/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/211001.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Friday, October 1, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 191

                           Headlines



C R O A T I A

DJURO DJAKOVIC: Files Proposal to Launch Bankruptcy Proceedings


I R E L A N D

PENTA CLO 2021-2: Fitch Rates Final 'B-(EXP)' to F-RR Debt
RRE 8 LOAN: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to EUR20MM Class D Notes


N O R W A Y

HURTIGRUTEN GROUP: Moody's Affirms 'Caa1' CFR, Outlook Negative


R U S S I A

CREDIT BANK: Fitch Gives 'B-(EXP)' to Upcoming Perpetual AT1 Notes


S W I T Z E R L A N D

SIG COMBIBLOC: Moody's Upgrades CFR to Ba1, Outlook Remains Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

GREENSILL: Shilpa Strong to Take Up Tokio Marine Chief Exec Role
GREENSILL: West Va Gov. Proposes to Pay Credit Suisse US$300M
HOUSE CROWD: Administration to Take 2 Yrs, Cost GBP869,500
NEWGATE FUNDING 2006-1: Moody's Ups GBP2.6MM E Notes Rating to Ba2
ROLAND MOURET: Rescue Talks Underway as Administration Looms

ROYAL BRITISH LEGION: Winton and Moordown Branch Shuttered


X X X X X X X X

[^] BOOK REVIEW: Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in Cyberspace

                           - - - - -


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C R O A T I A
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DJURO DJAKOVIC: Files Proposal to Launch Bankruptcy Proceedings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Annie Tsoneva at SeeNews reports that Croatian holding company
Djuro Djakovic Grupa said its unit Djuro Djakovic Industrijska
Rjesenja d.d. has filed for bankruptcy.

"Following an announcement from July 13, 2021 that business
accounts of Djuro Djakovic Industrijska Rjesenja were blocked, we
inform the investment community that the management of the unit has
submitted a proposal to the court to launch bankruptcy
proceedings," SeeNews quotes the holding company as saying on Sept.
29 in a filing to the Zagreb bourse.

The basic activity of Djuro Djakovic Industrijska Rjesenja is the
development, design, engineering and manufacturing of industrial
machines, parts of industrial machines and steel structures.

At the beginning of this year, the company reached a pre-bankruptcy
settlement agreement with its creditors but has failed to cover its
liabilities since then, SeeNews relates.

In mid-July, the holding company said that Djuro Djakovic
Industrijska Rjesenja had less than 17 employees and contributed
less than 5% to the consolidated operating revenue of the group in
2020, SeeNews discloses.




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PENTA CLO 2021-2: Fitch Rates Final 'B-(EXP)' to F-RR Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Penta CLO 2021-2 Designated Activity
Company expected ratings.

The assignment of final ratings is contingent on the final
documents conforming to information already received.

DEBT                               RATING
----                               ------
Penta CLO 2021-2 Designated Activity Company

A-RR                     LT AAA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
B-1-RR                   LT AA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
B-2-RR                   LT AA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
C-RR                     LT A(EXP)sf     Expected Rating
D-RR                     LT BBB-(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
E-RR                     LT BB-(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
F-RR                     LT B-(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
Subordinated Notes-RR    LT NR(EXP)sf    Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Penta CLO 2021-2 DAC is a securitisation of mainly senior secured
obligations (at least 90%) with a component of senior unsecured,
mezzanine, second-lien loans, first-lien, last-out loans and
high-yield bonds. Net proceeds from the issuance of the notes will
be used to fund a portfolio with a target par of EUR350 million.
The portfolio is actively managed by Partners Group. The
transaction has a 4.5-year reinvestment period and an 8.5-year
weighted average life (WAL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Average Portfolio Credit Quality (Neutral): Fitch assesses the
average credit quality of obligors to be in the 'B'/'B-' category.
The Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the identified
portfolio is 26.25.

High Recovery Expectations (Positive): At least 90% of the
portfolio will comprise senior secured obligations. Fitch views the
recovery prospects for these assets as more favourable than for
second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine assets. The Fitch weighted
average recovery rate (WARR) of the identified portfolio is
63.15%.

Diversified Portfolio (Positive): The indicative maximum exposure
of the 10 largest obligors for assigning the expected ratings is
20% of the portfolio balance and maximum fixed rated obligations
are limited at 5% of the portfolio. The transaction also includes
various concentration limits, including the maximum exposure to the
three largest (Fitch-defined) industries in the portfolio at 40%.
These covenants ensure that the asset portfolio will not be exposed
to excessive concentration.

Portfolio Management (Positive): The transaction has a 4.5-year
reinvestment period and includes reinvestment criteria similar to
those of other European transactions. Fitch's analysis is based on
a stressed-case portfolio with the aim of testing the robustness of
the transaction structure against its covenants and portfolio
guidelines.

Cash Flow Modelling (Neutral): The WAL used for the transaction
stress portfolio and matrices analysis is 12 months less than the
WAL covenant, to account for structural and reinvestment conditions
post-reinvestment period, including the OC tests and Fitch 'CCC'
limitation passing post reinvestment, among others. This ultimately
reduces the maximum possible risk horizon of the portfolio when
combined with loan pre-payment expectations.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- An increase of the default rate (RDR) at all rating levels by
    25% of the mean RDR and a decrease of the recovery rate (RRR)
    by 25% at all rating levels will result in downgrades of no
    more than four notches, depending on the notes.

-- Downgrades may occur if the build-up of credit enhancement
    following amortisation does not compensate for a larger loss
    expectation than initially assumed due to unexpectedly high
    levels of defaults and portfolio deterioration.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- A reduction of the RDR at all rating levels by 25% of the mean
    RDR and an increase in the RRR by 25% at all rating levels
    would result in an upgrade of up to five notches depending on
    the notes, except for the class A notes, which are already at
    the highest rating on Fitch's scale and cannot be upgraded.

