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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Tuesday, September 21, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 183

                           Headlines



B E L A R U S

BELARUS: S&P Affirms 'B/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Neg.


G E R M A N Y

DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA: To Use Share Offer Proceeds to Repay Bailout
WIRECARD AG: Police Probes Payment to Marsalek Fiancee's Landlord


I R E L A N D

CAIRN CLO XIV: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to EUR11.6MM F Notes
FINANCE IRELAND 1: Moody's Ups Rating on EUR5.8MM E Notes to Ba2
GLENBEIGH 2 ISSUER 2021-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating on F Notes
TCS FINANCE: Fitch Assigns Final B- Rating on USD600MM AT1 Notes


P O R T U G A L

VIRIATO FINANCE 1: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class E Notes


R O M A N I A

CITY INSURANCE: Romania's ASF Withdraws Operating License


R U S S I A

RUNA-BANK JSC: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration


S P A I N

OBRASCON HUARTE: Fitch Withdraws All Ratings
[*] SPAIN: Council of Ministers Approve Insolvency Legislation


S W E D E N

INTRUM AB: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' CFR, Outlook Remains Negative
POLYSTORM BIDCO: Fitch Assigns FirstTime 'B(EXP)' IDR
POLYSTORM BIDCO: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CHESHIRE 2021-1 PLC: Fitch Assigns Final B Rating on Class F Debt
MANSARD MORTGAGES 2007-1: Fitch Raises Class B2a Notes Rating to BB
S4 CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Stable
WELLESLEY: Losses Widen to GBP1MM+ Amid Winding-Down Process

                           - - - - -


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B E L A R U S
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BELARUS: S&P Affirms 'B/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Neg.
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S&P Global Ratings, on Sept. 17, 2021, affirmed its 'B/B' long- and
short-term foreign- and local-currency sovereign credit ratings on
Belarus. The outlook remains negative.

Outlook

The negative outlook on Belarus indicates the risk that
international sanctions and the protracted political crisis could
weigh on the country's economic, balance-of-payments, and fiscal
performance more than we expect over the next 12 months. The
outlook also factors in the possibility that timely financial
support to Belarus from Russia could become less predictable,
perhaps due to stricter conditions that Belarus might find
difficult to meet in some instances.

Downside scenario

S&P said, "We could lower the ratings on Belarus if we perceive
that existing and possible new international sanctions will likely
result in more severe implications for its macroeconomic outlook
than we project. Rating downside could also emerge if timely
financial support from Russia proves inadequate or less
forthcoming. Both scenarios would pressure the country's
international reserves and weaken the government's ability to meet
its upcoming public debt redemptions."

Upside scenario

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the economy adjusts to
the international sanctions regime faster than it anticipates,
substantially mitigating the adverse implications for the economy
and the balance of payments. A stable outlook could also be
supported if lingering political uncertainty is replaced by a clear
policy direction that supports Belarus' economic, fiscal, and
financial sector stability. In addition, a positive rating action
could follow a substantial improvement in the country's
international reserve position.

Rationale

S&P said, "Our ratings on Belarus are constrained by its weak
institutional arrangements--it has limited checks and balances in
place and power has been concentrated in the hands of Alexander
Lukashenko for several decades. In S&P's view, these shortcomings
contribute to the high level of political uncertainty and prevent
an effective resolution of the political crisis that emerged after
a disputed presidential election in 2020. The ratings are also
constrained by international sectorial and financial sanctions
imposed on Belarus, which have pressured the country's already
vulnerable external and fiscal positions, amid limited monetary
policy flexibility.

"Our ratings on Belarus are supported by somewhat stronger
international reserves on the back of the recent IMF Special
Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation of $0.9 billion (1.4% of GDP), its
still-moderate government debt, relatively flexible exchange rate
regime, and financial support from the country's key creditor,
Russia."

Institutional and economic profile: Sanctions will likely trigger a
recession next year

-- GDP will likely contract in 2022, but the ultimate impact of
sanctions is difficult to quantify.

-- Belarus' plans to redirect exports away from the EU are subject
to execution risks.

-- The domestic political crisis is continuing, with no clear
resolution path in sight.

S&P said, "Despite a rebound in economic growth in first-half 2021
following the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, we consider
Belarus' medium-term economic prospects fragile. We expect the
economy to contract 0.7% in 2022 on declining exports, as well as
shrinking domestic demand." Exports will take a hit from several
rounds of sectorial sanctions imposed by the EU, U.K., and U.S.,
among others, which have targeted a wide range of the country's key
export goods, including petroleum and potash products. These
restrictions follow the forced landing of an over-flying civilian
aircraft and the arrest of a regime critic in May 2021, as well as
human rights abuses after the disputed presidential election in
August 2020.

Although the sanctions affect a range of Belarus' export products,
the hit will be partially mitigated by several factors.

First, EU sanctions explicitly exclude potash with a potassium
content of 40%-62%, which forms over 70% of Belarus' EU potash
exports. Restrictions also do not target export contracts concluded
before June 25, 2021, meaning it will take time for the adverse
effects to fully materialize. In addition, S&P understands the U.S.
ban on its residents interacting with Belarus potash producer
Belaruskali is unlikely to adversely affect trade relations with
China, India, and Brazil, which together account for over 50% of
Belarus' total potash fertilizer exports. On the petrochemicals
side, Ukraine represents a sizable 40% of Belarus' petroleum
exports (with the EU and U.K. accounting for the remaining 60%) and
so far it has not joined the sanctions.

S&P said, "Second, we understand that the Belarus authorities are
planning to reroute the sanctioned exports away from the EU to
other markets and logistical hubs, primarily in Russia. It appears
that Russia's transport infrastructure and market capacity will
likely accommodate at least some of these flows, softening the
sanctions impact.

"Nevertheless, we expect a visible macroeconomic hit from the
sanctions. In our view, the rerouting of supplies away from Europe
toward Russia could take time and face logistical difficulties at
least in the initial stage, prompting real exports to decline 5%-6%
in 2022. At the same time, it remains difficult to quantify the
response to sanctions from Belarus' individual counterparties, some
of which might discontinue their business with the country to
reduce compliance risks stemming from possible U.S. secondary
sanctions, particularly if they have other U.S. business.

"We project Belarus' economy will expand 2% this year, supported by
double-digit export growth because of the fast recovery at key
trading partners (Russia and the EU) in first-half 2021. The
country's real GDP increased 3.3% in the first seven months of
2021.

"However, like never before, our economic projections remain
subject to a high degree of uncertainty. This is because of the
impact of international sanctions on top of the protracted
political crisis, which will likely weigh on domestic investor and
consumer confidence."

Even though Mr. Lukashenko has largely retaken control of the
country due to a heavy-handed response to public protests from the
security services, political stability remains fragile. The impasse
is particularly difficult to overcome, given that Belarus lacks
independent institutions that could credibly arbitrate and aid an
effective resolution. In February, the country's leadership
proposed a constitutional reform to decentralize power to the
government and parliament and take effect in 2022. However, the
details and timeline remain vague, offering no visibility on the
post-reform institutional setup and power succession scenario.
Moreover, key opposition figures and activists have been excluded
from the reform discussion, with most independent presidential
candidates either prosecuted or pushed into exile, including
Svetlana Tikhanovskaya--the opposition frontrunner in the 2020
election.

S&P said, "In our view, extended political uncertainty will likely
cloud the outlook for domestic and foreign investment as well as
weaken the prospects of Belarus' technology sector--an important
source of growth in recent years. In addition, there are signs that
domestic volatility might reverse past economic reforms, especially
in the large state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector, with the
government's pervasive involvement in the economy increasing again.
This could constrain Belarus' long-term growth prospects, which we
believe are weaker than in other countries at a similar level of
economic development, due to low levels of competition and
innovation, a challenging business and regulatory environment, and
adverse demographic trends."

Flexibility and performance profile: Immediate external financing
risks have somewhat abated

-- Belarus' official reserves have increased, but external
vulnerabilities remain high.

-- Russia is likely to provide financial support in 2022-2023.

-- Banking sector stability remains fragile, but imminent
liquidity risks have moderated.

Stronger exports and current account performance to date this year,
as well as the allocation of an equivalent of $0.9 billion from the
IMF SDR to Belarus, boosted the country's international reserves to
$8.5 billion in August--broadly the same as at the onset of the
political crisis in 2020. This has strengthened Belarus' buffers
against a likely deterioration of current account performance and
possible external financing shortfalls.

At the same time, Russia still appears committed to supporting
Belarus. Public statements suggest that Russia and Russian-backed
financial institutions are once again close to a new loan
arrangement, with the first tranche to be disbursed in the next few
months. S&P also understands the Russian government is
contemplating a $0.63 billion loan to partially compensate Belarus'
losses from changes in oil taxation in Russia, which effectively
downsized energy subsidies to Belarus previously.

If provided, this funding will broadly cover the government's
external refinancing needs in 2022 and 2023, which amount to $1.7
billion and $2.8 billion, respectively. Government debt is
dominated by official loans from Russia and Russian-controlled
institutions (about 50% of the total) and China (about 13%). The
first sizable principal repayment on Belarus' Eurobond ($0.8
billion) comes due in early 2023. S&P understands that apart from
additional credit lines from bilateral lenders, Belarus could also
use its access to the Russian capital markets.

Beyond the immediate pressures somewhat mitigated by the likely
financial support from Russia and improved buffers, S&P considers
that Belarus' balance of payments will remain vulnerable over the
medium term. The main pressures stem from sectoral sanctions that
could dent the country's exports receipts, potentially elevated
demand for foreign currency from domestic residents, and a
comparatively heavy external public debt redemption profile, even
as current account deficits are expected to remain fairly modest at
an average of 1.7%-2.0% of GDP over 2021-2024. Belarus' foreign
exchange reserves remain largely underpinned by past public sector
borrowing in foreign currencies, with proceeds placed at the
central bank. As such, the central bank's ability to deploy its
reserves to support the balance of payments in case of need is more
limited than it would be if reserves had been accumulated through
past current account surpluses.

