---

       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Friday, December 18, 2020, Vol. 21, No. 253

                           Headlines



F R A N C E

BOURBON MARITIME: Marseilles Commercial Court OKs Recovery Plan


G E R M A N Y

CONSUS REAL: S&P Raises Long-Term ICR to BB-, Outlook Stable
FRESHWORLD HOLDING: S&P Affirms 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

CIFC EURO III: Fitch Assigns B(EXP)sf Rating on Class F Debt
SCULPTOR EUROPEAN VII: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on Class F Notes


I T A L Y

EVOCA: S&P Lowers Senior Sec. Notes to 'B-' Amid COVID-19 Fallout
TELECOM ITALIA: Moody's Downgrades CFR to Ba2, Outlook Negative


L U X E M B O U R G

CONSOLIDATED ENERGY: Moody's Downgrades CFR to B2


N O R W A Y

NORWEGIAN AIR: Shareholders Endorse Financial Rescue Plan


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALLANDER PRINT: Enters Administration, 40 Jobs Affected
BREATHER: US, UK Units File for Separate Insolvency Processes
IDEAL MODULAR: Bought Out of Administration in Pre-Pack Deal
LONDON CAPITAL: FCA Failed to Supervise, Regulate Company
PRECISE MORTGAGE 2018-1B: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. E Notes



X X X X X X X X

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Hospitals, Health and People

                           - - - - -


===========
F R A N C E
===========

BOURBON MARITIME: Marseilles Commercial Court OKs Recovery Plan
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Maritime Executive reports that the Commercial Court of
Marseilles approved the recovery plan for Bourbon Maritime after an
agreement was reached with the creditors.

The decision completed the reorganization proceedings that began
nearly 18 months ago, The Maritime Executive notes.

The company expects to complete the financial and capital
restructuring of the group by the end of the year as it continues
to overhaul its business, The Maritime Executive states.

According to The Maritime Executive, the company said its two
priorities will be transformation of business models towards more
integrated services and the digitalization of the fleet.  The goal
is to improve while gradually reducing vessel operating costs and
CO2 emissions, The Maritime Executive notes.

As part of the transformation of the business Bourbon also expects
to downsize its current fleet, The Maritime Executive relays.  The
plans set a target for the fleet of less than 350 vessels at the
end of 2021, according to The Maritime Executive.  That is down
from 458 vessels and more than 8,200 employees, The Maritime
Executive notes.

A market leader in offshore marine services, Bourbon focus on the
offshore energy sector providing surface and subsea marine services
for oil & gas fields and wind farms.  The company had been declared
insolvent in 2019 when it was unable to meet the demands for rental
payments, The Maritime Executive recounts.  At the end of 2019, the
company was sold to creditors with a plan to liquidate the parent
company and overhaul the offshore business with a new strategic
plan, The Maritime Executive relates.

The agreements signed with the creditors reduces the group's debt
by more than half, The Maritime Executive says.  It goes from
approximately US$3.2 billion to under US$1.4 billion including
approximately US$278 million in bonds redeemable for shares issued
by the Societe Phoceenne de Participations, the company formed by
the creditors that took control of Bourbon at the beginning of
2020, The Maritime Executive discloses.  The conversion of the
major part of this debt into equity significantly strengthens the
group's balance sheet and there are provisions for nearly US$200
million in additional new financing,
The Maritime Executive states.

Societe Generale will keep the majority stake, while BNP Paribas,
Credit Agricole, Credit Mutuel, and BPCE will also be shareholders,
according to The Maritime Executive.




=============
G E R M A N Y
=============

CONSUS REAL: S&P Raises Long-Term ICR to BB-, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term issuer credit rating on
Germany-based developer Consus Real Estate AG to 'BB-' from 'B-',
which is one notch below our 'BB' rating on Adler. At the same
time, S&P raised its issue rating on the company's senior secured
bond to 'B+' from 'CCC+'.

S&P said, "In July 2020, Adler increased its stake in Consus to 65%
from 25.7% and now fully consolidates the company. We understand
that Adler intends to increase its stake further by a public
voluntary tender offer to all remaining Consus minority
shareholders, and has received an irrevocable commitment from
shareholders to achieve a stake of more than 80% in Consus. We
further understand that Adler would like to place a domination
agreement between Adler and Consus to secure full control. Consus
is currently listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange with only about
14% of its shares in free float. The largest shareholders are Adler
Group (65%) and Gröner Gruppe (21%) as of Sept. 30, 2020.

"We believe Consus' credit profile is enhanced by its strategic
importance to its parent Adler.

"In our view, Consus would benefit from extraordinary support from
the group in case of financial stress as Adler is a stronger group
and better positioned than Consus on a stand-alone basis.

"We see Consus landbank as a strategic platform for Adler's future
growth.

"We understand that Adler will use Consus' landbank and development
platform to fuel future growth and develop mainly residential
assets in Germany for holding purposes in the medium-to-long term.
Adler will manage Consus' development pipeline of forward-sold
projects to institutional investors and condominium projects until
delivery. Consus already sold most of the noncore projects and will
only hold core projects that will be leased in the medium-to-long
term.

"Consus receivables are delayed from recent projects sold but we
understand they will materialize by the end of this month.

"Earlier this year, Consus sold eight development projects to
Partners Immobilien Capital Management and 17 projects to Groner
Group GmbH, for a total transaction value of about EUR1.0 billion.
We previously expected Consus to receive the sales proceeds before
the end of third-quarter 2020 but about EUR730 million in
receivables relating to the sale of projects have been delayed. We
now understand from management that the majority of the receivables
will come through by the end of this month. Consus repaid about
EUR475 million of mezzanine debt in 2020, which was mostly funded
from Adler's shareholder loan of about EUR696.5 million to Consus.
We treat the shareholder loan as debt in Consus, given the short
maturity and required cash interest payments under the instrument.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Consus should be
able to continue benefiting from the favorable fundamentals of the
German residential real estate market and strong demand,
underpinned by its expanding project pipeline. This should
translate into an adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 8x-9x and EBITDA
interest coverage well above 1x over the next 12-18 months for
Consus, alongside a sufficient liquidity buffer to cover short-term
debt maturities and working capital needs. Our stable outlook also
reflects our expectation that Adler continues to generate stable
cash flows, while maintaining resilient occupancy rates and ongoing
positive like-for-like rental income growth.

"We may lower the ratings if Consus' liquidity cushion deteriorates
materially and we believe that its capital structure becomes
unsustainable. We would also take a negative rating action if
Consus pursues more significant debt-funded investments, or if its
cash flow generation is materially lower than we estimate--for
example, because of prolonged disruption due to the COVID-19
pandemic--such that its EBITDA interest coverage ratio fails to
exceed 1.0x in the next 12-18 months.

"We could also consider lowering our ratings on Consus if we took
the same action on Adler, if its debt to debt plus equity exceeded
60% and its EBITDA interest coverage ratio fell to well below 2.0x,
for example, as a result of additional debt-funded investments or
higher refinancing costs.

"We could also downgrade Consus if Adler does not maintain adequate
liquidity.

"We are unlikely to take a positive rating action, but this could
result from a reassessment of Consus' group status to Adler, for
example if Adler increases its stake further in Consus and exhibits
full control. In that case, we would view Consus as fully
integrated to Adler's current identity and future strategy and
Adler would be likely to support Consus under any foreseeable
circumstances."

FRESHWORLD HOLDING: S&P Affirms 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' issuer credit rating on German
sanitary services provider Freshworld Holding III GmbH (ADCO) and
its 'B' issue rating, with a '3' recovery rating, on the senior
secured debt facilities, including the term loan increase.

