/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/220111.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Tuesday, January 11, 2022, Vol. 23, No. 2

                           Headlines



F R A N C E

OGF: Creditors Agree to Extend Deadline to Repay Borrowings


G E R M A N Y

UNIPER: Forced to Seek EUR10 Billion in New Credit Lines


N E T H E R L A N D S

JUBILEE PLACE 3: Moody's Gives (P)Ca Rating to Class X2 Notes
JUBILEE PLACE 3: S&P Puts Prelim B- (sf) Rating to Cl. X1, X2 Notes


S L O V E N I A

BREST: Factory Sold for EUR4.6 Million at Auction


S P A I N

[*] SPAIN: 2021 Bankruptcies Up 31% Despite Insolvency Moratorium


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

GREENSILL: Credit Suisse Disputes Son's Account of Katerra Deal
SIG PLC: S&P Assigns 'B+' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
TOGETHER ENERGY: Warrington May Face Up to GBP52MM Financial Hit
TOWER BRIDGE 2022-1: S&P Assigns Prelim B- (sf) Rating to X Notes

                           - - - - -


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F R A N C E
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OGF: Creditors Agree to Extend Deadline to Repay Borrowings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Lucca de Paoli at Bloomberg News reports that French funeral firm
OGF has been given an extension to repay borrowings.

Lenders including Ares, KKR and M&G agreed to give OGF more time to
pay its EUR1 billion debt, Bloomberg relays, citing a person
familiar with the situation.

The firm, owned by the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board, won
consent from its pool of creditors to extend its debt maturity to
2025 from 2023, Bloomberg discloses.

OGF, which carries out almost a fifth of all funerals in France,
put a turnaround plan in place early last year, in a bid to boost
growth and claw back lost market share, Bloomberg recounts.



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G E R M A N Y
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UNIPER: Forced to Seek EUR10 Billion in New Credit Lines
--------------------------------------------------------
Erika Solomon, Neil Hume and Olaf Storbeck at The Financial Times
report that German utility Uniper's admission that it had been
forced to seek EUR10 billion in new credit lines was a stark
reminder that the threat posed by Europe's energy crisis is not
limited to consumers.

The dash for cash last week by one of Europe's largest energy
companies comes as unprecedented rises in natural gas and power
prices prompt a sudden swelling of its liabilities on futures
contracts, the FT relates.

With state-backed lender KfW providing EUR2 billion of the mammoth
financing alongside EUR8 billion from Uniper's Finnish owner
Fortum, bankers now fear a scramble for credit among the region's
smaller companies as private-sector banks back away, the FT
discloses.

European gas prices have surged more than 400% over the past year,
as demand rebounded from the pandemic and Asian customers snapped
up additional cargoes of liquefied natural gas, the FT relates.

At the same, Russia's Gazprom has restricted sales only to those
covered by long-term contracts, while letting its storage
facilities in Europe drop to unusually low levels, the FT states.
More than a third of the EU's gas supplies come from Russia, the FT
notes.

German energy companies say Uniper's huge financing needs were not
unique, according to the FT.




=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================

JUBILEE PLACE 3: Moody's Gives (P)Ca Rating to Class X2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to Notes
to be issued by Jubilee Place 3 B.V.:

EUR [] M Class A Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due January
2059, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR [] M Class B Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due January
2059, Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

EUR [] M Class C Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due January
2059, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

EUR [] M Class D Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due January
2059, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

EUR [] M Class E Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due January
2059, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

EUR [] M Class X1 Notes due January 2059, Assigned (P)B1 (sf)

EUR [] M Class X2 Notes due January 2059, Assigned (P)Ca (sf)

The EUR [] M VRR Loan due January 2059, the Class S1 Notes, and the
Class S2 Notes have not been rated by Moody's.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Notes are backed by a pool of Dutch buy-to-let ("BTL") mortgage
loans originated by Dutch Mortgage Services B.V. ("DMS", NR), DNL 1
B.V. ("DNL", NR) and Community Hypotheken B.V. ("Community", NR).
The securitised portfolio consists of 1,076 mortgage loans with a
current balance of EUR 314.0 million as of 31 October 2021.  The
VRR Loan is a risk retention Note which receives 5% of all
available receipts, while the remaining Notes receive 95% of the
available receipts on a pari-passu basis.

