projected ratios. The key assumptions for the scenario include:

-- A two-digit decrease in operating revenue as long as the war
    lasts;

-- A two-digit increase in operating spending as long as the war
    lasts, including increasing transfers to the GREs made for the

    purpose of financing their operations and debt servicing;

-- A two-digit increase and strongly negative net capital balance

    in 2021-2025 due to reconstruction needs;

-- limitations to the market debt: lowered accessibility of long-
    term debt, higher debt costs, increased FX exchange rates.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Positive rating action could result from upward reassessment
    of the SCPs to 'b-' on a sustained basis in Fitch's rating
    case scenario, due to the resumption and stabilisation of
    operating balances and of the direct and indirect debt level
    at levels adequate to the cities' budget sizes; and

-- Upgrade of Ukraine's sovereign ratings, which is very unlikely

    as long as the war lasts.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Further downward reassessment of the SCP, resulting from
    persistent liquidity stress, heightened default probability or

    default-like processes in place;

-- Downgrade of Ukraine's sovereign ratings.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance
and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

ISSUER PROFILE

Kryvyi Rih is in the Dnipropetrovsk Region and has a population of
about 620,000. Iron-ore mining and processing industry dominates
the city's economy.

Mariupol is on the Sea of Azov, in the Donetsk Region and has
population of about 460,000. The city's economy is dominated by
metallurgy and machine building.

Mykolaiv is the capital of the Mykolaiv region and has a population
of about 480,000. The city operates three sea ports and its economy
is related to manufacturing and services.

Zaporizhzhia, the capital of the Zaporizhzhia Region, has
population of about 730,000. The city's economy is industrialised
with developed machine building and metallurgy.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Kryvyi Rih has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Political
Stability and Rights due to its exposure to impact of political
pressure or to instability of operations and tendency towards
unpredictable policy shifts, which has a negative impact on the
credit profile, and is relevant to the rating[s] in conjunction
with other factors.

Mariupol has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Political Stability
and Rights due to its exposure to impact of political pressure or
to instability of operations and tendency towards unpredictable
policy shifts, which has a negative impact on the credit profile,
and is relevant to the rating[s] in conjunction with other
factors.

Mykolaiv has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Political Stability
and Rights due to its exposure to impact of political pressure or
to instability of operations and tendency towards unpredictable
policy shifts, which has a negative impact on the credit profile,
and is relevant to the rating[s] in conjunction with other
factors.

Zaporizhzhia has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Political
Stability and Rights due to its exposure to impact of political
pressure or to instability of operations and tendency towards
unpredictable policy shifts, which has a negative impact on the
credit profile, and is relevant to the rating[s] in conjunction
with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the
entities, either due to their nature or the way in which they are
being managed by the entities.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

AMIGO LOANS: High Court Accepts Proposed New Business Scheme
------------------------------------------------------------
Siddharth Venkataramakrishnan at The Financial Times reports that a
High Court judge has accepted Amigo Loans' proposed new business
scheme in a crucial step towards the company resuming lending.

The announcement on May 23 marks a turnround for the subprime
lender, although it still has to raise new capital and receive
permission from the Financial Conduct Authority, the FT notes.

Amigo, which offers loans on the basis of a guarantee from another
person, stopped lending in November 2020, citing uncertainty caused
by the pandemic, the FT recounts.  It has been unable to resume
business since because of a dispute over compensation for historic
mis-selling, the FT discloses.

The company has faced complaints from consumers who accused it of
failing to check whether their loans were affordable, the FT
notes.

A previous "scheme of arrangement" proposed by Amigo that would
have limited compensation payouts to a greater extent was rejected
by the FCA, which said that it unfairly benefited shareholders over
customers, the FT states.

The new scheme offers more compensation, partly because of better
than expected loan repayments during 2021, according to the FT.

Under the new scheme, Amigo will pay compensation of at least
GBP112 million provided that it can restart lending within 9 months
of the scheme being approved and that it can complete a rights
issue within 12 months of approval, the FT discloses.


LIBERTY STEEL: Court Overturns Decision to Liquidate Liege Unit
---------------------------------------------------------------
Cynthia O'Murchu and Sylvia Pfeifer at The Financial Times report
that a Belgian court has overturned a decision to liquidate
under-fire metal tycoon Sanjeev Gupta's operations in the country,
paving the way for the plants to restart production.

According to the FT, Gupta's Belgian company Liberty Liege
Dudelange on May 19 successfully appealed an April court order
which called for the company to be liquidated after a judge
rejected a restructuring plan for its Belgian assets.

The decision was overturned after Gupta's Romanian steel subsidiary
Liberty Galati provided financial support for its Belgian
counterpart in the form of a debt-to-equity swap worth EUR52.5
million as well as EUR3 million in cash, according to court
records, the FT discloses.