-- At closing, Fitch used a standardised stressed portfolio
    (Fitch's stressed portfolio) that is customised to the
    portfolio limits as specified in the transaction documents.
    Even if the actual portfolio shows lower defaults and smaller
    losses (at all rating levels) than the Fitch's stressed
    portfolio assumed at closing, an upgrade of the notes during
    the reinvestment period is unlikely, given the portfolio
    credit quality may still deteriorate, not only by natural
    credit migration, but also by reinvestments, and also because
    the manager has the possibility to update the Fitch collateral
    quality tests.

-- After the end of the reinvestment period, upgrades may occur
    on better-than-initially expected portfolio credit quality and
    deal performance, leading to higher credit enhancement and
    excess spread available to cover for losses in the remaining
    portfolio.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset pool
and the transaction. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets or risk presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European
Securities and Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information or information on the risk presenting entities.

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates that it is adequately reliable.


RRE 8 LOAN: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to EUR20MM Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned these definitive ratings to
notes issued by RRE 8 Loan Management DAC (the "Issuer"):

EUR302,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2036, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR42,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2036, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

EUR20,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2036, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the ratings is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in Moody's methodology.

The Issuer is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 92.5% of the
portfolio must consist of secured senior loans or senior secured
bonds and up to 7.5% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured
senior loans, second-lien loans, high yield bonds and mezzanine
loans. The portfolio is expected to be 80% ramped as of the closing
date and to comprise of predominantly corporate loans to obligors
domiciled in Western Europe. The remainder of the portfolio will be
acquired during the 4 months ramp-up period in compliance with the
portfolio guidelines.

Redding Ridge Asset Management (UK) LLP ("Redding Ridge") will
manage the CLO. It will direct the selection, acquisition and
disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in
trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's 4.6 year reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to
certain restrictions, purchases are permitted using principal
proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from
sales of credit risk obligations or credit improved obligations.

In addition to the three classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue two classes of notes due 2036 and subordinated
notes due 2121, which are not rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Methodology underlying the rating action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2020.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The collateral manager's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2020.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par Amount: EUR500,000,000

Diversity Score(1): 44

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3340

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 46.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 9 years



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HURTIGRUTEN GROUP: Moody's Affirms 'Caa1' CFR, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the long term corporate family
rating of Hurtigruten Group AS at Caa1 and its probability of
default rating at Caa1-PD. Concurrently, the rating agency affirmed
at Caa1 the ratings assigned to the company's existing senior
secured bank facilities, consisting of a EUR655 million guaranteed
term loan B due 2025 and an EUR85 million guaranteed revolving
credit facility (RCF) due 2024, as well as the Caa1 rating of the
EUR300 million guaranteed senior secured note due 2025 issued by
Explorer II AS, an indirect subsidiary of Hurtigruten Group AS, the
owner of Norwegian cruise operator Hurtigruten AS. The rating
outlook on all ratings remains negative.

The affirmation follows Hurtigruten's announcement that it has
secured a new fully committed EUR75 million subordinated
shareholder loan facility from its shareholders. The loan will be
fully subordinated to the senior secured debt and will be utilized
for general corporate purposes, working capital needs and
investments for growth.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects Hurtigruten's improved liquidity as a
result of the new shareholder loan as well as improved operations
in recent months counterbalanced by continuing uncertainty
regarding the evolution of recovery and potential for setbacks due
to new coronavirus variants, as well as sustained very high
leverage.

The company reported growing sailings and robust booking trends
underpinned by strong pent up demand as travel restrictions are
relaxed and eliminated in some of its key markets such as Norway,
Germany and the UK. Still, there is significant uncertainty with
respect to the recovery path and the company carries very material
leverage which Moody's expects to be approximately 10x in 2022.
Furthermore, Hurtigruten is not expected to generate positive free
cash flow in the next 12-18 months.

In July 2021, Hurtigruten was able to resume the sailings of all
seven of its ships in the Norway segment. The company deployed one
Expedition vessel in August and anticipates adding one more in
September with three more coming on line before the end of the
year. Also positively, Hurtigruten reported high levels of
pre-bookings for the second half of 2021 and 2022, as well as a
strong start to 2023. In the second half of 2021, the company
expects 45% occupancy which is above 30% cash break-even. Current
bookings for 2022 are 31% above historical trend with the main
booking window expected in September through November. These
bookings are primarily driven by Hurtigruten Expeditions which is
more profitable than the Hurtigruten Norway business segment and
will be augmented in 2022 with an option of a cruise to the
Galapagos. The company reported neutral cash from operations in the
second quarter of 2021; however, Moody's expects full-year EBITDA
still to be negative before reversing the trend in 2022.

Still, Moody's believes the evolution of the recovery remains
highly uncertain and poses a significant risk to Hurtigruten's
credit profile. Although some of Hurtigruten's key source markets
have relaxed or eliminated travel restrictions, reversals are
possible should a new coronavirus variant appear. Broadly, Moody's
does not expect travel volumes (measured in terms of air passenger
traffic) to return to pre-pandemic levels until 2024.

Hurtigruten's corporate family rating (CFR) of Caa1 continues to
reflect Moody's expectations of extremely high leverage in 2021 and
2022 which may lead to an unsustainable capital structure if not
materially improved thereafter. The CFR further incorporates the
company's (1) moderate scale; (2) high operational leverage, with a
high fixed-cost structure and sizeable exposure to bunker fuel
price volatility; (3) leveraged capital structure, reflecting
substantial debt-financed capital spending; and (4) high risk
appetite. More positively, the rating incorporates Hurtigruten's
well-established competitive positioning and differentiated offer
in the niche Norwegian and expedition cruise markets, as well as
strong pent up demand for its services.

