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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Friday, March 25, 2022, Vol. 23, No. 55

                           Headlines



C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

NET4GAS SRO: Moody's Assigns Ba2 CFR, Under Review for Downgrade


F R A N C E

PAPREC HOLDING: S&P Upgrades ICR to 'BB-', Outlook Stable


H U N G A R Y

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: Fitch Cuts IDR to 'BB-', On Watch Neg.


I R E L A N D

PENTA CLO 3: Fitch Gives Final B- Rating to Class F-R Notes
PENTA CLO 3: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to EUR12.4MM Cl. F-R Notes


I T A L Y

TELECOM ITALIA: S&P Downgrades LT Rating to 'BB-', Outlook Negative


R U S S I A

SEVERSTAL: May Default on Debt After Citi Blocks Interest Payment
[*] RUSSIA: JPMorgan Processes Payment on 2029 Sovereign Bond


S L O V A K I A

EUSTREAM AS: Moody's Assigns Ba1 CFR & Cuts Unsecured Notes to Ba1


S L O V E N I A

GORENJSKA BANKA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDR, Outlook Stable


S P A I N

FTA UCI 17: S&P Affirms 'CCC+ (sf)' Class B Notes Rating


S W E D E N

STORSKOGEN GROUP: S&P Assigns 'BB+' ICR, Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BULB: Bailout to Cost Taxpayers Additional GBP500 Million
HOLLAND & BARRETT: Struggles to Make Scheduled Interest Payment
MCCOLL'S: Chief Executive Steps Down Amid Rescue Talks
SAFE HANDS: Enters Administration, Can't Issue Immediate Refunds
WELCOME TO YORKSHIRE: Receives Numerous Expressions of Interest



X X X X X X X X

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in Cyberspace
[*] EUROPE: EU Firms Hit by Russian Sanctions Can Get State Support

                           - - - - -


===========================
C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================

NET4GAS SRO: Moody's Assigns Ba2 CFR, Under Review for Downgrade
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba2 Corporate Family
Rating and a Ba2-PD probability of default rating to NET4GAS,
s.r.o. (N4G) and has downgraded the company's senior unsecured debt
ratings to Ba2 from Baa2. All of N4G's ratings are on review for
downgrade. Concurrently, Moody's has withdrawn the Baa2 long-term
issuer ratings, as per the rating agency's practice for corporates
transitioning to speculative grade. The outlook remains ratings
under review.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of N4G's ratings reflects the company's exposure to
the risk of negative credit implications from the severe sanctions
imposed on the Government of Russia (Ca negative) and certain
Russian financial institutions by Western countries which could
disrupt the receipt of payments owed to N4G from its main
counterparty. While the European Union (EU, Aaa stable) sanctions
that have been put in place since the invasion of Ukraine (Caa2
review for downgrade) by Russia exclude energy-related payments and
are not directly imposed on the major Russian gas shipper, Moody's
considers the risk that additional EU sanctions and/or
countermeasures by Russia may stop the ability of the major Russian
gas shipper to make payments under its contractual obligations to
N4G is substantially higher than previously, given the volatile
geopolitical situation.

N4G, the owner and operator of the gas transmission system in the
Czech Republic (Aa3 stable), is generating around 75% of its
revenues from transporting gas that is primarily sourced from
Russia to Western and Southern Europe under long-term gas transit
contracts. The Russian company Gazprom Export LLC, a 100%
subsidiary of Gazprom, PJSC (Caa2 negative), has the monopoly on
pipeline gas exports from Russia. N4G's transit contracts are
largely on a ship-or-pay basis, meaning that the company receives
most income from capacity payments and independent of actual gas
flows. The contracts are primarily with the major Russian gas
shipper.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which started on February 24, 2022,
has led to sovereign rating actions, and subsequently downgrades of
Russian non-financial corporates, including the Russian gas shipper
on March 10. The weakening of the credit profile of the major
Russian gas shipper reflects Moody's view of a significantly
increased risk of default which may include trade-related
obligations.

Nevertheless, gas flows from Russia have continued uninterrupted
and the Russian shipper has honoured its contractual payment
obligations to N4G. Given that N4G's gas transportation network is
located centrally in Europe, Moody's expects that in case of a
cessation of gas flows from Russia or a disruption of capacity
payments by the Russian shipper, or both, the company could replace
part but not all of the business with the Russian shipper with
alternative bookings, but these may not fully compensate the
revenues coming from the major Russian gas shipper.

As a result of the elevated risk that revenues may reduce
materially, N4G is exposed to the risk of markedly weaker financial
leverage metrics. However, Moody's acknowledges the owners'
commitment to suspend dividends and to evaluate further support
measures, if required, as stated in a company press release on
March 17 [1].

While an immediate stop of gas imports from Russia into Europe is
currently not Moody's baseline scenario, the evolution of the
current geopolitical situation is highly uncertain and could have
materially adverse implications for the gas trade between Russia
and the EU, hence the ratings remain on review for downgrade.

The review will focus on (1) the evolution of the geopolitical
situation, including decisions, if any, around further of sanctions
and their impact on N4G's cash flow, liquidity and business risk
profile; (2) the evolution of the EU's energy policy, in particular
its plans for reducing energy dependence on Russia; as well as (3)
any credit enhancing measures that may become available from
shareholders to support the company's credit profile, if required.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Given the review for downgrade, an upgrade of N4G's ratings would
require greater visibility on the continued receipt of capacity
payments from the Russian shipper into the medium term, or its
replacement with bookings from alternative shippers with a solid
credit profile; or tangible external credit support; or a
combination of these. The ratings could be confirmed if N4G
continues to receive due capacity payments under the long-term
transit contracts and there was greater visibility as to their
continuation than currently; or if the company obtains adequate
support from its owners or other stakeholders to offset any further
deterioration of its credit profile.

N4G's ratings could be downgraded if capacity payments to the
company were, or were expected to be, discontinued or materially
delayed, for example due to sanctions, resulting in material
pressure on its liquidity and financial profile, without adequate
replacement through new bookings or external credit support.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Natural Gas
Pipelines published in July 2018.

NET4GAS, s.r.o. is the owner and operator of the Czech gas
transmission system. N4G is ultimately 50% owned by Allianz
Infrastructure Czech Holdco II S.a r.l., part of the wider Allianz
group and 50% by Borealis Novus Parent B.V., a subsidiary of OMERS
Administration Corporation. The company's core business consists of
transporting gas, primarily sourced from Russia, towards Western
and Southern Europe under long-term contracts. It is also the
regulated domestic gas transmission network operator under an
unlimited licence. In 2020, N4G reported revenues of CZK10,029
million and EBITDA amounting to CZK8,744 million.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: NET4GAS, s.r.o

Assignments:

LT Corporate Family Rating, Assigned Ba2, Placed On Review for
Downgrade

Probability of Default Rating, Assigned Ba2-PD, Placed on Review
for Downgrade

Downgrades:

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba2 from
Baa2; Placed On Review for further Downgrade

Withdrawals:

LT Issuer Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated Baa2, previously
Placed On Review for Downgrade



===========
F R A N C E
===========

PAPREC HOLDING: S&P Upgrades ICR to 'BB-', Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its ratings on Paprec Holding, its EUR450
million notes due 2025, and EUR575 million senior secured notes due
2028 to 'BB-' from 'B+'; S&P revised the recovery rating to '3'
(about 55% recovery) from '4' (about 40% recovery).

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Paprec will continue to
perform strongly in 2022, resulting in S&P Global Ratings-adjusted
leverage remaining well below 4.5x and FFO to debt comfortably
above 15%.

S&P said, "Paprec performed significantly better than we expected
in 2021. Sales increased by 41.3% in 2021 versus 2020 to close to
EUR1.9 billion, whereas we formerly anticipated approximatively 22%
growth. First, this was due to a significant increase in recycled
raw materials prices, mainly cardboard and plastic, which Paprec
collects from clients and then resells at a market-indexed price.
The price increases reflect the strong economic recovery from
COVID-19, but also the increasing importance of sustainability. The
latter has led packaging producers to increase the share of
recycled raw materials in their products, resulting in higher
demand for Paprec's collected materials. Second, Paprec has been
able to charge municipalities and industrials a higher price for
waste treatment, on the back of increased pollution tax charges
("Taxe Generale sur les Activites Polluantes") and strong pricing
power since clients are increasingly recycling the waste they
produce. The strong topline growth resulted in better absorption of
fixed costs, leading to S&P Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA margins
averaging 19.5% in 2021, up from 17.5% in 2020, and much better
than our forecast of 16.8%.

Equity injections support Paprec's international expansion plans.
The founder and majority owner of Paprec, Jean-Luc Petithuguenin,
through his family-owned holding JLPP Entrepreneurs, injected
EUR26.7 million of new equity into Paprec during the third quarter
of 2021. In December, French businessman Mathieu Leclerc injected
an additional EUR150 million through JLPP Entrepreneurs.
Furthermore, in March 2022. Vauban Infrastructure Partners
subscribed for EUR150 million of bonds that are mandatorily
convertible into shares from March to June 2023, which S&P treats
as equity. The purpose of these capital increases is to primarily
support Paprec's international growth plans. After acquiring its
first international operations in the U.K., Poland, and Azerbaijan
(CNIMO&M and TIRU) in 2021, Paprec intends to focus on Spain in the
coming years, where it stands to gain from a market that is
gradually moving from landfill disposal to recycling, as was the
case in France at the beginning of the last decade.

S&P said, "We forecast Paprec will continue to perform very
strongly in 2022. We expect sales will increase rapidly in 2022, by
21%-23% versus 2021. The main drivers will be the full-year
consolidation of companies acquired in 2020, the ramp-up of
collection contracts won in 2021, and the continuous revision of
fees charged to clients. We also expect the market price of
recycled raw materials will remain high. We expect S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted EBITDA margins could decrease to 17.0%-17.5% due
to slightly lower raw material prices and dilutive acquisitions.
This should bring leverage down to 3.0x-3.5x and result in positive
free operating cash flow (FOCF) after capex financed by leases of
EUR70 million-EUR80 million.