The ratings of the Notes are based on an analysis of the
characteristics and credit quality of the underlying buy-to-let
mortgage pool, sector wide and originator specific performance
data, protection provided by credit enhancement, the roles of
external counterparties and the structural features of the
transaction.

There is a liquidity reserve funded at closing at 0.75% of the
outstanding balance of Class A Notes. After closing, principal
receipts will be used to build up the reserve fund to a maximum of
1.25% of Class A Notes until the step-up date (including that
date). Following the step-up date, the liquidity is amortising to
1.25% of outstanding Class A Notes and the released amounts are
added to the principal waterfall.

MILAN CE for this pool is 19.0% and the expected loss is 2.8%.

The portfolio's expected loss is 2.8%, which is in line with other
Dutch BTL RMBS transactions owing to: (i) that no historical
performance data for the originator's portfolio is available and
the limited track record of the Dutch BTL market as a whole; (ii)
the performance of comparable originators in the Dutch
owner-occupied and UK BTL market; (iii) the current macroeconomic
environment in the Netherlands; and (iv) benchmarking with a small
sample of similar Dutch BTL transactions.

MILAN CE for this pool is 19.0%, which is in line with other Dutch
BTL RMBS transactions, owing to: (i) that no historical performance
data for the originator's portfolio is available and the limited
track record of the Dutch BTL market as a whole; (ii) benchmarking
with comparable transactions in the Dutch owner-occupied and UK BTL
market; (iii) the WA current LTV for the pool of 72.5%; (iv) high
borrower concentration, with top 20 borrowers constituting 13.3% of
the pool; (v) the high interest only (IO) loan exposure (all loans
feature an optionality to become IO loans after reaching 75.0% LTV
as per a new physical valuation), with significant maturity
concentration; and (vi) benchmarking with a small sample of similar
Dutch BTL transactions.

Operational Risk Analysis: Link Asset Services (Netherlands) B.V.
has been appointed as MPT Servicer by the three master servicers
(DMS, DNL, Community) in the transaction whilst Citibank N.A.,
London Branch, will be acting as the cash manager. In order to
mitigate the operational risk, Vistra Capital Markets (Netherlands)
N.V. (NR) will act as back-up servicer facilitator. To ensure
payment continuity over the transaction's lifetime, the transaction
documentation incorporates estimation language whereby the cash
manager can use the three most recent servicer reports available to
determine the cash allocation in case no servicer report is
available. The transaction also benefits from over 3 quarters of
liquidity for Class A based on Moody's calculations. Finally, there
is principal to pay interest as an additional source of liquidity
for the Classes A to E (when the relevant tranche becomes the most
senior Class of Notes outstanding).

Interest Rate Risk Analysis: 98.5% of the loans in the pool are
fixed rate loans reverting to 3m EURIBOR. The Notes are floating
rate securities with reference to 3M EURIBOR. To mitigate the
fixed-floating mismatch between fixed-rate assets and floating
liabilities, there will be a scheduled notional fixed-floating
interest rate swap provided by BNP Paribas (Aa3(cr)/P-1(cr)).

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Significantly different actual losses compared with Moody's
expectations at close due to either a change in economic conditions
from Moody's central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic performance
factors would lead to rating actions. For instance, should economic
conditions be worse than forecast, the higher defaults and loss
severities resulting from a greater unemployment rate, worsening
household affordability and a weaker housing market could result in
a downgrade of the ratings. Deleveraging of the capital structure
and therefore an improvement in the Notes' available credit
enhancement could result in an upgrade of the ratings.

JUBILEE PLACE 3: S&P Puts Prelim B- (sf) Rating to Cl. X1, X2 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned preliminary credit ratings to Jubilee
Place 3 B.V.'s class A notes and class B-Dfrd to X2-Dfrd interest
deferrable notes.

Jubilee Place 3 is a RMBS transaction that securitizes a portfolio
comprising EUR350.6 million of buy-to-let (BTL) mortgage loans
secured on properties located in the Netherlands. This is the third
Jubilee Place transaction, following Jubilee Place 2020-1 and
2021-1, which were also rated by S&P Global Ratings.

The loans in the pool were originated by DNL 1 B.V. (DNL; 27.6%;
trading as Tulp), Dutch Mortgage Services B.V. (DMS; 55.7%; trading
as Nestr), and Community Hypotheken B.V. (Community; 16.7%; trading
as Casarion).