Even if the Russian government is willing to roll over its official
loans to Belarus, it remains to be seen if Russia will fully offset
the drain on Belarus' external liquidity if sanctions have more
severe adverse effects. Relations between the two countries have
been marked by frequent disputes, which in some instances have
resulted in delayed disbursements of previously agreed funding
lines. Given the diminishing room for maneuver faced by Belarus'
authorities, S&P believes Russia could make lending arrangements
conditional on political concessions that Belarus was previously
unwilling to accept.

S&P said, "We consider that the currency structure of Belarus'
government debt remains unfavorable. Close to 95% of government
debt is denominated in foreign currencies, mostly U.S. dollars,
making the stock of debt highly sensitive to exchange rate
movements. Given our projection that the fiscal deficit will widen
to 4% of GDP next year as the recession hits revenue, and as the
domestic currency depreciates, we forecast that net general
government debt will increase to 39% of GDP by year-end 2022, from
33% at year-end 2021. That said, this is still below public debt
levels in many other emerging markets.

"In our view, the National Bank of Belarus (NBRB) is facing a
difficult choice between supporting growth and meeting its price
stability mandate. Inflation has been above the target since
midyear 2020, peaking at 9.9% in June 2021 on currency
depreciation, the value-added tax, administered-price hikes, and
higher food prices. Despite past progress in transitioning to a
more flexible monetary setting, including the floating
exchange-rate regime, we believe the NBRB's room for policy
maneuver is limited. Moreover, we understand that the NBRB paused
its transition to an inflation-targeting regime, rather focusing on
broad money supply as its intermediate monetary target. The
institution has also discontinued its prescheduled policy rate
decisions. Whether this represents a permanent step away from the
previous monetary policy reform path remains to be seen.

"More generally, we remain of the view that the NBRB lacks the
operational independence to make key decisions regarding its policy
direction due to political interference in its decision-making. The
weak position of the banking system and the high stock of directed
lending, high deposit dollarization (above 50%), and underdeveloped
domestic capital market also inhibit the monetary transmission
channel."

These long-term and more-structural constraints are aggravated by
pressures on banks' funding bases and the downside risks to asset
quality associated with international sanctions on a few SOEs
(credit to three SOEs has also been sanctioned by the EU) and the
country's weak economic performance. Although deposit conversions
to foreign currency and withdrawals have subsided substantially in
recent months, new domestic or external shocks, including from the
possibility of further rounds of stronger sanctions, could once
again pressure banks' capital and liquidity positions.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List

  RATINGS AFFIRMED

  BELARUS

   Sovereign Credit Rating      B/Negative/B
   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment    B
   Senior Unsecured                        B




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G E R M A N Y
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DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA: To Use Share Offer Proceeds to Repay Bailout
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Joe Miller at The Financial Times reports that Lufthansa is to
raise more than EUR2.1 billion by offering new shares to investors,
the German carrier said on Sept. 19, and use the proceeds to repay
the multibillion-euro bailout it received from Berlin in the summer
of 2020.

The group said the long-anticipated capital raising, underwritten
by 14 banks and due to be completed in early October, will help the
Frankfurt-based airline refund the full EUR2.5 billion it has drawn
from its home country's Economic Stabilisation Fund (ESF) by the
end of the year, the FT relates.

Germany's ESF participated in a EUR9 billion rescue package for
Lufthansa last summer, which included support from the Austrian,
Swiss, Italian and Belgian governments. Berlin also spent EUR300
million on shares in the company, and now owns almost 16 per cent
of the group, the FT recounts.

Lufthansa has repaid much of what it drew from the package,
including a EUR1 billion loan from the German development bank KfW,
the FT states.

According to the FT, a spokesperson said once the ESF tranche is
fully repaid, the airline will cancel the facility in its entirety,
before repaying the EUR1.2 billion it owes to the remaining
governments.

After being forced to ground almost all its planes at the height of
the pandemic, the group has been slowly recovering, with flights in
August reaching 50% of those flown in the same month in 2019, the
FT notes.

While it is still burning through roughly EUR200 million a month in
cash, Lufthansa said it expected to have no operating cash drain in
the third quarter, and for earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortisation to turn positive for the first time
since the pandemic broke out, the FT discloses.


WIRECARD AG: Police Probes Payment to Marsalek Fiancee's Landlord
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Olaf Storbeck at The Financial Times reports that Munich police
have investigated an EUR80,000 payment from a bank account in Dubai
to the landlord of Jan Marsalek's fiancee in Munich, which could
prove a rare link to the fugitive former Wirecard executive.

The 41-year-old Austrian fled in June 2020 just days before
Wirecard crashed into insolvency after admitting that EUR1.9
billion of cash and half of its revenues did not exist, the FT
recounts.  Mr. Marsalek, who is on Interpol's most wanted list, is
accused of "fraud in the billions" by Munich prosecutors, the FT
discloses.

The crash of the once high-flying electronic payments company,
which at its peak in 2018 was a member of Germany's blue-chip Dax
stock index worth EUR24 billion, is one of Europe's biggest postwar
accounting scandals, the FT notes.

Mr. Marsalek left behind his longtime girlfriend in Munich, who has
been interrogated by police several times, the FT relays, citing
people briefed on the investigation.  As Mr. Marsalek and his
girlfriend were engaged, she can claim spousal privilege and refuse
to give testimony, the FT states.

Mr. Marsalek's fiancee was renting a luxury flat in Munich, paying
a monthly rent of about EUR6,600, the FT says.  Earlier this year,
her landlord received a one-off payment of close to EUR80,000,
representing the value of 12 months' rent, the FT discloses.

The money was wired from a bank account in Dubai from a person with
an Arabic name, and came with the reference "für Jan" ("on behalf
of Jan"), the FT states.  The money was wired to the bank account
used to administer the tenant's deposit, which is different from
the one used to settle the monthly rent payments, people briefed on
the matter told the FT.  The landlord reported the payment to
police, according to these people.

A spokeswoman for Munich's public prosecutors told the FT that
investigators received a suspicious activity report from the
landlord's bank in that context, and declined to comment further on
the payment, which was first reported by Handelsblatt.

It is unclear if the person in whose name the money was sent really
exists, or if it was an alias used by Mr. Marsalek, the FT notes.
A name very similar to the sender's is listed as a client of one of
Wirecard's Asian business partners in one of the documents reviewed
by KPMG during its special audit into Wirecard, according to the
FT.




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CAIRN CLO XIV: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to EUR11.6MM F Notes
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Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Cairn CLO
XIV Designated Activity Company (the "Issuer"):

EUR244,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2034, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR29,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2034, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

EUR15,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2034,
Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

EUR24,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2034, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

EUR28,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2034, Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

EUR20,400,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2034, Assigned (P)Ba3 (sf)

EUR11,600,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2034, Assigned (P)B3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rationale for the rating is based on a consideration of the
risks associated with the CLO's portfolio and structure as
described in Moody's methodology.

The Issuer is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured obligations and up to 10%
of the portfolio may consist of senior unsecured obligations,
second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and high yield bonds. The
portfolio is expected to be 80% ramped as of the closing date and
to comprise of predominantly corporate loans to obligors domiciled
in Western Europe. The remainder of the portfolio will be acquired
during the 6-month ramp-up period in compliance with the portfolio
guidelines.

Cairn Loan Investments II LLP will manage the CLO. It will direct
the selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's 4.5-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, subject to certain restrictions,
purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from unscheduled
principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk
obligations or credit improved obligations.

In addition to the seven classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR22.5 million of M-1 Subordinated Notes and
EUR13.5 million of M-2 Subordinated Notes which are not rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which,
if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down
the notes in order of seniority.

Methodology underlying the rating action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
December 2020.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes'
performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions
that may change. The collateral manager's investment decisions and
management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of
the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in December 2020.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par Amount: EUR400,000,000

Diversity Score(*): 43

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2925

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.65%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 3.50%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 44.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.5 years

FINANCE IRELAND 1: Moody's Ups Rating on EUR5.8MM E Notes to Ba2
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Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 4 notes in
Finance Ireland RMBS No. 1 Designated Activity Company. The rating
action reflects the better than expected collateral performance and
increased levels of credit enhancement for the affected notes.

Moody's affirmed the rating of the Class A Notes that had
sufficient credit enhancement to maintain their current rating.

EUR245.2M Class A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 16,
2021 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR15.9M Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar
16, 2021 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

EUR8.7M Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar 16,
2021 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR7.9M Class D Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 16,
2021 Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

EUR5.8M Class E Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Mar 16,
2021 Affirmed B3 (sf)

Finance Ireland RMBS No. 1 Designated Activity Company is a static
cash securitisation of residential mortgages extended to obligors
located in Ireland by Finance Ireland Credit Solutions DAC and
Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is prompted by decreased key collateral
assumptions, namely the portfolio Expected Loss (EL) and MILAN CE
assumptions due to better than expected collateral performance, as
well as an increase in credit enhancement for the affected
tranches.

Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions:

As part of the rating action, Moody's reassessed its lifetime loss
expectation for the portfolio reflecting the collateral performance
to date.

The performance of the transaction has continued to be stable since
it closed in July 2019. Total delinquencies have remained stable
over the course of this year, with 90 days plus arrears currently
standing at only 1.2% of current pool balance. There have been no
losses in the transaction so far, with pool factor currently at
70.2%.

Moody's decreased the expected loss assumption to 1.8% as a
percentage of original pool balance from 3.2% previously. This
corresponds to an expected loss as a percentage of current pool
balance of 2.6%. The expected loss reduction was based on the good
performance since closing, despite challenging economic
environment, as well as benchmarking with comparable transactions
in Ireland and abroad.

Moody's has also assessed loan-by-loan information as a part of its
detailed transaction review to determine the credit support
consistent with target rating levels and the volatility of future
losses. As a result, Moody's has decreased the MILAN CE assumption
to 14.0% from 15.5%.

Increase in Available Credit Enhancement

Sequential amortization led to the increase in the credit
enhancement available in this transaction.

For instance, the credit enhancement for the most senior tranche
affected by the rating action increased to 15.90% from 14.96% since
the last rating action in March 2021.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
December 2020.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) performance of the underlying collateral that
is better than Moody's expected, (2) an increase in available
credit enhancement and (3) improvements in the credit quality of
the transaction counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk, (2) performance
of the underlying collateral that is worse than Moody's expected,
(3) deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement and
(4) deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.


