/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/210917.mbx        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Friday, September 17, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 181

                           Headlines



G E R M A N Y

FORTUNA CONSUMER: Fitch Assigns BB(EXP) Rating on 2 Note Classes
NIDDA BONDCO: Fitch Affirms 'B' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

CVC CORDATUS XV: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Notes


L U X E M B O U R G

CRC BREEZE: Fitch Affirms CC Rating on Class B Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ARTISAN H1: Kroll Advisory Set to Start Selling Off Assets
BARROW AND DISTRICT: Goes Into Administration
BUPA FINANCE: Fitch Publishes 'BB+' Rating on New Tier 1 Notes
CLEVELAND BRIDGE: Report Unveils Details of Financial Problems
ELEMENT MATERIALS: S&P Cuts ICR to B- on Capital Structure Stress

MVH HAULAGE: Dep't for Economy Accepts Director Disqualification
QUADRATE CATERING: Covid Pandemic Lockdowns Prompt Administration
THE COLLECTIVE: Enters Administration After Failing to Find Buyer


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions

                           - - - - -


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G E R M A N Y
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FORTUNA CONSUMER: Fitch Assigns BB(EXP) Rating on 2 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Fortuna Consumer Loan ABS 2021 DAC's
(Fortuna 2021) notes expected ratings.

The assignment of final ratings is contingent on the receipt of
final documentation conforming to information already reviewed.

DEBT           RATING
----           ------
Fortuna Consumer Loan ABS 2021 DAC

A    LT  AAA(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
B    LT  AA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
C    LT  A(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
D    LT  BBB(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
E    LT  BB(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
F    LT  NR(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
X    LT  BB(EXP)sf   Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Fortuna 2021 is a true-sale securitisation of a static pool of
unsecured consumer loans sold by auxmoney Investments Limited. The
securitised consumer loan receivables are derived from loan
agreements entered into between Süd-West-Kreditbank Finanzierung
GmbH (SWK) and individuals located in Germany and brokered by
auxmoney GmbH (auxmoney) via its online lending platform.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Operational Risks

auxmoney operates a data- and tech-driven lending platform that
connects borrowers and investors on a fully-digitalised basis.
Fitch conducted an operational review during which auxmoney showed
a robust corporate governance and risk approach. There is a
warehouse facility with BNP Paribas in place, of which auxmoney
holds the junior tranche.

Assets for the transaction will be selected from this warehouse
facility according to the transaction's eligibility criteria,
ensuring that auxmoney retains sufficient risk on their own books.

Large Loss Expectations

auxmoney also targets higher-risk borrowers compared with
traditional lenders of German unsecured consumer loans. Fitch
determined the borrower credit score calculated by auxmoney as the
key asset performance driver. Fitch assumes a weighted average (WA)
default base case of 12.8% based on the score distribution in the
pool and a recovery base case of 35%. Fitch applied a low WA
default multiple of 3.8x and a high recovery haircut of 60% at
'AAAsf'.

The resulting loss rates are the highest among the Fitch-rated
German unsecured loans transactions.

Adequate Historical Performance Data Availability

Our asset assumptions are based on historical performance data
since 2016, which just covers Fitch's minimum requirement of five
years' worth of data history and also covers the usual lifetime of
the loans. The data includes some visibility on performance during
economic stress (ie during the coronavirus pandemic in 2020).

Rapid Volume Growth; Stable Portfolio

Borrower characteristics have remained largely stable, despite
rapid origination volume growth until 2020; Fitch has not seen any
evidence suggesting an increase in risk appetite. The transaction
is static, which further limits the risk horizon in this regard.

Servicing Continuity Risk Addressed

CreditConnect GmbH, a subsidiary of auxmoney, is the servicer.
Loancos GmbH will act as back-up servicer from closing, reducing
the risk of servicing discontinuity. The back-up servicing
agreement covers two scenarios, (i) where CreditConnect is
replaced; and (ii) both CreditConnect and SWK no longer perform
their contractual duties. The risk of payment interruption is also
reduced by a liquidity reserve, which covers more than three months
of senior expenses, swap payments and interest on the class A and B
notes.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Long-term asset performance deterioration such as increased
    delinquencies or reduced portfolio yield, which could be
    driven by changes in portfolio characteristics, macro-economic
    conditions, business practices or legislation.

Expected impact on the notes' ratings of increased defaults (class
A/B/C/D/E/X):

-- Increase default rate by 10%: 'AAAsf'/'AA-sf'/'A-sf'/'BBB-
    sf'/'B+sf'/'B+sf'

-- Increase default rate by 25%:
    'AA+sf'/'A+sf'/'BBB+sf'/'BB+sf'/'CCCsf'/'CCCsf'

-- Increase default rate by 50%: 'AAsf'/'Asf'/'BBB-
    sf'/'BBsf'/'NRsf'/'NRsf'

Expected impact on the notes' ratings of decreased recoveries
(class A/B/C/D/E/X):

-- Reduce recovery rates by 10%:
    'AAAsf'/'AAsf'/'Asf'/'BBBsf'/'BBsf'/'BBsf'

-- Reduce recovery rates by 25%: 'AAAsf'/'AAsf'/'A-sf'/'BBB-
    sf'/'BBsf'/'BBsf'

-- Reduce recovery rates by 50%: 'AAAsf'/'AA-sf'/'A-sf'/'BBB-
    sf'/'B-sf'/'B-sf'

Expected impact on the notes' ratings of increased defaults and
decreased recoveries (class A/B/C/D/E/X):

-- Increase default rates by 10% and decrease recovery rates by
    10%: 'AAAsf'/'AA-sf'/'A-sf'/'BBB-sf'/'Bsf'/'Bsf'

-- Increase default rates by 25% and decrease recovery rates by
    25%: 'AA+sf'/'A+sf'/'BBBsf'/'BB+sf'/'NRsf'/'NRsf'

-- Increase default rates by 50% and decrease recovery rates by
    50%: 'AA-sf'/'BBB+sf'/'BB+sf'/'B+sf'/'NRsf'/'NRsf'

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Increase in credit enhancement ratios as the transaction
    deleverages and/or;

-- Losses are smaller than assumed.

