/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/220318.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Friday, March 18, 2022, Vol. 23, No. 50

                           Headlines



D E N M A R K

SGLT HOLDING: Fitch Raises LT IDR to 'B', Outlook Stable


F R A N C E

TARKETT PARTICIPATION: S&P Lowers ICR to 'B+', Outlook Negative


I R E L A N D

PALMER SQUARE 2022-1: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to EUR5MM F Notes
PALMER SQUARE: Fitch Gives Final BB+ Ratings to 2 Tranches
SHAMROCK RESIDENTIAL 2022-1: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating to G Notes


L U X E M B O U R G

ARMORICA LUX: Moody's Affirms B3 CFR & Alters Outlook to Negative


N E T H E R L A N D S

MAXEDA DIY: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT IDR, Outlook Stable
PEARLS (NETHERLANDS): S&P Assigns 'B' LT ICR, Outlook Stable


R U S S I A

DOM.RF BANK: Fitch Lowers LT Foreign Currency IDR to 'CC'
TRANSKAPITALBANK: Fitch Lowers LT Foreign Currency IDR to 'CC'
[*] Fitch Cuts LT Foreign Currency IDRs of 31 Russian Banks to 'CC'
[*] RUSSIA: Creditors Receive Sovereign Bond Coupon Payments


S P A I N

CAIXABANK PYMES 8: Moody's Ups Rating on EUR292.5MM B Notes From B2


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BEAUMONT MORGAN: Owed GBP12.3 Million at Time of Administration
CORBIN & KING: Shareholder Mulls Suit Against Knighthead Capital
CROUCH LOGISTICS: Tiered Charging Structure Hit Business
P&O FERRIES: 800 Staff Made Redundant, Rules Out Liquidation
STUDIO: Owed More Than GBP80 Million at Time of Administration

TM LEWIN: On Brink of Administration, Lines Up Advisers


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in Cyberspace

                           - - - - -


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D E N M A R K
=============

SGLT HOLDING: Fitch Raises LT IDR to 'B', Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded SGLT Holding I LP's (SGLT) Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B' from 'B-'. The Outlook is
Stable. Fitch has also upgraded SGL TransGroup International A/S's
(SGLTI) senior secured ratings to 'B+'/'RR3' from 'B-'/'RR4'.

The upgrade reflects a strengthening of SGLT's business and
financial profiles, with funds from operations (FFO) gross leverage
below 6.5x - which was Fitch's previous positive rating sensitivity
- supported by strong freight rates and organic growth as well as
through acquisitions.

The rating also captures SGLT's asset-light business model and
fairly diversified operations by geography, mode and end-customer
sector. The company operates in a highly competitive and fragmented
freight-forwarding market, but focuses on more high-end, complex
projects, which supports its competitive position in this niche
market.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Performance: SGLT posted record financial results in 4Q21,
driven by strong organic increase of activities for air and ocean
in the Nordics, North America and APAC as well as strong freight
rates. It substantially outperformed Fitch's conservative
projections that had reflected the inherent execution risks arising
from its aggressive growth strategy. Fitch views recovery in world
trade and stable performance from forwarding services to
non-governmental organisations through its aid, development &
projects (ADP) division as sustainable while record freight rates
are likely to moderate over time.

Improved Leverage Metrics: Continuous acquisition funding, offset
by supportive operational performance, will result in average FFO
gross leverage of 6.1x in Fitch's rating case for 2022-2025 with a
peak of 6.4x in 2023 and 2024. This is a significant improvement
from an average of 11.0x during 2017-2020, the main rationale for a
rating upgrade. However, Fitch expects the company's deleveraging
capacity will be constrained by its growth strategy.

Execution Risk Persists: Despite SGLT's emerging record of
successful integration of new businesses, cash flow visibility is
constrained by its acquisition strategy of less than homogenous
targets with different business risks, given the niche nature of
its business models. Execution risk is partly mitigated by
reasonable implied acquisition multiples that are either on a par
or marginally lower than SGLT's.

Small Scale in Specialty Niche: SGLT is a small but fast-growing
company in the freight-forwarding market, which is a rating
constraint. It operates in all main modes of transport. It focuses
on forwarding complex transportation projects and non-standardised
goods in a few chosen sectors, including food ingredients and
additives, fashion and retail, specialty automotive, and more
recently, coronavirus vaccine distribution. Its niche focus reduces
its direct competition with larger peers, but it remains exposed to
the highly competitive nature of the freight-forwarding sector.

Diversified Portfolio: Together with diversified logistics
solutions (by mode of transport and geography), SGLT serves more
than 20,000 customers with an average tenure among the 20 largest
of around eight years and no client accounting for more than 3% of
revenue. Its strategy focuses on complicated and time-critical
deliveries instead of price-sensitive bulk assignments. In
addition, SGLT provides forwarding services to non-governmental
organisations through its ADP division, which tends to be less
cyclical than commercial segments.

Asset-light Business Beneficial: SGLT's business model is
asset-light and capex needs are limited, which protect profit
margins and cash flows even with large declines in sales volumes.
The cost structure is flexible with a high share of variable costs
(mainly purchases of freight capacity). Fitch views freight
forwarding as less volatile than shipping with some margin
resilience against economic downturns. The asset-light business
model of freight forwarders provides flexibility to adapt to market
conditions.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Fitch sees SGLT's credit metrics as being in line with 'B' rated
peers'. The credit profile is supported by the diversification of
the group's end-customer portfolio by industry, which helps
mitigate and even offset the impact from the pandemic and economic
crisis. Fitch views SGLT's earnings as less volatile than that of
sole carriers, such as shipping companies, but the group's small
size of constrains its debt capacity.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

-- EBITDA growing to around USD200 million in 2025 from around
    USD100 million in 2021;

-- Fully debt-funded acquisitions of USD318 million over 2022-
    2025;

-- Cumulative capex of USD50 million in 2022-2025 in line with
    management guidance;

-- No dividend pay-outs to 2025.

KEY RECOVERY RATING ASSUMPTIONS

The recovery analysis assumes that SGLT would be reorganised as a
going-concern (GC) in bankruptcy rather than liquidated. Fitch has
assumed a 10% administrative claim.

GC EBITDA of USD92 million assumes a significant downturn in the
transportation industry. The assumed GC EBITDA is 15% lower than
SGLT's estimated 2021 EBITDA. The majority of SGLT's 140% annual
EBITDA increase in 2021 stems from inorganic growth, and M&A will
continue to play a key role in expanding its business. The 15%
haircut is Fitch's conservative assumption, reflecting inherent
execution risk in integrating new businesses and trading
under-performance in a distressed economic environment.

Fitch applies a distressed enterprise value (EV)/EBITDA multiple of
5x to calculate a GC EV, which is in line with the median for 'B'
companies in the sector.

The waterfall analysis output percentage on current metrics and
assumptions was 69%, which is commensurate with 'RR3', providing
one-notch uplift for the senior secured bond rating from the IDR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Successful implementation of growth strategy, resulting in FFO
    gross leverage consistently below 5.5x would result in an
    upgrade;

-- FFO interest coverage above 2.5x would result in an upgrade;

-- Positive FCF generation would result in an upgrade.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- FFO gross leverage consistently above 6.5x;

-- FFO interest coverage below 2.0x;

-- Negative free cash flow (FCF) through the economic cycle.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Adequate Liquidity: At end-2021, SGLT reported USD72 million of
cash in hand as well as USD 18 million of undrawn committed credit
lines, maturing in 2022. Following its EUR75 million of additional
bond issue in February 2022 Fitch does not see additional financing
needs in the short term, despite negative FCF after acquisitions.
SGLT is exposed to refinancing risks in the medium term, when all
its bonds mature in 2024 and 2025.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.



===========
F R A N C E
===========

TARKETT PARTICIPATION: S&P Lowers ICR to 'B+', Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term issuer credit rating on
Tarkett Participation, Tarkett's issuing entity, to 'B+' from
'BB-'; and its issue rating on Tarkett's EUR839 million and $72
million term loan B and EUR350 million revolving credit facility
(RCF) to 'B+' from 'BB-'.

The negative outlook reflects the risks that Tarkett's performance
and credit metrics might further deteriorate should high raw
material prices persist, or its Russian operations be severely
impaired by the economic tensions and sanctions.

French flooring manufacturer Tarkett, which generated about EUR220
million of S&P Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA in 2021, faces
unprecedented raw material price increases and uncertainty in its
Russian operations.

S&P said, "We anticipate material purchasing costs increase in
2022, mainly due to the rise in oil prices and supply chain
tensions. Half of Tarkett's raw materials are oil derivatives. The
company mainly uses polyvinyl chloride and plasticizers to
manufacture the products, which it also markets. Nylon is also an
important raw material. We also see significant price increases for
other raw materials, such as wood, which is used for Tarkett's wood
and laminate business. The rise in raw materials also boost
spending on the freight and logistics, as well as energy costs (10%
and 2% of the company's costs of goods sold, respectively). Raw
material prices already increased before the Ukrainian conflict,
and Tarkett budgeted an increase for purchasing costs of about
EUR220 million in 2022. However, the increase in purchasing costs
is likely to materially exceed that amount due to the recent sharp
rise in oil prices. We understand the company is in a position to
implement pricing initiatives, and demand for flooring and sport
surface remains strong. However, fully passing on price increases
is subject to a time lag of a few months in distribution channels
and longer (six months or more) for project-based activities. For
this reason, we believe that profitability will be further
depressed for most of 2022. The material prices increases in
Tarkett's products may also damper volumes."

The company's Russian operations will most likely suffer from the
geopolitical tensions. Tarkett generates about 20% of sales in the
Commonwealth of Independent States, Asia-Pacific, and Latin
America, of which half is from Russia. Tarkett has more than 1,500
employees in Russia and operates two production sites. The company
enjoys market leading positions and has very strong pricing power
in Russia, and which is more profitable than the rest of the group.
The Russian operations do not materially rely on Europe, because
most supplies come from Russia, and a vast majority of the
production is targeted to Russian customers. At this stage, we also
understand that the company is still able to make or receive
payments in Russia, although there could be restrictions on foreign
exchanges. S&P said, "However, we anticipate lower profitability
from that part of the group, because Russian operations will likely
suffer from lower volumes and the impact from the ruble's
depreciation in 2022. Tarkett also has one production site in
Ukraine. We expect significant disturbances for this production
facility. We understand that the Ukrainian production could be
relocated to another group manufacturing site."

