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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Friday, April 9, 2021, Vol. 22, No. 66

                           Headlines



F R A N C E

FINANCIERE CALLISTA: S&P Assigns 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable


G E R M A N Y

GREENSILL BANK: Administrator Wins Bid to Freeze Australian Assets
ZEPHYR GERMAN: S&P Rates EUR1,045MM Term Loan 'B+', Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO XII: Fitch Assigns Final B- Rating on F-R-R Tranche
AVOCA CLO XIII: Fitch Assigns B-(EXP) Rating to Class F-RR Tranche
CARYSFORT PARK: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating to Class E Notes
[*] IRELAND: Insolvencies Down in First Three Months of 2021


I T A L Y

SIENA PMI 2016 Series 2: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Class D Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

ARUBA: Fitch Alters Outlook on 'BB' FC IDR to Stable


R U S S I A

ALMAZERGIENBANK: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT IDR, Outlook Negative
INT'L INDUSTRIAL: Two Former SocGen Execs Challenge Swiss Fines
ORIENT FINANS: S&P Upgrades ICR to B+, Outlook Stable


S P A I N

EUSKALTEL SA: S&P Places 'BB-' ICR in CreditWatch Negative
LORCA TELECOM: S&P Alters Outlook to Negative, Affirms 'B+' ICR


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AI MISTRAL: S&P Upgrades ICR to 'CCC+' After Debt Restructuring
EUROSTAR: UK Government Resisting Requests for Bailout
GREENE KING: In Talks with Loch Fyne Landlords, Mulls CVA
GREENSILL CAPITAL: Staff Reassured of Liquidity Prior to Collapse
GREENSILL CAPITAL: Sunak Urged to Commit to Covid-19 Loan Probe

INTERNATIONAL CONSOLIDATED: S&P Affirms 'BB' Ratings, Outlook Neg.
KEMBLE WATER: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT IDR, Outlook Negative
LEON: Opts to Shut Down U.S. Restaurants Amid Pandemic
[*] UK: 190,000 High Retail Jobs Lost Due to Coronavirus Pandemic


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOOK REVIEW: The Sorcerer's Apprentice - Medical Miracles

                           - - - - -


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F R A N C E
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FINANCIERE CALLISTA: S&P Assigns 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' issuer credit rating to
Financiere Callista S.a.r.l., Cooper's holding company. S&P has
assigned its 'B' issue rating to the proposed first-lien term loan
B with a '3'(60%) recovery rating, and its 'CCC+' issue rating to
the proposed second-lien term loan B with a '6'(0%) recovery
rating.

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that Cooper's
resilient operating model should enable it to sustain a profitable
growth trajectory and solid cash flow generation allowing gradual
deleveraging to about 7.0x S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to
EBITDA in 2022.

"We expect Cooper's leverage to peak this year after the proposed
transaction, followed by gradual deleveraging from 2021."

CVC announced its acquisition of a majority stake in Cooper in
March 2021. The remaining shares will be split between Charterhouse
(reinvesting in the company), Avista Capital Partners, Yvan
Vindevogel's family office (Vemedia's founder), and Cooper's
management. S&P said, "To support the transaction, Cooper is
issuing a new first-lien EUR920 million term loan B, a new
second-lien EUR235 million term loan B, and a EUR160 million RCF,
and we project these issuances will lead to an S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of about 7.5x-7.7x (from 6.1x
at year-end 2020, excluding the non-common equity instruments) and
FFO cash interest coverage of around 3.0x-3.5x in 2021 (from 4.5x
at year-end 2020). We estimate adjusted debt will amount to EUR1.2
billion following the proposed transaction, which represents an
increase of about EUR400 million compared with year-end 2020
(excluding the non-common equity instruments). It includes around
EUR12 million of other debt (including about EUR8 million in lease
liabilities) and EUR3 million of pension-related liabilities. We
exclude the preferred shares from our debt metrics, since we view
them as non-debt-like."

S&P said, "We believe Cooper's leading positions in each of its key
segments, its strong brand awareness, and dense distribution
network will continue to drive market share gains and support
strong EBITDA growth in the next 12-18 months.   Although we view
the elevated leverage from the aggressive financial policy as one
of the main constraints for the rating, we assume earnings growth
in 2021 will be fueled by contribution from recent acquisitions and
a significant contract gain, as well as above-market organic growth
supported by the implementation of targeted strategic initiatives
on pricing and innovation. We still assume some volatility in
market demand for product categories like cough and cold, insect
repellents, and beauty and care in the first half of 2021, with a
stronger rebound starting in July as vaccinations progress across
Europe. Combined with our estimate of resilient margins, this will
lead to adjusted EBITDA of EUR150 million-EUR160 million in 2021,
from almost EUR130 million in 2020, strengthening to EUR165
million-EUR175 million in 2022. As a result, we anticipate gradual
deleveraging with adjusted debt to EBITDA falling to around 7.0x in
2022.

"We assume Cooper will continue to outperform the market in the
next 12-18 months, fueled by ongoing strategic initiatives on
pricing, innovation, and commercial performance.   Cooper has a
track record of delivering organic growth above the self-care
market (which is expected to grow by around 2%-2.5% per year by
2024). For instance, one of its top brands, Hexomedine (the No.3
dermatological antiseptic and disinfectant in France), grew by
44.4% organically in 2017-2019 versus market growth of similar
products at 6.2%, following its de-reimbursement and switch to OTC
in February 2019. We assume the group will continue to outperform
the market supported by innovation and product-extension
opportunities, especially on its top 15 brands, which are the key
drivers of the group's growth and profitability. For instance, the
group recently launched new gummy formats in France and the
Netherlands and a healthy nail serum, an extension from its Excilor
brand (fungal nail infection treatment) that will bring additional
sales. Other initiatives include continuous focus on pricing
management on key brands (supported by management's strong track
record in raising prices, with the average price increase of 1.8%
on OTC brands over 2017 and 2020), optimization of its sales force,
and marketing efforts. The group can rely on a numerous, very
efficient salesforce in France that provides the group with
privileged access to French pharmacies. Besides, we believe Cooper
will continue to supplement its growth with bolt-on asset deals
enhancing its market position as highlighted by the recent
acquisition of Thermacare and Tradiphar in France. Mergers and
acquisitions have proven growth and margin accretive in the past
with pre-synergy multiples of 7.6x and post-synergy multiples of
6.0x achieved on average between 2018 and 2020.

"We forecast Cooper will generate EUR70 million-EUR80 million FOCF
in the next 12 months, thanks to its high profit margins and
capital-expenditure (capex) light business model.  Cooper generates
a high EBITDA margin of nearly 30% annually, thanks to its business
model of having two-thirds of manufacturing activities outsourced.
The limited in-house manufacturing capabilities keep annual capex
requirements low, at an estimated 2.0%-2.5% of revenue in the next
12-18 months, with maintenance capex of around EUR7 million-EUR8
million mainly spent on manufacturing equipment. Our forecast also
factors in annual working capital requirements of about EUR10
million-EUR13 million, needed to increase inventories for pipeline
products and to integrate stocks for recent acquisitions. We note
that working capital deteriorated in 2020 due to some volatility in
receivables' collection because of COVID-19, but should reverse in
the course of 2021."

Earnings stability is supported by Cooper's exposure to various
therapeutic segments and its flexible cost structure.   Cooper
offers more than 3,000 stock-keeping units (SKUs) within different
therapeutic areas: from calm and sleeping, medicated foot care, and
cough and cold, to pain relief. No single SKU represent more than
2% of the group's sales. This diversity helped Cooper to partly
mitigate lower demand for some of its product categories affected
by lower footfall in points of sale as part of the lockdown, even
while some other product categories, including COVID-19-related
products (thermometers, hand sanitizers, and disinfectants)
demonstrated strong growth. As a result, the pandemic had a less
severe effect on the company's operating performance. S&P said,
"The group performed in line with our anticipations with sales
falling only 0.5% and S&P Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA increasing
to about EUR130 million in 2020 from EUR122 million in 2019,
indicating a rise in EBITDA margin to about 29.6% in 2020 from
27.8% in 2019. The higher margin was also driven by a flexible cost
structure and reinforced cost-cutting measures during the pandemic.
We note the group has decided to partly freeze advertising and
promotions spending in the first quarter of 2021 until the market
fully rebounds. We also believe that some of the group's
categories, such as hydroalcoholic gel in France (where it holds
more than 50% of the market share) could benefit from higher
medium-term growth prospects following the pandemic and increased
health safety."

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that Financiere
Callista's efficient operating model and the acquisition of OTC
brands in Europe should enable it to sustain a profitable growth
trajectory and solid cash flow generation. We think the group will
likely deliver about 3.0%-4.0% of organic revenue growth and
improve its adjusted EBITDA margin to 30.5%-31.5% in the next 12-18
months. Moreover, we anticipate the group will maintain FFO cash
interest coverage at above 3.0x and comfortable FOCF of around
EUR70 million–EUR80 million."

S&P would lower the rating over the next 12 months if:

-- The group cannot improve its debt-leverage ratio toward 7.0x
within the 12-18 months of the transaction's close or it is unable
to generate substantial annual FOCF in line with our base case.
This could result from delays in implementing growth and
profitability initiatives or from a change in the regulatory
framework for OTC drugs that led to pharmacies in France losing
their competitiveness as a distribution channel for OTC drugs, and
ensuing price competition. This could also result from an
unexpected large debt-funded acquisition.

-- S&P observed a deterioration of profitability, reflected in the
adjusted EBITDA margin contracting and approaching the 25%
threshold.

-- FFO cash interest coverage approaches 2x.

The potential for an upgrade is constrained by Financiere
Callista's currently high leverage and financial policy. Also, the
group operates in a consolidating industry and will most likely
participate in this trend to increase its scale and enhance its
operating leverage. Still, we could consider a positive rating
action if Financiere Callista displayed markedly increased EBITDA
levels translating to positive FOCF considerably above that
anticipated in our base, while integrating new businesses. An
upgrade would also be conditional on the group committing to a more
conservative financial policy.



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G E R M A N Y
=============

GREENSILL BANK: Administrator Wins Bid to Freeze Australian Assets
------------------------------------------------------------------
Harry Brumpton at Bloomberg News reports that a German lawyer
handling the insolvency of Greensill Capital's bank unit won a
request to freeze the collapsed lender's Australian assets, as part
of an effort to cooperate with counterparts to recover as much as
possible for the supply-chain finance firm's creditors.

Michael Frege had submitted an application to the Federal Court of
Australia on March 31 asking for the court to hand over insolvency
proceedings on the business to the German unit, where the entity
has its "main interest," Bloomberg relays, citing court documents.


According to Bloomberg, the filing said the administrator also
filed a lawsuit in London last week to safeguard the position of
the bank, which collected deposits from German investors and has
liabilities estimated to exceed EUR4 billion (US$4.7 billion).

A group of lenders that runs a deposit insurance fund is seeking
EUR2 billion from Greensill Bank while uninsured depositors also
want their money back, Bloomberg discloses.



ZEPHYR GERMAN: S&P Rates EUR1,045MM Term Loan 'B+', Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B+' long-term issuer credit and
issue ratings to Germany-based Flender and the EUR1,045 million
term loan B issued by its subsidiary Zephyr Germany BidCo GmbH. The
recovery rating on the term loan is '3' which reflects its
expectations of meaningful recovery (rounded estimate: 60%).

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Flender
will gradually increase revenue and profitability, with adjusted
EBITDA margins of 11% or more in fiscals 2021-2022; maintain an
adjusted debt to EBITDA ratio of about 7.5-8.0x (4.0-4.5x excluding
preferred equity certificates [CPECs] that we view as debt-like)
and funds from operations (FFO) cash interest cover comfortably
above 4x."

Germany-based Flender has been acquired from Siemens AG by
private-equity firm Carlyle via Zephyr German Topco GmbH, its
acquisition vehicle.

Flender, which posted sales of about EUR2.2 billion in fiscal 2020,
is a leading niche manufacturer and servicer of mechanical drive
technologies including gearboxes, couplings and generators, with a
strong position in wind and well-established customer relationships
with many original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).

Carlyle's acquisition of Flender is debt- and equity-financed and
will result in high leverage.  As part of the acquisition
financing, Zephyr German BidCo GmbH issued a new EUR1,045 million
term loan B; a new EUR150 million revolving credit facility (RCF;
pari passu to the term loan B); and a new EUR125 million pari passu
guarantee facility. The proceeds, which are supported by about 50%
of equity funding by the new owner Carlyle, has been used to
purchase 100% of Flender (EUR1,876 million) from Siemens AG and for
the related fees. S&P said, "We estimate that as of closing (or
"day 1" following the transaction), Flender had about EUR50 million
of cash on its balance sheet. The EUR150 million RCF was undrawn at
closing. We forecast S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA for
fiscals 2021-2022 will be about 7.5x-8.0x and 4.0x-4.5x excluding
CPECs that we view as debt-like. We forecast FFO to debt of about
10%-11% (17%-19% excluding CPECs) over the same horizon."

Relatively strong free operating cash flow prospects and good cash
interest cover support the rating.  S&P said, "We forecast that
over fiscals 2021 and 2022, Flender will exhibit adjusted margins
of more than 11%, up from 10.5% in fiscal 2020 (year ended Sept.
30, 2020) and positive free operating cash flow (FOCF) of about
EUR95 million-EUR115 million in fiscal 2021, followed by EUR150
million-EUR170 million in fiscal 2022, supported by relatively low
capital expenditure (3%-4% of sales) and good working capital
management. In addition, we expect the group will report FFO cash
interest cover ratios in excess of 5x in fiscals 2021-2022 and
adequate liquidity, thanks to the absence of any debt maturities in
the next six years."

The wind business generates almost two-thirds of group revenue,
supported by a strong order book.   The wind business mainly
provides wind gears (planetary, helical, and hybrid drives to
increase the rotational speed of a wind turbine) and wind
generators (geared and direct drive generators that convert
mechanical energy into electrical energy). With 62% of total
revenue generated by the wind business, the group is highly
dependent on the wind turbine industry. S&P said, "However, we see
a positive growth trend, with the development of the offshore wind
turbine business. Its gearbox offering (mid-speed gears for large
power ratings) enable Flender to be well positioned to take
advantage of growth in repowering with a trend toward higher
turbine power ratings. Furthermore, the group is the leading player
globally, excluding China, due to strong relationships with Vestas,
GE, and Nordex. We view barriers to entry as relatively high
because of strong process and manufacturing know-how with
increasing integration into OEM supply chains. Design, manufacture,
and installation of final products can take several years.
Therefore, given the high switching cost, changing suppliers can be
expensive and unappealing for many customers. Flender generates
approximately 20% of total revenue from aftermarket and services
activities, leading to recurring earnings at higher margins than
the rest of the business. Despite COVID-19-related setbacks,
Flender generated EUR2,185 million of sales revenue in fiscal 2020,
up by about 8% year on year. We view positively that the group did
not register significant delivery delays."