Expected impact on the notes' ratings of decreased defaults (class
A/B/C/D/E/X):

-- Decrease default rate by 10%:
    'AAAsf'/'AA+sf'/'A+sf'/'BBB+sf'/'BBsf'/'BBsf'

-- Decrease default rate by 25%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf'/'AA-
    sf'/'Asf'/'BB+sf'/'BB+sf'

-- Decrease default rate by 50%:
    'AAAsf'/'AAAsf'/'AAAsf'/'AAsf'/'A-sf'/'BB+sf'

Expected impact on the notes' ratings of increased recoveries
(class A/B/C/D/E/X):

-- Increase recovery rate by 10%:
    'AAAsf'/'AAsf'/'Asf'/'BBBsf'/'BBsf'/'BBsf'

-- Increase recovery rate by 25%:
    'AAAsf'/'AA+sf'/'Asf'/'BBB+sf'/'BBsf'/'BBsf'

-- Increase recovery rate by 50%:
    'AAAsf'/'AA+sf'/'A+sf'/'BBB+sf'/'BB+sf'/'BB+sf'

Expected impact on the notes' ratings of decreased defaults and
increased recoveries (class A/B/C/D/E/X):

-- Decrease default rates by 10% and increase recovery rates by
    10%: 'AAAsf'/'AA+sf'/'A+sf'/'BBB+sf'/'BB+sf'/'BB+sf'

-- Decrease default rates by 25% and increase recovery rates by
    25%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf'/'AA-sf'/'Asf'/'BBB-sf'/'BB+sf'

-- Decrease default rates by 50% and increase recovery rates by
    50%: 'AAAsf'/'AAAsf'/'AAAsf'/'AAsf'/'Asf'/'BB+sf'

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch reviewed the results of a third-party assessment conducted on
the asset portfolio information, and concluded that there were no
findings that affected the rating analysis.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

NIDDA BONDCO: Fitch Affirms 'B' LongTerm IDR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Nidda BondCo GmbH's (Nidda) Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' with Stable Outlook, following
an EUR350 million tap to the healthcare group's senior secured
loans. The proceeds will be used to repay operating pharmaceutical
company Stada Arzneimittel AG's (Stada) legacy bond of EUR267
million at maturity in 2022, with the balance to be invested in
M&A.

Nidda's rating reflects a highly aggressively leveraged capital
structure following a sponsor-backed acquisition of Stada, which is
balanced against Stada's robust business profile with strong 'BB'
characteristics. Fitch expects a post-pandemic recovery in EBITDA
margins and free cash flows (FCF), based on Stada's large product
and geographic footprint, which will continue to mitigate high
leverage estimated to remain at around 8.0x-8.5x in the medium
term.

The Stable Outlook is supported by healthy debt service coverage
ratios, sustainable high levels of organic cash generation in
combination with large available liquidity headroom, which offsets
temporary operating underperformance and excessive leverage
projected for 2021-2022.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

2021 Performance to Remain Weak: Fitch projects Stada to see
temporarily weaker sales and profitability in 2021, due to
continued pandemic pressures with product and country-mix shifts,
integration of large and complex assets acquired in 2020, and
foreign-exchange (FX) impact. Fitch sees EBITDA margins remaining
at 21% in 2021, below the pre-pandemic levels of 22%-25% (Fitch-
defined, excluding IFRS 16), given a growing share of sales and
marketing-intensive consumer healthcare products.

Recovery Expected in 2022: Fitch expects a performance recovery in
2022, through rigorous portfolio management and disciplined
integration, given its fundamentally strong business model and
product portfolio. Persisting operating softness after 2021 could
signal structural business issues, which combined with higher
leverage could put the ratings under pressure given the low rating
headroom.

Higher Leverage Through 2022: Fitch expects funds from operations
(FFO) gross leverage to remain high at around 9.0x-10.0x until
end-2022. The sponsors' aggressive financial policy means any
deleveraging would most likely come from EBITDA rather than debt
reduction. The Stable Outlook is supported by the prospect of a
near-term strengthening of free cash flow (FCF) margins,
counterbalancing Stada's sustained high financial risk.

Healthy Medium-Term FCF: A record of healthy FCF generation and the
prospect of FCF margins returning to mid-single digits from 2022
are a strong mitigating factor of Stada's over-leveraged balance
sheet. Fitch expects large and sustainable FCF at around
EUR150million and robust FCF margins to trend towards 5% in 2022,
despite growing trade working capital and capex. Stagnant or
weakening FCF in combination with persisting higher leverage will
point to credit deterioration and may lead to a negative rating
action in the next 12 months.

Strongly Acquisitive Strategy Continues: The planned tap confirms
Fitch's expectations of more opportunistic M&A activity, which
historically has been solely debt-funded. Fitch sees a wide range
of available suitable pharmaceutical asset targets to credits such
as Stada, as large pharma companies streamline their product
portfolios. The risk profile of the target assets, acquisition
economics and execution, as well as financial discipline pose
potential challenges. Acquisition of margin-dilutive or complex
assets could weigh on near-term operating margin recovery.

Positive Market Fundamentals: Fitch expects the positive
fundamentals for the European generics market will continue as
governments and healthcare providers seek to optimise healthcare
cost structures, which are under pressure from growing and ageing
populations, increasing prevalence of chronic diseases, and
expensive new innovative treatments coming to market and affecting
budgets. Fitch sees continued structural growth opportunities,
given limited overall generic penetration in Europe versus the US
and the increasing introduction of biosimilars.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Fitch rates Nidda according to its Global Rating Navigator
Framework for Pharmaceutical Companies. Under this framework,
Nidda's generic and consumer business benefits from diversification
by product and geography, with a balanced exposure to mature,
developed and emerging markets.

Nidda's business risk profile is affected by a smaller global
footprint than more global industry participants, such as Teva
Pharmaceutical Industries Limited (BB-/Negative) and Mylan N.V.
(BBB/Stable), and diversified companies, such as Novartis AG
(AA-/Stable) and Pfizer Inc. (A/Negative). High financial leverage
is a key rating constraint, compared with international peers', and
is reflected in the 'B' rating.

Nidda ranks ahead of other highly speculative sector peers such as
Care Bidco (B(EXP)/Stable), and IWH UK Finco Limited (B/Stable), in
size and product diversity. Nidda's business is mainly concentrated
in Europe, but it also has a growing presence in developed and
emerging markets. This gives Nidda a business risk profile that is
consistent with a higher rating. However, its high financial risk,
with FFO gross leverage projected to remain at or above 8.0x in
2021-2024, is more in line with a weak 'B-' rating, after being
offset by strong FCF generation.