S&P said, "We see significant downside risks to our base-case
scenario. In our view, the military conflict in Ukraine and
economic sanctions on Russia creates significant uncertainty to
Tarkett's performance. The ruble's strong depreciation adds
pressure to the group's profitability. In the next couple of years,
we believe that the local consumer confidence might weaken, leading
to lower demand for the company's flooring products. We also
believe that continued elevated raw material prices could further
weigh on profitability. In our base-case scenario, we assume that
an important portion of the EBITDA from Russia will be depressed in
2022. Overall, we assume an adjusted EBITDA of EUR170
million-EUR210 million in 2022, before recovering in 2023-2024.

"We forecast very limited or even negative FOCF in 2022. We
anticipate the depressed FOCF will result from the group's lower
profitability and slightly higher working capital linked to the
increase in the inventory values and the gradual recovery of the
commercial and sport segments. Tarkett will also pay the full-year
value of the term loan B interest. Management budgeted capital
expenditure (capex) of about EUR100 million in 2022, but anticipate
that management will likely curtail its plans to preserve cash
flows. While the capex reduction could benefit cash flow, we
believe that it could also prevent the company from making possibly
important operational investment.

"We forecast FFO to debt of 10%-15% in 2022-2023, which is
commensurate with our 'B+' rating. We also forecast an adjusted
leverage of 5.0x-6.0x in that same period, due to our projections
of lower EBITDA, and limited free cash flows."

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about
the extent, outcome, and consequences of the military conflict
between Russia and Ukraine.

Irrespective of the duration of military hostilities, sanctions and
related political risks are likely to remain in place for some
time. Potential effects could include dislocated commodities
markets -- notably for oil and gas -- supply chain disruptions,
inflationary pressures, weaker growth, and capital market
volatility. As the situation evolves, S&P will update its
assumptions and estimates accordingly.

The negative outlook reflects the risk that Tarkett's performance
and credit metrics might further deteriorate should high raw
material prices persist, or its Russian operations be severely
impaired by economic tensions and sanctions.

S&P could lower the ratings if the company's underperformance was
more pronounced than in our base-case scenario, due to further
inflationary pressure or higher than expected disturbance in its
Russian operations, such that:

-- FFO to debt fell below 12% for a prolonged period;

-- FOCF turned negative with no swift recovery; or

-- Liquidity came under pressure.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if:

-- FFO to debt trended toward 12%-15% in 2022-2023;
-- FOCF were sustainably robust; and
-- Liquidity remained sound.

ESG credit indicators: E-2, S-2, G-2




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I R E L A N D
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PALMER SQUARE 2022-1: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to EUR5MM F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to the notes issued by Palmer Square
European Loan Funding 2022-1 Designated Activity Company (the
"Issuer"):

EUR340,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR57,500,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2031,
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

EUR22,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

EUR27,500,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

EUR17,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

EUR5,000,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2031, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in Moody's methodology.

The Issuer is a static CLO. The issued notes will be collateralized
primarily by broadly syndicated senior secured corporate loans.
Moody's expect the portfolio to be 100% ramped as of the closing
date.

Palmer Square Europe Capital Management LLC (the "Servicer") may
sell assets on behalf of the Issuer during the life of the
transaction. Reinvestment is not permitted and all sales and
unscheduled principal proceeds received will be used to amortize
the notes in sequential order.

In addition, the Issuer has issued EUR33,700,000 of Subordinated
Notes due 2031 which are not rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Methodology underlying the rating action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2021.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The Servicer's investment decisions and management
of the transaction will also affect the debt's performance.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2021.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par Amount: EUR500,000,000.00

Diversity Score: 60

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2734

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.59% (actual spread vector of the
portfolio)

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 3.93% (actual spread vector of the
portfolio)

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 45.75%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 5.39 years (actual amortization vector
of the portfolio)

PALMER SQUARE: Fitch Gives Final BB+ Ratings to 2 Tranches
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Palmer Square European Loan Funding
2022-1 DAC final ratings.

     DEBT                  RATING              PRIOR
     ----                  ------              -----
Palmer Square European Loan Funding 2022-1 DAC

A XS2439765616       LT AAAsf   New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
B XS2439766184       LT AAsf    New Rating    AA(EXP)sf
C XS2439766341       LT A+sf    New Rating    A+(EXP)sf
D XS2439766697       LT BBB+sf  New Rating    BBB+(EXP)sf
E XS2439766853       LT BB+sf   New Rating    BB+(EXP)sf
F XS2439767075       LT BB+sf   New Rating    BB+(EXP)sf
Subordinated Notes   LT NRsf    New Rating    NR(EXP)sf
XS2439767232

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Palmer Square European Loan Funding 2022-1 DAC is an arbitrage cash
flow collateralised loan obligation (CLO) that is being serviced by
Palmer Square Europe Capital Management LLC (Palmer Square). Net
proceeds from the issuance of the notes are used to purchase a
static pool of primarily secured senior loans and bonds, with a
target par of EUR500million. The portfolio is fully ramped up and
is slightly above the target par.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B' Portfolio Credit Quality (Neutral): Fitch places the average
credit quality of obligors in the 'B' category. The Fitch weighted
average rating factor (WARF) of the current portfolio is 23.5.

High Recovery Expectations (Positive): Senior secured obligations
make up close to 100% of the portfolio. Fitch views the recovery
prospects for these assets as more favourable than for second-lien,
unsecured and mezzanine assets. The Fitch weighted average recovery
rate (WARR) of the current portfolio is 65.5%.

Diversified Portfolio Composition (Positive): The three-largest
industries comprise 34.9% of the portfolio balance, the top 10
obligors represent about 10% of the portfolio balance and the
largest obligor represents about 1% of the portfolio.

Static Portfolio (Positive): The transaction does not have a
reinvestment period and discretionary sales are not permitted.
Fitch's analysis is based on the current portfolio and stressed by
applying a one-notch reduction to all obligors with a Negative
Outlook (floored at 'CCC'). Post the adjustment, the WARF of the
portfolio would be 24.2.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- A 25% increase of the mean default rate (RDR) across all
    ratings and a 25% decrease of the recovery rate (RRR) across
    all ratings would lead to downgrades of up to five notches for
    the rated notes.

-- Downgrades may occur if the build-up of the notes' credit
    enhancement following amortisation does not compensate for a
    larger loss than initially assumed, due to unexpectedly high
    levels of defaults and portfolio deterioration.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- A 25% reduction of the RDR across all ratings and a 25%
    increase in the RRR across all ratings would lead to upgrades
    of up to three notches for the rated notes, except for the
    class A notes, which are already at the highest rating on
    Fitch's scale and therefore cannot be upgraded.

-- Upgrades could occur in case of a sustained better-than
    initially expected portfolio credit quality and deal
    performance, and continued amortisation that leads to higher
    credit enhancement for the notes and excess spread available
    to cover losses in the remaining portfolio. Upgrades of sub
    investment grade tranches could be more limited and may occur
    after significant amortisation of the senior tranches and
    sustained stable portfolio performance.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other nationally
recognised statistical rating organisations and/or European
securities and markets authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information or information on the risk-presenting entities.

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SHAMROCK RESIDENTIAL 2022-1: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating to G Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its credit ratings to Shamrock
Residential 2022-1 DAC's class A to G-Dfrd Irish RMBS notes. At
closing, the issuer will also issue unrated class RFN, Z and X
notes.

Shamrock Residential 2022-1 is a static RMBS transaction that
securitizes a portfolio of EUR574.8 million loans (excluding EUR2.4
million of loans subject to potential write-off). These consist of
owner-occupied and buy-to-let primarily reperforming mortgage loans
secured over residential properties in Ireland.

The securitization comprises two purchased portfolios, Bay and
Barrow, which aggregate assets from six Irish originators. The
loans in the Bay subpool were originated by AIB DAC, EBS DAC, and
Haven Mortgages Ltd., while the loans in the Barrow subpool were
originated by Ulster Bank Ireland DAC, Danske Bank A/S, and
Stepstone Mortgages Funding DAC.

S&P's rating on the class A notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal. Its ratings on the
class B to G-Dfrd notes address the ultimate payment of interest
and principal. The timely payment of interest on the class A notes
is supported by the liquidity reserve fund, which was fully funded
at closing to its required level of 2.0% of the class A notes'
balance. Furthermore, the transaction benefits from regular
transfers of principal funds to the revenue item (through 2.50%
yield supplement overcollateralization) and the ability to use
principal to cover certain senior items.

The cashflow results have improved since the preliminary ratings,
driven primarily by the improved credit profile of the secured
pool. S&P's BB+ (sf) and B+ (sf) ratings on the class E-dfrd and
class F-dfrd are one notch higher than what was assigned for the
preliminary ratings.

S&P said, "Our standard cash flow analysis indicates that the
available credit enhancement for the class C-Dfrd to F-Dfrd notes
is commensurate with higher ratings than those assigned. The
ratings on these notes also reflect their ability to withstand the
potential repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, including longer
foreclosure timing and higher defaults, as well as the number of
restructures in recent years. We also considered the impact of
potentially higher fees in the event of higher default levels,
leading to potentially higher servicing costs."

Cabot Financial (Ireland) Ltd. and Mars Capital Finance (Ireland)
DAC, the administrators, are responsible for the day-to-day
servicing.

At closing, the issuer will use the issuance proceeds to purchase
the beneficial interest in the mortgage loans from the seller. The
issuer grants security over all its assets in favor of the security
trustee. S&P considers the issuer to be bankruptcy remote under its
legal criteria.

  Ratings

  CLASS     RATING     AMOUNT (MIL. EUR )

  A         AAA (sf)      425.9

  B-Dfrd    AA+ (sf)       30.8

  C-Dfrd    A+ (sf)        28.0

  D-Dfrd    BBB+ (sf)     21.0

  E-Dfrd    BB+ (sf)      21.0

  F-Dfrd    B+ (sf)        8.4

  G-Dfrd    B- (sf)       11.2

  RFN       NR            11.2

  Z         NR            14.1

  X         NR             2.0

Dfrd--Deferrable.
NR--Not rated.