Profitability could be affected by high customer and geographic
concentration, coupled with exposure to some cyclical industrial
end markets.   The carve-out from Siemens results in some one-off
costs and restructuring costs which will weigh on the group's
profitability for the next five years. Costs should total about
EUR70 million for the whole period, but we expect them to reduce
from 2023. Flender generates most revenue by customer-buying-entity
in Europe (45%), specifically in Germany (21%), while China
accounts for 32% and the U.S. 12%. Therefore, the majority of total
group revenue is generated in only two regions. S&P said, "We also
note some customer concentration versus rated peers, with the top
10 customers accounting for almost 60% of group revenue in fiscal
2020, somewhat mitigated by well-established customer
relationships. Via its other industrial business, Flender operates
in oil and gas, power, cement, minerals and mining, and engineering
sectors. We think demand in some of these markets could be subdued
or choppy going forward, especially because of measures taken by
governments in response to the pandemic and the recent volatility
in oil and gas markets. However, we recognize the low correlation
between the wind turbine industry and these end-markets, mitigating
the risks during periods of headwinds."

S&P said, "We assess Flender as a financial sponsor-related owned
entity, given its acquisition by Carlyle.  Flender's new capital
structure includes CPECs that sit further up the group structure
outside the restricted group. We consider these instruments as
debt-like. This is because there are no transfer restrictions (to
third parties of the CPECS). When calculating adjusted debt, we
consider Flender's new debt facilities and then adjust for about
EUR18 million of operating leases, about EUR20 million of
pension-related obligations, and the EUR820 million of CPECs. We
apply a 100% cash haircut, and we consider that Flender may follow
a shareholder-friendly dividend policy.

"We view Flender's management and governance as fair.   The group
has clear strategic planning processes and good depth and breadth
of management. However, Flender is now under new ownership by a
private-equity sponsor. Management will need to steer the business
through a period of transformation under the new ownership and
navigate uncertainty caused by the pandemic, establishing a new
track record in the process.

"We view the company's business risk profile at the stronger end of
our assessment.   We applied a positive (one notch) comparable
rating analysis to our 'b' anchor score on Flender to derive our
preliminary 'B+' issuer credit rating. The adjustment mainly
reflects our view of the company's business risk profile at the
stronger end of our assessment, mainly related to Flender's scale
of operations that we view as closer to that of the company's
higher-rated peers. The adjustment also considers the cost
flexibility (about 25% of fixed costs) demonstrated during the
pandemic, being able to maintain its margin and to generate
positive FOCF, which facilitates cash generation and mitigates
pressure on leverage."

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects.   Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts
are gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P said, "We use these assumptions about
vaccine timing in assessing the economic and credit implications
associated with the pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will
update our assumptions and estimates accordingly."

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Flender
will gradually increase revenue and profitability, with adjusted
EBITDA margins of 11% or more in fiscals 2021-2022, maintain an
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of about 8x (about 4.5x excluding
CPECs that we view as debt-like), as well as FFO cash interest
coverage comfortably above 4x.

"We could lower the rating if FFO cash interest coverage trended
toward 3x because of operational setbacks, higher carve-out costs,
adjusted debt to EBITDA exceeding 8.5x (5x excluding CPECs) without
prospects of short-term recovery, or raising incremental debt to
distribute dividends. We could also take a negative rating action
if adjusted FOCF were to weaken to less than EUR50 million.

"We consider a positive rating action as unlikely over our 12-month
outlook horizon, but we could raise the rating if Flender were to
improve adjusted debt to EBITDA sustainably below 5x (including
CPECs), coupled with FOCF generation above EUR100 million, positive
industry trends, and robust operating performance."




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I R E L A N D
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AVOCA CLO XII: Fitch Assigns Final B- Rating on F-R-R Tranche
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Avoca CLO XII DAC's reset final
ratings.

Avoca CLO XII DAC

      DEBT                    RATING              PRIOR
      ----                    ------              -----
A Loan                LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
A-1-R XS1577526772    LT  PIFsf   Paid In Full   AAAsf
A-2-R XS1581264279    LT  PIFsf   Paid In Full   AAAsf
A-R-R XS2315802392    LT  AAAsf   New Rating     AAA(EXP)sf
B-1-R-R XS2315802558  LT  AAsf    New Rating     AA(EXP)sf
B-2-R-R XS2315802715  LT  AAsf    New Rating     AA(EXP)sf
B-R XS1577527150      LT  PIFsf   Paid In Full   AAsf
C-R XS1577527580      LT  PIFsf   Paid In Full   Asf
C-R-R XS2315802988    LT  Asf     New Rating     A(EXP)sf
D-R XS1577527747      LT  PIFsf   Paid In Full   BBBsf
D-R-R XS2315803101    LT  BBB-sf  New Rating     BBB-(EXP)sf
E-R XS1577528471      LT  PIFsf   Paid In Full   BBsf
E-R-R XS2315803440    LT  BB-sf   New Rating     BB-(EXP)sf
F-R XS1577528638      LT  PIFsf   Paid In Full   B-sf
F-R-R XS2315803523    LT  B-sf    New Rating     B-(EXP)sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Avoca CLO XII DAC is a securitisation of mainly senior secured
obligations with a component of senior unsecured, mezzanine and
second-lien loans. Note proceeds are being used to redeem all
existing classes except the subordinated notes and to upsize the
existing portfolio with a new target par of EUR450 million. The
portfolio is managed by KKR Credit Advisors (Ireland) Unlimited
Company. The collateralised loan obligation (CLO) envisages a
4.5-year reinvestment period and a 8.5-year weighted average life
(WAL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Average Portfolio Credit Quality (Positive): Fitch places the
average credit quality of obligors in the 'B' category. The Fitch
weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the identified portfolio
is 32.8.

High Recovery Expectations (Positive): At least 90% of the
portfolio will comprise senior secured obligations. Fitch views the
recovery prospects for these assets as more favourable than for
second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine assets. The Fitch weighted
average recovery rate (WARR) of the identified portfolio is 66.2.

Diversified Asset Portfolio (Positive): The transaction has four
Fitch test matrices corresponding to fixed-rate asset limits of 0%
and 10% and top-10 obligors' concentration limits of 16% and 20%.
The manager can interpolate within and between the matrices. The
transaction also includes various concentration limits, including a
maximum exposure to the three-largest (Fitch-defined) industries in
the portfolio at 40%. These covenants ensure the asset portfolio
will not be exposed to excessive concentration.

Portfolio Management (Neutral): The transaction has a 4.5-year
reinvestment period and includes reinvestment criteria similar to
those of other European transactions. Fitch's analysis is based on
a stressed-case portfolio with the aim of testing the robustness of
the transaction structure against its covenants and portfolio
guidelines.

Deviation from Model-Implied Rating (Negative): The ratings of the
D and F notes are one notch higher than the model-implied rating
(MIR) under the stressed portfolio analysis. When analysing the
updated matrices with the stressed portfolio, the notes showed a
maximum default-rate shortfall ranging from -0.45% to -1.23% across
the structure at the assigned ratings. However, the final ratings
are supported by the significant default cushion on the identified
portfolio due to the notable cushion between the covenants of the
transaction and the portfolio's parameters including the high
diversity (189 obligors) of the identified portfolio.

All notes pass the assigned ratings based on the identified
portfolio and the coronavirus baseline sensitivity analysis that is
used for surveillance. The class F notes' deviation from the MIR
reflects the agency's view that the tranche displays a significant
margin of safety given the credit enhancement level at closing. The
notes do not present a "real possibility of default", which is the
definition of 'CCC' in Fitch terminology.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- A reduction of the default rate (RDR) at all rating levels by
    25% of the mean RDR and an increase in the recovery rate (RRR)
    by 25% at all rating levels would result in an upgrade of up
    to five notches depending on the notes, except for the class
    A-R-R notes, which are already at the highest 'AAAsf' rating.

-- At closing, Fitch used a standardised stressed portfolio
    (Fitch's stressed portfolio) that was customised to the
    portfolio limits as specified in the transaction documents.
    Even if the actual portfolio shows lower defaults and smaller
    losses at all rating levels than Fitch's stressed portfolio
    assumed at closing, an upgrade of the notes during the
    reinvestment period is unlikely, as the portfolio credit
    quality may still deteriorate, not only by natural credit
    migration, but also through reinvestments.

-- After the end of the reinvestment period, upgrades may occur
    on better-than-expected portfolio credit quality and deal
    performance, leading to higher credit enhancement and excess
    spread available to cover for losses in the remaining
    portfolio.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- An increase of the RDR at all rating levels by 25% of the mean
    RDR and a decrease of the RRR by 25% at all rating levels will
    result in downgrades of no more than five notches depending on
    the notes.

Coronavirus Baseline Stress Scenario

Fitch has recently updated its CLO coronavirus stress scenario to
assume half of the corporate exposure on Negative Outlook is
downgraded by one notch instead of 100%. The Stable Outlooks on all
the notes reflect the default-rate cushion in the sensitivity
analysis it ran in light of the coronavirus pandemic.

Coronavirus Downside Stress Scenario

Fitch has added a sensitivity analysis that contemplates a more
severe and prolonged economic stress caused by a re-emergence of
infections in the major economies. The potential severe downside
stress incorporates a single-notch downgrade to all the corporate
exposure on Negative Outlook. This scenario shows resilience at the
current ratings for all the notes.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset pool
and the transaction. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other nationally
recognised statistical rating organisations and/or European
securities and markets authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information or information on the risk-presenting entities.

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates that it is adequately reliable.

AVOCA CLO XIII: Fitch Assigns B-(EXP) Rating to Class F-RR Tranche
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Avoca CLO XIII DAC reset expected
ratings.

The assignment of final ratings is contingent on the receipt of
final documents conforming to information already reviewed.

Avoca CLO XIII DAC

DEBT                 RATING
----                 ------
A-RR      LT  AAA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
B-1-RR    LT  AA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
B-2-RR    LT  AA(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
C-RR      LT  A(EXP)sf     Expected Rating
D-RR      LT  BBB-(EXP)sf  Expected Rating
E-RR      LT  BB-(EXP)sf   Expected Rating
F-RR      LT  B-(EXP)sf    Expected Rating
X-RR      LT  AAA(EXP)sf   Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Avoca CLO XIII Limited) is an arbitrage cash flow collateralised
loan obligation (CLO). Net proceeds from the issue of the notes
will be used to redeem existing notes (excluding the subordinated
notes) at the reset date. The portfolio is managed by KKR Credit
Advisors (Ireland). The CLO has a 4.25-year reinvestment period and
an 8.5-year weighted average life (WAL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Average Portfolio Credit Quality (Neutral): Fitch places the
average credit quality of obligors in the 'B'/'B-' category. The
Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the identified
portfolio is 34.05.

High Recovery Expectations (Positive): At least 90% of the
portfolio will comprise senior secured obligations. Fitch views the
recovery prospects for these assets as more favourable than for
second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine assets. The Fitch weighted
average recovery rate (WARR) of the identified portfolio is
64.82%.

Diversified Portfolio (Positive): The indicative maximum exposure
of the 10-largest obligors for assigning the expected ratings is
16% of the portfolio balance. The transaction also includes various
concentration limits, including a maximum exposure to the
three-largest (Fitch-defined) industries in the portfolio at 40%.
These covenants ensure that the asset portfolio will not be exposed
to excessive concentration.

Portfolio Management (Positive): The transaction has a 4.25-year
reinvestment period and includes reinvestment criteria similar to
those of other European transactions. Fitch's analysis is based on
a stressed-case portfolio with the aim of testing the robustness of
the transaction structure against its covenants and portfolio
guidelines.

Deviation from Model-Implied Rating (Negative): The expected
ratings of class B-1-RR, B-2-RR, C-RR, D-RR and F-RR notes are one
notch higher than the model-implied ratings (MIR). When analysing
the stressed portfolio, the notes showed a maximum break-even
default-rate shortfall ranging from -0.31% to -2.47% across the
structure at the assigned ratings.

However, the expected ratings are supported by the sound
performance of the existing CLO, as well as the significant default
cushion on the identified portfolio at the assigned ratings due to
the notable buffer between the transaction's covenants and the
portfolio's parameters, including a higher diversity (181 obligors)
for the identified portfolio. All notes pass the assigned ratings
based on the identified portfolio and the coronavirus sensitivity
analysis that is used for surveillance.

The F-RR notes' deviation from the MIR reflects Fitch's view that
the tranche displays a significant margin of safety given the
credit enhancement available. The notes do not currently present a
"real possibility of default", which is the definition of 'CCC' in
Fitch's terminology.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- A reduction of the default rate (RDR) at all rating levels by
    25% of the mean RDR and an increase in the recovery rate (RRR)
    by 25% at all rating levels would result in an upgrade of up
    to fives notches depending on the notes, except for the class
    A notes, which are already at the highest 'AAAsf' rating.

-- At closing, Fitch will use a standardised stressed portfolio
    (Fitch's stressed portfolio) that is customised to the
    portfolio limits as specified in the transaction documents.
    Even if the actual portfolio shows lower defaults and smaller
    losses at all rating levels than Fitch's stressed portfolio
    assumed at closing, an upgrade of the notes during the
    reinvestment period is unlikely, as the portfolio credit
    quality may still deteriorate, not only by natural credit
    migration, but also through reinvestments.

-- After the end of the reinvestment period, upgrades may occur
    on better-than-expected portfolio credit quality and deal
    performance, leading to higher credit enhancement and excess
    spread available to cover for losses in the remaining
    portfolio.

Factor that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- An increase of the RDR at all rating levels by 25% of the mean
    RDR and a decrease of the RRR by 25% at all rating levels will
    result in downgrades of no more than five notches depending on
    the notes.

Coronavirus Baseline Stress Scenario

Fitch has recently updated its CLO coronavirus stress scenario to
assume half of the corporate exposure on Negative Outlook is
downgraded by one notch instead of 100%. The Stable Outlooks on all
the notes reflect the resilience of the tranches in the sensitivity
analysis Fitch ran in light of the coronavirus pandemic.

Coronavirus Severe Downside Stress Scenario

Fitch has added a sensitivity analysis that contemplates a more
severe and prolonged economic stress caused by a re-emergence of
infections in the major economies. The severe downside stress
incorporate a single-notch downgrade to all the corporate exposure
on Negative Outlook. This scenario shows resilience at the current
ratings for all notes.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset pool
and the transaction. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other nationally
recognised statistical rating organisations and/or European
securities and markets authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information or information on the risk-presenting entities.

Overall, and together with any assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates that it is adequately reliable.

CARYSFORT PARK: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned credit ratings to Carysfort Park CLO
DAC's class X, A-1, A-2, B, C, D, and E notes. At closing, the
issuer also issued subordinated notes.

The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which primarily comprises
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-secured term loans and
bonds that are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which we consider bankruptcy
remote.
-- The transaction's counterparty risks, which we consider to be
in line with our counterparty rating framework.