S&P said, "ADCO has performed well throughout the pandemic, because
the group's sanitary services were considered "critically
important" in many countries it operates in.  Although ADCO faced a
significant decline in its short-term rental revenue (cultural and
sport events activities), this was more than offset by strong
demand for mobile sanitary services on construction sites and new
segments (hospitals and schools) due to increased hygiene
standards. This supports our 3% revenue growth assumption for 2020.
We expect the focus on stricter hygiene requirements will remain
high, supporting ADCO's long-term rental activities, while the
group's revenue from events activities should gradually pick up
once a vaccine is available globally, which we assume will be
toward the second half of 2021. In addition, positive price
effects--in part due to increased demand for high-end toilet cabins
(with sinks)--and cost savings targeted by the group's
transformation program have improved and will support ADCO's EBITDA
margins. Given that sanitary services only represent a small
portion of construction projects, we expect customers will
generally accept higher prices, while ADCO's high density network
and broad geographic coverage remain key competitive advantages
against smaller local players.

"We do not view the proposed shareholder return as overly
aggressive, considering the group's moderately high leverage
metrics and prudent liquidity management in 2020.  We expect that
the proposed transaction will result in an increase in S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted leverage ratio to about 5.8x from 5.0x currently.
We forecast that adjusted leverage will gradually decrease toward
5.0x by 2022, driven by solid revenue growth and profitability
improvement. In addition, we project materially positive free
operating cash flow in our forecast period, despite higher interest
expenses from the incremental term loan and higher capital
expenditure from 2021, to mitigate investment postponed to preserve
liquidity in 2020. This all supports our financial risk profile
assessment in the stronger end of highly leveraged."

S&P Global Ratings believes there remains a high degree of
uncertainty about the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic.
Reports that at least one experimental vaccine is highly effective
and might gain initial approval by the end of the year are
promising, but this is merely the first step toward a return to
social and economic normality; equally critical is the widespread
availability of effective immunization, which could come by the
middle of next year. S&P uses this assumption in assessing the
economic and credit implications associated with the pandemic.

S&P added, "The stable outlook indicates that ADCO will maintain
its leading market position in the mobile sanitation industry. We
expect total revenue growth to remain solid, at 3%-4% in 2020 and
2021, based on continued demand in the residential and
nonresidential construction end markets, and value-based selling
initiatives in Germany. The adjusted EBITDA margin is forecast to
increase to 28%-29% because of cost savings and improved product
mix. This will enable materially positive FOCF.

"We could lower the rating if ADCO underperforms our forecasts and
experiences a significant drop in EBITDA margins due to a loss of
market share or weakening demand from a struggling construction
industry. This would result in sustained higher leverage and
negative FOCF. In addition, if the group undertook material
debt-financed acquisitions or aggressive cash returns to
shareholders, or faced liquidity pressure, we could lower the
rating.

"We see limited near-term upside potential for the rating due the
relatively high adjusted leverage and aggressive financial policy.
However, if EBITDA margin growth was stronger than expected, such
that our adjusted leverage fell below 5x sustainably, combined with
solid and stable positive FOCF, we could consider raising the
rating. For an upgrade, these improved credit metrics would also
have to be consistent with our view of the long-term financial
policy."



=============
I R E L A N D
=============

CIFC EURO III: Fitch Assigns B(EXP)sf Rating on Class F Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned CIFC Euro Funding CLO III DAC expected
ratings.

The assignment of final ratings is contingent on the receipt of
final documents being in line with the information received for the
expected ratings.

RATING ACTIONS

CIFC European Funding CLO III DAC

Class A; LT AAA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B-1; LT AA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class B-2; LT AA(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class C; LT A(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class D; LT BBB-(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class E; LT BB(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Class F; LT B(EXP)sf Expected Rating

Subordinated; LT NR(EXP)sf Expected Rating

TRANSACTION SUMMARY
The transaction is a securitisation of mainly senior secured
obligations (at least 90%) with a component of senior unsecured,
mezzanine, second-lien loans and high-yield bonds. Note proceeds
will be used to fund a portfolio with a target par of EUR350
million. The portfolio will be actively managed by CIFC Asset
Management Europe Ltd. The collateralised loan obligation (CLO) has
a four-year reinvestment period and an 8.5-year weighted average
life (WAL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B/B-' Portfolio Credit Quality: Fitch assesses the average credit
quality of obligors to be in the 'B' category. The Fitch weighted
average rating factor (WARF) of the identified portfolio is 33.72,
below the indicative covenanted maximum of 35.

High Recovery Expectations: At least 90% of the portfolio will
comprise senior secured obligations. Fitch views the recovery
prospects for these assets as more favourable than for second-lien,
unsecured and mezzanine assets. The Fitch weighted average recovery
rate (WARR) of the identified portfolio is 62.95%, above the
indicative covenanted minimum of 62.75%.

Portfolio Management: The transaction has a four-year reinvestment
period and includes reinvestment criteria similar to those of other
European transactions. Fitch's analysis is based on a stressed-case
portfolio with the aim of testing the robustness of the transaction
structure against its covenants and portfolio guidelines.

Cash Flow Analysis: Fitch used a customised proprietary cash flow
model to replicate the principal and interest waterfalls and the
various structural features of the transaction, and to assess their
effectiveness, including the structural protection provided by
excess spread diverted through the par value and interest coverage
tests.

The transaction was modelled using the current portfolio, and also
the current portfolio with a coronavirus sensitivity analysis
applied. Fitch's analysis for the coronavirus sensitivity analysis
was based on a stable interest-rate scenario but included the
front-, mid- and back-loaded default timing scenarios as outlined
in the agency's criteria.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

This section provides insight into the model-implied sensitivities
the transaction faces when one assumption is modified, while
holding others equal. The modelling process uses the modification
of these variables to reflect asset performance in upside and
downside environments. The results below should only be considered
as one potential outcome, as the transaction is exposed to multiple
dynamic risk factors. It should not be used as an indicator of
possible future performance.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

A 25% reduction of the mean default rate (RDR) across all ratings
and a 25% increase in the recovery rate (RRR) across all ratings
will result in an upgrade of no more than five notches across the
structure, apart from the class A which is already at the highest
'AAAsf' rating.

At closing, Fitch will use a standardised stress portfolio (Fitch's
stressed portfolio) that is customised to the portfolio limits as
specified in the transaction documents. Even if the actual
portfolio shows lower defaults and smaller losses at all rating
levels than Fitch's stressed portfolio assumed at closing, an
upgrade of the notes during the reinvestment period is unlikely, as
the portfolio credit quality may still deteriorate, not only by
natural credit migration, but also through reinvestments.

After the end of the reinvestment period, upgrades may occur if
better-than-expected portfolio credit quality and deal performance
lead to higher credit enhancement and excess spread available to
cover for losses in the remaining portfolio.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

A 25% increase of the mean RDR across all ratings and a 25%
decrease of the RRR across all ratings will result in downgrades of
between three to five notches cross the structure.

Coronavirus Baseline Scenario Impact

Fitch carried out a sensitivity analysis on the target portfolio to
envisage the coronavirus baseline scenario. The agency notched down
the ratings for all assets with corporate issuers on Negative
Outlook regardless of sector. This scenario shows resilience of the
assigned ratings, with a substantial cushion across the class A to
D notes while the cushion is more limited for the class E and F
notes.

Fitch also considered the possibility that the stressed portfolio,
determined by the transaction's covenants, would further
deteriorate due to the impact of coronavirus-mitigation measures.
Fitch believes this risk is adequately addressed by the coronavirus
baseline sensitivity test, in which all classes pass the current
ratings.

Coronavirus Downside Scenario impact

Fitch has added a sensitivity analysis that contemplates a more
severe and prolonged economic stress caused by a re-emergence of
infections in the major economies, before halting recovery begins
in 2Q21. The downside sensitivity incorporates a single-notch
downgrade to all Fitch-derived ratings in the 'B' rating category
and a 0.85 recovery rate multiplier to all other assets in the
portfolio. This scenario would result in downgrades of between
three to five notches cross the structure.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally
Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European
Securities and Markets Authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SCULPTOR EUROPEAN VII: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating on Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned credit ratings to Sculptor European CLO
VII DAC's class A, B-1, B-2, C, D, E, and F notes.