All three originators are new lenders in the Dutch BTL market, with
a very limited track record. However, the key characteristics and
performance to date of their mortgage books are similar with peers.
Moreover, Citibank N.A., London Branch, maintains significant
oversight in operations, and due diligence is conducted by an
external company, Fortrum, which completes an underwriting audit of
all the loans for each lender before a binding mortgage offer can
be issued.

At closing, the issuer will use the issuance proceeds to purchase
the full beneficial interest in the mortgage loans from the seller.
The issuer will grant security over all its assets in favor of the
security trustee.

Of the preliminary pool, no loans have been granted payment
holidays due to COVID-19.

Citibank will retain an economic interest in the transaction in the
form of a vertical risk retention (VRR) loan note accounting for 5%
of the pool balance at closing. The remaining 95% of the pool will
be funded through the proceeds of the mortgage-backed rated notes.

S&P considers the collateral to be prime, based on the originators'
conservative lending criteria, and the absence of loans in arrears
in the preliminary pool.

Credit enhancement for the rated notes will consist of
subordination from the closing date and the liquidity reserve fund,
with any excess amount over the target being released to the
principal priority of payments.

The class A notes will benefit from liquidity support in the form
of a liquidity reserve, and the class A and B-Dfrd through E-Dfrd
notes will benefit from the ability of principal to be used to pay
interest, provided that, in the case of the class B-Dfrd to E-Dfrd
notes, they are the most senior class outstanding.

There are no rating constraints in the transaction under S&P's
counterparty, operational risk, or structured finance sovereign
risk criteria. S&P considers the issuer to be bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings

  CLASS      RATING     CLASS SIZE (%)*

   A         AAA (sf)       87.75
   B-Dfrd    AA (sf)         5.75
   C-Dfrd    A (sf)          3.25
   D-Dfrd    BBB (sf)        2.25
   E-Dfrd    BB+ (sf)        1.00
   X1-Dfrd   B- (sf)         4.00
   X2-Dfrd   B- (sf)         1.00
   S1        NR               N/A
   S2        NR               N/A
   R         NR               N/A

*As a percentage of 95% of the pool for the class A to X2-Dfrd
notes.
NR--Not rated.
N/A--Not applicable




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S L O V E N I A
===============

BREST: Factory Sold for EUR4.6 Million at Auction
-------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that Slovenian furniture company Brest's insolvency
administrators sold its factory at an auction for EUR4.6 million
(US$5.2 million).

The payment deadline is three months and the contract must be
signed within three working days, public broadcaster RTV quoted
insolvency administrator Andrej Razdrih as saying on Jan. 6,
SeeNews relates.

According to SeeNews, RTV reported the buyer showed up at the last
minute, as none of the potential bidders had paid the deposit by
Jan. 5, but no information about its identity was disclosed.

RTV said the initial price for the 63,000 sq m complex, including
machinery and equipment, was set at EUR5.1 million at the beginning
of last year, SeeNews notes.

Brest entered insolvency proceedings in December 2016 when it had a
workforce of about a hundred employees, SeeNews recounts.  The
insolvency administration acknowledged EUR14.7 million of debt to
creditors, SeeNews discloses.



=========
S P A I N
=========

[*] SPAIN: 2021 Bankruptcies Up 31% Despite Insolvency Moratorium
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Alejandra Olcese at CVBJ.biz reports that aid to companies and the
insolvency moratorium have not prevented tenders from growing by
31%.

According to CVBJ.biz, the impact of the pandemic on the productive
fabric has caused that in 2021 a total of 5,496 companies have been
doomed to bankruptcy, despite the fact that the Government approved
the granting of aid for companies affected by the pandemic and has
kept the obligation for companies to present a tender when reaching
a situation of insolvency and not being able to cope with debts.

This means that, despite the fact that companies do not have this
duty to file for bankruptcy and can continue to operate despite
their inability to pay debts, many of them have opted for this
route in light of the situation they suffer, CVBJ.biz states.  In
fact, the volume of contests has grown by 31% compared to 2020,
CVBJ.biz relays, citing data published on Jan. 7 by the business
information services firm Axesor.

Of these companies in competition -- whose financial situation has
been frozen -- many will end in bankruptcy and liquidation, while
others will get the suspension of your payments and they will move
on, according to CVBJ.biz.