  Portfolio Benchmarks
                                             Current
  S&P weighted-average rating factor        2,700.31
  Default rate dispersion                     661.02
  Weighted-average life (years)                 5.12
  Obligor diversity measure                   139.26
  Industry diversity measure                   14.70
  Regional diversity measure                    1.11

  Transaction Key Metrics
                                             Current
  Portfolio weighted-average rating
    derived from S&P's CDO evaluator               B
  'CCC' category rated assets (%)                4.40
  Actual 'AAA' weighted-average recovery (%)    35.93
  Covenanted weighted-average spread (%)         3.65
  Covenanted weighted-average coupon (%)         4.00

Loss mitigation loans

Under the transaction documents, the issuer can purchase loss
mitigation loans, which are assets of an existing collateral
obligation held by the issuer offered in connection with
bankruptcy, workout, or restructuring of the obligation, to improve
the related collateral obligation's recovery value.

Loss mitigation loans allow the issuer to participate in potential
new financing initiatives by the borrower in default. This feature
aims to mitigate the risk of other market participants taking
advantage of CLO restrictions, which typically do not allow the CLO
to participate in a defaulted entity's new financing request.
Hence, this feature increases the chance of a higher recovery for
the CLO. While the objective is positive, it can also lead to par
erosion, as additional funds will be placed with an entity that is
under distress or in default. This may cause greater volatility in
our ratings if the positive effect of the obligations does not
materialize. In S&P's view, the presence of a bucket for loss
mitigation loans, the restrictions on the use of interest and
principal proceeds to purchase those assets, and the limitations in
reclassifying proceeds received from those assets from principal to
interest help to mitigate the risk.

The purchase of loss mitigation loans is not subject to the
reinvestment criteria or the eligibility criteria. The issuer may
purchase loss mitigation loans using interest proceeds, principal
proceeds, or amounts in the supplemental reserve account. The use
of interest proceeds to purchase loss mitigation loans is subject
to:

-- The manager determining that there are sufficient interest
proceeds to pay interest on all the rated notes on the upcoming
payment date; and

-- Following the purchase of a loss mitigation loan, all coverage
tests and the reinvestment par value test must be satisfied.

The use of principal proceeds is subject to:

-- Passing par value tests;

-- The manager having built sufficient excess par in the
transaction so that the aggregate collateral principal amount is
equal to or exceeds the portfolio's reinvestment target par balance
after the reinvestment;

-- The loss mitigation loan being a debt obligation, ranking
senior or pari passu with the related collateral obligation, having
a par value greater than or equal to its purchase price and not
having a maturity date exceeding the maturity date of the rated
note.

Loss mitigation loans that are debt obligations and have limited
deviation from the eligibility criteria will receive collateral
value credit for overcollateralization carrying value purposes. To
protect the transaction from par erosion, amounts received from
loss mitigation loans originally purchased with principal proceeds
or loss mitigation loans that have been given a carrying value will
form part of the principal account proceeds, whereas for all other
loss mitigation loans, any amounts can be characterized as interest
at the manager's discretion. Loss mitigation loans that do not meet
this version of the eligibility criteria will receive zero credit.

The cumulative exposure to loss mitigation loans purchased with
principal is limited to 5% of the target par amount. The cumulative
exposure to loss mitigation loans purchased with principal and
interest is limited to 10% of the target par amount.

Rating rationale

Under the transaction documents, the rated notes will pay quarterly
interest unless a frequency switch event occurs. Following this,
the notes will switch to semiannual payments. The portfolio's
reinvestment period will end approximately 4.3 years after
closing.

S&P said, "We consider that, at closing, the portfolio is
well-diversified, primarily comprising broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior-secured term loans and senior-secured
bonds. Therefore, we have conducted our credit and cash flow
analysis by applying our criteria for corporate cash flow CDOs."

The transaction includes an amortizing reinvestment target par
amount, which is a predetermined reduction in the value of the
transaction's target par amount over time. This payment is
unrelated to the principal payments on the notes. This may allow
for the principal proceeds to be characterized as interest proceeds
when the collateral par exceeds this amount, subject to a limit,
and affect the reinvestment criteria, among others. This feature
allows some excess par to be released to equity during benign
times, which may lead to a reduction in the amount of losses that
the transaction could sustain during an economic downturn. Hence,
in S&P's cash flow analysis, it has considered scenarios in which
the target par amount declines by the maximum cumulative amount
permitted of EUR9.50 million to EUR390.50 million.

S&P said, "In our cash flow analysis, we used this EUR390.50
million amortizing target par amount, the covenanted
weighted-average spread (3.65%), the reference weighted-average
coupon (4.00%), and actual weighted-average recovery rates at each
rating level. We applied various cash flow stress scenarios, using
four different default patterns, in conjunction with different
interest rate stress scenarios for each liability rating category.

"Under our structured finance sovereign risk criteria, we consider
that the transaction's exposure to country risk is sufficiently
mitigated at the assigned ratings."

Until the end of the reinvestment period on July 28, 2025, the
collateral manager may substitute assets in the portfolio for so
long as our CDO Monitor test is maintained or improved in relation
to the initial ratings on the notes. This test looks at the total
amount of losses that the transaction can sustain as established by
the initial cash flows for each rating, and it compares that with
the current portfolio's default potential plus par losses to date.
As a result, until the end of the reinvestment period, the
collateral manager may through trading deteriorate the
transaction's current risk profile, as long as the initial ratings
are maintained.

S&P said, "We consider the transaction's documented counterparty
replacement and remedy mechanisms will adequately mitigate its
exposure to counterparty risk under our current counterparty
criteria.

"We consider the transaction's legal structure and framework to be
bankruptcy remote, in line with our legal criteria.

"Following our analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, we believe our ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for the class X
to D notes. Our credit and cash flow analysis indicates that the
available credit enhancement for the class A-2, B, and C notes
could withstand stresses commensurate with higher rating levels
than those we have assigned. However, as the CLO will be in its
reinvestment phase starting from closing, during which the
transaction's credit risk profile could deteriorate, we have capped
our ratings assigned to the notes.

"For the class E notes, our credit and cash flow analysis indicate
that the available credit enhancement could withstand stresses that
are commensurate with a 'CCC' rating. However, we have applied our
'CCC' rating criteria resulting in a 'B-' rating to this class of
notes."

The one notch of ratings uplift (to 'B-') from the model generated
results (of 'CCC'), reflects several key factors, including:

-- Credit enhancement comparison: S&P noted that the available
credit enhancement for this class of notes is in the same range as
other CLOs that S&P rates, and that have recently been issued in
Europe.

-- Portfolio characteristics: The portfolio's average credit
quality is similar to other recent CLOs.

-- S&P's model generated break even default rate at the 'B-'
rating level of 23.18% (for a portfolio with a weighted-average
life of 5.12 years), versus if it was to consider a long-term
sustainable default rate of 3.1% for 5.12 years, which would result
in a target default rate of 15.87%.

-- S&P also noted that the actual portfolio is generating higher
spreads versus the covenanted threshold that S&P has modelled in
its cash flow analysis.

S&P said, "For us to assign a rating in the 'CCC' category, we also
assessed (i) whether the tranche is vulnerable to non-payments in
the near future, (ii) if there is a one in two chances for this
note to default, and (iii) if we envision this tranche to default
in the next 12-18 months.

"Following this analysis, we consider that the available credit
enhancement for the class E notes is commensurate with the 'B-
(sf)' rating assigned.

"Taking the above factors into account and following our analysis
of the credit, cash flow, counterparty, operational, and legal
risks, we believe that our ratings are commensurate with the
available credit enhancement for all the rated classes of notes.

"In addition to our standard analysis, to provide an indication of
how rising pressures among speculative-grade corporates could
affect our ratings on European CLO transactions, we have also
included the sensitivity of the ratings on the class X to D notes
to five of the 10 hypothetical scenarios we looked at in our
publication "How Credit Distress Due To COVID-19 Could Affect
European CLO Ratings," published on April 2, 2020.

"As our ratings analysis makes additional considerations before
assigning ratings in the 'CCC' category, and we would assign a 'B-'
rating if the criteria for assigning a 'CCC' category rating are
not met, we have not included the above scenario analysis results
for the class E notes."

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts are
gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P said, "We use these assumptions about
vaccine timing in assessing the economic and credit implications
associated with the pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will
update our assumptions and estimates accordingly."

The transaction securitizes a portfolio of primarily senior-secured
leveraged loans and bonds managed by Blackstone Ireland Ltd.

  Ratings List
  
  Class  Rating    Amount    Interest rate (%)  Credit
                  (mil. EUR)                    enhancement (%)  
  X      AAA (sf)     1.50     3mE + 0.28         N/A
  A-1    AAA (sf)   244.00     3mE + 0.80       39.00
  A-2    AA (sf)     40.00     3mE + 1.25       29.00
  B      A (sf)      28.00     3mE + 2.05       22.00
  C      BBB (sf)    26.00     3mE + 3.20       15.50
  D      BB- (sf)    23.00     3mE + 6.14        9.75
  E      B- (sf)     12.00     3mE + 8.39        6.75
  Sub    NR          31.10     N/A                N/A

  NR--Not rated.
  N/A--Not applicable.
  3mE--Three-month Euro Interbank Offered Rate.


[*] IRELAND: Insolvencies Down in First Three Months of 2021
------------------------------------------------------------
Barry O'Halloran at The Irish Times reports that government
Covid-19 supports could be concealing many businesses' financial
woes, one expert warned on April 1, as figures showed company
insolvencies fell in the first three months of the year.

According to The Irish Times, statistics published by accountants
Deloitte show that 111 companies went through various insolvency
procedures in the first quarter of this year, 30% less than during
the same period in 2020.

The firm suggested that the decline from the 159 company
insolvencies recorded during the first quarter of last year was due
to ongoing Government Covid-19 supports, The Irish Times
discloses.

David Van Dessel, partner, financial advisory at Deloitte, said the
pandemic crisis created a significant challenge for otherwise
viable Irish companies, The Irish Times relates.

He added that Government supports were likely to be concealing the
true level of distress, particularly in hard-hit sectors such as
hospitality and retail, The Irish Times notes.

The first three months of 2020 was the last period of normal trade
before pandemic restrictions closed many businesses, The Irish
Times states.

Since then the State has given companies wage subsidies, regular
payments to those forced to close by pandemic restrictions,
warehoused tax liabilities and temporarily waived commercial rates,
to aid business through the crisis, The Irish Times recounts.

Mr. Van Dessel pointed out that rent and tax liabilities could have
continued to mount over the last year, while many businesses have
been closed, forced to operate sporadically or had their operations
limited, The Irish Times relays.

According to The Irish Times, Mr. Van Dessel predicted that
companies and creditors will have to deal with situations where the
business is trading profitably, but may not be able to repay its
Covid crisis liabilities.

He warned in those cases, they will have to consider paying off
those debts over time, but not all creditors may go along with
this, The Irish Times notes.

Deloitte's figures show that liquidations where creditors vote to
wind up a company, accounted for 78 of the insolvencies recorded in
the first quarter of this year, according to The Irish Times.

There were 134 such creditors' voluntary liquidations -- as this
process is known -- during the same period in 2020, The Irish Times
discloses.

There were 23 receiverships, that is, where creditors take control
of a business or its assets, on foot of a secured debt, The Irish
Times says.

In eight cases, creditors petitioned the High Court to wind up
companies, The Irish Times relates.  Just two companies had
examiners appointed to oversee a possible rescue of those
businesses, according to The Irish Times.




=========
I T A L Y
=========

SIENA PMI 2016 Series 2: Fitch Affirms CCC Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
This is a correction of a rating action commentary published on 1
October 2020 to include the class D notes and rating.

Fitch Ratings has affirmed Siena PMI 2016 S.r.l. (Siena PMI) and
Siena PMI 2016 series 2 S.r.l. (Siena PMI 2) and revised the
Outlook on Siena PMI 2's class B notes to Stable from Negative. The
class C notes in both transactions have been removed from Rating
Watch Negative (RWN).

     DEBT              RATING
     ----              ------
Siena PMI 2016 S.r.l - Series 2

A2 IT0005372955   LT AA-sf  Affirmed
B IT0005372963    LT AA-sf  Affirmed
C IT0005372971    LT BB+sf  Affirmed
D IT0005372989    LT CCCsf  Affirmed

Siena PMI 2016 S.r.l.

C IT0005218240    LT BBBsf  Affirmed

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The transactions are granular cash flow securitisation of mortgage
and non-mortgage loans granted to small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SME) located in Italy. The underlying loans were
originated by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. (B/Rating
Watch Evolving; RWE).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Coronavirus Baseline Case

Fitch anticipates a generalised weakening of Italian economy
following the measures adopted to contain the spread of the
coronavirus. In its analysis, Fitch has applied the Coronavirus
Baseline scenario, which assumed a 30% increase to default rates
combined with a 25% haircut to recovery assumptions, as outlined in
"Fitch Ratings Coronavirus Scenarios: Baseline and Downside Cases -
Update". The model-implied rating for Siena PMI 2's class C notes
is three notches above the current rating. However, Fitch has
deviated from the model-implied rating and has affirmed the notes
due to the additional portfolio losses projected under Fitch's
baseline scenario.

Payment Holiday take-up

In line with the national average take-up in the SME sector, as at
July 2020 and August 2020 less than 21% and 31% of the securitised
pools was suspended for Siena PMI and Siena PMI 2, respectively. In
lieu of a new decree approved in mid-August by the Italian
government, the payment holidays originally granted until end of
September 2020 have been automatically extended until January 2021.
However, the data provided clearly exhibit that the vast majority
of the payment holidays were requested and authorised in the first
months of the pandemic.

Payment Interruption Risk

Siena PMI's class C notes have no liquidity coverage. As they are
now the most senior notes they are exposed to servicer interruption
risk. The servicer is currently rated (B/Rating Watch Evolving) but
the transaction also includes a back-up servicing agreement with
Securitisation Services S.p.A. Therefore the class C notes' rating
is capped at 'BBBsf'.

Fast Deleveraging

Credit enhancement (CE) ratios increase as the transactions
deleverage. Over about 15 months Siena PMI 2 reduced its pool
factor to 67.7%, as per Fitch's calculation and the only rated
class of notes outstanding of Siena PMI has available CE of 83.0%
as at August 2020. In both transactions, Fitch considers the
available CE able compensates for potential additional portfolio
losses, which could emerge late in 1Q21, when the moratorium ends.

Loan Book Performance

The updated default frequencies provided by the originator as of
end-2019 show an improving trend for loan book performance.
However, the agency has not changed the bank benchmark of 5.5%
given the expected worsening macroeconomic conditions.