The distinction between Nidda and higher-rated peers CHEPLAPHARM
Arzneimittel GmbH (B+/Stable) and Pharmanovia Bidco Limited
(B+/Negative) reflects their less aggressive leverage, despite
smaller business models and higher exposure product concentration.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

-- Sales CAGR of 9.8% for 2020-2024, due to volume-driven growth
    of legacy product portfolio, new product launches, the
    acquisition of intellectual property rights and business
    additions;

-- Fitch-defined EBITDA margin recovering towards 21% by 2022,
    underpinned by a normalisation in trading operations combined
    with further cost improvements and synergies realised from the
    latest acquisitions;

-- Capex at 2.5% of sales a year to 2024, given recent capacity
    expansion and an expected increase in production volumes;

-- M&A estimated at EUR200 million-EUR500 million a year to 2024,
    to be primarily funded from internally generated funds and
    supported by tap on the existing senior secured facilities or
    a EUR400 million revolving credit facility (RCF);

-- M&A at 10x enterprise value (EV)/EBITDA multiples with a 20%
    EBITDA contribution; and

-- Stada's legacy debt (mainly an outstanding EUR267 million
    1.75% bond due in 2022) repaid via the contemplated tap issue.

Recovery Assumptions:

Nidda would be considered a going-concern (GC) in bankruptcy and be
reorganised rather than liquidated.

Fitch estimates a post-restructuring EBITDA of around EUR585
million, which would allow Nidda to remain a GC after distress and
assuming implementation of some corrective actions. Fitch's
estimate of the GC EBITDA also includes the M&A contribution to be
funded from the new EUR350 million senior secured loan tap.

Fitch applies a distressed EV/EBITDA multiple of 7.0x, which
reflects Stada's size, product breadth and cash-generative
operations.

Fitch assumes Stada's senior unsecured legacy debt (at the
operating company level), which is structurally the most senior,
ranks on enforcement pari passu with the senior secured acquisition
debt, including term loans and senior secured notes. This view is
based on Fitch's principal waterfall analysis and assuming the
EUR400 million RCF is fully drawn in the event of default. Senior
notes at Nidda rank below senior secured acquisition debt.

Our principal waterfall analysis, after deducting 10% for
administrative claims, generates a ranked recovery for the senior
secured debt of 63% in the 'RR3' category, leading to a 'B+'
rating, which is one notch above the IDR. Recoveries envisaged for
Nidda's senior unsecured notes remain at 0%, in the 'RR6' band,
providing a 'CCC+' instrument rating, two notches below the IDR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- Sustained Fitch-defined EBITDA margin in excess of 25% and FCF
    margin consistently above 5%;

-- Reduction in FFO gross leverage to below 7.0x, or FFO net
    leverage declining toward 6.0x on a sustained basis;

-- Maintenance of FFO interest coverage close to 3.0x.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Persisting operating weakness, with EBITDA margins declining
    to below 18%;

-- Diminished prospects for FFO gross leverage declining to below
    8.5x by 2023;

-- M&A shifting towards higher-risk or lower-quality assets or
    weak integration resulting in pressure on profitability and
    weak FCF margins;

-- FFO interest coverage weakening to below 2.0x.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Comfortable Liquidity: Fitch projects a comfortable year-end cash
position of EUR100 million to 2024, underpinned by an improving FCF
margin towards 5%. To calculate freely available liquidity, Fitch
has deducted EUR4 million of cash held in China and a further
EUR100 million as the minimum operating cash requirement,
reflecting Stada's expanding scale and geographical footprint.

The envisaged tap issue of EUR350 million will be used to redeem
Stada's EUR267 million bond at maturity in 2022, therefore
extending debt maturities until 2024, and increasing Stada's
financial flexibility to 2024.

ISSUER PROFILE

Nidda is an SPV indirectly owning the Germany-based pharmaceutical
company Stada, a manufacturer and distributor of generic and
branded consumer healthcare products.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============

CVC CORDATUS XV: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned CVC Cordatus Loan Fund XV DAC's
refinancing notes final ratings, based on its Exposure Draft for
CLOs and Corporate CDOs Rating Criteria published on 9 August 2021.
Fitch has also affirmed the non-refinanced class E, F and X notes
based on its existing CLOs and Corporate CDOs Rating Criteria.

     DEBT                    RATING               PRIOR
     ----                    ------               -----
CVC Cordatus Loan Fund XV DAC

A XS2025844114        LT  PIFsf   Paid In Full    AAAsf
A-R XS2382262793      LT  AAAsf   New Rating      AAA(EXP)sf
B-1 XS2025844544      LT  PIFsf   Paid In Full    AAsf
B-1-R XS2382262959    LT  AAsf    New Rating      AA(EXP)sf
B-2 XS2025845350      LT  PIFsf   Paid In Full    AAsf
B-2-R XS2382263171    LT  AAsf    New Rating      AA(EXP)sf
C XS2025845947        LT  PIFsf   Paid In Full    A+sf
C-R XS2382263338      LT  Asf     New Rating      A(EXP)sf
D XS2025846754        LT  PIFsf   Paid In Full    BBB-sf
D-R XS2382263502      LT  BBB-sf  New Rating      BBB-(EXP)sf
E XS2025846671        LT  BB-sf   Affirmed        BB-sf
F XS2025847216        LT  B-sf    Affirmed        B-sf
X XS2025843496        LT  AAAsf   Affirmed        AAAsf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

This transaction is a cash flow collateralised loan obligation
(CLO) actively managed by the manager, CVC Credit Partners European
CLO Management LLP. The reinvestment period is scheduled to end in
February 2024. At closing of the refinance, the class A-R, B-1-R,
B-2-R, C-R & D-R notes have been issued to refinance the existing
notes. The class X, E, F and the subordinated notes have not been
refinanced. The weighted average life (WAL) covenant has been
extended by nine months to 7.2 years and the matrix has been
updated concurrently based on the Exposure Draft.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Average Portfolio Credit Quality (Neutral): Fitch assesses the
average credit quality of obligors to be in the 'B'/'B-' category.
The Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the current
portfolio is 24.74 based on the Exposure Draft criteria and 33.52
based on the existing criteria.

High Recovery Expectations (Positive): Over 90% of the portfolio
comprises senior secured obligations. Fitch views the recovery
prospects for these assets as more favourable than for second-lien,
unsecured and mezzanine assets. The Fitch weighted average recovery
rate (WARR) of the portfolio is 63.65% based on both the Exposure
Draft and existing criteria.