By autonomous communities, Catalonia autonomy has been the leader
in competitions, with 1,373, 38.4% more than in 2020 (1,162 in
Barcelona, 89 in Gerona, 32 in Lrida and 90 in Tarragona); closely
followed by Madrid's community, with 1,256 contests, 38.1% more,
CVBJ.biz discloses.

In relative terms, there have been other regions with higher
percentage increases in the year, such as the Comunidad Foral de
Navarra (+ 73.7%), Castilla-La Mancha (+ 50.5%) or Castilla y Len
(45.2%), CVBJ.biz states.

Regarding the sectors of activity, the companies of the Commerce --
both wholesale and retail -- and vehicle repair were the ones that
had the greatest difficulties, with a total of 1,090 companies that
declared contest, CVBJ.biz relates.

It is followed by construction, with 837 contests, and the
hotelier, with 801, CVBJ.biz states.  This last sector was the one
that suffered the greatest increase in the number of tenders
compared to 2020, of the 85.8%, as well as the water supply,
sanitation, waste management and decontamination activities, where
tenders grew 77.7%, CVBJ.biz notes.

According to CVBJ.biz, the bankruptcy moratorium, that has not been
applied in other European countries, remain in force until June 30,
2022, with the objective that "viable companies under normal market
conditions have legal instruments that allow them to maintain their
activity and employment and have an additional margin to
reestablish their equity balance", as explained by the Executive
when extending Law 16/2020.

This extension, however, raises risks that have been highly
criticized by bankruptcy administrators and by institutions such as
the Bank of Spain, CVBJ.biz discloses.

According to CVBJ.biz, some examples are the possibility that there
is a judicial collapse the day the moratorium is lifted, or that
companies are not taking sufficient measures to guarantee their
survival and therefore increase the number of zombie companies in
the country.

"The bankruptcy moratorium, if prolonged in time, can contribute to
a higher survival rate of unviable companies, which, in the absence
of certain financial support measures (bank refinancing or new
credit from their contractual counterparts), will disappear in a
short period of time. In the economic literature, these companies
are often referred to as zombie companies", CVBJ.biz quotes the
supervisor when learning the extension of this measure as saying.




===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

GREENSILL: Credit Suisse Disputes Son's Account of Katerra Deal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Owen Walker at The Financial Times reports that Credit Suisse is
disputing SoftBank founder Masayoshi Son's account of a
controversial deal the Japanese group struck with Greensill
Capital, as once-close ties between the companies turn increasingly
bitter.

The Swiss bank last month launched legal action in the US over
US$440 million owed to its wealthy clients by Katerra, a
Californian construction group that was backed by SoftBank's US$100
billion Vision Fund and also a client of supply chain finance group
Greensill, the FT recounts.

The dispute centres on an emergency cash injection that SoftBank
agreed in late 2020 to give Greensill, which lent struggling
Katerra money that it had originally borrowed from Credit Suisse
clients, the FT notes.

As part of the deal, Greensill agreed to write off Katerra's debt
in return for a small stake in the construction group, which went
on to file for bankruptcy last June, the FT discloses.  The FT
revealed last year that the US$440 million cash from SoftBank never
reached the Swiss bank's customers.

Credit Suisse alleges in US filings that SoftBank masterminded a
financial restructuring of Katerra that benefited the Japanese
group at the expense of the bank's clients, the FT relays.

According to the filings, Credit Suisse claims a "material
discrepancy" between what it says was Son's denial of "all
knowledge of the Katerra" deal in a meeting last September with the
bank's chief executive Thomas Gottstein, and an email sent by Lex
Greensill in December 2019 suggesting the SoftBank boss had given
it his blessing, the FT discloses.

The filings show Credit Suisse also claims that Greensill, the
founder of the now-defunct finance firm, gave a presentation to Son
in October 2020 where he discussed the Katerra restructuring, the
FT notes.

Last year's meeting was set up by Credit Suisse to discuss broader
relations between the two groups, according to people briefed on
Son's involvement, and the SoftBank chief was not prepared to
answer detailed questions about Katerra, the FT recounts.

The people, as cited by the FT, said Yoshimitsu Goto, SoftBank's
chief financial officer, was also in the meeting, along with Helman
Sitohang, head of Asia-Pacific at Credit Suisse, and Ulrich
Körner, head of the bank's asset management division.