SME Loan Recovery Rates

When analysing the collateral available to the securitised loans in
Siena PMI 2, Fitch gave credit only to real estate collateral with
a first-lien mortgage (30.3% of the portfolio). Loans with no real
estate collateral, and loans secured by second or higher lien were
treated as unsecured by Fitch. This leads to a recovery rate
expectation of 58.0%.

Granular and diversified portfolio

The pool are amortising and broadly maintaining their granularity.
The largest obligor accounts for 1.6% and 0.6% of the pool balance,
and the largest 10 account for 8.8% and 4.0%, respectively for
Siena PMI and Siena PMI 2. The impact of obligor concentration in
taken into consideration is the Portfolio Credit Model derived
rating default rate (RDR) levels. Moreover, the industry
concentration is limited, with the largest sector (real estate)
accounting for less than 30% of the outstanding pools.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An upgrade of the Italian sovereign Long-Term Issuer Default
    Rating (IDR) to 'BBB' could increase the maximum achievable
    rating for Italian structured finance transactions, leading to
    upgrades of the Siena PMI 2's class A2 and B notes.

-- If Siena PMI 2 deleverages more quickly than the performance
    deterioration expected in the near future, the CE ratios for
    the mezzanine tranches could offset the credit losses and
    cash-flow stresses associated with the current and higher
    rating scenarios, all else being equal.

-- If structural mitigants are put in place to protect the class
    C of Siena PMI from payment interruption risk, it could lead
    to removal of the rating cap on the notes, all else being
    equal.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Fitch carried out a sensitivity analysis (ie. Downside
    Scenario - assuming an increase of 150% to default rates
    combined with a 50% haircut to recovery assumptions) for the
    current crisis. This analysis highlights that the available CE
    of the class C of Siena PMI offsets the credit losses assumed
    in this scenario, whereas for Siena PMI 2, with the exception
    of the class A2 notes the outstanding tranches may suffer a
    multi-category or notch downgrade.

-- A downgrade of the Italian sovereign Long-Term IDR could
    reduce the maximum achievable rating for Italian structured
    finance transactions.

-- A longer-than-expected recessionary period that weakens
    macroeconomic fundamentals beyond Fitch's current base case.
    CE ratios cannot fully compensate the credit losses and cash
    flow stresses associated with the current rating scenarios,
    all else being equal.

-- A longer-than-expected recessionary period that weakens
    macroeconomic fundamentals beyond Fitch's current base case.
    CE ratios cannot fully compensate the credit losses and cash
    flow stresses associated with the current rating scenarios,
    all else being equal.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Structured Finance
transactions have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as
the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of seven notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of seven notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAAsf' to 'Dsf'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings
are based on historical performance.

USE OF THIRD PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pools and the transactions. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolios' information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Prior to the transactions closing, Fitch reviewed the results of a
third-party assessment conducted on the asset portfolios'
information and concluded that there were no findings that affected
the rating analysis.

Prior to the transactions closing, Fitch conducted a review of a
small targeted sample of the originator's origination files and
found the information contained in the reviewed files to be
adequately consistent with the originator's policies and practices
and the other information provided to the agency about the asset
portfolio.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================

ARUBA: Fitch Alters Outlook on 'BB' FC IDR to Stable
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Aruba's Long-Term Foreign-Currency
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' and has revised the Rating
Outlook to Stable from Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Outlook revision reflects Fitch's expectation that the
extraordinary external financial, health, and institutional support
that Aruba has received from the Kingdom of the Netherlands in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic will continue during 2021-2022.
Aruba is a member of the Netherlands with 'status aparte'. In
November 2020 Aruba's government agreed to certain fiscal and
economic policy commitments in exchange for conditional
low-interest loans and external debt service assistance from the
Netherlands. This will put consolidated government debt/GDP on a
downward trend after peaking at 108% (2021).

The financing package from the Netherlands will cover budgetary
needs during the pandemic and external refinancing needs during
2021-2022, conditional upon implementation of fiscal and economic
reforms outlined in a national program by the Aruban government,
which will be monitored by the Board of Financial Supervision of
Aruba (CAFT). Decisions about the quarterly disbursements would
shift from the Kingdom Council of Ministers to a reform and
investment institute (COHO) once both parliaments pass the parallel
enabling legislation to establish COHO. Fitch believes Aruba's debt
burden and current deficit would present sustainability challenges
if refinanced at market rates, in the absence of Dutch support.

The pandemic pushed the government deficit/GDP to 19.0% (2020) (up
from 0.6% deficits during 2018-2019; the Dutch government agreed to
waive fiscal targets). A steep loss in tourism earnings and large
health and wage-subsidy outlays enlarged the deficit; public sector
salaries were cut 12.6% to fund a business wage-subsidy program.
Fitch expects the deficit/GDP to narrow to 14% (2021) reflecting an
improved tourism outlook. Fitch expects a sharp narrowing of the
2022 deficit/GDP to 3.9%, supported by the cyclical economic
recovery, lower transfers, and sustainable fiscal measures (new
value-added tax, reforms to public sector employment and pay)
agreed with the Dutch.

Aruba's consolidated general government debt/GDP (net of APFA civil
service pension fund holdings) will reach 108% (2021), well above
the 'BB' median (60%). Government interest/revenues will peak at
22.3% (2020), nearly triple the 'BB' median (8%). Fitch expects
that the sustainable budgetary reforms combined with near-zero
interest re/financing costs from the Netherlands will lower Aruba's
government debt/GDP to 77% (2025).

Aruba met its 2020 government gross financing needs (USD679
million) primarily externally, via USD231 million Dutch
zero-interest two-year bullet loans and USD226 million market
financing (mainly 5.3% seven-year instruments), to avert pressure
on the domestic market, which rolled over maturities. Fitch expects
Aruba will favor the Netherlands' loans to meet the estimated
USD515 million gross needs this year and USD676 million next. Large
maturities (USD524 million, 2022) will be covered by Dutch loans
and domestic rollovers under Fitch's baseline.

The urgency of Aruba's financial and social stability needs
surmounted political sovereignty concerns and facilitated agreement
on the Dutch financing package after five months of negotiation.
However, political risks are material. Fitch does not expect the
Aruban parliament, which resisted institutionalizing the CAFT
mandate into Aruban law, to ratify the agreement and pass framework
legislation until after the parliamentary elections (expected
June-July 2021). Dutch elections in March signaled policy
continuity, although a new coalition government could require
several months to pass the parallel framework legislation.
Political noise could also renew, such as around the reform agenda,
requisite Aruban legislation, or an adverse report from the CAFT
that delays a conditional quarterly disbursement during 2021-2022.

The SvB general pension fund will run an operational deficit
(currently funded from its limited liquidity reserves) while
contributions to the pay-as-you-go system remain low (2020-2022),
requiring 0.6% of GDP (2021) and 1.1% (2022) additional government
financing (included in Fitch's debt dynamics).

The economy is forecast to record double-digit growth in 2021-2022
as it recovers from 26% contraction in 2020. The growth path
reflects tourism dynamics benefiting from market concentration in
the US Northeast. Fitch expects 46% hotel occupancy in 2021 (up
from 27% in 2020). Financial system stability has been maintained,
banks' regulatory capital is high (33.5%, 2020) with firm
liquidity, positive ROE, and 5% NPLs fully provisioned.

Credibility of the exchange rate peg remains intact. Netherlands'
lending finances Aruba's large current account deficits/GDP of 16%
(2020) and 11% (2021). Net external debt/current external receipts
will rise to 95% in 2021 (2019: 30%) above the 'BB' median (59%).
However, Fitch expects budgetary and maturity requirements in
2021-2022 to be financed close to the Netherlands' treasury rate,
which will keep Aruba's external debt service in check. The central
bank expects to relax capital controls (restrictions on foreign
dividend repatriation and new FX licenses) in 2021-2022 provided
that FX inflows recover.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to
positive rating action/upgrade are:

-- Public finances: Sustained fiscal consolidation that
    significantly reduces government debt/GDP, likely reflecting
    the implementation of structural budget reforms and the
    continuation of material financial support from the
    Netherlands.

-- Macro: Higher private investment leading to economic growth
    that is higher and comparable to peers.

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to
negative rating action/downgrade:

-- Public finances: Failure to maintain access to concessional
    financing from the Netherlands that causes financing
    constraints and brings credibility risks for the exchange rate
    peg.

-- Public finances: Failure to reduce government debt/GDP, for
    example through a lack of sufficient fiscal policy measures or
    prolonged weak economic growth.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) AND QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Aruba a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BB' on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency (LT FC) IDR scale,
two notches lower than the 'BBB-' SRM score at Fitch's previous
review.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the SRM
to arrive at the final LT FC IDR by applying its QO, relative to
SRM data and output, as follows:

Fitch removed the previous -1 notch adjustment for public finances.
This reflects Fitch's expectation that the extraordinary budget and
debt-service support from the Kingdom of the Netherlands and
political agreements will increase Aruba's debt sustainability.
Fitch believes that the Netherlands' financial support balances the
non-linear risks of Aruba's high debt government debt/GDP, which
the SRM does not fully capture.

Fitch removed the previous -1 notch adjustment for macroeconomic
performance, policies, and prospects. This reflects Fitch's view
that the SRM now captures both Aruba's low longer-term prospects
for the narrowly-based economy as well as from the Aruba's relative
lack of fiscal policy credibility and limited monetary policy
discretion under the exchange rate peg.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating
model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centered
averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score
equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within
Fitch's criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Sovereigns, Public Finance
and Infrastructure issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- The global economy performs in line with Fitch's Global
    Economic Outlook (March 2021).

-- Aruba will continue to benefit from broad support from the
    Dutch government due to its membership with 'status aparte' in
    the Kingdom of the Netherlands, including financial support
    that supports interest and debt sustainability.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Aruba has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Political Stability and
Rights as World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight
in Fitch's SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and
a key rating driver with a high weight.

Aruba has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Rule of Law,
Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as
World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight in Fitch's
SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and are a key
rating driver with a high weight.

Aruba has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Human Rights and
Political Freedoms as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the
World Bank Governance Indicators is relevant to the rating and a
rating driver.

Aruba has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Creditor Rights as
willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating and
is a rating driver for Aruba, as for all sovereigns.

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of '3'. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).



===========
R U S S I A
===========

ALMAZERGIENBANK: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT IDR, Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Almazergienbank's (AEB) Viability Rating
(VR) to 'b' from 'b-', while affirming the bank's Long-Term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B+' with a Negative Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

AEB's Long-Term IDRs of 'B+' and Support Rating of '4' reflect the
limited probability of support from Russia's Republic of Sakha
(Yakutia; BBB-/Negative). Fitch believes that Sakha may provide
extraordinary capital support to AEB, in case of need, due to
majority ownership (86% direct stake) and its significant
operational and strategic control over the bank. However, Fitch
rates AEB four notches below Sakha, due to (i) AEB's limited
strategic importance for the region; and (ii) the low flexibility
of the local authorities to provide immediate extraordinary
support. At the same time, some ordinary liquidity support may be
swiftly channeled through Sakha-owned entities in case of stress.

VR

The upgrade of VR reflects recent improvement in AEB's core capital
metrics, and manageable asset-quality pressure in a challenging
operating environment.

AEB's Fitch core capital (FCC) ratio increased to 12.8% at end-3Q20
from a modest 8.5% at end-3Q19, owing to lumpy loan recoveries in
4Q19 and some profit retention in 9M20. In addition, Sakha
ultimately holds a large junior debt buffer (additional Tier 1
perpetual and Tier 2 subordinated debt), equal to 5% of
risk-weighted assets (RWAs) at end-3Q20.

AEB's impaired loans remained at a high 18% of the gross portfolio
at end-3Q20. However, provisioning is deep with impaired loans
85%-covered with reserves, which reduced net risk to a moderate 16%
of FCC at end-3Q20. Stage 2 loans, which were modestly provisioned
for, decreased to 5% of gross loans at end-3Q20 from 11% at
end-2018. This is largely because a few Sakha-sponsored
construction projects approached completion, which eliminated
non-completion risk.

The bank's significant exposure to the local public-sector entities
and private borrowers, whose revenues are fully or partially
sourced from the regional budget, equals to around half of AEB's
gross portfolio. Although some of these Sakha-controlled companies
on a standalone basis have weak performance and/or high leverage,
they are supported by the regional budget due to their strategic
importance to the local economy. Hence Fitch views such exposure as
providing resilience to AEB's asset quality against macroeconomic
stress as long as the local authorities are committed to making
timely budget disbursements.

The bank's performance has historically been modest. Annualised
pre-impairment profit in 9M20 covered 3% of average loans, which
Fitch views as providing only moderate loss absorption. AEB's net
profits have been volatile, subject to the size of provisioning
charges. Return on average equity (ROAE) in 9M20 was 10% (2019:
36%; 2018-2017: negative 11%-21%).

AEB's funding and liquidity profile remains a strength relative to
other rating factors. The bank is mainly funded by granular retail
accounts, which represent 70% of total liabilities. Highly liquid
assets covered over 30% of customer accounts at end-3Q20, while
liquidity risk is additionally mitigated by reasonable deposit
stability.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

-- An upgrade of AEB's IDRs is unlikely in the short term but its
    Outlook may be revised to Stable on a similar rating action on
    Sakha. In the longer term, an upgrade of the IDR would require
    a stronger record of timely support.

-- Upside for AEB's VR is limited unless Fitch sees a significant
    improvement of AEB's asset quality, performance and core
    capitalisation.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- AEB's IDRs would likely be downgraded if Sakha is downgraded.
    A downgrade of AEB's IDRs may be also driven by evidence of a
    weakening propensity by Sakha to support the bank as
    manifested, for example, in a delay to providing sufficient
    capital support.

-- Fitch may downgrade AEB's VR if substantial asset-quality
    deterioration weighs on the bank's core capitalisation, due
    to, for example, regional authorities ceasing to provide
    budget support to Sakha-related entities.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Financial Institutions and
Covered Bond issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario
(defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in
a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating
horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative
direction) of four notches over three years. The complete span of
best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating
categories ranges from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario
credit ratings are based on historical performance.

PUBLIC RATINGS WITH CREDIT LINKAGE TO OTHER RATINGS

AEB's IDRs are linked to those of Sakha.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

AEB has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Governance Structure in
view of significant exposure to related parties and Sakha's
involvement in the management of the bank at board level and in
particular in its business origination. This has a moderate
negative impact on the bank's credit profile, due to governance
risks and potential involvement in directed financing, and is
relevant to the ratings in conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

INT'L INDUSTRIAL: Two Former SocGen Execs Challenge Swiss Fines
---------------------------------------------------------------
Hugo Miller at Bloomberg News reports that two former Societe
Generale SA bankers are challenging Swiss fines issued for failing
to report suspicious deposits worth more than US$700 million made
by a one-time ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

According to Bloomberg, the former head of SocGen's Swiss private
bank and the ex-head of compliance, who can only be named as L. and
K. under Swiss reporting restrictions, are appealing fines totaling
90,000 swiss francs ($96,000) at a trial in Bellinzona.