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L U X E M B O U R G
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ARMORICA LUX: Moody's Affirms B3 CFR & Alters Outlook to Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook to negative from
stable on Armorica Lux S.ar.l. (idverde), the parent company of
idverde. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the B3 corporate family
rating and B3-PD probability of default rating of idverde as well
as the B3 rating on the EUR335 million senior secured first lien
term loan B due 2028 and the EUR50 million senior secured first
lien revolving credit facility (RCF) due 2028.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The change in outlook to negative follows the announcement of the
company's 2021 full year unaudited results to its lenders, which
were weaker than Moody's expected, due to a number of material and
unexpected costs, including some exceptional items. In FY2021,
Moody's adjusted EBITDA was EUR59 million (EUR33 million including
all one-off costs) and lower than Moody's previous forecast of
EUR67 million, while adjusted debt was EUR540 million compared with
the EUR487 million that Moody's forecast. This led to an adjusted
debt/EBITDA of 9.1x for FY2021 significantly higher than the 7.3x
forecasted in July 2021 when Moody's assigned the rating.

These one-off costs also drove a deterioration in free cash flow
(FCF) and liquidity compared to Moody's expectations, with negative
FCF of EUR42 million for 2021, much weaker than the negative EUR13
million Moody's had initially expected. In addition to this, the
company has a limited track record of positive FCF generation.

The materiality and unexpected nature of costs incurred in 2021 in
such a short period of time also raises concerns regarding
management's credibility, track record and transparency of
information as well as management's controls and processes. These
are governance considerations in accordance with Moody's ESG
framework.

The one-off costs were primarily due to the weak performance of the
UK division in the creation and housebuilder segment, which was
impacted by a number of operational issues mainly during the second
half of 2021. These include lower volumes on the creation and
housebuilder segment due to management's decision to stop bidding
on large projects, outdated pricing catalogues used for new
projects, a cyber-attack which affected two weeks of work and
losses on some specific complex contracts due to unfavorable
on-site conditions.

The company's operating performance in other parts of the business
such as its maintenance segment as well as in France and Denmark
was ahead of expectations due to strong demand for their services,
but insufficient to offset the aforementioned unexpected cost
items.

Moody's expects idverde to achieve EBITDA (Moody's adjusted) of
around EUR70 million in FY2022 which will reduce leverage to around
8x while free cash flow (FCF) generation is expected to be slightly
negative for FY2022. This is under the assumption that the UK
operations will improve in line with budget, no material increase
in one-off costs and no deterioration in operating performance from
inflationary pressures due to indexation clauses embedded in most
of their contracts.

LIQUIDITY

Moody's considers idverde's liquidity to be adequate with cash
balance of EUR55 million and access to undrawn RCF of EUR30 million
as of December 2021. EUR20 million of the RCF was drawn during
FY2021 for bolt-on acquisitions. The RCF has a springing senior
secured net leverage covenant of 7.4x when the RCF is drawn by more
than 40%. idverde has ample capacity under this covenant given
senior secured net leverage (as per the SFA definition) was 3.4x as
at December 31, 2021. Moody's notes that there are no imminent debt
maturities but improvement in performance is required to avoid cash
outflows which can further weaken liquidity.

RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the company's weaker than expected
operating performance across its UK creation and housebuilder
division driven by management's poor execution and operational
issues. This has resulted in significantly higher leverage and
weaker FCF and liquidity than previously anticipated. As such, the
negative outlook also reflects the delay in deleveraging to around
7x by FY2023 instead.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

A stabilisation of the outlook would require idverde to improve its
operating performance in the creation and housebuilder segment such
that FCF generation is at least slightly positive, liquidity
improves and growth in EBITDA reduces leverage towards 7x in the
next 12-18 months.

The rating is weakly positioned but positive pressure could develop
in case idverde 1) reduces its Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA
sustainably below 6.0x; 2) generates positive cash flow generation
with FCF/debt of around 5%; and 3) maintains adequate liquidity.

Negative pressure on the rating could occur if the company's 1)
operating performance doesn't improve resulting in leverage
remaining sustainably above 7.0x; 2) free cash flow generation
continues to be negative; 3) liquidity becomes weak; or 4)
debt-funded acquisitions evidence a more aggressive financial
policy than currently reflected in the rating.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Services published in November 2021.

COMPANY PROFILE

Armorica Lux S.ar.l. is the parent company of idverde, a leading
provider landscaping services in Europe offering a broad range of
services for public or private clients across all segments
(creation and maintenance) and service types (e.g. design, mowing,
gritting). The company has a network of approximately 150 branches
covering France, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark and recently
Germany, employing more than 7,100 employees. Idverde has a highly
diversified customer base, with approximately 14,000 customers,
including both large and small public and private entities. In
2021, the company generated EUR839 million of revenue and EUR59
million of Moody's adjusted EBITDA.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================

MAXEDA DIY: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT IDR, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Maxeda DIY Holding B.V.'s (Maxeda)
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B'. The Outlook is
Stable.

The 'B' rating reflects Maxeda's limited size but leading position
in the DIY retail market in Benelux and resilience of its business
model. While Fitch expects demand will normalise above 2019 levels,
supported by new consumer and sustainability habits, Fitch is
assuming a post-pandemic slowdown and no material store network
changes.

Leverage remains high for the rating, especially after incurring
debt for a distribution to shareholders, but Fitch sees
deleveraging capacity to below 6.0x (funds from operations (FFO)
adjusted net leverage) from FY23 (year-end January). Fitch assumes
Maxeda's ability to pass on cost inflation to consumers and
proximity to its supply chain will keep adequate profitability,
with an EBITDA margin stabilising between 7.5% and 8%.

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation of adequate cash
flow generation once working-capital flows normalise, together with
a prudent financial policy. Further shareholder returns or material
M&A activity could weigh on the rating.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Market Leader in Benelux: The rating reflects Maxeda's leading
position in the DIY market in Belgium and the Netherlands, with
market shares of 44% and 24%, respectively, at FYE22. The company
operates 340 stores located in prime retail locations, and benefits
from strong brand awareness, creating a barrier to entry for new
competitors. Fitch believes online penetration of the DIY market
will remain limited compared with other non-food retail sectors,
such as apparel, driven by the greater technical complexity of
Maxeda's product offering and logistics. This should also help
limit the entry of potential competitors.

Resilient DIY Market: The pandemic has led to strong like-for-like
(LFL) revenue growth for DIY retailers as people spend more time in
their homes. Maxeda experienced an 8.2% yoy surge in sales in FY22
compared with FY20, despite store closures in the Netherlands for
four months. Fitch expects that, despite some slowdown, revenue
growth will remain strong and normalise above 2019 levels, due to
changing consumer needs resulting from higher in-home time and
growing sustainability awareness. This translates into low
single-digit LFL sales growth after the pandemic as DIY retains its
appeal to consumers.

Satisfactory Format Diversification: Maxeda focuses on two
countries but benefits from some diversification due to its three
store formats (city stores, medium box and big box) operated
through three brands (Praxis in the Netherlands, and Brico and
BricoPlanit in Belgium). These stores offer a large product
portfolio, including private labels (25% of total offering in
FY22). Maxeda has also invested in omni-channel capabilities in
recent years, notably through the creation of a dedicated
e-distribution centre. Fitch estimates that online sales growth
will remain limited relative to the overall business, as expert
advice in store is key for its customers.

High Leverage: Fitch forecasts FFO adjusted gross leverage to
remain high in FY22 following an EUR50 million tap but for it to
trend below 6.0x from FY23, showing some deleveraging capacity. The
latest tap exhausted most of its 'B' rating headroom, leaving
little scope for manoeuvre in the event of operational disruptions,
more adverse macroeconomic conditions than expected or an
aggressive financial policy. This is offset, in Fitch's view, by a
sustainable business model and limited execution risks in Maxeda's
own strategy.

Protected Profitability: Fitch expects the Fitch-adjusted EBITDA
margin to remain close to 8% over the next three years, around
150bp above the FY20 level. Such performance will depend on
management's ability to increase prices to absorb higher costs and
operational leverage given the pre-dominance of fixed costs. The
local supply chain anticipates limited disruption from the Russian
conflict, but inflation related to energy, staff and logistics will
be material. Maxeda's profitability remains solid relative to that
of close peers, such as Kingfisher plc (BBB/Stable), and for the
'B' IDR.

FCF Generation to Turn Positive: Free cash flow (FCF) was negative
in 2021, due to exceptional working- capital needs following
year-end store closure in the Netherlands and inventory
seasonality. Total negative change in cash was accentuated by an
EUR90 million share repurchase and an EUR10 million management
incentivised plan contribution. Fitch forecasts FCF margin to turn
positive from FY22 as Maxeda improves FFO margin with normalised
working-capital dynamics, stabilises capex and maintains a prudent
financial policy (despite no public commitments) after the special
return to shareholder, partly funded by debt.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Maxeda's closest peer is Mobilux 2 SAS (BUT; B/Stable), the French
furniture and decoration retailer. Both companies have a
satisfactory business profile for the 'B' category, with
market-leading positions in concentrated geographies. Fitch expects
Maxeda to generate higher EBITDA and FCF margins than BUT. Leverage
for both companies is comparable, although slightly higher for
Maxeda after the tap. FFO adjusted net leverage is forecast at 5.8x
in FY23 for Maxeda and 5.9x in financial year to June 2023 for
BUT.

Maxeda is rated one notch above The Very Group (B-/Positive), which
is similar in size and profitability, despite higher sales
expectations for the latter due to its prominent exposure to online
retail. Fitch expects The Very Group to deleverage towards 6.5x in
financial year to June 2022 from around 8.0x in FY20 on an FFO
adjusted gross leverage basis, close to Maxeda's metrics, hence the
Positive Outlook.

Kingfisher plc (BBB/Stable), the largest DIY group in the UK and
the second-largest in France (behind Groupe Adeo), has sales almost
10x larger than Maxeda's, leading to benefits from scale, market
presence and brand diversification, which provide some competitive
advantages, underpinning its 'BBB' rating. Profitability is
comparable between these two DIY retailers, although FFO adjusted
net leverage is materially higher at Maxeda than for Kingfisher,
which Fitch expects to normalise to around 2.5x by 2022-2023.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Sales to increase 7.3% in FY22, after mandatory store closures
    in the Netherlands resulted in a sales decline of 3.7% in
    FY21, followed by steady like-for-like growth of around 1.5%
    to FY24;

-- Broadly stable store portfolio;

-- Fitch-adjusted EBITDA margin recovering to 7.7% in FY22,
    assuming cost inflation is passed onto selling prices. Margins
    to stabilise at 8% in FY23-FY24;

-- Capex on average at EUR50 million per year to FY24;

-- Working-capital normalisation in FY22 and FY23 and low single
    digit cash inflow in FY24;

-- No further stock repurchases, dividends or M&A to FY24.