GLENBEIGH 2 ISSUER 2021-2: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating on F Notes
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S&P Global Ratings has assigned preliminary credit ratings to
Glenbeigh 2 Issuer 2021-2 DAC's class A to F-Dfrd notes. At
closing, the issuer will also issue unrated class Z notes and class
S1, S2, and Y instruments.

Glenbeigh 2 Issuer 2021-2 is a static RMBS transaction that
securitizes a preliminary portfolio of EUR1.066 million loans
secured by primarily interest only, buy-to-let residential assets.

The loans were originated primarily between 2006 to 2008 by
Permanent TSB PLC (PTSB), one of the largest financial services
groups in Ireland.

The securitized portfolio was sold to Citibank N.A. as part of a
wider loan sale in November 2020. The assets are serviced by Pepper
Ireland.

None of the loans in the pool have taken a payment holiday because
of the COVID-19 pandemic. Those loans were explicitly excluded in
the initial portfolio sale to Citibank.

The transaction features a liquidity and a general reserve fund to
provide liquidity in the transaction. Principal can also be used to
pay senior fees and interest on the most senior class outstanding.

At closing, the issuer will use the issuance proceeds to purchase
the beneficial interest in the mortgage loans from the seller. The
issuer grants security over all of its assets in the security
trustee's favor.

There are no rating constraints in the transaction under our
counterparty, operational risk, or structured finance sovereign
risk criteria. S&P considers the issuer to be bankruptcy remote.

  Preliminary Ratings

  CLASS    PRELIM. RATING*    CLASS SIZE (%)§
  A          AAA (sf)           72.00
  B-Dfrd     AA (sf)             6.00
  C-Dfrd     A+ (sf)             4.00
  D-Dfrd     BBB+ (sf)           3.00
  E-Dfrd     BB+ (sf)            3.00
  F-Dfrd     B- (sf)             2.00
  Z          NR                 10.00
  S1         NR                   N/A
  S2         NR                   N/A
  Y          NR                   N/A

*S&P's preliminary ratings address timely receipt of interest and
ultimate repayment of principal on the class A notes, and the
ultimate payment of interest and principal on the other rated
notes. Interest payments on the class B-Dfrd to F-Dfrd notes can
continue to be deferred once that class of notes becomes the
most-senior outstanding.
§As a percentage of 95% of the pool balance.

NR--Not rated.
N/A--Not applicable.


TCS FINANCE: Fitch Assigns Final B- Rating on USD600MM AT1 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned TCS Finance DAC's USD600 million issue
of perpetual Additional Tier 1 (AT1) notes a final long-term rating
of 'B-'. TCS Finance DAC is registered in Ireland and is a
financing special purpose entity of Russia-based Tinkoff Bank
(BB/Stable/bb). The proceeds from the issue will be used solely for
financing a perpetual subordinated loan to Tinkoff, which will
count as regulatory Tier 1 capital at the bank.

The bonds have a 6% coupon rate and no established redemption date.
However, Tinkoff will have an option to repay the notes every five
years starting from 2026 subject to the Central Bank of Russia's
(CBR) approval.

The assignment of the final rating follows the completion of the
issue and receipt of documents conforming to the information
previously received.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The notes are rated four notches below Tinkoff's 'bb' Viability
Rating (VR). According to Fitch's Bank Rating Criteria, this is the
highest possible rating that can be assigned to deeply subordinated
notes with fully discretionary coupon omission issued by banks with
a VR anchor of 'bb'. The notching reflects the notes' higher loss
severity in light of their deep subordination and additional
non-performance risk relative to the VR given a high write-down
trigger and fully discretionary coupons.

The notes should qualify as AT1 capital in Tinkoff's regulatory
accounts due to a full coupon omission option at the bank's
discretion and full or partial write-down in case either (i)
regulatory core Tier 1 ratio falls below 5.125% (versus a 4.5%
regulatory minimum) for six or more operational days in aggregate
during any 30 consecutive operational days; or (ii) the CBR
approves a plan for the participation of the CBR in bankruptcy
prevention measures in respect of the bank, or the Banking
Supervision Committee of the CBR approves a plan for the
participation of the Deposit Insurance Agency in bankruptcy
prevention measures in respect of the bank.

Fitch expects any coupon omission to occur before the bank breaches
the notes' 5.125% core Tier 1 trigger. There is no specific trigger
which would oblige Tinkoff to omit coupons before its capital ratio
falls to 5.125%. However, if the bank's capital ratios fell below
minimum levels including buffers (i.e. 7% for core Tier 1) then the
bank would be required to submit a capital recovery plan to the
CBR. In Fitch's view, there would be at least moderate risk that
any plan would include the omission of coupons on the AT1
securities.

The risk of coupon omission is reasonably mitigated by Tinkoff's
stable financial profile, healthy profitability, and reasonable
headroom over capital minimums including buffers (Tinkoff's
regulatory core Tier 1 ratio (N20.1) was 10.2% at end-2Q21,
comparing favorably with the minimum requirements).

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of 3. ESG issues are credit neutral
or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either due to
their nature or the way in which they are being managed by the
entity.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- The issue rating could be upgraded if Tinkoff's VR was
    upgraded.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- The issue rating could be downgraded if Tinkoff's VR was
    downgraded.

The issue ratings could also be downgraded if Fitch takes a view
that non-performance risk has increased and widens the notching
between Tinkoff's VR and the issue's ratings. For example, this
could arise if Tinkoff fails to maintain reasonable headroom over
the minimum capital adequacy ratios (including buffers) or if the
instrument becomes non-performing, i.e. if the bank cancels any
coupon payment or at least partially writes off the principal. In
this case, the AT1's rating would be downgraded based on Fitch's
expectations about the form and duration of non-performance.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.




===============
P O R T U G A L
===============

VIRIATO FINANCE 1: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following provisional
ratings to the notes to be issued by Viriato Finance No. 1 ("the
issuer"):

EUR [ ] Class A Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes due Oct 2040,
Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)

EUR [ ] Class B Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes due Oct 2040,
Assigned (P)A3 (sf)

EUR [ ] Class C Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes due Oct 2040,
Assigned (P)Baa3 (sf)

EUR [ ] Class D Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes due Oct 2040,
Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

EUR [ ] Class E Floating Rate Asset Backed Notes due Oct 2040,
Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's has not assigned a rating to the Classes F Asset-Backed
Fixed Rate Notes, Class R Fixed Rate Notes and X Asset Backed Notes
due Oct 2040 amounting to EUR [ ]M.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The transaction is a one year cash securitisation of Portuguese
unsecured consumer loans originated by WiZink Bank, S.A.U. --
Sucursal em Portugal (N.R.) (WiZink). The portfolio consists of
consumer loans used for undefined or general purposes. WiZink will
also acts as servicer in the transaction.

The portfolio of underlying assets consists of pre-approved loans
granted to clients with at least 6 months of credit history on
WiZink credit card. The loans are originated via phone or online
channels and they are all fixed rate, annuity style amortising
loans with no balloon loans, the market standard for Portuguese
consumer loans. The total outstanding balance of the provisional
pool is approximately EUR176.1 million. As of June 30, 2021, the
provisional portfolio has 50,373 loans with a weighted average
interest of 11.7%. The portfolio is highly granular with the
largest and 10 largest borrower representing 0.02% and 0.16% of the
pool, respectively. The portfolio also benefits from a good
geographic diversification and good weighted average seasoning of
21 months. No loans in grace period due to moratoriums will be
securitised at closing. The final portfolio will be selected at
random from the provisional portfolio to match the final note
issuance amount.

The transaction benefits from credit strengths such as an
artificial write-off, which traps the available excess spread to
cover any losses when the loan has been eight months in arrears,
the high weighted average interest rate of 11.6% and swap agreement
to hedge the Interest rate mismatch risk provided by BNP Paribas

However, Moody's notes that the transaction features some credit
weaknesses such as (i) a one year revolving structure which could
increase performance volatility of the underlying portfolio,
partially mitigated by early amortisation triggers, revolving
criteria both on individual loan and portfolio level and the
eligibility criteria for the portfolio, (ii) a complex structure
including interest deferral triggers for juniors notes, pro-rata
payments on all classes of notes after the end of the revolving
period, (iii) commingling risk partially mitigated by the transfer
of collections to the issuer account bank within two days and (iv)
operational risk as Wizink is an unrated entity, acting as servicer
in the transaction.

Moody's analysis focused, amongst other factors, on (i) an
evaluation of the underlying portfolio of consumer loans and the
eligibility criteria; (ii) historical performance provided on
WiZink total book; (iii) the credit enhancement provided by
subordination and excess spread; (iv) the liquidity support
available in the transaction by way of principal to pay interest
for classes A-C (and D-F when they become the most senior class)
and a dedicated liquidity reserve only for classes A-C; and (v) the
overall legal and structural integrity of the transaction.

MAIN MODEL ASSUMPTIONS

Moody's determined a portfolio lifetime expected mean default rate
of 8.5%, expected recoveries of 15.0% and a portfolio credit
enhancement ("PCE") of 24.0%. The expected defaults and recoveries
capture Moody's expectations of performance considering the current
economic outlook, while the PCE captures the loss Moody's expect
the portfolio to suffer in the event of a severe recession
scenario. Expected defaults and PCE are parameters used by Moody's
to calibrate its lognormal portfolio loss distribution curve and to
associate a probability with each potential future loss scenario in
its ABSROM cash flow model to rate consumer ABS transactions.

The portfolio expected mean default rate of 8.5% is higher than
recent Iberian consumer loan transaction average and is based on
Moody's assessment of the lifetime expectation for the pool taking
into account (i) historic performance of the loan book of the
originator, (ii) other similar transactions in the Iberian market
used as a benchmark, (iii) macroeconomic trends and (iv) other
qualitative considerations.

Portfolio expected recoveries of 15% is in line with recent Iberian
consumer loan average and are based on Moody's assessment of the
lifetime expectation for the pool taking into account (i) historic
performance of the loan book of the originator, (ii) benchmark
transactions, and (iii) other qualitative considerations such as
quality of data provided.