The ratings reflect our assessment of:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior-secured term loans and
bonds that are governed by collateral quality tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect the
performance of the rated notes through collateral selection,
ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which S&P considers to be
bankruptcy remote.

-- The transaction's counterparty risks, which S&P considers to be
in line with our counterparty rating framework.

Loss mitigation loans
Under the transaction documents, the issuer can purchase loss
mitigation loans, which are assets of an existing collateral
obligation held by the issuer offered in connection with
bankruptcy, workout, or restructuring of such obligation, to
improve the recovery value of such related collateral obligation.

S&P said, "Loss mitigation loans allow the issuer to participate in
potential new financing initiatives by the borrower in default.
This feature aims to mitigate the risk of other market participants
taking advantage of CLO restrictions, which typically do not allow
the CLO to participate in a defaulted entity's new financing
request. Hence, this feature increases the chance of a higher
recovery for the CLO. While the objective is positive, it can also
lead to par erosion, as additional funds will be placed with an
entity that is under distress or in default. This may cause greater
volatility in our ratings if the positive effect of such loans does
not materialize. In our view, the presence of a bucket for loss
mitigation loans, the restrictions on the use of interest and
principal proceeds to purchase such assets, and the limitations in
reclassifying proceeds received from such assets from principal to
interest help to mitigate the risk."

The purchase of loss mitigation loans is not subject to the
reinvestment criteria or the eligibility criteria. The issuer may
purchase loss mitigation loans using interest proceeds, principal
proceeds, or amounts standing to the credit of the supplemental
reserve account. The use of interest proceeds to purchase loss
mitigation loans is subject to (1) the manager determining that
there are sufficient interest proceeds to pay interest on all the
rated notes on the upcoming payment date and (2) in the manager's
reasonable judgement, following the purchase, all coverage tests
will be satisfied on the upcoming payment date. The use of
principal proceeds is subject to (1) passing par coverage tests,
(2) the manager having built sufficient excess par in the
transaction so that the principal collateral amount is equal to or
exceeds the portfolio's reinvestment target par balance after the
reinvestment, and (3) the obligation purchased is a debt obligation
ranking senior or pari-passu with the related defaulted or credit
risk obligation.

Loss mitigation loans that are purchased with principal proceeds
and have limited deviation from the eligibility criteria will
receive collateral value credit in the principal balance
determination. To protect the transaction from par erosion, any
distributions received from loss mitigation loans purchased with
the use of principal proceeds will form part of the issuer's
principal account proceeds and cannot be recharacterized as
interest.

Loss mitigation loans that are purchased with interest will receive
zero credit in the principal balance determination, and the
proceeds received will form part of the issuer's interest account
proceeds. The manager can however elect to give collateral value
credit to loss mitigation loans, purchased with interest proceeds,
subject to them meeting the same limited deviation from eligibility
criteria conditions. The proceeds from any loss mitigations
reclassified in this way are credited to the principal account.

The cumulative exposure to loss mitigation loans purchased with
principal is limited to 3% of the target par amount. The cumulative
exposure to loss mitigation loans purchased with principal and
interest is limited to 10% of the target par amount.

Rating rationale
Under the transaction documents, the rated notes will pay quarterly
interest unless a frequency switch event occurs. Following this,
the notes will switch to semiannual payments. The portfolio's
reinvestment period will end approximately three years after
closing.

S&P stated, "We consider that the portfolio is well-diversified at
closing, primarily comprising broadly syndicated speculative-grade
senior-secured term loans and senior-secured bonds. Therefore, we
have conducted our credit and cash flow analysis by applying our
criteria for corporate cash flow CDOs (see "Global Methodology And
Assumptions For CLOs And Corporate CDOs," published on June 21,
2019).

"In our cash flow analysis, we used the €300 million target par
amount, the covenanted weighted-average spread (3.80%), the
reference weighted-average coupon (3.50%), and the target minimum
weighted-average recovery rates as indicated by the collateral
manager. We applied various cash flow stress scenarios, using four
different default patterns, in conjunction with different interest
rate stress scenarios for each liability rating category.

"Under our structured finance sovereign risk criteria, we consider
that the transaction's exposure to country risk is sufficiently
mitigated at the assigned ratings."

Until the end of the reinvestment period on Jan. 15, 2024, the
collateral manager may substitute assets in the portfolio for so
long as our CDO Monitor test is maintained or improved in relation
to the initial ratings on the notes. This test looks at the total
amount of losses that the transaction can sustain as established by
the initial cash flows for each rating, and it compares that with
the current portfolio's default potential plus par losses to date.
As a result, until the end of the reinvestment period, the
collateral manager may through trading deteriorate the
transaction's current risk profile, as long as the initial ratings
are maintained.

S&P added, "We consider that the transaction's documented
counterparty replacement and remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate
its exposure to counterparty risk under our current counterparty
criteria (see "Counterparty Risk Framework: Methodology And
Assumptions," published on March 8, 2019).

"We consider the transaction's legal structure and framework to be
bankruptcy remote, in line with our legal criteria (see "Asset
Isolation And Special-Purpose Entity Methodology," published on
March 29, 2017).

"Following our analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, we believe our ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for the class A
to F notes. Our credit and cash flow analysis indicate that the
available credit enhancement for the class B-1, B-2, C, D, and F
notes could withstand stresses commensurate with the same or higher
rating levels than those we have assigned. However, as the CLO will
be in its reinvestment phase starting from closing, during which
the transaction's credit risk profile could deteriorate, we have
capped our ratings assigned to the notes.

"Taking the above factors into account and following our analysis
of the credit, cash flow, counterparty, operational, and legal
risks, we believe that our ratings are commensurate with the
available credit enhancement for all the rated classes of notes.

"In light of the rapidly shifting credit dynamics within CLO
portfolios due to continuing rating actions (downgrades,
CreditWatch placements, and outlook changes) on speculative-grade
corporate loan issuers, we are making qualitative adjustments to
our analysis when rating CLO tranches to reflect the likelihood
that changes to the credit profile of the underlying assets may
affect a portfolio's credit quality in the near term."

To do this, S&P reviews the likelihood of near-term changes to the
portfolio's credit profile by evaluating the transaction's specific
risk factors, including, but not limited to, the percentage of the
underlying portfolio that comes from obligors that:

-- Are rated in the 'CCC' range;

-- Are currently on CreditWatch with negative implications;

-- Are rated with a negative outlook; or

-- Sit within a static portfolio CLO transaction.

S&P cited, "Based on our review of these factors, and considering
the portfolio concentration, we believe that the minimum cushion
between this CLO tranches' break-even default rates and scenario
default rates should be 1.0% (from a possible range of 0.0%-5.0%).

"As noted, the purpose of this analysis is to take a
forward-looking approach for potential near-term changes to the
underlying portfolio's credit profile.

"In addition to our standard analysis, to provide an indication of
how rising pressures among speculative-grade corporates could
affect our ratings on European CLO transactions, we have also
included the sensitivity of the ratings on the class A to E notes
to five of the 10 hypothetical scenarios."

Ratings List

Class        Rating   Amount    Interest    Credit
                    (mil. EUR)  rate (%)    enhancement (%)
A           AAA (sf) 186.00    3mE + 1.10   38.00
B-1      AA (sf)  11.20     3mE + 1.80   30.13
B-2      AA (sf)  12.40     2.10      30.13
C      A (sf)   18.90     3mE + 3.00   23.83
D      BBB-(sf) 20.50     3mE + 4.50   17.00
E      BB-(sf)  18.60     3mE + 6.82   10.80
F      B- (sf)  5.10      3mE + 8.38    9.10
Z      NR       15.00     N/A       N/A
Subordinated NR       28.05     N/A       N/A




=========
I T A L Y
=========

EVOCA: S&P Lowers Senior Sec. Notes to 'B-' Amid COVID-19 Fallout
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its ratings on Evoca and its senior
secured notes to 'B-' from 'B' and the rating on the super senior
revolving credit facility to 'B' from 'B+'.