"Despite low leverage, the rating is constrained by financial
policy. Paprec's credit metrics are in line with our significant
financial risk category. We understand Paprec intends to make
several small to midsize acquisitions per year in Spain while also
progressively increasing capex outside France, such as in Poland.
We understand the company has a lower leverage tolerance than in
previous years when S&P Global Ratings-adjusted basis exceeded 5x,
but that it could undertake large debt-funded acquisitions should
opportunities arise. The company's reported leverage could
therefore go up to 3.5x, which translates into S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA of 4.5x; we understand that Paprec
would intend to deleverage below 4.0x on an adjusted basis within
the subsequent 12 months. For this reason, we apply a one-notch
downward adjustment under our modifiers for the negative impact of
financial policy, since we see a risk that leverage could increase
beyond our base-case forecast.

"We consider Paprec's governance neutral to our analysis. The
company is a family-owned business with its founder Jean-Luc
Petithuguenin still directly and indirectly owning the majority of
shares (64.2%) and voting rights. The French government-owned fund
BPI France has a 19.9% stake and other financial investors own the
remainder. We see the balance of rights as equitable between the
different shareholders since the minority shareholders have veto
rights on several important strategic and financial decisions.
Moreover, despite Paprec's tolerance of high leverage in the past,
its new financial policy is more conservative and in line with what
we observe in the industry. All in all, we assess management and
governance as fair.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Paprec will
maintain adjusted leverage below 4.5x in the coming 12 months and
FFO to debt above 15%. We anticipate that the waste services
business will continue to expand following the successful
integration of bolt-on acquisitions in 2021, in a favorable
macroeconomic and regulatory context, resulting in EBITDA margins
of 17.0%-17.5% in 2022.

"We could raise the rating if we get a longer track record of
adjusted leverage comfortably below 4.0x and FFO to debt above 20%,
through the acquisition and investment cycles.

"We could take a negative rating action if Paprec's operating
performance is weaker than expected, resulting in leverage
remaining above 4.5x and FFO to debt falling below 15%, both on a
sustained basis. This could happen in case of higher capex than
expected following contract wins, economic contraction in France,
or a decrease in raw material prices, particularly for cardboard
and plastic.

"We could also lower the rating if Paprec attempted significant
debt-funded acquisitions, undertook material shareholder
distributions that significantly increased its leverage, or if its
liquidity weakened substantially."

Environmental, Social, And Governance

ESG credit indicators: To E-2, S-2, G-2; From E-2, S-2, G-3

S&P said, "Governance factors have an overall neutral impact on our
credit rating analysis of Paprec compared with moderately negative
previously. It is majority-owned by the family of current CEO and
founder Jean-Luc Petithuguenin with a fair balance of rights with
minority investors BPI France, Vauban Infrastructure Partners, and
BNP Development. Compared with previous years, we now see these
three shareholders as having a lower risk appetite, which should
lead to lower leverage than in the past and more in line with that
generally associated with family-owned companies."




=============
H U N G A R Y
=============

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: Fitch Cuts IDR to 'BB-', On Watch Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded International Investment Bank's (IIB)
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB-' from 'BBB'. The
rating remains on Rating Watch Negative (RWN). IIB's Short-Term IDR
has also been downgraded to 'B' from 'F2'.

In accordance with Fitch's policies, the issuer appealed and
provided additional information to Fitch that resulted in a rating
action that is different than the original rating committee
outcome.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Russia-Ukraine Conflict Impact: The downgrade to 'BB-'/RWN from
'BBB'/RWN reflects the negative impact of the conflict between
Russia and Ukraine on the bank's key credit metrics. Fitch has
revised IIB's solvency to 'bbb-' from 'a-', primarily to reflect
the impact of the crisis on IIB's risk profile. The severity of the
crisis affects Fitch's assessment of the bank's business profile,
which now leads to a three-notch negative adjustment to solvency
(previously two notches). The RWN reflects significant uncertainty
surrounding the future direction of the bank in the current
geopolitical context.

Downward Revision to Business Environment: Given the share of
Russia in IIB's capital (47.5% of paid in), Fitch believes that the
breakdown in the relationship between Russia and Western countries,
and the perception that the bank is closely linked with Russia,
will affect its operations and severely constrains its ability to
execute its strategy. Fitch has revised its assessment of IIB's
business environment as a result. Fitch assigns an ESG Relevance
Score of '5' for 'Governance Structure' to reflect the negative
impact of the large Russian capital ownership on the bank's
business profile.

Pressure on Asset Quality Affects Solvency: The downward revision
of IIB's solvency assessment to 'bbb-' from 'a-' primarily reflects
the negative impact of the macro financial shock in Russia on IIB's
loan performance and capitalisation. At end-2021, Russian borrowers
accounted for around 19% of IIB's loans and around 6% of its
treasury assets. The fact that 75% of loans to Russian entities are
denominated in local currency is a mitigating factor.

End of EU Expansion: In Fitch's view, the Russia-Ukraine crisis
will likely bring an end to IIB's expansion in the EU, which also
affects Fitch's assessment of IIB's solvency, primarily via its
impact on credit and concentration risk. The bank moved its
headquarters to Budapest from Moscow in 2019 and has grown lending
and funding activities in some highly rated EU countries in recent
years. The planned withdrawal of EU shareholders will limit the
number of countries where IIB operates and could increase
geographical concentration.

Uncertainty on Capital Structure: The planned, but yet to be
formalised, departure from the bank of several EU shareholders
(accounting for 32% of the bank paid in capital as of end 2021)
raises significant uncertainty about the bank's future capital
structure. Hungary, as the bank's host country and second largest
shareholder (17.4% of paid in capital as of end-2021), has not
signalled intentions to leave the bank and is currently
supportive.

Deleveraging Supports Capitalisation and Liquidity: In the current
environment, the bank's intention to shrink its balance sheet and
cease all lending operations should, all things equal, support core
capitalisation ratios as well as liquidity metrics. However,
significant uncertainty remains about IIB's future direction and
the RWN also in part reflects the uncertainty around Fitch's
baseline forecasts of these key ratios.

No Ownership Uplift: Fitch does not assign any credit uplift for
shareholders' support (assessed at 'C') for IIB. The support rating
is anchored to the sovereign rating of the bank's sole key
shareholder, Russia ('C').

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Solvency (Capitalisation): Decline in capitalisation metrics,
    which, for example, could result from larger-than-expected
    losses on the bank's assets as a result of the economic impact
    of the sanctions on Russia, which could affect Fitch's
    'excellent' capitalisation assessment.

-- Solvency (Risks): Tightening of sanctions on Russia that
    heighten the macro financial shock and leads to a sharper-
    than-expected deterioration in asset quality metrics and
    worse-than-expected deterioration in loan performance.
    Negative impact from the withdrawal of EU shareholders on the
    bank's loan performance in these countries could lead to
    downward revision of Fitch's overall solvency assessment.

-- Liquidity: A severe shock on liquidity that affects the bank's
    size and quality of liquid assets.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Business Environment: De-escalation of geopolitical tensions
    between Russia and Western countries that supports an
    improvement in Fitch's assessment of the bank's business
    profile and/or operating environment and reduces downside risk
    to asset quality and loan performance.

-- Solvency (Capitalisation/Risk): Signs that the macro financial
    shock to Russia is less severe than expected, leading to an
    improved assessment of the bank's asset quality, loan
    performance and capitalisation.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance
and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

IIB has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for 'Governance Structure'.
Russia (47.5% of paid-in capital), as the largest shareholder,
exerts strong influence on the bank's board, management, and
strategy. Fitch believes that the large share of Russian ownership
in the bank will affect its operations and severely constrain its
strategy as evident in the announcement by EU shareholders that
they will withdraw from the bank. This has a negative impact on the
credit profile, and is highly relevant to the ratings.

IIB has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Rule of Law,
Institutional & Regulatory Quality. All supra-nationals have a
score of '4'. Supra-nationals are neither subject to bank
regulation nor supervised by an external authority. Instead,
supra-nationals comply with their own set of rules. Fitch pays
particular attention to internal prudential policies, including
compliance with these policies. This has a negative impact on the
credit profile, and is relevant to the ratings.

IIB has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for 'Exposure to Social
Impact'. The bank has allowed payment deferrals to provide
temporary liquidity support to some of its borrowers affected by
the coronavirus crisis but had not experienced delays before the
deferral was granted. This has a negative impact on the credit
profile, and is relevant to the ratings.

Except for the matters discussed above, the highest level of ESG
credit relevance, if present, is a score of '3'. This means ESG
issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on
the entity, either due to their nature or to the way in which they
are being managed by the entity.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============

PENTA CLO 3: Fitch Gives Final B- Rating to Class F-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Penta CLO 3 DAC's refinancing notes
final ratings.