The PCE of 24.0% is higher than other Iberian consumer loan peers
and is based on Moody's assessment of the pool taking into account
the relative ranking to originator peers in the Spanish consumer
loan market. The PCE of 24.0% results in an implied coefficient of
variation ("CoV") of 47%.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan-Backed ABS" published in September
2021.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings of the Notes would be (1) better than expected performance
of the underlying collateral; or (2) a lowering of Portuguese's
sovereign risk leading to an higher local currency ceiling cap.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings would be (1) worse than expected performance of the
underlying collateral; (2) deterioration in the credit quality of
WiZink; or (3) an increase in Portuguese's sovereign risk.




=============
R O M A N I A
=============

CITY INSURANCE: Romania's ASF Withdraws Operating License
---------------------------------------------------------
Iulian Ernst at bne Intellinews reports that the Council of
Romania's Financial Supervisory Authority (ASF) on Sept. 17
withdrew the operating license of City Insurance, the country's
biggest insurer that owes its position to the massive portfolio of
mandatory car insurances.  

The ASF will now initiate bankruptcy procedures against City, bne
Intellinews relates.

According to bne Intellinews, the Romanian insurer, set up and
controlled until June by Romanian businessman Dan Odobescu, the
brother-in-law of former prime minister Adrian Nastase, failed to
observe the recovery strategies required by the ASF in June.

Under the strategies, the insurer was supposed to increase its
capital by EUR150 million before Sept. 6, bne Intellinews
discloses.

A Swiss-registered investment vehicle, I3CP, promised to buy new
shares issued by the insurer but it failed to come up with the
money by the deadline, bne Intellinews notes.

The ASF announced that Romania's biggest insurer failed to
demonstrate it is capable of increasing its own resources such as
to meet the minimum and solvency capital requirements, bne
Intellinews recounts.

The authority also concluded that the company is already insolvent
and its solvency keeps deteriorating, bne Intellinews states.

Under existing regulations, the claims generated by the insurance
policies issued by City will be processed from now on by the
Insurance Guarantee Fund (FGA) but the payments will be disbursed
only after City's bankruptcy, bne Intellinews relays.

The government is reportedly drafting an emergency decree that
would allow the FGA to disburse the money within 60 days after the
insurer loses its operating license, bne Intellinews says.

According to sources familiar with the market, City's portfolio
will generate total claims in the amount of around EUR100 million,
bne Intellinews notes.




===========
R U S S I A
===========

RUNA-BANK JSC: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, on Sept. 20, 2021, terminated the activity of
the provisional administration appointed to manage the credit
institution JSC RUNA-BANK (hereinafter, the Bank).

No signs of insolvency (bankruptcy) were established as a result of
the provisional administration-conducted inspection of the credit
institution.

On September 7, 2021, the Court of Arbitration of the City of
Moscow issued a ruling on the forced liquidation of the Bank.

The State Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency was appointed as
receiver.

Further information on the results of the activity of the
provisional administration is available on the Bank of Russia
website.

The provisional administration was appointed by virtue of Bank of
Russia Order No. OD-1532, dated July 23, 2021, following the
revocation of the Bank's banking license.




=========
S P A I N
=========

OBRASCON HUARTE: Fitch Withdraws All Ratings
--------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Obrascon Huarte Lain S.A.'s (OHLA's)
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CCC+' from 'RD'
(Restricted Default) and Short-Term IDR to 'C' from 'RD'. All
ratings have simultaneously been withdrawn.

The upgrade reflects Fitch's assessment of OHLA's
post-restructuring capital structure and business profile following
the engineering and construction (E&C) company's recent debt
restructuring. Its debt exchange has improved its liquidity
profile, mainly due to a three-year extension of maturities and
over EUR105 million reduction in debt principal.

The rating is constrained by a weak financial profile due to high
leverage and challenged, albeit improving, profitability.

The ratings have been withdrawn for commercial reasons. Fitch will
no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage of the company.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Outlier Leverage: Fitch expects high funds from operations (FFO)
gross leverage in the medium term, far above Fitch's 'b' category
median for E&C companies of 4.5x. The company retains a high debt
quantum, notwithstanding about EUR106 million debt reduction
achieved following the debt restructuring. Fitch expects around 12x
FFO gross leverage at end-2021 and gradual deleveraging towards 6x
by 2024 on the back of improving profitability and ongoing asset
disposals. Execution risk remains on the disposal plan, dependent
on macroeconomic conditions.

Weak but Improving Profitability: Fitch expects subdued margins and
negative free cash flows (FCF) in 2021-2022, followed by moderate
improvements in 2023-2024. Near-term cash flows prospects remain
constrained by around EUR65 million-EUR100 million total expected
remaining cash outflows from legacy loss-making projects in
2021-2022 as well as a subdued order backlog in 2020. Fitch expects
a pick-up in profitability from 2022, driven by the combination of
a phase-out of cash consumption from legacy projects, an increasing
order backlog and improving margins driven by assumed sound bidding
discipline and contract execution.

Increasing Available Liquidity: OHLA has improved its liquidity
profile, mainly due to the completed debt restructuring and ongoing
asset disposals. The company has extended debt maturities by three
years, completed a new equity injection of around EUR71 million
while Fitch also assumes around EUR0.3 billion total proceeds from
the disposal of non-core assets in 2021-2022. Fitch's rating case
excludes some potential cash buffers, including any uncertain
future proceeds from recoveries under ongoing litigation actions
such as the Cemonasa claim.

Strong New Order Intake: Fitch expects high single-digit revenue
growth in 2022-2024, driven by an improving order backlog. In 1H21,
the company recorded EUR1.8 billion new orders, which were around
64% above its muted 1H20 level. Fitch forecasts healthy new order
intake of around 1x-1.1x book-to-bill over the medium term,
supported by the healthy demand in infrastructure construction.

Intact Business Profile: OHLA's business profile is underpinned by
strong market positions, a fairly stable order book and sound
diversification. OHLA ranks as a top-50 international E&C
contractor and boasts a solid market position in roads and
railways. It has a globally diversified geographic footprint with
around two-thirds of revenue generated outside Spain, mainly in the
US and Latin America. OHLA has moderate customer concentration with
its top-10 customers accounting for around half of its backlog.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

OHLA's rating is mainly constrained by outlier leverage and weak,
but improving, profitability. OHLA's business profile is weaker
than that of higher Fitch-rated European E&C peers, due mainly to
their larger scale of operations, stronger market position and
greater project diversification.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Total revenue of around EUR2.9 billion in 2021;

-- High single-digit revenue growth in 2022-2024;

-- EBITDA margin of 2% in 2021, gradually growing towards 4% in
    2024;

-- Capex at around 1.2% of sales annually in 2021-2022 and 1.5%
    in 2023-2024;

-- Working-capital requirement of around 1.4% of revenues in
    2021, 0.6% in 2022 and broadly neutral in 2023-2024;

-- Total disposals proceeds of around EUR0.3 billion in 2021-
    2022;

-- No acquisitions and dividends to 2024.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Rating sensitivities are no longer relevant given the ratings are
withdrawn.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Sufficient Liquidity: At end-June 2021, OHLA had around EUR441
million reported cash, including a significant amount of cash held
in JVs, which Fitch deems as not readily available for debt
servicing.

Fitch expects that total liquidity will be sufficient to cover
projected negative FCF of EUR45 million in 2021 and short-term debt
maturities (mainly non-recourse factoring and a mandatory debt
repayment under its asset-sale regime). Fitch expects that
liquidity will be further supported by over EUR250 million disposal
proceeds in 2021-2022. Its main debt maturities fall in March 2025
and March 2026, when the new estimated EUR487 million notes falls
due (half of which in 2025).

ISSUER PROFILE

OHLA is a Spanish constructor mainly involved in infrastructure and
civil engineering. Its construction backlog is focused on roads and
railways. It is focused on three core regions: the US, Latin
America and Europe.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


[*] SPAIN: Council of Ministers Approve Insolvency Legislation
--------------------------------------------------------------
J.C. Gonzalez Vazquez at The Corner reports that on Aug. 3, the
Council of Ministers finally approved the long-awaited Bill for the
adaptation of Spain's insolvency legislation to EU Directive
2019/1023 regarding preventive restructuring frameworks, discharge
of debt and disqualifications.

In addition, measures to increase the efficiency of procedures
concerning restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt, The
Corner notes.

Great hopes had been placed on it because it was thought that it
would help to save companies which, although going through a
difficult patch, were viable.  However, these hopes were dashed as
soon as its content was known.  The Bill has drawn heavy criticism
from all concerned parties and the high number and length of the
allegations presented go to prove the Bill has met with unanimous
rejection, according to The Corner.

Firstly, the unhealthy and out of focus overprotection of whatever
has to do with "labour" or "what is public" (in particular, but not
only, labour credits and public credits), The Corner states.  Since
the pruning of privileges regarding these credits carried out in
the 2003 Insolvency Law, such privileges and protection have been
increased in successive reforms in spite of widespread criticism
from national and international quarters, The Corner notes.

The same mistake is made in this Bill.  For example restructuring
plans are prevented from affecting labour or public credits.
However, what was found most shocking is the fact that, in the case
of public credits, there is no exemption from financial liability,
The Corner says.  And the people who have received firm
administrative sanctions in the previous 10 years or who have been
subject to derivation of liability for offences classified as
fraudulent can't avail themselves of such exemption, according to
The Corner.

Secondly, the erroneous belief that in order to speed up insolvency
proceedings and make them cheaper you have to reduce or do away
with the involvement of private insolvency professionals, The
Corner discloses.  As if they were responsible for these
proceedings lasting too long or not being very efficient when it
comes to debt recovery for creditors, The Corner notes.

In the last reforms of the Insolvency Law, and in particular in the
ones since 2014-2015, there has been a clear bias against
insolvency administrators which in this Bill has been extended to
other professionals taking part in insolvency proceedings, The
Corner recounts.   In fact their presence is not compulsory in
special proceedings regarding microenterprises.  This bias can also
be seen in the fact that their fees will be halved when the
different phases of the proceedings last over a certain number of
months -- as if they were responsible for the excessive duration of
such proceedings -- and in the implementation of a single public
platform for all electronic auctions, The Corner discloses. Quite
the opposite to what the Government did during the pandemic when it
encouraged out-of-court settlements which have proved quite
successful in this last year and a half, The Corner states.

Thirdly, the lack of clear definition of some essential questions
can be a source of conflict, The Corner says.  For example, it is
not clear what is meant by when interim financing is "necessary and
appropriate" or by an expert in restructuring who has to be someone
with experience in that field, The Corner relays.  This is in
direct contradiction to what the European Directive says, since
that expert can be named by debtors and creditors without having to
be vetted by any administrative or judicial authority,  The Corner
notes.