LIQUIDITY

Hurtigruten's liquidity will improve materially as a result of the
proposed transaction with the addition of EUR75 million of cash
proceeds. At June 30, 2021, Hurtigruten had EUR83 million of cash
on balance sheet and expected to receive EUR21 million in
government grants during the third quarter of 2021. Positively, the
EUR75 million new shareholder loan will be provided by the sponsor,
TDR Capital, via a hybrid instrument which Moody's expects to be
classified as equity.

Moody's also notes that Hurtigruten anticipates making material
capital investments in particular into MGO/Hybrid engine
conversions of certain of its ships in order to reduce CO2
emissions. The agency anticipates these investments to utilize the
majority of the additional liquidity.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Hurtigruten's capital structure primarily consists of a EUR655
million senior secured TLB maturing in 2025 and an EUR85 million
senior secured RCF due in 2024, as well as TLC of EUR105 million
and TLD of EUR46.5 million term loans due 2023. All instruments
rank pari passu and the RCF and TLB are rated Caa1, in line with
the CFR. All instruments are secured by substantially all assets of
the group, including ship mortgages over ten vessels.

The EUR300 million bond issued by Explorer II AS, an indirect
subsidiary of Hurtigruten Group AS, will mature in 2025 and is
rated Caa1. It is secured on the two newbuild vessels received by
Hurtigruten in 2019. Because this debt instrument is secured by
specific vessels, Moody's views it as ranking pari passu with the
RCF and the term loans.

RATING OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the view that the operating
environment will remain challenging despite recent improvements and
that leverage will continue to be elevated.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Although considered unlikely in the near term, positive pressure on
the rating could occur once greater clarity with respect to
cruising demand is available and the expected leverage of the
company reduces sustainably to well below 10.0x debt/EBITDA.

Conversely, Moody's could downgrade the ratings if Hurtigruten's
liquidity profile is not strengthened, or if the company fails to
evidence recovery in bookings and convert those bookings to
sailings, leading to a potentially unsustainable capital
structure.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in October 2016.

COMPANY PROFILE

Headquartered in Oslo, Norway, Hurtigruten Group is a cruise ship
operator that offers cruises along the Norwegian coast under the
Hurtigruten Norway business unit, expedition cruises to over 200
destinations in 40 countries including the Arctic, Norway, Alaska,
Galapagos, Caribbean, and Antarctica, as well as land-based Arctic
experience tourism on the archipelago of Svalbard. In 2020,
Hurtigruten reported revenues of EUR269 million (2019: EUR609
million) and company-adjusted EBITDA of negative EUR2.7 million
(2019: EUR145 million).



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CREDIT BANK: Fitch Gives 'B-(EXP)' to Upcoming Perpetual AT1 Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Credit Bank of Moscow's (CBM) upcoming
issue of US dollar-denominated perpetual additional Tier 1 (AT1)
notes an expected 'B-(EXP)' rating.

The final rating is contingent upon the receipt of final documents
conforming to information already received.

The bonds will be issued by CBM's special purpose vehicle, CBOM
Finance PLC (Ireland). The proceeds from the issue will be used
solely for financing a perpetual subordinated loan to CBM, which
will count as regulatory Tier 1 capital at the bank.

The amount of the issue is not yet defined. The notes will have no
established redemption date. However, CBM will have an option to
repay the notes every five years starting from 2027 subject to the
Central Bank of Russia's (CBR) approval.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The notes will be rated four notches below CBM's 'bb' Viability
Rating (VR). According to Fitch's Bank Rating Criteria, this is the
highest possible rating that can be assigned to deeply subordinated
notes with fully discretionary coupon omission issued by banks with
a VR anchor of 'bb'. The notching reflects the notes' higher loss
severity in light of their deep subordination and additional
non-performance risk relative to the VR given a high write-down
trigger and fully discretionary coupons.

The upcoming notes should qualify as AT1 capital in CBM's
regulatory accounts due to a full coupon omission option at the
bank's discretion, and full or partial write-down if either (i) the
bank's core Tier 1 capital ratio falls below 5.125% (versus a 4.5%
regulatory minimum) for six or more operational days in aggregate
during any consecutive 30 operational days; or (ii) the CBR
approves a plan for the participation of the CBR in
bankruptcy-prevention measures in respect of the bank, or the
Banking Supervision Committee of the CBR approves a plan for the
participation of the Deposit Insurance Agency in
bankruptcy-prevention measures in respect of the bank.

Fitch expects any coupon omission to occur before the bank breaches
the notes' 5.125% core Tier 1 trigger. There is no specific trigger
that would oblige CBM to omit coupons before hitting the 5.125%
trigger. However, if the bank's capital ratios fell below minimum
levels including buffers (i.e. 8% for core Tier 1) then the bank
would be required to submit a capital-recovery plan to the CBR.
Fitch sees at least a moderate risk that any such plan would
include the omission of coupons on the AT1 securities.

The risk of coupon omission is reasonably mitigated by CBM's stable
financial profile, adequate internal capital generation, and
moderate headroom over capital minimums, including buffers (the
bank's regulatory core Tier 1 ratio was 9.7% at end-2Q21).

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

CBM has an ESG Relevance Scores of '4' for Governance Structure and
Group Structure due to significant level of relationship-based
operations, a lack of transparency with respect to ownership
structure and significant double leverage at the level of the
bank's holdco. These considerations have a moderately negative
impact on the credit profile, and are relevant to the ratings in
conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- The issue rating could be downgraded if CBM's VR is
    downgraded, particularly by two notches or more. If the VR was
    downgraded by one notch to 'bb-', the notes' rating could be
    affirmed, as the minimum notching for these instruments
    reduces to three notches for VRs of 'bb-' and below, compared
    with four notches at 'bb'.