The filings made by Credit Suisse were part of its application last
month in the US for permission to obtain further documents and
communications exchanged between SoftBank and Katerra, as well as
minutes from Katerra board meetings, the FT relates.  A judge in
California last week granted the bank permission, and SoftBank has
30 days to respond to any requests once they are received, the FT
discloses.

According to the FT, the Swiss bank intends to use these documents
as evidence that SoftBank's senior managers, including Son, were
aware of the Katerra agreement in a lawsuit they expect to file in
London in coming weeks, according to people familiar with the
bank's plans.

The acrimonious fight marks a souring of relations between the two
companies since Greensill collapsed last March, the FT recounts.
SoftBank was a key client of Credit Suisse during the Japanese
group's emergence as one of the world's most influential tech
investors, while Son was also a longstanding personal client of the
bank, the FT notes.

Greensill's implosion last year inflicted further damage on Credit
Suisse's reputation for risk management and enraged its wealthy
clients, the FT relays.  Some are now threatening legal action
against the bank after they were convinced to invest in the
Greensill-linked funds on the promise they would deliver better
returns than cash deposits but with low risk, according to the FT.


SIG PLC: S&P Assigns 'B+' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B+' issuer credit rating to SIG
PLC and its 'B+' issue rating to SIG's EUR300 million senior
secured notes.

Specialist building materials distributor SIG PLC raised EUR300
million of senior secured notes to repay GBP131 million of private
placement notes and GBP70 million of term loans.

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that SIG will
sustain S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA of 4x-5x,
supported by steady revenue growth and a recovery in profitability.
We anticipate that the company will generate positive free
operating cash flow (FOCF) from 2022 onward, and maintain adequate
liquidity and headroom under financial covenants.

"The assigned ratings are in line with our preliminary ratings,
which we assigned on Nov. 1, 2021. There were no material changes
to our base case or the financial documentation compared with our
original review.

"The main difference between our preliminary rating analysis and
our final analysis is that interest expense on the EUR300 million
senior secured notes is slightly higher than we previously
expected. This doesn't meaningfully affect our forecast of SIG's
leverage or FOCF generation.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that SIG will sustain
adjusted debt to EBITDA of 4x-5x, supported by steady revenue
growth and a recovery in profitability. We anticipate that the
company will generate positive FOCF from 2022 onward, and maintain
adequate liquidity and headroom under financial covenants.

"We could lower the rating if we predict that adjusted debt to
EBITDA will deteriorate to above 5x, without swift recovery
prospects. This could occur if SIG's profitability comes under
pressure, for example, from higher-than-anticipated cost inflation
and a delay in the pass-through, leading to negative FOCF. We could
also lower the rating if liquidity pressures arose."

Upside to the rating could develop over time, notably if SIG
established a track record of profitable growth and positive FOCF
generation under normalized business conditions. S&P could consider
raising the rating if:

-- SIG sustained adjusted EBITDA margins of 5%-6%;

-- Adjusted debt-to-EBITDA reduced consistently to below 4x; and

-- Positive FOCF amounted to at least GBP50 million per year.


TOGETHER ENERGY: Warrington May Face Up to GBP52MM Financial Hit
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jim Pickard and Nathalie Thomas at The Financial Times report that
taxpayers in a northern England town are facing a financial hit of
up to GBP52 million should energy supplier Together Energy
collapse, after the local Labour-controlled council bought a 50%
stake in the troubled company.

Warrington borough council spent GBP18 million on half of the
equity in Together Energy, based in Clydebank in the west of
Scotland, in 2019, the FT discloses.

Since then the Cheshire council has arranged a revolving credit
facility for Together worth GBP20 million, and provided a GBP14
million guarantee to Orsted, a wholesale energy supplier to the
Scottish company, the FT states.  This brings the council's total
estimated financial exposure to Together to GBP52 million, the FT
notes.

According to the FT, the council, which currently has net borrowing
of GBP336.4 million, was quoted at the time of its investment in
Together as saying it would generate "a commercial return to the
council which can be reinvested in frontline services".

But Together is now facing a similar plight to other energy
suppliers who have been hit hard by soaring wholesale gas prices,
with 26 companies having collapsed in the past five months, the FT
relays.

In an indication of the financial pressure on Together, the company
has been delaying making a GBP12.4 million payment plus interest
that is due to the energy regulator Ofgem, the FT discloses.