KEY RECOVERY RATING ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch assumes that Maxeda would be reorganised as a going-concern
(GC) in bankruptcy rather than liquidated. Fitch has assumed a 10%
administrative claim in the recovery analysis.

In Fitch's bespoke recovery analysis, Fitch estimates GC EBITDA
available to creditors of around EUR70 million. The GC EBITDA is
based on a stressed scenario reflecting, for example, a prolonged
downturn post-pandemic combined with sustained competitive
pressures and an inflationary environment.

Fitch continues to apply a distressed enterprise value (EV)/EBITDA
multiple of 5.0x, in line with comparable businesses such as BUT.

Based on the debt waterfall analysis, Maxeda's EUR65 million
revolving credit facility (RCF), which Fitch assumes to be fully
drawn on default, ranks super senior to the company's EUR470
million senior secured notes. Therefore, after deducting 10% for
administrative claims, the analysis generates a ranked recovery for
the senior secured bonds in the 'RR3' band, indicating a 'B+'
instrument rating with a waterfall generated recovery computation
(WGRC) of 53% (unchanged) based on current metrics and
assumptions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Further improvement in scale and diversification, together
    with better visibility over macroeconomic conditions, leading
    to an FFO margin above 5% and FCF margin above 3% on a
    sustained basis;

-- FFO fixed-charge coverage and operating EBITDAR/gross interest
    paid + rents sustained above 2.0x;

-- FFO adjusted gross leverage below 5.0x (net of cash: 4.5x) on
    a sustained basis or total adjusted debt/EBITDAR below 4.5x
    (net 4.0x).

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Significant deterioration in revenue and profitability
    reflecting, for example, incapability to pass on inflationary
    pressures to consumers;

-- FFO fixed-charge coverage and operating EBITDAR/gross interest
    paid + rents below 1.5x on a sustained basis;

-- FFO adjusted gross leverage sustained above 6.5x (net: 6.0x)
    or total adjusted debt/EBITDAR above 6.0x (net 5.5x);

-- FFO margin sustained below 3%;

-- Evidence that liquidity is tightening due to operational
    under-performance, large working-capital outflows, or further
    distribution to shareholders.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Satisfactory Liquidity: As of 31 October 2021, Maxeda had EUR25
million cash and cash equivalent (of which Fitch excluded EUR10
million for working-capital purposes) and full availability under
its EUR65 million RCF. Maxeda utilised EUR37.5 million of the RCF
during 4Q21 to fund working-capital needs, which it expects to
repay before 1H22.

Fitch forecasts adequate financial flexibility over the next four
years, on expected positive FCF. Fitch does not include further
shareholder distributions or M&A activity over the next four years
that could lead to an erosion of this liquidity buffer, and affect
the rating trajectory.

Maxeda has no near-term maturity as the super senior RCF and the
senior secured notes only come due in 2026.

ISSUER PROFILE

Maxeda is a leading DIY retailed in Benelux. It operates 340 stores
in prime retail locations (including 122 franchise-operated stores)
out of which 190 stores are in the Netherlands, 147 in Belgium and
three in Luxembourg.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

PEARLS (NETHERLANDS): S&P Assigns 'B' LT ICR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' long-term issuer credit and
issue ratings to Pearls (Netherlands) Bidco B.V. and the EUR1
billion equivalent term loan B (TLB) and EUR155 million RCF, with a
recovery rating of '3'.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that over the coming years
Caldic Group will gradually deleverage, reflecting the combined
group's solid top-line growth, improving profitability, and
continued strong cash flow generation.

Pearl (Netherlands) Bidco B.V. has acquired and merged Caldic
Holdco B.V. (Caldic) and GTM Holding S.A. (GTM), two specialty
focused distributors of chemicals and solutions to the life
sciences and industrial formulation markets owned by financial
sponsor Advent International, and operates the combined entity as
Caldic Group.

In November 2021, Advent international bought Caldic from Goldman
Sachs Asset Management and, as of March 1 2022, has merged the
company with GTM. Pearls (Netherlands) Bidco B.V. resulted from the
merger of Caldic and GTM, which are both owned by private-equity
firm Advent International, creating a well-positioned and leading
specialty chemical distributor focused on life ingredients and
industrial specialties, with operations across five continents. The
company will do business as Caldic Group. The financing of the
transaction included:

-- A EUR1 billion equivalent TLB, due 2029;

-- $300 million of second-lien senior secured debt, due 2030;

-- A EUR155 million RCF, due 2028 and assumed to be undrawn at
closing; and

-- EUR1.3 billion of common equity.

Caldic Group used the proceeds to fund the equity value of the
combined entity, refinance existing debt that is mostly at Caldic
Investment B.V. and GTM, and meet transaction costs, fees, and
expenses. The transaction closed on March 1, 2022. As a result, S&P
discontinued our ratings on Caldic Midco BV and Caldic Investments
BV.

S&P said, "We expect Caldic Group's S&P Global Ratings-adjusted
debt to EBITDA will stand at about 6.5x-7.0x in 2022 and 6.0x-6.5x
in 2023. We expect that solid revenue growth, mostly driven by
continued strong demand in key end markets and cross-selling
opportunities post transaction, combined with improving
profitability, will support gradual deleveraging. As such, we
expect that S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA will
decrease to about 6.5x-7.0x in 2022 and 6.0x-6.5x in 2023 from
about 7.3x at transaction close. We note that our assessment of
Caldic Group's financial risk profile is mainly driven by its
private-equity ownership and high adjusted gross debt, which we
estimate at about EUR1.35 billion at closing, with the undrawn RCF.
Our debt adjustments at transaction close include about EUR49
million of lease liabilities, EUR7 million of pension deficits, and
other adjustments for about EUR28 million related to factoring.

"We think Caldic Group's financial-sponsor ownership and
acquisitive strategy limit the potential for leverage reduction
over the medium term. We do not deduct cash from debt in our
calculation, owing to the company's private-equity ownership. In
the medium term, the financial sponsor's commitment to maintaining
adjusted debt to EBITDA sustainably below 5.0x would be necessary
for an improved financial profile assessment. We believe that cash
flow will be used to pursue bolt-on as well as strategic mergers
and acquisitions (M&A), in line with Caldic Group's acquisitive
strategy. Specifically, we expect that M&A will be focused on both
life-science and industrial end markets, mostly in North America
and Asia-Pacific."

Following the transaction, Caldic Group has a strong market
position as a global premium provider of value-added life sciences
and specialty industrial solutions. Caldic Group operates as one of
the main players in the fragmented specialty chemical distribution
market. The distribution of specialty chemicals and ingredients
accounts for about 60%-70% of its total business, with the
remaining part related to the distribution of commodity chemicals.
S&P said, "We believe that the company has a strong market position
in Europe and North America, especially in the food and pharma end
markets, and it is the leading independent provider of specialty
solutions and industrial chemicals in Latin America. Although about
one-third of the service offering relates to value-added solutions,
we expect that the company will increase this figure going forward,
especially focusing on customized product formulation, blending and
mixing, and increasing the number of own brands, which have higher
profitability."

S&P said, "We view Caldic Group's broad geographical and end-market
diversification as rating positive. The company generates about 41%
of its gross profit in Europe, with the remaining 35% in Latina
America, 19% in North America, and 5% in Asia Pacific. We believe
that this compares favorably with chemical distributors such as
Barentz and Azelis, which operate mostly in Europe and North
America, with emerging markets accounting for less than 15% of
total geographical exposure. Moreover, we view Caldic Group's
geographical exposure as well balanced, with life sciences and
industrials accounting for 52% and 48% of gross profit
respectively. Although we note that the company has some exposure
to more cyclical end markets such as oil and gas or auto, we
believe that this is well compensated by exposure to the resilient
and defensive food and pharma end markets, which account for more
than 40% of gross profit.

"We believe that Caldic Group benefits from a well-diversified
customer and principal base. With more than 25,000 customers and
2,700 suppliers, we view Caldic Group's concentration risk as very
limited." Specifically, the company has long-standing relationships
with its top-25 customers, which account for about 15% of gross
profit, and top-25 suppliers, which account for about 36% of total
procurement value. No individual customer or principal accounts for
more than 4% of the total exposure, which is better than other
players in the market.

The asset-light business model, flexible cost base, and efficient
operations, support strong profitability and cash flow. Only 10% of
Caldic Group's total operating expenses are fixed, with the rest
variable. This combined with low capital expenditure (capex)
requirements of about 1% of sales, supports profitability and cash
flow. Moreover, Caldic Group has higher profitability and a better
conversion margin than peers. S&P said, "We expect that EBITDA
margin will stand at about 10.5%-11.0% in 2022 and 2023, which is
better than the average for rated chemical distributors of about
8%-9%. We also note that Caldic Group's conversion margin averaged
40% for the past four years on a pro forma basis, which is higher
than the average for other rated peers at about 36%."

S&P said, "We view Caldic Group's limited size as a constraint to
our business risk assessment. Although the combined entity will
have larger scale of operations than Caldic Holdco B.V., narrowing
the gap with some competitors such as Azelis and IMCD, our analysis
acknowledges the highly fragmented nature of the industry with
increasing competition from larger players, such as Brenntag and
Univar. Therefore, despite Caldic Group's track record of an
acquisitive strategy, leading to sound growth management, we
continue to view the company's limited size and scope as a
constraining factor for the rating.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that Caldic Group will
continue to show resilient performance following the transaction,
showing profitability improvements, supported by good growth
prospects in its end markets and significant cross-selling
opportunities. We expect adjusted debt to EBITDA will gradually
decrease to about 6.5x-6.0x over the coming two years with
continued positive free operating cash flow (FOCF)."

S&P could lower the ratings if:

-- Caldic Group pursues larger-than-expected debt-funded M&A,
resulting in adjusted debt to EBTIDA materially exceeding 6.5x for
a prolonged period;

-- The group experiences adverse operational developments, such as
lagging growth in mature markets, lost market share, or
unanticipated one-off costs, leading to materially lower EBTIDA;

-- Caldic Group and its sponsor follow a more aggressive strategy
with regards to shareholder remuneration; or

-- Caldic Group reports neutral to negative FOCF, although S&P
views this as unlikely at this stage.

S&P believes that a positive rating action is remote at this stage,
given the high amount of debt in the capital structure. That said,
S&P could consider an upgrade if:

-- Caldic Group reduces gross debt using cash flow in the coming
years, leading to adjusted debt to EBITDA below 5x; or

-- There is a strong commitment from the owners to support
deleveraging and preserve credit metrics in line with a higher
rating.