     DEBT                RATING              PRIOR
     ----                ------              -----
Penta CLO 3 DAC

X-R XS2440090855   LT AAAsf  New Rating      AAA(EXP)sf
A XS1692079509     LT PIFsf  Paid In Full    AAAsf
A-R XS2440088958   LT AAAsf  New Rating      AAA(EXP)sf
B XS1692080184     LT PIFsf  Paid In Full    AAsf
B-R XS2440089501   LT AAsf   New Rating      AA(EXP)sf
C XS1692081075     LT PIFsf  Paid In Full    Asf
C-R XS2440089923   LT Asf    New Rating      A(EXP)sf
D XS1692081588     LT PIFsf  Paid In Full    BBBsf
D-R XS2440090186   LT BBB-sf New Rating      BBB-(EXP)sf
E XS1692082479     LT PIFsf  Paid In Full    BB-sf
E-R XS2440090343   LT BB-sf  New Rating      BB-(EXP)sf
F XS1692082636     LT PIFsf  Paid In Full    B-sf
F-R XS2440090699   LT B-sf   New Rating      B-(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Penta CLO 3 DAC is a securitisation of mainly senior secured
obligations (at least 90%) with a component of corporate rescue
loans, senior unsecured, mezzanine, second-lien loans and
high-yield bonds. Net proceeds from the note issuance are used to
redeem the outstanding rated notes and to fund a portfolio with a
target size of EUR400 million. The portfolio is managed by Partners
Group (UK) Management Limited. The collateralised loan obligation
(CLO) envisages a 4.6-year reinvestment period and an 8.5-year
weighted average life (WAL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Average Portfolio Credit Quality (Neutral): Fitch assesses the
average credit quality of obligors to be in the 'B'/'B-' category.
The Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the identified
portfolio is 26.

Strong Recovery Expectation (Positive): At least 90% of the
portfolio comprises senior secured obligations. Fitch views the
recovery prospects for these assets as more favourable than for
second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine assets. The Fitch weighted
average recovery rate (WARR) of the identified portfolio is 64.1%.

Diversified Portfolio (Positive): The transaction includes two
Fitch matrices: one effective at closing, corresponding to a top-10
obligor concentration limit at 20%, fixed-rate asset limits of 5%
and an 8.5 year WAL; and another that can be selected by the
manager at any time from one year after closing as long as the
portfolio balance (including defaulted obligations at their Fitch
collateral value) is above target par and corresponding to a top-10
obligor concentration limit at 20%, a fixed-rate asset limit of 5%
and 7.5-year WAL.

The transaction also includes various concentration limits,
including the maximum exposure to the three largest (Fitch-defined)
industries in the portfolio at 40%. These covenants ensure that the
asset portfolio will not be exposed to excessive concentration.

Portfolio Management (Neutral): The transaction has a 4.6-year
reinvestment period and includes reinvestment criteria similar to
those of other European transactions. Fitch's analysis is based on
a stressed-case portfolio with the aim of testing the robustness of
the transaction structure against its covenants and portfolio
guidelines.

Cash flow Modelling (Neutral): The WAL used for the transaction
stress portfolio is 12 months less than the WAL covenant, to
account for strict reinvestment conditions after the reinvestment
period, including the overcollateralisation tests and Fitch 'CCC'
limit passing together with a linearly decreasing WAL covenant. In
the agency's opinion, these conditions reduce the effective risk
horizon of the portfolio during stress periods.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- A reduction of the rating default rate (RDR) at all rating
    levels by 25% of the mean RDR and a 25% increase of the
    recovery rate at all rating levels, would lead to upgrades of
    up to five notches, apart from the class A notes, which are
    already the highest rating on Fitch's scale and cannot be
    upgraded.

-- After the end of the reinvestment period, upgrades may occur
    in case of a better-than-initially expected portfolio credit
    quality and deal performance, leading to higher credit
    enhancement and excess spread available to cover for losses in
    the remaining portfolio.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An increase of the RDR at all rating levels by 25% of the mean
    RDR and a 25% decrease of the recovery rate at all rating
    levels would lead to downgrades of up to four notches.

-- Downgrades may occur if the build-up of the notes' credit
    enhancement following amortisation does not compensate for a
    larger loss expectation than initially assumed due to
    unexpectedly high levels of defaults and portfolio
    deterioration.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

DATA ADEQUACY

Penta CLO 3 DAC

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset pool
and the transaction. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets or risk presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European
Securities and Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information or information on the risk presenting entities.

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates that it is adequately reliable.

PENTA CLO 3: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to EUR12.4MM Cl. F-R Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to refinancing notes issued by Penta
CLO 3 Designated Activity Company (the "Issuer"):

EUR4,000,000 Class X-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2035, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR248,000,000 Class A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2035, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR40,000,000 Class B-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2035, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

EUR22,800,000 Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2035, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

EUR27,200,000 Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2035, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

EUR20,400,000 Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2035, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

EUR12,400,000 Class F-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2035, Definitive Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in Moody's methodology.

Interest and principal amortisation amounts due to the Class X-R
Notes are paid pro rata with payments to the A-R Notes. The class
X-R Notes amortise by 10% or EUR400,000 over 10 payment dates,
starting on the 2nd payment date.

On November 16, 2017 (the "Original Issue Date"), the Issuer issued
EUR41,000,000 of unrated Subordinated Notes which will remain
outstanding. In addition, the Issuer issued EUR12,450,000 of
Subordinated Notes due 2035 which are not rated.

The Issuer is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of secured senior loans or senior secured
bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured
senior loans, second-lien loans, high yield bonds and mezzanine
loans. The underlying portfolio is expected to be fully ramped
shortly after the closing date and to comprise of predominantly
corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.

Partners Group (UK) Management Ltd will continue to manage the CLO.
It will direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading
activity, including discretionary trading, during the transaction's
four and half-year reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to
certain restrictions, purchases are permitted using principal
proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from
sales of credit risk obligations and credit improved obligations.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The collateral manager's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2021.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Target Par Amount: EUR400,000,000

Diversity Score: 55

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3118

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.45%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.5 years



=========
I T A L Y
=========

TELECOM ITALIA: S&P Downgrades LT Rating to 'BB-', Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term rating on Telecom Italia
SpA to 'BB-' from 'BB'.

The negative outlook reflects that S&P could lower its ratings to
'B+' if leverage remains elevated at more than 5.0x over a
prolonged period due to more-negative-than-anticipated reported
FOCF after leases.

S&P said, "In 2021, sharper-than-expected EBITDA decline and
slightly higher capital expenditures (capex) resulted in an S&P
Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA of 4.6x, above our rating
trigger for the 'BB' rating.In 2021, Telecom Italia (TIM) fell
short of our expectations in terms of adjusted EBITDA that landed
at about EUR6.0 billion, versus our previous forecast of EUR6.6
billion, resulting in a 16%-17% year-on-year decline." This is the
result of continued fierce competition in the Italian mobile and
fixed-line markets. Although some operational trends are
improving--for instance, subscriber base reduction is slowing down
and the churn rate is falling--fixed and mobile revenues continue
to decline, largely due to reduced interconnection tariffs and
lower average revenue per user (ARPU). What's more, TIM's earnings
have been impaired by weaker-than-expected benefits from DAZN
sports rights and a delay in voucher subsidies that further
pressured the group's ARPU. Finally, higher-than-expected costs
associated with football broadcasting, the launch of some digital
companies (fueling revenue growth, but at a lower margin than the
more traditional telecom activities), and corporate reorganization
and restructuring further pressure Italian operations and earnings.
In Brazil, the negative foreign exchange (FX) movements on Reis'
contributions, although lessening, have more than offset organic
growth in 2021. Weaker adjusted EBITDA, combined with
higher-than-planned capital expenditures--to fund the acceleration
of fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) deployment, investment in cloud
business and football in Italy, as well as preparation for the
integration of Oi Mobile in Brazil--translated into negative
reported FOCF of almost EUR550 million in 2021, from about EUR2.1
billion positive in 2020 and adjusted leverage of 4.6x, which
exceeds our maximum leverage threshold for the 'BB' rating.

S&P said, "We expect adjusted leverage will temporarily peak in
2022, at nearly 5.3x, then return to about 5.0x. In contrast to our
previous forecast that credit metrics for TIM would improve from
2022, we now expect S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA will
peak at 5.2x-5.3x in 2022, then strengthen towards 5.0x in 2023. In
2022, we now forecast low-single-digit-percent adjusted revenue
decline, compared to a stabilization in our previous base case.
Competitive market environment, accentuated further by the recent
launch of Iliad's fixed offers, as well as regulatory constraints
will likely continue to weigh on TIM's domestic revenues and
EBITDA. What's more, following new law (DL 207/2021) TIM is
changing its offers for consumer and microbusiness resulting in
front-end loaded costs, which will hurt EBITDA in 2022, fading away
in following years. This is partly offset by positive impact from
vouchers--although less than expected due to stricter rules,
positive impact should start accruing from 2022--and our forecast
of about 10% organic service revenue and annual EBITDA growth rate
in Brazil, combined with less-unfavorable FX movements from 2022.
Capex to sales will remain elevated in 2022 at 26%-27% and one-off
cash outflows associated to the acquisition of Oi Mobile in Brazil
(about EUR1.2 billion) and 5G spectrum in Italy and Brazil (about
EUR2.1 billion) will further weigh on TIM's adjusted leverage in
2022 that we forecast at 5.2x-5.3x, with negative reported FOCF of
about EUR735 million. In 2023, planned EBITDA recovery (although
still below 2021 level), combined with lessening capex intensity
toward 24%-26% of sales, should translate into still negative but
improving reported FOCF after lease of about EUR275 million, and
adjusted leverage still high but strengthening toward 5.0x, which
corresponds to the maximum leverage authorized at the current
rating.

"Our forecasts incorporate the pro forma effects of the recently
announced sale of additional stakes in Daphne 3--which owns 30.2%
of INWIT--that has yet to close. We include the incremental sale of
tower ownership to a consortium of investors led by Ardian for
about EUR1.5 billion (including the unlocking of cash in a vendor
loan). Although not finalized yet, we believe the transaction is
likely to close as the offer from the group of investors is binding
and TIM's board of directors gave its approval to carry over the
negotiations. Although this transaction will reduce net debt
because of the proceeds, our offsetting adjustment for leases would
partly offset the benefits. However, we calculate a 0.2x positive
impact on the group's adjusted leverage from the transaction.