Diversified Portfolio (Positive): The transaction has four matrices
corresponding to two top 10 limits at 18% and 23%, and two maximum
fixed rate asset limits at 0% and 12.5%. The portfolio is
diversified with 136 issuers and the top ten obligors' exposure is
16.70%, while the largest obligor represents 2.12% of the
portfolio. The transaction also includes various concentration
limits, including the maximum exposure to the three largest
(Fitch-defined) industries in the portfolio at 40%. These covenants
ensure that the asset portfolio will not be exposed to excessive
concentration.

Portfolio Management (Neutral): The transaction has a 2.4-year
reinvestment period and includes reinvestment criteria similar to
those of other European transactions. Fitch's analysis is based on
a stressed-case portfolio with the aim of testing the robustness of
the transaction structure against its covenants and portfolio
guidelines.

Cash Flow Analysis (Neutral): In Fitch's analysis, the
stressed-case portfolio is modelled with a WAL of 6.2 years, which
is one year shorter than the 7.2 years expected at closing of the
refinance due to the tight reinvestment conditions after the
reinvestment period. Fitch considers the reinvestment conditions
such as the satisfaction of 'CCC' limit and coverage tests post
reinvestment and a linear step down of the WAL test. This justifies
a one-year WAL reduction in Fitch's analysis.

Affirmation of Existing Notes: The class X, E and F notes have been
affirmed based on Fitch's existing criteria. For the class F note,
the notes show a marginal shortfall based on the current portfolio
analysis in the back-default timing scenario, which is not the
agency's base case expectation. The tranche displays a safety
margin due to its credit enhancement of 6.9% and therefore do not
show a real default possibility, which is Fitch's 'CCC'
definition.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- A 25% increase of the mean default rate (RDR) across all
    ratings and a 25% decrease of the recovery rate (RRR) across
    all ratings would result in downgrades of up to five notches
    cross the structure.

-- Downgrades may occur if the build-up of credit enhancement
    following amortisation does not compensate for a larger loss
    expectation than initially assumed due to unexpectedly high
    levels of defaults and portfolio deterioration.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- A 25% reduction of the mean RDR across all ratings and a 25%
    increase in the RRR across all ratings will result in an
    upgrade of no more than five notches across the structure,
    apart from the class X and A-R notes, which are already at the
    highest rating on Fitch's scale and cannot be upgraded.

-- At closing, Fitch used a standardised stressed portfolio
    (Fitch's stressed portfolio) that was customised to the
    portfolio limits as specified in the transaction documents.
    Even if the actual portfolio shows lower defaults and smaller
    losses (at all rating levels) than Fitch's stressed portfolio
    assumed at closing, an upgrade of the notes during the
    reinvestment period is unlikely as the portfolio credit
    quality may still deteriorate, not only through natural credit
    migration, but also through reinvestments as the manager can
    update the collateral quality tests.

-- Upgrades may occur after the end of the reinvestment period on
    better-than-expected portfolio credit quality and deal
    performance, leading to higher credit enhancement and excess
    spread available to cover losses in the remaining portfolio.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

CVC Cordatus Loan Fund XV DAC

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset pool
and the transaction. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets or risk presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations and/or European
Securities and Markets Authority registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information or information on the risk presenting entities.

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates that it is adequately reliable.




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L U X E M B O U R G
===================

CRC BREEZE: Fitch Affirms CC Rating on Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed CRC Breeze Finance S.A., (Breeze II)'s
class A notes at 'CCC' and class B notes at 'CC'. The notes were
issued to purchase a portfolio of wind farms in France and
Germany.

RATING RATIONALE

The ratings reflect that there may be insufficient cash in the debt
service reserve account (DSRA) to service the bonds until maturity,
indicating that default has become a real possibility. Revenue
under-performance has continued as a result of wind yield being
consistently below expectations, despite benefiting from fixed
feed-in tariffs. Fitch expects continued cash flow pressure due to
a rise in operating and maintenance costs and a decrease in turbine
availability as the assets age.

The bonds' equally sized semi-annual principal repayments in any
given year do not consider summer and winter wind seasonality,
which results in less cash being available for the autumn debt
service. The class B bonds' DSRA has no funds and the class A
bonds' DSRA is partially depleted. Fitch's forecasts indicate that
neither DSRA will be replenished as flows into them are
subordinated to the repayment of the class B bond deferrals,
currently approximately EUR18 million (around 36% of the original
class B notional). Fitch perceives a default as probable for the
class B notes.

From a probability of default perspective, a material reduction in
the terms of the bonds, agreed in the context of a potential
restructuring, could lead to an acceleration of the timing of a
default.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Aging Turbines Trigger More Maintenance - Operation Risk: Weaker

Turbine availability has historically been high, at or even
slightly exceeding Fitch's expectation of 96.5%. CRC Breeze Finance
has also demonstrated better cost control in recent years after
initially underestimating the budget prior to entering into the
transaction. However, Fitch considers that a decrease in
availability in the coming years is likely, given that the turbines
are aging and will need more maintenance, and this has been
reflected in Fitch's Rating Case. At the same time, operating costs
are expected to increase.

Initial Wind Estimates Largely Overestimated - Volume Risk: Weaker

The initial wind study grossly overestimated CRC Breeze Finance's
wind resources. A new study displaying lower wind forecasts was
prepared in 2010, which revised the wind forecast down by 17%.
However, the actual wind yield is also lower than the revised wind
estimates. Fitch now considers historical data as a more reliable
basis for Fitch's volume projections, because of the actual wind
yield repeatedly falling short of expectations.

Limited Exposure to Merchant Pricing - Price Risk: Midrange

The wind farms are remunerated through fixed feed-in-tariffs
embedded in German and French energy regulation. German tariffs are
set for 20 years and French tariffs for 15 years. This leaves the
project with a degree of exposure to merchant pricing, at
approximately 10% of the portfolio's generation capacity during the
last three to four years, increasing to more than 20% at the last
payment date.

Partially Depleted DSRA on Class A - Debt Structure: Midrange

Large Amounts of Deferrals on Class B - Debt Structure: Weaker

The class A bonds rank senior, are fully amortising and have a
fixed interest rate. However, the structure is weakened by equally
sized semi-annual principal repayments together with the potential
leakage of cash to pay semi-annual class B payments ignoring wind
seasonality. The low volumes have affected the project's cash
generation, and liquidity remains tight. Fitch does not expect it
to materially improve.