Environmental, Social, And Governance

ESG credit indicators: E-2, S-2, G-3

S&P said, "Environmental and social factors have an overall neutral
influence on our credit rating analysis of Pearls (Netherlands)
Bidco B.V. The group is a specialty chemicals and ingredients
distributor focusing on several end markets, including the
pharmaceutical and food industries. It has several initiatives to
reduce its impact along the supply chain and increase the number of
sustainable products in its portfolio. Governance is a moderately
negative consideration, as for most rated entities owned by
private-equity sponsors. We believe the group's highly leveraged
financial risk profile points to corporate decision-making that
prioritizes the interests of controlling owners. This also reflects
generally finite holding periods and a focus on maximizing
shareholder returns."




===========
R U S S I A
===========

DOM.RF BANK: Fitch Lowers LT Foreign Currency IDR to 'CC'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded JSC Bank DOM.RF's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency (LTFC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CC' from
'B' and removed it from Rating Watch Negative (RWN). The Short-Term
IDR has been downgraded to 'C' from 'B' and removed from RWN.

This rating action considers the Presidential Decree of 5 March
2022, which could impose insurmountable barriers to banks' ability
to make timely payments on foreign- and local-currency (LC) debt to
certain international creditors in their original currency. While
the practical implementation of this decree remains unclear, Fitch
believes that the severely heightened risk is best reflected in
Fitch's 'CC' rating definition of "default of some kind appears
probable". The rating action also considers the risk of broader
intervention in the FC operations and deposits of the banking
sector.

The rating actions follow Fitch's downgrade of Russia's sovereign
ratings on 8 March 2022.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

DOM.RF's LTFC IDR now reflects, in line with other Russian banks,
Fitch's opinion that some form of default on FC financial
obligations or deposits is probable over the rating horizon, due to
restrictions imposed on FC financial obligation payments to certain
international creditors under the presidential decree or broader
intervention in the FC operations and deposits of the banking
sector.

Key Rating Driver 1

Fitch has downgraded DOM.RF's LTLC IDR to 'CCC-' from 'B' and
removed it from RWN. Fitch believes there to be a lower risk of
default in LC under the presidential decree. In accordance with
Fitch's policies, the issuer appealed and provided additional
information to Fitch that resulted in a rating action that is
different than the original rating committee outcome.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Indications that a default or default-like process has begun,
    for example, due to debt service payments being converted to
    LC or not being remitted to certain creditors or an extended
    deposit freeze.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Relaxation of FC and cross-border payment risks, and an
    upgrade of the Russian sovereign rating.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: KEY RATING DRIVERS

DOM.RF's Government Support Rating (GSR) has been revised down to
'no support' from 'b' and removed from RWN. The rating reflects
Fitch's opinion that there is no reasonable assumption that
extraordinary support will be forthcoming for senior creditors from
the Russian sovereign, given the presidential decree.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Not applicable as the GSR is at the lowest possible level.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- DOM.RF's GSR could be revised up in case of materially higher
    certainty about the propensity of the sovereign to provide
    support.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

Criteria Variation

Fitch has varied its criteria by not aligning the IDRs of JSC Bank
DOM.RF, which has no Viability Rating, with its GSR. Instead, the
bank's 'CC' LTFC IDR reflects Fitch's 'CC' rating definition that
"default of some kind appears probable" because of the risk of
broader intervention in the FC operations and deposits of the
banking sector. The bank's 'CCC-' LTLC IDR reflects Fitch's view
that there is a lower risk of default under the 5 March
Presidential Decree in LC given the bank's liability structure and
that this risk is better reflected in Fitch's 'CCC' rating
definition that "default is a real possibility".

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

TRANSKAPITALBANK: Fitch Lowers LT Foreign Currency IDR to 'CC'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded TRANSKAPITALBANK's Long-Term
Foreign-Currency (LTFC) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CC' from
'B' and removed it from Rating Watch Negative (RWN). The Short-Term
IDR has been downgraded to 'C' from 'B' and removed from RWN.

This rating action considers i) the Presidential Decree of 5 March
2022, which could impose insurmountable barriers to banks' ability
to make timely payments on foreign- and local-currency debt to
certain international creditors in their original currency. While
the practical implementation of this decree remains unclear, Fitch
believes that the severely heightened risk is best reflected in
Fitch's 'CC' rating definition of 'default of some kind appears
probable'; and ii) the risk of broader intervention in the
foreign-currency (FC) operations and deposits of the banking
sector.

The rating actions follow Fitch's downgrade of Russia's sovereign
ratings on 8 March 2022.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch has downgraded Transkapitalbank's Viability Rating (VR) to
'ccc-' from 'b' and removed it from RWN to reflect the sharp
deterioration in the operating environment for conducting banking
business, which has resulted in us revising the Russian operating
environment score to 'ccc-' from 'b'. Sanctions imposed by the US
and EU have materially increased financial market and economic
risks, meaning Fitch sees very high fundamental credit risk to
Russian banks' asset quality, solvency, funding and liquidity
profiles.

Key Rating Driver 1

The LTFC IDR is now one notch below the bank's VR.
Transkapitalbank's LTFC IDR now reflects, in line with other
Russian banks, Fitch's opinion that some form of default on FC
financial obligations or deposits is probable over the rating
horizon, due to restrictions imposed on FC financial obligation
payments to certain international creditors under the Presidential
Decree or broader intervention in the FC operations and deposits of
the banking sector.

Fitch has downgraded Transkapitalbank's Long-Term Local Currency
(LC) IDR to 'CC' from 'B' and removed it from RWN in line with the
downgrade of the VR. The rating reflects the severely heightened
risk of a default on the banks' LC debt obligations because of
potential restrictions imposed on LC debt payments to certain
international creditors under the Presidential Decree of 5 March.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- IDRs: Indication that a default or default-like process has
    begun, for example due to debt service payments being
    converted to LC or not being remitted to certain creditors or
    an extended deposit freeze;

-- VRs: Solvency or liquidity shortfall becomes probable, due to
    economic or financial market stress.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Economic and/or financial market stabilisation and a
    relaxation of FC and cross-border payment risks.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Government Support Rating (GSR) has been affirmed at 'ns'. The
rating reflects Fitch's opinion that there is no reasonable
assumption that extraordinary support will be forthcoming for
senior creditors from the Russian sovereign, given the bank's low
systemic importance.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Not applicable as the GSR is at the lowest possible level.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Upward revision of the GSR is unlikely given the bank's low
    systemic importance.

VR ADJUSTMENTS

The operating environment score of 'ccc-' is below the 'bb'
category implied score, due to the following adjustment reasons:
'sovereign rating' (negative), and 'macroeconomic stability'
(negative).

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

Criteria Variation

Where Fitch expects insurmountable barriers to Russian banks'
ability to make timely payments on financial obligations to certain
international creditors in their original currency and see a
material risk of broader intervention in the FC operations and
deposits of the banking sector, Fitch has capped Russian banks'
relevant IDRs below their VRs at 'CC', in line with Fitch's rating
definitions that 'default of some kind appears probable'. As such,
Fitch has varied its criteria to permit the VR of Transkapitalbank
to be above the bank's Long-Term IDRs where the latter are not
capped by Russia's Country Ceiling of 'B-', but rather by Fitch's
broader view of potential restrictions on payments in the banking
system.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

[*] Fitch Cuts LT Foreign Currency IDRs of 31 Russian Banks to 'CC'
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 31 Russian banks' Long-Term Foreign
Currency (LTFC) Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'CC' from 'B' and
removed them from Rating Watch Negative (RWN). The Short-Term IDRs
have been downgraded to 'C' from 'B' and removed from RWN.

This rating action considers i) the Presidential Decree of 5 March
2022, which could impose insurmountable barriers to banks' ability
to make timely payments on foreign- and local-currency debt to
certain international creditors in their original currency. While
the practical implementation of this decree remains unclear, Fitch
believes that the severely heightened risk is best reflected in
Fitch's 'CC' rating definition of 'default of some kind appears
probable'; and ii) the risk of broader intervention in the
foreign-currency (FC) operations and deposits of the banking
sector.

The rating actions follow Fitch's downgrade of Russia's sovereign
ratings on 8 March 2022.

Fitch has also downgraded the IDRs of the Belarus-based
Belgazprombank and OJSC Sber Bank to 'CCC' from 'B' following the
downgrade of Belarus to 'CCC' on 7 March 2022.

Following the downgrades of their IDRs and other ratings, Fitch has
withdrawn all ratings of PJSC Chelindbank, Credit Europe Bank
(Russia) Ltd and SEB Bank JSC for commercial reasons.

Fitch has withdrawn the Support Ratings of Belgazprombank and OJSC
Sber Bank as they are no longer relevant to the agency's coverage
following the publication of its updated Bank Rating Criteria on 12
November 2021.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

VIABILITY RATINGS

Fitch has downgraded all Russian banks' Viability Rating (VR) to
'ccc-' from 'b' (from 'b-' in Joint Stock Company Russian
Agricultural Bank) and removed them from RWN to reflect the sharp
deterioration in the operating environment for conducting banking
business, which has resulted in us revising the Russian operating
environment score to 'ccc-' from 'b'. Sanctions imposed by the US
and EU have materially increased financial market and economic
risks, meaning Fitch sees very high fundamental credit risk to
banks' asset quality, solvency, funding and liquidity profiles.

Fitch has downgraded the VRs of Belarus-based Belgazprombank and
OJSC Sber Bank to 'ccc' from 'b' following the downgrade of Belarus
and subsequent revision of Fitch's Belarus operating environment
score to 'ccc' from 'b' to reflect heightened sovereign and
macro-stability risks. Fitch views the bank's business- and
financial-risk profiles, and hence VRs, as highly correlated with
Fitch's assessment of Belarus's operating environment risk.

LTFC IDRs

Russian banks' LTFC IDRs are now one notch below their VRs, where
assigned. Russian banks' LTFC IDRs now reflect Fitch's opinion that
some form of default on FC financial obligations or deposits is
probable over the rating horizon, due to restrictions imposed on FC
financial obligation payments to certain international creditors
under the Presidential Decree or broader intervention in the FC
operations and deposits of the banking sector.

The 'CCC' Long-Term IDRs of Belarus-based Belgazprombank and OJSC
Sber Bank are driven by and aligned with their respective VRs.