This resulted in raising the company's net assets to EUR81,946,
which places it above the mandatory threshold of EUR61,500
necessary to be compliant with the Belgian companies and
associations code, the FT states.

Liberty Liege Dudelange also filed its overdue accounts, a further
requirement from the court to grant the appeal, the FT notes.

The decision provides temporary relief to Gupta's GFG Alliance
group, which is facing court battles in several jurisdictions, and
has been attempting to refinance its businesses since the collapse
of the group's major lender Greensill Capital in March last year
amid allegations of fraud, the FT states.

The UK's Serious Fraud Office and French police are investigating
GFG Alliance companies over suspected fraud and money laundering,
the FT relays.

GFG bought two sites in Belgium, at Flemalle and Tilleur --
employing about 650 people -- near Liege from ArcelorMittal in
2018.  A reorganisation plan for the operations drafted after
Greensill's collapse originally provided for Liberty Galati to
offer financial support to Liberty Liege by December last year, the
FT recounts.

Gupta's Liberty Steel Group told the court that it had already
provided new funding "through a series of intragroup debt-to-equity
conversions" as well as new cash equity into the Liege plants,
which would allow it to restart operations, according to the FT.

Toker Ozcan, who was recently appointed as chief executive of
Greensteel EMEA for Liberty Steel, said on May 19 that the company
welcomed the court's decision and would restart production at the
mill as soon as possible, the FT relates.

Liberty Galati in 2020 reported a loss of EUR10.6 million while
Liberty Liege filed annual accounts to June 2021, which show
EUR77.5 million in losses before tax, according to the FT.


MONEYTHING: Administrator Looks at Costs of Operating Platform
--------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Lloyd at Peer2Peer Finance News reports that an additional
administrator has been working on the MoneyThing administration,
looking at the costs of operating the platform while it is formally
wound down.

Both MoneyThing Capital, the peer-to-peer lending platform, and
MoneyThing (Security Trustee), which acted as the platform's
security trustee on behalf of the P2P investors, entered into
administration in December 2020 after the platform revealed it was
unable to defend itself against future ligation from a borrower,
Peer2Peer Finance News relates.

Tom Straw and Milan Vuceljic of Moorfields Advisory were appointed
as joint administrators, Peer2Peer Finance News discloses.

James Money, joint administrator at Rollings Butt, was appointed as
joint administrator of MoneyThing (Security Trustee) in March,
Peer2Peer Finance News recounts.

His role is to look at the charges set by MoneyThing Capital to
cover the costs of operating the platform while the company is in
administration, including administration fees, Peer2Peer Finance
News notes.

Mr. Money, as cited by Peer2Peer Finance News, said he has had
discussions with the MoneyThing Capital administrators and "helpful
input" from some MoneyThing lenders.

In October last year, a spokesperson from Moorfields Advisory said
MoneyThing's administration had been extended until December 20,
2022, Peer2Peer Finance News relays.

In August, the MoneyThing joint administrators said that so far the
administration fees had totalled GBP300,000 more than previously
expected, Peer2Peer Finance News notes.


NEWDAY FUNDING 2022-1: DBRS Gives Prov. B(high) Rating on F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned provisional ratings to the notes (the
Notes) to be issued by NewDay Funding Master Issuer plc (the
Issuer):

-- Series 2022-1, Class A1 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Series 2022-1, Class A2 Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Series 2022-1, Class B Notes at AA (sf)
-- Series 2022-1, Class C Notes at A (low) (sf)
-- Series 2022-1, Class D Notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Series 2022-1, Class E Notes at BB (low) (sf)
-- Series 2022-1, Class F Notes at B (high) (sf)

The provisional ratings are based on information provided to DBRS
Morningstar by the Issuer and its agents as of the date of this
press release. The ratings can be finalized upon review of final
information, data, legal opinions, and the governing transaction
documents. To the extent that the information or the documents
provided to DBRS Morningstar as of this date differ from the final
information, DBRS Morningstar may assign different final ratings to
the Notes.

The ratings address the timely payment of scheduled interest and
the ultimate repayment of principal by the relevant legal final
maturity dates.

The Notes are backed by a portfolio of own-branded credit cards
granted by NewDay Cards, the originator, to individuals domiciled
in the UK.

The ratings are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- The transaction's capital structure, including form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement to support DBRS
Morningstar's revised expectation of charge-off, principal payment,
and yield rates under various stress scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash flow
assumptions and repay the Notes.

-- The originator's capabilities with respect to origination,
underwriting, and servicing.

-- An operational risk review of the originator, which DBRS
Morningstar deems to be an acceptable servicer.

-- The transaction parties' financial strength regarding their
respective roles.

-- The credit quality, diversification of the collateral, and
historical and projected performance of the securitized portfolio.

-- DBRS Morningstar's sovereign rating on the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland at AA (high) with a Stable
trend.