There have been several drawdowns on the DSRA, meaning that debt
service can still be maintained to an extent during weak wind
seasons but the reserve is significantly eroded, at EUR 6.5 million
versus the initial balance of EUR13.3 million. A replenishment of
this reserve is very unlikely, as it is subordinated to the
repayment of the entire balance of deferrals on the class B bonds.
Additional drawings on the class A DSRA would further affect the
debt structure.

The class B DSRA is depleted and large amounts of scheduled
payments on the class B bonds have been repeatedly deferred over
the years. In May 2021, the total accumulated amount of class B
principal deferrals was approximately EUR18 million, which may be
repaid until the class A bonds reach their maturity, but the
subordination to the class A makes this scenario unlikely.

Financial Profile

Fitch's rating case results in average and minimum DSCRs of 0.87x
and 0.72x, respectively, for the class A bonds and highlight that
there is no financial cushion. The equally sized semi-annual
principal repayments ignoring summer and winter wind seasonality
mean that there is less cash available for autumn debt service.
This increases the likelihood of further drawdowns on the class A
DSRA, already partially depleted. Fitch concludes that there may
not be sufficient cash in the reserve to service the class A until
maturity. This positions the rating at 'CCC'.

The balance of principal deferrals on the class B bonds currently
stands at around 36% of the notional, which indicates a clearly
probable default. However, CRC Breeze Finance SA can defer the
payments of the class B bonds until 2026, when the class A matures,
and the credit risk profile of the class B bonds corresponds to a
'CC' rating.

PEER GROUP

Like Breeze Finance SA, CRC Breeze Finance SA consists of a
portfolio of onshore wind farms located in Germany and to a lesser
extent, in France. As a result, they share the same regulatory
framework, with fixed feed-in-tariffs. They have equally suffered
from considerable over-estimation of their wind resources.
Additionally, the seasonality of wind yield, combined with equal
semi-annual principal repayments, has led to shortfalls at the
autumn payment dates. This has resulted in deferrals on the class B
notes and drawings on the class A notes' DSRA for both
transactions.

Compared with Breeze Finance SA, whose class B bonds mature in
2027, CRC Breeze Finance SA class B's scheduled maturity was 2016
but payments can be deferred until the class A bonds reach their
maturity in 2026. However, Fitch does not see this as a significant
benefit for CRC Breeze Finance SA as the high amount of deferrals,
their subordination to the class A notes and the fully depleted
class B notes' DSRA mean a full repayment of the class B bonds
remains unlikely. Fitch believes that the ratings of the two
transactions should be aligned as a result, at 'CCC' for the class
A notes and 'CC' for the class B notes.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Class A: weak wind conditions, a material decline in
    availability or a lasting increase in operating costs
    triggering further significant drawdowns on the class A DSRA.

-- Class B: default becoming imminent or inevitable.
    Restructuring proposal put to the bondholders to materially
    reduce the terms of class B bonds.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An upgrade of either class at this point appears unlikely.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance
and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

CREDIT UPDATE

Performance Update

There were no drawdowns under the DSRA during the last year given
the good levels of production during last year and strong cost
control, however production at the end of 2020 and in 1Q21 was low
due to weak wind levels. The current class A reserve balance is
below 50% of the target balance.

Covid-19 Not Affecting Operations

The portfolio has not suffered any major impact from the Covid-19
pandemic. In some locations, adjustments were made to adapt to the
lockdown in terms of logistic and worker availability, although
there were no events that affected the portfolio operations.

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

Fitch Cases

Fitch's base and rating cases are based on historical average
revenues. This assumption changes over time in Fitch's reviews, as
the project yields more historical data. Fitch's rating case also
includes an additional 15% stress on costs.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of '3'. This means ESG issues are credit- neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity, either due to their nature or
to the way in which they are being managed by the entity.




===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

ARTISAN H1: Kroll Advisory Set to Start Selling Off Assets
----------------------------------------------------------
Business Sale reports that Kroll Advisory Ltd is set to start
selling off assets after being appointed administrator to four
companies in the Artisan group.

Jimmy Saunders and Andrew Knowles of Kroll have been named joint
administrators of Artisan H1 Ltd, the Ainscow Hotel Ltd, Greyday
LLP and Artisan Group Facilities Management Ltd., Business Sale
relates.

The four companies operate numerous properties in Manchester,
including Salford's The Ainscow Hotel, several apartment buildings
and a former mill, which is described as having significant
potential for redevelopment.

According to Business Sale, the companies' struggles were partly
attributed to the fallout of the Grenfell Tower disaster.  Several
of its residential properties have cladding facades, severely
impacting the ability of the group and third-party leaseholders
within the buildings to sell apartments, Business Sale discloses.

The Ainscow Hotel, which employs 30 staff, is continuing to trade
as a going concern, with trade not suffering any disruption,
Business Sale notes.  Bookings at the hotel are being honoured and
are forecast to significantly improve as COVID-19 restrictions ease
and the business' key Christmas trading period starts, Business
Sale states.

The joint administrators are now set to proceed with a divestment
by selling assets relating to the residential developments,
according to Business Sale.  Kroll has said this will take place in
a staged process, initially focusing on buildings not affected by
cladding, with administrators working with managing agents and
professional consultants in an attempt to resolve the cladding
situation at other buildings, Business Sale notes.

The appointment of Kroll to the companies follows the firm's
appointment as administrator to Artisan H (Kings Waterfront) Ltd in
June 2021, Business Sale recounts.  Artisan H owns The Block
residential development on the Liverpool Waterfront.


BARROW AND DISTRICT: Goes Into Administration
---------------------------------------------
Dan Taylor at The Mail reports that members of Barrow and District
Credit Union will have their balances paid out after the group went
in administration.

According to The Mail, administrators have been called in at the
credit union, a community savings and loans provider.

The credit unions' 1,200 members are due to receive their money
under the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, The Mail
discloses.

The total payout is expected to be around GBP500,000, The Mail
states.

Members are due to receive a cheque for their balance, The Mail
notes.

Queries about Barrow and District Credit Union Ltd can be directed
to James Sleight and Peter Hart of PKF Geoffrey Martin & Co Ltd,
which has been appointed as administrator, The Mail says.

The administrator can be contacted by telephone on 01229 520130 or
01229 870110 or email bdcu@pkfgm.co.uk, The Mail notes.


BUPA FINANCE: Fitch Publishes 'BB+' Rating on New Tier 1 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has published Bupa Finance plc's (Bupa Finance);
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) 'A-'/Stable proposed issue of perpetual
subordinated Restricted Tier 1 (RT1) convertible notes' 'BB+'
rating.