In addition to their LTFC IDRs, the Long-Term Local-Currency (LTLC)
IDRs of Bank of China (Russia), China Construction Bank (Russia)
Limited, HSBC Bank (RR) LLC and ING Bank (Eurasia) JSC have been
downgraded to 'CC' from 'B' and removed from RWN. These banks'
IDRs, and the Long-Term IDR of SEB Bank JSC, are driven by
expectations of shareholder support, as reflected in the issuers'
Shareholder Support Ratings (SSRs). The SSRs have been downgraded
to 'cc' from 'b' and removed from RWN.

The SSRs and IDRs reflect Fitch's opinion that support is possible,
but can no longer be relied on. Fitch now sees a heightened risk
that shareholder support will not be available to support senior
creditors given high country risks, weaker prospects and
intervention risk in banks' FC obligations and/or deposits. Fitch
views the probability of support the same in both LC and FC.

The Long-Term IDR of ABH Financial Limited, the Cypriot holding
company of Joint Stock Company Alfa-Bank (Alfa), has been
downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC+' and removed from RWN. It is notched
down once from the VR of Alfa, reflecting the issuer's different
jurisdictions and the regulatory focus on the protection of bank
creditors at the Alfa level.

The Long-Term IDR and SSR of Gazprombank (Switzerland) Ltd have
been downgraded to 'CCC-' and 'ccc-' from 'B-' and 'b-',
respectively, and removed from RWN. The ratings are equalised with
the VR of Gazprombank, reflecting Fitch's view that it is a highly
integrated subsidiary, with an important role in providing services
that the parent bank has identified as either core or complementary
to its business.

The LTFC IDR of Sberbank Leasing has been downgraded to 'CC' from
'B' and removed from RWN, and is aligned with that of its parent,
Sberbank of Russia, but is also constrained by heightened Russian
FC payment risks. Sberbank Leasing is a highly integrated
subsidiary with an important role in providing services that
Sberbank identifies as core to its business. The LTLC IDR of
Sberbank Leasing has been downgraded to 'CCC-' from 'B' and removed
from RWN and is equalised with the VR of Sberbank of Russia,
reflecting the same high level of integration, but also lower
payment intervention risks in LC than in FC.

LTLC IDRs

Fitch has downgraded the following banks' LTLC IDRs to 'CC' from
'B' and removed them from RWN: AO Raiffeisenbank, Credit Bank of
Moscow, Expobank JSC, Gazprombank (Joint-stock Company), Home
Credit & Finance Bank Limited Liability Company, Alfa, Joint Stock
Company Russian Agricultural Bank, PJSC Bank Zenit, PJSC Rosbank,
Sberbank of Russia and Tinkoff Bank. The ratings reflect the
severely heightened risk of a default on the banks' LC debt
obligations because of potential restrictions imposed on LC debt
payments to certain international creditors under the Presidential
Decree of 5 March.

Fitch has downgraded the LTLC IDRs of other Russian banks with VRs
to 'CCC-' from 'B' and removed them from RWN. The ratings are in
line with the banks' VRs as Fitch sees a lower risk of default
under the 5 March Presidential Decree.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Russian banks and affiliates' IDRs: Indication that a default
    or default-like process has begun, for example due to debt
    service payments being converted to LC or not being remitted
    to certain creditors or an extended deposit freeze;

-- Russian banks' VRs: Solvency or liquidity shortfall becomes
    probable, due to economic or financial market stress;

-- Gazprombank (Switzerland) Ltd: Downgrade of Gazprombank's VR;

-- Sberbank Leasing: Downgrade of Sberbank's VR;

-- Belgazprombank and OJSC Sber Bank: Downgrade of Belarus's
    sovereign rating or, for IDRs, an increase in debt service or
    deposit intervention risk.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Russian banks: Economic and/or financial market stabilization
    and a relaxation of FC and cross-border payment risks;

-- Belgazprombank and OJSC Sber Bank: Upgrade of Belarus's
    sovereign rating;

-- Gazprombank (Switzerland) Ltd: Upgrade of Gazprombank's VR;

-- Sberbank Leasing: Upgrade of Sberbank's VR;

-- ABH Financial: Upgrade of Alfa's VR and lower holding company
    liquidity risks.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: KEY RATING DRIVERS

The SSRs of PJSC Bank Zenit, Public Joint-Stock Company MTS-Bank
and JSB Almazergienbank have been revised down to 'ns' from 'ccc+',
'ccc+' and 'ccc', respectively, and removed from RWN, following the
downgrades of their respective parents' Long-Term IDRs. The rating
action and SSRs reflect banks' moderate synergies with their
corporate shareholders (Zenit and MTS) and limited strategic
importance for the Republic of Sakha (Almazergienbank)

In line with Fitch's updated Bank Rating criteria, Fitch has
assigned SSRs of 'cc' to Belgazprombank and OJSC Sber Bank, one
notch below the VRs of Gazprombank and Sberbank of Russia,
respectively, reflecting their strong synergies with their
parents.

The Government Support Ratings (GSRs) of Russian banks have either
been affirmed at 'ns' or revised down to 'ns' from 'b' and removed
from RWN. The ratings reflect Fitch's opinion that no extraordinary
support will be forthcoming for senior creditors from the Russian
sovereign, given either the banks' the low systemic importance or
the Presidential Decree.

The SSRs of foreign-owned Russian banks have been downgraded to
'cc' from 'b', reflecting Fitch's opinion that support cannot be
relied on, given the level of intervention risk in the financial
obligations of the Russian banking sector.

Senior debt has been downgraded to 'CC'/'RR4', in line with
respective banks' IDRs, and removed from RWN. Prior to this
downgrade, Fitch corrected the Recovery Rating on the 'CCC+'/RWN
senior debt of Alfa Holding Issuance plc, an issuance SPV of Alfa
Financial Limited, to 'RR4' from 'RR6'.

Subordinated debt and AT1 debt has been downgraded to 'C'/'RR6',
two notches below their respective VR anchors, with the 'RR6'
Recovery Ratings reflecting expectations of poor recoveries. Prior
to this downgrade, Fitch corrected the Recovery Rating on
subordinated debt of SB Capital S.A., an issuance SPV of Sberbank
of Russia, to 'RR5' from 'RR6'.

AO Toyota Bank's guaranteed senior unsecured rouble-denominated
bond rating has been downgraded to 'CC' from 'BB+' and removed from
RWN. The bonds are guaranteed by Toyota Motor Finance Netherlands
BV (A+). However, payments to bondholders, including those made by
TMFNL pursuant to the guarantee, are made through the National
Settlement Depository. Consequently, Fitch believes this exposes
certain international bondholders to payment restriction risk under
the 5 March Presidential Decree. While the practical implementation
of this decree remains unclear, Fitch believes that the severely
heightened risk is best reflected in Fitch's 'CC' rating definition
of 'default of some kind appears probable.

OTHER DEBT AND ISSUER RATINGS: RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Senior debt ratings would likely be downgraded if respective
    issuers' IDRs are downgraded because a default-like event has
    begun. They would also be downgraded if it becomes clear that
    reoveries are likely to be below average or poor, for example
    due to an extended period of default under the Presidential
    Decree;

-- The SSRs of Belgazprombank and OJSC Sber Bank could be
    downgraded if the VRs of Gazprombank and Sberbank of Russia
    are downgraded;

-- The SSRs of foreign-owned banks could be downgraded if Fitch
    sees no support preventing default.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Senior debt ratings would likely be upgraded if respective
    issuers' IDRs are upgraded. Otherwise, they would only be
    upgraded in the event of very high recovery prospects;

-- GSRs of systemically important commercial banks could be
    revised up in case of materially higher certainty about the
    propensity of the sovereign to provide support;

-- Subordinated and AT1 debt ratings would likely require an VR
    upgrade, potentially of more than one notch for AT1s, or lower
    loss severity expectations;

-- The SSRs of Belgazprombank and OJSC Sber Bank could be
    upgraded if the VRs of Gazprombank and Sberbank of Russia are
    upgraded;

-- The SSRs of foreign-owned banks could be upgraded if
    intervention risks reduce in the Russian banking sector;

-- SSRs of PJSC Bank Zenit, Public Joint-Stock Company MTS-Bank
    and JSB Almazergienbank would require upgrades of respective
    shareholders' ratings and lower FC debt and deposit
    intervention risks to be upgraded.

VR ADJUSTMENTS

All Russian banks: the operating environment score of 'ccc-' is
below the 'bb' category implied score, due the following adjustment
reasons: 'sovereign rating' (negative), and 'macroeconomic
stability' (negative).

Belgazprombank and OJSC Sber Bank: the operating environment score
of 'ccc' is below the 'bb' category implied score, due the
following adjustment reasons: 'sovereign rating' (negative), and
'macroeconomic stability' (negative).

AO Raiffeisen Bank: the earnings and profitability score of 'ccc-'
is below the 'bb' category implied score, due to the following
adjustment reason: 'revenue diversification' (negative).

Bank Avers: the asset quality score of 'ccc-' is below the 'bb'
category implied score, due the following adjustment reason:
'non-loan exposures' (negative). The capitalisation score of 'ccc-'
is below the 'bb' category implied score, due to the following
adjustment reason: 'risk profile and business model' (negative).
The funding and liquidity score of 'ccc-' is below the 'bb'
category implied score, due to the following adjustment reason:
'deposit structure' (negative).

Gazprombank (Joint-stock Company): the business profile score of
'ccc-' is below the 'bb' category implied score, due the following
adjustment reason: 'business model' (negative).

Home Credit & Finance Bank Limited Liability Company: the earnings
and profitability score of 'ccc-' is below the 'bb' category
implied score, due to the following adjustment reason: 'revenue
diversification' (negative). The capitalisation score of 'ccc-' is
below the 'bb' category implied score, due to the following
adjustment reasons: 'leverage and risk-weight calculation'
(negative), and 'risk profile and business model' (negative).

Alfa: the business profile score of 'ccc-' is below the 'bb'
category implied score, due the following adjustment reason:
'business model' (negative).

Joint Stock Company Russian Agricultural Bank: the business profile
score of 'ccc-' is below the 'bb' category implied score, due the
following adjustment reason: 'business model' (negative).

LOCKO-Bank JSC: the capitalisation score of 'ccc-' is below the
'bb' category implied score, due to the following adjustment
reasons: 'size of capital base' (negative), and 'risk profile and
business model' (negative).

SDM-Bank PJSC: the funding and liquidity score of 'ccc-' is below
the 'bb' category implied score, due to the following adjustment
reason: 'deposit structure' (negative).

Sberbank of Russia: the business profile score of 'ccc-' is below
the 'bb' category implied score, due the following adjustment
reason: 'business model' (negative).