S&P said, "COVID-19 fallout has intensified the pressure on Evoca's
already highly leveraged capital structure.  The ongoing
restrictions imposed by governments to contain the spread of the
coronavirus are weighing on Evoca's performance and its credit
metrics. We estimate that S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to
EBITDA will materially exceed 10x in 2020-in 2021. Our adjusted
debt includes EUR210 million principal value of the payment-in-kind
notes issued at Evoca's parent (LSF9 Canto Midco DAC) in 2019, as
well as accrued interests. At the same time, we assume adjusted
funds from operations cash interest will deteriorate over the same
period and remain below 2.0x due to significant erosion of top line
and EBITDA. These credit metrics are not commensurate with our 'B'
rating.

"Governments' COVID-19-related confinement measures took a bigger
hit on Evoca's sales than expected .  Evoca reported a top line
decline in the third quarter of about 29%, and this was preceded by
a more severe 58% drop in the second quarter. In the nine months to
September 2020, Evoca's top line declined 33.5%, and we expect a
30%-35% contraction for the full year, based on indications from
Evoca's management.

"The entire professional coffee machine industry is hurting.
Travel limitations and the quickly spreading adoption of smart
working, mainly for the big corporations, has muted demand for
automatic coffee machines. This translated into a 45.7% decline in
Evoca's automatic coffee machines division in the nine months ended
September 2020. At the same time, sales of Evoca's vending machines
dispensing food and snacks (Impulse segment) declined roughly 37%
over the same period. Evoca's broad range of products in its
semi-automatic coffee line partially mitigated the challenges
observed in the Ho.Re.Ca. channel, one of the segments most
affected by the pandemic. This is due to more resilient performance
of small-size coffee machines, such as bean to cup machines
typically sold to smaller offices (less impacted by smart working).
Sales in this segment declined 26% in the first nine months of the
year. Moreover, we believe the current restrictions will
temporarily change habits, with at-home coffee consumption trumping
out-of-home trends. That said, this is likely to reverse once the
restrictions are lifted.

"Resumed restrictions pose additional uncertainties on the speed of
recovery from 2021.  The second wave of COVID-19 infections across
Europe and resumed mobility restrictions and social distancing will
likely drag on Evoca's top line recovery in fourth-quarter 2020 and
into the first part of 2021. The ongoing concerns raised by the
pandemic is likely to weigh on investment decisions of Evoca's key
customers (operators and roaster), which could delay purchases of
new coffee machines in 2021. We currently estimate Evoca's sales to
increase by 15%-20% in 2021 to EUR350 million-EUR370 million,
materially below sales reported in 2019.

"Evoca's asset-light business model supports its business profile.
Despite the significant erosion of Evoca's top line in 2020, we
view positively the company's ability to manage its cost structure
and to limit profit losses. Evoca's asset-light business model
ensures a relatively high proportion of variable costs and active
renegotiations of prices with suppliers. At the same time, Evoca is
taking advantage of government support in terms of staff costs in
key countries such as Italy, Spain and Canada. We estimate S&P
Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA margin will contract 400-450 bps in
2020 from 19% at end-2019, mainly due to COVID-19-related
exceptional costs as well as foreign exchange headwinds in Brazil
and Argentina.

"We understand Evoca is taking the necessary steps to adjust its
product offering toward small-size machines.  In our view, this
market segment is highly competitive, and the successful transition
should be managed preserving the level of profitability through the
rationalization of Evoca's existing manufacturing footprint. We
believe it will underpin margin improvements from 2021 and positive
free operating cash flow.

"Good working capital management and cash control underpin solid
liquidity.  Evoca's cost control and working capital management
supported sound cash management during the peak of the pandemic in
the second quarter. This led the company to repay in advance the
EUR80 million RCF it had precautionarily drawn at the end of the
first quarter. Evoca didn't experience a material deterioration of
trade receivables and was able to adjust its supply purchases and
inventory level according to the expected sales volumes. The
company took a material cut on its investments mainly in relation
to non-strategic projects, which we expect will normalize from next
year. The existing cash on balance sheet, which we estimate at
around EUR60 million and the full availability of the EUR80 million
RCF, ensures relatively solid liquidity over the next 12 months."

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about
the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic.  The current consensus
among health experts is that COVID-19 will remain a threat until a
vaccine or effective treatment becomes widely available, which
could be around mid-2021. We are using this assumption in assessing
the economic and credit implications associated with the pandemic.

Environmental, social, and governance credit factors for this
credit rating change are health and safety.

S&P added, "The stable outlook reflects our estimate that over the
next 12 months Evoca will manage its liquidity needs, thanks to
existing cash on balance sheet and its fully available EUR80
million RCF. At the same time, we expect a gradual recovery of
Evoca's EBITDA margin in 2021 supporting positive free operating
cash flow generation. We forecast S&P Global FFO cash interest to
gradually recover in 2021 approaching 1.5x-2.0x from 1.0x-1.5x
estimated at year end 2020."

Downside scenario
S&P could lower the rating if Evoca's liquidity position
deteriorates or if adjusted debt to EBITDA remains permanently
above 10.0x, leading S&P to regard the capital structure as
unsustainable. This could happen if Evoca fails to adapt its
product offering to any structural change in coffee consumption
trends.

Upside scenario
S&P stated, "We could upgrade Evoca if we believe its leverage can
recover toward 8.0x-8.5x, including the PIK notes issued at the
parent level, and if we believe that the FFO cash interest ratio
could remain sustainably above 2.0x. At the same time, we would
expect the company to generate positive FOCF."

TELECOM ITALIA: Moody's Downgrades CFR to Ba2, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the corporate family rating
(CFR) and the ratings of all debt instruments issued (or
guaranteed) by Telecom Italia S.p.A. and its subsidiaries to
Ba2/(P)Ba2 from Ba1/(P)Ba1. Concurrently, Moody's has downgraded to
Ba2-PD from Ba1-PD the company's probability of default rating
(PDR). The outlook is negative.

"The downgrade reflects our expectation that Telecom Italia will
remain adversely affected by a very competitive operating
environment in Italy which will further constrain the company's
ability to strengthen cash flow generation and reduce leverage,"
says Carlos Winzer, a Moody's Senior Vice President and lead
analyst for Telecom Italia.

"In addition, we expect further investments in Brazil together with
the restored dividend policy and the increasing complexity of the
group structure to translate into higher business and financial
risks. We expect the company's net adjusted leverage to peak at
4.2x in 2020 and improve towards 3.7x by 2022, exceeding the 3.5x
maximum leverage tolerance for the previous rating," adds Mr.
Winzer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of Telecom Italia's ratings to Ba2 from Ba1 reflects
the combination of three main factors: (1) the challenging
operating environment both in the fixed and mobile
telecommunications segments in Italy, which will continue to put
pressure on group revenues and cash flow generation, (2) the
increasing complexity of the group structure as Telecom Italia
dilutes its equity ownership in key infrastructure assets such as
FiberCop S.p.A. (58% ownership) and INWIT (17.2%), and (3) the more
aggressive financial policy associated with the 2020 decisions to
resume dividend distributions to ordinary shareholders and to
consider additional investments in Oi in Brazil, all of which
translate into higher leverage no longer commensurate with a Ba1
rating. Moody's regards the increased group complexity and more
aggressive financial policy as a governance risk under its ESG
framework.