The proposed notes are rated four notches below Bupa Finance's IDR,
made up of two notches for poor recovery and two notches for
moderate non-performance risk. The proceeds of the notes will be
used for general corporate purposes including without limitation
the redemption of some of Bupa Finance's 2023 subordinated notes by
way of tender offer.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The proposed notes will have a fixed coupon, which will be reset
every five years after the first 10.5 years non-call period.

The notes will rank ahead of ordinary shares in the event of a
winding-up, but behind senior creditors, which are defined as
including Solvency II Tier 2 subordinated debt. The level of
subordination results in Fitch's baseline recovery assumption of
'poor'. Fitch therefore notches down twice from the IDR.

The notes will include a mandatory interest cancellation feature,
which will be triggered if any solvency capital requirement (SCR)
applicable to the issuer or the group is not met, or if the
regulator has notified the issuer that payments under the notes
have to be cancelled.

The issuer will also have full discretion to cancel interest
payments at any time at its option. Fitch therefore assesses the
risk of non-performance as 'moderate' and Fitch notches down twice
from the IDR to reflect this fully flexible interest cancellation
feature. This assessment implies one extra notch compared with
Fitch's treatment of standard Solvency II Tier 2 instruments to
reflect the higher non-performance risk arising from the fully
flexible interest cancellation.

The principal amount outstanding of the proposed notes will be
converted into ordinary shares if a trigger event occurs, which is
defined as the amount of own funds eligible to cover the SCR being
equal or less than 75% of the SCR; or the amount of own funds
eligible to cover the minimum capital requirement (MCR) being equal
or less than the MCR; or a breach of the SCR has occurred and
compliance is not re-established within three months of the breach.
The conversion feature does not affect Fitch's rating notching.

Fitch expects the notes to receive 100% equity credit in Fitch's
Prism Factor-Based Model. Given that the proposed notes are
noncumulative perpetual instruments with no step-ups, Fitch will
treat them as equity in Fitch's financial debt leverage
calculation. However, the notes will be treated as 100% debt in
Fitch's total financing and commitments ratio, in common with any
other debt instrument.

Fitch views the issuance of the RT1 instrument as positive for the
Bupa group's financial leverage ratio (FLR). In addition, Fitch
expects a further improvement in FLR if Bupa Finance partially buys
back its Tier 2 notes due in 2023, given that this instrument is
treated as 100% debt in the FLR calculation. Fitch views the issue
of the proposed RT1 notes as negative for fixed-charge-coverage
ratio (FCC). However, a part redemption of the 2023 notes could
fully offset this increase.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An improvement in Bupa's business profile through greater
    diversification of its business mix. However, Fitch views an
    upgrade as unlikely in the medium term, given the group's
    earnings concentration in Private Medical Insurance (PMI) and
    associated operations.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- An increase in Bupa's FLR over 35%;

-- Sustained deterioration in operating performance, as
    evidenced, for example, by a combined operating ratio above
    100%.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

ISSUER PROFILE

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.


CLEVELAND BRIDGE: Report Unveils Details of Financial Problems
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dave Rogers at Building reports that Cleveland Bridge first
approached a restructuring specialist about its worsening financial
problems at the start of this year, months before the firm sank
into administration owing creditors nearly GBP22 million.

The steelwork contractor's finance director Phil Heathcock
contacted FRP Advisory in January about getting hold of more
working capital to allow it to keep trading in the latter part of
this year, Building recounts.

According to Building, FRP was told Cleveland Bridge bosses were
"confident . . . any funding shortfall would be met by ARPIC" --
the Saudi Arabian oil and gas business which has owned the firm for
close to 20 years.

Turnaround specialist Kingsgate, which was brought in at the
beginning of June, around which time Cleveland Bridge's managing
director Chris Droogan handed in his resignation, estimated the
firm was facing a funding shortfall of GBP12 million, Building
relates.

But Mr. Heathcock, who documents filed at Companies House show
stepped down as a director at the beginning of the month, told FRP
on July 16 that "ARPIC had declined to provide any further
financial support.  Heathcock advised that the company would
therefore be unable to pay wages the following week and that he now
considered insolvency inevitable", Building recounts.

After a final approach was made to ARPIC to "request finding to
avoid administration" FRP was formally appointed on July 22 as
administrator after finance firm 4Syte, which provided the
contractor with GBP4 million of emergency funding in June, called
them in, Building discloses.

According to Building, an administrator's report filed at Companies
House this week, laid bare some of the issues Cleveland Bridge said
it had run into which meant its finances deteriorated rapidly.

These included a GBP1.7 million bill to cover the cost of the
pandemic, the rise in steel prices, delays on jobs caused by the
pandemic and an estimating blunder on a GBP11 million scheme which
meant the job, which made up the majority of its production hours
at its Darlington facility in the first three months of this year,
was being done at zero gross profit, Building states.

It said margins had been hit by paying for overtime working and
agency staff after work on jobs restarted following the lifting of
lockdown restrictions while "a significant high margin overseas
contract" had been delayed by a political coup, Building notes.

According to the FRP report, 4Syte is a secured creditor and is
owed GBP2.24 million which FRP said it expected "will be repaid in
full", Building relays.  ARPIC is owed around GBP8 million but has
been warned to not expect all of it back, Building states.

Preferential creditors including the firm's 227 staff are owed
GBP401,000 in missing wages, holiday pay and pension contributions
while HMRC is owed a further GBP2.5 million, Building discloses.
FRP, as cited by Building, said: "It is anticipated that there will
be a distribution available to preferential creditors."

But unsecured creditors, owed a total of around GBP8 million, have
been told to forget about any hope of getting their money back,
Building notes.

Last week, FRP said that hopes of finding a buyer for the stricken
firm, founded in 1877, have to come to nought with the business set
to shut for good by the end of the month, Building recounts.


ELEMENT MATERIALS: S&P Cuts ICR to B- on Capital Structure Stress
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings downgraded its issuer credit rating to 'B-' from
'B' on U.K.-based Element Materials Technology Ltd. (Element) and
its financing subsidiaries, Greenrock Midco Ltd. and Greenrock
Finance Inc. S&P also downgraded its issue rating on the first-lien
facilities to 'B-' from 'B'. The outlook is stable. The recovery
rating is unchanged at '3' (rounded recovery 50%), indicating
meaningful recovery prospects in a default scenario.