"We have not yet incorporated in our forecasts KKR's offer to take
TIM private, nor TIM's strategic stand-alone reorganization plan.
On March 14, 2022, TIM's board of directors mandated the CEO and
chairman of the group to begin formal talks with U.S. private
equity fund KKR regarding its nonbinding and indicative offer on
the entire share capital of the company. We still do not consider
the take-private transaction in our base-case scenario for TIM
because the offer is nonbinding, the Italian government may block
the transaction if it deemed it not in the national interest, and
TIM also presented on March 3 its strategic plan to reorganize its
activities on its own, also considering a possible merger with Open
Fiber, to which TIM's board of directors remains supportive. TIM's
strategic plan to separate its activities into a ServiceCo and a
NetCo does not constitute our base case for the group as we have no
visibility on the structure of such a transaction (we understand
the group will provide guidance on these new entities at the
capital market day) and TIM continues to guide on the combined
group. An asset-light ServiceCo could erode TIM's incumbent
advantage and credit profile compared with fully integrated
European telecom peers, if not balanced by deleveraging or
improvements in the network and the structure of the broader fiber
wholesale market through a potential combination of OpenFiber and
TIM's fixed-line assets. However, we acknowledge a structural
separation would provide regulatory relief to both the ServiceCo
and the NetCo. Ultimately, the capital structure of NetCo and
ServiceCo, as well as the terms of any agreement for ServiceCo to
access a fixed network, would be critical to understand the
financial impact of the proposed structural subordination.

"The negative outlook is based on our forecast that debt to EBITDA
will be elevated at about 5.3x in 2022, and fall close to 5.0x in
2023. However, operational and investment risks could keep leverage
higher for longer, which could trigger a downgrade.

"We could lower the rating if we forecast adjusted leverage staying
substantially above 5.0x on a prolonged period. This could stem
from a return to unsustainable mobile competition that further
depresses the ARPU or causes a spike in customer attrition, or from
longer term fixed-line deterioration under wholesale pressure from
Open Fiber and retail pressure from Iliad. More leverage could also
stem from more negative reported FOCF than currently forecast in
our base case. If, contrary to our current expectations, Telecom
Italia moved to relinquish control over its fixed network, we could
also consider a downgrade based on a weaker business profile,
unless this was offset by a material reduction in leverage.

"We could stabilize the rating if we expect sustainable adjusted
leverage comfortably below 5.0x, combined with FOCF to debt
improving toward 5% or above."

Environmental, Social, And Governance

ESG credit indicators: To E-2, S-3, G-3; From E-2, S-3, G-2

S&P said, "Governance factors are now a moderately negative
consideration in our credit rating analysis, reflecting the recent
multiple profit warnings that weighed on the group's results in
2021, as well as on its short- and mid-term guidance, resulting in
spiking leverage and deteriorating reported FOCF after leases
toward negative territory. It also factors in uncertainties around
the evolution of the group's strategic direction as TIM has
presented its plan for a potential split of its activities between
a NetCo and a ServiceCo, while announcing a few days later that it
is starting formal discussion with KKR on its nonbinding offer to
take the company private. Social factors continue to be a
moderately negative consideration in our credit rating analysis of
TIM, reflecting exposure to political and regulatory
decision-making affecting its operations or strategic decisions."

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) credit factors for this
change in credit rating/outlook and/or CreditWatch status:

-- Risk management, culture, and oversight




===========
R U S S I A
===========

SEVERSTAL: May Default on Debt After Citi Blocks Interest Payment
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tommy Stubbington and Robert Smith at The Financial Times report
that Severstal is on course to become the first major Russian
company to default on its debt since the invasion of Ukraine, after
Citigroup blocked an interest payment from the company that is
majority owned by oligarch Alexei Mordashov.

The steelmaker has spent the past week attempting to pay a coupon
on a US$800 million bond, but has now exceeded a five-day grace
period that means holders of the debt could force the company into
default, the FT relates.

According to the FT, Severstal said on March 23 that Citigroup, its
so-called correspondent bank, had "frozen" the US$12.6 million
interest payment "due to regulatory investigations".

The bank asked the company to obtain a licence from the US Office
of Foreign Assets Control before it would process the cash, the FT
relays, citing two people familiar with the matter.

Ofac, the agency that enforces US sanctions, can provide special
authorisations to engage in transactions that would otherwise be
prohibited, the FT states.


[*] RUSSIA: JPMorgan Processes Payment on 2029 Sovereign Bond
-------------------------------------------------------------
Lyubov Pronina, Abhinav Ramnarayan and Selcuk Gokoluk at Bloomberg
News report that foreign holders of Russia's sovereign bond
maturing in 2029 are watching as the latest debt payment from the
sanctioned nation draws closer to completion.

The US$66 million coupon due March 21 was processed Tuesday, March
22, by Russia's National Settlement Depository, it said in a
statement, Bloomberg relates.  Earlier in the day, the Finance
Ministry said it had transferred the cash to the NSD, thus meeting
its obligations "in full."  Four bondholders in Europe said they
hadn't received the payment as of 3.40 p.m. in London, Bloomberg
notes.

From this point, the cash would typically journey to custodian
banks, which hold assets for safekeeping, then to bondholders'
accounts, Bloomberg discloses.  But given the sweeping sanctions in
place against Russia following President Vladimir Putin's invasion
of Ukraine, concerns will remain until the money actually lands in
investors' accounts, according to Bloomberg.

Billions of dollars of Russian government and company debt have
been put in question after as much as two thirds of the country's
foreign currency reserves were frozen, as well as the overseas
assets of numerous billionaires, Bloomberg states.  Russia has at
least $400 million of interest payments coming due over the next 10
weeks, as well as a US$2 billion bond it must repay next month,
data compiled by Bloomberg show.  Last week, the government paid
US$117 million in coupon payments, Bloomberg recounts.

Unlike the terms of the bonds with coupon payments last week, the
March 2029 prospectus has a ruble-fallback option, which allows
Russia to make the transfer in its local currency, Bloomberg
states.  That's raised questions about the ultimate denomination of
the payment and prompted investors to track it from the start,
according to Bloomberg.

Russia sent the cash to JPMorgan Chase & Co., which processed the
payment after getting approvals from the U.S. Treasury Department,
according to a person familiar with the matter, confirming a
Reuters report earlier, Bloomberg notes.  According to Bloomberg,
unlike the payment of the previous week, this bond's prospectus
states that the coupon settlement would be done through Russia's
central securities depository and Euroclear, one of the world's
biggest clearing houses.

It's not a process investors typically follow.  The back-office
moves took center stage after sanctions and capital controls were
imposed on Russia, and investors braced for a default.  For now,
the process is working, and not just for the sovereign.

The government is "paying because they have significant western
assets that creditors would lay a claim on if they go to
bankruptcy," Bloomberg quotes Phillip Torres, a senior portfolio
manager of emerging market debt at Aegon Asset Management in
Chicago, as saying.  "They are going to pay as long as they are
able to.  There is a real cost in going to bankruptcy that they
would want to avoid."




===============
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EUSTREAM AS: Moody's Assigns Ba1 CFR & Cuts Unsecured Notes to Ba1
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2 the
ratings on the senior unsecured notes issued by eustream, a.s. and
on the backed senior unsecured notes issued by SPP Infrastructure
Financing B.V. (SPP-IF) and guaranteed by eustream. At the same
time, Moody's has assigned a Ba1 long-term Corporate Family Rating
and a Ba1-PD probability of default rating to eustream and
concurrently has withdrawn the company's Baa2 long-term issuer
rating, as per the rating agency's practice for corporates
transitioning to speculative grade. All of eustream's ratings are
on review for downgrade.

At the same time, Moody's has confirmed the Baa2 senior unsecured
debt and long-term issuer ratings of SPP-distribucia, a.s. (SPP-d
or SPP-distribucia). The outlook is negative. This rating action
concludes the review for downgrade initiated on March 3, 2022.

Moody's has also downgraded to Ba2 from Baa3 the ratings on the
senior unsecured notes issued by EP Infrastructure, a.s. (EPIF). At
the same time, Moody's has assigned a Ba1 long-term CFR and a
Ba1-PD probability of default rating to EPIF and concurrently
withdrawn the company's Baa3 long-term issuer rating, as per the
rating agency's practice for corporates transitioning to
speculative grade. All of EPIF's ratings are on review for
downgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

eustream

The downgrade of eustream's ratings reflects the company's exposure
to the risk of negative credit implications from the severe
sanctions imposed on the Government of Russia (Ca negative) and
certain Russian financial institutions by Western countries which
could disrupt the receipt of payments due to eustream from its main
counterparty. While the European Union (EU, Aaa stable) sanctions
that have been put in place since the invasion of Ukraine (Caa2
review for downgrade) by Russia exclude energy-related payments and
are not directly imposed on the major Russian gas shipper, Moody's
considers that the risk that additional EU sanctions and/or
countermeasures by Russia may stop the ability of the major Russian
gas shipper to make payments under its contractual obligations to
eustream is substantially higher than previously, given the
volatile geopolitical situation.

eustream, the owner and operator of the gas transmission system in
Slovakia (A2 stable), is generating around 95% of its revenues from
transporting gas that is primarily sourced from Russia to Central
and Southern Europe under long-term gas transit contracts. The
Russian company Gazprom Export LLC, a 100% subsidiary of Gazprom,
PJSC (Caa2 negative), has the monopoly on pipeline gas exports from
Russia. The company's transit contracts are on a ship-or-pay basis,
meaning that eustream receives most income from capacity payments
and independent of actual gas flows. The contract portfolio is
highly concentrated in the major Russian gas shipper.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which started on February 24, 2022,
has led to sovereign rating actions, and subsequently downgrades of
Russian non-financial corporates, including the Russian gas shipper
on March 10. The weakening of the credit profile of the major
Russian gas shipper reflects Moody's view of a significantly
increased risk of default which may include trade-related
obligations.