Moody's expects that, despite recently reported improvement in
domestic key performance indicators both in fixed and mobile, the
operating environment for Telecom Italia will remain challenging,
with around 1.5% revenue decrease in 2021 and the expectation of
reaching revenue stability only by 2022. Telecom Italia's service
revenues have been severely affected by the entry of Iliad in the
Italian market in 2018. YoY Q3 2020 reported revenues and EBITDA
have declined by 12% and 18%, respectively (-5% and -7.9% organic,
like-for-like), owing to the intense competitive domestic market
and the impact from foreign currency volatility in its Brazilian
operations, adding to the deconsolidation of INWIT. Moody's notes,
however, that both mobile and fixed pricing in Italy have been
marginally improving in recent months, easing some pressure in the
domestic business, and that Sky's entrance in fixed broadband has
not had an impact on the market so far. However, the competitive
intensity may resume in the fixed broadband segment when Iliad
launches its fixed offer expected by mid-2021.

Moody's also notes management's efforts and success in executing
Telecom Italia's strategy, which was designed two years ago and
included a plan to enhance the quality of both fixed and mobile
networks, further improve cash flow by reinforcing cost cutting,
accelerating customer satisfaction and additional convergent
services to support future revenue growth.

The rating downgrade also reflects the increasing corporate
complexity of the group which, in Moody's view, complicates the
analysis of credit metrics relative to some peers and implies a
higher business risk.

Moody's notes the completion of the merger of Telecom Italia and
Vodafone Italy's towers into INWIT creating a deconsolidated Joint
Venture in which Telecom Italia only owns a 17.2% equity stake,
with additional minority shareholders, as well as the separation of
Telecom Italia's secondary network with the creation of FiberCop,
alongside the sale of a 37.5% stake to KKR and a 4.5% stake to
Fastweb. Although the company will raise approximately EUR4 billion
in cash to reduce debt as a result of these sales, it is diluting
its stakes in key infrastructure assets which benefit from a more
predictable cash flow generation capacity than service operations.
In addition, the company fully consolidates assets that it does not
fully own, including TIM Brasil (66.58%) and FiberCop (58%).
Moody's estimates that TI's 2020 leverage on a pro rata
consolidated basis would be 0.3x higher than leverage reported on a
fully consolidated basis.

Moody's expects Telecom Italia's adjusted net debt/EBITDA to peak
at 4.2x in 2020 and thereafter to improve towards 3.7x by 2022. The
restored dividend payout together with additional investments in
Brazil, and continued high capex needs in Italy will constrain the
company's free cash flow and therefore its ability to de-lever over
the next 24 months.

In calculating free cash flow for H1 2020 (most recent auditor
reviewed financial statements), Moody's has reduced cash inflow
from operating activities (CFO) by EUR516 million to EUR3,514
million. This adjustment has been made because the financing
activities section of the cash flow statement contains an outflow
of EUR516 million described as "changes in hedging and non-hedging
derivatives" which, in Moody's opinion, does not reflect an outflow
of cash. Moody's adjusted CFO of EUR3,514 million is EUR581 million
higher than EBITDA of EUR3,398 million reported for H1 2020, after
adding back EUR465 million to CFO for income taxes paid, net
interest paid and dividends received.

The Ba2 rating reflects Telecom Italia's: (1) scale and position as
the incumbent service provider in Italy, with strong market shares
in both fixed and mobile segments; (2) international
diversification in Brazil; and (3) strong operating margins and
continued focus on cost control.

Counterbalancing these strengths are: (1) highly competitive
pressures in Italy; (2) expectations of continued revenue declines
through 2022; (3) high net leverage; and (4) continued need for
capex investments which have restricted cash flow and its ability
to de-lever.

LIQUIDITY

Moody's considers Telecom Italia's liquidity position to be strong,
based on the company's cash flow generation, available cash
resources and committed credit lines, as well as an extended debt
maturity profile. The company has ample access to liquidity as a
result of (1) its current cash and marketable securities position
of around EUR3.9 billion; and (2) its EUR6.7 billion committed
credit facility that expires in January 2023. These liquidity
sources cover the company's debt maturities over the next 18 to 24
months. Moody's notes that in 2022, the company faces larger than
average debt maturities of EUR4.9 billion, which Moody's expects
will be refinanced well ahead of maturity, as well as the payment
of EUR1.7 billion worth of spectrum.

RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects Telecom Italia's high leverage
peaking at 4.2x in 2020 with only marginal improvement to around 4x
in 2021. Despite early signs of improvements, visibility still
remains low in relation to a more marked improvement in the
currently weak operating performance.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Negative pressure could be exerted on Telecom Italia's rating in
the event of (1) a material declines in its organic operating
performance relative to Moody's expectations, including low single
digit decline in revenues in 2021 with stable EBITDA, trending
towards revenue stability with some EBITDA growth in 2022; or (2)
failure to achieve a deleveraging trajectory, particularly if the
company's net adjusted debt/EBITDA remains above 3.75x by 2022,
with no prospect of improvement. In addition, downward pressure
would also be exerted on the rating if concerns about the strength
of the group's liquidity arise.

Conversely, Moody's could consider a rating upgrade if Telecom
Italia's operating performance materially improves and exceeds the
rating agency's expectations, such that its net adjusted
debt/EBITDA remains comfortably below 3.25x on a sustained basis.

As part of the rating action, Moody's has tightened the leverage
parameters for the rating by 0.25x to reflect the increased
complexity of the group structure following the recent transactions
involving INWIT and FiberCop.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Olivetti Finance N.V.

Downgrade:

Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba2
from Ba1

Outlook Action:

Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: Telecom Italia Capital S.A.

Downgrade:

Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba2
from Ba1

Outlook action:

Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: Telecom Italia Finance, S.A.

Downgrades:

Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to
(P)Ba2 from (P)Ba1

Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba2
from Ba1

Outlook action:

Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: Telecom Italia S.p.A.

Downgrades:

Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to Ba2-PD from Ba1-PD

LT Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1

Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to (P)Ba2
from (P)Ba1

Senior Unsecured Bank Credit Facility, Downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1

Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to
(P)Ba2 from (P)Ba1

Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Ba2 from
Ba1

Outlook Action:

Outlook, Remains Negative

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was
Telecommunications Service Providers published in January 2017.

COMPANY PROFILE

Telecom Italia Group (consisting of Telecom Italia S.p.A. and its
subsidiaries) is the leading integrated telecommunications provider
in Italy. The company delivers a full range of services and
products, including telephony, data exchange, interactive content,
and information and communications technology solutions. In
addition, the group is one of the leading telecom companies in the
Brazilian mobile market, operating through its subsidiary TIM
Brasil. Vivendi SA (Baa2, Stable) and Cassa Depositi e Prestiti
S.p.A. (Baa3, Stable) are the main shareholders in Telecom Italia,
with 23.9% and 9.9% equity stakes, respectively. In 2019, Telecom
Italia reported EUR18 billion in revenue and EUR8 billion in
EBITDA, respectively.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================

CONSOLIDATED ENERGY: Moody's Downgrades CFR to B2
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Consolidated Energy Finance,
S.A.'s corporate family rating (CFR) to B2 from B1. Concurrently
Moody's has downgraded the ratings of CEF's backed senior unsecured
notes and backed senior secured bank credit facility to B3 and B1
from B2 and Ba3, respectively.

Going forward Moody's will maintain a corporate family rating and a
probability of default rating (PDR) at the level of CEF's parent
and topco of the restricted group, Consolidated Energy Limited
(CEL). Consequently, Moody's has assigned a B2 CFR and a B2-PD to
CEL. The outlook on CEF changed to negative from ratings under
review. The outlook on CEL is negative. This rating action
concludes the rating review for downgrade that was initiated on
November 10, 2020.