-- The issue ratings could also be downgraded if Fitch takes a
    view that non-performance risk has increased and widens the
    notching between CBM's VR and the issue's ratings. For
    example, this could arise if the bank fails to maintain
    reasonable headroom over the minimum capital adequacy ratios
    (including buffers) or if the instrument becomes non
    performing, i.e. if the bank cancels any coupon payment or at
    least partially writes off the principal. In this case, the
    issue rating will be downgraded based on Fitch's expectations
    about the form and duration of non-performance.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- The issue rating could be upgraded if CBM's VR is upgraded.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.




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SIG COMBIBLOC: Moody's Upgrades CFR to Ba1, Outlook Remains Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the corporate family rating of
SIG Combibloc Group AG to Ba1 from Ba2 and the probability of
default rating to Ba1-PD from Ba2-PD. Concurrently, Moody's
upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2 the senior unsecured ratings of its EUR550
million Term Loan borrowed at subsidiaries SIG Combibloc PurchaseCo
S.a r.l. and SIG Combibloc US Acquisition II Inc., and the EUR300
million senior unsecured revolving bank credit facility borrowed at
SIG Combibloc PurchaseCo S.a r.l. and SIG Euro Holding GmbH.
Further, Moody's upgraded to Ba1 from Ba2 backed senior unsecured
ratings of SIG Combibloc PurchaseCo S.a r.l.'s EUR450 million notes
due 2023 and EUR550 million notes due 2025. The outlook on all
ratings remains stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects SIG's solid market position as the
number two player in the aseptic carton packaging market with
long-term client relationships and stable contract base with high
renewal rate, as well as the company's strong and consistent
performance since the IPO, including through the pandemic, with a
track record of growth, stable credit metrics and ample liquidity.
Also positively, SIG has consistently generated positive free cash
flow while investing in growth and maintaining a dividend.

SIG has demonstrated the resilience of its model during the
pandemic. While its "on-the-go" consumption business was negatively
impacted by the restrictions of mobility as a result of
coronavirus, particularly in Asia Pacific, "at home" consumption,
especially in Europe, increased as a result of the same trends and
offset some of the lost volumes. In the first half of 2021 SIG
reported healthy like-for-like core revenue growth of 8.8% at
constant currency and an adjusted EBITDA margin of 27.3%, slightly
above historical levels. Revenue growth was primarily driven by the
Americas (28.4% at constant currency) where "at home" consumption
was high in Brazil and Mexico during the pandemic and APAC (up
10.9% like-for-like) where restocking and strong demand for white
milk bolstered performance. Still, Europe, SIG's most mature market
also posted 1% like-for-like growth aided by "at home" consumption.
SIG's acquisition of its Middle East joint venture offers the
company a greater foothold in this market which posted 2.1%
like-for-like growth in the first four months of 2021 and has the
potential to extend SIG's reach to a number of new countries.

Moody's expects that SIG will continue deleveraging and gradually
bring its Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA below 3.5x by 2022 (4.1x as
of the trailing twelve months ended June 30, 2021) in line with the
company's declared focus to deleverage towards 2.0x (based on the
company's definition of net leverage) over the medium term. Moody's
notes that SIG's gross leverage metric incorporates the company's
significant year-end cash balances which reflect the timing of its
customer rebates and exceed running cash needs of the business. The
agency notes that SIG's net leverage is approximately 0.5x lower
than gross debt/EBITDA and has been declining in recent years.
Moody's also expects steady free cash flow generation after net
capex, dividends and interest payments.

SIG's corporate family rating (CFR) continues to reflect the
company's good competitive position as the second largest operator
globally in aseptic carton packaging and its business model
underpinned by long-term contracts. The CFR also incorporates (i) a
large installed base of 1,266 filling machines at end 2020; (ii)
focus on less-discretionary and less cyclical food and beverage end
markets; and (iii) a global footprint. However, these positives are
counterbalanced by (i) the concentration of revenue within one
activity, aseptic carton packaging systems; (ii) the risks from
potential price volatility in certain raw materials and the general
pressure from cost inflation and FX; (iii) a more challenging
growth environment in its core and more mature European market,
(iv) moderate leverage.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS

Environmental and social considerations reflected in the rating
include the trend towards more sustainable packaging solutions
amongst customers, regulators and consumers that may influence the
demand for the company's products and that provide SIG with an
opportunity to market higher value environmentally-friendly
offerings. Governance considerations include the growing track
record of the company as a Swiss-listed business and related
governance requirements following the 2018 IPO and the exit of
major shareholder, Onex, in 2020. Positively, the company has also
recently accomplished a CEO and CFO transition in a transparent and
orderly manner. The company has a well-defined dividend policy and
aims to reducing net leverage towards 2x although without a clearly
stated timeframe.

LIQUIDITY

SIG benefits from ample liquidity which the company carefully
maintains. At the end of the first half of 2021, SIG had EUR152
million of cash and an undrawn EUR300 million senior unsecured
revolving credit facility. Its only near-term maturities are EUR50
million in September and December of 2021 with the next debt
repayment not due until EUR450 million of backed senior unsecured
notes mature in June 2023. The company is expected to continue
generating positive free cash flow. SIG paid a EUR128 million
dividend in April 2021 and expects to continue paying dividends in
line with its target of 50%-60% of adjusted net income. SIG is
subject to a net leverage covenant which the company is expected to
meet comfortably and expects that its net capex will continue to
comprise 8%-10% of sales.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

SIG's capital structure is unsecured and consists of a EUR300
million senior unsecured revolving credit facility, a EUR550
million senior unsecured term loan due June 2025, EUR450 million
backed senior unsecured notes due 2023 and EUR550 million backed
senior unsecured notes due 2025. All instruments rank pari passu.
Therefore, Moody's assigned all instrument ratings at Ba1 in line
with the CFR.