To make matters worse, in the case of special proceedings
concerning microenterprises, there is no provision for appeal
against decisions and judgements, according to The Corner.  An
attack on the right to legal protection which could render the Bill
unconstitutional, The Corner states.




===========
S W E D E N
===========

INTRUM AB: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' CFR, Outlook Remains Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Ba2 corporate family rating
of Intrum AB (publ) and Ba2 senior unsecured debt ratings. The
outlook remains negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation of Intrum's Ba2 CFR continues to reflect the
company's: (i) leading debt purchasing and debt servicing market
position in Europe; (ii) diversified business model, with the
majority of external revenues coming from third party debt
collections; and (iii) recovering financial performance in the
first half of 2021, including a sound liquidity position with no
material near-term refinancing requirements. These strengths are
balanced against: (i) still elevated albeit reducing leverage and
(ii) remaining execution and operational risks relating to Intrum's
debt-funded, acquisition-driven growth strategy since 2017-2018.

The Ba2 CFR reflects the recovery in Intrum's key credit metrics
after a pandemic-induced deterioration in 2020. Intrum's
profitability measured as net income / averaged managed assets
improved to 3.9% in Q2 2021 from 2.5% at year-end 2020. Interest
coverage ratio measured as EBITDA to Interest Expense improved to
5.7x as compared with 4.9x at year-end 2020, but remains below
Moody's expectations and below the average of the peer group in the
Ba category. Debt/EBITDA, improved to 4.5x from 4.7x at year-end
2020, however the pace of deleveraging is slower than expected.
After the company revised its financial objectives in November
2020, Moody's now expects the gross debt/EBITDA leverage threshold
of 4.0x to be met in 2022.

The affirmation of the Ba2 ratings of Intrum's senior unsecured
notes reflects the results from the application of Moody's Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Companies methodology
(published in December 2015) and particularly the priorities of
claims and asset coverage in the company's current liability
structure. The model outcome for the notes is Ba2. Moody's
anticipates that any potential temporary increase in Revolving
Credit Facility (RCF) drawdowns to accommodate swings in
investments can be refinanced via Intrum's commercial paper program
or bonds issuance.

The outlook remains negative reflecting 1) not yet fully recovered
credit metrics, particularly interest coverage and leverage; and 2)
downside risks related to acquisition-driven growth strategy and
elevated risk appetite.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

An upgrade of Intrum's CFR will depend on the speed of post
COVID-19 leverage reduction and sustainably improved key credit
metrics commensurate with a higher rating category. Moody's could
upgrade Intrum's CFR as a result of faster than expected progress
in reducing leverage or in improving profitability by the
successful implementation of the "One Intrum" transformation
program.

An upgrade of Intrum's CFR would likely result in an upgrade of its
debt ratings.

Moody's could downgrade Intrum's CFR if (i) the company is unable
to bring leverage under 4.0x over the outlook period; (ii) its
liquidity worsens significantly; and (iii) if the company fails to
appropriately manage the risks related to its transformation
program.

A downgrade of Intrum's CFR would likely result in a downgrade of
its debt ratings.

Furthermore, Moody's could also downgrade Intrum's senior unsecured
foreign-currency debt rating in case of a prolonged utilization
under its RCF, which is senior to the company's senior unsecured
liabilities.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Intrum AB (publ)

Affirmations:

Long-term Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed Ba2

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba2

Outlook Action:

Outlook remains Negative

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Finance
Companies Methodology published in November 2019.


POLYSTORM BIDCO: Fitch Assigns FirstTime 'B(EXP)' IDR
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned PolyStorm Bidco AB (Polygon) a
first-time expected Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of
'B(EXP)' with a Stable Outlook. Fitch has also assigned the group's
proposed up to EUR485 million first-lien term loan B (TLB,
including an up to EUR55 million of delayed draw TLB2 for
acquisitions) and EUR90 million revolving credit facility (RCF)
expected ratings of 'B(EXP)' with Recovery Ratings of 'RR4'.

The assignment of final ratings is subject to the completion of the
proposed debt issue and receipt of final documents conforming to
information already reviewed.

The ratings of Polygon reflect the expected capital structure after
its acquisition by AEA Investors currently scheduled for 5 October
2021. The transaction is to be financed with a combination of up to
EUR485 million first-lien TLB, EUR120 million second-lien term loan
and around EUR554 million equity. The group plans to redeem its
existing EUR250 million senior secured notes.

The ratings are constrained to the 'B' category by the expected
high leverage resulting from the new financing structure, fairly
limited but growing scale and by strong dependence on the German
insurance sector. Rating strengths are resilient operating
performance and a solid business profile underpinned by
market-leading positions and contracted income structure that is
consistent with a 'BB' category business services company.

Polygon's acquisitive strategy is partly mitigated by prudent M&A
policies including price discipline, the geographic and product
diversification of acquired targets and no signs of significant
integration issues.

The Stable Outlook reflects Polygon's strong operating performance
and expected deleveraging over the medium term.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High but Sustainable Leverage: The rating is restricted to the 'B'
category because of high leverage and expected modest deleveraging
over the next three years. Fitch expects gross leverage will be
above Fitch's 7.5x negative sensitivity for around 18 months after
the transaction (acquisition and debt issue) completion. Fitch
forecasts funds from operations (FFO) gross leverage at around 7.8x
in 2022 and gradual deleveraging towards 6.7x by end-2024, mainly
driven by increasing FFO on expected strong revenue growth and
broadly stable margins.

Sound Business Profile: Fitch views Polygon's business profile as
solid, with market-leading positions and a contractually secured
income structure that is consistent with a 'BB' rating. It has
operations in 16 countries, providing healthy geographic
diversification, albeit with some dependence on Germany. Its
service offering is well-diversified, which should attract larger
insurance-company customers as it enters new markets.

Concentration Risk: Fitch views Polygon's dependence on insurance
companies as a concentration risk, generating close to two thirds
of total revenue, although the relationships are generally stable
and long-term, based on multi-year contracts with a very high
retention rate.

Leading Position in Niche Market: Polygon is the dominant
participant in the European property damage restoration (PDR)
market with a leading position in Germany, the UK, Norway, and
Finland. Polygon estimates its share in the key German market at
around 10%-13%. The total addressable market amounts to around
EUR12 billion-EUR13 billion and the sector is highly fragmented
with many smaller and often family-owned businesses.

Size is an important competitive advantage in the PDR market in
winning framework agreements with large insurance companies.
Additionally, larger participants provide a comprehensive offer
with add-on services, which is an increasingly common requirement
from insurance companies.

Industry with Low Cyclicality: Demand for property damage control
is viewed as stable and driven by insurance claims, which are
resilient to economic trends. Around 80% of Polygon's revenue is
generated from framework agreements with customers and can be
regarded as recurring, delivering good revenue visibility. Claims
under these types of damages follow normal seasonal patterns, with
water leaks and fires being the most important product segments for
Polygon. The remaining revenue is more unpredictable and related to
extreme weather conditions, which have increased during the last
decade.

Resilient Performance in Pandemic: Polygon continued to see solid
operating performance for 1H21, due to strong organic growth and
bolt-on acquisitions. Its resilience to the pandemic is underpinned
by its exposure to the stable PDR sector, a high share of long-term
contracts with customers and a favourable geographic footprint
focused on Germany and the Nordics.

Positive Free Cash Flows: Fitch expects Polygon to continue to
generate free cash flow (FCF) through the cycle, except in 2021
when high working-capital consumption will lead to negative FCF.
Fitch expects limited volatility of profitability through the cycle
due to a large share of contract revenue and manageable customer
concentration.

Cash flow will be supported by expected organic growth in the
mid-single digits, partly driven by an increasing number of
restorable residential and commercial properties, ageing building
stock and the increasing value of properties, which in turn results
in more claims for damages.

Continued Acquisitive Strategy: Fitch expects Polygon to continue
to pursue an M&A-driven growth strategy and continue to gain market
share in selected geographies as it broadens its services scope
with some of its latest acquisitions. Execution risk is mitigated
by the group's successful integration record and prudent policy of
acquiring companies with a clear strategic fit at sound valuation
multiples. Nevertheless, the M&A pipeline, deal parameters and
post-merger integration remain important rating drivers.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Polygon is the market leader in the European PDR sector and has no
direct peers in Fitch's rating universe. Its framework agreements
with major property insurance providers and leading market
positions in Germany, the UK and the Nordics limit volatility of
profitability, provide some barriers to entry and enhance operating
leverage.

Its business profile is somewhat stronger than that of Assemblin
Financing AB (Assemblin, B/Stable), mainly due to Polygon's broader
geographic footprint and lower direct exposure to the cyclical
construction end-market. Both companies have broadly similar scale
of operations, leading market position, a large number of
customers, a high share of contract revenue and active M&A-driven
strategy.

Polygon's financial profile is expected to be weaker than that of
Assemblin. Both companies generate FCF through the cycle. Polygon's
somewhat stronger operating margins are more than offset by an
expected significantly higher leverage after the proposed financing
package.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Total revenue of around EUR855 million in 2021;

-- Organic revenue growth of about 5% annually in 2022-2024;

-- Total acquisition spend of about EUR20 million annually in
    2022-2024 at 0.5x enterprise value (EV)/sales multiple;

-- Broadly stable EBITDA margin of 8.6%-8.9% in 2021-2024;

-- Capex of around EUR21 million-EUR25 million annually to 2024;

-- No dividends in 2021-2024;

-- Issue of EUR30 million from the delayed draw TLB2 in 2022 (out
    of EUR55 million total availability).

Recovery Assumptions

-- The recovery analysis assumes that Polygon would be
    restructured as a going-concern (GC) rather than liquidated in
    a default. It mainly reflects Polygon's strong market position
    and customer relationships as well as the potential for
    further consolidation in the fragmented PDR sector.

-- For the purpose of recovery analysis, Fitch assumes that post
    transaction debt comprises the first-lien EUR90 million RCF
    (assumed full drawdown), EUR430 million TLB, EUR55 million
    delayed draw TLB2 and second-lien EUR120 million term loan.