With the CFR and PDR now assigned at the level of Consolidated
Energy Limited, Moody's will withdraw the CFR at the level of
Consolidated Energy Finance, S.A.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of Consolidated Energy Finance, S.A.'s ratings
reflects Moody's expectations that credit metrics of Consolidated
Energy Limited (CEL) in 2021 will not be in line with the
requirements to maintain a B1 rating, even though 2021 should see a
considerable improvement in Moody's-adjusted gross leverage to
below 7x from 21x as of end Q3 2020 driven by significantly
improved operating performance. Even this deleveraging trajectory
positions the company weakly in the B2 rating category. The
downgrade of CEL's rating furthermore reflects the weakening of the
company's liquidity profile during 2020.

Moody's expects that CEL's EBITDA generation in 2021 will benefit
from improved average pricing for methanol through 2021 compared to
2020. Furthermore, Moody's forecast incorporates the expectation
that methanol production volumes in 2021 will benefit from
increasing production and sales volumes as the company has
restarted its M2 & M3 facilities in Trinidad & Tobago, which
combined have a nameplate capacity of around 1.1 million metric
tonnes per annum. Based on these assumptions, Moody's expects that
CEL will generate Moody's adjusted EBITDA of around $500 million in
2021 resulting in a Moody's adjusted gross leverage of below 7x.
Lower than expected sales & production volumes due to operational
issues, insufficient gas supply or prices trending down from
current levels represent a downside to this view. Absent steep
improvements in the company's operating performance. The company
will need to refinance two upcoming debt maturities in June 2022
($425 million) and September 2022 ($149 million) which could lead
to increased interest expense subject to the continued recovery and
market conditions. Moody's also notes that the company's $149
million local term loan in Trinidad is currently classified as a
current financial liability, as the company is currently not
compliant with covenants under this loan, but covenant testing
requirement has been waived until Q1-2021.

CEL's liquidity profile has substantially weakened during 2020. The
company's unrestricted cash balance as of Q3-20 was $46 million
compared to $191 million at the end of December 2019. Furthermore,
the company has drawn $74.5 million under its $225 million
revolving credit facilities (RCF) at the level of CEF, $13 million
under its RCF at the level of Natgasoline and $50 million under a
revolving credit facility provided by its ultimate shareholder
during Q3-20. During Q3-20, the company paid a $122 million
payable, which was due to its ultimate shareholder and originated
from the acquisition of a remaining minority stake in CEL's
subsidiary G2X in 2018. YTD September 2020, the company's Moody's
adjusted free cash flow (FCF) (incl. interest paid, repayment of
leases but excluding the payment to Proman Holding AG (Proman)
related to the acquisition of the G2X minority stake) was negative
at $162 million. Despite the substantial weakening of the liquidity
profile, the company's liquidity profile is still adequate,
supported by availabilities under its revolving credit facilities,
but also by its expectation that the company will be able to
generate Moody's adjusted FCF in excess of $100 million in 2021 and
positive FCF in Q4-20. Despite the company's liquidity profile
still being adequate, any underperformance to its expectation with
regards to operational cash generation or any other unexpected
payments including payments to its shareholder will reduce CEL's
financial flexibility and be negative for the rating.

Consolidated Energy Finance, S.A.'s rating positively reflects its
leading market positions in methanol, which are underpinned by its
competitive cost position as demonstrated by its high EBITDA
margins pre-2020. Its world scale methanol plants and AUM
(anhydrous ammonia, urea, ammonium nitrate, and melamine) complex
in Trinidad benefit from natural gas purchased at prices referenced
to market prices of methanol, thereby somewhat mitigating the
negative impact of volatile end product selling prices on its
profitability. CEL's rating also reflects the company's operating
leverage, which will lead to an immediate earnings recovery as soon
as methanol prices increase. CEL's rating also reflects the
company's complex capital structure with debt at various levels of
the group.

LIQUIDTY PROFILE

The company's liquidity profile is adequate. Internal sources
consist of unrestricted cash of $46 million as of Q3 2020, and $150
million of availability under its $225 million revolving credit
facility at the level of CEL and $32 million availability under the
Natgasoline revolving credit facility, available to cater liquidity
needs at the level of Natgasoline. In combination with forecasted
FFO generation of around $300 million in 2021 those sources should
be sufficient to cover capital expenditures of around $100 million,
operating lease repayments of around $20 million, day to day cash
needs (which Moody's estimates to be around 3% of annual sales) and
to accommodate unexpected swings in working capital during 2021.
Moody's rating incorporates the expectation that the company will
meet the covenant requirement under its revolving credit facility
at all times.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

CEL is 100% owned by Proman Holding AG, which in turn is privately
owned. Privately owned companies tend to have less independent
board representation compared to listed companies. Proman Holding
AG has other operations outside of CEL, as well as additional cash
resources and outstanding indebtedness. The CEL perimeter
represents a material part of its shareholders' operations. CEL's
operations and the operations of its shareholder are highly
interdependent, entities controlled or related to Proman Holding AG
provide distribution, logistics and manufacturing services to CEL
at arms- length, resulting in substantial related party
transactions. In the past, Proman Holding AG has demonstrated its
willingness to support CEL through equity contributions or
deferring the purchase price consideration for the minority stake
in G2X, which CEL acquired from a Proman entity in 2018. CEL is
holding minority shares in ammonia producers N2000 and CNC, with
Proman also holding minority shares in these companies. In Moody's
view the group and capital structure of Proman/CEL is complex,
although Moody's notes that has recently been simplified, and the
repayment of the deferred purchase price consideration for the G2X
minority stake, at a time of increased cash needs of CEL due to the
weak operating environment, has contributed to the weakening of
CEL's liquidity profile, while at the same time its parent provided
a new unsecured $50 million RCF due 2027 to CEL.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on CEL's B2 rating highlights its weak
positioning in the B2 rating category and the risks that CEL's
leverage, in case of lower-than-expected production volumes or
weaker than expected average methanol prices in 2021 will remain
above 7x and the company will not be able to improve its liquidity
profile.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Moody's could consider downgrading CEL's rating, if the company
fails to reduce leverage to below 6x at midcycle conditions
(defined as the moving average methanol price for the last five
years) on a sustainable basis or in case of a further weakening of
the company's liquidity profile. CEL's rating could also be
downgraded if the company fails to refinance its 2022 maturities at
least one year ahead of maturities or publicly commits to viable
refinancing plan at least one year ahead of maturity.

Although unlikely at this stage, Moody's could upgrade CEL's
rating, if the company reduces leverage to below 5x at midcycle
conditions with EBITDA to Interest Expense close to 4x and the
company strengthens its liquidity profile.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Consolidated Energy Finance, S.A.'s outstanding senior unsecured
bonds are rated B3, one notch below the B2 CFR, reflecting the
priority ranking of the senior secured term facilities and the $225
million revolving credit facility which are rated B1. It also
reflects the structural subordination of CEF's creditors to those
of its US based operating subsidiary Natgasoline which is not a
guarantor to CEF's bonds and whose financial debt is largely
secured against respective assets. The rating of the senior secured
term facilities is B1, one notch above CEL's CFR, because of their
priority ranking in the capital structure.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Chemical
Industry published in March 2019.



===========
N O R W A Y
===========

NORWEGIAN AIR: Shareholders Endorse Financial Rescue Plan
---------------------------------------------------------
Victoria Klesty at Reuters reports that Norwegian Air's
shareholders endorsed the airline's financial rescue plan on Dec.
17 in a series of votes, one of several hurdles the heavily
indebted company must clear to survive the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to Reuters, Norwegian Air now faces difficult
negotiations with creditors as it tries to reduce its debt and
liabilities of NOK66.8 billion (US$7.8 billion).  It must also find
investors and lenders willing to put up fresh cash, Reuters
discloses.

The airline obtained creditor protection this month from courts in
Norway and Ireland, giving it some breathing space as it seeks to
convert debt into equity, Reuters recounts.