OUTLOOK

The rating is on stable outlook because Moody's expect gradual
deleveraging in 2022 stemming from positive free cash flows and
growth in EBITDA.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Further positive rating movement would place SIG in the investment
grade category which would require a stronger balance sheet.
Specifically, Moody's would expect SIG to achieve a leverage of
3.25x (measured as debt/EBITDA) and FCF/debt sustainably improving
above 15%. All metrics reflect Moody's standard adjustments.
Although the company benefits from technological know-how and
strong market position, greater product diversification would
benefit its credit profile.

Negative rating pressure could result from SIG's failure to
maintain Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA sustainably above 4.0x, a
weakening of the company's free cash flow such that its FCF/debt is
below 5%. More aggressive financial policies, evidenced for example
by debt-funded acquisitions, rising Moody's adjusted debt or more
shareholder-friendly actions, could also pressure the rating.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Packaging
Manufacturers: Metal, Glass and Plastic Containers Methodology
published in September 2020.

Headquartered in Switzerland, SIG Combibloc Group AG is the second
largest manufacturer of aseptic carton packaging systems, supplying
mostly the liquid dairy (e.g. milk, cream and soy milk products)
and non-carbonated soft drinks (e.g. juice, nectar and ice tea) end
markets. The company's aseptic cartons can also be used for liquid
food products, such as soups and broths, sauces, desserts and baby
food. The company is listed on the Swiss Stock Exchange since
September 2018 and reported revenues of EUR1.8 billion in 2020.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

GREENSILL: Shilpa Strong to Take Up Tokio Marine Chief Exec Role
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ian Smith at The Financial Times reports that Japanese insurer
Tokio Marine is parachuting in a top executive from the US to run
the unit that was at the heart of its fraught relationship with
Greensill Capital, the supply-chain finance group whose collapse
unleashed a political and financial scandal.

According to the FT, the group said Shilpa Strong, chief innovation
officer at the insurer's Houston-based operation Tokio Marine HCC,
will take up the chief executive role at Tokio Marine Management
Australasia early next month, replacing Toby Guy.

TMMA includes the Sydney-based Bond & Credit Co subsidiary
responsible for providing billions of dollars of insurance cover
that underpinned Greensill, a start-up whose promise to
revolutionise the staid world of supply chain finance attracted
backing from Japan's SoftBank and US private equity firm General
Atlantic.

Its founder, Lex Greensill, told MPs in London this year that Tokio
Marine's decision not to renew his firm's insurance cover "ensured"
its collapse, the FT recounts.  Tokio Marine replied that it was
under no obligation to extend coverage, and that in the summer of
2020 it had developed "particular concerns" about the lender, the
FT relates.

Tokio Marine served notice on that insurance last year after firing
an underwriter at BCC for allegedly exceeding his risk limits with
relation to Greensill, the FT recounts.

According to the FT, in the fallout from Greensill's demise, it
emerged that BCC had once received a personal visit from David
Cameron, the former UK prime minister serving in his role as a paid
adviser to the supply chain finance group.  Mr. Cameron later
described this to MPs as a "getting to know" exercise, the FT
recounts.

Tokio Marine has defended its controls and disclosure in the wake
of the scandal, but senior management have been engaged in efforts
to improve governance, after analysts and investors raised concerns
about transparency and oversight, the FT discloses.  The insurer
has repeatedly said that it does not expect a material impact from
Greensill claims, the FT notes.


GREENSILL: West Va Gov. Proposes to Pay Credit Suisse US$300M
-------------------------------------------------------------
Owen Walker at The Financial Times reports that West Virginia
governor Jim Justice has proposed paying Credit Suisse US$300
million and offering half the proceeds from the sale of his mining
business to settle debts owed to the bank's Greensill
Capital-linked supply-chain finance funds.

Bluestone Resources, the coal mining empire run by Justice,
borrowed heavily from Greensill, the finance firm whose collapse in
March sparked a lobbying scandal in the UK and damaged the
reputation of Credit Suisse, the FT notes.

Greensill had lent US$690 million to Bluestone from money raised
through the Credit Suisse funds, the FT discloses.  Bluestone last
week wrote to Credit Suisse with the proposal to settle the debts,
which was first reported by the Wall Street Journal, the FT
recounts.

In the letter, Bluestone, as cited by the FT, said it was
negotiating a US$300 million refinancing deal from an unnamed party
and would pay the money to the Credit Suisse funds, according to
people with knowledge of the letter.

The offer also included half the proceeds, net of any debt, of a
future sale of Bluestone, though the letter did not contain details
about whether such a transaction was imminent, the FT states.

According to the FT, a person familiar with Credit Suisse
executives' thinking on the proposal said they would consider
opening talks over a deal, but there was scepticism whether the
refinancing could be achieved and what value would be left in the
business.

Credit Suisse announced on Sept. 27 that a further US$400 million
would be repaid to the 1,000 wealthy clients trapped in the
supply-chain funds, bringing the total returned to US$6.3 billion
out of the US$10 billion held in the funds when they were suspended
in March, the FT relates.

Bluestone was one of three creditors to the funds -- including
Sanjeev Gupta's GFG Alliance and collapsed US construction company
Katerra -- that Credit Suisse identified as being problematic, the
FT notes.  The trio collectively owe the Credit Suisse funds US$2.3
billion, the FT discloses.