As flows from Russia have continued uninterrupted and the Russian
shipper has honoured its contractual payment obligations. Given
that a part of eustream's gas transportation network serves as a
link between Czech Republic (Aa3 stable) and Austria (Aa1 stable),
Moody's expects that in a case of cessation of gas flows or
capacity payments from Russia, or both, the company could replace
part but not all of the business with the Russian shipper with
alternative bookings, but these are unlikely to fully compensate
the revenues coming from the major Russian gas shipper.

The Ba1 ratings also factor in Moody's expectation that EPIF is
willing to protect the financial profiles of eustream and SPP-d
since these operating companies are a key source of its income. In
a press release dated March 10 [1], EPIF and its shareholders
confirmed their commitment to maintain an investment grade rating
for EPIF, eustream and SPP-d, subject to other factors outside
their control. Moody's believes that SPP-d has some capacity to
provide support to eustream, if needed, given its current strong
financial profile.

Nevertheless, while an immediate stop of gas imports from Russia
into Europe is currently not Moody's baseline scenario, the
evolution of the current geopolitical situation is highly uncertain
and could have materially adverse implications for the gas trade
between Russia and the EU, hence the ratings remain on review for
downgrade.

The review will focus on (1) the evolution of the geopolitical
situation, including decisions, if any, around further of sanctions
and their impact on eustream's cash flow, liquidity and business
risk profile; (2) the evolution of the EU's energy policy, in
particular its plans for reducing energy dependence on Russia; as
well as (3) any credit enhancing measures that may become available
from shareholders to support the company's credit profile, if
required.

SPP-distribúcia

The confirmation of SPP-d's ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that the company, which as owner and operator of the largest gas
distribution network in Slovakia has no direct exposure to Russia,
will remain able to preserve its current strong financial profile.
Should eustream require financial support, Moody's believes that
earnings from SPP-d in excess of what is required to maintain its
financial profile; and those from the gas storage companies which
only have moderate debt; will likely suffice to support eustream
over the next 2-3 years. The rating confirmation also reflects
Moody's expectation that EPIF is willing to protect the financial
profile of SPP-d since this operating company is a material source
of its income. The outlook is nevertheless negative, reflecting the
risk of contagion from eustream.

EP Infrastructure

The downgrade of EPIF's ratings follows that of eustream's ratings
and reflects the credit linkages of EPIF with eustream. EPIF is a
pure holding company and owns 49% eustream and SPP-d through a 49%
stake in and management control of SPP Infrastructure a.s. (SPP-I)
group that includes eustream and SPP-d, which together contribute
around 60% of its EBITDA on a proportional basis. The company also
has access to the cash flows of some district heating companies in
the Czech Republic, whose cogeneration plants have been benefitting
from high power prices, as well as to the earnings of some gas
storage companies, which are partly located within SPP-I and stand
to benefit from the EU's greater focus on strategic gas storage.
The Slovak government indirectly owns 51% of SPP-I, which supports
Moody's view that the government has a strong incentive to protect
the operating companies within SPP-I.

EPIF's Ba1 CFR reflects Moody's assessment of the consolidated
credit quality of the EPIF group's operating subsidiaries, which
incorporates the weaker credit profile of eustream, together with
the additional debt of EUR2.35 billion at the holding company,
albeit partly offset by Moody's expectation of potential support
coming from EPIF's majority owner EnergetickA1/2 a prumyslovA1/2
holding, a.s. (EPH) in a situation of financial distress. EPIF,
which holds 70% of proportionate group debt, is reliant on dividend
income from its subsidiaries, which, in addition to SPP-I and the
heating and gas storage subsidiaries, also include a 49% share in
the second-largest power distribution and supply company in
Slovakia, Stredoslovenska Energetika group (SSE).

Moody's believes that EPIF will be able to service its debt over
the next two years without a meaningful contribution from eustream
and SPP-d, given that only interest payments will be due before the
next debt maturity of a EUR750 million bond in April 2024. The Ba2
senior unsecured rating of EPIF's outstanding senior bonds is
nevertheless one notch below EPIF's CFR, reflecting (1) the
structural subordination of noteholders to the claims of other EPIF
group creditors as well as (2) Moody's view that in the current
situation there is a focus on the protection of the credit profiles
of eustream and SPP-d.

EPIF's ratings remain on review for downgrade, reflecting the
review of eustream's ratings. The review will focus on (1) the
evolution and potential effect of sanctions and changes in EU
energy policies on EPIF's consolidated credit quality; (2) the
company's ability and willingness to upstream funds from the
operating companies to the holding company; as well as (3) any
credit enhancing measures that may become available from
shareholders to support the company's credit profile, if required.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

eustream

Given the review for downgrade, an upgrade of eustream's and
SPP-IF's ratings in the near term is unlikely. The ratings could be
confirmed if eustream continues to receive due capacity payments
under the long-term transit contracts and uses these to protect its
financial profile; or, in case the capacity payments were to be
materially reduced, revenues from other bookings could be achieved
that support the current credit profile; or if the company obtains
adequate support from its owners to offset any further
deterioration of its credit profile.

eustream's ratings could be downgraded if capacity payments to the
company were to be discontinued or materially delayed, for example
due to sanctions, resulting in material pressure on its liquidity
and financial profile.

SPP-distribucia

Given the negative outlook, an upgrade of SPP-d's current ratings
is unlikely. The ratings could be affirmed with a stable outlook if
the credit profile of eustream were to stabilize and there was
adequate visibility that any potential financial support needs from
eustream would not materially affect SPP-d's financial profile.

SPP-d's ratings could be downgraded if cash requirements from
eustream were to lead to a materially weaker financial profile.

EP Infrastructure

Given the review for downgrade, an upgrade of EPIF's ratings is
unlikely. The ratings could be confirmed if eustream's ratings were
confirmed; or if the company obtains adequate support from its
owners to offset any further deterioration of its credit profile.

EPIF's ratings could be downgraded if eustream's or SPP-d's ratings
were downgraded; if dividend flows from subsidiaries were unlikely
to be sufficient to cover the company's operating and interest
expenses; or if there was an increased likelihood that the company
could face difficulties to refinance the next bond maturity.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: EP Infrastructure, a.s.

Assignments:

Probability of Default Rating, Assigned Ba1-PD, Placed On Review
for Downgrade

LT Corporate Family Rating, Assigned Ba1, Placed On Review for
Downgrade

Downgrades:

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba2 from
Baa3; Placed On Review for further Possible Downgrade

Withdrawals:

LT Issuer Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated Baa3, previously
Placed On Review for Downgrade

Issuer: SPP-distribúcia, a.s.

Confirmations:

LT Issuer Rating, Confirmed at Baa2

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Baa2

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review

Issuer: eustream, a.s.

Assignments:

Probability of Default Rating, Assigned Ba1-PD, Placed On Review
for Downgrade

LT Corporate Family Rating, Assigned Ba1, Placed On Review for
Downgrade

Downgrades:

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba1 from
Baa2; Placed On Review for further Possible Downgrade

Withdrawals:

LT Issuer Rating, Withdrawn, previously rated Baa2, previously
Placed On Review for Downgrade

Issuer: SPP Infrastructure Financing B.V.

Downgrades:

Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba1
from Baa2; Placed On Review for further Possible Downgrade

The principal methodology used in rating EP Infrastructure, a.s.
and SPP-distribucia, a.s. was Regulated Electric and Gas Networks
published in March 2017.

eustream a.s., is the owner and operator of the natural gas
transmission and transit pipeline that runs through Slovakia. In
the financial year 2020/21 the company reported EUR622 million of
revenues and EBITDA of EUR544 million.

SPP-distribucia, a.s. is the monopoly provider of regulated gas
distribution services in Slovakia. In the financial year 2020/21
the company reported EUR443 million of revenues and an EBIT of
EUR178 million.

EP Infrastructure, a.s. is a Czech holding company with
shareholdings in core Slovak gas and electricity infrastructure,
including (1) eustream a.s.; (2) SPP-distribucia, a.s.; and (3)
Stredoslovenska Energetika group. The group also holds stakes in
regional gas storage entities SPP Storage, NAFTA, NAFTA Speicher
and Pozagas, as well as a number of district heating infrastructure
providers in the Czech Republic. EP Infrastructure, a.s. is
ultimately owned 69% by EnergetickA1/2 a prumyslovA1/2 holding,
a.s. and 31% by a number of specialist investment funds managed by
Macquarie Infrastructure and Real Assets.



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GORENJSKA BANKA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT IDR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Slovenia-based Gorenjska Banka d.d.,
Kranj's (Gorenjska Banka) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at
'BB-' and Viability Rating (VR) at 'bb-'. The ratings have been
removed from Rating Watch Evolving (RWE). The Outlook on the IDR is
Stable.

Fitch has removed the RWE as planned acquisition of selected CEE
subsidiaries (including Slovenia-based Sberbank banka d.d) from
Sberbank Europe AG has not materialised. Fitch placed Gorenjska
Banka on RWE following the announcement on 3 November 2021 that
together with parent Serbia-based AIK Banka a.d. and Agri Cyprus
Europe Ltd, it had agreed the acquisition with Sberbank Europe AG.
As a result of resolution action Sberbank banka d.d was taken over
by the Slovenian central bank and subsequently sold to Nova
Ljubljanska Banka d.d. on 1 March 2022.

The affirmation reflects no significant changes to the bank's
credit profile since the last full review in March 2021.

Fitch has withdrawn Gorenjska Banka's 's Support Rating as it is no
longer relevant to the agency's coverage following the publication
of its updated Bank Rating Criteria on 12 November 2021. In line
with the updated criteria, Fitch has assigned Gorenjska Banka a
Shareholder Support Rating (SSR) of 'no support' (ns).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Gorenjska Banka's IDRs are driven by its standalone financial
strength, as expressed by its VR. Gorenjska Banka's ratings do not
factor in any potential support from AIK due to is large size
relative to its parent, which could make it difficult for the
latter to provide support in case of need. In addition, it reflects
limitations to AIK's own credit profile, given its exposure to its
home market of Serbia (BB+/Stable), whose operating environment
Fitch assesses at 'bb-'.