Sergei Pugachyov, a former Russian senator, was once a close
confidant of Putin and amassed a fortune of more than US$1 billion
in the 2000s, Bloomberg relates.  Russian prosecutors, however,
claim his fortune is based on theft and have been seeking his
extradition from France, so he can face charges that he embezzled
at least Us$1.5 billion from his Moscow-based International
Industrial Bank before it collapsed, Bloomberg discloses.

Between 2007 and 2010, SocGen opened 30 accounts in the name of 22
companies on behalf of Pugachyov and his family, according to Swiss
prosecutors, Bloomberg recounts.  In the first few months of 2009,
US$713 million was deposited by Mr. Pugachyov's companies,
ostensibly intended for Russian construction projects, Bloomberg
relays, citing the indictment.

Over the course of 2009, it became clear that those construction
projects weren't going forward, the prosecutors said. During 2010,
SocGen's Swiss executives learned more about the ties between
Pugachyov's companies and troubled Mejprombank, as International
Industrial Bank is known in Russia, which eventually filed for
bankruptcy in late 2010, Bloomberg notes.  

The prosecutors said that in January 2011, Mr. Pugachyov lost his
Russian senatte seat and was stripped of his parliamentary immunity
as a criminal investigation was opened against him over his role in
the collapse of Mejprombank, Bloomberg relates.

K., who was fined 60,000 francs, "had received by Jan. 28, 2011,
all the information he needed to conclude that a well-founded
suspicion of criminal origin of the funds weighed on the business
relations linked to Pugachyov," Swiss prosecutors wrote in the
indictment, according to Bloomberg.

As for L., who was then the unit's CEO and was fined 30,000 francs,
the prosecutors said that it's simply "not credible" that he failed
to spot how insufficient the explanations given in late 2010 were
for US$271 million worth of incoming funds, Bloomberg notes.  

Prosecutors will seek to raise his fine at the appeal to match that
of K, Bloomberg discloses.


ORIENT FINANS: S&P Upgrades ICR to B+, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings took the following actions on the
Uzbekistan-based banks it rates:

                                To           From
  Orient Finans Bank

  Issuer credit rating     B+/Stable/B     B/Stable/B

  Davr-Bank

  Issuer credit rating     B/Stable/B      B-/Stable/B

  Kapitalbank

  Issuer credit rating     B-/Positive/B   B-/Stable/B

S&P believes that COVID-19's effects remain manageable for the
Uzbek economy. Support packages from the Uzbekistan government
somewhat helped to alleviate stress on the economy and households.
Uzbekistan GDP continued expanded in real terms in 2020 at 1.6%,
and believe that growth will accelerate in 2021-2022 to about
5.0%.

The banking sector was resilient despite COVID-19's effect. Credit
costs and nonperforming loans (NPLs), while increased versus 2019,
did not lead to banking sector running losses. While the average
return on equity (ROE) for the Uzbek banking system declined to
10.0% in 2020 from 12.5% in 2019, return on assets improved to 2.2%
from 1.92%.

The consequences of economic deceleration for Uzbekistan banks
proved to be better than we expected. Therefore S&P has revised its
assessment of the economic risk trend for Uzbekistan's banking
system to stable from negative.

S&P said, "We expect that the nominal lending growth will remain
high and accelerate in 2021-2022 to 30% from 27% in 2020,
reflecting overall improvements in economic prospects. We believe
that credit costs will be about 2%, improved from 2.6% for 2020,
but still higher than the average for 2016-2019 at 1.6%. We expect
NPLs to gradually increase to slightly above 2%, a level observed
in 2020, and stay flat in 2022-2023."

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects. Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts are
gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P said, "We use these assumptions about
vaccine timing in assessing the economic and credit implications
associated with the pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will
update our assumptions and estimates accordingly."

Orient Finans Bank

S&P said, "We upgraded Orient Finans Bank (OFB) to 'B+' from 'B'
based on bank's sustainable performance in terms of cost of risk
and NPLs amid the pandemic, combined with prudent capital
management. As a result, we now believe the bank's risk position is
moderate.

"In our base-case scenario, OFB will have a 2% cost of risk in
2021-2022, in line with the sector average. We continue to believe
that the bank has substantial capital buffers, underpinned by good
profits, to absorb losses.

"We estimate our risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio for OFB at about
13.0% over the next 12-18 months. We believe that the bank has
lower loan dollarization than peers', with loans in foreign
currency (FX) at only 37% of gross loans, versus about 49% for the
system average. This somewhat protects the bank's performance from
devaluation of the sum."

While not owned by the government, OFB has access to large
corporate customers and is involved in financing high-profile
projects initiated by the Cabinet of Ministers, despite its
relatively small market share and in contrast to other small and
midsize banks in Uzbekistan. The projects have generally good
credit quality. However, this leads to relatively high single-name
concentration versus peers.

OFB has adequate liquidity. As of March 1, 2021, the bank's liquid
assets represented about 21.5% of its total assets, above local
peers. We have not seen unusual funding volatility over the past
several months.

Outlook

The stable outlook reflects S&P views that OFB's solid capital
buffer and earnings capacity will support its credit standing over
the next 12-18 months. The outlook also reflects its expectation
that the bank's liquidity position will remain adequate in that
time.

Upside scenario.   S&P believes that a positive rating action in
the next 12-18 months is unlikely. Beyond then, S&P could take a
positive rating action if OFB continues to show a track record of
lower credit losses and lower share of NPLs compared with that of
peers, while maintaining stable capitalization and profitability
metrics.

Downside scenario.   A significant decline in capitalization,
either via higher-than-expected growth in exposure or large
dividend distributions, could also lead us to revise outlook to
negative or lower the rating.

Davr-Bank

S&P said, "We upgraded Davr-Bank to 'B' from 'B-' because we
believe that the bank's performance over 2020 and in the next few
years would be at least at the sector average in terms of cost of
risk and NPLs. Therefore, we now believe Davr-Bank's risk position
is adequate.

"We believe the bank will experience a 2% cost of risk in
2021-2022, in line with the sector average. We believe Davr-Bank
has substantial capital buffers, underpinned by good profitability,
to absorb losses. Given the bank's planned growth, we forecast
that, over the next 12-18 months, the RAC ratio will remain close
to, but not sustainably above, 10%."

Davr-Bank's credit standing benefits from lower single-name
concentrations in the loan book than local peers'. Also, the bank
has lower dollarization than peers', with foreign-currency loans at
around 24% of gross loans, versus about 49% for the system on
average. This protects the bank's performance from potential sum
volatility.

S&P said, "Davr-Bank has an adequate liquidity buffer, in our view.
As of March 1, 2021, the bank's liquid assets represented about 17%
of total assets. About 25% of liabilities are long-term funds from
international financial institutions (IFIs), obtained to finance
lending to SMEs and entrepreneurs. In our base-case scenario, we
therefore do not expect material pressure on the bank's
liquidity."

Outlook

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that Davr-Bank's
solid capital buffer and earnings capacity will support the bank's
expected loan growth of 30%-35% in the next two years. The outlook
also reflects our expectation that the bank's liquidity position
will remain adequate, with banks maintaining access to funding from
IFIs."

Upside scenario.   S&P believes that a positive rating action in
the next 12-18 months is unlikely. Beyond then, S&P could take a
positive rating action if Davr-Bank commits to raising and
increases its capitalization metrics, with the RAC ratio
sustainably above 10%, either through lower growth or additional
capital injections. A positive rating action would hinge on the
bank's funding and liquidity remaining adequate with no dependency
on short-term funding.

Downside scenario.   S&P said, "We could revise the outlook to
negative if Davr-Bank's asset quality deteriorated beyond our
assumptions, which would result in higher impairment charges.
Furthermore, a negative rating action is possible if lending growth
that is above expectations results in weaker capitalization, In
addition, we would revise our outlook to negative if the bank faced
unexpected funding outflows."

Kapitalbank

S&P revised its outlook on Kapitalbank to positive from stable to
reflect the bank's efforts to improve financial results in a highly
competitive market through revenue diversity and operating
efficiency enhancement. This was combined with leveraging bank's
settlement and transactional business, in both corporate and retail
segments, focus on secured retail lending, and continued prudent
capital management. As a result, the bank has expanded its loan
book by around 50% in 2020 and demonstrated ROE above 17% over the
past two years, historical highs for Kapitalbank. This was despite
the pressure on margins from high competition and downward trend on
market rates.

S&P views positively that so far, the pandemic's impact on the bank
was less severe than assumed. In particular, Kapitalbank did not
face massive nonpayments in 2020 unlike some peers, while
COVID-19-related restructurings amounted to only 2% of gross loans.
Moreover, the majority of these restructurings is serviced and
hence these loans are not classified as problematic ones.
Simultaneously, credit costs under Uzbekistani GAAP constituted
1.5% of the average loan book for 2020, compared with the 2.6%
system-average. For 2021, S&P expects credit losses to rise to
around 2.3% on lending growth.

Over the past two years, the bank's capitalization was supported by
an Uzbekistani som (UZS) 50 billion capital injection from
shareholders, preferred stock issuance for UZS75 billion, and
several subordinated debt instruments. This resulted in our RAC
ratio remaining at 6.9% at end-2020 vs 7.0% a year earlier, despite
high growth in 2020.

Deposits form the vast majority of Kapitalbank's funding base, at
around 97% at March 1, 2021. The bank enjoys an established deposit
franchise in the country, comparable with that of much larger
players. Its market share in terms of retail deposits was about 11%
on Feb. 1, 2021, which is comparable with that of large state-owned
banks.

In S&P's view, Kapitalbank has an adequate liquidity buffer, with
broad liquid assets covering short-term wholesale funding by 3.5x
or more over the past five years, and net broad liquid assets
covering short-term customer deposits by 42% as of Jan. 1, 2021.

Outlook

The positive outlook reflects S&P Global Ratings' view that
Kapitalbank's creditworthiness may improve over the next 12-18
months. This could happen if the bank continues posting sustainable
bottom-line results and increasing business volumes in line with
strategy, while preserving its capital buffer and asset quality.

Upside scenario.  An upgrade in the next 12-18 months would hinge
on Kapitalbank increasing business volumes in SME and retail
lending, as per its strategy, and demonstrate sustainable profits.
This would enhance revenue diversification and support margins and
profitability, allowing the bank to withstand stiff competition
from large private and state-owned banks. An upgrade is only
possible if the bank maintains prudent risk and capital management,
with local capital regulatory ratio remaining 100 bps above the 13%
minimum requirement and with credit losses no higher than those of
peers with a similar business mix.

Downside scenario.  An negative rating action is possible if
Kapitalbank's capital becomes volatile, with S&P's RAC ratio
dropping below 5% and regulatory capital ratios falling to their
minimal values. This could happen following substantial asset
quality deterioration, leading to elevated credit losses, or in the
absence of a fresh capital injection to support
greater-than-expected lending growth.

  Ratings List

  Upgraded; Ratings Affirmed  
                               To          From
  Orient Finans Bank

  Issuer Credit Rating    B+/Stable/B    B/Stable/B

  Davr-Bank

  Issuer Credit Rating    B/Stable/B     B-/Stable/B

  Outlook Action; Ratings Affirmed  

  Kapitalbank

  Issuer Credit Rating    B-/Positive/B  B-/Stable/B




=========
S P A I N
=========

EUSKALTEL SA: S&P Places 'BB-' ICR in CreditWatch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its 'BB-' long-term issuer credit and
issue ratings on Spanish Telco Euskaltel S.A. and its senior
secured debt on CreditWatch with negative implications. S&P will
resolve the CreditWatch placement once the transaction closes,
likely in the second half of 2021.

Lorca Telecom Bidco S.A.U. (holding company of MasMovil group)
announced a takeover bid for all of Euskaltel S.A.'s shares for an
equity value of EUR2 billion.

The CreditWatch placement follows MasMovil's announcement that it
will acquire Euskaltel.  S&P said, "We expect the combined group
will be rated no higher than 'B+'. The transaction is subject to
the acceptance of at least 75% plus one share of Euskaltel's
capital and to regulatory approvals. As Euskaltel's main
shareholders (Zegona Communications, Kutxabank, and Alba Europe,
representing about 52% of the company's capital) have already
accepted the transaction, we believe the transaction is likely to
be successful. In the meantime, we expect Euskaltel will continue
its strategy, including the Virgin telco rollout and the deployment
of its fiber network."

S&P said, "We will resolve the CreditWatch negative placement once
the transaction closes, which we expect will occur during
second-half 2021. At that time, we expect to equalize our ratings
on Euskaltel with those on Lorca Telecom Bidco S.A.U.
(B+/Negative/--), likely leading to a downgrade by one notch if the
transaction closes. If the transaction is cancelled, we would
likely affirm our ratings on Euskaltel."


LORCA TELECOM: S&P Alters Outlook to Negative, Affirms 'B+' ICR
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Lorca Telecom Bidco
S.A.U. (holding company of MasMovil group) to negative from stable
and affirmed its 'B+' issuer credit rating and issue ratings on
Lorca Telecom Bidco S.A.U. and its senior secured debt.

The negative outlook reflects both S&P's short-term expectation of
materially higher leverage than initially expected in 2021, with
debt to EBITDA of 5.6x-5.7x, based on preliminary estimates,
instead of 4.5x-4.6x. It also stems from long-term questions about
the group's financial policy commitment to sustainable
deleveraging.

On March 28, Lorca Telecom Bidco S.A.U. (holding company of
MasMovil group) announced a takeover bid for all of Euskaltel
S.A.'s shares for an equity value of EUR2 billion, funded by debt.
Although the deal will strengthen MasMovil's position on the
Spanish market, this doesn't entirely compensate for higher
leverage than it had expected in 2021 and 2022 and uncertainties
around MasMovil's free operating cash flow (FOCF) turning positive
in 2021.

Lorca Telecom's acquisition of Euskaltel should improve its
position and already strong operational performance in the Spanish
market.   S&P said, "We believe the transaction should lower
competitive pressures on the Spanish telecom market, with a
four-player market instead of five, and one challenger instead of
two. The acquisition will improve MasMovil's scale (EUR2.7 billion
forecast revenue in 2021, versus EUR2 billion pre-transaction), and
geographic coverage within Spain, since MasMovil's presence is
limited in the Basque country, Asturias, and Galicia, Euskaltel's
historical regions. Also, we expect significant synergies will
boost margins, because Euskaltel will move under MasMovil's
wholesale agreements, which are more favorable, and the two
companies combined will be able to share part of their own
respective networks. For the transaction to be successful, MasMovil
needs the approval of 75% plus one share of Euskaltel's capital as
well as regulatory authorizations. We think this is likely since it
has public support from the major shareholders (Zegona, Kutxabank,
and Alba, representing about 52% of Euskaltel's capital) and a
26.8% premium is being offered."