Norwegian's main aircraft-owning subsidiaries are Irish and its
parent company, Norwegian Air ASA, is registered in Norway.

The company aims, with the help of the courts in both countries, to
emerge by Feb. 26 as a smaller but more efficient airline with
fewer planes, less debt and more equity, Reuters states.

More than 80% of Norwegian's owners voted in favor of letting the
board raise up to NOK4 billion from a sale of shares or hybrid
instruments, Reuters notes.

If the sale fails, Norwegian has said it could run out of cash by
the end of March, according to Reuters.

Norwegian Chief Financial Officer Geir Karlsen said The airline now
needs to give assurances in parallel court restructurings in
Ireland and Norway that it can get access to sufficient capital,
Reuters relates.




===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

ALLANDER PRINT: Enters Administration, 40 Jobs Affected
-------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that an Edinburgh-based commercial printing firm
has gone into administration, with the loss of 40 jobs.

According to BBC, the company collapsed this week after suffering
"unsustainable cash flow problems" as a result of Covid-19
restrictions.

Administrators from FRP Advisory have since sold Allander's assets
to another Edinburgh firm, Tempus IME, BBC relates.

Tempus provides digital design, print, marketing and communications
services to blue-chip businesses, BBC discloses.



BREATHER: US, UK Units File for Separate Insolvency Processes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Meagan Simpson at BetaKit reports that the United States and United
Kingdom subsidiaries of Montreal-based flexible workspace company
Breather have reportedly filed for separate insolvency processes,
amid financial troubles and significant downsizing happening at the
startup.

The subsidiaries filed for insolvency this week, around the same
time Breather decided to pull out of hundreds of leases, BetaKit
relays, citing The Globe and Mail.  The 315 office spaces Breather
leased in the US and 40 in the UK will be assigned to third parties
to "wind them down" and repay creditors, BetaKit discloses.
Breather is also reportedly looking to get out of the 79 leases it
has in Canada within the next 90 days, BetaKit notes.

At the same time, The Globe reports Breather furloughed the
majority of its 120 employees this year, with plans to decrease
that to just 30 staff, BetaKit relates.  Breather CEO Bryan Murphy
told the publication the goal now is to rebuild Breather with a
focus on technology rather than leasing spaces, BetaKit states.

Breather, BetaKit says, has been heavily affected by the COVID-19
pandemic; timing that did not bode well for a company that was
already facing financial troubles in 2019.

In December of last year, Breather laid off around 17% of its then
200 staff, BetaKit recounts.  BetaKit later discovered the layoffs
were part of a larger plan to get the company to profitability by
2021, BetaKit discloses.  They were also connected to overspending
within the company, which had run through US$120 million USD of the
US$122 million it had raised in venture funding at the time,
according to BetaKit.

Mr. Murphy, who had joined Breather in January 2019 with the goal
of pivoting the company and creating a path to profitability, told
BetaKit last year that he saw massive opportunity in the industry
for Breather to grow.  Unfortunately, the onset of COVID-19 appears
to have affected those plans, with major office shutdowns across
many of Breather's markets, BetaKit discloses.

Breather was founded in Montreal in 2012, and enabled tenants to
find, book, pay and access private spaces in 10 markets around the
world, including meeting and private office space.


IDEAL MODULAR: Bought Out of Administration in Pre-Pack Deal
------------------------------------------------------------
Business Sale reports that Liverpool-based modular housing firm
Ideal Modular Homes has been acquired in a pre-pack administration
after running into cashflow difficulties.

According to Business Sale, the company has been acquired by newly
formed IDMH from administrators Quantuma and trading will continue
uninterrupted.

IDMH is headed by Tom White, a former board member of Ideal Modular
who will now become the company's new CEO, and Christopher Snape,
an Ideal Modular shareholder, Business Sale discloses.  The new
owners' pre-existing connection to the firm mean that this is the
sort of pre-pack acquisition that may face greater scrutiny once
proposed new regulations come in next year, Business Sale notes.

Ideal Modular Homes was established in 2017 and had become a
high-profile operator in the emerging modular homes market.
However, the firm was impacted by the COVID-19 crisis which forced
it to close operations in the initial spring lockdown, Business
Sale states.

The company received a CBILS cash injection in June and, in August,
was part of a consortium that won a GBP300 million contract to
build 750 affordable rent council homes in the London borough of
Greenwich, Business Sale recounts.

In spite of this, Ideal Modular's COVID-related struggles were
compacted when the company received a pay-less notice in regard to
"sizeable payment application" from a customer in September,
Business Sale relays.  According to Business Sale, the
administrators said the lower payment impacted the company's
ability to borrow money, ultimately leading to its administration.


LONDON CAPITAL: FCA Failed to Supervise, Regulate Company
---------------------------------------------------------
Kevin Peachey at BBC News reports that the City regulator failed to
"effectively supervise and regulate" London Capital and Finance
(LCF) which collapsed with losses for investors.

Bank of England governor Andrew Bailey, who was running the
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), has apologized to those who lost
life savings, BBC relates.

Some 11,625 people invested a total of GBP237 million with LCF
before it collapsed into administration in January 2019, BBC
discloses.

Many lost all their investment, but may now receive one-off
compensation, BBC notes.

"The scheme will assess whether there is a justification for
further one-off compensation payments in certain circumstances for
some LCF bondholders," BBC quotes economic secretary to the
Treasury John Glen as saying.

According to BBC, former Court of Appeal judge, Dame Elizabeth
Gloster, who wrote the review, said the FCA's failure to regulate
properly was due to "significant gaps and weaknesses" in its
practices and policies at a time when it was run by Mr. Bailey who
was chief executive at the FCA before becoming the Bank of
England's governor.

The report said the FCA's "flawed approach" allowed LCF to look
respectable, even regarding its non-regulated products, BBC
relates.

Many people who put money in to LCF were first-time investors,
including inheritance recipients, small business owners or newly
retired, BBC discloses.

They believed they were putting their money into safe, secure
fixed-rate ISAs, approved by the FCA, according to BBC.  In fact,
LCF was approved, but the products -- which were high-risk
mini-bonds -- were not, BBC states.

LCF offered returns of around 8% on three-year mini-bonds, BBC
notes.

The FCA ordered LCF to withdraw its marketing and, following
further investigation, then froze LCF's assets leading the company
to collapse into administration, BBC recounts.

According to BBC, a report by the administrators said there were a
number of "highly suspicious transactions" involving a "small group
of connected people" which led to large sums of investors' money
ending up in their "personal possession or control".

Many investors face the possibility of losing most, if not all, of
their money, BBC says.

Several independent financial advisers said they warned the FCA,
some as far back as 2015, about what they felt were "misleading,
inaccurate and not clear" adverts, often promoted on social media,
BBC relates.


PRECISE MORTGAGE 2018-1B: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on Cl. E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of six notes in
Paragon Second Funding Limited, Precise Mortgage Funding 2018-1B
plc and Precise Mortgage Funding 2018-2B plc. The rating action
reflects better than expected collateral performance and the
increased levels of credit enhancement for the affected notes.

Moody's affirmed the ratings of the notes that had sufficient
credit enhancement to maintain the current rating on the affected
notes.

Issuer: Paragon Second Funding Limited

GBP1,229M Class A Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec
23, 2014 Assigned A2 (sf)

Issuer: Precise Mortgage Funding 2018-1B plc

GBP222.7M Class A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 24,
2018 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

GBP7.38M Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 24,
2018 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

GBP7.38M Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jan 24,
2018 Definitive Rating Assigned A1 (sf)

GBP4.92M Class D Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan
24, 2018 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

GBP3.69M Class E Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jan 24,
2018 Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Issuer: Precise Mortgage Funding 2018-2B PLC

GBP338.9M Class A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 20,
2018 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

GBP11.23M Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar
20, 2018 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

GBP11.23M Class C Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Mar
20, 2018 Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

GBP7.49M Class D Notes, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 20,
2018 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

GBP5.62M Class E Notes, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Mar 20,
2018 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action is prompted by an increase in credit enhancement
for the affected tranches and decreased key collateral assumptions,
namely the portfolio Expected Loss (EL) assumptions due to better
than expected collateral performance.