"Credit Suisse Asset Management is doing everything we can to
maximise recovery for our fund investors," the FT quotes the bank
as saying.  "If outstanding debtors put proposals to us, we will of
course look at them."

Bluestone and its related companies had become one of Greensill's
biggest clients before its spectacular collapse, with the finance
firm arranging corporate funding linked to invoices from the coal
miner, the FT notes.

Greensill had a partnership with Credit Suisse, which repackaged
the debt and sold them to investors in several supply chain finance
funds, the FT discloses.  The 1,000 fund investors have threatened
litigation as they stand to lose billions, despite the Swiss bank
marketing the funds as fully insured and low-risk, the FT
recounts.


HOUSE CROWD: Administration to Take 2 Yrs, Cost GBP869,500
----------------------------------------------------------
Michael Lloyd at Peer2Peer Finance News reports that the House
Crowd (THC) administration process is expected to take between 18
months to two years, at a cost of GBP869,527.

According to the joint administrators' latest progress report, they
have incurred GBP421,995 from 1,366 hours of work since the
platform collapsed in February 2021, Peer2Peer Finance News
discloses.  A further GBP447,532 of time costs is estimated to be
charged in continuing the administration process and finalizing the
outstanding matters, Peer2Peer Finance News states.

The joint administrators said they will seek an extension to the
maximum 12-month period of administration from unsecured creditors,
Peer2Peer Finance News notes.

The joint administrators intend to apply to court for directions on
the fairest distribution mechanisms to return funds to auto-invest
and self-select retail lenders, because it is currently unclear as
to how net bridging and development loan realizations should be
properly and accurately distributed to retail lenders due to
inaccurate record keeping, according to Peer2Peer Finance News.

The joint administrators said they have successfully reconciled the
sums held with third-party payment providers Mango Pay and Woodside
Corporate and have asked that all of the concerned retail lenders
provide their bank account details so that their funds can be
returned to them, Peer2Peer Finance News relays.

To date they have returned GBP84,000 out of GBP103,000 to retail
lenders and are awaiting bank details from some investors to pay
out the remaining GBP19,000, Peer2Peer Finance News discloses.

The joint administrators have identified non-invested funds held by
THC in its pre-administration bank accounts and have contacted the
relevant retail lenders for their bank account details to get this
paid, Peer2Peer Finance News states.

The joint administrators have recovered around GBP85,000 from THC's
former solicitors Jane Hartley Associates, which possessed some
undeployed monies from the platform's retail lenders, according to
Peer2Peer Finance News.  These funds have been ring-fenced in
separate bank accounts before being repatriated back to retail
lenders.

They said the directors' statement of affairs estimated House Crowd
Property's special purpose vehicle loans have a book value of
GBP76,018, but the realization of this is uncertain, Peer2Peer
Finance News relays.

After advice from CASS and discussions with the City regulator, the
joint administrators said they plan to create a process that will
make sure funds that come into their possession and are considered
client money will be put into segregated ring-fenced bank accounts
for retail lenders to be paid to them, Peer2Peer Finance News
notes.

The peer-to-peer property lending platform went into administration
on February 26, 2021, and Frank Ofonagoro, Jeremy Woodside and
Frank Wessely at business advisory firm Quantuma were appointed as
joint administrators with consent from the Financial Conduct
Authority, Peer2Peer Finance News relates.



NEWGATE FUNDING 2006-1: Moody's Ups GBP2.6MM E Notes Rating to Ba2
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 21 notes in
six Newgate deals. The rating action reflects better than expected
collateral performance and the increased levels of credit
enhancement for the affected notes.

Moody's affirmed the ratings of the notes that had sufficient
credit enhancement to maintain the current rating on the affected
notes.

The transactions are static cash securitizations of legacy
non-conforming mortgage loans secured on residential properties
located in the UK.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is prompted by:

     -- decreased key collateral assumptions, namely the portfolio
Expected Loss (EL) and MILAN CE assumptions due to better than
expected collateral performance

     -- an increase in credit enhancement for the affected
tranches

Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions:

As part of the rating actions, Moody's reassessed its lifetime loss
expectations and recovery rates for the portfolios reflecting their
collateral performance to date.

Despite relatively high delinquencies, the cumulative losses have
remained stable since last year. 90+ delinquencies are currently
standing at:

     (i) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-1, 16.3%, and
cumulative losses at 2.17% up from 2.16% last year.

    (ii) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-2, 14.2%, and
cumulative losses at 2.71% unchanged since last year.

   (iii) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-3, 13.9%, and
cumulative losses at 4.08% up from 4.06% last year.

    (iv) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-1, 14.2%, and
cumulative losses at 4.7% up from 4.68% last year.

     (v) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-2, 13.45%, and
cumulative losses at 4.64% unchanged since last year.

    (vi) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-3, 9.72%, and
cumulative losses at 3.29% unchanged since last year.

Moody's assumed the expected loss as a percentage of current pool
balance as follows:

     (i) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-1, 5.50%.

    (ii) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-2, 5.50%.

   (iii) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-3, 5.00%.

    (iv) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-1, 5.00%.

     (v) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-2, 5.00%.

    (vi) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-3, 4.00%.

This corresponds to expected loss assumptions as a percentage of
original pool balance of:

     (i) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-1, 2.78% changed from
3.12%

    (ii) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-2, 3.70% changed from
4.50%

   (iii) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-3, 5.24% changed from
6.37%

    (iv) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-1, 6.09% changed from
7.56%

     (v) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-2, 6.23% changed from
7.91%

    (vi) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-3, 4.70% changed from
6.31%

Moody's has also assessed loan-by-loan information as a part of its
detailed transaction review to determine the credit support
consistent with target ratings levels and the volatility of future
losses. As a result, Moody's has decreased the MILAN CE assumption
of each transaction as follows:

     (i) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-1, to 21% from 25%.
   