At the same time, Fitch does not expect significant near-term
contagion risks from AIK for Gorenjska Banka. This is based on
AIK's reasonable reported financial metrics, no reliance on funding
from AIK and Fitch's view that direct supervision by ECB prevents
upstreaming of capital or liquidity from Gorenjska Banka to AIK to
the extent it could put significant pressure on Gorenjska Banka's
credit profile.

VR

Fitch assessment of Gorenjska Banka's standalone profile reflects
the bank's small size and modest franchise, modest capital buffers,
sizeable loan-book concentrations and volatile profitability. The
bank's funding profile and liquidity are rating strengths.

Gorenjska Banka's business model is simple, relatively stable and
profitable and focused on Slovenia, which Fitch considers
relatively low risk. Lending is predominantly to corporates and
SMEs, with only 32% exposure to retail clients. Customer deposits
provide the bulk of funding. Despite franchise weaknesses, these
features of the bank's business model allow Gorenjska Banka's
business profile to be scored at 'bb-', which is above the implied
'b' category score.

In Fitch's view, the bank's risk appetite is higher than rated
Slovenian peers. This is demonstrated by reducing, but still
sizeable related-party exposures, and higher-than-average loan
growth and industry concentrations, including to real estate and
construction (around 30% of corporate gross exposure at end-2021).

The impaired loan ratio (Stage 3 loans) of 2.2% was broadly stable
in 2021 (2020: 2.0%) as loan performance has benefited from
Slovenia's post-2020 economic recovery, despite the expiration of
loan repayment moratoria and other extraordinary state support
measures. According to management, the bank's direct credit
exposure to Russia and Ukraine is small and largely covered by
guarantees or insurance, but Fitch believes that second-order
economic effects of the conflict in Ukraine (such as rising energy
prices, higher inflation, weaker growth) will gradually put
pressure on retail and corporate borrowers. Nevertheless,
considering current asset quality metrics and expectation that
deterioration is likely to be contained, Fitch has upgraded the
asset quality score to 'bb-' from 'b+'.

In this context, Fitch also expects Stage 2 loans (about 16% of
total gross loans) to stay elevated given the bank's cautious
approach to restaging.

Coverage of Stage 3 loans with specific loan loss allowances was
low at around 32% at and-2021, but reflects the highly
collateralised nature of the bank's loan book. The coverage of
Stage 3 loans by all loan loss allowances was solid at close to
72%.

Sizeable industry and single-obligor concentrations continue to
weigh on Fitch's assessment of Gorenjska Banka's asset quality.

Operating profitability was solid in 2021. The headline ratio of
operating profit-to- risk weighted assets (RWAs) improved to around
2.4% from 2.0% in 2020, underpinned by low loan impairment charges
(LICs). Revenue was up by around 17% yoy, which allowed for
pre-impairment profit improvement, despite s strong increase in
operating expenses. In Fitch's view, Gorenjska Banka's LICs are
likely to be much higher in 2022 and 2023, but
overall-profitability metrics should remain reasonable, supported
by expected loan growth and stable margins. For this reason, Fitch
has upgraded the earnings and profitability score to 'bb' from
'bb-'.

Our assessment of capital and leverage considers the small absolute
size of the bank's capital base and elevated risk appetite
manifesting itself in sizeable loan book concentrations. The bank's
common equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio declined to 14.3% at end-2021
from 14.9% a year before, driven by RWA growth and only a small
part of 2020 profit and none of 2021 profit is included in CET1
capital. Fitch expects that at current level of CET 1 profit
retention is likely to balance Gorenjska Banka's loan growth and
help stabilise capitalisation metrics.

Customer deposits are stable and diversified, although the share of
term deposits is higher than at peers, indicating somewhat weaker
customer relationships. Refinancing risks are low and the liquidity
position is solid. Fitch's outlook for the bank's funding and
liquidity profile is stable. Wholesale funding is limited and
primarily sourced from the Slovenian development bank and AIK
(through a subordinated loan). Liquidity remains sound with
regulatory liquidity ratios materially above minimum requirements.

SSR

The SSR Support Rating of 'ns' reflects Fitch's opinion that
support from AIK, while possible, cannot be relied on. This
reflects that the large size of Gorenjska Banka relative to AIK
limits the parent's ability to provide support.

Gorenjska Banka's gross direct exposure to AIK (money market
placement) was broadly unchanged over the last year and equivalent
to about 40% of Gorenjska Banka's CET1 capital at end-2021. On a
net basis it reduced to around 20% of CET1 (2020: 30%). Some
related-party loans have been repaid, reducing this part of
exposure to around 10% of CET1. In Fitch's view, despite a modest
reduction over 2021, this indicates increased risk appetite and
weaknesses in Gorenjska Banka's governance structure relative to
peers. Although not a key rating driver, combined with other
factors, governance risk has a moderate influence on Gorenjska
Banka's VR. This is reflected in a score of '4' for Governance
Structure under Fitch's Environmental Social and Governance (ESG)
Relevance Scores.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

IDRs and VR

Our base case is that Gorenjska Banka's VR and hence Long-Term IDR
have moderate headroom to withstand pressures stemming from the
deteriorating economic outlook. They would be downgraded if the
bank experiences a sharp deterioration in asset quality,
capitalisation and operating profitability metrics without clear
prospects for recovery. The bank's ratings would likely be
downgraded if:

-- The bank's capitalisation weakens beyond Fitch's baseline
    expectations, in particular if the buffers above the minimum
    regulatory requirements for CET1 ratio decrease substantially,
    providing only small headroom above the minimum capital
    requirements, and if loan book concentrations are not reduced.

-- There is a substantial increase in risk appetite, especially
    if combined with asset quality and profitability
    deterioration, or evidence of material governance weakness.

SSR

-- A downgrade of Gorenjska Banka's SSR is not possible, given it
    is currently the lowest SSR on Fitch's scale.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

IDRs and VR

-- An upgrade would require a significant strengthening of the
    bank's franchise, and a record of sound performance under
    AIK's ownership.

SSR

-- An upgrade is unlikely, as it would require a material change
    of Gorenjska Banka's size relative to AIK.

VR ADJUSTMENTS

The business profile score of 'bb-' has been assigned above the
implied score, due to the following adjustment: Business Model
(positive).

The earnings and profitability score of 'bb' has been assigned
below the implied score due to the following adjustment: Earnings
Stability (negative).

The capitalisation and leverage score of 'bb-' has been assigned
below the implied score due to the following adjustments: Size of
Capital Base (negative) and Risk Profile and Business Model
(Negative)

Funding and Liquidity score of 'bb+' has been assigned below the
implied score due to the following adjustments: Deposit Structure
(negative)

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Gorenjska Banka d.d., Kranj has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for
Governance Structure reflecting board independence issues given
sizeable direct and indirect related-party exposures with parent
AIK, which has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is
relevant to the rating[s] in conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.



=========
S P A I N
=========

FTA UCI 17: S&P Affirms 'CCC+ (sf)' Class B Notes Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'A- (sf)' its credit
rating on Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 17's class A2 notes.
S&P also affirmed its 'CCC+ (sf)', 'D (sf)', and 'D (sf)' ratings
on the class B, C, and D notes, respectively.

S&P said, "The rating actions follow the application of our
relevant criteria and assumptions for assessing pools of Spanish
residential loans. They also reflect our full analysis of the most
recent information that we have received and the transaction's
current structural features. We corrected how we assess recoveries
in defaulted assets in our analysis which, due to an error, were
not correctly considered in our previous review. Today's rating
actions correct this error and reflect our updated view of the
assets' credit quality, which is the main driver of the rating
actions, together with latest credit enhancement levels.

"We expect Spanish inflation to reach 5.2% in 2022. Although
elevated inflation is overall credit negative for all borrowers,
inevitably some borrowers will be more negatively affected than
others and to the extent inflationary pressures materialize more
quickly or more severely than currently expected, risks may emerge.
Borrowers in this transaction pay a variable rate of interest. As a
result, some borrowers in this pool face near-term pressure from
both a cost of living and rate rise perspective.

"In line with our previous analysis, we applied a higher
reperforming adjustment for loans under performing arrangements.
These borrowers are paying a lower amount compared with their
original schedule. Therefore, we increased our reperforming
adjustment to 5.0x from 2.5x because we consider that these loans
introduce higher risk in the transaction, and these restructures do
not appear to be successful, are not a permanent solution, and they
have been extended multiple times.

"Our weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) assumptions
remained stable compared with our previous review, with decreasing
arrears and a slightly higher reperforming effect. In addition, our
weighted-average loss severity (WALS) assumptions have increased,
due to the higher market value declines applied in the Spanish
market."

  Table 1

  Credit Analysis Results

  RATING     WAFF (%)    WALS (%)    CREDIT COVERAGE (%)

  AAA        59.53       37.23       22.16

  AA         49.68       33.07       16.43

  A          43.04       26.18       11.27

  BBB        36.73       22.58        8.29

  BB         28.58       20.11        5.75

  B          20.69       17.89        3.70

  WAFF--Weighted-average foreclosure frequency.
  WALS--Weighted-average loss severity.

UCI 17's class A2, B, and C notes' credit enhancement has increased
to 24.0%, 6.3%, and -0.6%, respectively, from 20.0%, 3.7%, and
-2.5% as of our previous review due to the reserve fund being at
target and the notes' amortization, which is sequential following
the arrears trigger breach. Since the June 2021 payment date,
collections have been used to fund the reserve fund after paying
principal on the class A2 notes. Given that the three-month Euro
Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) is currently negative and
considering the margin on the notes, no interest is due on the
class A2, B, and C notes.

Loan-level arrears increased slightly to 6.5%, compared with 6.0%
as of the previous review. Overall delinquencies remain in line
with our Spanish RMBS index.