Tinkoff Bank: the business profile score of 'ccc-' is below the
'bb' category implied score, due the following adjustment reason:
'business model' (negative). The earnings and profitability score
of 'ccc-' is below the 'bb' category implied score, due to the
following adjustment reason: 'revenue diversification' (negative).

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

Criteria Variation

Fitch has varied its criteria by using parent banks' VRs, rather
than IDRs, as the anchor ratings to assess the SSR and IDRs of
Gazprombank (Switzerland) Ltd, the LTLC IDR of Sberbank Leasing and
the SSRs of Belgazprombank and OJSC Sber Bank. This is because the
parent banks' IDRs also capture risks of insurmountable barriers to
banks' ability to make timely payments on financial obligations to
certain international creditors in their original currency. Such
restrictions do not exist for domestic subsidiaries and Fitch sees
the restrictions on providing support to international subsidiaries
also as lower, based on statements in the decree.

Where Fitch expects insurmountable barriers to Russian bank's
ability to make timely payments on financial obligations to certain
international creditors in their original currency and see a
material risk of broader intervention in the FC operations and
deposits of the banking sector, Fitch has capped banks' relevant
IDRs below their VRs at 'CC', in line with Fitch's rating
definitions that that 'default of some kind appears probable'. As
such, Fitch has varied its criteria to permit VRs to be above
banks' IDRs where the latter are not capped by Russia's Country
Ceiling of 'B-', but rather by Fitch's broader view of potential
restrictions on payments in the banking system.

PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS

IDRs of Sberbank Leasing are linked to VR of Sberbank of Russia.
IDRs of ABH Financial Limited are linked to VR of Joint Stock
Company Alfa-Bank. IDRs of Gazprombank (Switzerland) Ltd are linked
to the VR of Gazprombank (Open Joint Stock Company)

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

DEBT                       RATING                            PRIOR
----                       ------                            -----
Banca Intesa

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CCC- Downgrade               B
                       LC ST IDR C Downgrade                  B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Shareholder Support cc Downgrade       b

Joint Stock Company Russian Agricultural Bank

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CC Downgrade                 B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b-
                       Government Supportns Revision Rating   b
                       senior unsecured LT CC Downgrade RR4   B

SB Capital S.A.

                       Subordinated LT C Downgrade RR6        B-

Alfa Holding Issuance plc

                       senior unsecured LT CC Downgrade RR4   CCC+


ING Bank (Eurasia) JSC

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CC Downgrade                 B
                       Shareholder Support cc Downgrade       b

AO Raiffeisenbank

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CC Downgrade                 B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Shareholder Support cc Downgrade       b

AO Toyota Bank

                       Guaranteed LT CC Downgrade RR4         BB+

Gazprombank (Joint-stock Company)

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CC Downgrade                 B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Government Support ns Revision Rating  b
                       senior unsecured LT CC Downgrade RR4   B

PJSC Chelindbank

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       LT IDR WD Withdrawn                    CC
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       ST IDR WD Withdrawn                    C
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Viability WD Withdrawn                 ccc-

                       Government Support ns Affirmed         ns
                       Government Support WD Withdrawn        ns

Home Credit & Finance Bank Limited Liability Company

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CC Downgrade                 B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Government Support ns Affirmed         ns

PJSC Rosbank

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CC Downgrade                 B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Shareholder Support cc Downgrade       b
                       senior unsecured LT CC Downgrade RR4   B

CBOM Finance PLC

                       senior unsecured LT CC Downgrade RR4   B
                       Subordinated LT C Downgrade RR6        CCC-

                       Subordinated LT C Downgrade RR6        CCC+


TCS Finance DAC

                       Subordinated LT C Downgrade RR6        CCC-


Novosibirsk Social Commercial Bank Levoberezhny, PJSC

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CCC- Downgrade               B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Government Support ns Affirmed         ns

Alfa Bond Issuance Public Limited Company

                       senior unsecured LT CC Downgrade RR4   B
                       Subordinated LT C Downgrade RR6        CCC-

                       Subordinated LT C Downgrade RR6        CCC+


Belgazprombank

                       LT IDR CCC Downgrade                   B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       Viability ccc Downgrade                b
                       Support WD Withdrawn                   4
                       Shareholder Support cc New Rating

SEB Bank JSC

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       LT IDR WD Withdrawn                    CC
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       ST IDR WD Withdrawn                    C
                       Shareholder Support cc Downgrade       b
                       Shareholder Support WD Withdrawn       cc

PJSC Bank Zenit

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CC Downgrade                 B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Shareholder Support ns Revision Rating ccc+

                       senior unsecured LT CC Downgrade RR4   B

Joint Stock Company OTP Bank

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CCC- Downgrade               B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Shareholder Support cc Downgrade       b

Eurasia Capital SA

                       Subordinated LT C Downgrade RR6        CCC-


SDM-Bank PJSC

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CCC- Downgrade               B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Government Support ns Affirmed         ns

Joint Stock Company Alfa-Bank

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CC Downgrade                 B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Government Support ns Revision Rating  b
                       senior unsecured LT CC Downgrade RR4   B

PJSC Bank Uralsib

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Government Support ns Affirmed         ns

Gazprombank (Switzerland) Ltd

                       LT IDR CCC- Downgrade                  B-
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       Shareholder Support ccc- Downgrade     b-

Tinkoff Bank

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CC Downgrade                 B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Government Support ns Revision Rating  b

LOCKO-Bank JSC

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CCC- Downgrade               B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Government Support ns Affirmed         ns

ABH Financial Limited

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    CCC+

                       ST IDR C Affirmed                      C

Expobank JSC

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CC Downgrade                 B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Government Support ns Affirmed         ns

Credit Bank of Moscow

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CC Downgrade                 B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Government Support ns Revision Rating  b

Bank Avers

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CCC- Downgrade               B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Government Support ns Affirmed         ns

China Construction Bank (Russia) Limited

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CC Downgrade                 B
                       Shareholder Support cc Downgrade       b

Primsotsbank

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Government Support ns Affirmed         ns

Sberbank Leasing

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CCC- Downgrade               B
                       Shareholder Supportcc Downgrade        b

HSBC Bank (RR) LLC

                       LT IDRCC Downgrade                     B
                       ST IDRC Downgrade                      B
                       LC LT IDRCC Downgrade                  B
                       Shareholder Supportcc Downgrade        b

JSB Almazergienbank

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CCC- Downgrade               B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Shareholder Support ns Revision Rating ccc

Bank Saint Petersburg PJSC

                       LT IDRCC Downgrade                     B
                       ST IDRC Downgrade                      B
                       LC LT IDRCCC- Downgrade                B
                       Viabilityccc- Downgrade                b
                       Government Supportns Revision Rating   b

JSC Asian-Pacific Bank

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B

                       LC LT IDR CCC- Downgrade               B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Government Support ns Affirmed         ns

OJSC Sber Bank

                       LT IDR CCC Downgrade                   B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       Viability ccc Downgrade                b
                       SupportWD Withdrawn 4
                       Shareholder Support cc New Rating

Sberbank of Russia

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CC Downgrade                 B
                       LC ST IDR C Downgrade                  B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Government Supportns Revision Rating   b

Public Joint-Stock Company MTS Bank

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Shareholder Supportns Revision Rating  ccc+


Credit Europe Bank (Russia) Ltd

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       LT IDR WD Withdrawn                    CC
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       ST IDR WD Withdrawn                    C
                       Viability ccc- Downgrade               b
                       Viability WD Withdrawn                 ccc-

                       Government Support ns Affirmed         ns
                       Government Support WD Withdrawn        ns

Bank of China (Russia)

                       LT IDR CC Downgrade                    B
                       ST IDR C Downgrade                     B
                       LC LT IDR CC Downgrade                 B
                       Shareholder Support cc Downgrade       b

[*] RUSSIA: Creditors Receive Sovereign Bond Coupon Payments
------------------------------------------------------------
Sujata Rao and Marc Jones at Reuters report that sovereign bond
coupon payments that Russia was due to make on March 16 have been
received by bondholders, in dollars, two market sources told
Reuters on Thursday, March 17.

Earlier another source told Reuters that JPMorgan, Russia's
correspondent bank, had received the funds from the government and
credited to Citi for paying on to bondholders.

It means Russia has for now dodged a sovereign default that could
have been caused by sanctions slapped on to punish it for invading
Ukraine, Reuters notes.




=========
S P A I N
=========

CAIXABANK PYMES 8: Moody's Ups Rating on EUR292.5MM B Notes From B2
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of Class B Notes
in CAIXABANK PYMES 8, FONDO DE TITULIZACION. The rating action
reflects the increased levels of credit enhancement for the
affected note.

Moody's affirmed the rating of the Class A Notes that had
sufficient credit enhancement to maintain their current rating.

EUR1,957.5M Class A Notes, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar
25, 2019 Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

EUR292.5M Class B Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar
25, 2019 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

CAIXABANK PYMES 8, FONDO DE TITULIZACION is a static securitization
of loans and current draw-downs under mortgage lines of credit
granted by CaixaBank, S.A.

Deposit Rating: A3/ Short Term Deposit Rating: P-2) to small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and self-employed individuals.

Maximum achievable rating is Aa1 (sf) for structured finance
transactions in Spain, driven by the corresponding local currency
country ceiling of the country.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is prompted by an increase in credit enhancement
for the affected tranche.

Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions

As part of the rating action, Moody's reassessed its default
probability and recovery rate assumptions for the portfolio
reflecting the collateral performance to date.

The performance of the transaction has continued to be stable since
last rating action in March 2019. Total delinquencies have
increased in the past year, with 90 days plus arrears currently
standing at 2.32% of current pool balance. Cumulative defaults
currently stand at 1.54% of original pool balance up from 1.35% a
year earlier.

For CAIXABANK PYMES 8, FONDO DE TITULIZACION, the current default
probability is 12.5% of the current portfolio balance and the
assumption for the fixed recovery rate is 45%. Moody's has
increased the CoV to 43.4% from 43.1%, which, combined with the
revised key collateral assumptions, corresponds to a portfolio
credit enhancement of 19%.

Increase in Available Credit Enhancement

Sequential amortization led to the increase in the credit
enhancement available in this transaction.

For instance, the credit enhancement for the tranche affected by
today's rating action increased to 14.9% from 7.5% since the last
rating action.