-- Fitch applies a distressed EV/EBITDA multiple of 5.0x to
    calculate a GC EV, reflecting Polygon's market-leading
    position, strong operating environment, a sticky customer base
    and potential for growth via the consolidation of the PDR
    sector. The multiple is limited by Polygon's small size and
    significant reliance on insurance companies in Germany.

-- The GC EBITDA estimate of EUR61 million reflects Fitch's view
    of a sustainable, post-reorganisation EBITDA level upon which
    Fitch bases the EV. This GC EBITDA level would result in
    marginally but persistently negative FCF, effectively
    representing a post-distress cash flow proxy for the business
    to remain a GC. The assumed level includes the run-rate impact
    of bolt-on acquisitions signed so far in 2021 (revenue of
    around EUR80 million) and the pro-forma impact of future
    acquisitions (assumed revenue of around EUR110 million)
    financed via EUR55 million delayed draw TLB2.

-- A 10% administrative claim.

-- These assumptions result in a 48% recovery rate for the first
    lien senior secured TLB, TLB2 and RCF, resulting in
    'B(EXP)'/'RR4' ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Increasing scale with EBIT margin above 6% on a sustained
    basis;

-- FCF post acquisitions;

-- FFO gross leverage below 5.5x on a sustained basis;

-- FFO interest coverage above 4.0x on a sustained basis.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- FFO gross leverage above 7.5x on a sustained basis;

-- FFO interest coverage below 3.0x on a sustained basis;

-- Problems with integration of acquisitions leading to pressure
    on margins;

-- Negative FCF generation.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Satisfactory Liquidity: Liquidity at the closing of the transaction
is expected to mainly consist of an undrawn EUR90 million committed
6.5-year RCF. Polygon has no significant short-term debt maturities
as the new proposed debt structure is concentrated on a seven-year
EUR430 million senior secured seven-year TLB and an eight-year
EUR120 million second-lien credit facility. The proposed debt
package also includes access to an EUR55 million delayed seven-year
TLB2 for acquisitions available for 18 months after the transaction
completion.

ISSUER PROFILE

Polygon is a Sweden-based leading provider of PDR and control
services with a presence in 16 countries. Its service offering is
focused on water and fire damage restoration and its key direct
customers are mainly insurance companies.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


POLYSTORM BIDCO: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary 'B' ratings to
Sweden-based property damage control company Polystorm BidCo
(Polygon) and proposed first-lien debt (including the delayed-draw
facility and RCF), with a recovery rating of '3', indicating its
expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-70%; rounded estimate 60%)
in the event of a default.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Polygon's revenue and
EBITDA will increase via bolt-on acquisitions and solid organic
growth of 6%-7%, which should support deleveraging toward 6.5x in
2022, while the company generates around EUR40 million of adjusted
free operating cash flow (FOCF) annually.

AEA Investors and several co-investors are acquiring Polygon via a
new entity, Polystorm BidCo AB, funded by a EUR430 million
first-lien term loan, a EUR120 million second-lien term loan and an
equity contribution of around EUR554 million.
As part of the new capital structure, the group has also contracted
a EUR55 million delayed-draw first-lien term loan and a EUR90
million revolving credit facility (RCF).

Polygon is a leading property damage control services provider in
Europe with a strong regional presence and one-stop-shop solution
approach. In S&P's view, Polygon's business is supported by its
leadership position in the European property damage control (PDC)
market. It's the largest European operator holding the No. 1 market
position in Germany, the U.K., Norway, and Finland, with a
top-three market position in Sweden and Denmark. Polygon serves its
clients via a dense network of more than 350 depots, spread out
across the 16 countries in which it operates, but particularly
clustered in western Europe and the Nordics. This local presence
allows for quick response times to reported damage, with deployment
across Europe possible within 24 hours, which is particularly
important in the essential PDC market, where there is a need to get
water or fire damage resolved immediately. These deployment
capabilities and scale also differentiate the group to some extent
from smaller players in the market that do not have an extensive
branch network, large equipment base, or diversified staffing
capabilities. Additionally, they make the company more attractive
to large insurance customers, who can use Polygon for one-stop-shop
solutions to all their PDC needs.

The group has a diversified client base, and framework agreements
provide it with stable, recurring revenue. Polygon generates around
60% of its revenue from insurance companies, and the remaining 40%
from commercial, public-sector, and residential clients. Of these,
the company is not significantly reliant on a single customer, with
the top 10 customers contributing about 35% of sales in 2020. In
terms of contracts, the company primarily operates through
framework agreements, under which 80% of German sales were
generated as of June 30, 2021. The group posts high retention rates
of over 95% on such framework agreements, which are typically for
one to two years but can be longer for larger accounts, thus
providing good visibility on a large part of its revenue base.
While revenue can be linked to a number of extreme weather events,
the increasing impact of climate change is likely to continue
supporting stable revenue generation.

Polygon has a strong track record of implementing acquisitions
under its decentralized operating model. Polygon is highly
acquisitive, having completed 33 acquisitions since 2018. This is
mostly attributable to the fragmented nature of the PDC market in
core countries of operation, where approximately 75% of the
providers are small companies. The other 25% consists of larger
players, of which Polygon is the leader with a share of 7%-9%
across Europe. This environment allows the group to pursue bolt-on
acquisitions to solidify its market position and enhance its
product suite in existing markets. That said, S&P notes that
Polygon has also acquired several platforms to enter new markets in
recent years; its management has a tested process for making and
integrating acquisitions. The group remains selective in its
pursuit of targets, focusing only on companies with stable
management that typically remains with the company after the
acquisition, stable profitability and cash flow, as well as a
growth track record. At the same time, acquired entities also
benefit from Polygon's decentralized business model, under which it
devolves operational autonomy to its depot managers while providing
them with groupwide support, such as with administration,
procurement, or the sharing of best practices. Most acquisitions
are rebranded under the stronger Polygon brand and can provide
enhanced cross-selling capability in new geographies.

Polygon's relatively small size, narrow product scope, and
geographic concentration in Europe We consider the business to be
constrained by its relatively small size, with EUR743 million in
revenue in 2020, particularly when compared with peers in the wider
facility management industry. There is also a lack of service
differentiation, with all activities focused on PDC. S&P also notes
the company's limited geographic diversification, with 94% of
revenue coming from Europe, particularly Germany, where it
generated 55% of its revenue in 2020. This concentration makes
Polygon vulnerable to macroeconomic developments in its specific
markets, although the group has taken efforts in recent years to
diversify its geographic footprint, as underscored for instance by
its market entry into Italy and Luxembourg via acquisitions in
2020.

Polygon's operating performance remained robust during the pandemic
in 2020, which supports our view of the business' resilience.
Despite COVID-19's economic impact in countries where it operates,
Polygon's revenue increased 9.3% to EUR743 million in 2020,
supported by organic growth and a solid contribution from
acquisitions. This performance is largely attributable to the
relatively resilient, noncyclical nature of PDC activities, which
generally continue irrespective of the prevailing economic
situation. Given the time-critical element to its activities,
Polygon obtained permission to operate as an essential service
throughout the pandemic, which allowed it provide services to
customers largely uninterrupted by lockdowns. Moreover, thanks to
the group's ability to contain pandemic-related additional costs,
operational efficiency improvements, and higher-margin COVID-19
related business (providing climate control for test-kit
manufacturing in the U.S.), the company's S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted EBITDA margins increased to 12.4% in 2020 from
11.4% in 2019.

S&P said, "We consider Polygon's capital structure to be highly
leveraged. Our assessment of Polygon's financial risk profile
reflects the company's private-equity ownership and our forecast
that its S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA will amount to
about 6.7x at year-end 2021, following the transaction. We expect
adjusted leverage to decline to 6.2x-6.5x in 2022, fueled by solid
revenue and EBITDA growth both on an organic and inorganic basis.
Deleveraging should take place in 2022. This is even though we
believe the group will likely use the delayed-draw EUR55 million
first-lien term loan add-on to fund acquisitions and thus increase
the revenue and EBITDA base that year.

"The final rating will depend on our receipt and satisfactory
review of all final transaction documentation. Accordingly, the
preliminary ratings should not be construed as evidence of the
final ratings. If we do not receive the final documentation within
a reasonable time frame, or the final documentation departs from
the materials reviewed, we reserve the right to withdraw or revise
our ratings. Potential changes include, but are not limited to, use
of loan proceeds, maturity, size, and conditions of loans,
financial and other covenants, security, and ranking.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that Polygon's revenue base
and EBITDA will continue increasing via bolt-on acquisitions and
continued organic growth of 6%-7%, which should support
deleveraging in the coming years. We expect the S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted leverage ratio to trend below 6.5x at the end of
2022, with FOCF at about EUR40 million."

S&P could lower the ratings if:

-- Polygon's operating performance weakened, resulting in
persistently low-single-digit or negative FOCF; or

-- S&P assesses the financial policy as increasingly aggressive,
with ongoing debt-funded acquisitions or shareholder returns
eroding leverage.

S&P could raise the rating if Polygon can improve its market
positions and diversify its product offering, while maintaining
adjusted debt to EBITDA at about 5x, with funds from operations
(FFO) to debt at about 12% and the private-equity owner commits to
a financial policy that sustains metrics at these levels.




===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

CHESHIRE 2021-1 PLC: Fitch Assigns Final B Rating on Class F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Cheshire 2021-1 PLC final ratings.

     DEBT                RATING             PRIOR
     ----                ------             -----
Cheshire 2021-1 PLC

A XS2386503721    LT  AAAsf  New Rating    AAA(EXP)sf
B XS2386503994    LT  AA-sf  New Rating    AA-(EXP)sf
C XS2386504026    LT  A-sf   New Rating    A-(EXP)sf
D XS2386504299    LT  BBBsf  New Rating    BBB(EXP)sf
E XS2386504372    LT  BBsf   New Rating    BB(EXP)sf
F XS2386504455    LT  Bsf    New Rating    B(EXP)sf
Z XS2386504539    LT  NRsf   New Rating    NR(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Cheshire 2021-1 PLC is a multi-originator securitisation of legacy
owner-occupied (OO) and buy-to-let (BTL) mortgages. The three
largest lenders are GMAC-RFC Limited (64.7%), Future Mortgages
Limited (14.6%) and Mortgages 1 Limited (11.9%). The transaction is
a refinancing of the Dukinfield II PLC issuance.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Additional Stress Scenario: Fitch has applied its additional stress
scenario to its UK non-conforming assumptions (see EMEA RMBS:
Criteria Assumptions Updated due to Impact of the Coronavirus
Pandemic). This is due to uncertainty remaining regarding the
long-term impact of the pandemic on payment ability, with borrowers
rolling into late-stage arrears over recent months in the sector.
The additional stress scenario is not applicable to BTL loans,
which make up 7.7% of the collateral.