-- The consistency of the transaction's legal structure with DBRS
Morningstar's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

TRANSACTION STRUCTURE

The Notes are to be issued out of NewDay Funding Master Issuer plc
as part of the NewDay Funding-related master issuance structure,
where all series of notes are supported by the same pool of
receivables and generally issued under the same requirements
regarding servicing, amortization events, priority of
distributions, and eligible investments.

The transaction includes a scheduled revolving period. During this
period, additional receivables may be purchased and transferred to
the securitized pool, provided that the eligibility criteria set
out in the transaction documents are satisfied. The revolving
period may end earlier than scheduled if certain events occur, such
as the breach of performance triggers or servicer termination. The
scheduled revolving period may be extended by the servicer by up to
12 months. If the Notes are not fully redeemed at the end of the
respective scheduled revolving periods, the transaction enters into
a rapid amortization.

As the Class A2 notes are denominated in U.S. dollars (USD), there
is a balance-guaranteed, cross-currency swap to hedge the currency
risk between the British pound sterling (GBP)-denominated
receivables and the USD-denominated Class A2 notes. For the
GBP-denominated classes of the Notes, which carry floating-rate
coupons based on the rate of daily compounded Sterling Overnight
Index Average (Sonia), the interest rate mismatch risk arising from
the fixed-rate collateral is mitigated by the excess spread in the
transaction and is considered in DBRS Morningstar's cash flow
analysis.

The transaction includes a series-specific liquidity reserve that
is available to cover the shortfalls in senior expenses, swap costs
if applicable, and interest due on the Class A1, Class A2, Class B,
Class C, and Class D notes and would amortize down to a floor of
GBP 250,000.

COUNTERPARTIES

HSBC Bank plc is the account bank and swap collateral account bank
for the transactions. Based on DBRS Morningstar's private rating on
HSBC Bank and the downgrade provisions outlined in the transaction
documents, DBRS Morningstar considers the risk arising from the
exposure to the account bank and swap collateral account bank to be
commensurate with the ratings assigned.

ING Bank N.V. is the swap counterparty for the Class A2 swap. DBRS
Morningstar has a Long-Term Issuer Rating of AA (low) with a Stable
trend on ING Bank N.V., which meets DBRS Morningstar's criteria to
act in such capacity. The swap documentation also contains
downgrade provisions consistent with DBRS Morningstar's criteria.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS

The most recent March 2022 servicer report of the securitized
portfolio shows a total payment rate of 13.9%, including the
interest collections. The most recent payment rates are above
historical levels but it remains to be seen if they are sustainable
in the current challenging environment of further Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) variants, uneven economic recovery, persistent
inflationary pressures, and interest rate increases. After removing
the interest collections, the estimated monthly principal payment
rates (MPPRs) of the securitized portfolio have been stable above
8%. Based on the analysis of historical data, DBRS Morningstar
maintained the expected MPPR at 8%.

The portfolio yield was largely stable over the reported period
until March 2020. The most recent performance in February 2022
showed a total yield of 30.2%, which increased from the record low
of 25.0% in May 2020 because of higher delinquencies and the
forbearance measures (i.e., payment holidays and payment freeze)
offered. Based on the observed trend, DBRS Morningstar maintained
the expected yield at 24.5%.

The reported historical charge-off rates was high but stable at
approximately 16% until June 2020. The most recent performance in
February 2022 showed a charge-off rate of 9.3% after reaching a
record high of 17.1% in April 2020. Based on the analysis of
historical data, DBRS Morningstar maintained the expected
charge-off rate at 18%.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.


WHIRLI: Enters Administration, 10,500 Customers Affected
--------------------------------------------------------
Emily White at MoneySavingExpert reports that children's toy
subscription service Whirli has gone into administration.

According to MoneySavingExpert, the collapse affects around 10,500
customers.

Whirli, a start-up that formed in 2018, sold monthly, bi-annual and
annual subscription packages that gave customers tokens to borrow
toys and swap them for others on return, with the option to keep a
toy forever after eight months, MoneySavingExpert relates.

Geoff Rowley and Ian Corfield of business advisory firm FRP
Advisory were appointed administrators for Whirli on May 11,
MoneySavingExpert discloses.  They say the company went under due
to a lack of funding, MoneySavingExpert notes.

All Whirli subscriptions have been cancelled by the administrators,
MoneySavingExpert states.

Monthly users who paid by direct debit should also have seen these
automatically cancelled when the administrators took over,
according to MoneySavingExpert.

FRP Advisory says it is encouraging all customers, those who paid
for bi-annual or annual subscriptions as well as those who paid
monthly, to get in touch and register as a creditor,
MoneySavingExpert relates.

Whether refunds can be paid depends on how much cash is left once
the administrators have paid everyone Whirli owed money to -- and
consumers usually come bottom of this list, MoneySavingExpert
says.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2022.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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