This payment, required under a scheme administered by Ofgem to
support renewable energy projects in Britain, had initially been
due by last September, the FT notes.

Together subsequently failed to meet an extended deadline of the
end of October for the payment, the FT says.  It is now due at the
end of this month, according to the FT.

Energy suppliers that fail to make payments under what is known as
the renewables obligation can be stripped of their licences by
Ofgem, putting them out of business, the FT states.

Together was founded in 2016 by Paul Richards, once a British Gas
employee, and prided itself on employing staff from some of
Scotland's poorest areas.  It doubled in size in 2020 when it
acquired Bristol Energy, a supplier previously owned by Bristol
council, which had more than 144,000 customers.

In the financial year that Warrington council made its initial
investment in Together, the company made losses of £11m and had
net liabilities of GBP19 million, although its directors expressed
confidence at the time that it was "well positioned" to achieve
sales growth and profitability "in the future", the FT discloses.

The most recent available accounts for the company, for the year to
October 2020, and before the current crisis in the energy market,
showed losses had narrowed to GBP3.8 million but its net
liabilities had increased to GBP22.8 million, of which it
attributed GBP17.2 million to preference shares held by Warrington
council, the FT states.

Together did not respond to questions about its cash position and
whether it would be able to make the GBP12.4 million payment
required by Ofgem, the FT notes.


TOWER BRIDGE 2022-1: S&P Assigns Prelim B- (sf) Rating to X Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings has assigned preliminary credit ratings to Tower
Bridge Funding 2022-1 PLC's class A to X-Dfrd notes. At closing,
the issuer will also issue unrated class Z notes and certificates.

S&P said, "Our preliminary ratings address timely receipt of
interest and ultimate repayment of principal on the class A notes,
and the ultimate payment of interest and principal on all the other
rated notes. Our preliminary ratings also address timely receipt of
interest on the class B–Dfrd to D-Dfrd notes when they become the
most senior outstanding."

The transaction securitizes a portfolio of BTL and owner-occupied
mortgage loans secured on properties in the U.K.

The loans in the pool were originated between 2017 and 2021 by
Belmont Green Finance Ltd. (BGFL), a nonbank specialist lender, via
its specialist mortgage lending brand, Vida Homeloans. The
collateral comprises complex income borrowers with limited credit
impairments, and there is a high exposure to self-employed,
contractors, and first-time buyers. Approximately 82.05% of the
pool comprises BTL loans and the remaining 17.95% are
owner-occupier loans.

The transaction will benefit from a fully funded general reserve
fund, which will be used to provide credit support to the class A
to class D-Dfrd notes. The transaction will have a liquidity
reserve fund, funded initially via the principal waterfall, to
provide liquidity support to the class A and B-Dfrd notes.
Principal can be used to pay senior fees and interest on the rated
notes subject to conditions.

The transaction incorporates a swap to hedge the mismatch between
the notes, which pay a coupon based on the compounded daily
Sterling Overnight Index Average Rate (SONIA), and certain loans,
which pay fixed-rate interest before reversion.

At closing, the issuer will use the issuance proceeds to purchase
the full beneficial interest in the mortgage loans from the seller.
The issuer grants security over all of its assets in favor of the
security trustee.

There are no rating constraints in the transaction under our
counterparty, operational risk, or structured finance sovereign
risk criteria. S&P considers the issuer to be bankruptcy remote.

At closing, BGFL will be the mortgage administrator in the
transaction, with servicing delegated to Homeloan Management Ltd.
(HML).

S&P said, "Our credit and cash flow analysis and related
assumptions consider the transaction's ability to withstand the
potential repercussions of the COVID-19 outbreak, namely, higher
defaults, longer recovery timing, and additional liquidity
stresses. Considering these factors, we believe that the available
credit enhancement is commensurate with the preliminary ratings
assigned. As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions
and estimates accordingly."

  Ratings List

  CLASS    PRELIM. RATING     PRELIM. CLASS SIZE (%)
   A           AAA (sf)            85.00

   B-Dfrd      AA+ (sf)             5.50

   C-Dfrd      AA- (sf)             4.70

   D-Dfrd      BBB (sf)             4.80

   X-Dfrd      B- (sf)              4.00

   Z           NR                   1.50

   Certificates  NR                 N/A

NR--Not rated.
N/A--Not applicable.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2022.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


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