The combined application of the revised 'Bsf' representative pool
weighted average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and revised rating
multiples resulted in a multiple to the current FF assumptions of
about 1.3x at 'Bsf'.

Seasoned Non-Prime Loans: The portfolio consists of seasoned loans,
originated primarily before 2007. The OO loans (92.3% of the pool)
contain a high proportion of self-certified, interest-only, county
court judgements, restructured loan arrangements and loans in
arrears. Fitch applied its non-conforming assumptions to this
sub-pool.

Certain loan-level attributes that attract a FF adjustment were not
provided to Fitch, but were reported in the Dukinfield II PLC
prospectus. Fitch has used these reported proportions to apply
loan-level data adjustments to capture relevant FF adjustments. In
setting originator adjustments for the portfolio, Fitch considered
factors including historical performance and the average annualised
constant default rate since Dukinfield II PLC closed, resulting in
an originator adjustment of 1.0x for the OO sub-pool and 1.5x for
the BTL sub-pool.

Interest Deferability: The interest payments for all notes apart
from the class A are deferrable at all times. In its analysis,
Fitch tested the ratings of the class A and B notes on a timely
basis and assessed the materiality of the interest deferability
exposure for the class C to F notes. Fitch considers the liquidity
protection in the structure adequate at the assigned ratings.
Nonetheless, the class C to F notes' ratings are constrained at the
'Asf' rating category due to a lack of dedicated liquidity.

Warranty Reserve Fund: The transaction features a warranty reserve
sized at 0.1% of the closing collateral balance and available to
compensate the issuer for any loan that breaches the
representations and warranties. This reserve replaces the
obligation of the seller to repurchase loans in breach, which is
typical of a UK RMBS transaction.

Fitch has assessed the likelihood of excess spread being available
to replenish the warranty reserve fund in an expected case
scenario, and expects the reserve to be available to cover for
breaches over the life of the transaction.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- The transaction's performance may be affected by changes in
    market conditions and economic environment. Weakening economic
    performance is strongly correlated to increasing levels of
    delinquencies and defaults that could reduce credit
    enhancement available to the notes.

-- In addition, unanticipated declines in recoveries could result
    in lower net proceeds, which may make certain notes' ratings
    susceptible to potential negative rating action depending on
    the extent of the decline in recoveries. Fitch conducts
    sensitivity analyses by stressing both a transaction's base
    case FF and recovery rate (RR) assumptions. For example, a 15%
    WAFF increase and 15% WARR decrease would result in model
    implied downgrade of up to three notches for the class A
    notes.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Stable to improved asset performance driven by stable
    delinquencies and defaults would lead to increasing credit
    enhancement levels and potential upgrades. Fitch tested an
    additional rating sensitivity scenario by applying a decrease
    in the WAFF of 15% and an increase in the WARR of 15%,
    implying upgrades of up to four notches.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch reviewed the results of a third party assessment conducted on
the asset portfolio information, and concluded that there were no
findings that affected the rating analysis.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Cheshire 2021-1 PLC has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Customer
Welfare - Fair Messaging, Privacy & Data Security due to exposure
to compliance risks including fair lending practices, mis-selling,
repossession/foreclosure practices, consumer data protection (data
security), which has a negative impact on the credit profile, and
is relevant to the ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Cheshire 2021-1 PLC has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Human
Rights, Community Relations, Access & Affordability due to exposure
to accessibility to affordable housing, which has a negative impact
on the credit profile, and is relevant to the ratings in
conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


MANSARD MORTGAGES 2007-1: Fitch Raises Class B2a Notes Rating to BB
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Mansard Mortgages 2007-1 Plc's class
M2a, B1a and B2a notes, and affirmed the other tranches. The class
B2a notes have been removed from Rating Watch Positive.

         DEBT                  RATING            PRIOR
         ----                  ------            -----
Mansard Mortgages 2007-1 PLC

Class A2a XS0293438965    LT  AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
Class B1a XS0293442215    LT  A-sf   Upgrade     BBBsf
Class B2a XS0293446711    LT  BBsf   Upgrade     BB-sf
Class M1a XS0293458054    LT  AAAsf  Affirmed    AAAsf
Class M2a XS0293460381    LT  AAsf   Upgrade     AA-sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The transaction is backed by residential mortgages originated by
Rooftop Mortgages, a non-conforming mortgage lender.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Class B2a Notes off RWP: The class B2a notes have been removed from
RWP where they were placed in July 2021 following the retirement of
Fitch's coronavirus-related additional stress scenario analysis for
buy to let (BTL) assets (see 'Fitch Retires UK and European RMBS
Coronavirus Additional Stress Scenario Analysis, except for UK
Non-Conforming'). The retirement of the additional stress analysis
is the result of improved macroeconomic forecasts, the limited to
no performance deterioration so far, and Fitch's expectation that
the stress included in Fitch's representative pool foreclosure
frequency (FF) and house price decline assumptions is sufficient to
account for the remaining uncertainty related to the Covid-19
pandemic.

Coronavirus Additional Assumptions: Fitch applied coronavirus
additional assumptions to the owner-occupied component of the
underlying mortgage portfolio. The combined application of revised
'Bsf' representative pool weighted average (WA) FF and revised
rating multiples resulted in a multiple to the current FF
assumptions of 1.3x at 'Bsf' and 1.0x at 'AAAsf'. The coronavirus
additional assumptions are more modest for higher rating levels as
the corresponding rating assumptions are already meant to withstand
more severe shocks than the lower-rated notes.

Increasing Credit Enhancement (CE): The cash reserve is
non-amortising due to irreversible trigger breaches. As a result,
credit enhancement for all notes continues to increase and Fitch
expects it to continue doing so for the life of the transaction. CE
for the senior notes increased to 60.5% from 60.0% since October
2020, while the increase in CE for the most junior notes was
relatively larger, to 3.9% from 3.2%. The increased CE available to
protect against expected losses contributed to the upgrade of the
class M2a, B1a and B2a notes.

Rising Late Stage Arrears: Loans that are three months or more in
arrears increased in the last collection period. Since July 2020
they have increased from 6.5% to 8.4% in July 2021, an eight-year
high. Early stage arrears remain stable as the formation of new
delinquencies has been limited. Fitch applies a FF floor for loans
in arrears to account for the increased default risk. In Fitch's
analysis, the increase in expected loss from additional loans
moving into late stage arrears has been more than offset by
increased CE available to the upgraded classes of notes.

Interest-only (IO) Concentration: The transaction has a material
concentration of IO loans maturing within a three-year period
during the lifetime of the transaction. IO loans maturing between
2030 and 2032 make up 61.8% of the portfolio. For both
owner-occupied and BTL sub-portfolios, the IO concentration WAFF is
lower than the standard portfolio WAFF. As a result, the IO
concentrations do not constrain the notes' ratings.

There are four owner-occupied and four BTL interest-only loans,
making up 2.4% of the pool, that failed to make their bullet
payments at loan maturity. The servicer has implemented alternative
plans with these borrowers and recovered part of the amounts due
since the last review. If this trend reverses and grows to a
significant number, Fitch may apply more conservative assumptions
in its asset and cash flow analysis.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- The transaction's performance may be affected by changes in
    market conditions and economic environment. Weakening economic
    performance is strongly correlated to increasing levels of
    delinquencies and defaults that could reduce CE available to
    the notes.

-- Unanticipated declines in recoveries could also result in
    lower net proceeds, which may make certain notes susceptible
    to negative rating action depending on the extent of the
    decline in recoveries. Fitch conducts sensitivity analyses by
    stressing both a transaction's base-case FF and recovery rate
    (RR) assumptions, and examining the rating implications on all
    classes of issued notes. Under this scenario, Fitch assumed a
    15% increase in the WAFF and a 15% decrease in the WARR. The
    results indicate a six-notch downgrade of the junior tranche.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Stable to improved asset performance driven by stable
    delinquencies and defaults would lead to increasing CE levels
    and potential upgrades. Fitch tested an additional rating
    sensitivity scenario by applying a decrease in the FF of 15%
    and an increase in the RR of 15%. The results indicate a four
    notch upgrade of the junior notes.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset pool
and the transaction. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's initial
closing. The subsequent performance of the transaction over the
years is consistent with the agency's expectations given the
operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that the
asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating analysis
was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Mansard Mortgages 2007-1 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for
"Human Rights, Community Relations, Access & Affordability" due to
a significant proportion of the pools containing owner-occupied
loans advanced with limited affordability checks, which has a
negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant to the
ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Mansard Mortgages 2007-1 has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for
"Social Impact" due to accessibility to affordable housing and
compliance risks including fair lending practices, mis-selling,
repossession/foreclosure practices and consumer data protection
(data security), which has a negative impact on the credit profile,
and is relevant to the ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


S4 CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned S4 Capital group's term loan B a final
'BB+'/RR2 rating and affirmed S4 Capital plc's (S4C) Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' with a Stable Outlook.

The assignment of a final rating follows review of loan
documentation conforming to information already received by Fitch.

S4C's rating incorporates the company's well-defined digital
strategy, which positions it as an industry disruptor with strong
like-for-like growth, a record of expanding client relationships
and a focus on the technology sector and other growth advertising
categories.

A strategy founded on both organic and inorganic growth has been
developed with financial discipline, including 50% equity funding
in acquisitions (which the company defines as mergers) and target
leverage of no more than 1.5x-2.0x. The company shows solid cash
generation with excess cash flow likely to be re-invested in
further merger activity, in Fitch's view.