The UCI pools comprise mortgage loans granted to individuals solely
for the acquisition of residential properties. S&P said, "In our
cash flow analysis, we consider recoveries coming from already
defaulted assets. Due to an error in our 2018 review, we did not
correctly model these recoveries, and as a result, our cash flow
results were higher than they should have been. In our model,
recoveries were applied as a nominal value rather than a
percentage. Consequently, an error occurred because 30 times
recoveries on defaulted assets were considered instead of 30% of
such amount. We have now corrected this error."

S&P said, "Our operational, sovereign, counterparty, and legal risk
analyses remain unchanged since our previous review. Therefore, the
ratings assigned are not capped by any of these criteria. The
replacement framework for the collection account does not satisfy
our counterparty criteria. Therefore, we stressed one month of
commingling risk as a loss.

"We lowered to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'A- (sf)' our rating on the class
A2 notes, driven by the abovementioned error correction. The class
A2 notes could withstand our cash-flow stresses at a higher rating
than the revised rating. However, our revised rating considers the
uncertain macroeconomic environment, the transaction's historical
performance, and the sensitivity of this class of notes to loans
under performing arrangements.

"Although credit enhancement and our cash flow results have
improved for the class B notes, we still consider them to be
vulnerable to nonpayment and dependent upon favorable business,
financial, or economic conditions to meet their financial
commitments. Therefore, we affirmed our 'CCC+ (sf)' rating on the
class B notes."

The class C notes paid all unpaid interest due on the March 2019
interest payment date. Since then, interest on this tranche has
been paid timely. Given that it is difficult to predict recoveries,
the observed payment record of borrowers, and level of defaults the
securitized portfolio has experienced, interest payments may depend
on excess spread. In addition, this tranche is undercollateralized,
it missed a significant amount of interest payments in the past,
and it is still not certain that future interest payments will not
be missed. S&P said, "We expect to see more stability on interest
payments before upgrading this tranche. Given its current credit
enhancement, the current macroeconomic environment, and the class C
notes' position in the waterfall, we have affirmed our 'D (sf)'
rating on this class of notes."

At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class
D notes, as this class of notes continues to not pay timely
interest regularly.




===========
S W E D E N
===========

STORSKOGEN GROUP: S&P Assigns 'BB+' ICR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'BB+' long-term issuer credit
rating to Sweden-Based Storskogen Group AB (Storskogen).

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Storskogen will
continue to expand organically and inorganically, supporting stable
EBITDA margins of about 12%-13%, and S&P Global Ratings weighted
average funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 35% and debt
to EBITDA of about 2.5x.

S&P's 'BB+' rating is supported by Storskogen's relatively low
leverage profile and diversified portfolio of companies.

Storskogen has completed close to 200 acquisitions since its
incorporation in 2012. The company is largely focused on three main
sectors--including trade, industry, and services--across 12
different subsegments or verticals. S&P said, "Although Storskogen
is largely exposed to Sweden where it generates almost 80% of
revenue, its diversification across end markets supports our fair
business risk assessment. The company's customers span a wide range
of industry end markets--including construction, food, furniture,
apparel, logistics, auto, and jewelry--which we believe will
support stable margins due to diversification from cyclical
events." The acquired businesses operate on a decentralized basis,
with Storskogen providing, among other things, business and
strategic support, central treasury functions, corporate
governance, and best practices from the group level.

Services, the broadest and largest business vertical, incorporates
more than 54 business units and 4,700 employees. This is
Storskogen's lowest margin segment, given that installation and
engineering services operate at lower-than-average margins. It has
also been the most active segment by way of acquisitions over the
past 12 months. Trade remains the most geographically diversified
business of the three, following its entry into Norway, the U.K.,
and Switzerland. This segment comprises 27 business units and 1,585
employees with much of the revenue generated via the distribution
of external brands and some private labels. Industry is the group's
most profitable segment, operating across 34 business units with
3,900 employees.

Storskogen's strategy to date has been largely to expand via
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), funded by a mix of debt and equity.
The company was recently listed, raising more than Swedish krona
(SEK) 7 billion via newly issued shares during 2021 to support the
continued pace of acquisitions. S&P said, "M&A spending in 2021 was
four times that in 2020, and we expect it will be almost one and a
half times the 2021 level in 2022. In addition, the company raised
bonds amounting to SEK2 billion within its framework of SEK5
billion during 2021, with a further SEK1 billion raised in early
2022. We expect that Storskogen will remain within its stated
financial policy of 2x-3x leverage, while continuing to fund M&A
with a mix of debt and equity. The company also pursued an equity
issuance before the IPO to sustain its financial policy. We note
the credit agreement allows for a potential increase to 3.5x
leverage but do not expect management to be this aggressive."

Storskogen's M&A pipeline remains strong with a focus on
geographical diversification. Almost half of the company's
acquisitions to date have been completed over the past 18 months,
and the company has expanded geographically by entering new markets
such as Germany, Switzerland, Norway, and Finland. These entities
receive the support of group functions but continue to operate on a
decentralized model, which has provided relatively seamless
integration and minimal integration risk issues to date. Group
functions include a centralized treasury and risk management team
with a cash pool mechanism. In addition, the group supports the
newly acquired entities on IT security, financial reporting,
operational excellence, strategy development, inventory
optimization, add-on acquisitions, and sustainability initiatives.
S&P said, "We understand that the M&A pipeline remains strong, and
we expect that this will support further diversification across the
group's top-10 companies, which represent about 46% of total sales;
geographical expansion; and improved scale via add-on acquisitions
for some business units. In our view, the company's track record of
integrating acquisitions to date and strong governance will ensure
stable operating performance, therefore we anticipate minimal
integration issues."

S&P said, "We expect margins to remain relatively stable in the
coming years. We acknowledge that the company saw margin
fluctuations in 2019, with some of the larger companies
underperforming. In our view, this volatility will reduce as
acquisitions continue to diversify the business across units and
verticals. In addition, management's hands-on approach to promptly
turn around underperforming entities from the group level, via the
hiring of new personnel, is a best practice approach against peers
within the portfolio and efficiency initiatives. We expect that
EBITDA margins will remain relatively stable in the coming years,
at about 12%-13%, and about 90% of entities within the portfolio to
be profitable (from about 94% at present)."

Operating performance has remained relatively resilient,
particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, and organic growth
metrics have rebounded strongly in 2021. Despite topline pressures
during 2020, the company benefited on a margin basis, increasing
its profitable business to 97% from 86% in 2019. S&P said, "We note
that both the trade and industry sectors benefited from furlough
measures in 2020, as well as management restructuring and improved
operational initiatives for some businesses during 2019. Revenue
rebounded well in 2021, with some lower-margin generation largely
related to the build out of the corporate cost base and several
nonrecurring items, including inventory write downs, which we
expect to reduce in 2022."

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that
Storskogen will continue to expand organically and inorganically,
supporting stable EBITDA margins of about 12%-13% and S&P Global
Ratings-weighted-average FFO to debt and debt to EBITDA of about
35% and 2.5x respectively.

"We could lower the rating if the company undertakes more
debt-funded M&A, engages in more shareholder friendly actions than
we anticipate, or suffers from operational underperformance that
results in leverage above 3x with FFO to debt falling below 30% on
a sustained basis.

"We could also consider a negative rating action if Storskogen
experiences operating difficulties for a prolonged period,
resulting in more volatile EBITDA margins without short-term
prospects of recovery."

Although not expected, a downgrade could also follow a failure to
continue upstreaming free operating cash flows (FOCF) from
subsidiaries to the parent, a reduction in entities across its cash
pooling mechanism, or an increase in debt with a shorter maturity
horizon.

S&P said, "We could consider rating upside if Storskogen sustains
S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA below 2x and FFO to debt
above 45% for a sustained period with a sufficient cushion for
further M&A activities and management's commitment to maintain
this. In addition, further geographical expansion, and a track
record of solid organic growth within existing businesses would
support a stronger business risk profile."

ESG credit indicators: E2, S2, G2

Environmental, social, and governance credit factors have no
material influence on S&P's credit rating analysis of Storskogen.




===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

BULB: Bailout to Cost Taxpayers Additional GBP500 Million
---------------------------------------------------------
Jim Pickard and Nathalie Thomas at The Financial Times report that
the government bailout of failed British energy supplier Bulb will
cost taxpayers an additional GBP500 million over two years, taking
the total support required to GBP2.2 billion, according to the
independent fiscal watchdog.

According to the FT, the Office for Budget Responsibility said in
documents published alongside the Spring Statement on March 23 that
the bailout would cost GBP1.2 billion in 2021-22 and a further GBP1
billion in 2022-23 to "cover the company's operating losses".

Bulb, Britain's seventh biggest energy supplier with some 1.6
million customers, was rescued under a process known as "special
administration" in November after it admitted it could no longer
withstand sharp swings in wholesale energy prices, the FT
recounts.

At the time of the rescue, the government said it would put up
GBP1.7 billion in taxpayer money to support the failed group until
it could be sold, the FT notes.  People with knowledge of the
situation said administrators had used GBP800 million to keep the
company afloat, a GBP200 million increase on their last estimate a
week ago, the FT relates.

The price of supporting Bulb is in addition to an estimated GBP2.4
billion cost to consumers of rescuing customers of the roughly 30
other collapsed energy suppliers, the FT states.


HOLLAND & BARRETT: Struggles to Make Scheduled Interest Payment
---------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Smith, Daniel Thomas and Stephen Morris at The Financial
Times report that Holland & Barrett is struggling to make a
scheduled interest payment to its lenders even though the UK
healthcare retailer and its Russian oligarch-backed private equity
owner are not under direct sanctions.

According to the FT, LetterOne, the London-based investment group
that bought Holland & Barrett in 2017, has so far escaped UK and EU
sanctions, even though its Russian owners such as Mikhail Fridman
have been hit with asset freezes and travel bans.