Counterparty Exposure

The rating actions took into consideration the notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as servicer, or account banks.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was 'Moody's Global
Approach to Rating SME Balance Sheet Securitizations' published in
July 2021.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) performance of the underlying collateral that
is better than Moody's expected, (2) an increase in available
credit enhancement, (3) improvements in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties and (4) a decrease in sovereign risk.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk, (2) performance
of the underlying collateral that is worse than Moody's expected,
(3) deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement and
(4) deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

BEAUMONT MORGAN: Owed GBP12.3 Million at Time of Administration
---------------------------------------------------------------
Grant Prior at Construction Enquirer reports that Manchester based
contractor Beaumont Morgan Developments went into administration
owing GBP12.3 million -- including GBP7 million to unsecured
creditors in the supply chain.

A statement of affairs lodged by administrator Begbies Traynor
highlights the scale of debts in the wake of Beaumont Morgan's
collapse in January, Construction Enquirer discloses.

According to Construction Enquirer, directors at Beaumont Morgan
blamed the contractor's demise on a number of factors including
delays on a design and build job in Sheffield which led to a legal
dispute with the structural engineers.

The business also boosted staff numbers to 70 and increased its
regional office network in anticipation of an increased pipeline of
work which failed to materialise, Construction Enquirer states.

A series of disputes with subcontractors also flared-up while
projects were also put on hold by the pandemic, Construction
Enquirer notes.

Begbies Traynor said Beaumont Morgan has more than 200 trade
creditors owed more than GBP7 million with little chance of them
seeing any of their money, Construction Enquirer notes.

The main secured creditor was Fortis UK Holdings Ltd who were owed
GBP4.4 million, according to Construction Enquirer.


CORBIN & KING: Shareholder Mulls Suit Against Knighthead Capital
----------------------------------------------------------------
Emily Hawkins at City A.M. reports that tensions between a London
restaurant goliath and its largest shareholder have once more
flared up as Minor International looks to sue a US investment
fund.

Jeremy King, who co-founded the operation behind Mayfair's the
Wolseley restaurant, has been embroiled in a tussle with Thai hotel
giant Minor International, City A.M. relates.

According to City A.M., Mr. King is hoping a GBP38 million rescue
package from US firm Knighthead Capital Management will mean the
group can slash its ties with its shareholder.

In the latest instalment, Sky News has reported that Minor
International has recruited lawyers at Linklaters to take legal
action against the US fund, City A.M. notes.

The Magic Circle firm reportedly alleges that Knightshead induced
King to breach his shareholder agreement, City A.M. states.

Sky News also claimed that Minor was working with law firm Mischon
de Reya, on an unrelated claim regarding King, City A.M. relates.

Earlier this year, Minor International had been hoping to be
granted an injunction to block a repayment, after the shareholder
forced Corbin & King into administration over a loan, City A.M.
recounts.

However, a judge ruled that Minor should not be granted the
injunction, meaning that Corbin & King could take up an offer to
repay loans to Minor, City A.M. discloses.


CROUCH LOGISTICS: Tiered Charging Structure Hit Business
--------------------------------------------------------
Chris Tindall at MotorTransport reports that Crouch Logistics was
hampered by a tiered charging structure which led to it losing
money on each of its drivers, every day, before it eventually
collapsed into administration and was sold back to its management
for GBP150,000, documents revealed.

The Lutterworth-based haulier had recovered from losing a major
contract worth GBP6.5 million in 2016 and turnover had returned to
around GBP11 million before Covid struck, MotorTransport relates.



P&O FERRIES: 800 Staff Made Redundant, Rules Out Liquidation
------------------------------------------------------------
William James and Muvija M at Reuters report that Britain's P&O
Ferries on March 17 made 800 staff redundant with immediate effect
and suspended crossings for the next few days, sparking a backlash
from politicians and unions who criticised plans to hire cheaper
agency workers instead.

According to Reuters, the shock move caused delays around Britain's
busiest port, Dover, and drew threats of a standoff as trade unions
urged their members to defy any instructions to leave P&O ships.
The government condemned the way P&O handled the announcement,
Reuters notes.

Owned by Dubai ports firm DP World, P&O is recovering from two
years of disruption when COVID-19 prevented tourists from
travelling on its routes between Britain, France, Ireland and
elsewhere in northern Europe, Reuters discloses.

P&O, which has almost 4,000 employees and operates more than 30,000
sailings a year, said it had lost
GBP100 million (US$131 million) year-on-year and the business was
no longer viable in its current form, Reuters relates.

"This is not sustainable," Reuters quotes a spokesperson for P&O as
saying.  "Our survival is dependent on making swift and significant
changes now. Without these changes there is no future for P&O
Ferries."

It said passengers should not travel to ports unless their journey
was essential, according to Reuters.

Transport union RMT said it had advised its members who worked for
P&O not to leave their vessels, Reuters recounts.  The union said
security guards with handcuffs were looking to board ships to
remove staff, Reuters discloses.

In March 2021, DP World reported an 11% jump in 2020 revenue and
said it would continue to invest in the segment even as it
acknowledged that P&O Ferries and Ferrymasters had been through a
"particularly challenging time" due to COVID-19, Reuters relates.

Separately, Reuters' Muvija M reports that UK-registered P&O
Ferries said it was not going into liquidation and is preparing to
make a company announcement, after the company told passengers it
was suspending services on March 16.

"P&O Ferries is not going into liquidation," Reuters quotes a
company spokesperson as saying in a statement.
"We have asked all ships to come alongside, in preparation for a
company announcement. Until then, services from P&O will not be
running and we are advising travellers of alternative
arrangements."


STUDIO: Owed More Than GBP80 Million at Time of Administration
--------------------------------------------------------------
Sahar Nazir at Retail Gazette reports that Studio owed more than
GBP80 million when it fell into administration and was sold to Mike
Ashley's Frasers Group for just GBP1.

According to Retail Gazette, new documents submitted to Companies
House by administrators Teneo show the total consideration for the
group was GBP1 as well as the release of GBP53.1 million of secured
liabilities under its revolving credit facility and ancillary
facilities.

Frasers Group bought Studio's secured lenders' claims against it
for around GBP26.8 million, Retail Gazette discloses.

Studio also owed around GBP4.7 million to HMRC and about GBP1,100
to employees for holiday pay and pension contributions, Retail
Gazette states.

Teneo said it is waiting for a directors' statement regarding how
much is owed to unsecured creditors and that "there may be funds
available to distribute to unsecured creditors", Retail Gazette
notes.

The document showed the firm saw "considerable supply chain
disruption" during the six months to December 2021, which delayed
the receipt of stock into the UK resulting in an inability to meet
customer demand and the loss of sales throughout the group's peak,
pre-Christmas trading period, Retail Gazette relays.

Studio requested HSBC to extend its funding facility in January,
but the request was denied, according to Retail Gazette.


TM LEWIN: On Brink of Administration, Lines Up Advisers
-------------------------------------------------------
According to Retail Gazette's Sahar Nazir TM Lewin is reportedly on
the verge of administration as it considers lining up advisers to
handle the process.

Lenders to the company are on the verge of appointing Interpath
Advisory to handle an insolvency process, Sky News discloses.

TM Lewin was bought by Torque Brands in May 2020 and is close to
collapsing into administration for the second time in less than two
years, Sky News recounts.

Torque Capital had been unable to meet a recent demand for funding,
Retail Gazette relays, citing Sky News.

Administrators could be appointed as early as this week, Sky News
states.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in Cyberspace
-------------------------------------------------------------
Author: Warren E. Agin
Publisher: Bowne Publishing Co.
List price: $225.00
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher

Red Hat Inc. finds itself with a high of 151 5/8 and low of 20 over
the last 12 months! Microstrategy Inc. has roller-coasted from a
high of 333 to a low of 7 over the same period! Just when the IPO
boom is imploding and high-technology companies are running out of
cash, Warren Agin comes out with a guide to the legal issues of the
cyberage.

The word "cyberspace" did not appear in the Merriam-Webster
Dictionary until 1986, defined as "the on-line world of computer
networks." The word "Internet" showed up that year as well, as "an
electronic communications network that connects computer networks
and organizational computer facilities around the world."
Cyberspace has been leading a kaleidoscopic parade ever since, with
the legal profession striding smartly in rhythm. There is no
definition for the word "cyberassets" in the current
Merriam-Webster. Fortunately, Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in
Cyberspace tells us what cyberassets are and lays out in meticulous
detail how to address them, not only for troubled technology
companies, but for all companies with websites and domain names.
Cyberassets are primarily websites and domain names, but also
include technology contracts and licenses. There are four types of
assets embodied in a website: content, hardware, the Internet
connection, and software. The website's content is its fundamental
asset and may include databases, text, pictures, and video and
sound clips. The value of a website depends largely on the traffic
it generates.

A domain name provides the mechanism to reach the information
provided by a company on its website, or find the products or
services the company is selling over the Internet. Examples are
Amazon.com, bankrupt.com, and "swiggartagin.com." Determining the
value of a domain name is comparable to valuing trademark rights.
Domain names can come at a high price! Compaq Computer Corp. paid
Alta Vista Technology Inc. more than $3 million for "Altavista.com"
when it developed its AltaVista search engine.

The subject matter covered in this book falls into three groups:
the Internet's effect on the practice of bankruptcy law; the ways
substantive bankruptcy law handles the impact of cyberspace on
basic concepts and procedures; and issues related to cyberassets as
secured lending collateral.

The book includes point-by-point treatment of the effect of
cyberassets on venue and jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings;
electronic filing and access to official records and pleadings in
bankruptcy cases; using the Internet for communications and
noticing in bankruptcy cases; administration of bankruptcy estates
with cyberassets; selling bankruptcy estate assets over the
Internet; trading in bankruptcy claims over the Internet; and
technology contracts and licenses under the bankruptcy codes. The
chapters on secured lending detail technology escrow agreements for
cyberassets; obtaining and perfecting security interests for
cyberassets; enforcing rights against collateral for cyberassets;
and bankruptcy concerns for the secured lender with regard to
cyberassets.

The book concludes with chapters on Y2K and bankruptcy; revisions
in the Uniform Commercial Code in the electronic age; and a
compendium of bankruptcy and secured lending resources on the
Internet. The appendix consists of a comprehensive set of forms for
cyberspace-related bankruptcy issues and cyberasset lending
transactions. The forms include bankruptcy orders authorizing a
domain name sale; forms for electronic filing of documents;
bankruptcy motions related to domain names; and security agreements
for Web sites.

Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in Cyberspace is a well-written,
succinct, and comprehensive reference for lending against
cyberassets and treating cyberassets in bankruptcy cases.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2022.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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                * * * End of Transmission * * *