Lorca Telecom's leverage will remain significantly higher than 5.0x
in 2021, and positive cash flow generation from 2021 is uncertain,
offsetting the transaction's benefits to Masmovil's business
profile.   S&P said, "Our base-case scenario assumes a 100%
purchase of shares for EUR2 billion, financed by debt and the sale
of a stake in Euskaltel's future Fiberco to investors; it also
factors in synergies and integration costs. As a result, we expect
Lorca Telecom's adjusted debt to EBITDA to stand at 5.6x-5.7x in
2021 and to approach 5.0x in 2022, against a deleveraging to
4.5x-4.6x in 2021 in our previous forecasts. While we continue to
expect that MasMovil will generate positive FOCF in 2021, we
believe the risk of negative or only breakeven cash flow has
increased recently. First, we believe the fiber-to-the-home (FTTH)
construction at Euskaltel's Fiberco could require additional
funding, although the timing of such capital expenditure (capex)
would be at MasMovil's discretion. Second, subsequent to MasMovil
becoming the sole shareholder of Portuguese mobile virtual network
operator Nowo in November 2020 and potential spectrum auction
commitments, we expect the group's focus on Portugal to increase in
the coming years. As a result, with the lower likelihood of a
merger with Vodafone Spain and Portugal following the Euskaltel
deal, MasMovil may have to dedicate a considerable amount of capex
to develop its own infrastructure in Portugal."

Overall, the transaction raises questions about Lorca Telecom's
financial policy and the priority of its commitment to deleverage.
S&P said, "Our previous assessment incorporated steep deleveraging
to below 5.0x after the take-private operation by private equity
firms Cinven, KKR, and Providence. We also expected that Lorca
Telecom would favor organic growth and tuck-in acquisitions in the
two to three years following the transaction, before potentially
targeting larger deals (see "Lorca Telecom Bidco S.A.U. Assigned
'B+' Preliminary Rating On MasMovil Takeover Bid; Outlook Stable,"
published June 25, 2020). With the Euskaltel acquisition and
growing interest in Portugal, we see greater risk that Lorca
Telecom's leverage will remain elevated in the coming years, driven
by elevated capex and potentially new acquisitions, in Spain,
Portugal, or even other European countries (the latter being less
likely in the short term)." However, this could be offset if local
or international expansion sufficiently reinforces MasMovil's
business.

S&P said, "The negative outlook reflects our expectation of
MasMovil's slower deleveraging in the coming years. We expect
adjusted debt to EBITDA to decline to about 5.6x-5.7x in 2021 and
to approach 5.0x in 2022 from 6.3x in 2020, instead of declining to
below 5.0x in 2021 in our previous forecasts. While we continue to
expect FOCF to debt after leases to turn positive in 2021, we
believe uncertainties around cash flow generation increase with the
Euskaltel transaction and growing interest in Portugal. This is
partly offset by expectations of continued organic revenue growth
and adjusted EBITDA margin improvement to 45%-46% in 2021 and
2022.

"We could lower the ratings should FOCF after leases fail to turn
positive in 2021 or should adjusted debt to EBITDA remain
sustainably above 5.0x. This could stem from lower-than-expected
revenue or EBITDA growth, higher capex, additional acquisitions, or
financial policy decisions to increase leverage. It could also
result from less favorable outcomes related to Fiberco proceeds,
integration costs, and synergies.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if MasMovil continues
increasing fixed broadband and mobile market share at a high pace
and maintains its adjusted EBITDA margin at about 45% from 2021. It
could also result from more favorable outcomes related to Fiberco
proceeds, integration costs, and synergies. A stable outlook would
require FOCF after leases to turn positive in 2021, adjusted
leverage at about 5.0x in 2022 and below thereafter, and a credible
financial policy commitment to maintain these levels."




===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

AI MISTRAL: S&P Upgrades ICR to 'CCC+' After Debt Restructuring
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term issuer credit ratings on AI
Mistral Holdco and its financing subsidiary AI Mistral (Luxembourg)
Subco S.a.r.l. to 'CCC+' from 'SD' (selective default), affirmed
its 'CCC+' rating on the company's $497 million first-lien term
loan B, and lowered the recovery rating on this debt to '4' from
'3'.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that AI Mistral has
adequate liquidity headroom for the next 12 months.

AI Mistral's financial restructuring has resulted in lower debt and
interest costs, while an equity contribution from the owner
strengthened the company's liquidity.   As a result of debt
restructuring, AI Mistral's former $172.5 million second-lien term
loan was converted to a $75 million first-lien term loan C,
comprising a $50 million term loan C-1 due in March 2024 and a $25
million term loan C-2 due in March 2026 (versus March 2025
originally), which share the same priority and ranking as the
pre-existing $497 million first-lien term loan B. This write-off
has effectively reduced total debt by $98 million and annual cash
interest by $14 million. The company has also extended the
maturities of its $57.5 million revolving credit facility (RCF) and
$25 million acquisition credit facilities (ACF) to December 2023
from March 2022. Subsequently, the company has no bullet debt
maturities until its drawn ACF is due in December 2023. At the same
time, the $50 million equity contribution from the owner Advent
International Corporation has bolstered AI Mistral's liquidity,
with liquidity sources covering uses by about 3.0x in the upcoming
12 months. Therefore, S&P currently doesn't see liquidity as a
near-term risk.

S&P said, "Given AI Mistral Holdco's significant debt, we believe
the company's capital structure is unsustainable in the long term.
AI Mistral's debt is a very high multiple of EBITDA and we foresee
only a gradual moderate financial improvement in the next 12-24
months. We forecast a slow recovery in S&P Global Ratings adjusted
EBITDA to $45 million-$50 million in 2021 from $41 million in 2020,
and further improvement to closer to 2019 levels of about $56
million in 2022. That said, the company's adjusted debt to EBITDA
will remain above 10x on the back of adjusted debt of about $600
million. We believe that if EBIDTA does not improve significantly
over the next few years, AI Mistral will face mounting refinancing
risk as it gets closer to its term loan maturities. At the same
time, we expect AI Mistral will generate sufficient EBITDA to cover
its mandatory annual cash needs of about $45 million. These
comprise about $25 million of cash interest (including finance
lease interest), $5 million in yearly debt amortizations, $10
million of lease payments, and about $5 million of maintenance
capital expenditures (capex). Compared with the pre-financial
restructuring annual cash needs of about $60 million, the reduction
is due to lower interest margin on the first-lien term loan C, at
LIBOR plus 3% (from LIBOR plus 8% previously), and an option to
accrue the interest payments.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that AI Mistral has
adequate liquidity headroom for the next 12 months.

"We could lower our ratings on AI Mistral if the company generated
a large operating cash flow deficit, resulting in a dwindling cash
balance (absent shareholders' support), or if we considered a
distressed debt restructuring as likely over the next 12 months. We
would view any financial restructuring that is less than the
promise of the original security, absent of adequate compensation,
as tantamount to default.

"We could raise the rating if EBITDA improved significantly beyond
our expectations, such that our adjusted debt to EBITDA decreased
to below 8.0x and cash interest coverage increased to above 2.0x,
while liquidity remained adequate."


EUROSTAR: UK Government Resisting Requests for Bailout
------------------------------------------------------
Philip Georgiadis, George Parker and David Keohane at The Financial
Times report that the UK government is resisting requests to
bailout struggling train operator Eurostar, with ministers
insisting that the company should look to its shareholders to ease
its plight.

Eurostar is at risk of bankruptcy following a collapse in revenue
after passenger numbers plunged during the pandemic, the FT
discloses.

UK ministers are said to be taking a tough line, the FT notes.

According to the FT, one UK official briefed on the situation said:
"The tunnel and the rolling stock are there.  Someone would take
them on, even if the company went to the wall.  There's no appetite
for bailing them out at all."

Chancellor Rishi Sunak announced in May 2020 a scheme called
Project Birch to help strategically important companies but only
where "viable companies have exhausted all options", the FT
recounts.

Eurostar has GBP400 million loans that are due by June, although
they can be extended, the FT relays, citing people familiar with
the matter.  The company called for rescue funds from the UK
government in January, when it said there had been a 95% decline in
passenger numbers since March 2020, the FT relates.

But the UK government has maintained that the French state and
private shareholders should be primarily responsible for any
rescue, with both France and the UK reluctant to move first and
lose negotiating power, the FT notes.

The UK sold its stake in Eurostar in 2015, leaving the French
government with a majority 55% stake via the state-owned railway
SNCF, and Belgium 5%, the FT recounts.

According to the FT, a senior official in Paris said the French
government expected shareholders and creditors to make an
additional effort before any state aid could be put on the table.

The official added that a solution for Eurostar would have to be
found by this summer, and that as it stands France still expects
the UK to participate if needed but there had been no high-level
political contacts with the British so far, the FT notes.

Shareholders, including the Canadian pension fund Caisse de depot
et placement du Quebec and Hermes Infrastructure have already put
in more than EUR200 million during the crisis, the FT discloses.

SNCF told the FT in March that Eurostar will need new money in
"weeks not months" to fend off a looming cash crunch and that both
the French and UK governments were in advanced discussions about
how to help the company.

Eurostar and the UK government have held talks over a possible
state-backed commercial loan worth GBP60 million to help it through
the crisis, but they are yet to yield any results, the FT relays.
One person close to the talks said the discussions had not
concluded, and there has not yet been a definitive refusal from the
government, the FT notes.

Eurostar owns and runs the trains that travel on high-speed lines
between the UK and France, Belgium and the Netherlands but does not
own any of the infrastructure it uses, including the Channel Tunnel
itself.


GREENE KING: In Talks with Loch Fyne Landlords, Mulls CVA
---------------------------------------------------------
Lisa Jenkins at The Caterer reports that Greene King has confirmed
it is in talks with the landlords of its Loch Fyne sites, ahead of
making a formal decision to proceed with a company voluntary
arrangement (CVA).

According to The Caterer, a spokesperson from Greene King said:
"Loch Fyne has been severely impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic and
the resulting social restrictions.  As such, we have started
conversations with landlords ahead of making a decision to formally
proceed with a CVA, which would enable us to hand back to landlords
a number of sites which are already closed and no longer needed
within the Greene King estate.

"There are no job losses as a result of this and we are looking
forward to reopening a smaller number of profitable and well-run
Loch Fyne restaurants, which will continue trade once restrictions
ease.

"We are still in discussions and taking advice from an insolvency
practitioner and have not yet started the formal process."

The pub giant closed 25 sites, of which 11 were Loch Fyne
restaurants, in October last year after a drop in trade following
the 10pm curfew, The Caterer discloses.

Greene King runs more than 2,700 pubs, restaurants and hotels
across England, Wales and Scotland.  The pub company employs around
38,000 people and was sold to Hong Kong-based real estate firm CK
Asset Holdings in a GBP2.7b deal in 2019.


GREENSILL CAPITAL: Staff Reassured of Liquidity Prior to Collapse
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Smith at The Financial Times reports that Lex Greensill told
employees that his company enjoyed "enormous" liquidity just three
weeks before the finance firm collapsed into insolvency.

Mr. Greensill, a 44-year old Australian financier now at the centre
of a growing corporate and political scandal, reassured staff in an
internal video on Feb. 15 that a crucial set of funds at Credit
Suisse was robust, while explaining that the company was on the
verge of finalising a new insurance policy, the FT relates.

Two weeks later, Credit Suisse froze its US$10 billion range of
supply-chain finance funds, after insurance covering their assets
expired, precipitating Greensill Capital's downfall, the FT
recounts.

During the February recording, Greensill boasted of the "incredible
strength" of these funds, which also included a smaller US$842
million range at Zurich-based asset manager GAM, the FT notes.

In its main supply chain finance business, Greensill provided
financing to large companies to pay their suppliers, the FT
discloses.  It bundled up these loans into notes that were placed
into the funds at Credit Suisse and GAM, the FT states.

The insurance was to guard against the -- supposedly small -- risk
of one of the large corporate customers defaulting. Its presence
allowed investors to put cash in the funds as if it were almost
risk free.

Now that large customers including Sanjeev Gupta's GFG Alliance
have defaulted on the loans, there are arguments over whether the
insurance was valid and Credit Suisse has said it is anticipating
losses as the funds are wound up, the FT relays.

There is expected to be a legal battle between the bank, investors,
insurers, Greensill's administrators and its corporate customers as
to who bears the losses, the FT notes.

The details of the video, which have not been previously reported,
underscore the confidence that Greensill projected to his staff,
even as his company teetered on the verge of insolvency, the FT
discloses.  The majority of Greensill Capital's more than 1,000
employees were made redundant shortly after it filed for
administration on March 8, the FT recounts.

On the Feb. 15 video, the Australian financier said that Greensill
was working with its "friends at Marsh and Chubb" -- the company's
insurance broker and one of its insurers -- in order to make an
important "tweak" to its policies, the FT notes.  He said this
would make the insurance "pretty much exactly the same" as a
previous policy that had offered 100 per cent cover, according to
the FT.

In a later witness statement to court on March 8, Greensill said
that while it had signed a US$3 billion insurance policy with Chubb
and other insurers in November, it had "never been used because
they do not provide 100 per cent cover", the FT relays.

On a previous address to staff in November, Greensill announced the
freshly signed insurance contract with Chubb, describing it as a
"big vote of confidence", the FT recounts.  "That's a real credit
to the whole company," he said.

During the Nov. 23 message, Greensill also told employees that a
series of investor meetings were "going really well", the FT
states.


GREENSILL CAPITAL: Sunak Urged to Commit to Covid-19 Loan Probe
---------------------------------------------------------------
George Parker at The Financial Times reports that Chancellor Rishi
Sunak was on April 6 urged by Labour to commit to a "full,
transparent and thorough investigation" into how collapsed finance
group Greensill Capital was given the right to dispense tens of
millions of pounds of government-backed Covid-19 loans to
companies.

According to the FT, Mr. Sunak is under pressure to answer
questions about the Treasury's role in an affair which saw
Greensill accredited as a lender under one of the government's
coronavirus loan schemes, even though it was exempt from safeguards
imposed on other banks.

So far much of the political focus around the dealings of
Australian financier Lex Greensill, founder of the eponymous
finance group, has been on former prime minister David Cameron, who
was an adviser to the company, the FT notes.

Dodds wants to put Mr. Sunak, who was lobbied directly by Cameron,
under greater scrutiny, notably over a decision to allow Greensill
Capital to dispense loans under the government's Coronavirus Large
Business Interruption Loan Scheme, the FT discloses.

According to the FT, in a letter to Sunak, Dodds said parliamentary
written answers had confirmed that "Greensill was accredited to
lend under CLBILS despite not being regulated by the Bank of
England or Financial Conduct Authority".

She added this meant that Greensill was not subject to the capital
adequacy and stress tests that applied to most other lenders
accredited to lend under CLBILS, the FT notes.

Dodds has asked Mr. Sunak to explain which government department
formulated the criteria for lenders to be accredited under the
scheme and whether the Treasury communicated any concerns to the
state-owned British Business Bank, which administers the programme,
the FT relays.