    (ii) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-2, to 21% from 25%.

   (iii) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-3, to 21% from 26%.

    (iv) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-1, to 21% from 26%.

     (v) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-2, to 21% from 26%.

    (vi) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-3, to 21% from 26%.

The MILAN CE in these transactions is mainly driven by the Minimum
Expected Loss Multiple, a floor defined in Moody's methodology for
rating EMEA RMBS transactions.

Increase in Available Credit Enhancement

Non-amortizing reserve funds led to the increase in the credit
enhancement available in these transactions.

For instance, the credit enhancement for the tranches affected by
the rating action increased:

     (i) for tranche D of Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-1, to
11.42% from 10.09% at last rating action, and for tranche E, to
9.25% from 7.91% .

    (ii) for tranches Ba and Bb of Newgate Funding PLC: Series
2006-2, to 30.35% from 29.60% at last rating action, for tranches
Da and Db, to 8.99% from 8.25%, and for tranche E, to 7.51% from
6.77%.

   (iii) for tranche Cb of Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-3, to
14.39% from 11.38% at last rating action, for tranches Da and Db to
8.15% from 5.28%, and for tranche E, to 5.79% from 3.21%.

    (iv) for tranche Cb of Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-1, to
10.54% from 9.09% at last rating action, for tranche Db, to 5.16%
from 3.82%, for tranche E, to 4.06% from 2.74%, and for tranche F,
to 2.98% from 1.68%

     (iv) for tranche Cb of Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-2, to
8.22% from 7.25% at last rating action, for tranche Db, to 4.15%
from 3.17%, and for tranche E, to 3.20% from 2.22%.

    (iv) for tranche Cb of Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-3, to
11.2% from 9.16% at last rating action, for tranche D, to 8.89%
from 6.85%, and for tranche E, to 6.81% from 4.77%.

All transactions are currently paying pro-rata, but could switch to
sequential payment if there is a trigger breach, for example if 90+
days arrears reach a certain threshold, if there is any outstanding
unpaid PDL or if there is any drawings on the reserve fund or
liquidity facility.

Moody's also considered how the liquidity available in the
transactions supports the ratings of the notes. In particular:

    (i) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-1, a reserve fund of
GBP5.7M and a liquidity facility of GBP5.1M.

   (ii) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-2, a reserve fund of
GBP6.5M and a liquidity facility of GBP6.9M.

   (iii) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-3, a reserve fund of
GBP8.5M and a liquidity facility of GBP11.5M.

    (iv) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-1, a reserve fund of
GBP4.6M and a liquidity facility of GBP21.7M.

     (v) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-2, a reserve fund of
GBP3.2M and a liquidity facility of GBP19.0M.

    (vi) for Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-3, a reserve fund of
GBP23.8M and a liquidity facility of GBP45.0M.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
December 2020.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include: (i) performance of the underlying collateral that
is better than Moody's expected; (ii) an increase in available
credit enhancement; (iii) improvements in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties; and (iv) a decrease in sovereign risk.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include: (i) an increase in sovereign risk; (ii)
performance of the underlying collateral that is worse than Moody's
expected; (iii) deterioration in the notes' available credit
enhancement; and (iv) deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS:

Issuer: Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-1

GBP135M Class A4 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

GBP7.5M Class Ma Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR10M Class Mb Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

GBP20M Class Ba Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR20M Class Bb Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

GBP10M Class Ca Notes, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

EUR10.05M Class Cb Notes, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Affirmed Aa3 (sf)

EUR23.45M Class D Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul
27, 2020 Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

GBP2.6M Class E Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-2

GBP190.55M Class A3a Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul
27, 2020 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR34M Class A3b Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

GBP12.55M Class M Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

GBP22M Class Ba Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

EUR12M Class Bb Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

GBP9M Class Ca Notes, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jul 27, 2020
Confirmed at A2 (sf)

EUR14.5M Class Cb Notes, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Confirmed at A2 (sf)

GBP5M Class Da Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Confirmed at B1 (sf)

EUR13.4M Class Db Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul
27, 2020 Confirmed at B1 (sf)

GBP2.3M Class E Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 27,
2020 Confirmed at Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2006-3

GBP108.8M Class A3a Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr
23, 2015 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

EUR80M Class A3b Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 23,
2015 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

EUR24.3M Class Mb Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 14,
2015 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

GBP10M Class Ba Notes, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 23,
2015 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

EUR44M Class Bb Notes, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Apr 23,
2015 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

EUR36.8M Class Cb Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct
14, 2015 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

GBP5M Class Da Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 23,
2015 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

EUR15.8M Class Db Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr
23, 2015 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

GBP5.9M Class E Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 14,
2015 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-1

GBP130.1M Class A3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 23,
2015 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

GBP11M Class Ma Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 14,
2015 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

EUR5M Class Mb Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 14,
2015 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

GBP20M Class Ba Notes, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct 14,
2015 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR24.5M Class Bb Notes, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct 14,
2015 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR32.1M Class Cb Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr
23, 2015 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

EUR21.2M Class Db Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct
14, 2015 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

GBP2.95M Class E Notes, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct
14, 2015 Upgraded to Ca (sf)

GBP2.9M Class F Notes, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct
14, 2015 Upgraded to Ca (sf)

Issuer: Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-2

GBP11.2M Class M Notes, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 14,
2015 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

EUR37.7M Class Bb Notes, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Oct 14,
2015 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

EUR25.25M Class Cb Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr
23, 2015 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

EUR14.6M Class Db Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct
14, 2015 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-3

EUR399M Class A2b Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 20,
2007 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

GBP148.1M Class A3 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 14,
2015 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

GBP31.2M Class Ba Notes, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct 14,
2015 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR42M Class Bb Notes, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct 14,
2015 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR44M Class Cb Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Oct
14, 2015 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

GBP12.75M Class D Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct
14, 2015 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

GBP11.5M Class E Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct
14, 2015 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)


ROLAND MOURET: Rescue Talks Underway as Administration Looms
------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Kleinman at Sky News reports that fashion designer Roland
Mouret is in urgent talks about its future amid fears that it is
about to collapse into administration.