But an interest payment the British retailer made on a EUR415
million loan on March 23 has not yet reached lenders, according to
three people familiar with the matter, because a bank is having
issues processing the payment, the FT notes.  In contrast, an
interest payment on another GBP450 million loan at Holland &
Barrett has flowed through to lenders without issue, the FT
states.

LetterOne confirmed to the FT that "one of the paying agents is
having difficulties processing euro payments".

"We are working with them to rectify this," the FT quotes the
investment group as saying.  "LetterOne is not sanctioned and has
had confirmation of this from authorities in the UK and Luxembourg.
We are confident the paying agent will make this payment
swiftly."

The delay in the interest payment is the latest example of the
obstacles sanctions are creating for companies that have links to
Russian oligarchs, even if they have not been directly targeted
themselves, the FT discloses.


MCCOLL'S: Chief Executive Steps Down Amid Rescue Talks
------------------------------------------------------
Scott Reid at The Scotsman reports that the boss of convenience
store and newsagent chain McColl's has stepped down as the company
looks to secure its future.

According to The Scotsman, the group, which employs some 16,000
people and also trades under the RS McColl banner in Scotland, said
Jonathan Miller had departed after 30 years with the firm,
including six years at the helm.

Non-executive chairman Angus Porter has taken on the role of
executive chairman until a successor to Miller is appointed, with
chief operating officer Karen Bird becoming interim chief executive
to manage the day-to-day responsibilities, The Scotsman discloses.

The changes come as the firm remains in talks with lenders to
secure vital funding, while working with advisers to find a buyer
or a third party willing to inject fresh cash, The Scotsman
states.

Supermarket giant Morrisons -- which runs its Morrisons Daily
convenience stores in partnership with McColl's -- is now said to
have drafted in City advisers as it considers how to deal with the
financial struggles of McColl's, The Scotsman notes.

Morrisons has appointed investment bank Houlihan Lokey to look at
options for its exposure to McColl's, The Scotsman relays, citing a
Sky News report.


SAFE HANDS: Enters Administration, Can't Issue Immediate Refunds
----------------------------------------------------------------
Kevin Peachey at BBC News reports that Safe Hands, a funeral plan
provider with 45,000 customers in the UK has collapsed, throwing
contracts into doubt and raising concern over refunds.

The company had already signalled its intention to stop operating,
but its collapse means pre-bought funerals may not be honoured, BBC
News relates.

According to BBC News, administrators said the company could not
provide immediate refunds, leaving many worried their money will be
lost.

The sector is facing an imminent overhaul, leaving other plans in
doubt, BBC News notes.

From July 29, any provider must be authorised and regulated by the
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) which, from that point onwards,
will give consumers far greater protection than they have at the
moment, BBC News discloses.

Safe Hands was one of dozens of companies operating in the
currently unregulated pre-paid funeral sector, BBC News states.

Joint administrator Nedim Ailyan, partner at FRP, said they would
carry out a detailed investigation to discover what could be
returned to creditors, including policyholders -- whose funds are
in a trust fund, which itself has a shortfall compared to what is
required for full refunds, BBC News relates.

"Regrettably, the administration means the company is not in a
position to issue refunds at this time.  We appreciate how
upsetting this period of uncertainty will be for Safe Hands Plans'
customers and their families," he said, notes the report.
"Unfortunately, there is a shortfall between the level of plan
holder investments and the forecast level of funeral plan costs to
be paid.  Essentially, the value of the investments is not enough
to meet the funeral plan obligations of the company."


WELCOME TO YORKSHIRE: Receives Numerous Expressions of Interest
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ian Hirst at Halifax Courier reports that Rob Adamson of Armstrong
Watson LLP said that administrators hope to conclude the sales
process for the company by the end of this month with different
prospective buyers interested in both the business's assets and the
possibility of buying the entire company.

"We have had numerous expressions of interest to buy the business
outright," Halifax Courier quotes Mr. Adamson as saying.

The firm, which is the region's official tourism agency, was placed
into administration at the start of this month after council
leaders determined they would no longer fund the organisation and
instead look to establish a replacement body, Halifax Courier
relates.  Welcome to Yorkshire is a private company but had been
reliant on millions of pounds of funding from the public sector,
chiefly through local councils, Halifax Courier notes.

Mr. Adamson, as cited by Halifax Courier, said he could not
disclose the details of any of the interested parties due to
non-disclosure agreements.

The Yorkshire Leaders' Board, made up of council leaders and the
region's two metro mayors, has already indicated it is interested
in buying Welcome to Yorkshire assets including the organisation's
name, Halifax Courier states.  It has been mooted the replacement
body could also be called Welcome to Yorkshire, according to
Halifax Courier.

A spokesperson for the Leaders Board said it was awaiting details
of the administrators' valuation of Welcome to Yorkshire assets
before making any further decisions, Halifax Courier relays.

"The administrators have not yet released the inventory of assets
and valuations.  The Yorkshire Leaders Board will consider the
options this presents when it is available," they said.

Mr. Adamson also confirmed a further two redundancies have been
made at the firm following 11 at the start of the administration
process but said there is "no intention" for any further job cuts
at this stage, Halifax Courier notes.  It means staff numbers have
fallen from 23 to just 10 as a result of the administration,
Halifax Courier states.

When asked whether it was likely the existing business will end up
being liquidated given the plan by council leaders to set up a
different destination marketing organisation, Mr. Adamson, as cited
by Halifax Courier, said: "The administrators are in dialogue with
the interested parties, and it is too early in the process to
comment on the likely outcome."




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in Cyberspace
-------------------------------------------------------------
Author: Warren E. Agin
Publisher: Bowne Publishing Co.
List price: $225.00
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher

Red Hat Inc. finds itself with a high of 151 5/8 and low of 20 over
the last 12 months! Microstrategy Inc. has roller-coasted from a
high of 333 to a low of 7 over the same period! Just when the IPO
boom is imploding and high-technology companies are running out of
cash, Warren Agin comes out with a guide to the legal issues of the
cyberage.

The word "cyberspace" did not appear in the Merriam-Webster
Dictionary until 1986, defined as "the on-line world of computer
networks." The word "Internet" showed up that year as well, as "an
electronic communications network that connects computer networks
and organizational computer facilities around the world."
Cyberspace has been leading a kaleidoscopic parade ever since, with
the legal profession striding smartly in rhythm. There is no
definition for the word "cyberassets" in the current
Merriam-Webster. Fortunately, Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in
Cyberspace tells us what cyberassets are and lays out in meticulous
detail how to address them, not only for troubled technology
companies, but for all companies with websites and domain names.
Cyberassets are primarily websites and domain names, but also
include technology contracts and licenses. There are four types of
assets embodied in a website: content, hardware, the Internet
connection, and software. The website's content is its fundamental
asset and may include databases, text, pictures, and video and
sound clips. The value of a website depends largely on the traffic
it generates.

A domain name provides the mechanism to reach the information
provided by a company on its website, or find the products or
services the company is selling over the Internet. Examples are
Amazon.com, bankrupt.com, and "swiggartagin.com." Determining the
value of a domain name is comparable to valuing trademark rights.
Domain names can come at a high price! Compaq Computer Corp. paid
Alta Vista Technology Inc. more than $3 million for "Altavista.com"
when it developed its AltaVista search engine.

The subject matter covered in this book falls into three groups:
the Internet's effect on the practice of bankruptcy law; the ways
substantive bankruptcy law handles the impact of cyberspace on
basic concepts and procedures; and issues related to cyberassets as
secured lending collateral.

The book includes point-by-point treatment of the effect of
cyberassets on venue and jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings;
electronic filing and access to official records and pleadings in
bankruptcy cases; using the Internet for communications and
noticing in bankruptcy cases; administration of bankruptcy estates
with cyberassets; selling bankruptcy estate assets over the
Internet; trading in bankruptcy claims over the Internet; and
technology contracts and licenses under the bankruptcy codes. The
chapters on secured lending detail technology escrow agreements for
cyberassets; obtaining and perfecting security interests for
cyberassets; enforcing rights against collateral for cyberassets;
and bankruptcy concerns for the secured lender with regard to
cyberassets.

The book concludes with chapters on Y2K and bankruptcy; revisions
in the Uniform Commercial Code in the electronic age; and a
compendium of bankruptcy and secured lending resources on the
Internet. The appendix consists of a comprehensive set of forms for
cyberspace-related bankruptcy issues and cyberasset lending
transactions. The forms include bankruptcy orders authorizing a
domain name sale; forms for electronic filing of documents;
bankruptcy motions related to domain names; and security agreements
for Web sites.

Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in Cyberspace is a well-written,
succinct, and comprehensive reference for lending against
cyberassets and treating cyberassets in bankruptcy cases.


[*] EUROPE: EU Firms Hit by Russian Sanctions Can Get State Support
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Foo Yun Chee at Reuters reports that the European Commission said
on March 23 EU companies affected by sanctions imposed on Russia
can get up to EUR400,000 (US$440,360) in state support and
compensation up to 30% of energy costs under looser EU state aid
rules.

From airlines to carmakers to tourism businesses, thousands of
companies across the 27-country bloc have reported severe
disruption due to the sanctions, Reuters discloses.

According to Reuters, companies in the agriculture, fisheries,
aquaculture sectors can get up to EUR35,000 while businesses facing
a liquidity crunch can get state guarantees on loans, subsidised
loans.

The Commission did not specify which sectors would qualify for the
larger support.

Companies facing soaring energy costs can get state aid up to 30%
of costs, capped at EUR2 million, the Commission said, confirming a
Reuters story on March 22, Reuters notes.

This measure will benefit manufacturers of aluminum and other
metals, glass fibers, pulp, fertiliser, hydrogen and other basic
chemicals, Reuters states.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2022.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
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