S&P said, "The stable outlook shows that we expect Element to
generate positive free operating cash flow (FOCF) of $18
million-$30 million in 2022 and 2023, and that liquidity will
remain adequate over the next 12 months, albeit with S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA remaining elevated above 16x (above
8.5x on a cash-pay basis) until the end of 2023.

"We base our downgrade on Element's more-aggressive financial
policy. Element has chosen to undertake debt-funded acquisitions
with limited equity contributions, even though the group had
limited rating headroom and stretched credit metrics, as reflected
in our negative outlook and previous base case. In the
year-to-date, it has increased its acquisitions activity, although
some of its end-markets have not fully recovered from the pandemic.
For instance, in July 2021, it added $180 million in first-lien
debt to its debt stock, under existing debt baskets. It used the
money to refinance the capital expenditure (capex) facility it uses
for acquisitions. Its acquisition pipeline will continue to focus
on building the group's Life Sciences and Connected Technology
segments, which are sectors that offer a competitive edge and
uplift operating performance, in our view."

Element has demonstrated a high pace of acquisitions, with total
consideration for acquisitions estimated to exceed $250 million in
2021. As a result, reducing its leverage will take longer than we
had previously anticipated. Its leverage is elevated compared with
financial-sponsor owned peers rated 'B', which suggests that its
financial sponsor's strategy for expanding Element is aggressive.
S&P said, "Our base-case forecast is that adjusted leverage for
2021 will be 18.0x-18.3x (10.0x-10.3x on a cash-pay basis,
excluding payment-in-kind [PIK] and preferred shares). S&P said,
"Our adjusted debt figure for 2021 includes PIK and preferred
shares with interest for the preferred shares accruing at 11% a
year and at 8.75% for the PIK instrument. This amounts to about
$1.6 billion by the end of the year. Although this interest does
not weigh on cash pay interest, it is captured in our leverage
metrics and weighs on the group's financial risk profile." It could
also affect the group's ability to refinance the capital structure
within the next couple of years.

S&P said, "Although we expect Element's revenue to rebound further
in 2021, the EBITDA base is recovering more slowly than previously
anticipated. Indeed, we forecast resilient top-line growth in 2021
and 2022, with revenue growing 6.7%-7.0% per year. However, this is
counterbalanced by high restructuring costs of $20 million-$30
million as part of the group's merger and acquisition (M&A)
strategy. As a result, we predict that our FFO coverage ratio will
be 1.8x-1.9x in 2021, below our 2.0x trigger, suggesting two years
of sustained underperformance on this trigger. Although our base
case forecasts that this ratio will rebound to 2.1x-2.2x in
2022-2023, we see increased downside risk because of the
restructuring costs and the higher interest burden that could
follow Element's increased appetite for M&A.

"The group undertook cost-cutting measures and working capital
initiatives during 2020 and we expect these to continue through
2021. They support FOCF generation and the group's liquidity
profile. At the height of the pandemic, in April 2020, the group
obtained its lenders' agreement to use the acquisition/capex
facility to cover corporate general purposes for the 18 months to
Oct. 14, 2021. We factored this significant liquidity buffer into
our liquidity assessment, but assume that the agreement will not be
extended, limiting use of the facility to capex and M&A financing.
Nevertheless, liquidity remains adequate, in our view. We forecast
that FOCF will be minimal and positive in 2021 and then rise to $18
million-$30 million in 2022 and 2023.

"The stable outlook indicates that we expect Element to generate
positive FOCF of $18 million-$30 million in 2022 and 2023, and that
liquidity will remain adequate for the next 12 months. We
anticipate that its capital structure will remain deeply leveraged,
with adjusted debt-to-EBITDA above 18x (10x on a cash pay basis) in
2021. This will fall to around 16x (8.5x on a cash pay basis) in
2022 and 2023."

S&P could consider lowering the rating on Element if:

-- Liquidity weakening significantly; and

-- Leverage shows any further deterioration, which could cause us
to view the capital structure as unsustainable.

S&P could consider raising the rating if:

-- Element reduces leverage more quickly than anticipated over the
next 12 months, so that cash-pay leverage is below 8.0x; and

-- Its financial sponsor commits to limiting debt-funded
acquisitions.

Given the recent increase in debt, and the life cycle of the
investment, S&P believes this scenario to be unlikely. In addition,
it would expect the group to build a record of adjusted FOCF above
$30 million per year.


MVH HAULAGE: Dep't for Economy Accepts Director Disqualification
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Department for the Economy has accepted a disqualification
undertaking from the director of a company providing freight
transport by road.

The undertaking was received for seven years from Kevin Patrick
Donnelly (75) of Caman Park, Ballycastle in respect of his conduct
as a director of MVH Haulage Services Limited ("the Company").

The Company acted as a freight transportation, trading from 3 Mill
Street, Ballycastle and went into liquidation on July 24, 2018,
with an estimated deficiency as regards creditors of
GBP1,846,655.14.  There was a total of GBP100,000 owing as Share
Capital, resulting in an estimated deficiency as regards members of
GBP1,946,655.14.

The Department accepted the disqualification undertaking from Kevin
Patrick Donnelly on August 20, 2021, based on the following unfit
conduct which solely for the purposes of the disqualification
procedure was not disputed:

   * Causing and permitting MVH Haulage Services Ltd to submit
inaccurate PAYE/NIC returns totalling GBP764,724.35, inaccurate
Corporation Tax Returns by inaccurately claiming Capital Allowances
totalling GBP380,552.08 and failing to pay a further sum of
GBP130,274.28 resulting in a loss of monies properly due to the
Crown from 2010/11. Causing and permitting MVH Haulage Services Ltd
to retain a total of GBP1,275,550.07 due to the Crown as at the
date of liquidation.  By failing to submit PAYE / NIC returns and
failing to submit accurate Corporation Tax Returns, MVH Haulage
Services Ltd ultimately discriminated against the Crown as the
Company was not paying as much PAYE / NIC and Corporation Tax as it
should have paid, and therefore had more money available to fund
the continued trading of the Company.  

   * Failing to maintain and / or preserve and / or deliver up the
books and records of MVH Haulage Services Ltd.

   * Causing and permitting MVH Haulage Services Ltd to fail to
comply with the relevant legislation in that the annual accounts
for 11 years of trading were not filed within the prescribed
periods i.e. the years ending March 31, 2017, March 31, 2016, March
31, 2015, March 31, 2014, March 31, 2013, March 31, 2012, March 31,
2010, March 31, 2009, March 31, 2007, March 31, 2006, and March 31,
2005.