Sky News has learned that stakeholders in 19RM, which counts the
entertainment mogul Simon Fuller among its backers, are discussing
the option of calling in insolvency experts within days.

Further details of the prospective appointment of administrators
were unclear as of Sept. 30, and one source close to the
discussions said there remained a possibility that administration
could be averted, Sky News relates.

According to Sky News, sources said The Grosvenor Estate and XIX
Entertainment, the media and artist management group founded by
Fuller, had been discussing an alternative funding proposal to keep
Roland Mouret out of administration, although details of that
proposal were unclear.

"The shareholders have been and continue to work with the
management at Roland Mouret to agree a way forward for the
business," Sky News quotes a joint statement issued by the
company's investors as saying on Sept. 30.

Roland Mouret -- https://www.rolandmouret.com/ -- sells women's
designer clothing.

ROYAL BRITISH LEGION: Winton and Moordown Branch Shuttered
----------------------------------------------------------
Marie-Claire Alfonso at Daily Echo reports that a Royal British
Legion (RBL) branch has had to close after it went into
administration and failed to find enough volunteers to keep it
going.

The Winton and Moordown branch of the RBL was taken into county
administration in 2019, and at an annual general meeting in October
of that year, was fortunate to be able to recruit just enough
committee members to save the branch, Daily Echo recounts.

However, those committee members are said to have either now left
the county or moved onto other ventures, and without a viable
committee the decision has been taken to close the branch, Daily
Echo relates.

According to Daily Echo, the remaining branch members will be
transferred to Ferndown Royal British Legion or a branch of their
choosing, and will be contacted in due course.

At a meeting held on Sept. 16, the Winton & Moordown Club in
Bournemouth was informed of this decision and of its options and
will now make a decision as to how to proceed the running of the
property on Wimborne Road, Daily Echo notes.

The Royal British Legion is a charity providing financial, social
and emotional support to members and veterans of the British Armed
Forces, their families and dependents.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[^] BOOK REVIEW: Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in Cyberspace
-------------------------------------------------------------
Author: Warren E. Agin
Publisher: Bowne Publishing Co.
List price: $225.00
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher

Red Hat Inc. finds itself with a high of 151 5/8 and low of 20 over
the last 12 months! Microstrategy Inc. has roller-coasted from a
high of 333 to a low of 7 over the same period! Just when the IPO
boom is imploding and high-technology companies are running out of
cash, Warren Agin comes out with a guide to the legal issues of the
cyberage.

The word "cyberspace" did not appear in the Merriam-Webster
Dictionary until 1986, defined as "the on-line world of computer
networks." The word "Internet" showed up that year as well, as "an
electronic communications network that connects computer networks
and organizational computer facilities around the world."
Cyberspace has been leading a kaleidoscopic parade ever since, with
the legal profession striding smartly in rhythm. There is no
definition for the word "cyberassets" in the current
Merriam-Webster. Fortunately, Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in
Cyberspace tells us what cyberassets are and lays out in meticulous
detail how to address them, not only for troubled technology
companies, but for all companies with websites and domain names.
Cyberassets are primarily websites and domain names, but also
include technology contracts and licenses. There are four types of
assets embodied in a website: content, hardware, the Internet
connection, and software. The website's content is its fundamental
asset and may include databases, text, pictures, and video and
sound clips. The value of a website depends largely on the traffic
it generates.

A domain name provides the mechanism to reach the information
provided by a company on its website, or find the products or
services the company is selling over the Internet. Examples are
Amazon.com, bankrupt.com, and "swiggartagin.com." Determining the
value of a domain name is comparable to valuing trademark rights.
Domain names can come at a high price! Compaq Computer Corp. paid
Alta Vista Technology Inc. more than $3 million for "Altavista.com"
when it developed its AltaVista search engine.

The subject matter covered in this book falls into three groups:
the Internet's effect on the practice of bankruptcy law; the ways
substantive bankruptcy law handles the impact of cyberspace on
basic concepts and procedures; and issues related to cyberassets as
secured lending collateral.

The book includes point-by-point treatment of the effect of
cyberassets on venue and jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings;
electronic filing and access to official records and pleadings in
bankruptcy cases; using the Internet for communications and
noticing in bankruptcy cases; administration of bankruptcy estates
with cyberassets; selling bankruptcy estate assets over the
Internet; trading in bankruptcy claims over the Internet; and
technology contracts and licenses under the bankruptcy codes. The
chapters on secured lending detail technology escrow agreements for
cyberassets; obtaining and perfecting security interests for
cyberassets; enforcing rights against collateral for cyberassets;
and bankruptcy concerns for the secured lender with regard to
cyberassets.

The book concludes with chapters on Y2K and bankruptcy; revisions
in the Uniform Commercial Code in the electronic age; and a
compendium of bankruptcy and secured lending resources on the
Internet. The appendix consists of a comprehensive set of forms for
cyberspace-related bankruptcy issues and cyberasset lending
transactions. The forms include bankruptcy orders authorizing a
domain name sale; forms for electronic filing of documents;
bankruptcy motions related to domain names; and security agreements
for Web sites.

Bankruptcy and Secured Lending in Cyberspace is a well-written,
succinct, and comprehensive reference for lending against
cyberassets and treating cyberassets in bankruptcy cases.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


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