S4C had completed 23 merger deals since its inception in 2018 as of
May 2021. The rating is slightly constrained by management's
ambition and potential execution risk of future transactions.
Public targets include a desire to double its size organically by
2023. Metrics are strong for the rating. Rating upside is possible
over the medium term as the company delivers scale, provided this
is done with sound execution and financial discipline, although an
upgrade is unlikely before performance history is more
established.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Digital, Disruptive Business Model: S4C is a purely digitally based
advertising practice, which in Fitch's view has a very different
business model from the global agency holding companies (GHCs) that
dominate a traditional ad industry worth about USD650 billion in
2021 (source: Statistica). The GHCs also face secular shifts,
including the established threat from search engines, social media,
ad tech and other digital platforms, as well as competition from
the consultancies and more nimble competitors such as S4C.

Industry research suggests that where medium-term industry growth
should recover to mid-single digits following the pandemic, digital
advertising (i.e. online), which already accounts for about 60% of
the ad market, has been growing at above 20% and is expected to
remain in low double digits. Fitch believes S4C has aligned itself
well both in terms of its digital-only strategy and the
high-profile accounts (particularly within the tech sector) it has
developed so far.

No Legacy Business to Defend: S4C is focused on multiple
disciplines across creative, web design and app development, media
buying, digital and data measurement (including strategic
consulting, in-housing). As such, it has been growing fast (2020
pro-forma growth of 24%, despite the pandemic), with the absence of
a traditional legacy business (e.g. TV, newspaper, outdoor) key to
its ability to target growth advertising needs. A unitary group
structure with one unified profit and loss, provides further
advantages relative to the holding company structure - also a
legacy for the GHCs.

Tech, High Growth Client Focus: S4C's clients are closely aligned
with the tech sector, in particular the so-called FAANG companies
(Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix and Google (Alphabet)), along
with other high-growth advertising sectors such as fast-moving
consumer goods. In 2020, 53% of S4C's sales came from tech
accounts. FAANG companies accounted for 36% and 74% of global and
digital advertising, respectively, in 2019. S4C's strategy (land
and expand) is to win an account and up- and cross-sell a suite of
services across its practice disciplines, This strategy underpinned
average revenue retention of 130% in 2020 from its top 100 2019
clients.

Growth Ambitions: S4C's public targets include a three-year plan to
double organic revenue, implying scale approaching GBP900 million
by 2023. This target will require accelerating growth driven by new
client wins and deeper client penetration. Fitch believes that M&A
activity will continue to meaningfully feature. Acquired businesses
are merged into the wider group; with 50% equity funding structured
to incentivise cross-selling of the integrated group skill-sets.

This growth ambition, especially in mergers, leads to some
execution risk and the rating incorporates a degree of caution to
reflect the potential to misstep. Nonetheless, execution has so far
been good.

Evolving Industry Model: Fitch expects the evolving nature of the
ad industry to benefit S4C. Advertisers remain highly focused on
return on investment, expecting cheaper content costs and shorter
delivery times, highly sophisticated data gathering and analytics,
the ability to manage content across multiple digital platforms as
well as a shift towards advertisers' in-housing marketing
capabilities.

Revenue Model: S4C's revenue model is largely fee-based and in many
cases project-based. However, challenges and competition remain.
Therefore, it is important that with each project the group embeds
itself further with the quality and efficiency of work delivered.
Multiple year revenues are not substantively contracted as they are
for professional publishers, for instance.

However, relationships are well-established; 2020 client retention
was 89%, and the company shows a record of expanding per client
revenue. The loss of a scaled account (so-called 'whopper', e.g.
generating client revenue of at least USD20 million) would have a
meaningful top-line impact and potentially some ripple-across
effect, given the optics of account losses in creative industries.
However, whopper accounts are typically spread across multiple
engagements eg Google) or are on a longer-term contract basis
(BMW/Mondelez).

Prudent Financial Policy: Fitch views S4C's financial policy as
conservative, despite its growth ambition. Fitch believes the 50%
equity consideration embedded in mergers will limit the risk of
excessive deal-driven financial leverage, as well as incentivise
founders to buy in to the future success of the group. Adherence to
an enterprise value/EBITDA valuation range of 5x-10x in mergers
should protect against the risk of over-paying, while a maximum net
leverage policy not exceeding 1.5x-2x is prudent and in Fitch's
view important, given the company's growth ambition.

Key Person Risk: S4C was founded in 2018 by Sir Martin Sorrell,
formerly the founder and chief executive of WPP plc, one of the
world's largest marketing services and advertising companies. Fitch
views Sir Martin's involvement as key to attracting other founding
investors, and as influential in making the company attractive to
merger targets and industry talents as well as providing access to
key client accounts. At YE20, Sir Martin owned 10% of the company
as well as the only "B" share (providing veto rights and the right
to appoint either himself or another to the board).

Fitch views Sir Martin as instrumental to the success of the
company as well as benefiting from a certain degree of control. He
has assembled a strong leadership team, a number of whom Fitch
views also as key personnel.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

S4C has few comparable rated peers, given that it is a newly
founded digitally based advertising and marketing agency. Fitch
does not believe it is relevant to benchmark S4C to the large GHCs,
given the maturity and scale of the latter's business model and the
fact that they face secular risks, including competition from
disruptive challengers such as S4C.

Fitch does see similarities with digital advertising platforms such
as Adevinta ASA (BB/Stable), Axel Springer (which underpins
Traviata B.V.'s 'B'/Stable rating) and Speedster Bidco GmbH
(B/Negative). Each of these peers have been affected by
Covid-19-related business disruptions and are arguably more
cyclically exposed than S4C. Nonetheless, they are expected to
recover well and exhibit solid growth driven by embedded contracts
and to some extent, natural price inflation post-pandemic. They
typically have higher margins and a higher component of contracted
revenue than S4C, leading to relatively high rating thresholds:
Adevinta has funds from operations (FFO) net leverage thresholds of
4x-5x, and Speedster has an FFO gross leverage band of 6x-8x.

More broadly, GfK SE (BB-/Stable) is a leading market intelligence
group, which is advanced in its digital transformation, but which
has been through major restructuring. With revenue of EUR900
million and EBITDA of EUR153 million in 2020, it has greater scale
than S4C, comparable EBITDA margins, and weaker cash conversion.
Fitch considers there is some execution risk in GfK's rating given
it is yet to fully deliver the benefits of restructuring, and,
therefore, a degree of caution in FFO gross leverage thresholds of
4x-5x.

A more esoteric peer is Stan Holdings SAS (Voodoo; BB/Stable), the
largest publisher of mobile hyper-casual games. Voodoo's business
is very different from S4C's. However, games monetisation is driven
by in-app advertising. Its rating is constrained by its small
absolute scale, high targeted growth, execution and some key person
risk. These factors lead to an FFO gross leverage band of 2x-3x,
with the similarities to S4C helping to explain the caution in the
latter's rating thresholds.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- High double-digit revenue growth in 2021 driven by organic
    growth and acquisitions;

-- Stable Fitch-defined EBITDA margin of about 17.4%;

-- Change in working capital slowly declining to 1.5% of total
    revenue by FY24 from 3% in FY21;

-- Capex of about 2%;

-- No dividends; and

-- M&A - Fitch has assumed about GBP138 million of cumulative
    contingent payments over three years, related to past mergers.

The above reflects Fitch's base case and a continuation of growth
currently seen in the business; Fitch has also stressed the
forecast to reflect growth in the 10%-15% range in 2022-2023, which
continues to show the company performing within the rating leverage
thresholds.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- FFO gross leverage that is expected to remain consistently
    below 2.5x;

-- Free cash flow (FCF) margin that is expected to remain
    consistently above 9%; and

-- Operational performance consistent with the management's
    growth ambitions, including a continued record of execution
    and financial discipline in targeted merger activity. This
    will be measured, among other things, in terms of sustained
    performance in key profitability and cash flow margins;

-- An upgrade is unlikely before the company has a more
    established performance history, including visibility of 2022
    performance in line with the revenue expansion and client
    diversification anticipated in Fitch's forecasts.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- FFO gross leverage that is expected to remain consistently
    above 3.5x,

-- FCF margin that is expected to remain consistently below 3%;
    and

-- Operational performance that materially underperforms
    management's ambitions in terms of organic growth and forecast
    margins. Performance that suggests a failure to integrate
    merger companies, as evidenced by a meaningful margin dilution
    and/or a tangible divergence from stated financial policies
    (i.e. valuation discipline and peak leverage), is a key
    downgrade parameter.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Strong Liquidity: S4C had about GBP120 million of cash on its
balance sheet at end-June 2021. Following the refinancing
transaction, Fitch expects that the group will benefit from a
GBP100 million undrawn revolving credit facility, and that
refinancing risk will be limited as the new term loan B will mature
in seven years. S4C's liquidity profile is also supported by an
expected mid-to-high single-digit FCF margin over the rating
horizon.

ESG Considerations

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

ISSUER PROFILE

Founded by Sir Martin Sorrell in 2018, S4C is a purely digital
global advertising and marketing services business.

Most of S4C's revenue is generated in the Americas, and more
specifically in North America at end-2020, even though it is a
global company.


WELLESLEY: Losses Widen to GBP1MM+ Amid Winding-Down Process
------------------------------------------------------------
Suzie Neuwirth at Peer2Peer Finance News reports that Wellesley saw
its losses widen to just over GBP1 million last year, as it
discontinued its management fees and begun to wind down the
business.

The property lending platform announced in September 2020 that it
was restructuring the company, due to liquidity issues amid the
pandemic and a challenging regulatory environment, Peer2Peer
Finance News relates.

Wellesley reported a pre-tax loss of GBP1.028 million for the 12
months to December 31, 2020, compared to a pre-tax loss of
GBP400,000 the previous year, Peer2Peer Finance News discloses.

Income from management fees fell from GBP3.905 million in 2019 to
GBP890,000 in 2020, Peer2Peer Finance News relays, citing annual
accounts filed with Companies House.

Last September, Wellesley asked its creditors to back its proposal
for a company voluntary arrangement, which was voted through in
October 2020, Peer2Peer Finance News recounts.

According to Peer2Peer Finance News, founder and chief executive
Graham Wellesley said ahead of the vote that a CVA offered an
alternative "to an otherwise disorderly wind-down," warning
insolvency would "result in an inferior outcome" for all
investors.

Following the passing of the vote, Wellesley discontinued its
regulated financial services activities and will operate in the
future as an unregulated entity, Peer2Peer Finance News notes.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
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Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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