Increase/Decrease in Available Credit Enhancement

Sequential amortization and significant paydown led to the increase
in the credit enhancement available in the three transactions.

For Paragon Second Funding Limited, the credit enhancement for the
most senior tranche affected by the rating action increased to 8.6%
from 5.7% since rating date (Dec 2014).

For Precise Mortgage Funding 2018-1B plc, the credit enhancement
for the most senior tranche affected by the rating action increased
to 12.9% from 8.0% since closing.

For Precise Mortgage Funding 2018-2B plc, the credit enhancement
for the most senior tranche affected by the rating action increased
to 12.4% from 8.0% since closing.

Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions

As part of the rating action, Moody's reassessed its lifetime loss
expectation for the portfolio reflecting the collateral performance
to date.

In Paragon Second Funding Limited, cumulative losses currently
stand at 0.76% of original pool balance since Dec 2015. Moody's
maintained the expected loss assumption to 2.10% as a percentage of
pool balance as of rating date (Dec 2014).

In Precise Mortgage Funding 2018-1B plc, cumulative losses
currently stand at 0% of original pool balance. Moody's decreased
the expected loss assumption to 1.15% as a percentage of original
pool balance from 2% due to the improving performance.

In Precise Mortgage Funding 2018-2B plc, cumulative losses
currently stand at 0% of original pool balance. Moody's decreased
the expected loss assumption to 1.25% as a percentage of original
pool balance from 2% due to the improving performance.

Moody's has also assessed loan-by-loan information as a part of its
detailed transaction review to determine the credit support
consistent with target rating levels and the volatility of future
losses. As a result, Moody's has maintained the MILAN CE assumption
at 13% in Paragon Second Funding Limited plc and 12% in Precise
Mortgage Funding 2018-1B plc and Precise Mortgage Funding 2018-2B
plc.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Its analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
consumer assets from the current weak UK economic activity and a
gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

Counterparty Exposure

The rating actions took into consideration the notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as servicer, account banks or swap
providers.

Moody's considered the lack of liquidity available in Paragon
Second Funding Limited in case of servicer default and that there
is no estimation language allowing waterfall payments to be
computed from servicer reports. As a result, the rating of the
class A notes of Paragon Second Funding Limited are constrained by
financial disruption risk.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in May
2020.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include: (1) performance of the underlying collateral that
is better than Moody's expected; (2) an increase in available
credit enhancement; (3) improvements in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties; and (4) a decrease in sovereign risk.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include: (1) an increase in sovereign risk; (2) performance
of the underlying collateral that is worse than Moody's expected;
(3) deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement; and
(4) deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Hospitals, Health and People
---------------------------------------------
Author: Albert W. Snoke, M.D.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 232 pages
List Price: $34.95
Order your personal copy today at
http://www.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/hospitals_health_and_people.html

Hospitals, Health and People is an interesting and very readable
account of the career of a hospital administrator and physician
from the 1930's through the 1980's, the formative years of today's
health care system. Although much has changed in hospital
administration and health care since the book was first published
in 1987, Dr. Snoke's discussion of the evolution of the modern
hospital provides a unique and very valuable perspective for
readers who wish to better understand the forces at work in our
current health care system.

The first half of Hospitals, Health and People is devoted to the
functional parts of the hospital system, as observed by Dr. Snoke
between the late 1930's through 1969, when he served first as
assistant director of the Strong Memorial Hospital in Rochester,
New York, and then as the director of the Grace-New Haven Hospital
in Connecticut. In these first chapters, Dr. Snoke examines the
evolution and institutionalization of a number of aspects of the
hospital system, including the financial and community
responsibilities of the hospital administrator, education and
training in hospital administration, the role of the governing
board of a hospital, the dynamics between the hospital
administrator and the medical staff, and the unique role of the
teaching hospital.

The importance of Hospitals, Health and People for today's readers
is due in large part to the author's pivotal role in creating the
modern-day hospital. Dr. Snoke and others in similar positions
played a large part in advocating or forcing change in our hospital
system, particularly in recognizing the importance of the nursing
profession and the contributions of non-physician professionals,
such as psychologists, hearing and speech specialists, and social
workers, to the overall care of the patient. Throughout the first
chapters, there are also many observations on the factors that are
contributing to today's cost of care. Malpractice is just one
example. According to Dr. Snoke, "malpractice premiums were
negligible in the 1950's and 1960's. In 1970, Yale-New Haven's
annual malpractice premiums had mounted to about $150,000." By the
time of the first publication of the book, the hospital's premiums
were costing about $10 million a year.

In the second half of Hospitals, Health and People, Dr. Snoke
addresses the national health care system as we've come to know it,
including insurance and cost containment; the role of the
government in health care; health care for the elderly; home health
care; and the changing role of ethics in health care. It is
particularly interesting to note the role that Senator Wilbur Mills
from Arkansas played in the allocation of costs of hospital-based
specialty components under Part B rather than Part A of the
Medicare bill. Dr. Snoke comments: "This was considered a great
victory by the hospital-based specialists. I was disappointed
because I knew it would cause confusion in working relationships
between hospitals and specialists and among patients covered by
Medicare. I was also concerned about potential cost increases. My
fears were realized. Not only have health costs increased in
certain areas more than anticipated, but confusion is rampant among
the elderly patients and their families, as well as in hospital
business offices and among physicians' secretaries." This aspect of
Medicare caused such confusion that Congress amended Medicare in
1967 to provide that the professional components of radiological
and pathological in-hospital services be reimbursed as if they were
hospital services under Part A rather than part of the co-payment
provisions of Part B.

At the start of his book, Dr. Snoke refers to a small statue,
Discharged Cured, which was given to him in the late 1940's by a
fellow physician, Dr. Jack Masur. Dr. Snoke explains the
significance the statue held for him throughout his professional
career by quoting from an article by Dr. Masur: "The whole question
of the responsibility of the physician, of the hospital, of the
health agency, brings vividly to mind a small statue which I saw a
great many years ago.it is a pathetic little figure of a man, coat
collar turned up and shoulders hunched against the chill winds,
clutching his belongings in a paper bag-shaking, tremulous,
discouraged. He's clearly unfit for work-no employer would dare to
take a chance on hiring him. You know that he will need much more
help before he can face the world with shoulders back and
confidence in himself. The statuette epitomizes the task of medical
rehabilitation: to bridge the gap between the sick and a job."

It is clear that Dr. Snoke devoted his life to exactly that
purpose. Although there is much to criticize in our current
healthcare system, the wellness concept that we expect and accept
today as part of our medical care was almost nonexistent when Dr.
Snoke began his career in the 1930's. Throughout his 50 years in
hospital administration, Dr. Snoke frequently had to focus on the
big picture and the bottom line. He never forgot the importance of
Discharged Cured, however, and his book provides us with a great
appreciation of how compassionate administrators such as Dr. Snoke
have contributed to the state of patient care today.

Albert Waldo Snoke was director of the Grace-New Haven Hospital in
New Haven, Connecticut from 1946 until 1969. In New Haven, Dr.
Snoke also taught hospital administration at Yale University and
oversaw the development of the Yale-New Haven Hospital, serving as
its executive director from 1965-1968. From 1969-1973, Dr. Snoke
worked in Illinois as coordinator of health services in the Office
of the Governor and later as acting executive director of the
Illinois Comprehensive State Health Planning Agency. Dr. Snoke died
in April 1988.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2020.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                * * * End of Transmission * * *