A Treasury official, as cited by the FT, said that the
accreditation process was run independently by the British Business
Bank.  "It's not a requirement to be regulated by the financial
regulators to lend under the schemes," added the official.

While other lenders such as Barclays could issue CLBILS loans worth
up to GBP200 million, companies using supply chain financing --
including Greensill -- were limited to a cap of GBP50 million, the
FT notes.

However, even at the lower limit, Greensill was still able to lend
millions of pounds through multiple loans to companies linked to
Sanjeev Gupta, the steel tycoon behind the GFG Alliance, which has
several UK assets, the FT states.

Dodds, the FT says, has also asked Mr. Sunak why Greensill was
allowed to insert itself between the government and its suppliers,
including NHS pharmacies.

Dodds asked Mr. Sunak why -- if Whitehall was subject to its own
prompt payment code -- Greensill was needed to offer swift payments
to suppliers in exchange for a cut, when the government could just
pay on time, the FT discloses.

The Treasury is expected to give a full response to Dodds'
questions in the coming days, the FT notes.


INTERNATIONAL CONSOLIDATED: S&P Affirms 'BB' Ratings, Outlook Neg.
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' ratings on International
Consolidated Airlines Group S.A. (IAG) and its existing unsecured
debt.

S&P said, "The negative outlook reflects our view that the group's
financial metrics will remain under considerable pressure in the
next few quarters and that there is high uncertainty regarding the
pandemic and its effects on air traffic demand and IAG's financial
position.

"We have revised up our assessment of IAG's liquidity to
exceptional from strong.   Including the proceeds from the EUR1.2
billion unsecured notes issuance completed in March 2021 and
undrawn multi-borrower secured three-year $1.8 billion RCF signed
in March 2021, we forecast that the group's sources of liquidity
will be more than double the amount of liquidity uses over the next
two years. Well-established and solid relationships with banks and
high standing in credit markets have further enhanced IAG's already
exceptional liquidity sources-to-uses coverage ratio. While the
most recent treasury measures provide IAG with an ample liquidity
cushion to withstand the continued weak trading conditions, we
believe that our revised liquidity assessment is susceptible to the
recovery of air passenger traffic by the end of the third quarter
of 2021 and IAG's operating cash flow (OCF) turning positive from
2022, which we assume in our base case.

"IAG started 2020 with more financial leeway and a larger liquidity
buffer than that of many peers and has maintained solid liquidity
during the pandemic so far.   We continue to count IAG among the
airline industry's financially strongest groups, with total
liquidity of about EUR10.2 billion on March 31, 2021, comprising
EUR7.7 billion of available cash, cash equivalents, and
interest-bearing deposits, as well as nearly EUR2.3 billion of
undrawn committed general and aircraft facilities maturing beyond
24 months, as adjusted by S&P Global Ratings. IAG demonstrates
proactive treasury management, continued access to debt markets,
and an ability to safeguard liquidity. We also factor IAG's
expressed determination and flexibility to defer capital spending
(capex) for new planes and suspend shareholder remuneration, with a
focus on preserving cash and restoring its credit metrics.

"We expect 2021 to be another very difficult year for IAG.  We
believe the ongoing turbulent traffic conditions will likely
continue in the coming months, depending on local travel
constraints, including quarantine rules or mandatory testing for
COVID-19, particularly in IAG's home markets. Furthermore, we
anticipate a delayed and subdued recovery of business and corporate
traffic, which typically is one of IAG's most profitable segments.
According to our base case, this year's passenger numbers for the
group will rebound to about 40% of 2019 levels. This includes only
up to 20% air traffic recovery in the first quarter because of
continuing extensive lockdowns and travel restrictions, and our
expectation of only a gradual recovery in the second quarter,
translating to our overall estimate of up to 30% of pre-pandemic
traffic volumes in first-half 2021. This compares with IAG's
current passenger capacity plans in first-quarter 2021 for about
20% of 2019 capacity. We anticipate a delay to a more meaningful
recovery until after the crucial third-quarter/summer season and an
acceleration in traffic toward the year-end. However, our forecast
is subject to significant uncertainties and, most importantly, it
hinges on overall vaccination progress.

"We expect IAG will report a continuing substantial deficits in OCF
(after lease payments) and accumulate new debt in 2021, while its
credit metrics remain under considerable pressure.  The group
executed significant restructuring measures during 2020, among
others, to downscale the workforce and aircraft fleet to expected
capacity levels and reduce payments to suppliers. It should benefit
from a lower fuel bill, which S&P Global Ratings forecasts at up to
EUR2.2 billion (versus last year's EUR3.7 billion, including EUR1.7
billion of losses from ineffective fuel hedges). That said, these
factors will be insufficient to counterbalance the only gradual
revenue recovery in 2021 to 50%-55% below 2019 levels, according to
our base case. We estimate that IAG's adjusted EBITDA will turn
positive this year to EUR700 million-EUR1.0 billion from negative
EUR4.47 billion in 2020, but it will be far off the strong EUR5.4
billion in 2019." This will result in continually negative OCF
(after lease payments) and buildup of financial leverage in 2021,
aggravated by:

-- Working capital needs, which could be significant because of
potential ongoing ticket refunds and slow forward bookings
(particularly in first-half 2021);

-- The outstanding cash settlement of ineffective hedge losses,
which S&P estimates at EUR500 million in 2021, after EUR1.2 billion
IAG paid in 2020); and

-- Cash outflows for restructuring.

S&P forecasts IAG's S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt (including an
EUR830 million upfront payment from American Express, which it
views akin to factoring) will increase to EUR12.5 billion-EUR12.8
billion by year-end 2021 from EUR10.6 billion in 2020.

Financial flexibility for operational glitches under our base-case
scenario and the 'BB' rating is limited.   Nevertheless, IAG's
efforts to contain capital spending and safeguard cash should
partly offset the slow rebound in passenger volumes, contribute to
the group's financial recovery, and help to preserve the rating.
The accumulation of new debt will be hindered to some extent by
deferrals or cuts to capex for new planes and other discretionary
projects. IAG slashed its capex guidance further to EUR1.7 billion
in 2021, from the previously communicated EUR1.9 billion and
pre-pandemic target of EUR4.0 billion-EUR4.5 billion. S&P said,
"Trimmed capex and a good grip on working capital control (more
specifically, with regard to liabilities from deferred revenue on
ticket sales and collection of receivables) meant new debt was
close to EUR2 billion lower than we expected in 2020. Furthermore,
we envisage passenger traffic and IAG's operating performance will
start to improve meaningfully from late third-quarter 2021--after
the crucial summer season--and strengthen in 2022, with adjusted
EBITDA reaching up to EUR3.0 billion. We assume that widespread
immunization across Europe and most other developed economies will
be achieved by the end of third-quarter 2021 and help to lessen or
lift travel restrictions and restore passenger confidence in
flying. Our base case supports our view that adjusted funds from
operations (FFO) to debt will rebound to the rating-commensurate
level of more than 12% only in 2022."

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains high, albeit moderating,
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic and its
economic effects.   Vaccine production is ramping up and rollouts
are gathering pace around the world. Widespread immunization, which
will help pave the way for a return to more normal levels of social
and economic activity, looks to be achievable by most developed
economies by the end of the third quarter. However, some emerging
markets may only be able to achieve widespread immunization by
year-end or later. S&P said, "We use these assumptions about
vaccine timing in assessing the economic and credit implications
associated with the pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will
update our assumptions and estimates accordingly."

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that the group's financial
metrics will remain under considerable pressure in the next few
quarters and that there is high uncertainty regarding the pandemic
and its effects on air traffic demand, as well as IAG's financial
position.

S&P would lower the rating if:

-- Passenger demand recovery is further delayed or appears to be
structurally weaker than expected, placing additional pressure on
IAG's credit metrics; and

-- If S&P does not expect that adjusted FFO to debt will recover
to at least 12% by 2022.

This could occur if the pandemic cannot be contained, resulting in
prolonged lockdowns and travel restrictions, or if passengers
remain reluctant to book flights.

S&P said, "Although we currently don't see liquidity as a near-term
risk, we would lower the rating if air traffic does not recover in
line with our expectations, external funding becomes unavailable
for IAG, and if management's proactive efforts to adjust operating
costs and capex are insufficient to preserve at least adequate
liquidity, such that sources exceed uses by more than 1.2x in the
coming 12 months.

"We could also lower the rating if industry fundamentals weaken
significantly for a prolonged period, impairing IAG's competitive
position and profitability.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if we became more certain
that demand is normalizing and the recovery is robust enough to
enable IAG to partly restore its financial strength, such that
adjusted FFO to debt increases sustainably to at least 12%, while
maintaining at least adequate liquidity. A revision of the outlook
to stable would also hinge on our view that IAG was maintaining
prudent capital spending and shareholder returns."


KEMBLE WATER: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT IDR, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Kemble Water Finance Limited's (holding
company) senior secured debt rating and Long-Term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'B+'. The Outlook on the IDR is Negative.

The rating reflects pressure on Kemble's financial profile from the
challenging price control (AMP7) set for operating company Thames
Water Utilities Limited (TWUL) by the UK water industry regulator
(Ofwat). The Negative Outlook accounts for exhausted financial
headroom at the current rating and uncertainty around the pace of
improvement in TWUL's operational performance. The Negative Outlook
also incorporates reduced headroom to dividend lock-up at TWUL. In
addition, the rating reflects Kemble's flexible dividend policy,
supporting the holding company's financial profile.

The rating could be downgraded if TWUL's operational performance
improves at a slower pace than currently assumed, leading to
outcome delivery incentives (ODI) penalties and total expenditure
overspend in excess of Fitch's rating case. Conversely, the Outlook
could be revised to Stable if TWUL shows continued accelerated
improvement in operational performance, resulting in substantially
lower overall ODI penalties and totex overspend in AMP7.

TWUL is the operating company structurally positioned below
Kemble.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Reliance on TWUL's Dividends: Kemble's main source of cash flow is
TWUL. Kemble relies on dividends from TWUL to service its debt.
Fitch therefore places emphasis on the analysis of the dividend
stream, which could be negatively affected by operational
underperformance, a low annual inflation index resulting in lower
revenue and regulated capital value (RCV) growth, as well as in an
extreme case the inability of TWUL to distribute dividends due to
the dividend lock-up under its debt financing being triggered.

Weak Financial Profile: Fitch estimates Kemble's adjusted gearing
at about 92% at FYE25 (year-end 31 March), cash and nominal
post-maintenance coverage ratios (PMICRs) averaging 1.0x and 1.2x,
respectively, and dividend cover capacity at about 1.5x. Forecast
gearing and nominal PMICR are at Fitch's negative rating
sensitivities for the 'B+' IDR of 92% and 1.2x, respectively, while
dividend cover is below Fitch's negative sensitivity of 2.0x. The
updated forecast is weaker than last year's due to higher expected
totex overspend and lower inflation expectations. At the same time,
Kemble's forecast financial profile is supported by dividend
flexibility: distributions to shareholders will remain subject to
TWUL's performance and rating considerations for TWUL and Kemble.

Tight Covenant Headroom at TWUL: Fitch expects TWUL to maintain
modest headroom of 2.5%-3.5% RCV to its total senior gearing
covenant of 85% during AMP7, aided by sizeable equity injections
funded by new debt at Kemble. The low headroom at TWUL weighs on
Kemble's credit quality as a covenant breach would lead to TWUL's
inability to pay dividends. Fitch does not rule out that a
combination of an external shock and operational underperformance
could absorb all of the forecast RCV headroom, depleting Kemble's
financial resilience.

Totex Overspend Increasing: In its updated rating case Fitch
assumes higher totex overspend against the allowance over AMP7 of
around GBP600 million or 6.2% in nominal terms versus GBP240
million or 2.5% last year. The increase is associated with higher
contingencies to de-risk Kemble's business plan, new projects
related to water network transformation and higher-than-expected
business rates. TWUL will only be able to recover 25% of its totex
overspend through customer bills under the totex-sharing rate set
by Ofwat, so any overspend would have a material financial impact.

Mixed Operating Performance: TWUL demonstrated further improvement
in its leakage performance in FY21. Forecast leakage in FY21 is 562
Ml/day (not considering the cold weather in March 2021), around
5.5% lower than in FY20 and slightly below the regulatory target of
569.5 Ml/day. It also made some progress in reducing supply
interruptions to 18 minutes in FY20, but still has a large gap to
close on its FYE21 target of 6.5 minutes (interruptions lasting
over three hours). Its category 1-3 pollution incidents in FY20
increased to 321, hence requiring a major improvement to achieve
the FYE21 regulatory target of 272. Customer satisfaction scores
remained poor with TWUL ranking last in the league table on the
shadow C-Mex measure in FY20.

Sizeable ODI Penalties Assumed: Fitch rating case assumes about
GBP170 million of net ODI penalties (nominal) related to TWUL's
AMP7's operational performance, broadly in line with last year's
assumptions. Fitch estimates that the majority of penalties will
come from customer satisfaction and supply interruptions. In cash
terms, Fitch expects AMP7's revenue to decrease by about GBP110
million in FY23-FY25, related to FY21-FY23 performance, due to a
two-year lag between performance and revenue adjustment. Last year
Fitch expected around GBP95 million of revenue impact during AMP7.

Moderate Pandemic Impact: Coronavirus has adversely affected TWUL's
revenue recovery, bad debts and per capita consumption (PCC)
performance commitment in FY21. Fitch expects the volume-related
revenue under-recovery of around GBP70 million and lower
contribution from developer services of around GBP30 million to be
recovered in two years, while anticipated bad debt increase of
around GBP24 million has uncertain recovery timeframe and
prospects. PCC performance, according to Ofwat's latest guidance,
will be reconciled at the end of AMP7 and will not impact TWUL's
cash flows within AMP7. Additionally, lockdowns caused delays in
the delivery of capital investments of around GBP90 million, which
had a positive impact on cash flows.

TWUL Supported by Equity from Kemble: TWUL received its first
equity injection of GBP250 million from Kemble in FY20 and the
second one of GBP80 million in FY21. Fitch's rating case assumes
that over FY22-FY25 Kemble would inject a further GBP300 million of
equity into TWUL, funded by new debt issuance. As a result, Fitch
estimates that Kemble's standalone net debt-to-RCV could rise to
about 9% by FY25 from about 7.2% at FYE20. The redistribution of
debt between TWUL and Kemble helps create greater headroom to
lock-up at TWUL and ensure dividends could still be paid to Kemble
for servicing its debt.

Cash Flow Intermittent at Kemble: No dividend was paid by TWUL to
Kemble during 1HFY21 due to uncertainty over the impact of pandemic
and given Kemble's strong liquidity. Fitch expects average cash
dividend cover at Kemble of around 1.0x during AMP7 to be supported
by an increase in TWUL dividends over FY22-FY25. Its liquidity is
also supported by the recent large debt issuance and a fully
undrawn revolving credit facility (RCF).