   * Causing and permitting MVH Haulage Services Ltd to fail to
comply with the relevant legislation in that the annual returns for
10 years of trading were not filed within the prescribed periods
i.e. the periods ending March 3, 2015, March 25, 2013, March 25,
2012, March 25, 2011, March 25, 2010, March 25, 2009, March 25,
2008, March 25, 2007, March 25, 2006 and March 25, 2005.

The Department has accepted 16 Disqualification Undertakings in the
financial year commencing April 1, 2021.


QUADRATE CATERING: Covid Pandemic Lockdowns Prompt Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sanjeeta Bains at BirminghamLive reports that the companies which
own the franchise to Marco Pierre White Steakhouse and Hotel Indigo
at The Cube has gone into administration.

Advisory and restructuring firm Kroll has been appointed
administrators of Quadrate Catering Ltd, which owns the franchise
to the MPW Steakhouse at The Cube as well as Commercial Street
Hotel Ltd, which owns the franchise to IHG's Hotel Indigo at The
Cube, BirminghamLive relates.

Both businesses remain open, BirminghamLive notes.

The firm, as cited by BirminghamLive, said it had taken over
control due to the financial impact to the businesses after the
three lockdown and Tier Three restrictions over the usually busy
Christmas period.  No other Marco Pierre White branded restaurants
have been impacted, BirminghamLive states.

According to Companies House, Kroll was appointed as administrators
on May 14, 2021, BirminghamLive discloses.

A spokesman for Kroll told BirminghamLive: "Allan Graham and
Matthew Ingram both of Kroll Advisory Ltd has been appointed Joint
Administrators to Quadrade Catering Ltd and Commercial Street Hotel
Ltd.

"Both are managed by Black and White Hospitality Management Ltd,
which is retaining control of the management.  No other Marco
Pierre White restaurants or Black and White Hospitality
subsidiaries are impacted by the Administration of the leasehold
companies at The Cube.

"The decision to place the companies into administration was taken
following the difficult trading conditions faced over the past year
as a direct consequence of the Covid pandemic.  For businesses in
Birmingham, this was particularly difficult given the fact that the
city itself remained in Tier 3 for an extended time period."


THE COLLECTIVE: Enters Administration After Failing to Find Buyer
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Olivia Konotey-Ahulu at Bloomberg News reports that The Collective,
an operator of small apartments in London and New York that offer
communal lifestyles for young urban professionals, has fallen into
administration after failing to find a buyer.

FTI Consulting has been appointed to assess potential options for
the privately held firm following unsuccessful attempts to raise
capital from investors and undertake a sale, Bloomberg relays,
citing a statement from FTI on Sept. 16.  Some of the firm's 62
employees will likely be dismissed in the coming weeks, Bloomberg
discloses.

The firm had appointed Credit Suisse Group AG to conduct a
strategic review which could have led to a full or partial sale,
Bloomberg reported in June.  The nascent co-living market, with its
small units and focus on shared amenities, has been hard hit by the
pandemic as government restrictions forced operators to suspend
some perks, limit mixing and stop all but essential travel,
Bloomberg notes,  

The Collective's current portfolio includes properties in west
London and the capital's Canary Wharf district, as well as the
Paper Factory in Long Island City, New York, Bloomberg states.

The statement said the pandemic has seen occupancy levels at The
Collective slide, and the firm has faced delays in the development
of non-operational assets, Bloomberg relays.

London's popularity also continues to lag global cities such as New
York in the wake of easing lockdown restrictions, with rents
struggling to return to pre-Covid levels, according to Bloomberg.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions
-------------------------------------------------------
Author: Sarkis J. Khoury
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 292 pages
List Price: $34.95
Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/hl7cni

Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions in the United States will
appeal to a wide range of readers. Dr. Khoury's analysis is
valuable for managers involved in transnational acquisitions,
whether they are acquiring companies or being acquired themselves.
At the same time, he provides a comprehensive and large-scale look
at the industrial sector of the U.S. economy that proves very
useful for policy makers even today. With its nearly 100 tables of
data and numerous examples, Khoury provides a wealth of information
for business historians and researchers as well.

Until the late 1960s, we Americans were confident (some might say
smug) in our belief that U.S. direct investment abroad would
continue to grow as it had in the 1950s and 1960s, and that we
would dominate the other large world economies in foreign
investment for some time to come. And then came the 1970s, U.S.
investment abroad stood at $78 billion, in contrast to only $13
billion in foreign investment in the U.S. In 1978, however, only
eight years later, foreign investment in the U.S. had skyrocketed
to nearly #41 billion, about half of it in acquisition of U.S.
firms. Foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies grew from 20 in 1970
to 188 in 1978. The tables had turned an Americans were worried.
Acquisitions in the banking and insurance sectors were increasing
sharply, which in particular alarmed many analysts.

Thus, when it was first published in 1980, this book met a growing
need for analytical and empirical data on this rapidly increasing
flow of foreign investment money into the U.S., much of it in
acquisitions. Khoury answers many of the questions arising from the
situation as it stood in 1980, many of which are applicable today:
What are the motives for transnational acquisitions? How do foreign
firms plans, evaluate, and negotiate mergers in the U.S.? What are
the effects of these acquisitions on competition, money and capital
markets; relative technological position; balance of payments and
economic policy in the U.S.?

To begin to answer these questions, Khoury researched foreign
investment in the U.S. from 1790 to 1979. His historical review
includes foreign firms' industry preferences, choice of location in
the U.S., and methods for penetrating the U.S. market. He notes the
importance of foreign investment to growth in the U.S.,
particularly until the early 20th century, and that prior to the
1970s, foreign investment had grown steadily throughout U.S.
history, with lapses during and after the world wars.

Khoury found that rates of return to foreign companies were not
excessive. He determined that the effect on the U.S. economy was
generally positive and concluded that restricting the inflow of
direct and indirect foreign investment would hinder U.S. economic
growth both in the short term and long term. Further, he found no
compelling reason to restrict the activities of multinational
corporations in the U.S. from a policy perspective. Khoury's
research broke new ground and provided input for economic policy at
just the right time.

Sarkis J. Khoury holds a Ph.D. in International Finance from
Wharton. He teaches finance and international finance at the
University of California, Riverside, and serves as the Executive
Director of International Programs at the Anderson Graduate School
of Business.




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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
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