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Kemble is the holding company of TWUL, one of the regulated,
monopoly providers of water and wastewater services in England and
Wales. Kemble's weaker rating than closest peer Osprey Acquisitions
Limited's (BB-/Negative) reflects weaker credit metrics and TWUL's
weaker regulatory performance on ODI's and totex.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Kemble has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' each for Fair Messaging,
Privacy & Data Security; Group Structure; Exposure to Environmental
Impacts; and Water & Wastewater Management.

Kemble has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Water & Wastewater
Management due to TWUL's significantly weaker-than-sector average
leakage performance and the sizeable penalty of GBP120 million (in
2018/2019 prices) it received from Ofwat for failing its leakage
performance targets in AMP6. This has a negative impact on the
credit profile, and is relevant to the rating in conjunction with
other factors. The score has been changed to '4' from '5',
reflecting significant improvement in TWUL's leakage performance
over FY20 and FY21.

Kemble has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Customer Welfare,
Product Safety, Data Security due to large penalties expected for
the customer service performance in AMP7 (around GBP73 million in
nominal terms). These penalties will put further pressure on cash
flows. This has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is
relevant to the rating in conjunction with other factors.

Kemble has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Exposure to
Environmental Impacts due to the potential impact severe weather
events could have on its operational performance and financial
profile. Colder winters, heavy rainfalls and extreme heat during
summers causes higher leakage and mains bursts, as well as higher
sewer flooding and pollution incidents. Although severe weather
events have unpredictable nature and could be rare, they have the
potential to significantly increase operating costs and lead to
additional ODI penalties. This has a negative impact on the credit
profile, and is relevant to the rating in conjunction with other
factors.

Kemble has an ESG Relevance Score of '4' for Group Structure as its
debt is structurally and contractually subordinated to TWUL's debt.
This has a negative impact on the credit profile, and is relevant
to the rating in conjunction with other factors.

Unless otherwise disclosed in this section, the highest level of
ESG credit relevance is a score of '3'. This means ESG issues are
credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity,
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- Ofwat's final determinations financial model used as main
    information source;

-- Allowed wholesale weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of
    1.92% (RPI-based) and 2.92% (CPIH-based) in real terms,
    excluding retail margins;

-- 50% of RCV is RPI-linked and another 50% plus capital
    additions is CPIH-linked, starting from FY21;

-- Long-term RPI averaging 2.24% and long-term CPIH averaging
    1.58% for 2021-2025;

-- Allowed wholesale totex of GBP9.6 billion in nominal terms
    (net of grants and contributions and excluding GBP300 million
    conditional allowance);

-- Totex overspend of 6.2% or GBP600 million in nominal terms;

-- Weighted average PAYG rate of 45.6% over AMP7;

-- Weighted average run-off rate of 5%;

-- Net ODI penalties of around GBP170 million for AMP7's
    performance (nominal), of which GBP110 million reduce revenue
    in FY23- FY25;

-- Unregulated EBITDA of GBP67 million over AMP7 (nominal);

-- Retail EBITDA of around GBP25 million over AMP7 (nominal),
    excluding additional bad debt related to Covid-19;

-- Dividends paid by TWUL in FY21-FY25 of GBP60 million per year;
    nil external dividends;

-- One-off working capital outflow in FY21 of GBP48 million
    related to bad debts as a result of Covid-19, with recovery of
    GBP24 million in FY22 and a further GBP20 million in even
    instalments over FY23-FY25;

-- GBP90 million of capex and GBP45 million of operating
    expenditure in FY21 delayed to FY23;

-- Equity injections from Kemble to TWUL of GBP390 million in
    during AMP7 (via new debt raised at Kemble);

-- Operating company annual pension deficit recovery payments of
    GBP19.2 million on average in FY21-FY25;

-- TWUL's average nominal cost of debt at around 4.59% in FY20,
    before decreasing to 3.86% by FY25;

-- Proportion of index-linked debt at TWUL increasing to 61.5% at
    FYE25 from 58.2% at FYE20;

-- Kemble's average nominal cost of debt at around 5.17% in FY20
    FY25.

Key Recovery Rating Assumptions

-- Kemble Water's recovery analysis is based on a going-concern
    approach;

-- 100% of RCV would be recoverable at default, with 10% of
    liquidation value administrative claim, reflecting the
    negative mark-to-market value on index-linked swaps;

-- Default due to the dividend lock-up at TWUL (85% net debt-to
    RCV), and the opco having drawn its liquidity facility;

-- Kemble's net debt-to-RCV at 9%, plus a full draw-down of the
    liquidity facility;

-- Fitch's waterfall analysis output percentage on current
    metrics and assumptions was 40% corresponding to 'RR4'
    Recovery Rating for senior secured debt.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

A rating upgrade in the near-term is unlikely but Fitch may revise
the Outlook to Stable on:

-- Adjusted net debt-to-RCV consistently below 92% and
    substantial improvement in regulatory performance at TWUL.

-- Dividend cover capacity sustained above 2.0x and cash PMICR
    above 1.1x and nominal PMICR above 1.2x during AMP7.

In the longer term, an upgrade to 'BB-' could be considered if
Kemble's financial profile is consistent with:

-- Adjusted net debt-to-RCV below 87%.

-- Dividend cover capacity sustained above 2.5x and cash PMICR
    above 1.15x and nominal PMICR above 1.3x during AMP7.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

-- Dividend cover capacity below 2.0x, increase of gearing to
    consistently above 92% and/or decrease of cash PMICR to below
    1.1x or nominal PMICR below 1.2x during AMP7.

-- Significantly reduced headroom under TWUL's documentary or
    regulatory dividend lock-up covenants.

BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Non-Financial Corporate
issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the
99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive
direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a
worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th
percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction)
of four notches over three years. The complete span of best- and
worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges
from 'AAA' to 'D'. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are
based on historical performance.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Strong Liquidity: As at FYE20, Kemble held GBP28.7million in
unrestricted cash and cash equivalents and a GBP110 million of
committed, undrawn RCF maturing in 2023. It issued GBP500 million
of new debt in FYE21, GBP80 million of which was used for an equity
injection into TWUL and a further GBP139million for early debt
repurchase/repayment. The remaining cash balance provides more than
sufficient financial resources for operating requirements, debt
maturities and interest service until FY23.

Fitch expects negative free cash flow of around GBP46 million in
FY21-FY22, with the nearest debt maturity being a GBP115 million
remaining balance under a fixed-rate bond in FY22.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

-- Capitalised interest added back to P&L and cash interest.

-- Statutory cash interest and total debt reconciled to match
    compliance certificate.

-- Developer grants and contributions excluded from post
    maintenance cash flow (treated as a prepayment for capex).

-- Cash interest was adjusted to include 50% of the five-year pay
    downs of inflation accretion from RPI swaps for the purpose of
    calculating PMICR.

LEON: Opts to Shut Down U.S. Restaurants Amid Pandemic
------------------------------------------------------
Katherine Price at The Caterer reports that naturally fast food
chain Leon has closed its Stateside restaurants in Washington DC
and Virginia as the pandemic has "taken its toll" on the company's
finances.

According to The Caterer, the group said it will instead be
focusing on its UK and Europe sites.  However, Leon said it hoped
to revisit a US expansion in the future, The Caterer notes.

The healthy fast food chain launched a company voluntary
arrangement (CVA) last year to restructure the firm's finances
after the pandemic hit trading, with creditors agreeing to
turnover-based rents, The Caterer relates.

The restaurant chain was founded in 2004 and had expanded rapidly
to operate 75 sites globally, both owned and franchised.  The
company-owned restaurants in the UK total 44, in prime locations
and transport hubs, predominantly across central London.


[*] UK: 190,000 High Retail Jobs Lost Due to Coronavirus Pandemic
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Henry Saker-Clark at Independent reports that almost 190,000 jobs
have been lost in the retail bloodbath since shops were first
forced to shut their doors a year ago, according to new figures.

According to Independent, in exclusive data for the PA news agency,
the Centre for Retail Research has revealed that 188,685 retail
jobs have vanished between the start of the first coronavirus
lockdown on March 23, 2020, and March 31 this year.

The figures come less than two weeks before non-essential shops
reopen their doors to customers in England after the lengthy third
lockdown, Independent notes.

However, shoppers will visit high streets and town centres that
have been hit hard by the pandemic, with thousands of stores
shutting their doors for good, Independent states.

The figures revealed that 83,725 jobs lost in the period were due
to administrations, including major collapses by Debenhams and Sir
Philip Green's Arcadia Group, Independent discloses.

Meanwhile, about 11,986 jobs were cut during Company Voluntary
Arrangement (CVA) restructuring processes, Independent notes.

Another 92,974 jobs were axed through rationalisation programmes,
which included supermarkets Sainsbury's and Asda cutting thousands
of roles, Independent recounts.

The figures also revealed devastating impact of the pandemic
resulted in 15,153 store closures in shopping destinations across
the UK, Independent says.

Up to 401,690 shops are currently shuttered around the country and
could reopen in the next stage of Boris Johnson's roadmap out of
lockdown, Independent relays, citing real estate adviser Altus
Group.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOOK REVIEW: The Sorcerer's Apprentice - Medical Miracles
-------------------------------------------------------------
Author: Sallie Tisdale
Publisher: BeardBooks
Softcover: 270 pages
List Price: $34.95
Order your own personal copy at http://is.gd/9SAfJR

An earlier edition of "The Sorcerer's Apprentice" won an American
Health Book Award in 1986. The book has been recognized as an
outstanding book on popular science. Tisdale brings to her subject
of the wide nd engrossing field of health and illness the
perspective, as well as the special sympathies and sensitivities,
of a registered nurse. She is an exceptionally skilled writer.

Again and again, her descriptions of ill individuals and images of
illnesses such as cancer and meningitis make a lasting impression.

Tisdale accomplishes the tricky business of bringing the reader to
an understanding of what persons experience when they are ill; and
in doing this, to understand more about the nature of illness as
well. Her style and aim as a writer are like that of a medical or
science journalist for leading major newspaper, say the "New York
Times" or "Los Angeles Times." To this informative, readable style
is added the probing interest and concern of the philosopher trying
to shed some light on one of the central and most unsettling
aspects of human existence. In this insightful, illuminating,
probing exploration of the mystery of illness, Tisdale also
outlines the limits of the effectiveness of treatments and cures,
even with modern medicine's store of technology and drugs. These
are often called "miracles" of modern medicine. But from this
author's perspective, with the most serious, life-threatening,
illnesses, doctors and other health-care professionals are like
sorcerer's trying to work magic on them. They hope to bring
improvement, but can never be sure what they do will bring it
about. Tisdale's intent is not to debunk modern medicine, belittle
its resources and ways, or suggest that the medical profession
holds out false hopes. Her intent is do report on the mystery of
serious illness as she has witnessed it and from this, imagined
what it is like in her varied work as a registered nurse. She also
writes from her own experiences in being chronically ill when she
was younger and the pain and surgery going with this. She writes,
"I want to get at the reasons for the strange state of amnesia we
in the health professions find ourselves in. I want to find clues
to my weird experiences, try to sense the nature of being sick."
The amnesia of health professionals is their state of mind from the
demands placed on them all the time by patients, employers, and
society, as well as themselves, to cure illness, to save lives, to
make sick people feel better. Doctors, surgeons, nurses, and other
health-care professionals become primarily technicians applying the
wonders of modern medicine. Because of the volume of patients, they
do not get to spend much time with any one or a few of them. It's
all they can do to apply the prescribed treatment, apply more of it
if it doesn't work the first time, and try something else if this
treatment doesn't seem to be effective.

Added to this is keeping up with the new medical studies and
treatments. But Tisdale stepped out of this problem-solving
outlook, can-do, perfectionist mentality by opting to spend most of
her time in nursing homes, where she would be among old persons she
would see regularly, away from the high-charged atmosphere of a
hospital with its "many medical students, technicians,
administrators, and insurance review artists." To stay on her
"medical toes," she balanced this with working occasional shifts in
a nearby hospital. In her hospital work, she worked in a neonatal
intensive care unit (NICU), intensive care unit (ICU), a burn
center, and in a surgery room. From this combination of work with
the infirm, ill, and the latest medical technology and procedures
among highly-skilled professionals, Tisdale learned that "being
sick is the strangest of states." This is not the lesson nearly all
other health-care workers come away with. For them, sick persons
are like something that has to be "fixed." They're focused on the
practical, physical matter of treating a malady. Unlike this
author, they're not focused consciously on the nature of pain and
what the patient is experiencing. The pragmatic, results-oriented
medical profession is focused on the effects of treatment. Tisdale
brings into the picture of health care and seriously-ill patients
all of what the medical profession in its amnesia, as she called
it, overlooks.

Simply in describing what she observes, Tisdale leads those in the
medical profession as well as other interested readers to see what
they normally overlook, what they normally do not see in the
business and pressures of their work. She describes the beginning
of a hip-replacement operation, the surgeon "takes the scalpel and
cuts -- the top of the hip to a third of the way down the thigh --
and cuts again through the globular yellow fat, and deeper. The
resident follows with a cautery, holding tiny spraying blood
vessels and burning them shut with an electric current. One small,
throbbing arteriole escapes, and his glasses and cheek are
splattered." One learns more about what is actually going on in an
operation from this and following passages than from seeing one of
those glimpses of operations commonly shown on TV. The author
explains the illness of meningitis, "The brain becomes swollen with
blood and tissue fluid, its entire surface layered with pus . . .
The pressure in the skull increases until the winding convolutions
of the brain are flattened out . . . The spreading infection and
pressure from the growing turbulent ocean sitting on top of the
brain cause permanent weakness and paralysis, blindness, deafness .
. . . " This dramatic depiction of meningitis brings together
medical facts, symptoms, and effects on the patient. Tisdale does
this repeatedly to present illness and the persons whose lives
revolve around it from patients and relatives to doctors and nurses
in a light readers could never imagine, even those who are immersed
in this world.

Tisdale's main point is that the miracles of modern medicine do not
unquestionably end the miseries of illness, or even unquestionably
alleviate them. As much as they bring some relief to ill
individuals and sometimes cure illness, in many cases they bring on
other kinds of pains and sorrows. Tisdale reminds readers that the
mystery of illness does, and always will, elude the miracle of
medical technology, drugs, and practices. Part of the mystery of
the paradoxes of treatment and the elusiveness of restored health
for ill persons she focuses on is "simply the mystery of illness.
Erosion, obviously, is natural. Our bodies are essentially
entropic." This is what many persons, both among the public and
medical professionals, tend to forget. "The Sorcerer's Apprentice"
serves as a reminder that the faith and hope placed in modern
medicine need to be balanced with an awareness of the mystery of
illness which will always be a part of human life.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2021.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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                * * * End of Transmission * * *